On the Passions

Prooemium.

[After St. Thomas, I. IIae, from q. 22 to q. 48, had discussed the acts proper to man whereby the last end can be attained, from q. 22 to q. 48 he discusses the acts common to man and other animals, which are called passions; for inasmuch as they are subject politically to the empire of reason, they participate something of its regulation and of morality, and can conduce to the last end or turn away from it: whence the governing of them occupies a great part of the virtues, and from their disordination many vices spring up. Because however there are no grave controversies about this matter, and it is scarcely treated in the schools, although it matters greatly that tyros of theology not be ignorant of it, therefore we shall run through it summarily, yet sufficiently. Likewise of the virtues, of which the holy Doctor treats from q. 55 to 70, we shall say little, for the same reasons. Therefore all things which we shall say of the passions and virtues we shall embrace compendiously in a twofold dissertation.]

{ Question is asked 1° what passion is.

I answer. Common is the sense of all, that passion is an act of sensitive appetite whereby one is affected toward something or flees from it. But why, since it is an act, is it called passion? The reason is, because that act is apt to cause a transmutation in the natural disposition of the body, which transmutation inflicts passion, insofar as the subject suffers by losing something.

For the understanding of this it must be observed that to suffer is said in a threefold way. In one mode, commonly and widely, according as every receiving is suffering, even if nothing be cast off from the thing, as if it be said that air suffers while it is illuminated: and in this sense intellect and cognitive sense, receiving species, can be said to suffer. In another mode it is said properly to suffer when something is received with the casting off of another. And this happens in a twofold way. For sometimes there is cast off what is unfitting to the thing, and received what is fitting: thus, when the animal body is healed, it is said to suffer, because it receives health, sickness being cast off. Sometimes, conversely, it happens while there is cast off what is fitting to the thing, and received what is unfitting: thus to be sick is said to suffer, because infirmity is received, health^{1 1} Here q. 22, a. 1, o.

cast off. And this third mode is the most proper mode of passion.

Whence Augustine says, lib. IX de Civit., c. 4, n. 1: « Those motions of soul which the Greeks call πάθη, but some of ours, as Cicero, perturbations, some affections or affects, others truly, as this one [Apuleius] more expressively from the Greek, call passions. » Such motions therefore are most rightly called passions, and passion is defined by the Angelic Doctor¹ from Damascene in lib. II de Fide orthod., c. 22: « Motion of the sensible appetitive power, upon imagination of good and evil; » that is: Motion of sensitive appetite from imagination of good and evil, with bodily transmutation. ¹ Here q. 22, a. 3, in arg. Sed contra et o.

It is called motion, that is act or operation, and holds the place of genus; of sensitive appetite, because that appetite is its subject; from imagination of good or evil, whereby its principle is signified; with bodily transmutation, which distinguishes such motion from the motions of the will, which since it is not affixed to a corporeal organ, moves not itself with bodily transmutation, and from the motion of the sensitive cognitive part, which, although affixed to a corporeal organ, does not per se transmute the body physically, but only intentionally. But passion transmutes the body physically, at least the heart²; for in every passion something is added to or diminished from the natural motion of the heart, insofar as the heart is moved more intensely or more remissly according to systole and diastole. ² Here q. 24, a. 2, ad 2

Passion therefore imports two things³, namely the act of the soul, which stands as it were formal, and the bodily transmutation, which stands as it were material, from which nevertheless passion is named. If the first be wanting, there will be purely bodily passion; if the second be wanting, there will be no passion, but simply a motion or operation of the soul. ³ Q. 6 de Veritate, a. 2, ad 5.

Question is asked 2° how many passions there are.

I answer. There are eleven passions, six in the concupiscible appetite and five in the irascible appetite.

In the concupiscible appetite are: love, or inclination into good apprehended simply, whose contrary is hatred, or aversion from evil simply; desire, or inclination into good apprehended as absent, but future, having as contrary flight, or aversion from evil apprehended as absent, but future; joy, which is also called pleasure or delight, or repose in good apprehended and really possessed, and it has as contrary sadness, or disquietude and languor of mind from evil apprehended and actually pressing.

In the irascible appetite truly are found: hope, or motion into good apprehended as arduous, but possible of attainment, whose contrary is despair, or motion away from good apprehended as arduous and impossible of attainment; daring, or motion into good apprehended as terrible and imminent, but as surmountable, having as contrary fear, or dejection of mind from evil apprehended as terrible and imminent, and not avoidable; anger, or vehement inclination to vindicate, that is to inflict harm upon the cause by which the evil unto which we are subjected was inflicted, and of this passion there is no contrary.

The reason of this distinction¹. Since passion is an act of sensitive appetite, it is divided according to the division of appetite. Sensitive appetite is twofold, concupiscible and irascible; for in animals, as in other natural things, there is not only inclination to pursue what is convenient, but also to resist contraries and impediments. The first inclination in an animal is called concupiscible appetite, the second irascible appetite. The object of the concupiscible is sensible good or evil precisely as such, the object of the irascible is arduous good or evil. If therefore the concupiscible appetite tend toward good or evil simply, abstracting whether it be present or absent, in respect of good it is love, in respect of evil hatred; if it tend toward absent good or evil, in respect of good it is desire, in respect of evil flight; if it be occupied about present good or evil, in respect of good it is joy, in respect of evil sadness. But if the irascible appetite tend toward arduous and difficult good, either that good is possible of attainment, and hope is born, or it is impossible of attainment, and despair arises; if it flee arduous evil, either that evil is easy to repel, and daring rises up, or it is difficult to repel, and fear appears; or finally it is occupied about present evil to be avenged, and anger is provoked, to which no passion is opposed. ¹ Here q. 23, a. 1, o; 1° p., q. 81, a. 2, o.

Hence you have that passions of the concupiscible differ from passions of the irascible in this, that passions of the concupiscible bear upon opposite objects; for they tend into good or recede from evil: but passions of the irascible bear upon the same object with contrary motions.

Question is asked 3° for what reason anger has not, like the rest, an opposite passion.

I answer. Passions of the concupiscible are mutually opposed according to the contrariety of objects, namely good and evil; but in passions of the irascible there is held a twofold contrariety: one indeed, as in the passions of the concupiscible, of good and evil, as between hope and fear; but the other contrariety is according to access and recess relative to the same term, as between hope and despair, between daring and fear. Of anger says St. Thomas here q. 23, a. 3, o: « It is singular in the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary, neither according to access and recess, nor according to the contrariety of good and evil. » And the holy Doctor brings this reason: « For anger is caused from difficult evil now pressing, at whose presence it is necessary that either the appetite succumb, and so sadness does not issue forth beyond its terms, which is a passion of the concupiscible, or it have motion toward invading the harmful evil, which pertains to anger. But it cannot have motion toward fleeing, because the evil is already posited present or past. And thus to the motion of anger no passion is contrary according to the contrariety of access and recess. Likewise also nor according to the contrariety of good and evil, because to evil already pressing is opposed good already attained, which can no longer have the reason of arduous or difficult, nor after the attainment of good does there remain any other motion than the quieting of appetite in the good attained, which pertains to joy, the passion of the concupiscible contrary to sadness; nor is merely cessation from motion opposed to it, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, that to grow mild is opposed to being angry; which is not a contrary opposition [as motion is opposed to motion], but negative or privative [as cessation of motion is opposed to motion]. »

Question is asked 4° whether passions can be good or bad.

I answer. 1. Passions of the soul can be considered in a twofold way: in one mode, in themselves; in another mode, insofar as they lie under the empire of reason and will. If therefore they be considered in themselves, namely as certain motions of irrational appetite, thus there is not in them moral good or evil, which depends upon reason; but if they be considered insofar as they lie under the empire of reason and will, thus there is in them moral good or evil. For sensitive appetite is nearer to reason itself and will than the exterior members, whose motions and acts nevertheless are morally good or bad, insofar as they are voluntary. Whence much more the passions themselves, insofar as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or bad. But they are voluntary, either from this that they are commanded by the will, or from this that they are not prohibited by the will.

But then they are good when they are moderated by reason; bad, when they are beyond the order of reason². Hence Christ, having no sin, employed passions where he judged according to reason that they should be employed, thus Marc., III, 5, he looked round about with anger; ibid., XIV, 34, his soul was sad even unto death; Luc., XIX, 41, he wept over Jerusalem; Joann., XI, 33 and 34, he troubled himself and wept. And the Apostle, Rom., XII, 15, commands to rejoi- ² Ibid., a. 2, o.

^{1 1} Here q. 24, a. 1, o.

ce with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep. And that is the common sense of men, that punishment can rightly be feared, good loved, evil fled, and deservedly; since sensitive appetite is from God as author of nature, there cannot fail to be some acts of it good, if they be regulated and commanded by reason.

But the rule and moderation of reason is attended to, not precisely according to intension or remission of passion, but according as, object and circumstances considered, right reason demands it intensified or remitted. Therefore not always does he sin who vehemently grows angry, or grieves, or fears, but he who exceeds what right reason demands in these or those circumstances. Whence Moses, Exod., XXXII, 19, is read to have been greatly angered on account of the adoration of the calf; Num., XXV, 11, the zeal and indignation of Phinees is praised; I Reg., II and IV, Heli is reprehended because he was not sufficiently indignant at his sons; finally Christ himself, as we already said, was saddened even unto death.

Question is asked 5° whether passion, while cooperating with reason and will, diminish or augment the goodness of the moral act.

Before the response, note that passions of the soul can stand in a twofold way toward will and reason, namely antecedently and consequently, and this latter in a twofold way¹: 1° by way of redundancy; for when the superior part of the soul is intensely moved into something, the inferior part follows her motion; 2° by way of election, namely when man from judgment of reason elects to be affected with some passion, that he operate more promptly and fervently, the sensitive appetite cooperating. This noted, ¹ Ibid., a. 3, ad 1.

I answer. 1° Passion antecedent to reason and will diminishes the goodness of the act, because it obscures the judgment of reason, whence depends the goodness of the moral act; for it is more laudable that one do the work of charity from judgment of reason than from mere passion of mercy². ² Ibid.

2° Passion consequent upon will by way of redundancy is a sign of intenser will, and thus indicates greater moral goodness, yet does not augment it¹. ¹ Ibid.

3° Passion consequent by way of election augments the goodness of the act²; because, since the good of man consists in reason as in root, so much the more perfect is that good, the more widely it extends to the many things that suit man: whence no one doubts that to the perfection of moral good pertains that the acts of exterior members be directed by rule of reason. But sensitive appetite can obey reason, as was said. Therefore to perfection of moral good pertains that even the passions themselves of the soul be regulated by reason. Therefore as it is better that man both will good and do it by exterior act, so also is it better that man be moved toward good according to will and according to sensitive appetite, according to that of Psal. LXXXIII, 3: My heart and my flesh exulted in the living God; which is to be understood thus, that we take heart for the intellective appetite, flesh however for the sensitive appetite.] ² Ibid. et o.