On the quality and necessity of restitution

Restitution is the giving back of a thing received, or compensation for damage inflicted.

Restitution differs from payment and satisfaction. From payment: because payment requires that the thing paid be different from the thing for which it is paid, and that it has not yet been in the possession of him to whom it is paid. Restitution, however, does not require that the thing restored be different from the thing for which it is restored; rather it requires that it be the same, as far as possible, or at least equivalent, and consequently it requires, of itself, that it has already been in the possession of him to whom it is restored. Hence he who gives back a deposit truly restitutes, yet does not pay; on the contrary, he who gives money for wheat bought properly pays, yet does not restitute.

From satisfaction restitution is distinguished³⁴⁰ : 1° because satisfaction properly regards the person to whom satisfaction is made, although it does not exhibit the equivalent of the debt; restitution, however, regards the thing, which must be given back the same or the equivalent. 2° Satisfaction regards the injury inflicted or the honor violated, even if no other damage has been inflicted; restitution, however, regards the damage inflicted. ³⁴⁰ In IV Sentent., dist. 5, q. 1, a. 5, quaestiunc. 1.

I say 1°: Restitution is an act of commutative justice³⁴¹ : because it belongs to commutative justice to establish equality of thing to thing between what is given and what is received, between loss and compensation. Now this is done through restitution. Therefore. ³⁴¹ Here q. 62, a. 1, c.

You will say : The violation of distributive justice obliges to restitution. Therefore restitution is an act of distributive justice. — The consequence is evident. An act destroying a virtue is repaired by the opposite act, as the act of intemperance by temperance. — It is proved of the antecedent. He who distributes common goods badly sins against distributive justice. Now he is bound to restitution. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. — To the proof, I distinguish the major. He who distributes common goods badly sins against distributive justice alone, I deny; at the same time also against commutative justice, at least regularly, I concede. — In this sense, I distinguish the minor. He is bound to restitution, insofar as he violates commutative justice, I concede the minor; insofar as he violates distributive justice, I deny the minor. For things owed to particular persons from distributive justice alone are not owed to them simply, as proper and their own, but only in a certain respect, by reason of condignity and of the community of which they are parts, as I said above, dissert. IV, a. 2. Whence they have no right in re to those things, nor to the thing itself, such that they could reclaim them in court as their own. Wherefore, if they are defrauded of them, from this heading they ought not to be restored to them more than those things ought to be restored which are owed from religion, or gratitude, or other potential parts of justice.

Yet it rarely happens that distributive justice has no commutative justice annexed to it. For he who distributes common goods to particular persons either is hired for a stipend for just distribution, or designated by office or pact, for which therefore he is bound from commutative justice. Whence, if he distributes badly, he sins first against distributive justice, inasmuch as he does not distribute the common goods to particular persons according to the proportion of merits; second he sins against commutative justice, not indeed by damaging particular persons in what is their own proper, or by retaining what is strictly theirs, but by omitting the appropriation or the just distribution according to merits, to which from his office, and consequently from commutative justice, he was bound.

I say 2°: The restitution of a thing unjustly taken away, or of damage unjustly inflicted, in the thing where possible, otherwise in vow, is necessary for salvation³⁴² . ³⁴² Ibid., a. 2, c.

It is proved,³⁴³ 1° from Scripture. Matt., XXII, 21 : Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Rom., XII, 7 : Render therefore to all men their debts. ³⁴³ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

It is proved 2° from Augustine, Epist. 153³⁴⁴, which is to Macedonius and is cited, c. Si res aliena, causa 14, q. 6 : « If the thing of another on account of which sin was committed is not restored when it can be restored, penance is not practiced, but feigned; but if it is practiced truthfully, sin is not forgiven unless what was taken away is restored; but, as I said, when it can be restored. » ³⁴⁴ Formerly 34.

It is proved 3° by reason³⁴⁵ : To preserve or not violate justice is necessary for salvation. Now he who does not restitute, when he can, what was unjustly taken away or damage unjustly inflicted does not preserve justice, but rather violates it, because he does not preserve equality. Therefore. ³⁴⁵ Here q. 62, a. 2, c.

It is confirmed. Not to steal is necessary for salvation. Now to retain what is owed to another has the same reason of harm as unjust reception³⁴⁶ . Therefore. ³⁴⁶ Here q. 66, a. 3, ad 2.

I said, « otherwise in vow; » because where restitution in the thing is impossible, one must then have the purpose of making it when it will be possible; because it is necessary for salvation that one have the purpose of keeping all the commandments of God, among which is placed the precept of restoring, or of not retaining what belongs to another unjustly, which is reduced to this precept of the Decalogue : Thou shalt not steal. On which account restitution in vow can be said to be necessary with a necessity of means for salvation.

You will ask whether the precept of restoring is affirmative or negative.

I answer. That it is affirmative according to its form; that it nevertheless implies within itself a negative, whereby we are forbidden to retain what belongs to another, as the reason of itself³⁴⁷ . ³⁴⁷ Here q. 62, a. 8, ad 1.

The first part is evident; because by an affirmative precept an act of virtue is commanded, by a negative one an act of vice is forbidden. Restitution, however, is an act of virtue.

The second part is also evident. For the reason why restitution must be made is that what belongs to another must not be retained; not so with other affirmative precepts, which although they include a negation as opposed to the affirmation, do not include it as the reason of themselves : thus, v. g., God is to be loved, not because he is not to be hated, but because he is supremely good; and so of the rest.