Preliminary Notes

Note 1° that among the various acceptations of liberty two especially are distinguished.

The first is liberty from violence or coercion, and it is called spontaneity or free inclination. It is found in all who act not compelled by external force, but from inclination, even though necessitating. With this liberty the blessed love God, and God loves himself. It extends even to brute animals, nay even to inanimate things. Thus water is said to flow spontaneously, the stone to descend downward of itself.

The second liberty is from necessity, and it is immunity not only from coercion or violence, but also from natural instinct and determination to one thing without power toward the opposite : with which liberty he enjoys who can will or not will, will this or that. It is called the liberty of indifference, because it is toward opposites. And since indifference is twofold, namely as regards specification and exercise, so liberty from necessity is twofold, namely of specification and of exercise. Liberty of exercise, which is also called liberty of contradiction, is toward an act and its omission, whereby indeed one can act and not act, love and not love. Liberty of specification is toward acts specifically diverse, which acts, if they be contraries, as to love and to hate, to sit and to stand, is called liberty of contrariety; if they be disparate acts, as to pray or to study, it is called liberty of disparity. That the liberty of the will lies in this liberty from necessity we now suppose, and we shall prove below.

Note 2° the various errors concerning free will. The Stoics denied it, from fate; the astrologers, from the influx of the stars; the Manichaeans, from a twofold soul, one good, the other evil, one of which necessarily coerced the other by this very fact that it prevailed; the Wiclefites, Lutherans and Calvinists, from original sin and from the force of necessitating grace; Baius and Jansenius¹, from the same principles. ¹ Baius said : « What is done voluntarily, although it be done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely. » This is his proposition 39, condemned by St. Pius V. « Only violence is repugnant to the liberty of man. » It is proposition 66. — Jansenius, lib. IV de Statu naturae lapsae, c. 24 : for Augustine « it is abundantly enough that the sinner... knowing and prudent, be borne into evil with full will, whether he can extricate himself from that necessity of loving the evil, or cannot. » He teaches the same in lib. IV de Gratia Christi, c. 9, that, « with carnal delectation prevailing, it is impossible that the consideration of virtue and honesty should prevail. » And he draws this also from that saying of St. Augustine which he repeats a thousand times and badly understands, in cap. v Epist. ad Galat. : « By what we are more delighted, according to that it behooves us to work, »

As regards Jansenius, it must be observed that he admits verbatim a liberty of the will compatible with necessity. He says therefore that the liberty of the will, which he calls essential, is compatible with a necessity fixed, invariable and perpetual, which can vary in no circumstances, such as that by which God loves himself, by which the blessed love God. The liberty of the will as regards the present state of man wayfarer he says subsists with a necessity not fixed and invariable, but transitory and relative, which, the present circumstances standing, relatively to a superior opposing force cannot be overcome, although absolutely and in other circumstances it could be overcome. Whence the whole liberty of the will which Jansenius acknowledges in this state of fallen nature is nothing else than alternative necessity, or turnability from one necessity to another; because wayfarers are not immovably fixed in evil, like the damned, but flexible now toward good, now toward evil, according as celestial or earthly delectation prevails, yet always necessarily : in almost the manner in which a dog now fawns, now grows angry, yet always necessarily.

^{1 1} Baius said : « What is done voluntarily, although it be done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely. » This is his proposition 39, condemned by St. Pius V. « Only violence is repugnant to the liberty of man. » It is proposition 66. — Jansenius, lib. IV de Statu naturae lapsae, c. 24 : for Augustine « it is abundantly enough that the sinner... knowing and prudent, be borne into evil with full will, whether he can extricate himself from that necessity of loving the evil, or cannot. » He teaches the same in lib. IV de Gratia Christi, c. 9, that, « with carnal delectation prevailing, it is impossible that the consideration of virtue and honesty should prevail. » And he draws this also from that saying of St. Augustine which he repeats a thousand times and badly understands, in cap. v Epist. ad Galat. : « By what we are more delighted, according to that it behooves us to work, »

On the other hand the Pelagians erred concerning free will, extolling it too much. They said 1° that it avails toward good just as toward evil without the grace of God; 2° that it cannot stand together with the necessity of preventing grace; 3° that Jesus was in no way touched by the sin of Adam, which they denied was transmitted to posterity; but that, placed as it were in equilibrium, he had equal indifference and facility either toward good or toward evil, as in the state of innocence; 4° they wished the power of sinning to belong to the essence of liberty.

Note 3° that there is a twofold root of liberty, one external, the other intrinsic. The intrinsic root of liberty is the supreme efficacy of the divine will¹ ; because, since God is the most universal cause of all being and all its modes, and the liberty of the will, both potential and actual, is one of its modes and perfections, as well as of all its actions, it plainly follows that liberty flows from the efficacy of the divine will, as from an external root. ¹ Ia p., q. 19, a. 8, c.

The intrinsic root of liberty is threefold. The first and remote is the very condition of intellectual nature² , which, on account of its immateriality, obtains that capacity that, without alteration of itself, it can receive within itself the forms of all things and become all things in intentional being. Hence follows the universality of the intellect, by which it can know all things, search them out, examine them, turn itself in all directions, judge of them what is to be fled, what pursued, likewise reflect upon its own judgment above itself, amend it, change it and reprove it. And this is the second intrinsic root of liberty. Now upon this universal intellectual form follows the inclination of like condition, namely the will capable of every universal and infinite good, and its eminence above all particular goods. And this is the third and proximate root of liberty; for from it there results in the will dominion over its own acts, and the right of disposing of them at a nod, in which formally consists the liberty of the will. ² Ia p., q. 14, a. 1, c ; q. 82, a. 2, c ; q. 24 de Verit., a. 2 ; q. 6 de Malo, a. unico, and elsewhere.

Note 4° that among the various definitions of liberty which St. Thomas hands down, the following is more frequently used by him, and is the best¹ , namely : « The elective power of means, the order of the end being preserved. » ¹ Ia p., q. 62, a. 8, ad 3 and q. 83, a. 4, c, and elsewhere.

It is explained. It is called power, that is, faculty or active potency. It is called elective power, because from this we are said to have free will, that we can take one thing, another refused; which is to choose. It is called elective power of means, because election properly is not about the end as end² , but only about means; because election, in things doable, stands to them as conclusion stands in things speculative, and the end as principle; whence, as conclusion is not about principles, but about their consequences, so election is not about the end, but about the means to it. I said, « about the end as end; » because, as in speculative matters nothing hinders what is the principle of one demonstration from being the conclusion of another demonstration (yet the first principle among demonstrables cannot be the conclusion of another demonstration), so also it happens that what is as end in one operation is ordered to something else as to an end, and in this way the end falls under election : thus, in the operation of a physician, health stands as end, whence it does not fall under the physician's election, but he supposes it as principle; but bodily health is ordered to the good of the soul, whence for him who has care of the salvation of the soul, being healthy or being sick can fall under election. But the last end falls under election in no way, because it cannot be ordered to anything else. ² Here q. 13, a. 3, c.

It is called, the order of the end being preserved ; because free will stands to choosing those things that are toward the end as intellect stands to the conclusion. But it is manifest that it pertains to the power of the intellect that it can proceed into various conclusions according to given principles; but that it proceed into some conclusion passing over the order of principles, this is from its defect. Similarly therefore, that free will can choose various things while preserving the order of the end, this pertains to the perfection of liberty; but that it choose something turning aside from the order of the end, this pertains to the defect of liberty. Whence the liberty of the will is greater and more perfect in God, in Christ and in the angels, who cannot sin, than in us, who can sin. And hence already it is clear that the power of sinning is not of the essence of liberty, but is its blemish : of which again below.

The other definition, now very commonly circulated, of liberty, is namely : « The faculty by which, all prerequisites for acting being posited, one can act or not act. » Truly that definition is ambiguous, and put forward by those who reject physical premotions. If then it be understood of the requisites temporally prior to acting, we admit it, both in the composite and divided sense, both of consequent and antecedent potency. But if it be understood of the requisites naturally prior only to acting, we do not admit it except in the divided sense and of antecedent potency for not acting; because, in this very instant in which the requisites for acting exist naturally only, there is action, and so with requisites of this kind for acting there remains indeed a potency for not acting, but it cannot conjoin non-act with them. Whence, according to this sense, it is improperly said in the definition, « by which one can act or not act », but it ought to be said, ibid. « which actually acts with the potency of not acting. »

Therefore R. P. Franciscus Henno was gravely hallucinated when, tract. de Principiis actuum humanorum, q. 3, he wrote that Thomists teach a physical premotion, « while it stands, non-action cannot be, unless in the divided sense of premotion, that is, premotion taken away, » and similar things. This doctrine is Calvinian, not Thomistic. For the Thomists teach that, the premotion to act standing, and in the composite sense of premotion, there remains a complete and expedite potency for non-act, because premotion supposes on both sides the complete potency, and holds itself only on the side of second act.

Note 5° that it does not pertain to free will to be the first determiner.

It is evident, first, from the nature of created being, to which dependence both in being and in operating upon uncreated being is so essential that it can by no reason be torn from it; since indeed the character of created being cannot be conceived, nor any of its perfections, which does not arise from God and depend upon him. Whence God is called not only first being, but first cause, first principle, first mover, first determiner, first free; because, as no being exists except participated from him, so no cause, no mover, no determiner, no free agent, except subordinated to him. And as, if there were some being not participated from him, it would cease to be first being; so, if the will were the first mover and determiner of itself, it would cease to be first cause, first principle, first mover, first free, and a creature would be adorned with these prerogatives, and would become as it were another God; for first is said of that which supposes no other prior.

Neither say you, with the adversaries, that although the will determined itself first, it would not therefore be the first cause and first principle; because the character of first cause and first principle requires not only that it be not moved by another, but also that it be from itself. This character indeed St. Thomas attacks as false in II Sentent., dist. 37, q. 2, a. 2, c. Because, he says, « it seems unfitting that what has not being from itself can act from itself...; for all power proceeds from essence, and operation from power. Whence whose essence is from another, his power and operation must be from another. » He adds : « Besides, although by this answer it were avoided that it not be simply first, still it could not be avoided that it be the first agent, if its action were not reduced to some prior agent, as to cause. »

It is evident, secondly, from observation, because nothing forbids the will to be first moved and determined by God, if under that motion of God it also moves and determines itself, and so preserves its liberty, and the character of praise and merit. For the adversaries deny that the will is first determined by God for no other reason than that they think, under that determination, the will does not move and determine itself, but is so determined to one that the opposite is not possible, and so is despoiled of its liberty. But it is thus that under the determination of God the will itself moves and determines itself. For to what purpose is given that motion and determination of God? Certainly not that the will do nothing, but that it act in a manner consonant to itself, that is, freely, so that it can act and not act. Whence the divine motion and determination not only does not prevent the will from moving and determining itself, but rather effects this very thing, that under that motion and determination it moves and determines itself. Therefore.

And this is the constant and perpetual doctrine of D. Thomas in all his works. Ia p., q. 83, a. 1, ad 3 : « Free will, he says, is the cause of its own motion, because man by free will moves himself to act. Not however is it of the necessity of liberty, that that which is free be the first cause of itself : as neither for a thing to be the cause of another is it required that it be the first cause of it. God therefore is the first moving cause both of natural causes and of voluntary ones. And as by moving natural causes he does not take away that their actions be natural; so, by moving voluntary causes, he does not take away that their actions be voluntary, but rather he effects this in them; for he operates in each thing according to its property. »