The various divisions of grace

Grace as such, taken theologically, insofar as we treat of it here, is « a supernatural gift granted gratis by God to a rational creature in view of the merits of Christ, in order to eternal salvation. »

[It is called « a gift, » which holds the place of genus. It is called « supernatural, » that it be distinguished from natural gifts, which are called graces only in a wide sense. Yet by this there is not excluded a certain disposition of natural things by singular providence in order to salvation; for this is supernatural on the part of the end and of the principle. It is called « granted gratis, » that is, owed in no way, otherwise it would not be grace, as the Apostle says, Rom., XI, 6. It is said to be « granted by God to a rational creature in view of the merits of Christ^{1 1} Ibid., a. 4, c.

in order to salvation. » By the first particles is designated the subject or material cause of grace; by the following, the efficient cause; by the next, the meritorious cause; by the last, the final cause.]

Grace thus taken is divided 1° into external and internal. External grace is that which does not affect man intrinsically, but extrinsically only, such as are the divine law, the preaching of the Gospel, miracles, the examples of Christ and of the saints, occasions of doing good prepared by supernatural providence, occasions of sinning removed by the same providence: in one word, every effect of supernatural providence ordered to our salvation. Internal grace is that which affects man intrinsically, either by inhering, as habitual grace and the infused virtues, or by moving inwardly, as are the actual graces of intellect and will.

2° Internal grace is divided into grace gratis data and grace gratum faciens. Grace gratis data is that which is per se primo ordered to the salvation of others; grace gratum faciens is that which is per se primo ordered to the salvation of the recipient.

[3° Grace gratum faciens is divided into habitual, which sanctifies formally and resides in the essence of the soul, and actual, which concurs efficiently to justification. 4° Actual grace is divided into operating and cooperating. St. Thomas explains here, q. 111, a. 2, c, this division founded upon the Scriptures, councils, and Fathers thus: « The operation of some effect is not attributed to the thing moved, but to the mover. In that effect, therefore, in which our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone is the mover, operation is attributed to God; and accordingly grace is called operating. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and accordingly grace is called cooperating. » The Angelic Doctor proceeds, applying this distinction to the internal and external acts of man: « There is in us a twofold act. The first indeed is interior, of the will. And with respect to this act, the will stands as moved, but God as moving, especially when the will begins to will good, whereas before it willed evil. And therefore, according as God moves the human mind to this act, grace is called operating. » But another act is exterior; and since it is elicited by the will, it follows that for this act operation is attributed to the will. And because God also aids us toward this act, both inwardly confirming the will that it may arrive at the act, and outwardly offering the faculty of acting, with respect to such an act grace is called cooperating. » And he teaches this from Augustine saying it, and proving it from Scripture, lib. de Gratia et libero arbit., chapter 17, n. 33: « He [God] works in us that we may will without us, who cooperates with those willing, perfecting. On which account the Apostle says, Philipp., I, 6: Being confident of this very thing, that he who has begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus. Therefore that we may will he works without us; but when we will, and so will as to do, he cooperates with us. »

It must be noted, however, that it is certain that the will does not stand merely passive toward that first act; for it is a vital volition of good, consequently an act elicited by the will. Nor does it follow that the will in this first volition is not free; for that the will act freely it is not necessary that it move itself from a preceding act, but it suffices that the object be proposed under an indifference of judgment; for then there intervenes a virtual deliberation. Compare what is said on this in the treatise de Angelis and in the treatise de Actib. hum.

5° Grace is divided, by the same St. Thomas, into prevenient and subsequent, according to the order of prior and later effects. For he says here, q. 111, a. 3, c: « As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, according to different effects, so also into prevenient and subsequent, however grace be taken. Now there are five effects of grace in us: the first of which is, that the soul is healed; the second, that it wills good; the third, that it efficaciously carries out the good it wills; the fourth, that it perseveres in good; the fifth, that it attains glory. And therefore grace, according as it causes in us the first effect, is called prevenient with respect to the second effect; and as it causes in us the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And just as one effect is posterior to one effect and prior to another, so grace can be called prevenient and subsequent, according to the same effect, with respect to different ones. And this is what Augustine says in the lib. de Natura et Gratia, chapter 31, n. 35: « He prevents us that we may be healed; he follows after that being healed we may be strengthened; he prevents us that we may be called; he follows after that we may be glorified. »]

6° Grace is divided into sufficient and efficacious. That which suffices for something is said in two ways: 1° simply and in every respect; 2° secundum quid, that is, in one genus only, but not in every respect. Thus healing suffices for life simply, but not in every respect, so as to be perfect health; for it fails in another genus, as will be more fully explained below. By sufficient grace here we do not understand that which suffices simply and in every respect, but that which suffices in its own genus, that is, in the reason of a power of acting. By efficacious grace, moreover, we understand that which applies this power to act. To this notion suit the various definitions which are current concerning each. Sufficient grace is that which confers the faculty of acting well; efficacious that which provides the good use of this faculty. Likewise, sufficient grace is that which gives the good power, if we will; efficacious that which makes us will. Likewise, sufficient grace is the grace of possibility, efficacious the grace of action. And finally, according to Augustine, sufficient grace is the aid without which not, efficacious grace the aid by which. All coincide. This is the most celebrated division of grace, about which the gravest difficulties are raised, which we shall endeavor to elucidate in the following articles.