Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether actual grace is necessary to justified man for each act of piety?
In conformity with what we resolved above concerning morally good acts, the present question concerning supernatural acts must be resolved, proportion being preserved. Hence :
Conformiter ad ea quae resolvimus supra de actibus moraliter bonis, praesens quaestio de actibus supernaturalibus, proportione servata, est resolvenda. Unde :
I say : To justified man, besides habitual grace and the infused virtues annexed to it, there is necessary, for each act of piety, the general motion of God as supernatural author1 ; and this motion suffices for certain acts, yet it must be called special and gratuitous in some sense. But that justified man may persevere long in them, there is required a special grace superadded2. 1 Ibid., a. 9, c. — 2. Ibid. et a. 1, c. 2 Ibid. et a. 1, c.
Dico : Homini justificato, praeter gratiam habitualem et virtutes infusas ei annexas, necessaria est ad singulos pietatis actus generalis motio Dei ut authoris supernaturalis1, eaque sufficit ad aliquos, quae tamen debet dici aliquo sensu specialis et gratuita. Ut autem diu homo justificatus in illis perseveret, requiritur gratia specialis superaddita2. 1 Ibid., a. 9, c. — 2. Ibid. et a. 1, c. 2 Ibid. et a. 1, c.
The first part is proved from the general principle of the Author2. However perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature be supposed to be, it cannot proceed into its own act unless it is moved by God, as a second mover moved by the first. Therefore, just as the natural powers, namely the will and the intellect, even as informed by the acquired virtues, which give the power to perform morally good acts, need to be applied and moved by the general motion of God as natural author in order actually to perform them; so the same powers, as informed by grace and the infused virtues, which give the power to perform good supernatural acts, need the general motion of God as supernatural author in order actually to perform them. 2 Ibid. et a. 1, c.
Probatur prima pars ex principio generali Authoris2. Quantacumque natura aliqua corporea vel spiritualis ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere, nisi moveatur a Deo, ut secundum movens motum a primo. Sicut ergo potentiae naturales, scilicet voluntas et intellectus, etiam ut informata virtutibus acquisitis, quae dant posse facere actus moraliter bonos, ut de facto faciant, indigent applicari et moveri per motionem generalem Dei ut authoris naturalis; ita eaedem potentiae, ut informata gratia et virtutibus infusis, quae dant posse facere bonos actus supernaturales, ut de facto faciant, indigent motione generali Dei ut authoris supernaturalis. 2 Ibid. et a. 1, c.
The second part is proved. Sanctifying grace and the infused virtues annexed to it stand to supernatural actions as nature and the natural powers stand to natural actions. But nature, even corrupted, can perform some good moral work with only the general concurrence of the order of nature, without a special grace superadded, as is clear from art. 2, § 4, of this dissertation. Therefore sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, by its aid, can perform some good supernatural work with only the general supernatural assistance.
Probatur secunda pars. Sic se habet gratia sanctificans et virtutes infusae ei annexa ad supernaturales actiones, sicut natura et naturales potentiae ad actiones naturales. Atqui natura, etiam corrupta, potest aliquod opus bonum morale facere cum solo concursu generali ordinis naturae, absque speciali gratia superaddita, ut liquet art. 2, § 4, hujus dissert. Ergo gratia sanctificans et virtutes infusae ope ejus, cum solo generali auxilio supernaturali possunt aliquod bonum opus supernaturale facere.
The third part is clear from what was said in a. 1 and 3, § 4.
Patet tertia pars ex dictis a. 1 et 3, § 4.
For although the general concurrence of the supernatural order toward some supernatural good is due to a nature informed by grace and the infused virtues, as the general concurrence of the natural order toward some natural good is due to nature considered in itself, because indeed God, according to the common laws of providence, moves each thing according to its own mode and its own disposition; nevertheless, since nature, even as elevated by grace and the supernatural virtues, is borne toward the good variably and can defect from it (for it is not, as I suppose, confirmed in good), hence it comes about that, although there is due to a nature so elevated the general motion by which at times it elicits acts proportioned to itself, it is not however due so that it elicits them always and indefectibly. Therefore that this motion be given to this individual here and now, and not to another, is from special grace.
Quia, quamvis concursus generalis ordinis supernaturalis ad aliquod bonum supernaturale sit debitus naturae informatae gratia et virtutibus infusis, sicut concursus generalis ordinis naturalis ad aliquod bonum naturale est debitus naturae secundum se, quia nempe Deus secundum leges communes providentiae movet unumquodque secundum suum modum et suam dispositionem; attamen, cum natura, etiam ut elevata per gratiam et virtutes supernaturales, feratur in bonum variabiliter et ab illo sit defectibilis (non enim, ut suppono, est firmata in bono), hinc fit quod, quamvis illi sic elevatae debeatur generalis motio qua aliquando eliciat actus sibi proportionatos, non tamen ut semper et indefectibiliter eliciat. Quod ergo illi individuo detur hic et nunc, et non alteri, est ex speciali gratia.
The fourth part is proved1 ; because, on account of the infection of the flesh, as to the flesh, and of ignorance, as to the intellect, which remain in justified man, as was said, it is most difficult for him amid continuous conflicts and temptations, and in such great obscurity, to persevere long in supernatural good, unless he is strengthened and helped by a special grace superadded to the powers he already possesses. 1 Ibid.
Probatur quarta pars1; quia, propter infectionem carnis, quantum ad carnem, et ignorantiam quantum ad intellectum, quae remanent in homine justificato, ut dictum est, difficillimum est illi inter continuos conflictus et tentationes, atque in tanta obscuritate, diu perseverare in bono supernaturali, nisi speciali gratia viribus jam habitis superaddita roboretur et adjuvetur. 1 Ibid.
And thus it is drawn from the Council of Arausic. II, can. 10, in which it is thus defined: « The help of God is ever to be implored by those reborn and sanctified, that they may come to a good end, or be able to persevere in good work. » Wherein for both perseverances, the final and the long-lasting, special grace is required. Likewise Trid., sess. VI, can. 22, speaking of perseverance indefinitely, decrees thus: « If anyone shall say that a justified man can persevere in the justice received either without the special help of God, or cannot with it, let him be anathema. »
Et ita eruitur ex Concilio Arausic. II, can. 10, in quo sic definitur: « Adjutorium Dei in Renatis ac Sanctis semper est implorandum, ut ad bonum finem pervenire, vel in bono possint opere perdurare. » Ubi pro utraque perseverantia, finali et diuturna, requiritur specialis gratia. Similiter Trid., sess. VI, can. 22, de perseverantia indefinite loquens, statuit sic: « Si quis dixerit justificatum vel sine speciali Dei auxilio in accepta justitia perseverare posse, vel cum eo non posse, anathema sit. »