Whether for meriting or demeriting, in this state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity, or liberty of indifference, is required?

The dogma of faith being posited, namely that man in the state of fallen nature enjoys liberty from necessity or indifference, which we call liberty of arbitrium, we now ask whether this liberty from necessity is altogether required for meriting or demeriting in this same state; — or whether the liberty of spontaneity, or from coercion, does not suffice.

I say 1° : To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature there is required in man liberty from necessity, or liberty of indifference, and the liberty from coercion does not suffice ¹ . ¹ Q. 6 de Malo, a. unico, c.

Thus defined it Innocent XII and Alexander VII, condemning as heretical this third proposition of Jansenius contradictory to our conclusion, in the sense intended by the author: « To merit and demerit, in the state of fallen nature, there is not required in man liberty from necessity, but the liberty from coercion suffices. » S. Pius V and Greg. XIII, condemning this 67th proposition of Baius: « Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily. » St. Thomas preceded these Pontiffs, q. 6 cit. de Malo, where he says the contrary opinion to be

^{1 1} Q. 6 de Malo, a. unico, c.

heretical and to subvert all the principles of moral philosophy: « For if, he says, something be not free in us but moved from necessity toward willing, deliberation, exhortation, precept, punishment, praise and blame are taken away. »

It is proved by further reason. Our acts, as purely spontaneous, are not moral. Therefore neither meritorious nor demeritorious. — Prob. ant. Insofar as acts are called moral, insofar are they subjected to rules of morals and can be directed by them. Yet necessary and purely spontaneous acts cannot be subjected to rules of morals nor directed by them. Therefore. — Prob. min. Acts invariable in themselves cannot be subjected to rules of morals nor directed by them; for it would be vain, nay foolish, to apply a rule to an action which could not be otherwise. Yet necessary and merely spontaneous acts are invariable in themselves, as appears in beatific love, in love of beatitude in common, and others. Therefore.

I say 2° : To merit or demerit there is not necessarily required liberty of contrariety toward good or evil, but the liberty of contradiction suffices.

Prob. 1° in Christ, who was impeccable, and yet merited; 2° in the angels, who merited in the first instant, yet could not sin, as I said in the treatise on Angels; 3° in the very holy Virgin, Apostles and other saints confirmed in grace, who merited without that they could sin; 4° By reason, because by this very fact that an act is free with the liberty of contradiction, so that it can be placed and not placed, it falls under rules of morals; for law and reason can dispose concerning it, command or forbid it. Therefore it is moral, consequently meritorious or demeritorious.

You will say against the first conclusion: St. Thomas, in III Sentent., dist. 18, a. 2, ad 5, says thus: « It must be said that although the free will of Christ were determined to one numerically, as to loving God, which he cannot not do, nevertheless from this he loses not liberty or the notion of praise or merit; because he tends toward it not coerced but spontaneously, and thus is master of his act. » Therefore to merit or demerit liberty from necessity is not required.

Resp. the sense of St. Thomas to be that, although the free will of Christ were determined necessarily to loving God in itself, he could nevertheless merit, because with such determination he remained free toward that same love of God as it is the ratio of loving creatures. Whence he wills that merit be found only in the same necessary act not in the part wherein it is necessary but in the part wherein it is free; otherwise he would contradict his former answer, in which he requires for merit immunity from determination to one numerically. Nor do these words stand in the way: « Because he tends toward it not coerced, but spontaneously; » for τὸ « not coerced but spontaneously » is the same as not necessarily but freely. For often with St. Thomas and the ancients coactum is taken for necessarium, and spontaneum for liberum. And that it is thus taken here these following words plainly indicate: « And thus he is master of his act, » which would be false if he understood it of a necessary act; for we are not masters of necessary acts, as the same holy Doctor attests: « We are, he says, 1ª p., q. 82, a. 1, masters of our own acts according as we can choose this or that. »

You will ask whether, the indifference of judgment standing, the will can be necessitated.

Resp. That the will, the indifferent judgment standing, is necessitated.

It is proved ¹ . The will is rational appetite following cognition and the lead of the intellect, since it is only of good proposed to itself through cognitive power. Such are the words of St. Thomas at the place cited, and such is the principle he everywhere inculcates and which no one calls into doubt, as founded in the nature of things. For whatever form or nature follows its inclination proportioned to itself, as appears in all things; and thus the inclination of intellectual nature is rational appetite following the form through intellect appre- ¹ Q. 25 de Veritate, a. 2, c.

^{1 1} Q. 25 de Veritate, a. 2, c.

hended. Therefore, as it implies that the will desire an object which is not proposed to it through intellect but unknown, so it implies desiring otherwise than proposed to itself, consequently desiring necessarily what is proposed to it under indifference; otherwise, as in the first case, so also in the second rational appetite would be and would not be.

It is confirmed. It implies the will acting without any cognition; because, as said, it is essentially rational appetite following cognition and the lead of the intellect. Yet that would happen if it were borne necessarily toward the object proposed under indifference. Therefore. — Prob. min. It would not act nor be regulated by that cognition which represents the object as indifferent; otherwise it would be borne also toward it indifferently, nor would it be another cognition, as supposed. Therefore it would act without that cognition.