Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether man, in the first moral instant of the use of reason, is bound to turn himself to God; and whether venial sin can exist with original sin alone?
The question is of the perfect use of reason, which suffices for deliberating about things most weighty, to which a child arrives gradually and successively, some more quickly, some more slowly.
Quaestio est de perfecto usu rationis, qui sufficiat ad deliberandum de rebus gravissimis, ad quem puer pervenit paulatim et successive, alii citius, alii tardius.
A conversion to God is distinguished two ways: one explicit and formal toward God distinctly and explicitly known, whether through faith, or through natural light; the other virtual and implicit, whereby one proposes to live according to reason, or loves the honest good, in which God, as author and end of this good, implicitly is contained. The instant in which the child who has reached the perfect use of reason deliberates about the last end, setting it before himself, is not physical but moral, comprising several physical instants; because however it takes place in the briefest time, it is called an instant.
Duplex distinguitur conversio ad Deum : una explicita et formalis ad Deum distincte et explicite cognitum, sive per fidem, sive per lumen naturale; altera virtualis et implicita, qua quis proponit vivere secundum rationem, aut amat bonum honestum, in quo Deus, ut hujus boni auctor et finis, implicite continetur. Instans quo puer qui pervenit ad perfectum usum rationis, deliberat de ultimo fine sibi praefigendo, non est physicum, sed morale, plura instantia physica complectens; quia tamen id sit brevissimo tempore, dicitur instans.
I say: In the first moral instant of perfect use of reason man is bound under mortal sin to convert himself to God, either explicitly, in that manner in which he can and knows him, or, as the holy Doctor says, Hebr., V, 14, he who has his senses exercised to discern the good and evil that is of others 1. 1 Here q. 89, a. 6, c; in II Sentent., dist. 42, a. 5, ad 7; q. 5 de Malo, a. 2, ad 8, and elsewhere.
Dico : Homo in primo instanti morali usus perfecti rationis tenetur sub mortali se convertere ad Deum, vel explicite, eo modo quo potest et eum cognoscit, seu, ut dicit S. Doctor, Hebr., V, 14, qui sensum habent exercitatum ad discretionem boni et mali extranei1. 1 Hic q. 89, a. 6, c; in II Sentent., dist. 42, a. 5, ad 7; q. 5 de Malo, a. 2, ad 8, et alibi.
It is proved 1°. That which first occurs to man upon arriving at the perfect use of reason is to think and deliberate about himself, namely toward what end he is about to order himself and his actions. Therefore he is bound then to constitute God as his end, if he know him explicitly, or the good suitable to his nature, namely the honest good consonant with reason, in which God implicitly is contained. — Proof of the antecedent: Man is the end of all desirable things, but man himself is means with respect to God, who is his [man's] end. But the end is prior in intention. Therefore what first occurs to man arriving at the perfect use of reason is to think and deliberate about himself, toward what end he should order himself and his actions.
Probatur 1°. Id quod primum occurrit homini ad usum perfectum rationis pervenienti, est cogitare et deliberare de seipso, ad quem scilicet finem se suasque actiones sit ordinaturus. Ergo tenetur tunc sibi constituere Deum pro fine, si illum explicite cognoscat, aut bonum suae naturae conveniens, nempe bonum honestum et rationi consonum, in quo Deus implicite continetur. — Prob. ant. Homo est finis cui omnium concupiscibilium, ipse autem homo est medium respectu Dei, qui est illius finis. Atqui finis est prior in intentione. Ergo quod primo occurrit homini pervenienti ad perfectum usum rationis, est cogitare et deliberare de seipso, ad quem finem se et suas actiones sit ordinaturus.
It is confirmed. To arrive at the perfect use of reason is to discern between moral good and evil; and thus at that instant the natural law, through synderesis dictating that the honest good is to be done and evil shunned, is intimated to him. Therefore man is bound then to accept that law and subject himself to it, proposing to act according to it; just as, while the evangelical law is sufficiently promulgated to anyone, he is bound straightway to accept it and subject himself to it, proposing to live and act according to it. Therefore.
Confirmatur. Pervenire ad usum perfectum rationis, est discernere inter bonum et malum morale, sicque pro eo instanti intimatur per synderesim lex naturalis dicitans bonum honestum esse faciendum et malum fugiendum. Ergo tenetur tunc homo illam legem acceptare et ei se subjicere, proponendo agere secundum illam; sicut, dum lex evangelica est alicui sufficienter promulgata, tenetur statim eam acceptare, seque illi subjicere, proponendo vivere et agere secundum illam. Ergo.
It is proved 2°. There is a natural precept of converting oneself to God and loving him above all things, which, since it is affirmative, binds not always but for a determinate time. But there is no time more fitting, and in which it binds the more, than the first moral instant of use of reason. Therefore. — Proof of the minor in many ways: 1° From the reason already made, that what first occurs to man in this instant is to deliberate about himself in order to the end. 2° When man first arrives at the use of reason, he enters the world as a moral agent, and begins the way of the life of reason. Therefore then above all is he bound to set before himself the legitimate end, namely God, or the honest good, unto which direct all his actions: otherwise he is exposed forthwith to danger of going astray and losing salvation; as he who prudently begins a great journey ought to set before himself the term toward which he tends. 3° Because the other times assigned by theologians for the fulfillment of this precept are not so fitting.
Prubatur 2º. Est praeceptum naturale se convertendi ad Deum et ipsum super omnia diligendi, quod cum sit affirmativum, non obligat pro semper, sed determinato tempore. Atqui nullum est tempus magis conveniens et in quo magis obliget, quam primum instans morale usus rationis. Ergo. — Prob. min. multipliciter: 1° Ex ratione jam facta, quod primum quod occurrit homini in hoc instanti, sit deliberare de seipso in ordine ad finem. 2º Dum homo primum pervenit ad usum rationis, mundum tamquam agens morale ingreditur, et viam vitae rationis incipit. Ergo tunc maxime tenetur sibi praefigere finem legitimum, nempe Deum, vel bonum honestum, ad quem omnes suas actiones dirigat : alioquin exponitur continuo periculo deviandi et perdendi salutem; sicut qui prudenter inchoat magnum iter, debet sibi praefigere terminum in quem tendat. 3° Quia alia tempora assignata a theologis ad impletionem hujus praecepti, non ita sunt convenientia.
I say 2°: It is probable that venial sin cannot be in anyone together with original alone 1 1 Ibid.
Dico 2° : Probabile est peccatum veniale non posse esse in aliquo cum solo originali1 1 Ibid.
It is proved. If venial could be found in man together with original alone, this would happen either before the first instant of reason, or in that very instant, or immediately after. Not before the first instant of reason, because then man lacks the use of reason and liberty, and thus is incapable of venial sin; not in the very instant of the use of reason, because either he converts himself to God, and is justified from original sin, or converts himself not, and thus sins mortally, as has been said; consequently neither immediately after the first instant can there be venial together with original alone.
Probatur. Si posset in homine reperiri veniale cum solo originali, id contingeret vel ante primum instans rationis, vel in ipso instanti, vel immediate post. Non ante primum instans rationis, quia tunc homo caret usu rationis et libertate, sicque est incapax peccati venialis; non in ipso instanti usus rationis, quia vel convertitur ad Deum, et justificatur a peccato originali, vel non convertitur, et sic peccat mortaliter, ut dictum est; consequenter nec immediate post primum instans potest esse veniale cum solo originali.