Whether man in the state of fallen nature not yet repaired has less strength for moral good than he would have had in the state of pure nature?

From the parable Luc., X, 30, of the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho who fell among robbers, who stripped him, and having laid on wounds departed, leaving him half dead, the common voice of the Holy Fathers and theologians is that man by original sin was not only stripped of original justice and other gratuitous gifts, but was also wounded in his natural endowments.

We call the wound of nature here the disruption and discontinuation of the union and subordination of reason to God, of the lower part to reason, and of the body to the soul. For just as in the human body there is said to be a wound when some division and disruption is made between its continuous and united parts, so analogically in the soul there is said to be a wound when its natural powers, which were united and subordinated to one another, were divided by the loss of this subordination. Whence, although in pure nature there would not have been greater union and subordination between these powers than there is now, nevertheless it would not be called a wound; because, since those powers would never have been joined and subordinated, the defect of union and subordination would not be through disruption and discontinuation, and therefore could not be called a wound.

Four wounds of nature are enumerated, according to the same number as the powers of the soul. For insofar as reason is deprived of its order to the true, it is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is deprived of its order to the good, it is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous good, it is the wound of infirmity; insofar as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delight moderated by reason, it is the wound of concupiscence.

And although that perfect union and subordination of the powers in the state of innocence would not be natural or due to nature, but from a gratuitous gift, yet since it was a good of nature itself and perfected it, even in its natural order, its disruption is called the wound of nature, and by this man is wounded in his natural endowments. But whether man ought not moreover to be called wounded in his natural endowments in some further sense, we shall now explain.

From these things it is clear that man in the state of fallen nature is far weaker toward good and more prone to evil than in the state of integral and innocent nature. And these things are certain among authors. But the difficulty concerns the state of pure nature, whether man in the state of fallen nature, unrepaired, has lesser powers for the moral good of the natural order than he would have had in pure nature.

I say: The natural powers of man for the moral good of the natural order in the state of fallen nature, not yet repaired, are not diminished intrinsically and as to entity; nevertheless it is more probable that he is less apt for the moral good extrinsically and from the addition of an impediment which he would not have had in pure nature, and in this sense can be said to be lesser than he would have been in pure nature.

The first part of the conclusion is proved. The natural powers of man for the moral good of the natural order, namely intellect, will and sensitive appetite, are properties flowing necessarily and uniformly from the essence; consequently, like the essence itself, they admit of no more and less, especially intellect and will, which since they are spiritual are incorruptible and unalterable.

It is confirmed. Original sin consists essentially in the privation of original justice, which contained the powers in right order. But from what removes and prohibits no real and physical change is made in the thing, but it is left to its own nature. Therefore.

The second part of the conclusion is proved. He is less apt for the moral good of the natural order who is averted from God as last natural end than he who is not thus averted. But man, in the state of unrepaired fallen nature, is by original sin averted from God as last natural end, and in the state of pure nature he would not be thus averted. Therefore man in the state of fallen nature, extrinsically and from the addition of an impediment, is less apt for the moral good than in the state of pure nature. — The major seems certain; because the efficacy and powers of the will for choosing means are taken from love and conversion to the end, which stands in things doable as the first principle does in things speculable. Therefore just as he who is not rightly instructed in first principles, but deviates from them, is less apt for drawing true conclusions, so he who is averted from the end is less apt for right operations. — The minor is proved. Adam, by sinning, violated not only the supernatural law but also the natural; for every sin is against reason and the natural law commanding obedience to every legitimate superior commanding: consequently he turned all his posterity away from God as natural author. But in pure nature there would have been no such aversion, because there would have been no sin. Therefore.

Some not improbably posit another impediment, from the captivity and tyranny of the devil. For as it is said II Petr., II, 19, by whom anyone is overcome, of him also he is the slave. And Trident., sess. v, on original sin, canon 1, strikes with anathema him who should say that the first man, by transgressing the commandment of God, did not incur « with death the captivity under his power who thereafter had the empire of death, that is, of the devil. » This captivity, however, since it is an effect of sin, would not have been in the state of pure nature. Moreover the devil exercises his tyranny, inviting and moving his subjects in various ways to all wickedness, proposing external objects, stirring the phantasy, inflaming the passions, altering bodies, etc. And although he could have tempted men in pure nature, seeing that he tempted the first man in integral nature, it is nevertheless far more probable that he exercises his dominion far more powerfully and efficaciously over his captives, God permitting, in vengeance for sin.

Obj.: From what removes and prohibits there does not follow a greater or lesser natural effect than follows from nature itself, as is clear in the example of a stone held up; for it, the impediment removed, is not moved more quickly than if it had been moved by gravity alone. But original sin stands only as removing-prohibiting in ordine to the disordered motions of the will and sensitive appetite, inasmuch as it took away original justice, by which disordered motions were curbed. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the minor. For original sin, besides the privation of original justice, imports aversion from God as natural author, such as pure nature does not import. This aversion however is a moral impediment to doing good. Whence from this argument, which is the principal one of the opposite opinion, just as from various texts of St. Thomas in which he says that through original sin « nature is left to itself, » 1a 2ae, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1, and that the bond of original justice removed, each power of the soul tends into its own proper motion, ibid., q. 87, a. 7, c, and similar passages: from these, I say, only the first part of the conclusion is proved, namely that the natural powers for good are not diminished intrinsically, physically and entitatively, but not that they are not diminished morally and from the addition of an impediment in ordine to pursuing the good.