Whether man without grace can know anything true?

I suppose as a certain principle, by which all difficulties concerning the necessity of grace must be removed, what Pope Coelestine defines, or whatever other author of the chapters attributed to him, cap. 12, namely: « From the work and favor of grace nothing at all is to be subtracted. » This principle, founded in Scripture, councils, Fathers and common sense, the Thomists explain with their Doctor ^{1 1} I. 1° part., q. 103, a. 3, c; IIa 2ae, q. 109, a. 1, c.

thus, that God not only gave and preserves to man the virtues of acting well, but moves and applies them to act well; for in these two is contained whatsoever there is of being and good in an act.

As to the knowledge of truth, truths are of two kinds, according as they look to the order of nature or to the supernatural order.

Among natural truths some are, for the present state of union of soul with body, proportioned to our intellect, as those deduced from the senses or from principles known per se. Some surpass our capacity, either because they are impenetrable to the senses, or have no necessary connection with principles naturally known, as thoughts of hearts and future contingents, or because they are merely spiritual, as angelic substance. It is agreed that these latter cannot be known without special assistance of God, and of these there is no question, but only of the former.

Again, among natural truths some are merely speculative, which namely nowise look to practice, as: anything is or is not, the whole is greater than its part, there is no effect without cause. Some are practical, as: good is to be done, God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored. Of natural truths of the first genus I say 1°: Man fallen can, without special grace superadded to nature, but with sole preceding general concourse — which nevertheless in some sense ought to be called special and gratuitous — know certain natural truths ¹ This is against certain ancients and Vasquez. ¹ Here ibi, q. 109, a. 1, c.

The first part is proved. Every form or virtue implanted by God in created things has efficacy with respect to some determinate act into which it can be borne according to its property. Ergo our intellect, even in the present state, having the form cognoscitive of truth, that is, intelligible light, though darkened by sin, yet not extinguished, can from itself know some truth. Add that otherwise the intellective potency, which is the most perfect of all potencies, would be the most imperfect.

The second part is proved. All motions, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover simply, which is God: and therefore, however perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature be posited, it cannot proceed to its act unless moved by God; which motion indeed is according to the reason of his providence, not according to the necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body.

The third part is proved, namely that this motion which we call general ought in some sense to be called special and gratuitous. For since our intellect is defectible and flexible toward assenting to true and false, there is due to it, according to the laws of common providence, that it sometimes be moved to truth and not always to falsehood; and in this sense the motion is general and in a manner owed, and therefore ought not to be called grace. But that he rather be moved to truth than another who falls short of him and by whom he himself could fall short, that is not due to him, but is from special providence and benevolence; and in this sense the motion can and ought to be called motion and special grace. — By this explanation the foundation of Vasquez, sought from the indifference of our intellect to assent to true and false, is overturned.

I say 2°: Fallen man cannot, without special grace superadded, with moral potency at least, know, whether collectively or divisively, all natural truths, both speculative and speculative-practical, much less practical-practical ones.

I said 1° « with moral potency at least. » A twofold potency is distinguished, namely physical, which has of itself due proportion with the object, abstracting from impediments to attaining it; moral, which besides due proportion with the object, is not entangled or retarded by impediments so as not to pass into act.

I said 2° « speculative-practical truths, » which although they look to practice do not move to act, as are the general principles of synderesis, or the habit of the principles of things to be done, and universal propositions which pertain to moral philosophy, as: good is to be done, God is to be worshiped. Practical-practical truths move in particular to act, as: parents are to be honored here and now by such an act. On account of the acts which proceed from them, these latter truths pertain to the following articles, in which will be treated the necessity of grace for operating any good whatsoever. Here therefore must be treated only of truths merely speculative and speculative-practical.

The first part is proved, namely concerning knowledge of all natural truths collectively.

1° A weak and wounded potency cannot produce an act most excellent for a sound and whole potency. Yet to know all natural truths collectively is an act most excellent of a sound and whole intellect; but human intellect is wounded and weakened by sin. Ergo. Whence St. Thomas, IV Contra gentes, cap. 52, speaking of the spiritual punishments of original sin, says: « Among the spiritual ones is the chief weakness of reason, from which it happens that man arrives with difficulty at knowledge of truth and easily slips into error, and cannot altogether overcome bestial appetites, but is often obscured by them. » And here a. 3, ad 3: « Human nature is more corrupted through sin with regard to appetite for good than with regard to knowledge of truth. » Ergo it is corrupted also with regard to knowledge of truth, though less.

2° The intellective faculty in fallen man is entangled by many impediments, lest he be able to attain every truth taken collectively without error. The first is brevity of life, at whose beginning man is little apt for intellectual operations, and the almost infinite multitude of natural truths. Second, weakness of body and imperfection of the senses, upon which cognition depends, which are first less prompt, then are weakened by long and intense study. Third, the duties of civil life, domestic care, necessities of nature, whereby the greatest part of life is spent and the mind is drawn away from study of truth. Fourth, disorder of passions, by which reason is obscured, love of truth grows torpid and delight in contemplation.

Yet these defects must needs be compensated by superior assistance, that man may be able to obtain even knowledge of natural truths collectively. Ergo.

The second part is proved, concerning knowledge of any natural truths whatsoever divisively, by nearly the same reasons.

1° A wounded will cannot do any good moral work without special grace, as will be proved below. Ergo similarly a wounded intellect cannot know any truth without special grace.

2° There are natural truths most difficult, which cannot be understood certainly and integrally without long and intense study, for which are required a constantly upright will, burning love of truth, delight in contemplation, quiet of passions, firmness and good disposition of the senses, and leisure free from cares. Yet all these are not had in the present state, as was said in the proof of the first part. Ergo.

As to supernatural truths,

I say 1°: Fallen man, external preaching or revelation supposed, can, with sole preceding general concourse, without special grace superadded, know and embrace supernatural truths with imperfect assent, from some human motive. This is common opinion.

The first part is proved. That external revelation must be supposed and is necessary the Apostle teaches, Rom., IX, 14, saying: How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And it is evident; because we can know nothing in the present state except what falls under the senses per se or through another. Yet supernatural truth, since it has no connection with the works of nature, does not fall under the senses per se nor through another. Ergo it must be learned from another teaching.

The second part is proved, which similarly is evident. Supernatural truth, inasmuch as it stands under a human or natural motive, although it be entitatively supernatural, nevertheless formally in the character of object is not supernatural; because the object is constituted formally in the character of object through the motive or formal reason under which it is attained. Ergo, external revelation supposed, he can believe from a human motive by his own powers. And this appears in heretics, who believe by human faith certain mysteries of faith, not from the supernatural motive of divine revelation — otherwise they would believe everything — but either from their own judgment, or because they esteem such faith honorable or useful to themselves.

I say 2°: Man cannot believe supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation without special internal grace, both on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will ¹ This is against Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians and certain theologians who say that fallen man can assent by his own powers with natural assent to supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation. ¹ Here q. 109, a. 1, c.

The first part is proved, namely that supernatural grace is required on the part of the intellect, 1° from Scripture. Matth., XI, 27: No one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him. Ibid. XVI, 17, to Peter professing his faith in Christ, Christ himself says: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven. Ephes., II, 8 and 9: For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: not of works, that no man may glory. Ergo.

2° By reason. The act of faith whereby we assent to supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation is supernatural. Ergo the intellect cannot elicit it unless assisted by supernatural assistance. — Prob. ant. The object of this act or assent is formally and in the character of object supernatural: for the object quod, namely truth itself, is in itself supernatural; the object quo, that is, the motive or formal reason under which it is attained, is also supernatural, namely divine revelation. Yet an object formally supernatural, qua such, cannot be attained except through supernatural act. Ergo. And hence is overturned the foundation of Molina, who says that assent of faith from the motive of divine revelation is as to substance natural, and supernatural only as to mode.

The second part is proved, namely that supernatural grace is required also on the part of the will. To believe supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation there is required a pious motion of will which efficaciously moves the intellect to such assent. Yet the will cannot efficaciously move to a supernatural act, such as is assent to the truths of faith from the motive of divine revelation, by its own powers, without supernatural assistance. Ergo. — Prob. maj. In this natural truths differ from supernatural, that natural ones can be evident either of themselves or by reason of medium, and thus convince the intellect and extort its assent without motion, at least free, of the will; but revealed supernatural truths are evident neither of themselves nor by reason of revelation, and consequently do not convince the intellect nor obtain its assent, unless the intellect be specially moved to this assent by the will.