Question III: Whether acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

St. Bonaventure holds as certain, in the Speculum, cap. 3, and D. Thomas here, that in the exhibition of such things acception of persons can intervene, insofar as they are goods of the Republic, and others have a greater right to them, for instance by reason of virtue, which is to be esteemed at more, than others by reason of power and riches.

It is PROVED by both Holy Doctors from that text of James 2: Do not in acception of persons hold the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ. For if there shall come in unto your assembly a man having a golden ring in fine apparel, and there shall come in also a poor man in vile attire; and you have respect to him that is clothed in fine apparel, and shall say unto him: Sit thou here well; but say to the poor: Stand thou there, or sit under my footstool: do not you judge within yourselves, and are become judges of unjust thoughts?

By these things the Apostle shows that it is fraudulent acception of persons to honor some, even if they are wicked, on account of riches alone, more than poor men eminent in virtue. It is confirmed by the Holy Doctor from the Interlinear Gloss on this passage, expressly reproving this preference of persons.

It is PROVED secondly by reason, by St. Bonaventure. For honor, according to Aristotle, 2 Rhet., cap. 5, is nothing other than the testimony of virtue, owed to each proportionately for the magnitude or smallness of the virtue itself; and it is an estimable good, and a good of the Republic insofar as it is a civil body; and consequently to deprive studious men of this observance is acception of persons, and consequently, if it verges toward contempt of the poor studious man, it will be mortal, especially when the rich man is honored for riches alone, as the Holy Doctor notes from the testimony of D. James, who calls such a one a judge of unjust thoughts, or an unjust judge. Valencia uses this argument, quaest. 7, puncto 3.

From this it appears that Cajetan here is deceived, and Lessius, tome 1 de Iustitia, l. 2, cap. 11, de detract. et contumel., dub. 27, num. 142; Filliuccius, tomo 2, tract. 32, cap. 9, num. 251; Fagundez, lib. 8, cap. 28, num. 8 — saying that the denial of due honor is not against justice, but only against observance, of which St. Thomas, quaest. 102; unless perhaps contumely be interpretatively attached, as if someone, while all honor a passing Pastor or Prince, should look upon him without any sign of honor. From this they deduce that the denial of reverence does not of itself obligate to restitution.

But they are DECEIVED, because these acts must be considered not as immediately elicited by the virtue of observance, but as they are the matter, or the thing owed; and consequently he abuses the virtue of observance unjustly, which is opposed to the act of Distributive Justice; for it is not unusual for the act of one virtue to be the matter of another virtue; for thus also the act of divine liberality and mercy, by which he gives grace, is the matter of justice, insofar as that grace is owed by the merits of Christ. Therefore the exhibition of reverence is the matter of distributive justice in the manner in which Ecclesiastical benefices also are to be distributed, as Valencia notes, loc. cit.

From this also falls Cajetan's other argument: This exhibition of honor is gratuitous; but in gratuitous things acception of persons does not intervene.

It is ANSWERED that these acts are gratuitous as they are elicited immediately by the virtue of observance; but not as they are owed insofar as they are public goods of the Republic, as it is a civil body, to be distributed according to merits. Nor indeed does anyone infer well that these do not pertain to distributive justice, on the ground that even inferiors pertain to it, who exhibit these signs of reverence. For it is enough that it pertain to everyone having a right to those goods, which are to be distributed to each according to his own merit.

TANNERUS indeed, disp. 4, quaest. 8, num. 20, says that honor is indeed immediately and elicitive from the virtue of observance; but imperative from Commutative Justice. Thus he reconciles the opinions.

Most GLORIOUSLY, however, St. Doctor confirms the assertion laid down from the Holy Fathers, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 38, by which also he dissolves the objections. Most illustrious, too, are the testimonies on this matter of DD. Gregory and Jerome; see them in the preceding question.

He ADDS Seneca, epist. 76, after the middle: In this error we toil; thus is it imposed upon us, that we estimate no man for what he is, but we add to him also those things by which he is adorned: But when you wish to enter upon the true estimation of a man, and to know what sort he is; look upon him naked: let him cast away patrimony, let him cast away honors, and the other lies of fortune, let him strip off the body itself; consider the soul, what and how great it is, whether great by another's, or by its own.