Doubt VI: Whether among the degrees of lying there is a gravest and a lightest

The holy Doctor asserts, with St. Augustine (On Lying, chapter 21), that the degrees of lies follow the order of things, so that there is a greatest and a least, because, as the Philosopher says (3 Topics, cap. 4), if the maximum in one genus exceeds the maximum in another genus, this genus simply exceeds that one. Hence, for one genus to exceed another, it is not necessary that each member of that genus exceed each member of the other genus, but that the highest in that genus be greater than all absolutely of the other genus. Since, therefore, among all lies that is the greatest in which one intends to harm another in the way of truth and salvation, because it inflicts on him an uncompensatable spiritual harm with respect to the greatest goods; hence a lie in the doctrine of religion is the greatest among the others. On the contrary, because one cannot be moved to lie by a more urgent cause than to preserve a spiritual good, or one attached to the spiritual: hence that lie is the lightest which is committed to preserve chastity, or a similar thing, and thus one ascends and descends by degrees, so that the closer it approaches the first, the graver it is; and the closer to the least, the less it is; and the holy Doctor proves this also in the Pharetra, lib. 3, cap. 3, De mendacio, from St. Gregory, lib. 8 of the Morals, cap. 4.

He objects first against these degrees. Let one say that Christ did not ride upon the ass out of a certain jesting wit; he sins in the first genus of lie. Let another, by a lie, impose a false crime on his neighbor, so that he be killed; he sins in an inferior genus of lie, and yet this is graver: Therefore the degrees of lies are badly ordered.

The holy Doctor answers that the most grave lie is that which asserts a falsehood out of malice for the subversion of religion; but such is not he who says for that reason that Christ did not ride upon the ass.

He objects second. He who tells a lie sowing schisms sins more gravely than he who sows false doctrines in religion; and yet the latter sins in the first genus of lie.

The holy Doctor answers that the former is graver; for if the falsity of doctrine induces schisms and other evils.

He objects third. One can lie in the first genus out of infirmity, and in the second genus out of malice; then this latter will sin gravely, because he sins against the Holy Spirit.

The holy Doctor answers that he who lies against the truth of religion is not supposed to err out of infirmity.

He objects fourth, that the supreme genus of lie is against faith; but the inferior one, pernicious to one's neighbor, is against Charity, which is the greater virtue.

The holy Doctor answers first, that it does not follow from the fact that Charity is a greater good than faith, that every lack of Charity is a greater evil, for there can be a very small privation of Charity and a maximal privation of faith. The holy Doctor adds that a lie against the truth of religion harms not only faith, but also good works and Charity: e.g. if you say that fornication is not to be avoided, that parents are not to be honored; for in matters of religion not only what is to be believed is taught, but also what is to be done according to each virtue.

He objects fifth against the lowest lie, which is officious for saving chastity, for this has more the character of a lie, since it is serious: Therefore it is graver than the jocose one.

He answers by denying that this officious lie is graver than the jocose one, because in neither does one intend to deceive another; yet in each he intends to utter a falsehood, that he may delight in one case and profit in the other; but less disordered is the intention that wishes to profit than that which wishes to delight, and this is done even in earnest things for the sake of delighting.

He objects sixth, that he who succors in greater necessity sins less by lying: but he who succors in danger of life succors in greater necessity than he who does in danger of chastity, because this cannot be wrested away against one's will, as that can.

The holy Doctor answers that the greater necessity is then for preserving chastity, because this is a spiritual good, and a greater good, which, although it cannot formally be taken away against one's will, is nevertheless taken away as regards bodily purity, joined with the danger of consent and of spiritual ruin. Therefore, although natural piety inclines more to saving life, gratuitous piety inclines more to saving the life of grace.

He objects seventh; he who takes away life takes away the space for penance, not so he who takes away chastity: Therefore the former is the greater evil, and therefore it will be a lesser sin to lie for such a salvation.

The holy Doctor answers; one deprived of life also lacks the space for sinning, and it is not known whether he would have spent his life in sins.

At the end the holy Doctor asks whether, in danger of chastity, one ought to choose to be corrupted, or rather to lie.

The holy Doctor answers that if one can know probably that he will not consent in his will, he ought to suffer corruption rather than lie, because corruption is doubled into a crown, as Blessed Lucy used to say; but if he be imperfect, and fears lest he succumb, then the lesser evil, that of lying, can be chosen to avoid it, and this also to redeem another's.

He asks also: whether it is lawful to lie, so that we may bring another back to the way of salvation.

He answers, negatively, because evil must not be done that good may come, nor does God need our lie to save others; for man is not directed by a lie, but by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of Truth, without whom we preach in vain.