Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
Whether the exterior act adds goodness or malice to the interior act?
We do not inquire here whether the exterior act is good or evil. We suppose this as certain; for by the very fact that it is voluntary, conformable or disconformable to reason, it has all that is required in order that it be good or evil. Moreover, on exterior acts there are the eight precepts of the Decalogue.
Non quaerimus hic, utrum actus exterior sit bonus vel malus. Ita esse pro certo supponimus; hoc ipso enim quo est voluntarius, conformis vel difformis rationi, habet totum quod requiritur ut sit bonus vel malus. Insuper de actibus exterioribus sunt octo praecepta Decalogi.
But we inquire whether the exterior act is good or evil by a goodness or malice formally distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, which it superadds to it1. And the question concerns the exterior act inasmuch as it is the mere execution of the interior act. For if some goodness were annexed accidentally and from without to the exterior act, e. g., the special grace of the exterior reception of the sacraments, or the grace of indulgence attached to almsgiving or to exterior prayer, it is certain that the exterior act would add this accidental goodness to the interior act. Likewise, if for the execution of the exterior act the interior act must needs be intensified or multiplied, as often happens, then also it is evident that the exterior act adds goodness or malice to the interior: yet not per se and by reason of itself, but only occasionally, because on occasion of the exterior act the interior act is intensified or multiplied. 1 Here q. 20, a. 4, c.
Sed quaerimus utrum actus exterior sit bonus vel malus bonitate vel malitia formali distincta a bonitate vel malitia actus interioris, quam ei superaddat1. Et est quaestio de actu exteriori ut est mera executio interioris. Si enim actui exteriori esset accidentaliter et ab extrinseco annexa aliqua bonitas, v. g., specialis gratia susceptioni exteriori sacramentorum, aut gratia indulgentiae eleemosynae seu orationi exteriori, certum est quod actus exterior hanc bonitatem accidentalem adderet actui interiori. Item, si ad executionem actus exterioris necesse sit actum interiorem intendi vel multiplicari, ut saepe contingit, etiam constat actum exteriorem addere bonitatem vel malitiam interiori : hoc tamen non per se et ratione sui, sed occasionaliter tantum, quia occasione actus exterioris intenditur aut multiplicatur actus interior. 1 Hic q. 20, a. 4, c.
I say 1°: The exterior act, precisely as the execution of the interior act, adds to it no goodness or malice simply, in the order to essential reward or punishment, but only secundum quid, in the order to accidental reward or punishment: whence it does not render the one acting better or worse simply, but only secundum quid.
Dico 1° : Actus exterior, ut est praecise executio actus interioris, illi non addit bonitatem aut malitiam simpliciter in ordine ad praemium aut poenam essentialem, sed tantum secundum quid, in ordine ad praemium vel poenam accidentale : unde non reddit operantem meliorem aut pejorem simpliciter, sed secundum quid tantum.
It is proved first part1. The exterior act is either considered as the object of the interior act, or as its effect or execution. But in neither way does it add to the interior a distinct goodness or malice. Therefore. — The first part of the minor is proved. If the exterior act be considered as the object of the interior act, the whole goodness or malice which is in it objectively is transfused into the act formally, so that the object has nothing objectively which is not in the act formally. Therefore the exterior act, as object, has no distinct goodness or malice which it superadds to the goodness or malice of the interior act, since it is on both sides the same, with this difference, that it is objectively in the exterior act, as in the object and motive of the will, and in the interior act formally, as in the subject. — The second part of the min. is proved, concerning which especially is the difficulty. The exterior act, precisely as effect and execution of the interior act, has no intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but is good or evil denominatively and extrinsically only from the goodness or malice of the interior act. Therefore it adds to the interior no distinct goodness or malice. — The foregoing is proved 1° by the most formal words of St. Thomas here a. 3, ad 3: « As, he says, health is derived from what is healthy in the animal to medicine and urine...; in this manner the goodness of the exterior act is derived from the goodness of the will. » Therefore, as health is in medicine and urine denominatively and extrinsically only, so moral goodness or malice in the exterior act. The same foregoing is proved 2° by a decisive reason. Liberty is the foundation of morality, and therefore intrinsic moral goodness or malice can be only there where there is intrinsic liberty. But in the exterior act of the executive power there is not intrinsic liberty; for this is intrinsically subjected in the will alone. Therefore. 1 Ibid.
Probatur prima pars1. Actus exterior vel consideratur ut objectum interioris, vel ut ejus effectus seu executio. Atqui neutro modo addit interiori bonitatem vel malitiam distinctam. Ergo. — Probatur prima pars minoris. Si actus exterior consideretur ut objectum interioris, tota bonitas vel malitia quae est in illo objective, transfunditur in actum formaliter, ita ut objectum nihil habeat objective quod non sit in actu formaliter. Ergo actus exterior, ut objectum, non habet aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam distinctam, quam superaddat bonitati vel malitiae actus interioris, cum sit utrimque eadem, cum hac differentia quod sit objective in actu exteriori, ut in objecto et motivo voluntatis, et in actu interiori formaliter, ut in subjecto. — Probatur secunda pars min., de qua est praesertim difficultas. Actus exterior, ut effectus et executio interioris praecise, nullam habet bonitatem vel malitiam moralem intrinsecam, sed est bonus vel malus denominative extrinsece tantum a bonitate vel malitia actus interioris. Ergo non addit interiori ullam bonitatem vel malitiam distinctam. — Probatur ant. 1° verbis formalissimis D. Thoma hic a. 3, ad 3 : « Sicut, inquit, a sano quod est in animali derivatur sanum ad medicinam et urinam...; hoc modo a bonitate voluntatis derivatur bonitas actus exterioris. » Ergo, sicut sanitas est in medicina et urina denominative extrinsece tantum, ita bonitas vel malitia moralis in actu exteriori. Probatur idem ant. 2° ratione peremptoria. Libertas est fundamentum moralitatis, ideoque bonitas vel malitia moralis intrinseca ibi solum esse potest, ubi est libertas intrinseca. Atqui in actu exteriori potentiae executivae non est libertas intrinseca; haec enim in sola voluntate intrinsece subjicitur. Ergo. 1 Ibid.
It is confirmed. If the exterior act adds something to the interior act, either that superadded thing is willed by the interior act, as by the exterior act it is exercised, or it is not: if it be not willed, it is not a moral good or evil, and thus it adds nothing of goodness or malice; if it be willed, by this very fact it is prehad in the interior act of the will, in which is the foundation of all morality. Therefore.
Confirmatur. Si actus exterior aliquid addat interiori, vel illud superadditum est volitum ab actu interiori sicut ab exteriori est exercitum, vel non : si non sit volitum, non est bonum aut malum morale, et sic nihil addit bonitatis aut malitiae; si sit volitum, hoc ipso praehabetur in actu interiori voluntatis, in qua est fundamentum totius moralitatis. Ergo.
It is proved the second part of the conclusion1. The interior act is compared to the exterior as tendency and motion to the term and end. But every tendency and motion is perfected and consummated in this, that it attain the end and reach the term; whence the will is not perfect unless it be such that, the opportunity being given, it operate. Therefore the exterior act adds to the interior goodness or malice, not simply, or distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior, but secundum quid, that is, the same extended and consummated, or its extension and consummation. 1 Ibid.
Probatur secunda pars conclusionis1. Actus interior comparatur ad exteriorem tamquam tendentia et motus ad terminum et finem. Atqui omnis tendentia et motus perficitur et consummatur in hoc quod consequatur finem et attingat terminum; unde non est perfecta voluntas, nisi sit talis qua opportunitate data operetur. Ergo actus exterior addit interiori bonitatem vel malitiam, non simpliciter, seu distinctam a bonitate vel malitia interioris, sed secundum quid, id est eamdem extensam et consummatam, seu ejus extensionem et consummationem. 1 Ibid.
Whence it follows that it makes the one acting better, not simply, but secundum quid, and that it is in the order to punishment or reward, not essential, but accidental.
Ex quo sequitur quod faciat agentem meliorem, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, et quod sit in ordine ad poenam aut praemium, non essentiale, sed accidentale.