Fundamental Moral Theology

1. Definition. 1. Moral theology can be defined: the science of human activity, insofar as it is directed to the ultimate supernatural end.

a. The material object of moral theology is human acts, that is, the whole free human activity; for moral theology undertakes to direct this activity to the end of human life. The formal object is the human act in order to the ultimate supernatural end; for moral theology considers human acts not under just any respect, but insofar as they are ordered to the ultimate end of human life, or insofar as by them man tends to the end of eternal life.

b. It belongs to moral theology to teach in what way human actions ought to be arranged, so that through them man may attain his ultimate end. But a twofold ultimate end of man can be considered: the natural, which befits man insofar as he is a creature of God, and such as it would have been if God had left man in the order of nature; and the supernatural, which befits man insofar as he is a son of God, and which in the present supernatural order is proposed to us as to be attained. Which actions bring man to the natural end can be known by the natural light of reason, and this is taught by moral philosophy; but which actions befit the supernatural end can be known only from divine revelation, and this is taught by moral theology. Nevertheless the natural and supernatural end, or order, do not exclude each other, but the supernatural supposes the natural and elevates it to a greater dignity.

2. The proposed definition is to be proved: for the definition of any science ought to set forth its proper object, so that it may be distinguished from every other science. But the proposed definition sets forth the proper object of moral theology, and indeed in such a way that moral theology is easily distinguished from ethics, which is occupied with the same object: for ethics orders human actions to the ultimate natural end, whereas moral theology orders the same actions to the ultimate supernatural end.

¹ Bouquillon, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, 3rd ed. (Bruges: Beyaert, 1903). Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis, 10th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1902). Muller, Theologia Moralis, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Meyer, 1894). Schwane, Allgemeine Moraltheologie (Freiburg: Herder, 1885). Simar, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie (Freiburg: Herder, 1893). Pruner, "Moraltheologie" (Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed.). Gopfert, Moraltheologie, 6th ed. (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1905). Kraunitzky, Moraltheologische Einleitung, 2nd ed. (Breslau: Aderholz, 1898). Schindler, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie (Vienna: Opitz, 1897).

2. Other definitions. Moral theology can be defined in two other ways:

a. The science of the laws and means by which human actions are ordered to the ultimate supernatural end.

In order that man may come to the supernatural end of eternal life, God has given precepts which must be observed, and has instituted means which must be employed. Hence, in order to direct human actions to their ultimate end, norms to be observed from the will of God and means to be employed from the same will must be proposed. Since, therefore, the task of moral theology consists in this, that it direct human actions to the ultimate end, moral theology must teach both the laws given by God and the means instituted by God.

b. The science of the virtues which man must exercise in order to come to the ultimate supernatural end.

Every moral action of man is in the genus of some virtue; for by any human action by which a norm is observed or a means is employed, through which man is directed to the ultimate end, some virtue is exercised. Therefore the proper task of moral theology can also be set forth in this way: that it teaches the virtues which man, according to the will of God, must exercise in order to attain his ultimate end. Hence moral theology can truly be called the doctrine concerning Christian virtues; and because the complex of all virtues is signified by the name of justice, moral theology is rightly called the doctrine concerning Christian justice - die Lehre von der christlichen Gerechtigkeit.

Note. It can be asked whether moral theology is properly a doctrine concerning virtues, or rather a doctrine concerning duties. Both can be truly and rightly affirmed: for the proper task of moral theology is so to direct man that he may obtain the end of eternal life. Now man can be directed to this end in two ways: either by deducing from Christian revelation and declaring the virtues which must be exercised for obtaining the ultimate end; or by collecting and explaining the norms or precepts which, according to the will of God, must be observed for obtaining the ultimate end. The former was done by St. Thomas in the second part of the second part of the Summa Theologica; the latter was accomplished by St. Alphonsus in moral theology. The former is more suited to theory and speculation, the latter to the practice of the confessional and to popular instruction. Nevertheless moral theology does not set forth the doctrine of the virtues absolutely and perfectly, but it teaches the virtues only insofar as they are prescribed and insofar as their exercise is necessary for obtaining eternal life or for avoiding sin. The doctrine of the virtues, complete in every respect up to the highest perfection, belongs to Ascetic Theology.

3. Practical theology. Moral theology is a theological science, and indeed a practical one.

a. It belongs to the nature of moral science that it set forth truths pertaining to morals not in any manner whatever, but in such a way that it demonstrates them from principles or sources, shows the connection by which they cohere both with each other and also with the ultimate end, confirms one from another, and by reasoning from them deduces new truths; this is what moral theology, if it deserves to be marked by this name, must accomplish.

b. In order that it may be called a theological science in the strict sense, it must not only treat of God, but must also be known from divine revelation. But moral theology treats of God insofar as He is the ultimate supernatural end to be attained by man, and insofar as He is the lawgiver and institutor of the means of salvation; and this is known chiefly from divine revelation.

c. A practical science is one which does not intend mere knowledge of truth, but rather operation. But moral theology is wholly concerned with directing human actions, since from its task it teaches which precepts are to be observed and which virtues are to be exercised for obtaining the end of eternal life.

4. On the progress of moral science. Although the moral truths to be proposed in moral theology always remain unchanged in themselves, nevertheless moral theology itself, insofar as it is a theological science, can and must make continual progress. For, in the first place, the conditions of human life are continually changed and developed; hence moral truths must be applied to new conditions of life, so that human life may be in every respect consonant with moral norms. Moreover the sciences, both sacred and profane, daily increase and are perfected; indeed new sciences repeatedly arise. But the advances of these sciences and their discoveries are also of use to moral theology and perfect it. Finally, in the course of time, different adversaries arise and assail moral truths with new weapons. But by the fact that their attacks are rejected and their difficulties solved, moral truths themselves shine with greater clarity and are established with more perfect certitude.

5. The relation of moral theology to related sciences. a. To ethics. Ethics agrees with moral theology in many things; indeed the latter partly contains the former in itself. For since the supernatural end does not exclude the natural end, but rather supposes and contains it, what is evil with respect to the natural end will necessarily also be evil with respect to the supernatural end, although what is good with respect to the natural end cannot yet be good with respect to the supernatural end unless it is elevated to the supernatural order.

Nevertheless ethics and moral theology differ in several respects:

a. By reason of the means of knowledge: for the means of knowing for ethics is natural reason; but the primary means of knowing for moral theology is divine revelation, while the secondary means is reason enlightened by faith.

b. By reason of the object: for moral theology adds to ethical truths many truths drawn from divine revelation, especially those which refer to supernatural life and to the theological virtues.

c. By reason of the end: for ethics directs man to natural perfection and the natural end; but moral theology directs him to supernatural perfection and the supernatural end.

d. By reason of the means: for moral theology teaches man the supernatural helps, and especially the sacraments instituted by God, so that by their aid he may be able to come to the end of eternal life. Likewise it supplies supernatural motives of acting - fear, hope, charity - and finally shows supernatural examples - the life of Christ and of the saints - so that the faithful may attain their end in an easier and more perfect way, as is shown by the highest Christian perfection which the saints of the Church have attained.

b. To dogmatic theology.

a. The older theologians did not distinguish dogmatic theology from moral theology, but brought together all revealed truths under the name of speculative theology into one body of doctrine.

b. Afterwards, however, they separated moral theology from dogmatic theology and treated it separately, so that they assigned to moral theology the truths which pertain to directing morals, and to dogmatic theology those truths which do not proximately refer to morals. They called the latter theoretical theology, and the former practical theology.

From this it is clear that many moral truths are drawn from divine revelation and, as dogmas, pertain to the object of faith, such as the truths concerning the exercise of the theological virtues. Indeed there are several truths about which discourse can be undertaken with equal right both in dogmatic theology and in moral theology, such as truths concerning the sacraments, justification, merit, the end of man, the virtues, sins, and so forth.

c. Dogmatic theology, with regard to truths which pertain to faith alone and not to morals, is the foundation of moral theology, so that one ought to support and illuminate the other. And indeed the moral actions of man themselves are understood more accurately and more perfectly from dogmatic truths concerning justice and original sin, creation, redemption, and the grace of the Redeemer. Moreover, there are many other dogmatic truths which shed much light on moral truths.

c. To pastoral theology. Pastoral theology is the doctrine concerning the care of souls. Therefore it teaches pastors how they ought to exercise the care of souls according to the example of Christ the Lord, who is the prince of pastors,¹ namely through the exercise of the threefold office: of teacher, priest, and king, or pastor. Moral theology, among all theological disciplines, is most closely related to pastoral theology. For moral theology treats of the obligations which are incumbent upon all men, so that by their observance they may come to the end of eternal life; but pastoral theology treats of the duties which are incumbent specifically upon pastors, so that they may rightly exercise the care of souls and by its exercise lead the faithful committed to them to the end of eternal life.

d. To juridical sciences. Ecclesiastical law directs the external activity of ecclesiastical society and orders the relation of individual faithful to that same society; it more accurately determines and perfects the law, both natural and positive divine. Since a true legislative power has been granted to the Church by God, her laws have force in the forum of conscience and, according to the will of God, must be observed, so that we may obtain the end of eternal life. Therefore moral theology must frequently also attend to the dispositions of ecclesiastical law. Civil law rules the external activity of civil society and determines the external relation of citizens both among themselves and to society itself; it explains and perfects the social law of nature. Since civil authority also is furnished with the power of making laws that bind in conscience, its laws too must be observed according to the will of God. Of these laws, those pertain especially to moral theology by which rights are established and determined.

Among the philosophical and juridical sciences in our time the social and economic sciences are diligently cultivated; their investigations must be attended to in moral theology, so that by their aid false or obsolete notions and opinions may be corrected and moral theology itself may be fittingly perfected.

Note 1. Theologians, with Clement of Alexandria leading the way,² reduce the relation between Christian ethics and ancient ethics, and the perfection of the former, to these three heads. Christian ethics: a. contains all moral truths, and these fittingly connected; b. supplies greater certitude, drawn both from evident internal reasons and from the highest authority of Christ; c. confers force and virtue, by which even the most difficult and most perfect moral precepts may be expressed in the life of the faithful.³

Note 2. The relation between Catholic and Protestant ethics is determined by these five heads. Catholic ethics: a. is governed by the infallible magisterium of the Church; on the contrary, Protestant ethics, which lacks such a magisterium, necessarily falls into subjectivism and error; b. its source is not Scripture alone, but besides Scripture it also acknowledges ecclesiastical tradition; c. it teaches that liberty is necessary for the moral life, and that neither sin nor grace removes it; d. it teaches that the justification of sinners consists in internal conversion and sanctification through divine grace, not in the subjective apprehension of the justice by which Christ is just; e. we obtain justification through the sacraments received in reality or in desire, which the Church alone instituted by Christ administers.

From these points two things are made manifest. The first is that the difference between Catholic and Protestant ethics must be called entirely essential; the second is that the reason for the difference must be taken from the dogmatic truths which are rejected by Protestants.⁴

¹ 1 Pet. 5:4.

² Stromata 1, 20.

³ Cf. Mausbach, Christentum und Weltmoral (Munster: Aschendorff, 1897), pp. 1-35.

⁴ Cf. Mausbach, Die katholische Moral (Cologne: Bachem, 1901), p. 70 ff.

6. Method. Moral theology, by reason of its task, proposes norms and laws by which the moral and Christian life of man must be directed. Now the method of moral theology is the mode and form which is observed in proposing these laws, or in treating moral theology. A threefold method is distinguished: positive, scholastic, and casuistic.

a. The positive method is that by which moral truths, drawn from the proper sources of this science and proved from them, are proposed in systematic order. Therefore the positive method supplies a simple knowledge of moral truths from their sources.

b. The scholastic or speculative method is that by which moral truths taken from their proper sources are explained more accurately, confirmed from theological and philosophical principles, vindicated from attacks, the connection by which they cohere with one another and with the ultimate end is investigated, and finally conclusions are deduced from them. Therefore the scholastic method supplies a deeper and more scientific knowledge of the same truths.

c. The casuistic method is that by which, systematic order being neglected, moral truths are applied to particular cases, and these the rarer cases of human life, and practical questions, especially the more difficult ones, are resolved from moral principles, so that in individual cases it may be known what is lawful and what unlawful, what is grave sin and what light sin.

a. Others, passing over the positive method as being joined with the scholastic method by an inseparable bond, distinguish this threefold way of treating moral theology: scholastic, casuistic, and mystical. The mystical method is that by which moral truths are treated in such a way that they arouse and direct one to pursue virtue, and that perfect virtue. Therefore the mystical method sets forth the individual virtues and their diverse grades of perfection, and from moral truths deduces reasons and motives by which man may be moved and determined to pursue Christian perfection. Since there exists a special theological discipline, namely ascetic theology, which treats of virtues in this way, the mystical method is not a way of treating moral theology.

b. Moral theologians who chiefly follow the casuistic method are called casuists. Some of them, with the exposition of principles almost entirely neglected, devote themselves almost exclusively to solving cases, especially the more difficult and intricate ones (Bucceroni, Genicot); others, however, after a more or less accurate and scientific exposition of principles has been set forth, give their effort to discussing cases (Elbel, Lehmkuhl).

7. The method of recent authors. Recent authors of moral theology do not follow only one method in preference to the others, but most of them fittingly join all three. Therefore, although in the different parts of moral theology, according as the matter itself requires, one method prevails over the others, nevertheless generally there is discerned a method composed and mixed from these three.

And rightly indeed the casuistic method is joined also with the positive-scholastic method.

For where moral theology is proposed to future confessors, the mere exposition of moral principles is not sufficient, but the resolution of diverse cases and questions drawn from practical life is altogether necessary. For the application of principles to practical questions, especially those entangled by diverse circumstances, is not without difficulty for beginners; and this difficulty cannot be overcome except by long and varied exercises.

Moreover, the solution of many practical questions is taken not so much from certain principles as from the prudent judgment and estimation of experts. But such a prudent estimation is not acquired except by the manifold consideration and study of cases which authors discuss and resolve.

Hence it happens that in moral theology, especially in questions whose solution depends upon prudent estimation, not only is much deference given to the authority of those theologians who excel the rest in prudent judgment, but also the opinion of several authors is usually cited, because the conforming judgment of several in questions of this sort offers a very clear testimony of truth.

8. Division. In order that moral theology may suit the practical end which we chiefly intend, it can fittingly be divided into three parts. The first is concerning the foundations of moral theology, or concerning the first and general principles of this science. The second is concerning precepts, which sets forth the norms drawn from Christian revelation which man, according to the will of God, must observe in order to attain the ultimate end of eternal life. The third is concerning the sacraments, which are so many means or helps of salvation instituted by God, so that man by their use may come to eternal life. God commands the use of these means by positive law, and the Church determines it by her decrees.

This division does not differ from that by which moral theology is commonly divided into two parts, of which one is called general or fundamental, the other special. The former sets forth the general principles of morals, namely those properties which must belong to all human actions so that they may be apt for the ultimate end. The latter teaches what man in particular must do or omit, namely both the obligations which, according to the will of God, man must fulfill, and the means which he must employ in order to obtain eternal life. For this reason special moral theology comprises those two parts which we mentioned above: concerning precepts and concerning the sacraments.

THE Christian faith teaches that the end of human life is to know, love, and serve God. If a man fulfils this obligation faithfully till death, it further gives him the assured hope of eternal happiness with God in heaven. All our actions should be directed towards the end for which the whole man exists; if an action is such that it conduces to that end, it is a good, moral action; if, on the contrary, it does not conduce to that end, it is a bad, immoral action.

Not all man’s actions, however, are capable of being invested with this moral quality. There are many actions of man which have no more moral quality than the growth of a tree in the garden or the running of a dog in the street. Good or bad digestion is an operation to a great extent removed from man’s control; he is in general no more responsible for it than for the condition in which he was born. Or, if some immoral picture is suddenly thrust under his eyes, he cannot help seeing it. Such acts are neither moral nor immoral; they are neither capable of conducing to the end of moral human action, nor of diverting the agent from it: they merit neither praise nor blame.

A man is a good man morally if he performs well the good actions over which he has control; he is a bad man if he wilfully performs bad actions. So that the actions over which a man has control, the actions which he freely performs, are alone capable of making him a good or a bad man; they are the only actions of man which have a moral quality; they alone are treated of in moral theology. It is the task of moral theology to frame rules for human conduct according to the teaching of the Catholic Church, to decide what actions are good and what bad according to the principles of the Christian faith.

The actions over which a man has control are in a special sense called human if acts, because they are due to his free choice. That man has the power of free choice or free will, is clearly taught in Holy Scripture, and is a dogma of faith.¹ It is also a truth of sound philosophy,” vouched for by the consciousness of each individual and by the common sense of mankind. It does not belong to our province to prove the doctrine. We suppose that, at any rate in many of his daily actions, when all the conditions requisite for action are present, a man is free to act or not, to perform this action rather than that other. A man must indeed have a motive for action, but that motive does not constrain him to act; if he has the use and control of his reason, he may as long as he is in life perform or abstain from the action proposed to him. Man has the wonderful power, unique in all the visible creation, of directing his mental and bodily activity in this way or that according to his good pleasure; and it is this wonderful power which makes him a moral agent, and makes it worth while to discuss and formulate rules of human conduct. Man himself is the cause of his human acts; he freely directs them to the end of human existence, or to some perverse end of his own choice.

¹ Ecclus. xxxi 10; Trent, sess. 6, can. 5, 6.

This power of free choice is a property of the rational will, and is the natural complement of the deliberative reason with which man is also endowed. For among the various objects offered to the will’s acceptance, the reason can propose motives for the selection of one object rather than of another, and, at any rate in many actions, until the deliberation is finished, the will need not decide between them. If an object capable of satisfying all our desires were presented to us, there would indeed be no room for deliberation; as Dante expresses it: Such one becomes, admiring that blest Ray, That, whatsoever else allure the sight, Impossible it is to turn away; Because the one sole wished-for Good is there, A.d everything defective elsewhere found, In it is perfected beyond compare. Paradiso, xxxiii 100. Wright’s translation. In the presence of such an object, the whole man, with all the vehemence of his will made for good, would rush into the embrace of his God. For God alone is capable of wholly satisfying all man’s desires. Or again, if some object of ardent natural desire were suddenly thrust upon us, leaving no time for deliberation, overwhelming us with the idea of its power¹ to satisfy our appetite, it might be that no room was left for free choice, that we should be necessitated to action. There would be at least some indeliberate motion towards the object, a movement of the will which divines call motus primo-primus. If in such a case the power of deliberation is not altogether smothered, but is exercised, though imperfectly, the movement of the will which follows is called secundo-primus. If the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi-deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin.²

These principles are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect.

It follows from what has been said that previous knowledge of, and deliberation about, the object proposed by the intellect to the will, is necessary to free and moral action, which is defined by divines to be action which proceeds from man’s deliberative will.³

¹ M. Maher, Psychology, 5th ed., p. 394.

² St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7.

³ St Thomas, 1-2, q. I, a. 1.

Human acts are by theologians divided into various classes:

(a) Internal acts are performed by the internal powers of the soul; external, by the bodily organs.

(b) Elicited acts are such as proceed immediately from the will and are performed by it alone. They are usually said to be six in number; three having reference to the end, and three others to the means for the attaining of the end. A wish is a simple inclination of the will or an ineffectual desire of an object; an intention is a firm resolve to attain an object by the use of the appropriate means; fruition is a peaceful delight in the possession, real or imagined, of a loved object. The act of selection between various means to an end is called choice; if no alternative is offered by the intellect, acceptance of the means by the will is called consent, though this term is more commonly used of every act of acceptance by the will of an object proposed to it; use or execution is said of the act of the will which applies the means chosen to the obtaining of the end proposed.

Commanded acts are executed by other faculties than the will by which they are commanded.

(c) Natural acts are performed by man’s faculties unaided by divine grace; supernatural, by the help of God’s grace.

(d) Good actions are conformed to the rules of morality; bad actions are contrary to them; those that are indifferent may be good or bad according to circumstances.

(e) Valid acts are such as have all the conditions requisite, and so produce their effect; invalid acts are destitute of some condition necessary to produce their effect.

Human acts, the subject-matter of moral theology, are also called voluntary acts to distinguish them from such actions as are produced under external compulsion. For voluntary acts are the effect of an internal principle, the will (voluntas). The term, however, is ordinarily used not of all actions which are produced by an internal principle, for some of these are specially denominated spontaneous or reflex actions. These latter are the immediate result of sense excitation without the intervention of consciousness. Thus the eyelid closes to protect the threatened organ, and the hand rises involuntarily to drive off a troublesome fly. Voluntary in the strict sense is used only of actions produced by the will with rational knowledge of, and inclination towards, the object. Voluntary actions are produced with consciousness and deliberation. Thus, practically and in the concrete, voluntary actions are identical with human acts, though their connotation is different. For human acts connote freedom, as we have seen, while an act may be voluntary and yet not free. The beatific vision by which the blessed see God face to face, and are thereby thrilled with ineffable delight, is a voluntary act; it proceeds from the will with full and clear knowledge of God, but it is not free; the blessed cannot avert their gaze from the Infinite Beauty which enraptures every fibre of their being. However, all voluntary acts of man are in this life free, and so, for the purposes of moral theology, human acts and voluntary acts are interchangeable terms.

An act may be voluntary in various ways:

(a) An act is perfectly voluntary if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; if the knowledge and deliberation are not full, the act is imperfectly voluntary.

(b) Simply or absolutely voluntary is distinguished from voluntary under a certain respect, or secundum quid. More commonly an action which under the circumstances is willed, but which would not be willed if the circumstances were different, is said to be simply or absolutely voluntary; while inasmuch as the same action would not be willed if the circumstances were different, it may also be said to be only voluntary under a certain respect. Thus, to take the well-worn example, when the merchant is willing in a storm that his goods should be thrown overboard to save the ship, the action is simply voluntary; he would not will it unless the ship were in danger, so that it is also voluntary only under a certain respect.

(c) An action is said to be voluntary in itself when it is in itself and by itself the object of the will; if it is merely the effect of something else which is willed, it is then called voluntary in something else, or voluntary in the cause.

Frequently directly and indirectly voluntary are used in the same sense as voluntary in itself and voluntary in the cause.

All voluntary action is imputed to the agent for praise or blame, merit or demerit; for the action is free, as we have seen, and proceeds from a positive inclination of the will. This inclination of the will is an important element in voluntary actions; the absence of it prevents the sin of man being imputed to God as voluntary, and the same principle sometimes justifies us in performing an action which is right in itself, though some of its effects are evil. But this is an important point and requires fuller treatment.

First of all then, let us see what is required before an evil effect of my action can justly be imputed to me and make me morally guilty.

(a) The evil effect must in some measure be foreseen, otherwise it will be involuntary and not imputable. And so no moral blame attaches to a man who, thinking that he is drinking water, swallows poison. (b) The agent must be able to prevent the evil effect, for we are only responsible for what is under our control. The engine-driver of an express train is not responsible for the death of a person who suddenly throws himself under the wheels of the engine.

(c) There must be an obligation not to perform the action by reason of the evil effect which would follow from it. If the evil effect follows merely by accident, it does not render an otherwise lawful action unlawful, and I am not bound to abstain from it on account of the mere possibility of the evil effect following from it. Thus, if a hundred people indulge in hunting or motoring for a considerable time, some one of them is morally certain to meet with an accident endangering lite or limb. But this does not make hunting or motoring morally wrong. Though I am conscious that the accident may happen to me, I may nevertheless hunt or use the motorcar as usual. If I kill myself or someone else, it will be merely by accident, for it is presumed that I use reasonable care to avoid mishap.

On the other hand, a superior, whose commands I am bound to obey, may have used his authority to forbid an action on account of the possible evil effect which may follow therefrom. In that case I must abstain from the action by reason of the command of my superior, though otherwise I should be free. And so if a father, for special reasons, forbids his son to go to the theatre, the son should obey, as long as he is subject to parental authority. Again, even though there may be no positive command of a superior, in cases where no good would come from the action, and where the only effects would be evil, I am bound to abstain from the action, which in that case itself becomes evil. Similarly, where the evil effects are largely in excess of the good, right reason tells me that I must abstain from the action. But there are many actions which are forbidden by no lawful authority, which have both good and evil effects, while it is not clear that the latter largely outweigh the former. Am I bound to abstain from such actions, or when am I bound to abstain from them ?

In order to provide a general rule of conduct in such circumstances, divines have formulated what is known as the principle of a double effect. That principle may be enunciated as follows: It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad, provided that (1) the action, viewed in itself, is good, or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good; (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of— the bad; and (4) there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect.

This rule will furnish us with a guide in case of doubt whether we are bound to abstain from any given action because of some evil effect which will follow from it. We shall be at liberty to perform the action in question provided that four conditions are realized. In the first place, the action itself, apart from the evil effect, must not be bad. If it is bad in itself, there can be no question about its lawfulness. Further, the agent must not intend the evil effect, though he foresees that it will follow. If he intends it, the evil effect becomes voluntary in itself and imputable to the agent. Then, the good effect must not be the result of the bad, for we must not do evil that good may come; the end does not justify the means.1 Lastly, there must be such a proportion between the good and bad effects that right reason tells me that I am not forbidden to forego the good effect of the action on account of the bad being inextricably bound up with it.

The question as to whether a general is justified in ordering his army to take a stronghold by assault in war will serve to illustrate the principle and its use. In the first place, the assault must be justified by itself, apart from the cost in human life. The assault will be justified in itself if the war is just and the stronghold belongs to the enemy; it will not be justified if the war is one of unjust aggression, or if the general has been expressly ordered by his Government not to take the place. Moreover, the general must not directly intend the necessary loss of life among the innocent non-belligerents.

He foresees and deplores it; he is said in the technical language of theology to permit the evil effect, not to intend it. The slaughter of innocent non-belligerents must not be the means chosen to capture the stronghold; evil may not be done that good may come. Finally, the capture of the place must be a matter of sufficient importance in the war to warrant the shedding of innocent blood in the bombardment, and the other evils necessarily entailed in an assault. The question as to when the good result is sufficient to outweigh the evil is largely a matter of sound judgement after a careful examination of all the circumstances. If the successful storming of the place would only add to the personal reputation of the general without bringing the end of the war any the nearer, the assault would be a crime; if it would compel the enemy to sue for peace, it would usually be justified. This principle is of great importance in Moral Theology; it has in its support the common consent of divines, and is expressly used by St Thomas.”

If I am not justified, according to the foregoing principle, in performing an action which causes some evil effect, that evil effect is imputable to me though I did not intend it in itself; it is not indeed voluntary in itself, but it is voluntary in its cause, and I am bound to avoid evil even though only voluntary in its cause.

When, however, evil is not voluntary in itself, but only voluntary in its cause, a question arises concerning the degree of moral guilt which is contracted when such a cause of evil is posited unwarrantably. The case arises especially when grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide.

But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour’s crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case¹ Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence² ‘The answer must be ‘“‘ No.”’ For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

¹ Rom. iii 8.

² Summa, 2-2, q. 64, a. 7.

'Theologians dispute about the question whether such a sin of omission as is committed by not closing the gate after me, with resulting loss to my neighbour, can be committed without a special act, by simply neglecting to put the act which was of obligation.

The question is not a very practical one; it will be sufficient to say in reply that physically a man who adverts to the obligation of doing something may hold himself neutral, and so sin by omission without doing anything; practically, however, in such cases, a positive determination is formed not to perform the duty, or at least to perform something else which is foreseen to be an obstacle to the performance of the duty.¹

¹ Suarez, tract. 5, d. 3, sec. 2, n. 6.

The question sometimes arises at what time a sin of omission or a sin which is voluntary only in the cause is committed. When a man gets drunk on the Saturday evening and foresees that in consequence he will not be able to attend Mass on the following day, is the sin of omitting to hear Mass committed on the Saturday night, when he voluntarily posits the cause of his not hearing Mass on the following day, or on the Sunday, when Mass is not heard as is of obligation? Inasmuch as a formal sin is a human act, it would seem that we must say with St Alphonsus¹ that the sin is committed when the cause of the omission or of the evil is voluntarily posited, otherwise we should have to say that a man may commit sin without knowing it, or while he is asleep. ‘10.

¹ Theol. Mor. lib. 5,

WE have seen that we are responsible only for those actions which are performed with knowledge or advertence and freedom of choice. Whatever tends to prevent or lessen advertence, or to restrict liberty, will tend to diminish our responsibility. Ignorance affects advertence, fear and violence influence freedom of choice, and concupiscence influences both. Something must now be said on each of these causes which affect the voluntariness and imputability of our actions.

Ignorance is the absence of knowledge which the person who is ignorant should have. It is thus distinguished from nescience, which is merely the absence of knowledge, without the implication that the knowledge should be possessed.

Ignorance must also be carefully distinguished from error or mistake, which is a false judgement concerning something. Thus, if I simply do not know the person to whom I am speaking, I am in ignorance of his identity; if I mistake him for someone else, I am in error.

(a) With reference to the subject who is ignorant, ignorance is either invincible or vincible.

Invincible ignorance cannot be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. This may arise in my mind either because no thought of my want of knowledge occurs to me, and so the idea of making inquiries never enters into my head, or because I have failed to acquire knowledge on the point, though I made all reasonable efforts to do so. What efforts should be made in any given case depends on the character and circumstances of the person and the matter on which he is ignorant. If the matter is of great importance, if it affects the salvation of souls or the spiritual and temporal welfare of large numbers, great efforts must be made to dissipate ignorance; the efforts which would be sufficient in the case of one poorly instructed, or very much occupied with other weighty affairs, would not be It sufficient in other cases where these suppositions are not verified. In general, where knowledge is of obligation those efforts must be made to acquire it which ordinarily prudent and good men would exert in the circumstances.

Vincible ignorance is such as can be removed by the use of the requisite diligence. Various degrees are distinguished by divines according as some, or little, or no diligence is exercised to dispel it or means are used to foster it. If means are used to foster it, the ignorance is called affected; if little or no diligence is used to dispel it, it is called crass or supine; if some diligence is used, but not what is required in the case, it is called simply vincible ignorance.

(b) With reference to the object of ignorance, we must distinguish ignorance of law, fact, and penalty. 'There is ignorance of law, if the law’s existence is not known, as when a Catholic does not know that the Church forbids marriage within the third degree of kindred. There would be ignorance of fact, if it were not known that A. B. is related to C. D. within the third degree. Ignorance of the penalty is distinguished from ignorance of law when some special sanction is not known, though the law itself is known.

(c) With reference to the action of the subject, we distinguish antecedent, consequent, and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is not voluntary, it is not willed by the subject; consequent ignorance is voluntary; concomitant is not expressly willed, but the action which is done with concomitant ignorance would ex hypothesi be done, even if the ignorance did not exist.

Invincible ignorance, as defined above, excuses from fault, so that, however bad an action done in invincible ignorance may be, it cannot be a formal sin. The reason is obvious; there is no knowledge in the agent of the malice of the action, and so the bad action is involuntary, and not imputable.

Vincible ignorance of the malice of the act, however, cannot excuse one who does wrong. He does not indeed will the evil in itself, but he wills its cause, and so it is voluntary in its cause and imputable. A person who sins in simply vincible ignorance, or even in crass ignorance, is indeed less blameworthy than one who sins with full knowledge of the malice of his act; the sin is only imperfectly voluntary, and less imputable than if perfectly voluntary. There is an apparent difference of opinion among theologians as to whether affected ignorance increases or lessens the malice of a wrong Prop. 2 damn. ab Alex. viii; 68 inter Baianas, can. 2202. action. With many modern authors it seems best to distinguish the motive with which in each case ignorance is fostered. If the state of ignorance is fostered through fear of being compelled by knowledge to abstain from the sinful act, such affected ignorance would seem to lessen the malice of the sin; the wrongdoer would not in this case venture to sin if he had full knowledge, and so he fosters his ignorance; his will is less malicious than if he sinned with full deliberation and consent. If, on the contrary, he merely fosters his ignorance to be able to plead it in excuse, and he is so bent on sinning that he would do the act in the same way even if he had full knowledge of its malice, then it does not seem to diminish the sin; it is rather a sign of an absolute determination to commit the sin.¹

We saw in a former chapter that the degree of malice which attaches to a sin committed in more or less culpable ignorance is measured rather by the sinfulness of the neglect to put away the ignorance, than by the sinfulness of the act in itself.

¹ Bucceroni, 1, n. 51, can. 2229.

Ignorance itself of what we are bound to know, as of the obligations of our state of life, of the truths of faith which are necessary to salvation, is sinful if consequent and vincible; antecedent and invincible ignorance is of course not sinful.

Ignorance does not render an act invalid which has all other requisites for its validity; and so baptism conferred by one who knows nothing about its effects will be valid, if the - matter and form are correctly applied with the intention of doing what the Church does. Substantial error or mistake about the person with whom marriage is contracted will invalidate the contract, while ignorance of who the person is will not, if there be the will to marry.

In theology concupiscence is used in two distinct senses. It frequently signifies the inclination to evil, which in human nature is a result of the fall of our first parents. In this sense it is called sin by the Apostle.¹ Without any moral or immoral implication the word is used here to denote any passion or any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object. It comprehends, therefore, any movement of love, desire, or hatred, sorrow, anger, or delight.

Concupiscence is antecedent or consequent. The former precedes any action of the will, and so is involuntary. The latter is voluntary, either because it is deliberately and directly excited by the will, or at any rate willed in its cause.

¹ Trent, sess. 5, de pec. orig.

Antecedent concupiscence lessens the malice of an evil action which is done under its impulse. For concupiscence troubles the intellect, so that it cannot dispassionately weigh the moral quality of the object proposed to the will and the motives for rejecting it; moreover, concupiscence paints the object in more than naturally attractive colours, so that it exerts an undue influence on the will. Concupiscence thus disturbs the indifference of the will and renders the act which follows less voluntary and free. It is accordingly less imputable to the agent.

It sometimes happens that antecedent concupiscence renders the subsequent action involuntary, and so in no wise imputable, however wrong it may be. This will be the case when some sudden onslaught of passion deprives the agent of the use of reason and blindly impels him to evil. Strong passions, such as love or anger, especially in impressionable natures, sometimes produce this result, and even when murder or suicide is committed in such circumstances juries are warranted in bringing in a merciful verdict of murder or suicide while temporarily insane. If, however, the passion was not altogether antecedent, but in the early stages of its onslaught there was room for deliberation, the consequent evil will not be altogether involuntary; it will to some extent be voluntary in its cause at least.+

It used to bea matter of dispute among theologians whether a man could be insane and not responsible for his actions in some one category, while he retained his self-control in others. In our days it will hardly be disputed that monomania exists, and if it exists, as, for example, in the matter of intoxicating drink, the monomaniac will not be directly responsible for his actions done under the influence of his madness, although he may be responsible for them in their cause.” ¹ Similarly, those who suffer from illusions may be so demented on the particular point as not to be responsible for actions which they perform under the influence of their illusion. It is a question of fact when this is the case, a fact which it is difficult even for experts to determine.

Natural propensities to evil arising from hereditary taint or from temperament lessen the voluntariness of the action just as passion does, but they are not as a rule so strong as to make what in itself is mortally sinful only venial.

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7, can. 2206.

Consequent concupiscence increases the malice of a bad action if it is wilfully excited, because the tendency of the will to evil is voluntarily made more intense. If the passion is voluntary only in its cause, it is rather a sign of the great intensity of the perverse will from which it flows, but which it does not cause.

The evil motions of anger, impurity, rash judgement which precede all advertence and deliberation of the mind, cannot of course be sinful, as they are not voluntary. They become sinful when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice. The question is discussed among theologians, whether it be sinful, and in what degree, to remain neutral under an evil motion of concupiscence, neither giving consent to it nor positively resisting it. If the question is raised concerning a vehement temptation to impurity, it may reasonably be denied that it is ordinarily possible to remain neutral; the danger of consenting would be too great. In such a case there will usually be a grave obligation to resist positively for fear of being drawn into giving consent. Positive resistance does not mean direct and physical effort, which would be worse than useless; but it means that we must, under temptation, avert our minds from the evil suggestion and occupy them with other thoughts. If, however, the question be put, whether sin is committed by remaining neutral under temptation to evil, not deliberating about committing it, but simply neither consenting to it nor rejecting it, the correct answer would seem to be that a venial but not a mortal sin is thereby mortally sinful only venial. The struggle against vice is more difficult for those who are subject to such propensities, but as long as they are in their right senses with the help of God’s grace they can resist, if only they take the necessary means. The same must be said of those who have strengthened their passions and weakened their will by long indulgence in a habit of sin. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 1, n. 236. ‘“‘ ' There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane.” C. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 1905, p. 174.

However, on p. 203 the same author writes: ‘‘ The majority of insane persons are sane in a considerable proportion of their conduct; and when in this part of their conduct they commit offences they are rightly punishable.” Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in a sentence which immediately follows the last. It is this: “‘ Since the limits between the sane and the insane areas of conduct of insane persons are ill defined, no insane person should be punished with the same severity that would be awarded to a sane person for the same offence.” committed. There is some sin, because we are commanded to rule the lower appetites and keep them in subjection to reason, which is not done in the case supposed. But the sin cannot be mortal, for there is no consent of the will, by which alone mortal sin can be committed. This is the teaching of St Thomas and of St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor. 5, n. 6.

Fear is defined to be a perturbation of the mind on account of some present or future danger.

It is grave or slight in proportion as the danger is serious or not serious. Absolutely grave fear is such as will seriously affect an ordinarily constant man, as the fear of death, of perpetual imprisonment, or of loss of goods; relatively grave is such as will seriously affect anyone of timid disposition.

Reverential fear is that which a subject feels lest he should offend his superior. Ordinarily, divines rank it as slight fear, but it may become grave if, for example, a very austere father threaten his daughter with loss of home or with his perpetual displeasure.

Fear from without is the result of some external danger, which may arise either from a necessary cause, as, e.g., from the danger of shipwreck; or it may be threatening from a free agent. Fear from within is from an internal cause, as the fear of death from a disease which has been contracted.

The actions which are done out of fear are simply voluntary, but they are usually also involuntary under a certain respect.

There is no question here of actions which are done in fear or with fear, as when I walk with fear and trembling along a lonely road by night. We are concerned with the effect which fear has on human actions done in consequence of fear; and unless it deprives the agent of the use of reason, which in rare cases may happen, the action remains voluntary, because it is done freely and deliberately to avoid the threatened danger. In such circumstances, as we saw above, the action is said to be simply voluntary; but it is also involuntary under a certain respect, for, unless the danger threatened, the action would not be done. An exception must be made with regard to attrition elicited from fear of hell, which, if it is to be efficacious, must be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary,¹ for otherwise it would not help to justify the sinner in the sacrament of Penance.² We can easily see how this is possible with regard to sin. For other actions done through fear have some evil or loss annexed to them, on which account they are involuntary under some respect; while aversion from sin is wholly good and reasonable, and so there is no reason why repentance for sin from fear of hell should not be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary.”

¹ St.Alphonsus, 6, n. 442.

² Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

Inasmuch as bad actions done through fear are simply voluntary, it would follow that they are imputable to the agent, so that fear does not excuse him from sin. And this is true of such actions as are intrinsically bad and against the natural law. The Church has always considered those to be apostates who through fear of death or persecution deny their faith, though less culpable than those who renounce it without excuse (Can. 2205).

However, with regard to positive precepts, grave fear ordinarily excuses transgressors of them from sin. The reason is, because the legislator is not presumed to desire that his laws should bind when their observance would entail such grave consequences to his subjects. Divines, relying on what we read in Holy Scripture, teach this doctrine concerning the positive law of God, and it will be all the more true of positive human legislation.¹ But if non-observance of a law or a command of a superior would cause great damage to the common good, then the law or command must be obeyed, even with loss of life; for private advantage must yield to the requirements of the common weal. And so a soldier must stick to his post in war, even at the risk of life.

¹ St Thomas, 3, q. 40, a. 4, ad 3; 1-2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 4; Suarez, De Leg. 3, c. 30, n. 6; Can. 2205, sec. 2.

Violence or coercion is the using of greater force than can be resisted to compel another to perform some action against his will. In certain connections the person who suffers violence is said in English law to be under duress.

It follows from the definition that violence is from something external to the agent; no one can offer violence to himself; and that the subject resists to the utmost of his power.

If the resistance is only partial, there is violence only under a certain respect (secundum quid).

The elicited acts of the will cannot be forced by violence, for in that case the agent would will and not will at the same time.

The other internal faculties, and much more the external faculties of man, may be subject to violence. If the violence is absolute, the resulting action is involuntary and not imputable to him who suffers violence; if the resistance is only partial, the action will be voluntary to a certain extent, and in the same degree it will be imputable to the agent (Can. 2205, 52215, Sec, 2).

By performing good actions a man becomes a good man morally, and he is a bad man morally if he performs bad actions. Actions are called good or bad morally with reference to the norm or rule of human conduct. So that the morality of an action is its relation to the rule of human conduct. It will be a morally good action if it be conformed to the rule of conduct; otherwise it will be a morally bad action. As men have differed, and do differ, widely in their views as to the meaning of human life and as to man’s destiny, they naturally have differed, and do differ, widely in deciding what is the rule of human conduct. The rule in different systems will be progress, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or pleasure, or the categorical imperative of the individual reason. Even among Catholic philosophers and divines there is some difference of opinion as to what constitutes the fundamental norm of morality. Practically the different opinions come to much the same, especially as there is greater agreement among Catholics as to what are the formal and proximate rules of morality. The teaching of St Thomas and many others seems to be that the fundamental norm of morality is rational human nature as such. Good in general is that which is conformable to the being whose good it is; and so morally good actions will be such as are conformable to the rational nature of man considered in itself and in all its relations.. Man’s intellect can know man himself, the existence of God and our relation to him, our relations to other human beings, and to the world round about us; knowing these things, our reason can tell us what actions are becoming and what unbecoming to such a nature. Moreover, reason tells us that although we have the physical liberty to do wrong, we are nevertheless under a moral obligation to abstain from it. Our most wise, and good, and provident Creator, who has given us our nature and placed us in the position which we hold, cannot be indifferent as to the manner in which we conduct ourselves. The still, small voice of conscience is there to tell us what is right, in the name of God whose herald it is, to approve of what we do well, to condemn what we do ill. The fundamental norm of right conduct, then, is man’s moral nature, morally right conduct is conduct in conformity with man’s nature in itself and in all its relations. This constitutes right order in the moral world, which God the Creator and provident Ruler of the universe cannot but will us to observe, and this divine Will or Reason bidding us to observe right order and prohibiting its violation is the eternal law of God, the formal objective rule of morality. Human reason, applied to conduct, or conscience, is the formal subjective rule which makes known to us and applies the objective rule¹

¹ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 65. 2, n. 65.

The morality of a human act belongs to it inasmuch as it issues freely from the will with knowledge of its moral quality. Because it is the free product of the human will, a human or a moral act makes a man culpable or praiseworthy. Now the will alone is free, and so morality belongs properly to the internal act of the will. In a perfect human action, indeed, the external act must follow, if it is in the agent’s power, in order to the completeness and perfection of the internal act; otherwise there will be no perfect and efficacious will, But the external act, which is called free only with reference to the will from which it proceeds, cannot have any separate morality of its own, nor of itself can it add to the morality of the internal act. In a complete human act, therefore, consisting of an internal and external action, morality is formally in the internal act alone. Accidentally, on account of longer duration, or repetition, or greater intensity which the external act causes, it may add something to the goodness or malice of the internal act, but not in and by itself. A man is good or bad as his will is good or bad.

From this it must not be concluded that an external sin is the same as an internal sin; that if a man has committed fornication, it is sufficient to confess the desire and intention to do so; the malice of the internal and external acts are the same substantially, but an internal act is different from an external act; and so the sins also differ, for sin is a bad human act.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether, besides the division into good and bad actions, we must also admit a third class, neither good nor bad, but indifferent. In the abstract, indifferent actions certainly exist; to take a walk, for example, in itself and in the abstract, is neither a good nor a bad action. But in the concrete, a man’s intention, and the circumstances in which the action is performed, necessarily give it a moral quality. The intention must be honest or not, the circumstances must be such as to make the action conformableto right reason or not, and so in the concrete any particular action must be either right or wrong; it must be either good or bad, it cannot be indifferent. An action may of course be morally good, and yet not supernaturally meritorious, and so indifferent from a supernatural point of view; and this perhaps is the meaning of some of those divines who contradict the above teaching of St Thomas and the common opinion of the schools.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 9.

An action which in itself is not conformable to right reason and order is against the law of nature and intrinsically bad. An action which in itself is not bad, but only bad because forbidden for good reasons by a lawful authority, as eating flesh meat on a day of abstinence, is said to be bad because forbidden; while intrinsically bad actions are forbidden by God because they are bad and inordinate. However, not all these intrinsically bad actions are bad in the same degree. Some are necessarily and always so, because in all circumstances they remain inordinate, as hatred of God, our first beginning and last end. Others in certain circumstances may become lawful, as taking what belongs to another, which in certain circumstances may be done without sin. The State for good reason may grant leave to take another’s land for a new railway; and a fortiori almighty God, the supreme Lord of all created things, may, without doing an injury, take the life, rights, or property of his creatures. Many divines explain the spoliation of the Egyptians, and the divine toleration of polygamy in the Old Law, by the aid of this principle.

Finally, some actions, as obscene touches and looks, are commonly inordinate and sinful; but if there is good reason for them, and due caution be exercised, they become lawful.¹

¹ Gury, I, n. 26.

We saw in the preceding section that there are various rules by which we know whether a human action is good or bad. It will be a good action if it be conformable to right order, otherwise it will be a bad action. It remains for us to cor- sider what elements in an action make it conformable or not with right order. What have we to attend to in order to know whether an action is according to right reason or not ?

There are three such elements, of which sometimes one, sometimes another, sometimes all together, contribute to make the actions in right order or, on the contrary, inordinate. They are the-object, the end, and the circumstances of the action.

By the object is here meant that to which the will primarily and directly tends; that which it determines to do looked at in itself, apart from the circumstances with which the action when done will be clothed; or it is the action considered in the abstract.

It is obvious that some objects, in the sense above defined, have an objective morality of their own, and this causes the will which tends towards them to be either good or bad as the object is good or bad. To blaspheme God is an action which no creature of his can will without the greatest inordinateness. The will to commit murder, or to steal another’s property, is essentially an evil will, because it tends to an evil object. On the contrary, to love God, to relieve human misery, to show love, honour, and reverence to one’s parents, are good actions, because these objects are good, and the will that tends to them is good.

Human actions, then, derive their specific morality from the object, whenever that object is of itself conformable to rational human nature or, on the contrary, not conformable to it. If the object is indifferent, without any objective moral quality, as walking, the action will derive its morality from the circumstances in which the action is performed.

By the end is here understood the reason or motive which induces the agent to act.

The end of all human life is called the last end; other motives for action are intermediate ends. An end is primary if it holds the first place among several, and would be sufficient by itself to induce action; otherwise it is secondary.

It is obvious that the end or motive which induces the agent to act holds a very prominent place among the sources of the morality of an action.

For it is the object to which the will tends, the prospect of gaining which moves the agent to act; but, as we saw in the last point, the motion of the will takes its moral quality from the object; a will, then, which tends to a good end will so far be good; a will which tends to a bad end will be bad. But the morality of an action resides chiefly in the will, so that a good or bad will, derived from the motive of an action, must necessarily contribute to the goodness or badness of that action. It is the end or motive which sets the will in motion and gives its own moral quality to the action which follows. One, then, who steals money in order to be able to commit adultery commits a sin against justice, induced thereto by a desire to sin against chastity, and as St Thomas, following Aristotle, says, he is more of an adulterer than a thief.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 6.

In the first book, which will present general moral theology, we shall speak first of the final end of man; then of motion in order to the final end, or of the human act considered according to its moral being; then of those things which dispose toward a human act, or of habits, especially good habits.¹

¹ Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, on St. Thomas I-II; Cajetan, on II-II, qq. 1-5; Billuart, I-II, De ultimo fine; the Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, tract 8, De ultimo fine, tract 9, De Beatitudine; Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, t. III, tr. II, De Deo fine ultimo, section I, De ultimo fine hominis; Lehu, Philosophia moralis et socialis, t. I; Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de St. Thomas d'Aquin; Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, vol. 1; Pegues, literal French commentary on the Summa of St. Thomas, tract VI; Meyer, Institutiones Iuris naturalis seu Philosophia moralis universa, part I, general natural law; Potters, Compendium Ethicae generalis; Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis.

In the First Part of this work, the means to man’s Last End were spoken of in a general way; the features that are common to all good acts—that they be human, morally deserving, directed according to law and conscience—were treated. In the present Part the means to the Last End will be discussed in particular, and we shall consider in turn the kinds of duties that are owed by all men and those owed by persons in special states of life.

1. Every treatment and question, in order that it may be rightly instituted, unfolded, and at length resolved, begins from the definition of the thing to be treated and investigated, from its division, and from the way to be followed in it, which is to be established beforehand. Concerning these matters, therefore, we shall speak briefly at the beginning of these Commentaries on the whole of Moral Theology.

2. Theology, in general, is defined: the science concerning God, acquired from divine revelation. Wherefore its material object is: all divine things demonstrable from divine revelation; its formal object is: truth demonstrable from the same divine revelation; its subject: God; its end: both, chiefly, the contemplation of divine truth, and also the sanctification of human life.

3. For indeed Theology, simply so called, is taken antonomastically for sacred or supernatural Theology; and here it is defined by a nominal and real definition. God can be known in two ways: first, from creatures, according to a certain imperfect likeness; second, from Himself, according to His proper nature and proper mode of being. The first knowledge of God is natural, for it is had by natural reason; and it constitutes natural Theology. The other knowledge of God is natural to God alone; exceeding every created intellect, it is wholly supernatural to it. We are made participants in this knowledge through the virtue of faith divinely infused into us. For through it we adhere to God, the First Truth, as to the principle of knowing, believing those things to be true which are revealed by God, because of the authority of God Himself revealing. Hence another science concerning God arises, resting upon this divine and supernatural revelation, which is called Sacred Doctrine, Sacred Theology, and supernatural Theology; and consequently it is rightly defined: the science concerning God, acquired from divine revelation.

4. The material object, or the object which, is that which is proximately and directly attained by some faculty, as whiteness with respect to sight. But Theology proximately and directly attains all divine things demonstrable from divine revelation. These, therefore, are its material object.

5. Hence: 1. The material object of Theology is both those things which we gather by reasoning from faith, and those things which we hold by faith itself; for Theology also demonstrates these, although from the principles or sources of faith itself. - 2. Faith is distinguished from Theology, and precedes it. For faith supplies the first principles from which, by reasoning and demonstration, Theology proceeds to know other things. - 3. The same truth can be the object of faith and of Theology: of faith, insofar as it is immediately believed by divine revelation; of Theology, insofar as it is demonstrated from divine revelation. And in this case, although, speaking per se, faith in the thing which is demonstrated does not precede, nevertheless faith in the thing from which it is demonstrated does precede, that is, in divine revelation and authority, which are known and certain by faith itself. For we believe by divine faith not only the things which have been said by God, but the very word of God itself.

6. The formal object, or the object on account of which, or by which, is that aspect by which the material object is attained by a faculty, as color with respect to sight. But Theology investigates truth from divine revelation, and, as a science, assents to truth on account of this demonstration. Therefore its formal object is truth demonstrable from the word of God.

7. The subject, or object concerning which, of some faculty is that thing to which the material object and the formal object, considered concretely, pertain; as the body, of which there is whiteness and color, is the subject of sight. But all those things which Theology attains as demonstrable from divine revelation are either God Himself, or indeed other things from God, but insofar as they have order to God as to their principle and end, and insofar as they are referred to the greatest knowledge of God. Therefore God is the subject of this science.

8. Hence it is clear: 1. that in the definition of Theology handed down, its subject and formal object are set forth. - 2. Although Theology treats of many and various things, which therefore in some way are its subject, nevertheless properly God alone is its subject; for under the aspect of God it treats those many and various things, and the treatment of each thing is ordered to the manifestation of God. And thus Theology treats of the world, not as Physics or Astronomy does, which consider its various qualities of extension, motion, etc., but by manifesting that it was created by the Omnipotence of God, is governed by Wisdom, and that all things in it cooperate unto good for those who love God. - 3. A twofold formal aspect can be distinguished: of the object and of the subject. The formal aspect of the object, or by which or under which, is the aspect by which something can be demonstrated by Theology; and this is divine revelation. The formal aspect of the subject, or which, is the reason why something is considered by Theology; and this is divinity. - 4. Theology is one science both in object and especially in subject. In object, because it demonstrates all things by divine revelation. In subject, because it is God, who is one not by genus or species, but by singularity.

9. The end of Theology, that is, the end of the work, or that toward which its intrinsic nature tends, is God, the supreme truth to be contemplated; for it discusses the nature and properties of God, the Trinity of the divine Persons, and other mysteries which per se and directly are not ordered to directing human operations. From this side Theology is speculative. Yet the end also of the work, toward which it tends by its nature, is God, the supreme Good to be sought, to whom every human action is to be directed; for it treats of God as the last end, of laws, of grace, of virtues, and of other things which per se and directly are referred to the ordering of the whole of human life. From this side Theology is practical. Yet it is chiefly speculative, because those very things which are proximately referred to the ordering of human life ultimately regard the more perfect knowledge of God. Moreover, each thing is to be judged more from its ultimate end than from its proximate end, since the ultimate end is the final measure of all things which are in it.

10. Theology is the most excellent of all human sciences, both by the dignity of its matter, by the certainty of its conclusions, and by the end to which it orders human life. - By the dignity of its matter. - 1 Cor. 2:6, 10. We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, which none of the princes of this world knew... but God has revealed it to us by the Holy Spirit. Therefore divine faith contains very many most sublime truths, hidden and altogether remote from human reason. But Theology rests upon faith; every other human discipline rests upon natural reason. - By the certainty of its conclusions. - Other sciences have certainty from the natural light of human reason, which can err. For although the principles of human reason are most certain, nevertheless they are abstract. Wherefore, in order that we may arrive at knowledge of other things, we need the experience of the senses, and many things are obtained by the aid of human faith. But spiritual things do not fall under the senses, and are apprehended after the manner of sensible things. Hence there is danger, and manifold danger, of erring. But Theology has certainty from the light of divine science, which cannot be deceived. For the principles from which it proceeds are the very word of God; and it draws very many conclusions from the same word of God; and while it treats others by reasoning, it is directed by the infallible magisterium of the Church. - By its end. - Any natural science can dispose man only to natural happiness. But Theology, which is the science of faith, disposes and orders man to that supernatural happiness which is placed in eternal life.

11. Theology, as we have already indicated, is divided into theoretical or dogmatic, and practical or moral. For if the matter which Theology treats is considered, it either proximately rests in the contemplation of divine things, or in directing and ordering operation and human life. If the first, Theoretical or Dogmatic Theology is had; if the second, Practical or Moral Theology is had. Therefore moral Theology can be taken in a broader and in a less strict signification. In the broader signification it is confounded with practical Theology; in the stricter signification, on the contrary, it is distinguished from it, as will soon be explained.

12. If the method by which Theology proceeds is considered, either it merely dwells upon dogmas from the written and handed-down Word of God to confirm them, or it proceeds further to the understanding and reason of the same dogmas, insofar as this can be done by human reason, declaring what is contained in them, searching out their connection and relation, and by reasoning from them also arriving at other things; and thus it tends from faith to understanding. In the first case there is Positive Theology, which lays down the principles and foundations of the science, and which rests upon positive arguments. In the second case there is Scholastic Theology, so called because more common in the Schools. For those ancient masters of Theology, who handed down Theological Institutions in the public Schools, thought that labor should be given rather to the understanding of dogmas than to their demonstration.

13. The Church has not only permitted, and permits, Theology to be cultivated and handed down according to the principles and method of the Scholastic Doctors, but has always commended and does commend it. Now the principles by which the Scholastic Doctors handed down Theology were not, indeed, certain natural principles of reason, from which supernatural truths could not be deduced; rather they were principles of the supernatural order, employed by the Fathers themselves: divine revelation and the divine authority of the Church. The method, however, was not investigative of truth, which in Theology cannot be found by natural reason, since it is of the supernatural order; rather, it is acquired by God's revelation, so that it is held most certainly by faith, and one may not doubt concerning it. Wherefore the method of the Scholastics was only demonstrative and declarative of truth. If, therefore, Theology, as it always accords with the necessities of all times and the progress of the sciences, so also Scholastic Theology accords with these same things, the same certainly must be said of this our time, since sciences are not changed by time in their intrinsic nature. Indeed this must be said especially of this our time, since now on every side naturalism and rationalism attempt to pervade human minds. Wherefore proposition 13 was deservedly condemned in the Syllabus: "The method and principles by which the ancient Scholastic Doctors cultivated Theology are in no way suited to the necessities of our times and to the progress of the sciences."

14. The subjective principle of knowing Theology is not only the human intellect instructed by the natural light of reason, but also adorned by the supernatural light of divine faith. - Theology proceeds from faith, by demonstrating the object of faith, explaining it, and by the knowledge of it arriving at other cognitions. But a progress of this kind presupposes an intellect not only adorned with its native power, but also imbued with the supernatural light of faith.

15. The objective principles, or sources or loci, from which theological cognitions are drawn, are counted as four: Sacred Scripture, divine Tradition, the Church, human reason. The other loci can be referred to these, of which the principal are the Holy Fathers and Theologians. - Divine revelation is contained only in Sacred Scripture and Tradition. The Church is the guardian and interpreter of both; excluding a new revelation, but with the Holy Spirit assisting, she infallibly proposes to us the revelation once divinely made. Therefore Scripture and Tradition are, as they say, the quasi-constitutive principles of Theology; the Church is the directive principle. Since, however, Theology proceeds by reasoning and demonstrating, there is another principle of it, namely human reason and natural science, whose value and use are determined by the principles of faith. - Now all cognition is drawn either from the light of faith or from the light of reason. If the first, the sources of such cognition will be Scripture, Tradition, the Church; if the second, the source will be human reason. The Holy Fathers and Theologians, however, are referred to Tradition.

16. But in order that the object of Theology may be fully unfolded, Theology is aided by subsidiary disciplines, of which the chief are: Exegesis or Exposition of the Sacred Books, Ecclesiastical History, Sacred Archaeology, to which all the rest can easily be referred.

17. Just as Philosophy not only investigates its proper object, asking what body is, what spirit is, what the world is, etc., but also considers the very principles of natural cognition, treating of intellect, of reason, of sense, of conscience; similarly Theology not only treats revealed truths, but also treats of revelation itself, of the Word of God Written and Handed Down, and of the other sources of supernatural cognitions. Now this treatment can be instituted in two ways. For either, proceeding by human reason alone, we show by historical and philosophical arguments the fact and value of revelation, of the institution of the Church, etc.; or, setting out from faith, we inquire what revelation itself teaches concerning these principles. The former manner of proceeding supplies the Evangelical Demonstration, which is also called Apologetics. It is not a part of Theology, but a certain propaedeutic or preamble of Theology. For since Theology is the science of faith, it must receive its principles of demonstration through faith itself.

18. The supreme objective principle of demonstration, from which namely other truths are derived by reasoning, is contained in the notion of God received by revelation. - For the supreme principle of any science is situated in the definition of its subject. And thus in man, for example, all properties are deduced from his definition or nature. Those very things which in man are done freely and are known through history are understood and judged according to his nature. In like manner, those things which follow upon the divine nature are deduced from its revealed notion; but things freely done by God are not indeed demonstrated from the same notion of God as having been done, but are understood and judged according to that notion.

19. Concerning the value of the theological sources or loci, these few things suffice. - On Sacred Scripture. 1. Although in Sacred Scripture some things which directly and per se order us to eternal life are proposed for their own sake, while other things are proposed not for their own sake but for the manifestation of these, nevertheless all things are to be believed by divine faith, for all are supported by the same authority of God speaking. The books of Scripture are therefore held to be sacred and divine because, having been written with God inspiring, they have God as their author, and truly and properly are the word of God. Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1. - 2. The Council of Trent declared that, from the various versions, "the old and Vulgate edition, which by the long use of so many centuries has been approved in the Church itself, is to be held as authentic in public readings, disputations, preachings, and expositions," Sess. 4. Wherefore it can and must be called a true and genuine source of revelation. From such a decree, however, as is clear from its whole tenor, end, and circumstances, it does not follow that it is forbidden for the original texts and other ancient versions to be used, and that intrinsic certainty also be had from them. Although their authenticity is declared by no solemn decree, it is proved both by long use and by critical and hermeneutical arguments. - 3. The genuine sense of Scripture is had: 1. from the declaration of the Church; 2. from the consent of the Fathers, against whom, although Scripture cannot be expounded, nevertheless it is not forbidden to bring forward an exposition adding something else to the common exposition; 3. if at times different Fathers expound a certain place differently, it does not on that account follow that a firm argument cannot be drawn thence. For the genuine sense can be determined by hermeneutical rules. The principal rules are: without an evident reason to the contrary, one must adhere to the proper and obvious sense. - Likewise one must adhere to the literal and historical sense, unless it is certainly established concerning the mystical sense.

20. On Tradition. The Council of Trent, Sess. 4, declares the nature of Tradition when it says that "saving doctrine is contained in written books and in unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, have come down even to us, handed on as it were from hand to hand." - The rule for distinguishing tradition, as regards the doctrine of faith, is this: if anything in the universal Church, at any time, is taught and believed as a dogma of faith, that thing, even if it is not written, is certainly contained in divine tradition. And the reason is that the universal Church can never defect from the true faith. - But as regards tradition which concerns the discipline or rites of the Church, the words of St. Augustine are well known, Ep. 54 to Januarius: "Those things which, not written, but handed down, we keep, which indeed are observed throughout the whole world, are understood to have been retained as commended and established either by the Apostles themselves, or by plenary Councils, whose authority in the Church is most salutary." But since those things which are established by Councils are recorded in their acts and in other documents of history, those things which are observed throughout the whole world, of whose beginning no trace is had in history, are deservedly referred to apostolic tradition. And if these are such that they exceed human power, as are rites concerning the substance of the sacraments, and other things which are intimately connected with dogma, such as the baptism of infants, they are with the best right referred to divine tradition transmitted through the Apostles.

21. On the Church. The Church is strong with an ordinary and perpetual magisterium, which is a continuous and ever-living Tradition expounding and completing the Sacred Scriptures. But since infallibility has been granted not to any part whatever of the Church, but only to the universal Church and to its Head, the Roman Pontiff, it follows that only those things enjoy the firmest certainty which are strengthened either by the universal consent and judgment of the Pastors, or by the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff. - And here it must be noted that the form of expressing a judgment of this kind matters little, provided that the mind of the Fathers or of the Pontiff to define is manifestly established, that is, to declare by proper and full authority what is the sentence to be held by all the faithful. - Since the magisterium of the Church exists for instructing the faithful, just as the universal Church cannot defect from the truth in teaching, so also neither can she defect in believing. Hence the common sense of the faithful furnishes a most firm argument.

22. On the Holy Fathers. The Fathers of the Church are those Ecclesiastical Writers who, besides antiquity, have singular doctrine and sanctity. Now although the authority of individuals is great, nevertheless full authority is had only when by unanimous consent they hand down a doctrine of faith; for then it is certain that it is taught and believed by the Church herself, which venerates them as Fathers. - As the Church not only guards the deposit of faith, but also explains it, so the Fathers are not only faithful witnesses of dogmas, but also doctors declaring them. Therefore those things which the Fathers hand down by unanimous consent for expounding the doctrine of faith are truly to be believed to pertain to the understanding of faith. Likewise, those things which, although known by the natural light, the Fathers hand down as connected with faith, are to be held as such; and in these matters their authority prevails over reason. - In order that there be unanimous consent of the Fathers, by which divine tradition is demonstrated, it is not necessary to find or recite the testimonies of all. From the sayings of some, the consent of others can be deduced from several heads. If at any time one or another seems to contradict all the rest, their sayings are to be explained benignly: from the context; from the end, because, while opposing an error, and being perhaps little concerned about an opposite error not yet arisen, they spoke more securely; finally from the time, because when errors have arisen and matters have been better discussed, formulas of speaking are more determined by use and by ecclesiastical judgment. But if this benign explanation cannot be made, the unanimous consent does not on that account fail, because a morally, not arithmetically, universal consent suffices.

23. On Theologians. In the first centuries of the Church, the Fathers were succeeded, in later time, by Theologians, who are those ecclesiastical Writers who are distinguished both by entire orthodoxy and by excellent doctrine. Their concordant sentence produces certainty. For this concord can be sufficiently explained only from the truth of the matter. What they hand down by unanimous consent in the schools, the pastors preach in the Churches, and the faithful believe. Hence it must not be doubted that those things which they hand down by a concordant, firm, and stable sentence are approved by the Church.

24. On human reason. Human reason is understood here both as the natural faculty of reasoning and as every natural science. Its use in Theology is manifold: 1. to show the foundations and credibility of Faith, Council of the Vatican, De Fide, chs. 3, 4; 2. to deduce the several heads of faith from the principles of Faith; 3. so that those things which are known by divine revelation may either be confirmed by natural arguments, or at least be declared and illustrated, insofar as this can be done; 4. so that errors, which are drawn especially from the natural sciences, may be refuted from those same sciences.

25. Finally, concerning dogma, theological opinions, and censures, a few things also suffice. Dogma here is properly called a sentence proposed by the Church to be believed with divine and catholic faith, or manifestly contained in Scripture or Tradition. And thus the Council of the Vatican, De Fide, ch. 3, says: "All those things are to be believed with divine and catholic faith which are contained in the word of God written and handed down, and which are proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium (by which Scripture and Tradition are attested to be the word of God), as divinely revealed and to be believed."

26. A theological sentence is here properly called one which, although it is not revealed or is not handed down as revealed in the common magisterium of the Church from an express definition of hers, nevertheless has an evident connection with revealed things and is deduced from them. If this deduction is imperfect, there will be a scholastic opinion or a theologically probable sentence. But if the deduction is perfect, then it is called a theological sentence simply, or theologically certain; and likewise it is said that it cannot be denied without error and rashness, since it cannot be denied except by one who has cast aside either faith or reason, or both.

27. A theological censure is called that note by which some depraved doctrine is reproved from the principles of faith, whether by the public magisterium of the Church or only by the authority of theologians. There are three principal censures: heretical, erroneous, rash. A sentence is called heretical when it is evidently and directly opposed to an evident dogma of faith. If a dogma of faith is indeed certain, but is not evident as a dogma of faith, then the sentence is called proximate to heresy. But if the dogma of faith is certain and evident, yet it is not certainly and evidently established that there is direct opposition, then it is called suspected of heresy, savoring of heresy, favoring heresy.

28. Error is called an assertion directly opposed to a theological conclusion, or to a theologically certain sentence. Therefore error is opposed to a sentence which is not of faith or dogma, but which is certain from faith, or which is deduced from dogma by an evident inference. Since there are various grades of connection with dogma, if the connection is not proximate but remote, the opposite opinion is not called error, but proximate to error.

29. Rash is the name given to an opinion which is destitute of every sufficient reason and is directly opposed to a sentence commonly received in the Church. For rashness, according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, II-II, q. 53, a. 3, ad 2, is not only to act without reason, but also to act from contempt of the directing rule.

30. After the nature of Theology, considered universally, has been declared, the intimate nature of Moral Theology is now easily understood. Moral Theology is a part of it, and consequently those things pertain to Moral Theology which pertain to Theology generally, and which consequently are common to speculative and practical Theology.

31. Moral Theology, strictly taken, if the name is considered, is the same as discourse concerning morals in order to God. This nominal definition, since the names of things and sciences are not without reason, is proved and explained from the real definition itself. - But if the thing itself is considered, it can be defined: that part of Theology which, resting upon divine law manifested through revelation, inquires what good and evil there is in human acts, what licit and illicit is found in them, in order that it may direct them in order to eternal life.

32. It is called Moral Theology, a part of Theology according to the matter which it treats. For Theology which contemplates divine things is called Dogmatic Theology; but Theology which considers human operations is called Moral. The former is speculative, for it rests in contemplating the truth of things. The latter is practical, for it proceeds to directing operations to man's ultimate end. Yet both attain their proper object by the same formal aspect, since the formal object of Theology is nothing other than truth demonstrable from the revealed word of God. Hence "Sacred Doctrine, being one, extends to those things which belong to diverse philosophical sciences, on account of the aspect which it considers in diverse things, namely insofar as they are knowable by the divine light: whence, although in the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless Sacred Doctrine comprehends both under itself, just as God by the same science knows Himself and the things which He makes." St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 4. Therefore Moral Theology is not distinguished from Dogmatic Theology as science from science, but as one and the same science according to one part and another part of its proper material object; since the unity of a science is taken not from the material object but from the formal object. Hence a diverse aspect of the knowable induces a diversity of sciences. St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2; aa. 3, 7. But if, from the fact that "Sacred Doctrine does not determine concerning God and concerning creatures equally, but concerning God principally and concerning creatures according as they are referred to God as to principle or end... the unity of the science is not impeded," St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 3 ad 1, this is especially true of Moral Theology. For if this Theology does not treat immediately of God Himself, but of human acts, it certainly treats of these according as through them man is ordered to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists. St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4.

33. It is said further that Moral Theology rests upon divine law manifested through revelation, so that at the same time both the formal object and the proper source of this science may be indicated: divine law manifested through revelation. For the good and evil, the licit and illicit, which Moral Theology inquires into in human actions, is proximately derived from law. And if Moral Theology, as Sacred Doctrine, proceeds by reasoning from divine revelation, it properly rests upon divine law manifested through revelation in Sacred Scripture and Tradition, and proposed and explained through the magisterium of the Church. Hence Moral Theology does not proceed from principles known by the light of the natural intellect, whether of human Jurisprudence, or of natural Ethics, or of moral philosophy; but from principles known by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God and of the Blessed. Hence it believes those revealed principles from God. St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 2. If it also receives something from other human and philosophical disciplines, it does not receive it as from superiors, but uses them only as inferiors and handmaids. Nor indeed does it do this because it needs them of necessity, but for the greater manifestation of those things which are handed down in this science, on account of the defect of our intellect, which, from those things that are known by natural reason, from which the other human sciences proceed, is more easily led by the hand into those things which are above reason and are handed down in this science. St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2.

34. Therefore moral Theology does not exclude moral philosophy from itself, but on the contrary contains it within itself; for the supernatural end does not exclude the natural end, but on the contrary presupposes and contains it, since it elevates it to the supernatural order of grace and glory, by which "He has given us the greatest and precious promises, that through these we may be made partakers of the divine nature." 2 Pet. 1:4. Hence it is that what is evil and turns us away from God as natural end also turns us away from God as supernatural end, as is certain by reason and faith. On the contrary, that which leads us to God as natural end cannot lead us to God as supernatural end without supernatural grace, as likewise is certain by reason and faith.

35. And from these things it is clear that the subjective principles of knowing are the same in Moral Theology and in dogmatic Theology: faith of divine revelation and human reason. For in order to attain man's supernatural end it is necessary to observe the laws and precepts of both orders, supernatural and natural. We know the former by divine revelation; the latter also by natural reason. But as divine revelation confirms even natural precepts, so human reason illustrates revealed divine precepts. And we learn the same precepts, whether of the supernatural order or of the natural order, from the infallible magisterium of the Church, which is also the directive principle of moral Theology, as it is the directive principle of dogmatic Theology.

36. But the fundamental and universal objective principle of demonstration, pervading and governing the whole of moral Theology, is that God is the ultimate end of man, and accordingly that man is bound by obligation to tend to God by acts proportioned to the aforesaid end, morally good, and moreover supernatural, since God is the ultimate end of man not merely naturally but supernaturally. For the beatitude to which man is destined in the present order of divine providence consists in the intuitive vision of God and in the fruitful love of God; this end is wholly supernatural, exceeding all the powers and all the exigencies of created nature. Indeed, the reason by which God is moved to create the world and man is His own divine goodness and infinite perfection itself, namely love of His own infinite goodness and perfection. The world exists and we exist because God is good. But since divine goodness and perfection are infinite and cannot in any way be increased in themselves, God, creating the world and man, can intend nothing other than to communicate outwardly His good and His perfections, which consequently all creatures may manifest, and rational creatures may know, and thus may tend to God and glorify Him. The Lord has wrought all things for Himself, Prov. 16:4. Therefore man was founded by God in order that he may know and love Him; and in this knowledge and love of God consists both the glory of God and at the same time the beatitude of man. But, showing the riches of His divine goodness and infinite perfection, God made man a sharer in the divine nature, by destining man to see Him as He is, not through a mirror in an enigma, but face to face. Therefore after this mortal life man enjoys the divine essence, by whose knowledge and love he possesses eternal beatitude. But this immediate and intuitive vision of God, and enjoyment of God from love of the divine goodness immediately known, is a participation in the divine life itself: when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, 1 John 3:2; and consequently it exceeds all natural exigencies and powers, and is wholly supernatural. Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him. 1 Cor. 2:3.

37. Since therefore man is destined to a supernatural end, he must tend to it by his own free acts. But since he cannot attain it by his own natural acts, supernatural virtues are therefore infused into man, which supply power to the intellect and will for connaturally producing supernatural acts. And, as in the natural order there is first the nature itself of the soul, and then its natural powers and acts, so in the supernatural order there is sanctifying grace, which inheres in the substance of the soul and elevates man to a supernatural nature; there are infused virtues, which inhere stably in the powers of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, to which they give force and power for eliciting supernatural acts; and finally there are actual graces, by which God actually concurs with each supernatural act of man, to prevent and excite, aid and perfect them. Wherefore an act at once vital and supernatural proceeds from a twofold proximate intrinsic principle, that is, from natural power and from the supernatural habit of infused virtue. This infused virtue is distinguished in two ways, theological and moral. The former has God Himself for its primary material object and some divine perfection for its formal object; the latter generally has for its formal object the very honesty of the human act. And as virtues are infused for the ordinary acts of supernatural life, so also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are conferred for extraordinary and more sublime acts of the supernatural life. To the former man is moved from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit and from the judgment of reason; to the latter he is moved by the instinct of the Holy Spirit alone. Through the infused virtues man is disposed to be made promptly movable according to the common aspect of Christian virtues, or according to their common rule; through the gifts man is disposed to be made promptly movable by divine inspiration. St. Thomas, I-II, qq. 63, 68.

The relation of man to God in human acts constitutes the moral order. Wherefore if human acts are fitting to that end, they will lead man through to God. Now some of these acts order man immediately to God, naturally by natural knowledge and love, supernaturally by faith, hope, and charity. Other acts immediately order man either in himself, so that the higher powers rule the lower and the lower are subjected to the higher; or to other creatures, so that he may use them only insofar as they are useful to him for attaining his end, and so that he may constitute a fitting society with other men, destined to the same end as himself. Wherefore all these other acts also, by preserving the order of nature established by God, although mediately, consequently order and lead man to God as ultimate end; and in this attainment and eternal possession of the ultimate end there is beatitude. Indeed, by destining man to this beatitude of eternal life and supplying him with the means for attaining it, God evidently imposes upon man by His will the necessity of applying the aforesaid means suitable for attaining the aforesaid end. This necessity constitutes moral obligation, which moral Theology attends to and considers in human acts. - Therefore God as the ultimate end of man is the supreme principle of the whole of moral Theology, by which namely all things which must be performed by man are understood and determined, so that he may act licitly and at last attain eternal life.

38. Moreover, Moral Theology inquires what good and evil there is in human acts, what licit and illicit is found in them. For its material object is not contained in human acts insofar as they are beings of nature, but insofar as they are moral being. Hence the Angelic Doctor, I-II, q. 7, a. 2, says: "First, the theologian considers human acts according as through them man is ordered to beatitude.... Second, the theologian considers human acts according as in them there is found good and evil, better and worse.... Third, the theologian considers human acts according as they are meritorious or demeritorious." And in the same place, ad 3: "The theologian has considerations concerning virtuous and vicious acts... and considers acts according as they merit punishment or reward."

39. If the material object of Moral Theology is considered thus generally and indiscriminately in its whole breadth, it is certainly not distinguished from Practical Theology, and it extends as broadly as the latter extends. But if moral Theology is taken in a certain stricter sense, and according to the common acceptance at present, then Moral Theology is distinguished from Practical Theology as a part from the whole. For Moral Theology is now usually taken in a certain restricted signification, namely insofar as it is confined to the mere consideration of the licit and illicit, or of sins, in human acts. And thus Ascetical and Mystical Theology are usually distinguished from Moral Theology, all of which Practical Theology embraces, and into which it is consequently divided. Ascetical Theology hands down not so much the doctrine of good and evil as the way and manner by which we can free ourselves from vices and attain virtues. Hence, as Moral Theology treats rather of determining sins, Ascetical Theology treats of explaining virtues. But Mystical Theology treats not of the common sanctity of morals, which Ascetical Theology does, but of that special union with God through more sublime contemplation and more intimate love, to which not all can tend and arrive, but those who are heaped by God with special gifts of grace.

What is moral theology? - If the name is considered, it is that part of theology which is concerned with morals. But if the thing itself is considered, it can be defined: that part of theology which, resting upon divine law manifested through revelation, inquires what is lawful and what is unlawful in human actions, so that it may direct these actions in order to eternal life. The human act is the subject of this science. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of human acts is the material object of this science. But the lawfulness or unlawfulness of human acts, insofar as it is demonstrable by divine law manifested through revelation, or by the revealed word of God, constitutes the formal object of this science. From this also the proper source of this science is clear. Therefore moral theology is distinguished from moral philosophy, because the former directs human acts to the supernatural end, the latter to the natural end of man; the former rests especially upon the light of faith, but the latter upon the natural light of reason. Hence it is easily clear how great is the excellence, necessity, and usefulness of moral theology.

By divine law manifested through revelation; for the principles of morals flow from the same sources as dogmas. They are contained first of all in Scripture, and are made known by Tradition, of which splendid monuments exist in the writings of the holy Fathers. Writings of this kind do not contain a distinct and methodical account of moral discipline, but certainly, together with the dogmas of faith, they present the principles of morals, besides also several particular cases, in which what is lawful and what is not lawful is discussed, as is especially to be seen in Tertullian, Cyprian, Chrysostom, and Augustine. But those who afterward treated moral discipline according to the method of the schools explained those principles more fully, adapting them to the individual cases which arise day by day.

What is lawful, what is unlawful; for in this it is distinguished from Ascetic and Mystical theology. Ascetic theology adds to Moral theology, commonly so called, in that it does not so much direct human acts so that they may simply be good, as hand down the manner by which human life may be adorned with all the virtues. Mystical theology, moreover, adds to common sanctity the manner of a special union with God, which is granted not to all, but only to some. Moral theology is also distinguished from Canon Law. For in the latter the laws by which the Church is governed are properly explained, especially as regards her whole external government. But Moral Theology also considers these laws, certainly, yet insofar as they bind in conscience and must be observed, and consequently what, also in regard to them, is lawful or unlawful in conscience. S. Th. I. p. q. I., 1. 2. q. 91. a. 4.; Commentary On the Nature of Moral Theology.

What have been the vicissitudes of Moral Theology? - There have been various vicissitudes of Moral Theology, both as regards its didactic development and as regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases.

As regards its methodical form, various ages can be distinguished in it, and they are the following six.

The first age, from the beginning, in the time of the Apostles, was when moral doubts were resolved by the decisions of the Supreme Pontiffs, by the decrees of Councils, and by the opinions of the Fathers, who especially in their homilies and sermons to the people explained those things which are necessary for rightly informing morals and for salvation.

The second age succeeds a little later, when in the first centuries of the Church the use of canonical penance became established, and Penitential Books were employed. Special treatises on moral matters were gradually multiplied in this age, either together with speculative doctrines or separately, up to the twelfth century, when, after St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died in the year 1033, and after St. Bernard, first Abbot of Clairvaux, who died in 1153, Peter Lombard, called the Master by antonomasia, wrote the books of the Sentences, in the third of which he treats of the virtues and of vices; he died in 1164. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 11, c. 11; Decree of Gratian, at the end.

The third age extends from the thirteenth century to the fourteenth. In this age sacred practical doctrine made great progress, especially through the work of William of Paris, who died in 1249, St. Bonaventure, O. Min., who died in the year 1274, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., who died in the year 1274, called the Angelic Doctor, St. Raymond of Pennafort, of the Order of Preachers, who died in the year 1275, and Peter Paludanus, O.P., who died in the year 1342, who for St. Alphonsus is a doctor of perfect knowledge.

The fourth age embraces the two following centuries, the fifteenth and the sixteenth; and it is distinguished by the notable saints who flourished in this age. Among others are celebrated St. John of Capistrano, O. Min., who died in the year 1440, St. Bernardine of Siena, O.S. Fr., who died in the year 1444, St. Lawrence Justinian, who died in the year 1455, St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who died in the year 1459, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan, O.P., who died in the year 1534, a man of most subtle genius, Francis de Vitoria, O.P., who died in the year 1546, Dominic Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1560, Peter Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1563, Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who died in the year 1581, St. Charles Borromeo, who died in the year 1584, Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus, who died in the year 1590, Cardinal Francis Toletus, S.J., who died in the year 1596, and Louis Molina, S.J., who died in the year 1600.

The fifth age embraces the seventeenth and eighteenth century up to St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, and it is distinguished by many learned scholastic theologians who expressly expounded and illustrated moral questions in copious treatises. Among many others there excel Thomas Sanchez, S.J., who died in the year 1610, Francis Suarez, S.J., who died in the year 1617, Leonard Lessius, S.J., who died in the year 1623, Basil Pontius, O.S. Aug., who died in the year 1629, the Salmanticenses, O. Carm. Disc., from 1631 to 1722, Martin Bonacina, who died in the year 1631, Giles Coninck, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Ferdinand De Castro Palao, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Paul Laymann, S.J., who died in the year 1635, Francis Sylvius, who died in the year 1649, Augustine Barbosa, who died in the year 1649, Cardinal John De Lugo, who died in the year 1660, Peter Marchant, O. Min., who died in the year 1661, Antoninus Diana, Cleric Regular Theatine, who died in the year 1663, Zacharias Pasqualigo, Cler. Reg., who died in the year 1664, Hermann Busembaum, S.J., who died in the year 1668, Henry Pirhing, S.J., who died in the year 1670, Thomas Tamburinus, S.J., who died in the year 1675, Anacletus Reiffenstuel, O.S. Franc., who died in the year 1703, Claude La-Croix, S.J., who died in the year 1714, Patrick Sporer, O. Min., who died in the year 1714, Prosper Lambertini, Benedict XIV, who died in the year 1758, and Lucius Ferraris, Ord. Min., who died in the year 1760.

The sixth age takes its beginning from St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, who died in the year 1787, and extends down to our own times. St. Alphonsus, most outstanding in genius and doctrine as well as in sanctity of life, and divinely given for exterminating Jansenist errors and severities, wrote a Moral Theology in which he treats all questions learnedly, eruditely, and with the highest prudence, recounting almost all that had been handed down before him; hence he was deservedly adorned by the Church with the title of Doctor. Hence it happened that in more recent times Moral Theologians followed St. Alphonsus as leader and master. In our age very many compendia of Moral Theology have been published.

The name indeed is modest, but the works are certainly of notable merit. For in these compendia the whole doctrine of Moral Theology is handed down briefly and in order, and in them is contained, accurately set forth, not only the doctrine of the old theologians accumulated in the course of time, but also that which has been acquired for Moral Theology either from the more recent Acts of the Holy See and of the Sacred Roman Congregations, or also from the progress of the natural sciences. Nor indeed have more expansive treatments been lacking in this age, as can be seen in the treatises On Justice and Law and On Contracts of D. Carriere, and in the scholia, annotations, and dissertations of Fr. Anthony Ballerini, S.J. Zitelli, Enchirid.;

Hurter, Nomenclat.; D'Annibale, Summ., 4th ed., p. 1, n. 2 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction V.

As regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases, for several centuries each one defended his own opinion, according to the varying weight of the reasons, as seemed better to him. In the year 1572 Antonius Cordubensis first began to contend on behalf of law, because of the authoritative and obligatory prerogative of law, and accordingly he established that in doubt the safer part must always be held. But in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina, professor at Salamanca, began, on the contrary, to contend on behalf of liberty because of the prerogative of its natural right, and accordingly he established that in doubtful matters he acts prudently and licitly who follows an opinion truly probable and favoring liberty, even after leaving aside the more probable opinion in favor of law. He was the first who reduced the doctrine concerning probable opinions into a system. From this Tutiorism and Probabilism arose.

In the following seventeenth century Synnichius, who died in the year 1666, brought Tutiorism down into Rigorism, while Caramuel brought Probabilism into Laxism: for the former denied that we can follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable, which was condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690; the latter, on the opposite side, affirmed that we can follow an opinion even slightly probable, which was proscribed by Innocent XI in the year 1679. Hence in that same century Probabilism was widely diffused, and became a very common and very received doctrine in every school: of almost all the disciples of St. Thomas, of almost all the disciples of Scotus, of almost all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and of other theologians, with few exceptions.

But since many of these probabilists favored liberty too much, asserting that it was lawful to follow even an opinion that was probably and doubtfully probable, the Probabilists were divided among themselves, and there arose moderate Probabilism, standing in an opinion truly and gravely probable, and broad Probabilism, proceeding even to doubtful probability. Hence, while the Fathers of the Society of Jesus commonly remained in Probabilism, the Thomists passed over to Probabiliorism, requiring for liberty an opinion more probable than the opinion favoring law. Zitelli, in his Enchiridion, mentions as the head of the probabiliorists Francis Genet, who died in the year 1702.

In the eighteenth century, to overthrow broad Probabilism and Probabiliorism at the same time, St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori undertook to defend moderate Probabilism, establishing that it is lawful to use a probable opinion even in competition with one more probable for law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. And for that reason the Holy Doctor called his system moderate Probabilism, against rigid Probabiliorists and lax Probabilists, Equiprobabilism, with aeque taken according to the nature of true probability, not according to equality of degree.

But since the word nevertheless was not free from ambiguity in itself, hence after St. Alphonsus another system arose, which the Redemptorist Fathers defend, namely the system of Equiprobabilism, by which it is established that it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty when it is equally or a little less probable than the opinion favoring law; but that it is not lawful when the latter is much more probable than the former, which in truth falls back into Probabiliorism. La-Croix, vol. 1, prodromal book, Franc. Ant. Zachariae and Quaest. facti of Stephen De Champs; Zitelli, Enchir.; D'Annibale, p. 1, n. 8 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction II; E. E. M. n. 114, 119.

What is the division of Moral Theology; and what is the order of the treatises? - All the questions of moral theology are reduced to certain principal treatises into which it is divided. That we may proceed in order, we shall speak: 1. On human acts, which are as it were the proper subject of honesty and sin. 2. On conscience, which proximately regulates human actions. 3. On laws in general, which remotely regulate the same actions. 4. On sins, which arise from the lack of conformity of human actions with respect to the rule, whether proximate or remote. 5. On laws in particular, by which what is lawful or unlawful in human actions is determined in particular. The first four treatises constitute fundamental or general Moral Theology, while the remaining treatises, on particular laws, constitute special Moral Theology.

Now the following order must be used in treating of these particular laws: 1. On the properly evangelical precepts, which are established by revealed divine law, namely on the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, by which man immediately tends to his end. Moreover, "law is not imposed by any lord except upon his subjects.... But the first subjection of man to God is through faith.... And therefore faith is presupposed for the Precepts of the Law." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 16. a. 1. But through hope man is led to the observance of the law, and from charity follows the observance of the precepts. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 22. a. 2.

2. On the precepts of the Decalogue, properly constituted by natural law, although also positively confirmed by divine law, as is clear from Matt. 19:17 and Trent, sess. 6, c. 19. 3. On the precepts of the Church, which depend upon human law. 4. On the obligations of various states. For after the more general precepts one must proceed to the more particular.

By the observance of all these latter precepts man tends mediately to his end. For other precepts concern various acts of the moral virtues. And as God is immediately attained by the theological virtues, so by the other moral virtues there is immediately attained only the honesty of some created thing.

5. On the precepts of the sacraments, which contain a law at once commanding and assisting; for through them sanctifying grace is infused, and other aids of grace are given, by which man can observe the whole law, so that he may thus be preserved in the friendship of God, or be restored to it if, by transgressing the law, he has sinned gravely against God.

6. On censures, which are ecclesiastical penalties, preventing and following upon the transgression of certain special laws; and on irregularities, which are partly penalties and partly impediments to receiving sacred orders. 7. On indulgences, through which, sins having otherwise been remitted, the temporal punishment still due to them is remitted; and thus man is proximately disposed to attain eternal life. Theol. Wirceburg., on the Theological Virtues, 32 ff., on the Virtue of Religion, 9 f.

By what method is Moral Theology treated? - Moral theology can be treated by a threefold method: positive, casuistic, and scholastic. The first sets forth and proves moral precepts and dogmas in an orderly way from properly theological sources. The second insists upon resolving practical cases, by applying general principles to particular cases determined by various circumstances. The third proceeds by the discourse of reason rather than by authority. For moral precepts and dogmas, already positively proved by properly theological arguments, it confirms and illustrates by philosophical principles and reasons, and declares their connections, relations, and consequences.

That threefold method can easily be joined and employed together, and from this threefold method, mixed together, there is had a perfect and excellent treatment of moral theology. In the present Institutions we shall insist a little more upon reason than upon authority. For the disputation which is instituted in the schools is not directed to removing error, but to instructing and leading the mind to the understanding of the truth which it intends; "and this ought to rest upon reasons which investigate the root of truth and cause one to know how that which is said is true; otherwise, if the master determines the question by bare authorities, the hearer will indeed be made certain that it is so, but he will acquire nothing of science or understanding, but will depart empty." S. Th. Quodl. 4, a. 18.

This latter scholastic method is of itself brief in the treatment of questions. But since several of the older scholastics often undertook a long examination of the opposed opinions of others, in order to refute them directly, hence, especially as regards moral theology, it has happened that their most learned works were handled only by few. In order that these, our whatever-sort-of Institutions, may be of greater use and utility, we have determined to proceed in them in scholastic form, omitting that long discussion of the opinions of others, which we also observe was done in the Summa Theologica by the Angelic Doctor. - Pius VI, Constitution Auctorem fidei, August 28, 1794, proposition 76; Pius IX, Syllabus, proposition 13.

What are human acts? - An act in created things is the determination of some potency or faculty. Hence human acts are acts of human faculties. But human acts are considered in moral theology in the genus of morals, or insofar as they are moral acts. Hence here "moral acts and human acts are the same." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. But "the genus of morals begins where dominion of the will is first found." S. Th. 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2. Therefore human acts are, in general, acts of man by which man himself orders himself to an end suitable to him. Therefore human acts can be considered either in relation to the man who is ordered to the end by them, or in relation to the end to which he is ordered by their help. We shall speak step by step of human acts considered in both respects. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 4.

What is the division of the treatment of human acts in relation to man? - Human acts, considered in relation to man, can be inspected in two ways: 1. Insofar as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature. For an act in general, in created things, as was just said, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from being able to be to being. And therefore they are called acts, not actions. For an act is so called by reason of its intrinsic principle; an action, when it comes forth outwardly, from which also the effect differs if it follows, for the action is the object of the act. 2. Insofar as they fall short of this proper nature of theirs because of impediments, which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly.

We shall speak first of the intrinsic nature of the human act; then of its impediments. E. M.

What is the intrinsic nature of the human act? - Usage has obtained that a distinction be made between an act of man and a human act. An act of man is called one which proceeds from man without advertence and deliberation, or without deliberation only. But human acts are called those which proceed, not in any way whatever, but with advertence and deliberation. Nor indeed was that distinction made without reason. For "of the actions which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man" (namely adequately, both as to the substance of the work and as to the mode of operating). "But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts.... But man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1.

Moreover, a human act can be elicited or commanded, according as it is performed by the will alone, or also by another potency; merely internal or external, or mixed, according as it is performed by a power of the soul alone, or also by another faculty of the body; natural or supernatural, according as it is brought about by the powers of nature alone, or also by the powers of grace; good, bad, indifferent, and meritorious or demeritorious from its relation and order to the rule of morality, to reward or punishment; valid or invalid, according as it has all the things required for its effect, or not.

Now, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, and therefore voluntary and free, so that we may know its nature more deeply, it is necessary briefly to explain 1. the nature of the voluntary, 2. the nature of the free, 3. finally, in how many ways any act can proceed from a deliberate will. And this is done in the following questions. E. M. n. 6, 69, 71, 72, 74, 89.

What is the voluntary; how many acceptions of the voluntary are there? - R. To the first: The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds from or is caused by the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. Therefore the voluntary differs from the willed, which designates only the object of the act of the will. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, it agrees with any natural motion, but differs from the violent; for the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle.

R. To the second: The voluntary can be taken in three ways: 1. more broadly, for the spontaneous; 2. more strictly, for the voluntary precisely as such, namely insofar as it differs from the spontaneous and from the free, or at least abstracts from the free; 3. most strictly, for the free. The spontaneous is that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object toward which the appetite tends. "The reason is that, just as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the elicited appetite follows from the apprehended form, the act representing the object." Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 4. Therefore the spontaneous belongs both to men and to brute animals.

The voluntary properly is that which proceeds from the spiritual appetite, or will, with prior rational cognition of the object or end. Finally, the free is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to an act, with the power of eliciting that very act, or not eliciting it, or of eliciting another. Therefore the free essentially includes the notion of the voluntary; and the voluntary also essentially includes the notion of the free, if indeed the voluntary is taken according to the proper meaning of the word, but adequately, both as to the substance of the act and as to the mode of operation proper to the will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1, 2; q. 8. a. 1; q. 26. a. 1; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 1, 3, 6; L. 1. 5. n. 6.

You will resolve: The voluntary cannot be had without prior cognition. Nothing is willed unless first known. Nevertheless a clear and distinct knowledge of the thing is not always necessary; for obscure and confused knowledge is sufficient. And thus an adult is validly baptized, even though he does not yet have all Christian obligations fully examined. Moreover, the voluntary cannot exist except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only to the good; but the good has the notion of an end. "Since the good is what all things seek, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that the good imports the notion of an end." S. Th. 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is nothing except something certain and determinate. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either one of two women does not contract; and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, l. 1, d. 26, s. 1; Rubr. Miss. de Defect., title 7, n. 1; L. 1. 3. n. 203, 224.

Finally, the voluntary cannot exist concerning an impossible thing. For "the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and suitable." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. Yet it is by no means required that the voluntary be only concerning a true and real good. "For the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good; and on account of this the Philosopher says: the end is a good, or an apparent good." S. Th. 1. c.

Can the voluntary at least exist concerning a thing impossible, not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot exist, as is clear from what was said in n. 9, if one uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand the empty space outside the world.

Concerning a thing impossible only as to law, there is a question: for example, contracting marriage with one who has a diriment impediment, consecrating water, baptizing with wine, etc. But it seems that this must be affirmed; since the will is borne into the fact itself, and it is not necessarily borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown to him, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, as far as he is concerned, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without a renewed consent, and validates the marriage. And indeed C. Ex sponsalibus, sole chapter, de Spons. et Matr. in the Sixth, says: "From pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason whatever, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of public honesty of justice." Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed. Cf. vol. 2, n. 1033; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 2, d. 33.

What is the free, and how many kinds are there? - The free adds to the voluntary only a relation to the potency eliciting the voluntary act and having the power to suspend it, or to elicit another act, different only in species, or even opposed. In the first case it is called liberty of exercise or of contradiction. In the second case, liberty of specification. In the third case, liberty of contrariety.

Therefore the free certainly requires in the potency or faculty an intrinsic dominion of the act, and accordingly immunity not only from extrinsic coercion, but also from intrinsic necessity; but it by no means requires immunity also from weakness, namely from concupiscence and the other miseries of human life, which, as extrinsic, and neither coercing nor necessitating, cannot change the intrinsic manner of acting of the human will. "The free is that which is the cause of itself." S. Th. C. G. l. 2, c. 48. And this liberty is altogether necessary for meriting or demeriting.

This liberty of which we are speaking is physical liberty. But moral liberty involves in its concept the absence not only of physical necessity of acting, but also of moral obligation by force of a law commanding or prohibiting. S. Th. 1. p. q. 83; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

There is indeed no doubt that various interior dispositions of the soul and body of man, and also exterior conditions of man, can influence human acts. Hence moral statistics collects the moral facts of men, in various conditions of persons, in order to investigate their causes, whether internal or external. And it especially dwells upon enumerating criminal facts. But criminal anthropology insists upon investigating the causes of crimes, some of which are internal, various diseases, neurasthenia, epilepsy, etc., others external, education, the company of associates, the reading of books and newspapers, etc. Psychopathology or Psychiatry considers the influence of various diseases upon various crimes. But from all these exterior and interior causes, although the voluntary and the free can be diminished, as will later be seen in the impediments of human acts, nevertheless liberty is by no means taken away, unless madness entirely perverts the use of reason. For from these there can indeed be inadvertence, inconsideration, ignorance, the excitation of concupiscence and of the passions, a contracted habit, and imaginations clinging to the mind, and certain fixed judgments; by all of these an inclination to acting can indeed be had, greater or lesser, but in no way an intrinsic necessity of acting. If the intellective faculty is not injured, through whatever bodily disturbance, the liberty of the will always remains.

In human acts is the free truly found not only from coercion, but also from necessity? - R. Affirmatively. It is a truth of faith, which is most openly clear from Scripture and Tradition; notably from Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6. The reason is that "if some good is proposed to the will which has the complete notion of good, as the ultimate end, on account of which all things are sought, it cannot not will to be happy, or will to be miserable. But in those things which are ordered to the ultimate end, nothing is found so evil that it does not have some good mixed in, nor anything so good that it suffices in all respects; hence, however much the good or the evil is shown, it can always adhere and flee into the contrary by reason of the other thing which is in it; from which it is taken, if it is evil simply, as an apparent good; and if it is good simply, as an apparent evil; and hence it is that in all things which fall under election the will remains free, having determination in this alone, that it naturally seeks happiness, and not determinately in this or in that." S. Th. 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 2.

Hence, as is clear, that power toward opposites, by which the act of the will is placed by the will itself, presupposes in its exercise the objective indifference of the judgment of the intellect, which consists in this: that the intellect proposes to the will in the object various notions of suitability or unsuitability, of good or evil. Therefore liberty is concerned with particular goods to be sought. But as regards the seeking of happiness in general, the human will is not free as to the specification of the act, because it cannot will the opposite; but it is free as to the exercise of the act, because someone can not wish then to think about beatitude. S. Th. de Malo, q. 6, sole article.

From the liberty by which human acts are performed, they are said to be imputable to the agent, namely the honesty or baseness of the act redounds to the agent himself, as to its author. Eccl. 15:11 ff.; Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6; St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 105; S. Th. 1. 2, Prologue, q. 10. a. 2; q. 13. a. 6; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 2; Wurzburg, de Act. hum., c. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

"It follows that, when a grave temptation has arisen, and after the sensitive appetite, concupiscible, venereal, or irascible, is vehemently excited by phantasy or from elsewhere, then, I say, acts of a threefold kind can be given in the will. 1. Those which precede the use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant or time in which the intellect does not yet propose to the will motives deterring it, but only motives enticing it toward that object into which the appetite is borne. And these acts of the will are called first-first motions. 2. Those which follow upon some use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant in which the intellect proposes the deterring motives only obscurely, but the enticing motives toward illicit love or toward hatred so vividly that the will is moved only weakly and imperfectly by the deterring motives.

And these acts of the will are called second-first motions. 3. Finally, those which follow upon the perfect use of reason, and are elicited by the will in that instant in which the intellect has proposed to the will, sufficiently clearly and intensely, deterring motives or the unsuitability and moral malice, by which the will could freely be deterred if it seriously wished. And these acts of the will are called deliberate acts. "Acts of the first kind are not free, and consequently they are not formally sinful. But acts of the second kind are imperfectly free, and only venially sinful. But acts of the third kind are perfectly free, and consequently, if there is gravity of matter, they are mortally sinful." Struggl, Theol. Mor., tr. 1, q. 1, a. 1, v. 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3.

In how many ways does the voluntary proceed from the will? Since the voluntary presupposes the apprehension of the intellect, includes an act of the will and the exercise of liberty, and extends itself also to some extrinsic act, or extrinsic action, hence the voluntary is from the will in many ways, and from this arise various divisions of the voluntary, which we shall now explain.

What is the voluntary elicitedly and commandingly? - The first is had when the whole act is performed by the will and in the will, without the aid of another faculty, whether interior and spiritual, or exterior and bodily; such are volitions and nolitions.

The second is had when the act indeed depends upon the very command of the will, but nevertheless is performed by another faculty of the agent; whether interior, as are the intellect, phantasy, memory; or exterior, as are the members of the body and the organs of the senses, as to walk or to speak. But an act can be at the same time elicited and commanded; for the will can command itself in its own acts. And in this way one virtue, for example charity, commands the acts of other virtues, when the will from the motive of one virtue elicits the act of another virtue, for example, from love of God it has mercy on the poor. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1 ad 2; q. 17. a. 5; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 10, s. 1, 2.

What is the division of acts elicited by the will? - The division is twofold, according as these acts consist in the pursuit of good, or in flight from evil; and according as they are concerned with the end or with the means.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What are the acts of the will which are concerned with the end and with the means? "Every action of the will is concerned either with the end, or with the means, which can happen in two ways, either by appetizing or by executing. From this arises a twofold order of acts of the will and of the practical intellect, which governs the will in morals. The first contains all those acts which are necessary up to the final election of the means, which are will, intention, counsel, consent, election. The first two are concerned with the end; the latter with the means, in the order in which they have been numbered. But once the election has been established, the will proceeds to free execution, and thus there is the second order, in which only two acts are numbered: command and use. To these acts fruition is added, which is not an operation ordered to seeking or attaining the end; but, rather, once the end has been obtained, it follows upon it." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, at the beginning.

What is will? - Will, or simple volition, is the first act of the will, which is as it were the first inclination of the will toward the proposed object, as toward something lovable of itself, without any order to another. From this it is clear that this act is concerned with the end; for only the end is lovable of itself. But it does not include a tendency into the end, standing only in love and complacency for that good, and therefore it is simple volition, or love and complacency, still inefficacious. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 1; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1, 2.

What is intention? - Intention is a free or perfectly voluntary tendency into a good, so that we may attain it. Therefore intention is a tendency of the will into some end to be obtained through due means. It is a purpose and desire toward the thing loved, and of itself is an efficacious desire. For purpose is had when someone determines with himself to do something. But desire, in its general signification, signifies any appetition whatever of obtaining a good which someone lacks; and it extends not only to the appetition of an efficacious will, but also to imperfect volitions, or velleities, even of impossible things. Intention, either virtually or expressly, is also an appetition of the means in common. The reason is that intention is the efficacious will of obtaining the end. But to will the end, absolutely as something to be attained as such, is virtually to will to execute all the means necessary to the end. Moreover someone can explicitly elicit this act: I will to employ all the means necessary for the end; this act is intention, because it precedes every consultation about the means and every election, and is the principle of counsel and election. In common, not in particular; for by this reason it is distinguished from election. Suarez, tr. 2, s. 2; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 2; q. 12.

Can someone intend several things at the same time; and if several incompatible things are intended, which intention prevails? - R. To the first: Affirmatively. For either those things are ordered to one another, or they are not. "If indeed they have been ordered to one another, it is manifest that man can intend many things at the same time. For there is intention not only of the ultimate end, but also of an intermediate end: but someone simultaneously intends both the proximate and the ultimate end, as the making of medicine and health. But if two things not ordered to one another are taken, thus also man can intend several things at the same time, which is clear from the fact that man chooses one thing before another, because it is better than the other. But among the other conditions by which something is better than another, one is that it is useful for several things. Hence something can be chosen before another from the fact that it is useful for several things, and thus manifestly man intends several things at the same time." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 12. a. 3.

R. To the second: If those wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen if the impossibility were known. If neither is more powerful, neither prevails, and accordingly neither is valid. If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later prevails over the former; for it is predominant in the order of time and actuality. Except if the former is more powerful, or has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the former will, provided it is not expressly revoked, is certainly predominant. Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 121, 123; L. 1. 6. n. 24.

You will resolve: If one person asked you for a Mass in thanksgiving, another for someone gravely sick, it must be held to have been applied for the latter, whether he asked for it first or later.

If you have established with yourself: Whatever vow I may emit hereafter without the permission of my confessor, I do not wish it to be valid; and afterward you have vowed something without consulting your confessor, it is not valid, provided that will is not retracted expressly or virtually, namely if, mindful of the first vow, you were to emit the second, for example in shipwreck, in fire, etc.

If someone contracted marriage, intending it to be soluble, with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract, the marriage is null; for indissolubility is an essential property of Christian marriage. But he would contract validly if merely through error he thought marriage to be soluble, because private error does not take away from him the intention of contracting in the way in which he ought. L. 1. 3. n. 179, 210, 700; l. 6. n. 24; Elbel 130.

What is election? - Election is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as a means, or as a useful good; namely, it is the efficacious volition of some particular thing which is loved on account of another.

Therefore election proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is the useful good as such and possible for us; and it contains at least virtually the volition of the end itself.

Likewise election retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to take place among several things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of election remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is the only means or whether it is compared with others. Election is after the manner of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing.

Moreover election is the purpose of the will; since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he will do something. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, d. 8, s. 1, 2.

What is consent? - Consent can be attributed to any free act of the will conforming itself, or consenting, to the judgment of the intellect, that is, accepting the good proposed by the intellect; in this way sin is said to be perfected by consent, and thus it is not a special act, and is concerned not only with the means, but also with the end. But insofar as it is a special act, it is concerned with the means, and is not an act specifically distinct from election, but only by reason, from diverse respects. "For insofar as the will wills what the intellect judges to be useful, it is called consent; but insofar as it prefers that either to other useful means, or certainly to other useless things not conducing to the end, it is called election." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 2. But also in reality consent can be distinguished from election, namely when consent is inefficacious. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 15.

What is counsel? - Counsel properly is an act of the intellect including two things: the inquiry and discovery of the means, and the discerning judgment concerning the means more apt for attaining the end. Therefore counsel involves not one act of the intellect, but several. For that inquiry does not take place without discourse and consideration of several things. But counsel sometimes signifies only inquiry, sometimes only judgment, even though it does not proceed from discourse, and sometimes it embraces both. Counsel in this last sense indeed frequently precedes election, but not always. For when election takes place among many things, which happens more often, all those things must be found, proposed, discussed, and judged by the intellect. But where there is question of very small matters, or of things determined of themselves, or known of themselves, then there is no formal counsel. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 14; q. 9. a. 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 5.

What is use? - Use is one thing active, another passive. The first is an act elicited by the will, by which the will moves the other powers to operating. The second is the act of the executing power proceeding from active use.

Use properly concerns the means, for use signifies a certain movement of the will toward really obtaining the thing willed, or the end. Use is really distinguished from election, since counsel and election concerning the means according to itself first take place before there is treatment of execution. But it is by no means really distinguished from election when the intellect suddenly determines the means and all the circumstances, and the will in the same instant in which it chooses the means also chooses the circumstance of actual execution; for from the force of such election there follows the action of the executing power. Therefore use is the will executing the chosen means for attaining the end. Use and election are not acts specifically distinct from one another, because they tend into the object under the same notion of good, namely as it is useful for attaining the end. But election of itself is concerned with the means in the order of intention, as future and as an effect of the end. Active use is concerned with the same means in the order of execution, as present and as the efficient cause of the end had in reality. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16; Suarez, d. 9, s. 1, 2.

What is command? - The command which is treated here is the command by which someone commands himself, not that by which he commands others, and it is the absolute will intimated to oneself for doing or omitting something. Man can command himself in two ways: 1. as it were in the exercised act, while he moves himself to doing something; 2. in the signified act, by expressly eliciting the act of command: do this. Command of this kind is partly an act of the will, and partly an act of the intellect; because to command is to move to acting, but "the first mover among the powers of the soul to the exercise of an act is the will." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. But to command is not to move in any way whatever, but to move as if by imposing a law; and it is the intellect that imposes law on the will, since it judges concerning things to be done. Now here it is asked, what is this act of intellect and will which adequately constitutes command?

As regards the act of the intellect, note: 1. Before will and intention there precedes a practical judgment of the intellect, by which someone judges not only that the thing is good in itself, but also that it is suitable for him, and that it is expedient to love it. This judgment contains some notion of command. "For one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1.

2. Before election and consent there likewise precedes a practical judgment, whether it is by way of formal counsel or not, proposing the means apt for the end as something electable; and a judgment of this kind contains the notion of command more, since it moves more by announcing and intimating.

3. After that election which in time precedes active use, another judgment precedes, more practical, distinct in this from the judgment which precedes election, that it more immediately touches the work and all the determinate circumstances necessary for the execution of the work. The reason is that before every act of the will there must precede a judgment of the intellect consonant with it, by which it is directed and illuminated; but active use is an act of the will, which adds something to the election already made. Therefore. This judgment still more participates in the notion of command; for it moves the will more vehemently by announcing and intimating, not so much by its own power as by the power of the election already made. For it is altogether ordered to the execution of the work and inclines more to overcoming the difficulty of the work, which at the time of execution always appears greater than in consultation and abstract election.

4. Besides these practical judgments, there is found in us another judgment, which we experience when it speaks thus internally with us: do this; and it explicitly expresses the efficacious act of the will to be elicited for executing the work. This judgment is that which explicitly constitutes command. This judgment is not of itself necessary for the work; nevertheless it is a useful act, so that the will itself and the whole man may be moved more, or so that he may more quickly undertake the execution, or so that he may persevere more constantly in it; because while man thus commands himself, he as it were reflects above himself and becomes superior to himself; and because, as external speech with regard to others has the power of moving and inciting the mind, so internal speech has this power with regard to oneself.

As regards the act of the will, it must be noted: 1. that this command, if it is efficacious and true, supposes an absolute will; for if it takes place without any will, it is fictitious and not true; but if the will which precedes is inefficacious, the command itself also will be inefficacious. And the reason is that the whole efficacy of moving is from the will. Therefore a will of this kind completes the notion of that command.

2. The act of the will preceding the act of reason, which is command, is election, by virtue of which reason moves. Therefore command is the practical judgment itself, whether direct or reflex, which, from election already made, by announcing and intimating what is to be done, moves to execution; and then the will begins to use by executing the command of reason. Hence it is manifest that command is prior to use.

3. Nevertheless active use itself of the will has some notion of command, and is often called command. For the will commands the other potencies, even the intellect. Indeed, the will commands even itself. For the will commands all voluntary acts, and one act of the will is commanded by another act of the same will. And the reason is that to command belongs to one having dominion; but it is the will which, as it were, has dominion over all human actions.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17; q. 71. a. 6 ad 2; 2. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2; Quodl. 9. a. 12; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 9, s. 3.

What is fruition? - Fruition, as regards the name, is to take fruit from a thing. As regards the thing itself, it is a certain repose of the will, sweetness, joy, delight, once the presence of the desired object and its possession have been posited.

Joy is said more of a rational good, delight of a sensitive good, fruition of both; and it is rather restricted to one's own good, while joy is also said of another's good, as of a friend. Moral theologians commonly distinguish joy from delight by time, teaching that joy is of a past thing, delight of a present thing. Therefore the object of fruition properly is the good under the notion of a delightable good. But both the end and the means can be an object of joy, although the reason for rejoicing, or the formal object, is always the end. The first reason is that joy arises from the attainment of a delightable good. But the means itself is a certain delightable good. And thus we experience that we are delighted when we obtain suitable means. The second reason is that every loved good is an end or by reason of the end. Therefore every good which delights is an end or by reason of the end. Moreover a twofold joy or fruition is distinguished, perfect and imperfect. "For since it concerns an attained end, if the end has been perfectly obtained, fruition is perfect; if it has been obtained in a certain hope, from this some fruition can arise, but imperfect, because that is already some kind of attainment; and this seems to be that fruition of which Paul speaks: rejoicing in hope." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 7, s. 2. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 11, 31; 2. 2. q. 28.

What is the perfect and imperfect voluntary; the absolute voluntary and velleity; the voluntary simply and according to a certain respect? - These various divisions can be taken and explained in various senses, according as there is considered in the voluntary either precisely the notion of the voluntary, or the notion of the free, or the various object to which it is referred, according to its various state. We shall briefly explain them in the following paragraphs, according to the various acceptions which they have.

By reason of the voluntary, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply, or perfect; another is such according to a certain respect, or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will with the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance. In this way the most perfect voluntary is the love of God toward Himself and the love of the Blessed toward God, which proceed from the most perfect cognition of the object.

The second is that which proceeds indeed from the consenting will, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed volition actually, but mixed with a conditioned nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw away the merchandise, which nevertheless he would also, by deliberate will, wish to preserve if shipwreck were not imminent; hence, not without the deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious repugnance, he absolutely consents to throw them away. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6 ad 3; a. 7 ad 2; Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; L. 1. 5. n. 21.

By reason of the free, according to the varying degree of deliberation, one voluntary is perfect, and it is that which proceeds from the will with perfect cognition and full deliberation; another is imperfect, and that is what proceeds from the will with imperfect cognition and half-full deliberation. Such are the actions of a man half-drunk, half-asleep. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 3, 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. The voluntary that is perfect in this way can well be imperfect in the preceding way, as is clear from the example given of throwing merchandise into the sea in shipwreck.

By reason of deliberation, simply, one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is according to a certain respect, which is also called velleity. And thus, when the temptation of sin stands in the will, yet someone deliberately resists the sin, the will as nature, or according to a certain respect, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Aptly S. Th. 3. p. q. 21. a. 4, where he also gives the reason for this division: "The will simply of man is the will of reason. For we will absolutely what we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the movement of sensuality, or even according to the movement of simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, namely if nothing else stands in the way, which is found by the deliberation of reason. Hence such a will should rather be called velleity than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this if something else did not stand in the way."

By reason of the object, likewise one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is velleity and according to a certain respect, according as the object to which the will tends is considered absolutely, as it really is, according to all its circumstances, or only as it is in itself, with abstraction made from the circumstances.

To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6 ad 1: "Each thing, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, as it is considered with something added, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself contrariwise. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or living to the danger of the multitude, then it is good for him to be killed, and evil for him to live. Hence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain ones to be damned, according to the demand of His justice. And nevertheless that which we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Hence we will something simply according as we will it with all particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Hence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but according to a certain respect he would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Hence it can rather be called velleity than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God wills simply, happens; although that which He wills antecedently does not happen."

And thus also that throwing away of merchandise of which above in n. 30, under various respects, is voluntary according to a certain respect, and at the same time voluntary simply. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 142. a. 3; 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6.

By reason of its perfection, finally, one voluntary is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete; another is the voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete. The first is that which extends itself all the way to the attainment of the thing, by efficaciously willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed all the way to the attainment of the thing, but stops in simple complacency for it. When there is a twofold contrary will concerning the same object, that one is absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other, because one is absolute, the other as if conditioned; for example, someone truly wills to contract marriage, but nevertheless would not wish to receive the sacrament; he truly contracts marriage and receives the sacrament. De Lugo, de Sacr. in genere, d. 8, s. 8, n. 120 ff.

Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason for this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1: "It must be said that the will is intermediate between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the movement of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the will is not complete except concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will it if it were possible."

A sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will; for he has an absolute and efficacious will of health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to employ the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, of health, since he does not at the same time will the means inducing health. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken as if incomplete will were an undeliberated willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberated willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from His kingdom, if he could, and similar things, where it is clear that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompletion of the will is to be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the movement of the will toward the thing. Hence from the fact that the movement of the will is toward the thing to be attained, disposed, etc., by means of exterior operation, it is not perfect, with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of movement of the will, unless it is terminated at a good that can be done, although it is perfect as regards consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God, and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will.

The Angelic Doctor, q. 20. 2. a. 4, says: "If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has according to the matter and due circumstances, then it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected in this, that it attains the end or reaches the term. Hence the will is not perfect unless it is such that, when opportunity is given, it acts. But if possibility is lacking, while the will exists perfected so that it would act if it could, the defect of perfection which is from the exterior act is simply involuntary."

Therefore the will can be called and can be complete in two ways. In one way, according to that relation by which the willed thing is in the will. In another way, according to that by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first way, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that it wills perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that it has perfectly, or attains and possesses the thing willed. Hence the will prepared to act if it could is a perfect will, because it wills perfectly, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really has, attains, and possesses that which it wills, and which it is apt by nature to have. For every movement falling short of the term is imperfect by privation, which consists in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account from the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as the imperfect to the perfect, it follows that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, alone it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater love no one has than that someone lay down his life for his friends; He said lay down, not wish to lay down. Cajetan, on 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5; q. 20, a. 4.

What is the direct and indirect voluntary; voluntary in itself and in the cause; positive and negative? - The voluntary, by reason of the act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one thing direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting, namely which ought and can prohibit. For "not always is that which follows upon a defect of action reduced, as into a cause, into the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or the governance of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, since the will, by willing and acting, can impede this which is not to will and not to act, and sometimes ought to, this which is not to will and not to act is imputed to it as existing from it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; 2. 2. q. 69. a. 7; 3. p. q. 47. a. 1. Namely, it must be what one ought and can prohibit, so that one is in fault. And thus no one would say that every good which you do not do is voluntary to you, even indirectly, and consequently imputable, although absolutely you can do it, but are not bound to do it; and much less every evil which you are not bound in any way to impede.

If nevertheless someone knowingly posits an act incompatible with another act, which is omitted, for performing which there is no obligation, since that omission is free, it is indirectly voluntary, although not imputable to fault; for example, if you wish to study without wishing not to go to visit a church, when there is no obligation; and, on the contrary, it is imputable to merit, as if you wish to pray and therefore omit recreation, without saying, I wish to omit it. Cf. Commentary de Act. hum., Fourth, n. 9. Cf. here the following paragraph and n. 35.

The voluntary, by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing voluntary in itself, another voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; the second, when someone wills the cause from which some effect is going to follow, even if he foresees this effect; for then he does not will it in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. Foresees, that is, merely foresees; for if besides this he wills it, that effect will already be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not merely in the cause. From this it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect, with respect to the will, will have the notion of an end, and the cause the notion of a means. For that which someone wills on account of itself has the notion of an end; what someone wills on account of another has the notion of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, then that effect is outside the intention, and in no way can it be voluntary, not even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to impede it if it is evil, the effect is imputed to it; consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3; q. 71. a. 5.

And thus evil works committed against one's neighbor in drunkenness are voluntary in the cause for him who was voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. If someone writing a bad book foresees many spiritual evils from it, although he does not intend them, they are imputed to him, and they are voluntary to him not in themselves, but in the cause. But if the effect is good, and someone who posits the cause foresees it, he is already judged implicitly to will it, and he does not lack his merit, since the good is the object of the will, not evil. If you give your goods to a monastery, foreseeing the spiritual goods thence to come, you certainly do not lack merit. Therefore there is a distinction between good and evil; for good, at least in some way, we ought to intend; evil, on the contrary, cannot be intended, but ought to be avoided. Suarez, d. 1, s. 4.

Several theologians altogether distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says, "The voluntary in itself is sufficiently clear; for then something is said to be voluntary in itself when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately concerned with it, either by a proper act, if it is voluntary direct, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirectly voluntary." D. 1, s. 4. Likewise S. Th. q. 77. a. 7: "Two things seem to have to be considered. First, that something can be voluntary either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it, or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause and not into the effect; as is clear in him who voluntarily becomes drunk. For from this, what he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly, it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed is that into which the will is borne; but indirect is that which the will could have prohibited, but does not prohibit."

But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause the direct and indirect voluntary, and express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. Gury, Ballerini, n. 5. Now, with a comparison established between both divisions, the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary includes under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause. For the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be "that which proceeds from the will as from an agent," q. 6. a. 3 ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing.

But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be "that which is from the will as from a non-agent," l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the acting and willing will. Therefore the indirectly voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Nevertheless it can be reduced to both; for the indirectly voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since externally not acting is as it were the external object completing that not willing, just as the former is in some way voluntary in itself, so also is the latter, since one complete non-act is as it were constituted from both the lack of an interior and exterior act; for example, not willing to hear Mass, and not hearing Mass in fact, just as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass.

Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so from the omission of an act another act can follow, which, although it is not properly the effect of that omission, just as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect. And thus it can be called voluntary in the cause; for example, the death of those sailing, indirectly voluntary, is, in the sense stated, voluntary in the cause for the pilot of the ship who desists from steering.

What is required so that an evil effect which follows, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will as fault? - The following conditions are required: 1. That he who posits or omits the cause advert, at least confusedly, that such an effect will follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless in some way it is known beforehand.

2. That the agent be able to impede such a cause; because there is no obligation to impossibilities.

3. That the agent be bound, by reason of that effect, to remove or omit that cause; because the effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in reality does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. L. 1. 5. n. 15; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; q. 21. a. 2; C. I. 1151 f.; C. G. 1182 f.; C. H. 1092 ff.

When is someone bound to remove the cause, by reason of an evil effect that will follow? - 1. He is bound when it of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect. For then the cause is evil in itself. It is said, of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect, because one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause if the evil effect followed merely accidentally; for then the cause would not therefore be evil in itself. Nor would he be bound if the cause of itself, directly and primarily, produces a good effect, and only through this as a medium an evil effect follows; for a cause according to moral estimation is judged from its effect of itself, directly, and primarily, and accordingly it is then simply honorable in itself. Therefore then one would not will the evil, but would will the good, and would only permit the evil. Likewise one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause because it equally, directly and primarily, as if in a parallel manner, influences a good and an evil effect. For then the cause in itself, according to moral estimation, is indifferent, and honorable, insofar as it is subject to the honorable intention of the agent; for the evil effect is not intended, but permitted. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 5; q. 73. a. 8; 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

2. Someone is likewise bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless someone is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept that presses to be fulfilled; for example, if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. "For he who is bound to the law must necessarily be bound to procure the ordinary means, and the means proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing, for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things." Ithur., case 32, n. 4. Hence "the reason can be given, that by reason of the precept that cause and the effects following from it, although physically they are connected only accidentally, and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless morally are judged to have the notion of one unsuitable object, or one to be avoided by the will, and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 9.

3. Finally, someone is bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness on the part of the agent. For then an honorable end of the one operating is lacking; for evil is to be avoided, and it can be permitted when there is a rational and just cause. Besides, to will such a cause then often shows an evil affection directly toward that evil effect that will follow; or at least there is often a proximate danger of such evil affection. But a greater or lesser reason is required for positing the cause according as it is a cause of itself, or from its own nature influencing such an effect, or an accidental cause, namely one which does not influence such an effect from its intrinsic nature, but from some extrinsic condition of things. Likewise the greater reason is required for acting in such a case, the more proximately the cause touches the evil effect, the more probable the evil effect is, the less right one has to the action considered in itself, and the graver the effect itself is, if one is bound by office to impede the evil. For if a proportionately grave reason is not had, natural honesty itself obliges us to omit that cause. L. 1. 1. n. 152; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

Is the effect which follows, gravely evil, voluntary only indirectly or in the cause, always imputable as grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if he illicitly posits the cause without any sufficient reason? - R. 1. Affirmatively, if that cause of itself, or from its intrinsic nature, gravely influences the effect. The reason is that if the cause of itself gravely influences the effect, the grave malice from the effect redounds into the cause. Therefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect itself by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, one who wills the cause, of itself gravely influencing an effect gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in reality directly wills the grave malice of that effect, and does not merely permit it; since the cause and effect are inseparably connected with one another, so far as concerns the very nature of the thing, and no other honorable reason is present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed.

R. 2. Negatively, if that cause of itself influences that effect only lightly. The reason is that, since the cause of itself has only a light influence upon that gravely evil effect, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and accordingly, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with one another. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. Accordingly he does not contract the grave malice proper to the effect. But since the malice of the effect redounds into the cause by reason of the influence which the latter has upon the effect, where the influence is light there is only light malice; and consequently, with the direct intention of the gravely evil effect always excluded, someone willing a cause that influences such an effect only lightly, although he will not sin gravely, nevertheless will sin lightly. And this is the proper reason why, although there is no smallness of matter in venereal matters, nevertheless there is such in those acts of mere sensuality, as are looks, from a cause of mere curiosity, at less honorable things, with the intention of the venereal thing itself again excluded, as the very common opinion of theologians holds.

R. 3. Again negatively, if the cause in no way of itself influences that evil effect, but the effect follows merely accidentally, or from extrinsic circumstances. The reason is that since the effect follows only accidentally, there is no connection, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause of itself, but merely accidentally, someone willing the cause, with every intention of the evil effect excluded, contracts none of its malice, neither grave nor light, although perhaps otherwise he also sins gravely. And thus, if someone foresees pollution from some excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly, or perhaps even gravely, by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of lust. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing only accidentally into some evil effect, by reason only of that evil effect itself. For in actions only this one thing must be attended to: whether they are the cause of this effect, or not. For if they do not have the force of a cause, it is ridiculous that they must be avoided on account of an effect of this kind. And in no way is someone bound to abstain from positing such a cause, if a reasonable motive is present for positing a cause of this kind.

Cf. 40. 1, 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, 5; Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 14 ff.; L. 1. 3. n. 484; Salm., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5; 3. p. q. 30. a. 7; d'Annibale, 4th ed., p. 1, n. 157, note 15.

When is an effect willed in the cause imputed? - It is imputed, speaking of itself, first when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. "The reason is that the free volition, or non-impeding, of an evil effect is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and accordingly formal sin is committed when there is such a perverse volition or nolition.... Thus therefore, he who, for example, has offered poison to another ... does not sin when the death of the other follows ... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect." Struggl, q. 1, a. 3, n. 32. Speaking of itself; for if someone can impede an effect of this kind right up to its execution, and does not impede it, or is pleased in its futurition or existence, he continues in his mind the sin whose cause he previously posited freely and culpably. Consequently someone must then confess the effect as if it were the external act and object, the complement of the sin. But it would be otherwise if, after the cause had been posited, before the effect follows, he retracts the will, or confesses the sin committed. L. 1. 5. n. 10; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 3.

Note: Since the cause, as such, participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a different malice, it suffices in confession to accuse only the malice of the effect; or if the cause has in itself another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if because of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if because of theft you likewise omitted Mass, you can then accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. L. 1. 5. n. 9; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 15, n. 479.

You will resolve: 1. "If the cause of pollution is one gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was at least confusedly foreseen. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust, namely touches or sights of the shameful parts of another's or one's own body with base and deliberate delight; the sight of human intercourse; and morose thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes are certainly mortal. Thus S. Th. a. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, de Matr., l. 9, c. 45, n. 23, and all agree." L. 1. 3. n. 482. A special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in delight excited from a base object. Gravely influencing; therefore, if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow, since then it follows outside the intention and accidentally. Of themselves are grave faults: "the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause of itself mortal in the genus of lust.... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil." L. 1. 3. n. 484. In the genus of lust, whence "it is inferred that the pollution which happens outside the intention from causes illicit even mortally in another genus than lust is not mortal, as from drunkenness, or from eating too immoderately or on a forbidden day." L. 1. 3. n. 484, 477; Salm., Theol. Schol., tr. 13, d. 10, n. 274; Theol. Mor., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41.

2. "If someone, about to do some necessary or lawful and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends, then, provided the danger of consent to the delight is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action; because the effect following accidentally and outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his right. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is lawful to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace according to the custom of the country, if otherwise one would have to be regarded as uncivil." L. 1. 3. n. 481. "It is lawful for someone who suffers a great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows." L. 1. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either of themselves influence only lightly, or although they of themselves gravely influence, nevertheless, since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and delight, but from an honorable, necessary, useful, suitable cause, they no longer have the same force and influence upon the effect, which is gravely increased by that evil propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished by the will turned elsewhere and resisting as far as it can. Hence the evil effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to natural constitution, or to weakness of nature, than to the aforesaid acts as cause. Besides, with the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the evil effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, by behaving permissively toward the evil. Therefore that evil effect, in the case, truly follows accidentally and outside the intention. L. 1. 3. n. 483; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

3. "It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not prolonged conversation with a girl, or from a slight glance, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as has been said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them." L. 1. 3. n. 484. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing. L. 1. 5. n. 29. A just cause is "any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness." L. 1. 3. n. 484; l. 5. n. 29.

4. A fortiori grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and accidentally, since they are outside the genus of lust. Therefore, although pollution or an evil commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is lawful to ride horseback, not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for recreation; to recline in some position in order to rest more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drink; to lead honorable dances, etc. L. 1. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent; for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the effect going to follow, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, "because, as they say, the pollution arises rather from the weakness of nature than from that cause, which concurs to pollution only accidentally and remotely. But Sanchez, Lessius, and others more probably affirm it..., because without a rational cause to permit pollution always seems something unbecoming and disordered." L. 1. 3. n. 484; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 45; Sporer, de Matr., n. 644 ff.; Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, d. 14, n. 97-103.

1. Arnulfus, an upright man, but of a petulant disposition, when, first, he had met his enemy, and had been provoked and attacked by him not only with words but also with blows, burns with the desire of killing him, and, having seized a dagger, rushes upon him. But, the impulse of anger having been restrained, he flees from the enemy. Afterwards, however, having become master of himself, he fears lest he has committed a mortal fault, and therefore, no delay having intervened, he throws himself at the feet of the confessor, about to accuse the sin.

2. The same man, although he had made serious efforts to destroy the evil habit of blaspheming, in a quarrel had with a certain adversary breaks out into blasphemies, and therefore again seeks a confessor to wash away this stain of conscience.

3. On another occasion, knowing that he was accustomed to quarrel in drunkenness, he carefully attends lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety. But behold, urged by his companions to drink beyond custom, he is overtaken by drunkenness before he has adverted to its danger, and, being furious, mixes in quarrels with others. But having returned to himself he strives to do penance, and again has recourse to the confessor.

Q. 1. What is the voluntary? 2. Has Arnulfus sinned in that threefold case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 6-8. To the second, Arnulfus does not seem to have sinned, at least gravely, in any of the three proposed cases. For the perfectly voluntary was lacking. Not in the first, for he is said, and appears, truly to be an upright man, and an upright man does not so easily resolve deliberately to kill a man. He is said, moreover, to be prone to anger, and that his enemy met him; whence, from his presence, he could at once be moved to anger. Likewise it is said that he was provoked and attacked with words and blows, and so he could be much moved to anger, so that he lacked at least full and perfect knowledge of the malice and deliberation of mind. Finally it is said that, the impulse of anger having been restrained, having become master of himself, he feared lest perhaps he had sinned, and at once went to the confessor to expiate the guilt of soul, if perhaps he had incurred it; and this indeed shows that Arnulfus acted at least without full deliberation of mind.

Not in the second; for, if he had sinned gravely, in the case this would have been only on account of the neglected habit of blaspheming. But he had made serious efforts to root it out. For since he is prone to anger, he is easily to be judged to have acted from a first-first movement.

Not in the third, since he carefully attended lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety, and then, not adverting to the danger of drunkenness, he was seized by drunkenness. - G. 1.

2. Elpidius, habitually given to drinking and of a quarrelsome disposition, furious in drunkenness, after having had a dispute with Titius, resolved to seek vengeance from him; yet he put off the purpose to another time. Afterwards he went to a nearby tavern, that he might calm his anger in wine; but behold, when at night he was leaving the tavern perfectly drunk, by an unfortunate chance he came upon Titius himself, and beat him so gravely that for many weeks he was forced to abstain from his accustomed work and suffered great damage.

Q. 1. What is the free? 2. Are the damages inflicted by Titius in drunkenness imputable to him, and therefore is he held to repair them?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 10-12. To the second: "Affirmatively. The reason is that the damages are truly voluntary and sufficiently foreseen in the cause itself, at least confusedly. For Elpidius willed to inflict damage on Titius, and drank with the danger of drunkenness, since he was habitually given to drinking. Moreover he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages; since he could not be ignorant that in wine he became furious and could harm someone. Therefore Elpidius is excused neither from grave sin against justice, nor from the obligation of repairing the damages." Thus G. 3.

But that resolution is not without difficulty. For Elpidius entered the nearby tavern, not in order then to carry out his evil purpose, but, on the contrary, to calm his anger; and so it does not appear that even confusedly Elpidius then foresaw damage to be inflicted on Titius. Nor is it valid to say that he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages. For if in fact, in the case, he did not foresee it, this general presumption must yield to the truth. And the presumption in the case is rather the contrary; since, stirred by anger, he entered the tavern to calm his anger; whence Elpidius rather seems, for that time, to have willed to abstain from every vengeance and from inflicting damage. But when Elpidius gravely beat Titius, Elpidius was already perfectly drunk, and so then the voluntary, the free, and sin were entirely lacking. - I. M. 288.

1. Blasius, wishing to harm Caius his enemy, intended to pierce his ass with lead. But alas! a double misfortune befell him. For the ass is not struck by the bullet, but leaps and springs away unharmed, while the cow of Titius his friend, which after a dense hedge was lying quietly, and could not be seen by him, is unhappily killed.

Q. 1. What is the not-voluntary and the involuntary? 2. Is Blasius held to restitution for the ass not harmed, or for the cow killed?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 8, 18. To the second, negatively to both. He is certainly not held to restitution for the ass, since it escaped unharmed. For to sin the mere will of causing damage suffices; but for restitution from damage caused, the mere damaging will does not suffice. There is also required a truly damaging action, and damage truly inflicted.

Nor is he held to restitution for the cow, since he neither intended that damage nor could foresee it, and so it was not voluntary; indeed it was altogether involuntary to him. For, for restitution from damage caused, an action actually damaging and damage actually inflicted do not suffice; it is required also that damage of this sort proceed from the will and be voluntary, so that it may be imputed to him and an obligation of reparation arise for him. Therefore in the forum of conscience, or before the sentence of a judge, he cannot be urged to any reparation of the damage. But what if the ass and the cow had belonged to the same Caius? In the rigor of principles, not even then would Blasius be held for the damage. For although it would not then have been involuntary, nevertheless it would still have been not-voluntary, because that damage would always have been unforeseen. For he had not seen the cow. - G. 3; I. M. 1358, 1370.

2. Faustinus, wishing to affect Nicolinus his enemy with injury, resolved to kill a pair of horses, which Nicolinus held very dear to himself. But amid the darkness of night, not discerning well, he kills another pair, namely asses of the same Nicolinus, which Nicolinus also held very dear to himself.

Q. Is Faustinus held to restitution; and, if affirmatively, what ought he to restore?

R. Faustinus is held to restitution from unjust damaging. For in the case there was a culpable, efficacious, and unjust cause of damage. Therefore no necessary condition for restitution is lacking. And indeed, knowingly and willingly, Faustinus killed the pair of asses, although he thought it was a pair of horses. Whence it cannot here be said that that killing was not-voluntary to him. The difficulty can only be in the estimation of the damage, because this cannot be taken from the horses, which he did not kill, nor from the asses, which he did not wish to kill. But certainly it cannot be taken from the horses, because their damage does not exist; and, on the contrary, it must be taken from the asses, because their damage does exist. In the present matter, error of person excuses from restitution, because then there is no injury of the person; but error of thing, since it does not remove injury of the person, does not excuse from restitution; for this always remains, whether by damage of horses or of asses; for in that damaging, the injury of the person, not of the horses nor of the asses, is considered. Therefore the damage unjustly inflicted must be repaired: the damage inflicted, by no means that which was not inflicted. If Caius, in order to inflict injury on Sempronius, were to snatch from him a golden necklace, judging it silver, and throw it into the sea, would he not certainly be held for the estimated value of a silver necklace? And if the necklace were silver, and he judged it golden, would he not again be held for the real value of the silver necklace? - Cf. 5. 1.

1. Titius, a priest, determines to celebrate Mass on the following day for Sempronius, who asked that it be celebrated according to his intention, an alms having been given, but with no determined time. But on the following day Titius is asked in the sacristy by Caius that he be willing soon to celebrate Mass, and to sing it for his father, who died that very night. Forgetful of the prior intention, Titius celebrates and sings the Mass for Caius's father. Still forgetful of the Mass to be celebrated for Sempronius, he celebrates on the third day for himself, since he thinks he has no other obligation which he must satisfy. But behold, after some days the same Sempronius asked several other Masses from Titius, and then Titius remembered that prior Mass to be celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius.

Q. 1. What is intention; and can several things be intended? 2. Which intention of Titius prevailed in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17-19. To the second: the Mass which Titius celebrated and sang on the following day was celebrated for Caius's deceased father. For this was the predominant intention, which prevails over the other, which was incompatible with it. This can be confirmed even from that circumstance, that he sang the Mass.

The Mass which Titius celebrated on the third day was celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius. For this intention, although habitual, was evidently predominant over the intention of celebrating for himself, although this latter was actual. For the predominant intention is that which would actually be chosen, once its incompatibility with the other were known. But, once each intention was known, the intention which would have been chosen by Titius would have been the intention of celebrating for Sempronius, because he celebrated for himself only insofar as he was persuaded that he had no obligation which he had to satisfy. Therefore. And this must be asserted a fortiori if Titius had had no intention specially on that day. "If it is applied to no one, or to one incapable, the fruit remains in the treasury of the Church, or yields to the priest himself, or to those for whom he is specially held to offer, since he is thus judged implicitly to have intended." St. Alph. l. 6, n. 336. Cf. n. 335, q. 1. Moreover, in practice, when a doubt stands, it would be safer to celebrate the Mass another time for the one for whom the application did not avail. - G. 5, 6; v. 2, 335; Elbel 403.

2. Franciscus, administering the sacrament of baptism, is distracted by a sudden noise made in the church, and pronounces the form of baptism without attending to it in any way. A little later, he hears confession, and, finding the penitent little disposed, resolves not to absolve him. But again he is distracted, thinking of the cause of that noise, and, distracted, pronounces the form of absolution.

Q. 1. What is actual and virtual intention? 2. Do baptism and absolution avail in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17, 18, 41, 42. To the second: Franciscus administers baptism validly and licitly. Validly, because, although there is no actual intention and voluntary; nevertheless there is virtual intention and voluntary, which suffices in the administration of the sacraments. Licitly, because that distraction, since it was voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, can be attributed to Franciscus as no fault. S. Th. 3 p., q. 64, a. 8, ad 3.

The absolution given by Franciscus was invalid, nor in giving it did Franciscus sin in any way. It was invalid because, of two intentions simultaneously incompatible, the predominant intention always prevails, and this in the case is the intention of not absolving. Indeed, it was the only one, since he absolved while distracted. But Franciscus sinned in no way, because that wandering of mind was altogether natural and involuntary. - G. 5.

1. Ricardus, an innkeeper, lest his tavern be deprived of the great concourse of guests, supplies abundant wine to drunkards asking for it, although he foresees that many of them will become drunk and quarrel. He is moved by reason of customary profit, and sometimes by reason of preventing blasphemies; nor does he think that he offends in this. He also easily admits into his inn men uttering impious or obscene conversations, nor does he rebuke them, because, he says, he is not held by reason of his office to be solicitous about their manner of acting.

2. Nemesius on a certain day offers 20 asses by way of payment to Caius, a porter carrying a certain bundle to his inn. The porter asks 25 asses. Nemesius denies that he will give him anything more, although that man, furious, breaks out into imprecations and blasphemies.

Q. 1. What is the indirectly voluntary? 2. Does Ricardus sin gravely by serving wine to those who will become drunk, for the sole reason of customary profit? 3. Does he sin gravely by doing this to prevent the blasphemies of the drunkards? 4. Does he sin gravely by not preventing the impious and obscene conversations of the guests? 5. In the second case, ought Nemesius to have given the aforesaid five asses, although not owed, in order to prevent the blasphemies of the porter?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 32, 33, 34. To the second, negatively, generally and speaking in itself. The reason is that the innkeeper is not held to prevent, with grave damage to himself, the sins of drunkenness and quarrels which guests are accustomed to admit; for charity does not urge with so great an inconvenience. But hardly any tavern is found in which some guests are not accustomed to become drunk, and afterwards to mix in some quarrels. Therefore, if the innkeeper denies wine, the guests will go to other drinking shops, in which abundant drink is served to them; and therefore he himself will undergo great damage, and uselessly. Generally and in itself: for if it is not a question of sins of this sort foreseen confusedly, but is a question of some particular case, namely of a certain drinker already near drunkenness, who asks for more drink, it cannot here be served. The reason is that in a particular, determined, and certain case, only slight damage would have to be undergone by him in order actually to prevent a determined and certain sin. Except if, from other extrinsic circumstances, grave damage would still have to be undergone by him, or graver sins would follow. Elbel 17; L. 1, 2, n. 69.

To the third, negatively. The reason is that, of two evils, the greater must be prevented when both cannot be prevented.

To the fourth, affirmatively, if there is grave scandal of others and he could easily prevent it. The reason is that he is held only by the general reason of charity, which does not oblige with grave damage. But a grave inconvenience in practice is not lacking, as was just said in the response to the first for the case of the drunkenness of guests.

To the fifth, negatively, if he has paid the customary and just price. The reason is that, since similar cases often occur, an occasion would be given to wicked men to blaspheme more and more, and grave damage would have to be undergone by pious men. G. 7, 8, 9; I. M. 35, 36, 337, 434.

1. Adalbertus confesses thus: 1. wishing to kill Titius, my enemy, I killed Caius, my friend. 2. By shooting a bullet at a deer, I at the same time pierced my enemy, sought on another occasion for death, standing hidden in a thicket. 3. Ignorant that it was a vigil, I ate meat; but out of laziness on Sunday I had not been present at Mass, in which the obligations occurring in the week are customarily announced.

Q. 1. Does ignorance cause the involuntary? 2. What is to be judged concerning Adalbertus?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 48. To the second: in the first case Adalbertus is not excused from the sin of homicide, since knowingly and willingly he killed a man. But if he used due diligence to guard against the homicide of another besides Titius the enemy, since his external act is not formally injurious to Caius, whom he killed altogether involuntarily, he is not to be bound to any restitution toward his heirs. But otherwise, if he omitted due diligence, or foresaw confusedly the danger of killing Caius. - I. M. 1370, 1372, 1373.

In the second case, either he used due diligence to guard against the damage of another, or he did not. If the former, the act is not voluntary, and consequently not a sin. If the latter, he is guilty of homicide. But since the enemy was standing hidden in a thicket, and Adalbertus thought he was killing nothing except a deer, he seems to be excused from homicide. - Elbel 46.

In the third case, either a thought occurred to him about an obligation perhaps to happen within the week, or no thought occurred. If the former, the ignorance was vincible, and he sinned against the precept of the Church by neglecting to inquire. If the latter, although he sinned by omitting Mass, nevertheless he did not sin by the omission of fasting. I. M. 8, 207, 288. - G. 12, 13, 14, 646 seqq.

2. Abundius, a priest approved for receiving the confessions of the faithful, experiences that his knowledge is slight and insufficient for duly carrying out that office; nevertheless he continues to hear confessions, because he has authentic testimony of the bishop concerning his suitability. Hence, through defect of knowledge and study, he commits various errors concerning the species of sins to be inquired into, and especially concerning the obligation of restoring. Having been rebuked by a confessor and bound to make restitution on behalf of the penitents, he had resolved seriously to apply himself to the studies of Moral Theology, and meanwhile to interrupt the sacred ministry, when behold, suddenly he is called to Titius, who is dying, and, as report has it, liable to various restitutions. He goes on uncertain, absolves the poor man while doubtful, not being able to discern the entangled conscience, and returns sad, muttering that he would again be liable to restitution on behalf of the penitent.

Q. 1. Is there sin in the case from ignorance, or are the aforesaid errors imputable to Abundius? 2. Did he sin gravely in each instance? 3. Is he liable to restitution?

1. Human acts are, generally, acts of man, by which the same man orders himself to an end consonant with himself. For every agent acts on account of an end. But this is the distinction between rational nature and irrational nature: that the former, by its own acts, orders itself unto an end, while the latter is ordered unto an end by another. Aptly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2: “It must be considered that something tends to an end by its action or motion in two ways. In one way, as moving itself to the end, as man does; in another way, as moved to the end by another, as an arrow tends to a determinate end from the fact that it is moved by the archer, who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts through free choice, which is the faculty of will and reason. But those things which lack reason tend to the end through natural inclination, as moved by another, and not by themselves, since they do not know the notion of the end. And therefore they cannot order anything unto an end, but are only ordered unto an end by another. For the whole irrational nature is compared to God as an instrument to the principal agent... And therefore it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as acting itself, or leading itself to the end; but it is proper to irrational nature as acted upon and led by another, whether to an apprehended end, as brute animals are, or to an end not apprehended, as those things are which entirely lack cognition.”

2. Wherefore human acts, concerning which these Commentaries treat, and concerning which St. Thomas treats in 1. 2., are acts of man as wayfarer, by which man tends toward Beatitude, so that, with divine grace assisting, he may merit it for himself and at last obtain it. Hence the Angelic Doctor first treats in 1. 2. of the ultimate end of man and of Beatitude, then of human acts. Hence human acts can be considered either relatively to the man who by them is ordered to the end, or relatively to the end to which man is ordered by their aid. We shall speak in an orderly way of human acts according to each consideration, in distinct Commentaries.

1. Human acts considered relatively to man can be looked at in two ways: first, according as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature; for an act, generally in created things, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from potency to act. secondly, according as they fall short from this nature proper to them, on account of accidental impediments which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly. Therefore first we set out to speak of the intrinsic nature of a human act; but afterward we shall speak of those accidental impediments.

2. Moreover usage has prevailed, and not without reason, that a distinction should be made between an act of man and a human act. Since man is a substantive name, and directly signifies a supposit or person, an act of man is taken merely materially for any act whatever proceeding from a man, or from a human supposit and person: for actions belong to supposits. But since human is an adjective name, and directly denotes a form, a human act is an act proceeding from man not in just any way, but according to the form or nature proper to him, namely with advertence of the intellect and deliberate will. “Of actions,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1., “which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man (namely adequately, and as to the substance of the work, and as to the mode of operating). But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are called properly human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will: hence free choice also is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are called properly human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man.” And in the same place, a. 3: “Acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberating will.” Therefore, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, in order that we may know its intrinsic nature more deeply, it is necessary to explain briefly: 1. the nature of the voluntary; 2. the nature of the free; 3. finally, in how many ways any act whatever can proceed from deliberate will. Hence in this first Commentary on human acts we have proposed first to explain the nature of the voluntary.

3. Moreover, before we proceed further, it must be noted that human acts are called acts rather than actions, because this name action is accustomed to designate more the exterior operation, although it is also used for an interior act; while, on the contrary, the name act is used rather for an interior act, or for an act considered in its intrinsic principle, than for an exterior operation, namely for an act considered with respect to its exterior object or extrinsic effect; although it is also taken for an exterior action, as when one says: an act of religious profession, an act of matrimony, an act of contract, etc. But a human act, as is clear from the very determination of the adjective added to it, properly designates an act according as it proceeds from its intrinsic principles and is considered according to them; which from what has been said is now sufficiently drawn out.

Moreover, since a human act proceeds from the will and from the free will, and in it alone, as in its proper subject, morality is found, concerning which there will be discussion hereafter, human acts are also called voluntary acts, free acts, moral acts, and one name is used for another indiscriminately, as may be seen in the Angelic Doctor in 1. 2. And thus q. 18. a. 5: “some acts are called human or moral, according as they are from reason.” And q. 1. a. 3: “moral acts and human acts are the same.” And q. 20. a. 6. ad 2: “it must be said that action and passion pertain to the genus of morals, insofar as they have the nature of the voluntary. And therefore according as by a diverse will they are called voluntary, according to this they are two morally, and there can be good on one side, and evil on the other.”

4. If a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, it is essentially a voluntary act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 6. For the voluntary, cognition is essentially prerequired: nothing is willed unless foreknown. This prior cognition is, in a human act, the prerequired condition; but voluntariness is properly the form constitutive of it. - From defect of the aforesaid condition, the acts of infants, of the insane, of those sleeping, of the intoxicated, are not human acts, but acts of man. Hence, if someone in a state of insanity, sleep, or intoxication baptizes, consecrates, contracts, or is present at Mass, recites the canonical hours, these acts are of no moral value and have no moral effect, because they are not human acts. And this holds even if someone, while still master of himself before he falls into that state, foresees it, indeed wills and intends it. For when, being master of himself, he wills and intends to do it, nevertheless he does not do it; but when, no longer master of himself, he does it, he does not will to do it by a human act; and since those things are of the moral order and of moral value, they can be done only by a human act. In sleep the imagination prevails, or at least “the intellect does not prevail; whence man follows the imaginative apprehension as if true.” St. Thomas, On Dreams, sect. 6. Namely, “the use of reason is indeed more or less impeded in sleeping; nevertheless it is always impeded as to something, so that one cannot have an altogether free judgment.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 2. ad 2. - Cf. Lugo, On the Sacraments, D. 8. n. 106; Suarez, On Religion, tr. 6, On Vow, l. 1. c. 10; Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 1. D. 8. n. 20; Laymann, l. 4. tr. 4, On Vow, c. 1. n. 4.

5. But if the prior cognition of the intellect is not indeed lacking, but is not perfect, the act, so far under this head, is human insofar as it is directed and ordered by that prior cognition. Therefore, one who is ignorant of what he does materially, or as to the fact, or is ignorant of what he does formally, that is, as to the morality of his action, because namely he is ignorant of the law, sins in no way; for example, if someone on a day of abstinence is ignorant that he is eating meat, or, eating it, is ignorant of the law of abstinence. - But it is not required that someone have perfect cognition of the thing, that namely, that the thing be known in itself and in the individual, or with every certainty; for it is sufficient that it be apprehended at least confusedly, and with doubt. For, with prior cognition of the thing standing, although confused, now the will is borne into it, whatever it may be; with doubt of thing and thing standing, the will is borne into each. And thus an adult is validly baptized, although he has not yet fully explored all the obligations of a Christian, and afterward he is bound by them. One receiving the subdiaconate, at least confusedly, apprehends and consequently wills all the obligations annexed to that state; wherefore, although he is ignorant of the chastity to be preserved which is annexed to it, nevertheless he is bound to it. A hunter striking a beast, concerning which he doubts whether it is a man, in truth wills both: to kill the beast and the man.

6. From defect of voluntariness or of deliberate will, the first intuition of evident truth and the first love of good in common, or of happiness, are not human acts. Beatitude itself, since it is not an act of deliberate will, but a necessary act, although it is a perfect act of the intellect and of the will, nevertheless is not a human act; and by the Angelic Doctor himself in 1. 2. it is not considered as a human act, but as the end of human acts. And thus in the prologue to q. 6 St. Thomas says: “Therefore, because it is necessary to arrive at beatitude through certain acts, it is consequently necessary to consider human acts, that we may know by which acts one may arrive at beatitude, or the way of beatitude may be impeded.” Therefore to the question which is commonly discussed, whether beatitude is a human act, one must answer that it is not a human act, but the term and end of all human acts. Cf. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 1. D. 2. S. 2.

7. From defect of both elements, intellective cognition and deliberate will, those sudden passions of desire, fear, and anger, which are stirred up in the sensitive appetite, are not human acts, but acts of man. The same must be said of those actions which man does from a certain natural instinct, thinking nothing about them, as when someone moves a foot or hand while intent on other things, or strokes his beard, etc. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3, “that actions of this sort are not properly human, because they do not proceed from deliberation of reason, which is the proper principle of human acts; and therefore they have, as it were, an imagined end, but not an end pre-established by reason.”

8. These things having been established, the question is at once resolved concerning that cognition prerequired for a human act: namely, whether merely sensitive cognition suffices for a human act, the apprehension of a thing through sensitive imagination. - Since a human act, as has already been said, is an essentially voluntary act, the proposed question falls back into another more general question.

Since the will is borne toward an apprehended good, it is asked: whether it can be borne toward an object apprehended by sensitive cognition alone, or through phantasy and imagination alone, and not at the same time through the intellect.

It must be denied altogether; and the reason is that, as the natural appetite follows the natural form, and the sensitive appetite follows sensitive cognition, so the spiritual appetite follows spiritual cognition. Therefore spiritual cognition alone is its foundation, and is consonant with it, so that it may be moved into act. Moreover, the cognoscitive power moving the will, which is an intrinsically inorganic and spiritual faculty, illuminates and directs it. But this cannot belong to a sensitive power of an inferior order, which is an intrinsically organic faculty. Aptly Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Libertas, 20 June 1888: “The will is in no way moved unless cognition of the mind has shone before it like a certain torch: namely, the good desired by the will is necessarily a good insofar as it is known by reason.”

And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3: “It must be said that... the goodness of the will properly depends upon the object. But the object of the will is proposed to it through reason. For the understood good is the object of the will proportioned to it. But the sensible or imaginary good is not proportioned to the will, but to the sensitive appetite; because the will can tend toward universal good, which reason apprehends. But the sensitive appetite tends only toward a particular good, which the sensitive power apprehends. And therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason in the way in which it depends on the object... The appetite of the will cannot be concerning the good unless it is first apprehended by reason.” And Cajetan, on q. 10. a. 3: “If sense alone could move the will, then man could will without the use of reason, and consequently could sin and do well, which is not intelligible; for it implies the existence of an act of free choice without the use of reason.” For liberty is founded in reason. Wherefore a human act, both insofar as it is an act proceeding from the will and insofar as it is proceeding from deliberate will, altogether requires prior cognition of reason. Cf. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. ad 3; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2; D. 6. S. 4. 5; Lessius on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. a. 2.

9. And thus much concerning the first element of the human act. The remaining matters which must be treated concerning it will more conveniently be explained presently when the discussion is about the other element, or about voluntariness. This element includes two things: the voluntary and the free. We pause now in explaining the voluntary. The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds or is caused by the will. “Voluntary,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. ad 1, “is said denominatively from the will... which names the rational appetite.” And in the same place, a. 3: “The voluntary is said to be that which is from the will,” namely, as the same Holy Doctor explains in the same article, that which proceeds from the will. Wherefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. And thus, q. 20. a. 2. ad 3, the Angelic Doctor says, “it must be said that voluntary is said not only of an act of the will, but also of exterior acts, according as they proceed from will and reason, and therefore there can be a difference of good and evil concerning both.” Just as some motion is from the sole instinct and impulse of nature, so some act is elicited from the vital appetite and arises from prior cognition. Just as the former motion has its proper name and is called natural, so also this act has its proper name and is called voluntary. And therefore this name is never attributed to those things which happen without cognition, and it is not used except to signify those things which are done by one's own will alone, without any exterior impeller. Thus 1 Peter 5:2: Not for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily; and sometimes those things which are done without obligation are also called voluntary, and those things which are done with a ready mind are especially called voluntary. Wherefore by this name voluntary is signified that motion which arises from one's own intrinsic appetite eliciting the act, with prior cognition. For since in every motion there is both to act and to act on account of an end, and since the end, the first cause of all things, does not exercise its causality except by means of cognition of it, the voluntary consequently will be that whose principle is simply intrinsic with cognition of the end. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 10.

10. The voluntary differs from the willed. For the willed neither proceeds from the will, nor consequently is it an act of the will or the effect of that act; but it designates only the object of the act of the will. Suaresius gives the example, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 2, “of a death effected by another,” while I indeed desire it, consent to it, and rejoice in it, but “do not cooperate.” That depraved desire, consent, and joy are voluntary, because they proceed from the will; but that death of the enemy, effected by another, with me in no way cooperating, is not voluntary for me, but only willed; for it does not proceed from my will, or depend upon it in any way, but is only the object of the act of my will. If, on the contrary, either I myself were to inflict that death, or at least were to cooperate so that it would be inflicted by another, then it would proceed from my will, and for me it would be at once voluntary and willed. Yet the willed object is not altogether excluded from the voluntary, insofar as the voluntary, that is, the very act of the will, is terminated at that object, and the will embraces that object by its act, and the act itself, according as it exists in the concrete, concerning such an object, proceeds from the will. But although not everything willed is also voluntary, nevertheless the voluntary is always in some way willed. For nothing can proceed from the will unless in some way it is the object of the will. Suaresius, l. c. S. 1.

11. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, the voluntary agrees with any natural motion whatever, but differs from the violent. For the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle. “But this,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. c. and ad 3, “the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination..... Yet it is commonly of the nature of natural and voluntary motion that they are from an intrinsic principle.” And in the same place, a. 4:

“The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition. But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” And thus in 1 Peter, loc. cit., it is said: “Feed the flock which is among you: overseeing not by constraint, but spontaneously according to God, neither for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily.”

12. The voluntary can be taken in three ways: first, in an improper sense, for the spontaneous; secondly, in a proper and strict sense, for the free; thirdly, in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will. The spontaneous, according as it is distinguished from the voluntary properly so called, is said to be that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object into which the appetite tends. For as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the vital appetite, elicited, follows from the apprehended form, actually representing the object. The form apprehended intellectually is followed by the rational appetite or will; the form apprehended sensibly is followed by the animal, or sensitive, appetite, common to brute and man. That which proceeds from the sensitive appetite indeed proceeds necessarily, but flows forth of its own accord, and therefore it is called necessary and spontaneous. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2., q. 8. a. 1., q. 30. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and strict sense, for the free, is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to act, with the active power of the same will of eliciting or not eliciting the act, of eliciting this act or another act. Wherefore the free essentially includes the notion of the simply voluntary. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3. 6.; Lessius on q. 6. St. Thomas a. 1., on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will, is generally that which proceeds from the spiritual or rational appetite, namely from the will, with prior intellective cognition of the object.

13. St. Thomas in 1. 2. seems to acknowledge no other voluntary than in the first and second sense, which voluntary he calls according to an imperfect and perfect notion. Hence the Angelic Doctor requires three things for the perfectly and properly voluntary. The first is that it be from an intrinsic principle, from an intrinsic inclination; for the will, whence voluntary, like every appetite, is nothing but a certain inclination intrinsic to the agent. “Appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing toward something.” 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. The second is that not only the motion itself of the will be from within, but also the motion of the will unto the end, since “it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end”; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2.; and therefore prior cognition of the end is required. The third, finally, is that the very application of the faculty to act be from within, namely that the faculty itself move itself to the end and not be moved by another. Therefore, according to the Angelic Doctor, the voluntary is then had perfectly or properly, when from within the will there is motion, motion unto the end, determination of motion unto the end. And this last thing, according to the Angelic Doctor, is to move oneself, which in no way is to be confused, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, with motion simply from an intrinsic principle.

14. It is worth the effort to bring forward the very words of the Holy Doctor, so that it may be clear whether the interpretation set forth of his doctrine is genuine. “Of those things which are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, but some do not. For since every agent, or moved thing, whether it acts or is moved, acts or is moved on account of an end, those are moved perfectly by an intrinsic principle in which there is some intrinsic principle, not only so that they are moved, but so that they are moved unto an end. But for something to be done on account of an end, some cognition of the end is required. Therefore whatever thus acts, or is moved by an intrinsic principle, which has some knowledge of the end, has in itself the principle of its act, not only so that it acts, but also so that it acts on account of an end. But that which has no knowledge of the end, although there is in it a principle of action or motion, nevertheless the principle of that which is to act or to be moved on account of an end is not in it, but in another, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed upon it. Hence things of this kind are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have knowledge of the end are said to move themselves, because in them there is a principle not only so that they act, but also so that they act on account of an end. And therefore, since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary. But this the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination. And from this it is that the voluntary is said to be, according to the definition of Aristotle and Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene, not only that whose principle is within, but with the addition of knowledge. Hence, since man most of all knows the end of his work and moves himself, in his acts the voluntary is found most of all.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. And then a. 2: “As has been said, for the notion of the voluntary it is required that the principle of the act be within, with some cognition of the end. But cognition of the end is twofold, namely perfect and imperfect. Perfect cognition of the end indeed is when not only the thing which is the end is apprehended, but also the notion of the end is known, and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end itself. And such cognition of the end belongs to rational nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the apprehension of the end alone, without this, that the notion of the end and the proportion of the act to the end be known. And such cognition of the end is found in brute animals through sense and natural estimation. Therefore perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, once the end has been apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end, or not be moved. But imperfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the imperfect notion; according as, namely, one apprehending the end does not deliberate, but suddenly is moved into it. Hence to rational nato rational nature belongs the voluntary according to the perfect notion, but according to the imperfect notion it belongs also to brutes... Will names the rational appetite; and therefore it cannot be in those things which lack reason. But voluntary is said denominatively from will, and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will according to some agreement with will. And in this way voluntary is attributed to brute animals, insofar namely as through some cognition they are moved unto an end... It must be said that from this it happens that man is master of his act: that he has deliberation concerning his acts. For from the fact that deliberating reason is related to opposites, the will is able toward either. But according to this, the voluntary is not in brute animals, as has been said.” And a. 3. §. Sed contra: “That of which we are masters is said to be voluntary.” And likewise q. 21. a. 2, the Holy Doctor affirms that in all voluntary acts there is present in the will dominion over its act.

15. But when it is said by the Angelic Doctor that the voluntary according to the perfect notion requires that the notion of the end be foreknown, the sense is not that it is necessary to know what an end is; but the sense is that the thing which is the end is known as an end, that is, as a term to be obtained through other things, so that the proportion of these as means to that thing is foreknown. Thus, for example, a woman about to prepare a banquet foreknows the banquet as the term of her preparation. This preparation must be directed to that. Wherefore, by reasoning from the banquet, she is moved to the preparation of these meats, of this wine, at this hour, in this place, as things corresponding to the obtaining of that banquet, and therefore she foreknows the proportion of these things, and therefore chooses and prepares these foods before others, these drinks before others.

16. But properly and strictly such a voluntary is so not only materially, because the voluntary is narrowed to the free, but also formally, since then the act, as has also been said, is from an intrinsic principle simply, not only insofar as the will simply acts and acts on account of an end, but also insofar as from itself it is determined to acting on account of an end, since it can be toward either, as St. Thomas says; or, as the same Angelic Doctor says, it itself is what moves itself unto the end. Since, on the contrary, toward an act of which it itself is not mistress, the will is as it were applied, determined, moved unto the end from elsewhere, namely by the very instinct of nature, by God himself conferring nature, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed, as the Holy Doctor says. Hence the former act, strictly and properly speaking, is voluntary; the latter should rather be called of the will. The former is from the power of the will, namely from the will which can be toward either; the latter is only from the natural inclination of the will. Since that former free act is in reality not concerning the end, namely concerning the necessary end which we necessarily will, by the natural instinct itself, but concerning the means to be chosen for the end; hence St. Thomas constantly narrows the voluntary to the free choice of means.

17. “Since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. To act on account of an end, as is clear of itself, is not the act itself by which we desire the end, but is the act by which we choose and assume the means, or something as a means to the end. And then, l. c.: “Hence since he most of all knows the end and moves himself (namely unto the end), in his acts the voluntary is found most of all.” The tendency and motion unto the end is contained in the choice of means. And l. c. a. 2: “Perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, namely, with the end apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end or not be moved.” And q. 10. a. 1, the Holy Doctor sets the voluntary against the natural in the very acts of the will, so that some are voluntary or free, others natural from the very intrinsic necessity of nature. And as the will is founded, as in its principle, in nature itself, that is, in the very substantial nature of man, so the voluntary act is founded in the natural act of the will, as in its principle, namely in the act by which man wills good in common or the ultimate end. For the free act of the will, or voluntary act, is concerning a determinate good, and that which is an end; but the natural act is concerning good in common and the ultimate end. But in every volition the volition of good in common and the volition of the ultimate end is included, as the principle is included in the conclusion. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6., Cajetan on this place; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1., Cajetan on this place.

18. Hence, if by the name voluntary is understood that which is from the will, acting of itself, or moving itself and applying itself to act, that which is from the rational appetite as author and master, which comes under the name voluntary strictly and properly, without doubt the free is altogether of the notion of the voluntary. But if by the name voluntary is understood merely an act of the will, namely an act elicited by the will, or an act elicited by the will according to its own propensity and inclination, the free is not of the notion of the voluntary. For first, the imperfect voluntary from imperfection of cognition is not rarely necessary, as may be seen in sudden motions. Secondly, beatific love is a perfect voluntary, for it is from perfect cognition of the object, and from the will loving God perfectly known by the whole inclination of its proper nature, and it is necessary. Thirdly, “Naturally man wills not only the object of the will, but also other things which belong to other powers, as cognition of the true, which belongs to the intellect; and being and living, and other things of this kind, which regard natural consistency, all of which are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. “It must be said that the ultimate end moves the will of necessity, because it is the perfect good, and similarly those things which are ordered to this end, without which the end cannot be had, such as being, and living, and things of this kind.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. ad 3. And these things man wills even by a perfect act of the will. - Therefore man naturally wills three things: first, good in common; secondly, beatitude, or happiness; thirdly, everything fitting to the one willing according to his nature. Suarez, in 1.2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3.

19. Now then, as in exterior things the natural is found in two ways, namely always or frequently, so also in natural motions of the will the natural is found in both ways. For toward certain objects, namely toward the first and the second, the will is so naturally determined that it cannot in any way will the opposite. But toward certain things it is so naturally inclined that it can by accident will the opposite, and such is that third object. For that which naturally befits man, such as being and living and other things of this kind, can be considered in two ways. First, these things can be looked at as certain particular goods according to themselves, and thus they can, although rarely, be rejected by the will because they have annexed the defect of some good which is desired, as may be seen in those who kill themselves. Secondly, they can be considered as they are necessarily connected with beatitude or happiness, and thus, so far as is on their part, they cannot be rejected by the will. Wherefore, if they are known sufficiently and in due manner by the intellect and proposed to the will, the will necessarily wills them and cannot not-will them. Cajetan on q. 10. a. 1. 2.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. § 3.

20. From what has been said, the distinction between the voluntary and the permitted is clear. The voluntary is that which is from an intrinsic principle, namely from the will, which by its affection, its propensity, its inclination, is borne into it, and therefore truly wills it, and by its volition contributes, as much as it can, that it be. “This the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. “The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. And thus the good which is in the world is voluntary to God, for God truly wills it and by his will contributes that it be. The routing of enemies in the siege of a fortress is voluntary to the leader of the army, for he truly wills it and by his will contributes that the defeated yield to the victors. The permitted is that which someone, although he does not will it, since it is contrary to his proper propensity and inclination, and consequently he positively contributes nothing by his will that it be, nevertheless does not will to impede, although absolutely he can, since from elsewhere he is not bound to do this. Wherefore sin is not voluntary to God, but only permitted by God, since certainly it is against the natural propensity of God and his proper inclination; nor does God positively contribute anything by his will that it be, but he only does not impede it, although he can do this, on account of most wise causes. Likewise, “it must be said that human law is said to permit some things, not as approving them, but because it is not able to direct them.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 93. a. 3. ad 3. The death of innocents, in the assault upon a city, is not voluntary to the leader of the army, since it is outside his intention and affection, and consequently he himself can positively contribute nothing by his will toward it; but it is permitted by him, since, on account of sufficient and rational causes, he does not impede it, although absolutely he could, for he could desist from that assault upon the city. But sin is voluntary to man, and not only permitted by him. “It must be said that that into which the will tends by sinning, although it is evil and contrary to rational nature according to the truth of the thing, nevertheless is apprehended as a good and as fitting to nature, insofar as it is fitting to man according to some delight of sense, or according to some corrupted habit.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 3. And in this way the will is inclined and borne into it by its affection, and wills it: “when the will is moved by the appetible according to its own inclination, the motion is voluntary.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 2.

21. Further, from what has been said, what the involuntary is is clear. The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Therefore the involuntary can be taken in three ways. First and properly for the involuntary, according as it is distinguished from the non-voluntary, or for the involuntary contrarily. Such an involuntary “is said through this, that the will is contrary to that which is done, whence sadness follows upon the involuntary.” St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 3. a. 8. Wherefore the involuntary contrarily is that which in a voluntary act is against the positive affection of the will. Secondly, the involuntary is taken for the non-voluntary. “The non-voluntary is said through the mere removal of the act of the will.” St. Thomas, l. c. Moreover, the removal of the act of the will can be understood in two ways: first negatively, for a mere negation of the voluntary. Of this kind are all acts which are neither elicited nor commanded by the will. Secondly privatively, insofar as an otherwise voluntary act lacks under some respect some condition required for a voluntary act, and thus that voluntary act is at the same time called an involuntary or non-voluntary act. Therefore the involuntary privatively is that which, in a voluntary act, is not from voluntary consent, insofar as some condition of the voluntary is lacking, namely due cognition on the part of the intellect and deliberation on the part of the will, and yet there is not in the will a contrary affection. Hence, says St. Thomas, l. c., sadness follows upon the involuntary, which nevertheless does not always follow upon the non-voluntary. For sometimes it happens that someone approaching one not his own, whom he believes to be his own, although he does not actually will to approach one not his own, because he does not know her to be not his own, nevertheless wills habitually and would will actually if he knew; whence when he afterward perceives that she was not his own, he is not saddened but rejoices, unless he has changed his will.” But if he neither wills habitually, nor would will actually if he knew, it would not be held merely non-voluntary, but involuntary. And from this example it appears how the involuntary and the non-voluntary privatively are verified only in a voluntary act, while for the non-voluntary merely negatively no act of the will is prerequired.

22. If in the involuntary that contrary affection of the will is of itself efficacious for impeding the contrary motion, so far as is on the part of the one operating, and the thing is so displeasing to the will that it wills it in no way, the involuntary simply is had. But if that affection is a simple affection, of itself not efficacious for impeding the contrary act, or if the thing is not so altogether displeasing to the will, and the will wills it at least in some way, then the involuntary in a certain respect is had. Hence an indication can be taken concerning consent or dissent of the will with respect to temptations to be repelled; concerning perfect or imperfect resistance of the will to the same; so that although perhaps mortal sin is excluded, nevertheless some defect, negligence, and venial sin are not excluded. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 3., a. 7. ad 2.

23. Since the voluntary is had by an act of the will, various questions are raised here concerning the object of this act, concerning the will itself passing from potency to act, concerning the very act of the will required for the voluntary. And first, with respect to the object, it is asked: whether the will is concerned only with good. - The answer must be affirmative. The reason: the will is the rational appetite. But every appetite is only of the good, because appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing into something. “But nothing is inclined except into something similar and fitting. Since therefore every thing, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is a certain good, it is necessary that every inclination be into good.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. But since each power extends itself to those things in which the notion of its object can be found in any way whatsoever, and since the notion of good is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are to the end, the will extends itself to all these things, St. Thomas, ib. a. 2. But since the will tends into apprehended good, “for the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good.” St. Thomas, ib. a. 1. Therefore the will can indeed be concerned with evil as material object, but by no means as formal object. But since the same power is of opposites, yet not bearing itself in the same way to each, the will is related both to good and to evil: to good by desiring it, but to evil by fleeing it. Hence, since whatever the will wills or does, it wills or does because it is good or on account of good, good and end are convertible, and the object of the will is said to be good and end. St. Thomas, ib. ad 1., q. 1. a. 2. ad 3. - Cf. Becanus, On Beatitude and Human Acts, C. 2. q. 7.; Lessius in l. c. St. Thomas.

24. Moreover, the good into which the will tends must not only be apprehended, but also determinate and possible. - First, the voluntary cannot be except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only into good; but good has the notion of an end. “Since good is what all things desire, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that good imports the notion of an end.” St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is only something certain and determinate. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either of two does not contract, and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 1. D. 26. S. 1., Rubr. Miss. De Defectibus, § VII. n. 1. - Furthermore, the voluntary cannot be concerning an impossible thing. For “the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and fitting.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. - Although, however, the object of the will must be a possible good, it is not nevertheless necessary that this good also be existing, because, since it moves the will only metaphorically through cognition, it is enough that it be apprehended by the mind and represented in the imagination. For it does not move the will except insofar as it is judged by the intellect to be fitting or good.

25. Having been established that the voluntary must be concerning a possible good, can the voluntary at least be concerning a thing impossible not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot be, as is clear from what has been said, cf. n. 24, if someone uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand a vacuum space outside the world. The question is concerning a thing impossible only as to law, for example, to contract marriage with one having a diriment impediment, to consecrate water, to baptize with wine, etc. But it seems that the answer must be affirmative, since the will is borne into the fact itself, and need not necessarily be borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, so far as in him lies, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without consent being renewed, and validates the marriage, Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 2. D. 33. And indeed in C. Ex sponsalibus, un., de Spons. in 6., it is said: “from pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of justice of public honesty.” Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed.

26. From the object of the will we proceed to the very faculty of the will, as passing from potency to act.

Hence the first question arises: whether the will is moved by the intellect? - The will is by no means moved by the intellect with respect to the exercise of the act. The reason is that the will is an inclination into the good of the whole supposit, while the other faculties are inclinations into some particular good of the supposit. But the inclination into the good of the whole ought to move and incite the particular inclinations, because particular goods ought to be referred to the good of the whole, and not conversely; just as a cause which regards the universal end moves causes which regard particular ends. Therefore “it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. Since the first final principle pertains to the will, it itself is the first mover in man. St. Thomas, 1.2. q. 9. a. 1., q. 11. a. 1. ad 2. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 7. But the intellect moves the will with respect to the specification of the act. For the intellect is what proposes the object to the will. “But the object moves by determining the act after the manner of a formal principle, from which action is specified in natural things.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. After the manner of a formal principle, because it is not an intrinsic formal principle but an extrinsic one, nevertheless not separated, as an idea or exemplar, but conjoined.

27. Another question follows: whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? - The answer must be negative with respect to the exercise of the act, on account of the same reason brought forward in the preceding number. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. But sense moves the will not directly and immediately, but indirectly and mediately, by inducing a disposition in the willing subject with respect to the specification of the act. For “that which is apprehended under the notion of good and fitting moves the will by mode of object. But that something appears good and fitting happens from two things, namely from the condition of that which is proposed, and of him to whom it is proposed. For fitting is said according to relation, whence it depends on each of the extremes. And thence it is that taste disposed in diverse ways does not receive something in the same way as fitting and as not fitting. Whence the Philosopher says in 3 Ethics, cap. 5. a med. to. 5., As each one is, such does the end seem to him. But it is manifest that according to passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to some disposition, whence according as man is in some passion something seems fitting to him which does not seem so to him existing outside the passion: as to the angry man something seems good which does not seem so to the quiet man; and in this way, on the part of the object, the sensitive appetite moves the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 2. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mover is not moved by that which it moves, so that there would be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, insofar as it obeys reason. For St. Thomas answers, l. c. ad 3: “It must be said that reason, in which the will is, moves by its command the irascible and concupiscible, not indeed by despotic principality, as a slave is moved by his master, but by royal or political principality, as free men are ruled by a governor, who nevertheless can move contrariwise. Whence both the irascible and the concupiscible can move the will in the contrary direction. And thus nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them.” Cf. St. Thomas, l. c. a. 5.; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6. S. 6. 7.; Cajetan on q. 9. a. 2.

28. Aptly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1: “It must be said that something needs to be moved by another insofar as it is in potency to several things. For that which is in potency must be reduced into act through something which is in act, and this is to move. But some power of the soul is found to be in potency to diverse things in two ways: in one way as to acting or not acting; in another way as to acting this or that; as sight sometimes sees actually and sometimes does not see, and sometimes sees white and sometimes sees black. Therefore it needs a mover as to two things, namely as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act; of which the first is on the part of the subject, which sometimes is found acting, sometimes not acting; but the other is on the part of the object, according as the act is specified. But the motion of the subject itself is from some agent. And since every agent acts on account of an end, as was shown above q. 1. a. 2., the principle of this motion is from the end. And thence it is that the art to which the end belongs moves by its command the art to which that which is to the end belongs, as the art of steering commands the art of shipbuilding.... But good in common, which has the notion of an end, is the object of the will. And therefore on this part the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts. For we use other powers when we will. For the ends and perfections of all the other powers are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods. But always the art or power to which the universal end belongs moves to acting the art or power to which the particular end belongs, comprehended under that universal: as the leader of an army, who intends the common good, namely the order of the whole army, moves by his command some one of the tribunes, who intends the order of one battle-line.” Therefore according to the Angelic Doctor the will is not moved with respect to the exercise of the act either by the intellect or by sense. But on the contrary, it itself is what moves the other faculties with respect to the exercise of the act. Hence the same Holy Doctor, l. c. ad 3, says still more clearly: “It must be said that the will moves the intellect as to the exercise of the act, because even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is contained under universal good, as a certain particular good.”

29. Since the will, as has been said, is moved in some way by the inferior appetite, another question thence arises: whether the will is moved of necessity by the inferior appetite. - It must be said that either reason is totally bound by the passion of the sensitive appetite, or reason is not totally absorbed by passion, but there remains, as to something, the free judgment of reason. If the first is verified, then there is not any motion of reason, and consequently neither of the will. If the second has place, according as the free judgment of reason remains as to something, consequently something of the motion of the will remains. “Therefore insofar as reason remains free and not subject to passion, so far the motion of the will which remains does not tend of necessity to that to which passion inclines. And thus either the motion of the will is not in man, but passion alone dominates; or if there is a motion of the will, it does not follow passion of necessity.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3. Wherefore, although the will cannot make it that motions of concupiscence do not arise, nevertheless it can not will to desire, or not consent to concupiscence. For although reason is clouded over by passion, nevertheless something of reason remains free. And according to this someone can either repel the passion totally, or at least contain himself lest he follow the passion. Sometimes indeed the sensitive part is totally subjected to reason, as happens in the virtuous and in the saints. Sometimes, conversely, reason is totally absorbed by passion, as happens in those who through vehement anger or concupiscence become furious or insane; concerning such persons the same account holds as concerning brute animals, which of necessity follow the impulse of passion. But we will and operate many things apart from passion of the sensitive appetite, through the choice alone of the rational appetite, as is clear in those things in which reason resists passion. St. Thomas, l. c. ad 1. 2. 3.

30. Since the will is moved neither by the intellect nor by sense to the exercise or use of the act, it is now asked: whether the will moves itself to act. - With respect to the specification of the act, the will is moved by the object, as is already clear from what has been said in n. 26. With respect to the exercise of the act, the will moves itself in the volition of means. For to move oneself is to reduce oneself, to apply oneself, to determine oneself from potency to act, by ordering oneself to the end. But the will, with respect to the volition of means unto the end, because it is free and has dominion over the act, is itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end. Therefore. On the contrary, by an exterior principle, which is the cause of the will itself, it is moved with respect to the exercise of the act in the first volition of the end. For in this volition the will is not itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end, but it is determined by the natural instinct itself of the will, received from an exterior principle, namely from God. Hence the principle of voluntary motions is something naturally willed, which is good in common, the ultimate end itself, and universally all those things which befit the one willing according to his nature. But the will does not always will these various objects actually, although it always has the aforesaid natural instinct, “but only when it is in some determinate disposition,” by which the aforesaid natural power is then stirred up to act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. c. ad 1. 2.

31. That according to St. Thomas the will moves itself with respect to the exercise of the act in the volition of means is affirmed most clearly in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3, where the Angelic Doctor treats this question expressly: whether the will moves itself. In the paragraph Sed contra, he says: “because the will is mistress of its act, and in it there is to will and not to will; which would not be if it did not have in its power to move itself to willing. Therefore it moves itself.” And then he responds: “It must be said that.... it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will. But... in this way the end is related in appetible things as a principle in intelligible things. But it is manifest that the intellect, through the fact that it knows a principle, reduces itself from potency into act as to the knowledge of conclusions. And in this way it moves itself. And similarly the will, through the fact that it wills the end, moves itself to willing those things which are to the end,” passing from act to act. And ad 1: “It must be said that the will does not move and is not moved according to the same thing. Whence neither according to the same thing is it in act and in potency; but insofar as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are to the end, namely so that it actually wills them.” The same is clear from 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2: “It must be said that it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end. For among causes ordered to one another, if the first is removed, it is necessary that the others be removed. But the first among all causes is the final cause. The reason for this is that matter does not obtain form except according as it is moved by an agent. For nothing reduces itself from potency into act. But the agent does not move except from intention of the end. For if an agent were not determined to some effect, it would not act this more than that. Therefore, in order that it produce a determinate effect, it is necessary that it be determined to something certain, which has the notion of an end. But this determination, as in rational nature it comes about through the rational appetite, which is called will, so in other things it comes about through natural inclination, which is called natural appetite.” St. Thomas then adds the things which have already been reported in n. 1, and in c. ad 1. 2 he says that man is moving himself to the end; that those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts; that it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as acting itself, or leading itself to the end; that man through himself acts on account of an end; that man orders into the end and acts himself into the end. This discussion indeed is about the volition of means. St. Thomas treats the question: whether to act on account of an end is proper to rational nature. Now to act on account of an end is to will and assume something as a means proportioned to attaining the end. And it is the same thing to move oneself to the end, to tend into the end, to act or lead oneself to the end, to order into the end; and, as the same Holy Doctor has it, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. ad 3, to be moved by itself according to the notion of the end; for he says that the will is moved by itself as to the exercise of the act, according to the notion of the end. And in the same place, when the second difficulty has been proposed: “A movable thing is moved at the presence of the mover. But the will is always present to itself. If therefore it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false,” he responds: “To the second it must be said that the power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will by which it wills the end sometimes is not always in the will itself. But in this way it moves itself. Whence it does not follow that it always moves itself;” since one actually willing the end moves himself to the means to be willed.

32. As regards the volition of the end, in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4 the Holy Doctor asks whether the will is moved by some exterior principle; and he responds by distinguishing motion as to specification and as to exercise, saying: “It must be said that according as the will is moved by the object, it is manifest that it can be moved by something exterior. But in that way in which it is moved, as to the exercise of the act, it is necessary to posit that the will is moved by some exterior principle. For everything which is sometimes an agent in act and sometimes in potency needs to be moved by some mover. But it is manifest that the will begins to will something when previously it did not will this. Therefore it is necessary that it be moved by something to willing. And indeed, as was said in the preceding article, it moves itself insofar as through the fact that it wills the end it reduces itself to willing those things which are to the end. But it cannot do this except by means of counsel. For when someone wills to be healed, he begins to think how he might attain this; and through such thought he arrives at this, that he can be healed through a physician, and this he wills; but because he did not always actually will health, it is necessary that he began to will to be healed from some mover; (that is, some principle was the cause for him why he began to will). And if indeed it moved itself to willing, it would have been necessary that it do this by means of counsel from some presupposed will, but one must not proceed to infinity. Whence it is necessary to posit that, into the first motion of the will, the will comes forth from the instinct of some exterior mover.” But this exterior mover, as is held from article 6, is God.

"1. A man must annihilate his powers, and this is eternal life. - 2. To will to act actively is to offend God, who wills to be the sole agent; and therefore it is necessary to abandon oneself wholly and totally to God, and afterward to remain like a lifeless body. - 4. Natural activity is the enemy of grace, and impedes the operations of God and true perfection; because God wills to operate in us without us. - 5. By doing nothing, the soul annihilates itself, and returns to the very principle and to its origin, which is the essence of God, in which it remains transformed and divinized; and God then remains in Himself, because there are then no longer two things united, but only one, and in this way God lives and reigns in us, and the soul annihilates itself in operative being. - 6. The interior way is that in which neither light, nor love, nor resignation is known; and it is not necessary to know God, and in this manner one proceeds rightly. - 13. Free will having been resigned to God, the thought and care of everything that concerns us must be left to the same God, and one must allow Him to accomplish His divine will in us." - Condemned propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI, Const. Caelestis Pastor, 20 Nov. 1687.

"16. The immediate division of human works is that they are either virtuous or vicious; because if a man is vicious and does anything, he then acts viciously, and if he is virtuous and does anything, he then acts virtuously; because just as vice, which is called a crime or mortal sin, universally infects the acts of a vicious man, so virtue vivifies all the acts of a virtuous man." Proposition of John Hus, condemned by the Council of Constance and by Martin V, Bull Inter cunctas, Bull In eminenti, 8 Kalends of March 1418.

"7. Every deliberate human action is love of God or of the world: if of God, it is the charity of the Father; if of the world, it is the concupiscence of the flesh, that is, evil." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"34. That distinction of a twofold love, namely, natural love, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous love, by which God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious, and was devised to make sport of the sacred Scriptures and very many testimonies of the ancients. - 37. He agrees with Pelagius who acknowledges any natural good, that is, any good which takes its origin from the powers of nature alone. - 62. That distinction also, by which a work is said to be good in two ways, either because it is right and good from its object and all its circumstances (which they are accustomed to call morally good), or because it is meritorious of the eternal kingdom, because it is performed by a living member of Christ through the Spirit of Charity, is to be rejected. - 63. But that distinction of a twofold justice is likewise rejected: one which is effected through the indwelling Spirit of Charity; the other which is effected indeed from an inspiration of the Holy Spirit stirring the heart to penance, but not yet dwelling in the heart and pouring forth charity in it, by which the justification of the divine law may be fulfilled." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V, Bull Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1 Oct. 1567. Cf. nn. 69, 75, 89.

"23. The doctrine of the Synod concerning a twofold love (of dominant cupidity and of dominant charity), declaring that man without grace is under the servitude of sin, and that in that state, through the general influence of dominant cupidity, he infects and corrupts all his actions; insofar as it insinuates that, in man while he is under servitude or in the state of sin, destitute of that grace by which he is freed from the servitude of sin and constituted a son of God, cupidity so dominates that, through the general influence of this cupidity, all his actions are in themselves infected and corrupted; or that all works which are done before justification, in whatever manner they are done, are sins, as though in all his acts the sinner serves dominant cupidity: false, pernicious, inducing into an error condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent, and condemned again in Baius, art. 40. - 24. But insofar as between dominant cupidity and dominant charity there are placed no intermediate affections implanted by nature itself and praiseworthy by their own nature, which, together with the love of beatitude and a natural inclination toward good, remained as the last lineaments and relics of the image of God; from St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 28; just as though between divine love, which leads us to the kingdom, and illicit human love, which is condemned, there were no licit human love which is not reprehended; from St. Augustine, sermon 349, On Charity, Maurist edition: false, previously condemned." Condemned propositions of the Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI, Const. Auctorem Fidei, 28 Aug. 1794.

"39. That which is done voluntarily, even if it is done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely. - 41. That mode of liberty which is freedom from necessity is not found in the Scriptures under the name of liberty, but only the name of liberty from sin."

"66. Violence alone is repugnant to the natural liberty of man." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"3. For meriting or demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices." Proposition of Cornelius Jansen, condemned by Innocent X as heretical; Const. Vineam Domini, 16 July 1705.

"27. Free will, without the assistance of the grace of God, avails only for sinning. - 28. It is a Pelagian error to say that free will avails for avoiding any sin." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"2. Although invincible ignorance of the natural law be granted, in the state of fallen nature this ignorance does not excuse one who acts from it from formal sin." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"10. That they did not sin who, not knowing Christ, crucified Him, and that whatever is done through ignorance is not to be ascribed to guilt." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II in the year 1140.

"But this holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence, or the fomes, remains in the baptized; and since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent, but who resist manfully through the grace of Christ Jesus; indeed, he who shall have contended lawfully shall be crowned. This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it is from sin and inclines toward sin. But if anyone shall think the contrary, let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 5, Decree on Original Sin, penultimate paragraph.

"74. Concupiscence in the regenerate who have relapsed into mortal sin, in whom it now dominates, is sin, just as are other vicious habits. - 75. The evil movements of concupiscence are, for the state of corrupted man, prohibited by the precept: Thou shalt not covet; whence a man who feels them and does not consent transgresses the precept Thou shalt not covet, although the transgression is not imputed as sin. - 76. As long as anything of carnal concupiscence is in one who loves, he does not fulfill the precept: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"19. That neither the work, nor the will, nor concupiscence, nor pleasure, when it moves the soul, is sin, nor ought we to will to extinguish it." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II.

"17. Free will having been handed over to God, and the care and thought of our soul having been left to Him, no further account is to be taken of temptations; nor must any resistance be made to them other than a negative one, with no industry employed; and if nature is moved, it is necessary to allow it to be moved, because it is nature. - 37. On occasions of even furious temptations, the soul must not elicit explicit acts of the opposite virtues, but must remain in the aforesaid love and resignation." Condemned propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI.

"41. God permits and wills, in order to humble us and lead us to true transformation, that in some perfect souls, even those not possessed, the demon inflict violence upon their bodies and cause them to commit carnal acts, even while awake and without obscuration of mind, by physically moving their hands and other members against their will. And the same is said as regards other acts sinful in themselves; in which case they are not sins, because consent is not present in them. - 47. When violences of this kind occur, it is necessary to allow Satan to operate, employing no industry and no effort of one's own, but a man must remain in his nothingness; and even if pollutions and obscene acts with one's own hands, and even worse things, should follow, it is not necessary to disquiet oneself, but scruples, doubts, and fears must be cast out; because the soul becomes more illuminated, more strengthened, and more pure, and holy liberty is acquired. And above all, it is not necessary to confess these things, and it is most holy not to confess them; because by this means the demon is overcome and the treasure of peace is acquired." Condemned propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI.

"38. Every love of a rational creature is either vicious cupidity, by which the world is loved, which is prohibited by John, or that praiseworthy charity, poured forth in the heart through the Holy Spirit, by which God is loved." Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

"40. Without grace we can love nothing except unto our condemnation. - 44. There are only two loves from which all our volitions and actions arise: the love of God, which does all things for the sake of God and which God rewards; and the love by which we love ourselves and the world, which does not refer to God that which is to be referred to God, and for this very reason becomes evil. - 45. Since the love of God no longer reigns in the heart of sinners, it is necessary that carnal cupidity reign in it and corrupt all their actions. - 46. Cupidity or charity makes the use of the senses good or evil." Condemned propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI, Const. Unigenitus, 8 Sept. 1713.

"15. God does not command an external act. - 16. An external act is not properly good, nor does God properly perform it. - 17. Let us bring forth the fruit, not of external acts, which do not make us good, but of interior acts, which the Father dwelling in us makes and performs. - 18. God loves souls, not the external work." Condemned propositions of Eckhart, condemned by John XXII in the year 1329.

"13. That because of works a man becomes neither better nor worse." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II.

"40. The Blessed Virgin never performed any external work, and nevertheless she was holier than all the Saints. Therefore one can arrive at holiness without an external work." Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

"Moreover, it teaches (the holy Synod) that the largess of divine munificence is so great that we are able to make satisfaction before God the Father through Christ Jesus not only by punishments voluntarily undertaken by us for punishing sin, or imposed at the judgment of a priest according to the measure of the offense, but also - which is the greatest proof of love - by temporal scourges inflicted by God and patiently borne by us." Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 9. Cf. also ibid., ch. 13, and sess. 6, ch. 14.

"If anyone shall say that nothing is commanded in the Gospel besides faith; that other things are indifferent, neither commanded nor prohibited, but free; or that the Ten Commandments in no way pertain to Christians: let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 19.

"61. That distinction of the doctors, that the mandates of the divine law are fulfilled in two ways - in one way only as regards the substance of the works commanded, and in the other as regards a certain mode, namely, that according to which they can lead the one acting to the eternal kingdom, that is, according to the meritorious mode - is fictitious and to be rejected." Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V. Cf. nn. 6, 89.

"9. He truly sins who hates sin merely because of its turpitude and incongruity with nature, without any regard for God offended. - 10. The intention by which someone detests evil and pursues good merely in order to obtain heavenly glory is not right or pleasing to God. - 11. Everything that is not from supernatural Christian faith, which works through love, is sin. - 13. Whoever also serves God with a view to eternal reward, if he should lack charity, is not free from fault whenever he acts, even with a view to beatitude. - 14. Fear of hell is not supernatural. - 15. Attrition, which is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments, without the love of benevolence for God on account of Himself, is not a good and supernatural movement." Propositions condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"60. If fear of punishment alone animates penance, the more violent this penance is, the more it leads to despair. - 61. Fear restrains only the hand; but the heart is devoted to sin as long as it is not led by the love of justice. - 62. He who abstains from evil only through fear of punishment commits it in his heart and is also guilty before God." Condemned propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI.

"8. To eat and drink unto satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided that it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts. - 9. The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone is wholly free from all fault and venial defect." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, Decree of 2 March 1679.

"2. Just as an evil work by its nature is meritorious of eternal death, so a good work by its nature is meritorious of eternal life. - 4. Eternal life was promised to man in his integrity and to the angel in view of good works, and good works by the law of nature suffice of themselves for attaining it. - 15. The reason of merit does not consist in this, that those who act well have grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but in this alone, that they obey the divine law." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"1. If anyone shall say that man can be justified before God by his works, whether done through human nature or through the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ: let him be anathema. - 2. If anyone shall say that divine grace through Christ Jesus is given only for this, that man may more easily live justly and merit eternal life, as though through free will without grace he could do both, though with hardship and difficulty: let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 6, canons.

"11. It is not necessary to reflect upon doubts which occur, whether one is proceeding rightly or not." Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

"1. It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, leaving aside the safer opinion, unless a law, an agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids it. Hence an opinion that is only probable is not to be used in conferring baptism, priestly ordination, or episcopal ordination. - 2. I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion that is even less probable. - 3. Generally, when, trusting in probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic and however slight, provided that the limits of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently. - 4. An unbeliever who does not believe, being led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity. - 21. The assent of supernatural faith which is useful for salvation is compatible with the fear by which someone fears that God may not have spoken." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679.

"26. When litigants have equally probable opinions in their favor, a judge can accept money for rendering judgment in favor of one rather than the other." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"3. It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"27. If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be considered probable so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"Rome, 19 April 1902. - A petition having been referred to this Supreme Congregation... in order to obtain official communication of the true text of the decree of the Holy Office on probabilism, directed to Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., the undersigned Assessor... has the honor to transmit herewith the authentic copy of the said decree, with an express declaration that this is the only true text; that consequently all the others, published in whatever manner and at whatever time, must be considered apocryphal; and that if any of these latter should happen to bear signs, even undoubted ones, of authenticity, it must be held that this occurred through mere mistake.... GIAMBATTISTA LUGARI, Assessor of the Holy Office."

"A report having been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written by the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having graciously accepted and read his letters not without praise, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the position of those who assert that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; and that he assure him that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness that he not only permit the Fathers of the same Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the position of those asserting that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one, as he pleases, may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and let him command them to submit themselves wholly to the mandate of His Holiness.

On 8 July 1680, when the aforesaid Order of His Holiness was reported by the Assessor to the Father General of the Society of Jesus, he responded that he would comply in all things as quickly as possible, although it had never been forbidden either by him or by his predecessors to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to teach it."

"I, the undersigned Notary of the Holy Office, testify that the above-written copy of the decree issued on Wednesday, 26 June 1680, was taken from the original acts of the same Sacred Congregation, and that it agrees with them exactly, as is established from a word-for-word collation.

Given at Rome, from the offices of the Holy Office, on 21 April 1902. Canon MANCINI, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."

"1. Whether a Professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which St. Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? 2. Whether a Confessor is to be disquieted who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred Tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works, with the note, namely, that this Confessor reads the works of the blessed Doctor only in order to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the arguments and reasons on which the various opinions rest; but judging that he acts safely from the very fact that he can prudently judge a doctrine which contains nothing worthy of censure to be sound and safe, and in no way contrary to Evangelical holiness? - Resp. To the 1st, in the affirmative, yet without this being taken to mean that those are to be censured who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors. But to the 2nd, in the negative, having regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approval of the writings of the Servants of God for the purpose of canonization." S. Poenit. 5 July 1831. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 1, p. 497 ff.

"Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, appointed by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public Moral Conferences, on account of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of the same so great Saint, and to make this openly known in the diocesan calendar shortly to be published, as also pleases his aforementioned Bishop, who is very favorably disposed toward St. Alphonsus, by adhering to and observing the Decision issued on this matter under the date of 5 July 1831 by this Sacred Penitentiary. But with regard to this he is held back by some scruple, because when he formerly obtained academic degrees he swore the oath set forth below, that he would retain the doctrine of that same University, which follows probabiliorism and the opinions of the probabiliorists. Since these things are so, and since moreover the very distinguished Scavini, who took the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as his guide, hence for the quiet of his conscience he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence, and earnestly begs:

1. That he be taught whether the aforesaid oath prevents him from following in all things and publicly handing down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath. - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd, provided for in the first." S. Poenit. 19 Dec. 1855. But what doctrine the Professors of Theology of the aforesaid University ought to hand down is clear from these words of the Constitutions: "The professors of Theology, both scholastic-dogmatic and moral, must adhere to the principles and to the system of St. Thomas, according to his letter and his school." Cf. Scavini, Milan, 1874, bk. 3, n. 492.

"That Christians are bound to the observance of civil laws, even if these have been enacted by unbelieving Princes, provided that these are not opposed to the Christian Religion and to the moral doctrine of the Gospel, there is no room for doubt; nor does the Apostle leave any room for doubt, who, making no distinction among higher powers, says: Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power except from God... Therefore he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God; but those who resist acquire damnation for themselves... Therefore be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience. Rom. 13, v. 1 and following.

From this most clear testimony it is manifest that those who rule supreme in civil government can enact laws for their subjects which bind them even in conscience; and this is also urged by the reason of the public good, namely, of warding off from civil societies the monster of anarchy, worse than dog and serpent; and it is commended by the illustrious examples of the first Christian faithful, who obeyed the civil laws of gentile Princes as long as they could do this without loss to faith and good morals.

Although these things are most true, nevertheless, with regard to the law forbidding the trade in opium, many doubts can arise because of the various opinions of Theologians concerning the obligation of civil laws; and since the solution of these is not very easy, in particular cases they can trouble not a little the mind of Missionaries and Confessors. The Sacred Congregation has learned from their letters that this has happened several times.

For there are very many Theologians, and these also of the highest name, who judge that there are civil laws whose transgression indeed has a penalty annexed, but by no means also theological guilt, and which therefore they call purely penal. These do not deny what is clear from the cited testimony of St. Paul, that supreme rulers can enact laws which bind subjects in conscience, that is, not only to the penalty but also to theological guilt; but they contend that they do not always will this by their laws, and that those laws are purely penal. According to this doctrine, which seems to be more common among Theologians, it can be doubted whether the civil law forbidding in your regions the trade in opium is a law having theological guilt annexed, or rather is a merely penal law, excluding all theological guilt. It could seem that this latter ought rather to be judged, from the fact that that law was enacted by an unbelieving Prince, who, since he can rightly be thought to make no account of that which Christians call obligation in conscience and theological guilt, seems to have wished to compel his subjects to the observance of that law by the penalty indeed and by its severity, but by no means by fear of wounding conscience and of theological guilt.

Nor does the most grave penalty of death against transgressors of that law seem a sufficient reason to show that it binds also to guilt, and not merely to penalty, because, as Roncaglia says, it is many times expedient for the common good that those also be punished with most grave penalties who violate some law without theological guilt. Thus Theologians commonly admit that a defendant can, without theological guilt, break out of prison in order to avoid, for example, death; yet the civil laws punish this most gravely. Hence from such penalties the intention of the legislator to bind to theological guilt is not sufficiently gathered. Tract. 3, On Laws, q. 2, c. 2, resp. 2, ad 9. 2.

But even if it be supposed that the aforesaid law enacted against the trade in opium binds also in conscience, nevertheless it would not follow from this that its violation in all circumstances brings theological guilt with it; for human laws, ordinarily speaking, do not oblige with grave harm to oneself to their observance. This has place in the divine laws themselves. Thus the observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law, and abstinence from blood, did not oblige with danger to life (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 100, a. 8; Suarez, bk. 3, On Laws), and in the New Law the law concerning the integrity of Confession, concerning the reception of the Sacraments, etc., does not oblige with the same danger.

Since these things are so, the mind of the Sacred Congregation is not to define those controversies of Theologians concerning a merely penal law, nor, on the supposition of the existence of laws of this kind, whether the law about which there is here discussion is to be counted among their number. Likewise, considering that a human law, although ordinarily speaking it does not oblige with grave harm, can nevertheless oblige with grave harm when a great public good requires it, which is the supreme law; and likewise considering that this necessity of the public good depends on circumstances which accompany the particular cases that can occur, all of which it is impossible to foresee; therefore it comprises this Instruction in two admonitions to be given to the Missionaries and Confessors of your Vicariate: namely, it teaches and wills that, in the resolutions of the various cases which can happen, they ought not to disregard, but ought to take great account of, the civil law forbidding the trade in opium; secondly, it wills that great account also be taken of the most grave evils which are accustomed to flow from the abuse of opium in the regions of your Vicariate.

As regards the first of these, it is an established matter that public order is guarded by civil laws, that the public good depends very greatly on the observance of the same laws, and that everything is overturned in that society whose citizens do not obey its laws. This reason is very weighty in the regions of your Vicariate, where violations of civil laws on the part of Christians could bring the greatest scandal, and stir up hatred in the civil government against Christians and their Religion, as though they were taught by the Religion which they profess to disturb public order by the violation of civil laws, and at the same time to violate the rights of sovereignty.

But as regards the second, this ought to be very well known in relation to Christians, whose Religion is founded wholly on charity, not only toward God but also toward neighbor. For this teaches that each person is bound to ward off evils from his neighbor, whom he is bound by divine law to love as himself. This law of charity toward neighbor indeed has its limits, but those limits are the broader in proportion as the evils to be removed from him are more numerous and more grave. But there are very many and very grave evils, both temporal and spiritual, which flow from the abuse of opium in the regions of your Vicariate, and which can be removed by the observance of the law prohibiting the trade in opium.

If, therefore, the Missionaries and Confessors of your Vicariate have these two things before their eyes, as the Sacred Congregation wills them to have them before their eyes, it will not be very difficult for them to know what they ought to answer and do in particular cases which can happen to them in relation to the observance or violation of the aforesaid law, and to find the way by which they can extricate themselves from perplexities and avoid anxieties of mind." Instr. S. C. de P. F. 23 June 1830.

Cf. the preceding number, paragraph beginning But, and following.

"Children after the seventh year are bound to observe the quality of foods prescribed by the Church." S. Poenit. 15 March 1837.

"Although practice and prudence teach that occult cases pertaining to the Forum of Conscience are to be proposed to the Sacred Penitentiary by sealed letters sent to the Most Eminent Lord Cardinal Major Penitentiary and with names withheld, nevertheless someone, whether from among Confessors or from among pastors of souls, departing from this practice, sometimes does not shrink from not only setting forth those cases by open letters and through procurators, even laymen, but also from narrating them to the same Procurators, so that concerning them they may compose supplicatory petitions to be presented to the Sacred Penitentiary. How unbecoming this is, and how much scandal it carries before itself, there is no one who does not see. Therefore the Sacred Penitentiary, wishing wholly to remove this entirely reprehensible manner of acting from the midst, gravely admonishes all and each of the Confessors and Pastors of souls that they entirely abstain from the aforesaid manner of having recourse. Moreover, if they wish to use the service of some Procurator in the gracious City, they will indeed be able to send to that Procurator sealed letters, with names suppressed, to be handed to the aforementioned Cardinal Major Penitentiary; but they must never and in no way dare to narrate or manifest the aforesaid cases to be proposed to the Sacred Penitentiary." Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 7, pp. 208-209; Vol. 1, p. 126 ff.

Cf. Bizzarri, Collectan., ed. 1885, p. 612.

"Whether decrees issued by the S. R. C., and whatever responses, formally issued in writing by it to proposed doubts, have the same authority as if they proceeded immediately from the Supreme Pontiff himself, even though no report concerning them was made to His Holiness? - Resp. In the affirmative." S. R. C. 23 May 1846, with the approval of His Holiness, 17 July 1846. Decrees and responses inserted in the authentic collection of Gardellini are to be held as formally issued. S. R. C. 6 Sept. 1854.

"The decrees of the S. R. C. which, although they do not stand forth in the Gardellinian Edition, are nevertheless known to be authentic, have the same authority which those retain that are read in the said Edition, provided that these Decrees, placed outside the Collection of Gardellini, are not opposed to later Decrees contained in the same Collection." S. R. C. 10 Dec. 1870.

"Whether decrees of the S. R. C., when they are issued, derogate from any contrary introduced custom whatever, even immemorial, and, in the affirmative case, oblige in conscience? - Resp. In the affirmative, but recourse must be had in the particular case." S. R. C. 11 Sept. 1847.

"Whether decrees, indults, and decisions of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, given or to be given in particular cases, are applicable and to be adopted in similar cases, as though they had been decided everywhere, especially because the Sacred Congregation itself seems to hint at this when, to proposed doubts, it is accustomed to respond: Let the Decrees be given, according to other Decrees, provided for in one case, etc. - Resp. In the negative, and recourse must always be had in particular cases." S. R. C. 8 April 1854. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 3, p. 563 ff.

"With the distinction presupposed of the Decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites into Decrees formally general, equivalently general, and particular, can the opinion be sustained... that only those Decrees oblige universally which are either formally general or equivalently general, so that they were not issued on account of a peculiar cause of some place or Diocese, and in addition the approval of the Supreme Pontiff has acceded? - Resp. Let him consult approved authors." S. R. C. 10 Dec. 1870. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 12, p. 144.

On the extension of Resolutions of the Sacred Penitentiary and of the Holy Office from case to case, cf. On the Sixth Precept of the Church, n. 513; On Particular States, n. 1; On Indulgences and Jubilee, n. 1074.

"Holding the Index by these Our Letters as expressly inserted, by Apostolic authority, by the tenor of the present letters, we approve and confirm it, and we command and order that it be observed inviolably and unshakenly by all and singular persons, wherever in the world they exist, under penalties," etc. Benedict XIV, Brief Quae ad catholicae, 23 Dec. 1757.

Cf. N. 84.

"... Therefore we have judged it good by the present Constitution, in order that abuses may be met, to declare what and of what sort a legitimate custom according to the canons ought to be, by which episcopal and ecclesiastical courts can have the right of taking cognizance of and judging the criminal causes of lay defendants. Therefore we order that not every custom for this purpose, but only that custom, have force which is both forty years old and perpetually constant, not indeed contradicted or interrupted. Moreover, we will that it be constituted by a multiplicity and frequency of acts, not slight but grave, which are known to have been performed with the intention of prescribing secular jurisdiction, not tolerated from favor or connivance; nor such acts as perhaps could have taken place apart from the certain and precise knowledge either of Us and of Our Successors for the time being, or at least of the supreme magistrates of this Our City, whom we are accustomed especially to set over the prosecution of the public vindication of crimes. We command that absolutely no account be taken, in a matter so grave, of the knowledge and patience of local rectors and of other inferior secular magistrates, to whom, when they are sometimes either negligent, or conniving and tolerating out of a certain reverential fear, we establish that it is not lawful, and has not been lawful, by their favor, acquiescence, and patience, to make legitimate a custom by which the jurisdiction entrusted to them is diminished, with the order of both powers disturbed. If, therefore, a custom such as we have now established is brought forward, we will that it be kept and observed; but a custom introduced otherwise we reprove, and by this Our Constitution we decree it to be of no force..." Clement XIII, Const. Praestat Romanum.

Since the whole of Moral Theology is occupied with directing human acts, we shall take the beginning of our treatment, as the order of things and common custom require, from human acts themselves. Therefore we must treat here 1. of the notion, 2. of the principles, 3. of the morality of human acts.

1. • DEFINITION. An act in general is the determination of a potency, or it is the faculty of acting placed in exercise, or also it is the exercise of the faculty of acting. The potency itself is customarily called first act, and its determination second act.

But a human act is that which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or it is an act proceeding from a free will with advertence to the goodness or malice of the act.

For that alone can be called a human act which proceeds from man insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures ¹. Now man acts then only, as such, when in acting he uses the faculties essential to himself, namely of knowing, willing, and freely determining himself; therefore there is not given an act properly human unless it proceeds from the deliberate or free will of man. Hence a human act at length is the same as a moral act. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, art. 1.

¹ From this manner of speaking certain moderns, after Alasia, ineptly conclude that also any acts of the intellect, such as thought, perception, judgment, reasoning, and likewise acts of the will even not free, are altogether human acts, because, they say, they are perfected by those powers by which man essentially differs from brutes. They did not understand, namely, that the distinction of man from brutes is employed here by the Doctors not only as to the substance of the faculties, but especially as to the mode of operating (see Suarez, on I-II, Treatise 1, Disputation 2, Section 2, from no. 7). And indeed this abuse of innovating can bring only this fruit: both that men do not understand one another and move controversies which arise merely from the opinions of another not being perceived, and that in reading the books of the Doctors, indeed also ecclesiastical monuments and decrees, they undergo the gravest danger of erring.

Hence it differs from an act of man ², which is done in man, or by man, without any deliberation, such as indeliberate acts, first-first motions, or acts of a man wholly distracted, sleeping, delirious, insane, drunk, or deprived in any way whatsoever of the use of reason ³.

² A certain modern, having rejected the customary distinction of the ancients into acts of man and human acts, introduced a new one of natural or animal acts and personal acts; for, as he says, the faculties of intellect and will, as the highest active principle, constitute personality. But from this an easy path lies open to grave errors; for if personality is constituted in the highest or supreme active principle, then God, for one nature or active principle, will have one person, but Christ, for a twofold nature, will have two.

³ It has pleased some to distinguish manifold acts in man according as St. Gregory the Great (Homily 29 on the Gospel) said that man has something from every creature, so that consequently 1. some acts are called natural, as to live, vegetate, grow, etc.; 2. others animal, common also to brutes, as to eat, walk, etc.; 3. others of man, as to speak, laugh, understand, etc.; and 4. finally human, which proceed from a deliberate will; in these the intellect holds itself as condition, but the free will as cause.

2. • DIVISION. A human act is distinguished in many ways.

1. Elicited, or commanded. That is called elicited which is consummated in the will itself, as an act of love, hatred, desire. But commanded is that which, with the will commanding, is perfected by another potency, whether internal, as an act of thinking, or external, as an act of walking, writing.

2. Internal, or external. An internal act is that which is perfected only in the internal powers of the soul, such as an act of thinking, loving. But an external act, or mixed act, is that which the will perfects through the organs of the body. An internal act is called more specially an act, and an external act is rather named an action ⁴.

⁴ The consideration of an internal or external act now especially regards whether the internal act, for example the consent of the will, in any way comes forth exteriorly or is manifested; so that thence it may be gathered whether it is subjected to a law, or censure, or reservation, etc.

3. Good, evil, indifferent. A good act is called that which is conformable to right reason; evil, that which is not agreeable to it; indifferent, that which neither is conformable to the norm of reason nor is repugnant to it. - A good or indifferent act is also called licit ⁵; but an evil act, illicit.

⁵ Those who do not admit indifferent acts in the individual by that very fact hold any licit act also as morally good. See what is to be said below, Chapter III, Article 1.

4. Natural, or supernatural. The former is that which is produced by the powers of nature alone; but the latter, that which is perfected by the help of divine grace ⁶.

⁶ A supernatural act is called meritorious either de condigno or de congruo, according as some retribution is repaid to it either from justice, or from the mere fittingness and benignity of God.

5. Valid, or invalid. A valid act is that which enjoys all the essentials required for producing its proper effect. But invalid is that which lacks even one of the essentials. Thus a contract is valid in which the things required for its validity, whether by natural law or by positive law, are found. Otherwise it must be held invalid.

3. • Three principles of human acts are numbered: 1. cognition, 2. will, 3. liberty. For these are constitutive of them, and therefore required for any act properly human, as is clear from the definition of a human act.

The will necessarily supposes previous cognition; for nothing can be the object of the will unless it has first been apprehended by means of the intellect. Hence the axiom: Nothing willed unless foreknown. But liberty supposes both. For liberty is the faculty of choosing, or of determining oneself to some act; but election cannot be made unless the will moves itself toward this or that foreknown part.

4. • DEFINITION. The voluntary, or a voluntary act, is called that which proceeds from the will with intellectual cognition of the end. The reason of this definition is clear from what has just been said, or from the necessity of previous cognition, so that the will can determine itself to an act.

Hence it differs 1. from the willed ¹, which can be the object of the will even when inefficacious, and therefore without being the effect of the same will; thus rain poured upon dry land, as regards the farmer, will be called willed, but not voluntary; 2. from the spontaneous, which is done with merely sensitive and material cognition, and therefore imperfect, and is commonly also attributed to brutes.

¹ The willed, namely, is not said of an act of the will, but of the object into which the will tends; and this can happen, although the object does not depend on the will as an effect on its cause. I said, can happen; for what we call willed can also proceed from and depend on the will, so that it is both willed and voluntary. Thus, for example, while you move foot or hand, this motion will be called both willed and voluntary to you. Wherefore it hardly appears why the editor of the most recent French edition (Anicii 1873) requires for the notion of the willed that it not proceed from or depend on the will, since nothing is more contrary to the very frequent usage of Theologians.

5. • DIVISION. The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1. Perfect, or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full cognition and full consent of the will. But the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure cognition or imperfect consent ².

² Understand: where full deliberation is not present; in which matter there can be many degrees.

2. Voluntary simply, or in a certain respect. The former is that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will. But the latter is that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite ³.

³ More commonly the Doctors employ this partition only with those acts in which there is something of the voluntary and at the same time of the involuntary; namely, when the affection of the will tends to two things which it cannot have at the same time, and therefore, concerning one, rises efficaciously and embraces it; toward the other, inefficaciously, and therefore leaves this. Concerning one there is will, concerning the other velleity; toward one the will is borne absolutely, but toward the other conditionally, namely if the former is not to be lost; and thence comes the appellation of absolute or simple will, and of will in a certain respect, namely according to some regard or inefficacious complacency.

3. Direct, or indirect ⁴. The former is that which is intended in itself, or per se, that is, that which is the immediate object of the will ⁵, as theft perpetrated by a thief, or killing intended by a malevolent murderer. The latter is called that which is not willed in itself, but in another directly willed, either as effect in cause, or as something connected with it, for example drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone.

⁴ Others, with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 6, art. 3), understand by the name of direct and indirect voluntary that which the Author soon designates by the expressions positive and negative voluntary. But the things handed down here express another partition of the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in cause.

⁵ The immediate object of the will can also be an effect very remote, provided that it too is intended in itself. But you will call voluntary in cause that which is not indeed intended in itself, yet is foreseen to follow.

4. Positive, or negative. The former is said to be that which is from the will itself really acting, or that which requires a positive action, for instance reading. The latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will. Such is the omission of Mass in him who, adverting to the instant celebration of it, nevertheless continues to devote himself to study at home ⁶.

⁶ More briefly and clearly you will say that it is called positive when the will elicits an act; negative, when the will elicits no act, but remains suspended. This distinction is employed when it is asked whether omission can be given without any act of the will. See Suarez on I-II, Treatise V, Disputation 3, Section 2.

5. Express, or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if it is known to be present from some fact or even omission. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a Superior if he does not oppose them, when otherwise he can and ought to do it ⁷. Hence rule 43 of law: He who is silent seems to consent ⁸.

⁷ In that example you have 1. tacit voluntary, as is clear; 2. voluntary in cause (the Author calls it indirect), insofar as the sins are judged effects of correction omitted by the Superior; and 3. negative voluntary (others with St. Thomas call it indirect), insofar as the effect comes from omission.

⁸ For rightly understanding the axiom, He who is silent seems to consent, these rules can help. I. Someone is judged to consent in favorable matters. II. Likewise one silent where otherwise there intervenes some obligation or necessity of contradicting, and an available faculty for doing it; to this also pertains that saying: Knowledge and patience in those things which are of slight prejudice works consent. III. One silent, if anything is decreed unjustly or less rightly, where deliberation is made by common counsel and vote. IV. Likewise, one asked several things, who is silent concerning one thing while he refuses the rest. V. Add cases from the disposition of law, for example of a son silent in betrothals contracted for him by a parent.

6. Actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. It is called actual if it proceeds from the will actually influencing, as for example contrition in him who here and now elicits an act of penance. It is virtual if it comes by force of an act previously posited and continuing morally to influence the agent, as absolution imparted by a distracted confessor. It is called habitual if indeed it was once had, and not retracted, but now neither directly nor reflexively influences the will or the act. It is named interpretative if it has been had neither physically nor morally, but can prudently be presumed, and would be had if it were thought about, or could be thought about. Thus a sick man deprived of his senses, if he has lived in a Christian manner, is judged to wish to receive extreme Unction ⁹.

⁹ The interpretative voluntary differs from the tacit because in the former there is no consent, in the latter true consent is present. But each is customarily called presumed voluntary, because it is presumed to be present in its own manner.

6. You Will Resolve. - 1. In the same act there can be direct voluntary, or voluntary in itself, indirect voluntary, or voluntary in cause, and involuntary ¹⁰. Example: Titius, seeking Caius his enemy unto death, attacks him, with danger also of injuring his companion, whom he sees associated with him; but with the bullet, besides both, he also strikes Sempronius, whom he neither saw nor could have suspected to be present there. Caius is struck from the direct voluntary of Titius; the companion from the voluntary in cause; and Sempronius apart from every voluntary.

¹⁰ It is clear from the context that involuntary is not here said of what is against the will. Others call it not voluntary rather than involuntary. Otherwise this would have to be said not apart from, but against, the will.

2. Where there is no advertence to a precept, there is no voluntary in relation to it, and therefore no voluntary transgression of the precept, and therefore no sin. - St. Lig., no. 8.

3. Where there is half-full advertence of the mind, you have an act only half-voluntary, which even in violation of a grave precept does not exceed venial sin; thus it happens in those half-asleep, or distracted to other things. Hold the same concerning imperfect consent of the will. - St. Lig., ibid.

4. Some act can be voluntary under one respect, not however under another, according as it is known in one way or another: thus he who kills someone, being ignorant that he is a Priest, commits homicide, but not sacrilege. - St. Lig., ibid.

5. He who violates a grave precept, induced by human fear or threats of companions, posits an act simply voluntary, and indeed gravely sinful in grave matter ¹¹, because he acts with full determination of the will, although he acts unwillingly, and would more gladly not have done this; nevertheless an act of this kind is also involuntary in a certain respect, and therefore becomes less culpable. - St. Lig., no. 21.

¹¹ Too hastily is this resolution placed here, which supposes that known point which will have to be discussed below concerning fear. Therefore, so that the resolution may be true, it must be supposed that the fear 1. did not greatly disturb the use of reason, and 2. does not excuse from observing the precept. For, as will be said below, fear of grave evil not only excuses from an ecclesiastical precept, for example of hearing Mass, but also from a positive divine precept, for example of confessing integrally, indeed even from natural divine law, for example of preserving a secret.

6. Not only actual voluntary, but also merely virtual voluntary influences the morality or validity of an act sufficiently in such a way that it is good or evil, valid or invalid; but otherwise one must speak concerning the habitual and interpretative, as becomes manifest from their definition.

7. Omission can be voluntary ¹², just as a positive act of the will; nevertheless, unless a precept is included, it cannot be imputable unto fault. Thus one omitting Mass on a weekday does not sin. St. Lig., no. 11.

¹² Indeed, even the omission itself, if it is truly voluntary, that is, free, according to the truer doctrine cannot be understood without some act of the will. For it is necessary that the will determine itself to it, and choose it before the opposite. But a determination or election of this kind says a positive act of the will. And the equivocation on which the opposite opinion rests, namely that it admits that free omission happens without any act of the will, you will easily detect from St. Thomas (I-II, q. 71, art. 5).

Since in the other species of the voluntary no special difficulty occurs, we shall say only:

7. Preliminary Notes. - The indirect voluntary, or voluntary in cause, as has been said, is not intended in itself, but is discerned as about to follow from another thing directly willed, as an effect from a cause. Nevertheless it is a true object of the will, although indirect; for he who wills the cause also wills the effect following from it, if he foresees this effect. Hence the saying: He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the thing caused. Thus when someone sins before others, the scandal coming from his sin is imputed to him by reason of indirect voluntary.

But cause is distinguished manifoldly, namely:

1. Physical, or moral. The former is that which produces the effect by acting physically, as fire produces burning, the sun light. The latter is that which effectively moves another free cause to acting. Thus one commanding a homicide is a moral cause of the killing.

2. Immediate, or mediate. The former is that which produces an effect with no other cause intervening, for example if someone pierces the breast of another, he will be the immediate cause of his death. The latter, which does not produce the effect unless another cause is interposed. Hence moral cause is always a mediate cause.

3. Proximate, or remote. That is called proximate which has a necessary or ordinary connection with the effect. But remote is that which, although it is able to produce the effect, nevertheless does not have great force, and does not influence it notably; or it is that from which the effect for the most part does not come.

4. Cause per se, or per accidens. The former is that which by its nature tends and is ordered to producing the effect. Thus excessive drink is a cause per se of drunkenness. But the latter is that which, although it is not ordered by its nature to some effect, nevertheless sometimes, some circumstance intervening, can produce it. Thus homicide can follow from drunkenness. For the most part this last division falls back into the preceding one.

8. Principles. - I. Principle. A threefold condition is required so that an effect can be imputed to the agent, or to the one positing the cause, namely:

1. That the agent has foreseen the effect, at least in confusion. The reason is that an effect in no way foreseen can in no way be voluntary; for nothing is willed unless it has been foreknown. Hence drunkenness is not voluntary, nor to be imputed to him who becomes drunk from a little wine, whose force he did not know. Therefore, as some have contended, it is not sufficient for fault that the evil effect could or ought to have been foreseen; for the supposition must be denied, namely, that the effect can be foreseen if in fact it is not foreseen, at least in confusion; for the first idea of some thing is not in the power of man.

2. That the agent could have not posited the cause, or could have removed it once posited; for otherwise, liberty being lacking, the voluntary necessarily is lacking. Moreover an obligation cannot be given when this cannot be fulfilled. Hence the axiom: No one is held to the impossible. Hence also Augustine, On Free Choice, book III, ch. 18: For who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against?

3. That the agent, lest such an effect follow, is held not to posit the cause, or to remove it once posited. For if there is not given an obligation of avoiding the cause, the effect following from it cannot be imputed, because the agent uses his own right, and holds himself only permissively as regards the effect. Hence inordinate motions are not imputed to a physician or surgeon in the exercise of his art as if voluntary; because these are not bound to omit their art for the purpose of guarding against this effect, but on the contrary have a just reason for exercising it, as will be declared more from the following principle. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, art. 5.

We have already spoken of Theology in general in the first volume of Dogmatic Theology. Here, therefore, it will be enough to premise a few things concerning the notion, sources, and history of Moral Theology.

1. 1° Definition. (A) Theology in general is defined: the supernatural science concerning God and creatures insofar as they are referred to God.

¹ St. Thomas, I, q. 1, a. 4-5; Zacharia, Dissertatio de Casuisticae Theologiae originibus, locis atque praestantia, in Heilig, Theol. Moralis S. Alphonsi, Mechlin, 1845, p. XXVII-CXLVIII; Patuzzi, Prodromus ad universam morum theologiam, in Migne, Theol. Curs. Compl. XI, col. 9-64; Muller, Theol. Moralis, Introduction, § 1-14; T. Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundam., 3rd ed., Introduction, p. 1-167; Hogan, Clerical Studies, Boston, 1898, ch. V; which work was rendered into French under the care of Boudinhon, Paris, 1902: Les Etudes du Clerge.

It is divided into dogmatic and moral theology: the former, which is more speculative, sets forth and demonstrates the truths to be believed, and deservedly is called the rule of things to be believed; the latter, which is more practical, is concerned with morals or things to be done, and therefore is called the rule of things to be done. Yet from this it is not lawful to infer that dogmatic theology is merely speculative, and moral theology merely practical: for the dogmas which are proposed to our faith, although primarily they present to the mind an objective concept, are finally ordered to our sanctification and glorification; on the other hand, the rule of morals flows logically from Christian dogmas, and nothing more efficaciously allures to the practice of virtues than the attentive and pious contemplation of the divine mysteries, for example, Creation, Providence, and the Incarnation. Hence dogmatic theology is indeed primarily, but not exclusively, the rule of things to be believed; and moral theology, although it is primarily the rule of things to be done, must also embrace speculative questions.

2. (B) Moral theology can be defined: a science, relying at once upon reason and faith, treating of human acts insofar as they are means for attaining the supernatural end.¹ - It is called:

¹ Today not a few defenders of independent ethics ambitiously define this science as the breviary of humanity, namely the compendium of all sciences which render man happier; others, with Payot, Cours de Morale, p. 6, assert that it is the science by which human life is made more perfect, more intense, and happier. There is no one who does not see that these definitions are too comprehensive and confused.

(a) A science, that is, a series of conclusions deduced from certain principles and connected in logical order. It differs therefore from that theology which is merely casuistic, and which is situated in the solution of practical difficulties; for Moral Theology ascends higher: it investigates, sets forth, and demonstrates the principles of morals, known both by reason and by faith; afterward from these it deduces in logical order conclusions which approach more nearly to practice; and it hands down rules by which human acts can tend toward our supernatural end.²

² Recently there has arisen, especially in Germany, a controversy among Protestants and Catholics, and indeed among Catholics themselves, concerning the method to be followed in Moral Theology: for many have contended that the casuistic discipline rests upon no solid foundation, and gives occasion to many abuses. This indeed is true when the rules of morals are set forth independently of dogmatic truths; but it is by no means verified in the works of theologians who, adhering to the footsteps of St. Thomas, diligently investigate principles, with the help of analysis and synthesis, and from them logically deduce conclusions. Cf. Mausbach, Die katholische Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsaetze und Aufgaben, Cologne, 1901; Adloff, Katholische Moral und Sittlichkeit, Strasbourg, 1901; E. Van Roey, Recentes controverses de Morale, in Revue Neo-Scolastique, May-Nov. 1902, pp. 213, 464.

(b) Relying upon reason and faith, that is, obtained not by natural light alone, but also with the help of revelation; and thus it is distinguished from Ethics, or moral Philosophy, which treats of the principles of morals known by reason alone, and insofar as they tend toward the ultimate natural end.

3. (c) Treating of human acts insofar as... by these words the object of this science is declared, namely all human acts, whether internal or external, pertaining to private, domestic, or social life, not indeed under every respect, but insofar as they tend toward the ultimate supernatural end; therefore it treats of human acts both in themselves and in their principles; of the laws by which acts of this kind are regulated; and also of the internal or external means, for example, the sacraments, by whose help we may be able to direct our actions to our supernatural end. And thus it is distinguished from those human sciences which treat of laws pertaining to some particular end, for example, from economic science, which hands down norms by which riches ought to be acquired and distributed; from politics, which hands down norms of prudent governing, etc. - It is likewise distinguished from those ecclesiastical sciences, such as canonical and liturgical science, which are proximately ordered to promoting the external governance of the Church or public worship, although remotely they also tend toward the ultimate end. Nevertheless moral theology uses these various sciences, and even in some respect presides over them, insofar as the proximate end ought to serve the ultimate end.

4. Moral theology taken in the broad sense embraces ascetical and mystical theology; but in the strict sense it is distinguished from them: for it is concerned with the laws of the Christian life; ascetical theology, however, with the rules and counsels of Christian perfection; and mystical theology with the higher ways of contemplation and of intimate union with God.

5. 2° Division. Commonly moral theology is divided into two parts: (a) General, or Fundamental, which treats both of the last end of man and of the norm of morality, which is nothing other than the ordering of acts to the last end, and of the general means by which we tend toward the end; (b) and special, which discusses the particular means by which we tend toward the end; namely, the virtues common to every Christian, and the duties proper to each state; and also the sacraments, by which grace is conferred for rightly fulfilling the duties of the Christian life.

6. But since in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology the doctrine, not only speculative but also practical, concerning the four sacraments has already been set forth, we first completed the sacramental matter, by setting forth the moral and canonical doctrine concerning the three other sacraments, namely Penance, Matrimony, and Order; afterward, however, in the following order we shall discuss the various parts of Fundamental and Special Theology:

Fundamental or General Theology:

On the Last End and the norm of morality.
On Human Acts.
On Laws.
On Conscience.
On Sins and Vices.
On Virtues in general.

Special Theology:

On Theological Virtues.
On Moral Virtues, or on the Decalogue.
Appendix concerning the precepts of the Church.
On Justice and Contracts.
On the Various Obligations of States.

7. The reason for the division will be clear to one who attends a little. First, in the Fundamental part, there is treatment of the Last End toward which we tend, according to that saying: in all things look to the end; afterward, of Human Acts, insofar as they are means to the end; of Laws, by which our acts are directed to the end; of Conscience, by whose help general laws are applied to individual persons; of Sins and Vices, by which the human will turns aside from the law; of Virtues, by whose help we are inclined to live according to the law.

Special theology, which treats of particular duties, first treats of theological virtues, and secondly of moral virtues, because under these two genera are comprehended all the common duties of the Christian life; thus the precepts of the Decalogue, which are referred to the virtues, are set forth. By way of Appendix, however, there is joined the Treatise on the Precepts of the Church, as a complement of Decalogal Theology. - But because among the moral virtues justice demands a longer exposition, there is special discussion of it in the Treatise on Justice and Contracts. - Finally, since besides the duties common to all, there are certain duties proper to various states, these are discussed in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States.¹

¹ In the special edition for the use of seminaries, where Moral Theology is set forth separately from Dogmatic Theology, we follow this division: T. I. Fundamental moral theology; on virtues and precepts. T. II. On Justice and contracts; on the various obligations of States. T. III. On the Sacraments in general and in particular.

The sources from which moral truths are drawn are the same as the theological sources, concerning which there has been treatment in the Synopsis of Fundamental Theology. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more directly concern moral discipline.

8. 1° Concerning the use of Scripture in moral matters. All who admit the inspiration of the Scriptures confess that the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament are useful, indeed necessary, for the right institution of morals: "All Scripture, inspired by God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice; that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work."¹ In truth, in them are found both precepts and examples by which morals are instructed.

¹ II Tim. 3:16-17.

(A) But when we use the books of the Old Testament, three things especially must be kept before our eyes: (a) that there was a constant and progressive increase of revelation from the Patriarchs even to Christ; and that God, in those things which He prescribed, permitted, or tolerated, accommodated Himself to human weakness, so that not all things which were lawful for the Jews are permitted to Christians; for example, polygamy and divorce, which at least were tolerated in ancient times, are wholly prohibited under the new dispensation; and the law of charity toward neighbor was not understood in the same manner by Jews and Christians. Hence texts taken from the Old Testament ought not to be alleged or understood without choice and discrimination, but with account taken of this evolution.

(b) In the legal books there are found precepts of three kinds: moral precepts, which retain their force, provided they are taken not precisely in the manner in which they lie there, but as approved, explained, and perfected by Christ; ceremonial precepts, which regarded worship; and judicial precepts, which constituted the law proper to the Israelite nation. These two latter kinds have now been abrogated, and we cannot use them except for determining more fully what is lawful or expedient in certain circumstances, what pertains to natural or positive law, or also for illustrating by analogy certain Christian truths or practices.

(c) As to the examples which are reported there, many indeed are worthy of imitation; but since even the holiest men are not free from human frailty, not all things which they did are for that very reason commendable, although they are not expressly reprehended by Scripture. Therefore it must be carefully weighed, from the context and parallel places, whether these are approved or not; and if they are approved, whether in themselves, under the moral respect, or under another respect; and if any actions either are evil, or at least bear before themselves the appearance of evil, they are not to be drawn into imitation. - The same must likewise be noted as to certain parables and some examples related in the New Testament.

9. (B) In reading the books of the New Testament, attention must chiefly be given to these three things: (a) Christian revelation was not completed in one moment, but grew successively until the death of the last of the Apostles; even after the Apostles had died, the Spirit of God teaches through the infallible magisterium of the Church, and those things which are contained only obscurely, implicitly, and virtually in the Gospels, Epistles, and divine Tradition, are in the course of time proposed more lucidly, explicitly, and formally by the Church herself. Hence, in order to set forth Christian ethics fully, one must wisely use the various books of the New Testament, the divine Traditions, and the infallible magisterium of the Church, whether extraordinary or ordinary.

(b) Since certain things are handed down under precept, but others under counsel, these must not be mixed indiscriminately, but must be distinguished with great circumspection. The foundation of this distinction is found in the Gospel itself:¹ for when the very rich young man had come to Christ, asking, "What good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?", the Master answered: "But if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." The young man said that he had kept these from his youth; then Jesus said to him: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." From this it is inferred that, for attaining eternal life, the observance of the commandments strictly suffices; but for perfection something further is required, namely poverty and the other evangelical counsels. Hence from the text, the context, parallel places, the subject matter, and especially the interpretation of the Church, it must be discerned what is established by way of precept and what by way of counsel.

¹ Matt. 19:16-21; cf. Maldonatus, on this place; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 118, a. 4.

(c) Likewise among precepts, some are universal, some particular, others perpetual, others temporary; for example, the Apostles in the Council of Jerusalem established these things:¹ "For it hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things; that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Now from elsewhere it is clear that the prohibition of fornication is perpetual, absolute, and universal, but that the other things are prohibited only for a time. Hence likewise the context, parallel places, and the interpretation of the Fathers and of the Church must be diligently inspected.

¹ Acts 15:28-29.

10. 2° Concerning the use of Tradition in Moral Theology. It has already been set forth elsewhere (On the Sources of Revelation, n. 961 sq.) by what means Tradition is transmitted and known; what is the authority of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church, of the Fathers, theologians, Congregations, etc. It may be permitted to add only a few things which more nearly regard practice.

(A) In reading the decrees of Councils and Supreme Pontiffs, these things especially must be attended to: (a) Definitions concerning moral matters indeed contain principles of morals which in themselves are immutable; but their application can be diverse according to the diverse circumstances of times and places. Thus definitions concerning usury, established in those times when economic laws differed much from those which now prevail, cannot today be applied in the same way as in the Middle Ages. (b) Disciplinary laws vary according to various times and nations, and therefore can be changed or abrogated; hence more recent decrees sometimes correct and reform older ones. Yet the theologian ought to use these so that he may better understand and explain the new dispositions of laws. (c) As to condemned propositions, in order to uncover their sense, it must be carefully inquired by whom and in what circumstances they were uttered, why and how they were reprobated.²

² For accomplishing this, cf. D. Viva, Damnatae Theses; Vacant-Mangenot, Dictionnaire de Theologie, I, 740, 748, etc.

11. (B) The Roman Congregations, in the name of the Pontiff, often promulgate decisions very useful concerning moral matters. For they not only have the power of authentically interpreting the Tridentine decrees and other ecclesiastical laws, each according to its proper competence, with the approval of the Roman Pontiff preserved; but in addition they settle controversies which are to be solved in a disciplinary or administrative manner:¹ decisions of this kind, however, which make law only between the parties, bear very great authority for similar cases. But among these one must speak a little more fully concerning the Holy Office, whose duty it is "to guard the doctrine of faith and morals,"² and also concerning the Tribunal of the Sacred Penitentiary, whose office it is "to examine and settle questions of conscience."³

¹ The examination of questions which are to be treated in judicial order is reserved to the Tribunal of the Sacred Rota; its sentences, which contain the reasons both in fact and in law, are of the greatest importance.

² Pius X, Bull Sapienti Consilio, June 29, 1908.

³ Ibid.

(a) The Congregation of the Holy Universal Inquisition, which is commonly called the Holy Office, has the right of proceeding and defining in all causes concerning heresy, schism, apostasy from the faith, magic, and abuse of the sacraments; for which reason it has issued not a few decrees for explaining the Bull Apostolicae Sedis, where these crimes are punished by various censures. Its doctrinal responses enjoy great authority, especially because they are not issued except after mature discussion of the matter, and are always approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nevertheless this approval, ordinarily in common form, in no way renders them infallible.

(b) The Sacred Penitentiary solves practical difficulties for the internal forum,⁴ but it does not settle speculative controversies; hence its decisions must be received with the greatest reverence, and can be very useful even in similar cases; but they do not have the force of law, since they are issued only for a particular case.

⁴ In truth Benedict XIV, Constitution Pastor Bonus, granted to the Major Penitentiary that "he may be able, with the counsel of his Doctors and Theologians, to declare all doubts in the matter of sins, or otherwise concerning the penitential forum in any way." - More briefly, Pius X, Bull Sapienti Consilio: "It examines questions of conscience, and settles them."

12. 3° Concerning the use of reason in Moral Theology. (A) Although the theologian treats especially of those things which God has revealed and which the Church proposes to us to be believed and done, he cannot pass over the principles of morals which are known by natural reason: for God is the author of reason as well as of faith, and revealed truths

are better understood and set forth when they are compared with truths of the natural order. On the other hand, revealed truths themselves ought to be understood reasonably; from these same truths conclusions and practical conclusions are to be inferred. Therefore Moral Theology can and ought to use reason in order rightly to set forth the principles of morals, to prove and illustrate them, and to unfold them for practical uses.

Yet human reason in moral matters is not independent, but subordinated to faith, and it ought to acknowledge the infallible magisterium of the Church in moral questions as much as in dogmatic ones.

(B) Among the natural sciences which can be useful to moralists are numbered: (a) natural Ethics, which treats of the various duties of men, and therefore the works of philosophers, even pagans, which deal with virtues and duties; (b) Psychology, not only speculative, where there is question of human faculties, habits, passions, etc., but also practical, which is acquired from discreet commerce with men; nor should experimental psychology be passed over, especially that part in which the various diseases are described which can affect the internal faculties; (c) Pastoral Medicine, where physiological and pathological notions are handed down which, on account of the intimate relations between body and soul, are very useful for judging concerning the morality of certain actions; (d) Sociology, which treats of the rights and duties of citizens, insofar as they are members of the social organism; (e) Political Economy, which hands down principles concerning the production and equitable distribution of temporal goods; (f) Civil Jurisprudence, insofar as it sets forth by law those things which among various nations complete and perfect the natural law; (g) History, especially that part which describes the morals, worship, and moral precepts of various peoples: for in this way the progress or regression of moral science is better understood; and besides, from the experience of past times it is more wisely inferred by what means morals can be restored.

1. Declaration of the title. Deservedly St. Thomas begins the moral part of the Summa theologica from the consideration of the ultimate end: for thus the connection between moral and dogmatic theology appears; since the morality of human acts ultimately depends on the ultimate end, both natural and supernatural, this morality cannot be understood unless the ultimate end of man is first set forth. Thus also the question concerning the foundation or norm of morality, which today is agitated with great heat, can be solved: for below it will be demonstrated that the ultimate norm of morality is God, the ultimate end. Wherefore in one and the same treatise we treat concerning the ultimate end and concerning the norm of morality, because these are only two respects of one and the same question.

Division. There will therefore be two articles: the former concerning the ultimate end of man; the latter concerning the norm or foundation of morality.

I. Concerning the ultimate end of man:

• Preliminary matters: concerning end, good, perfection, beatitude.
• God as ultimate end, insofar as:
• He is to be formally glorified by us.
• He beatifies us.
• He is reached through Christ.
• Corollary: concerning the cooperation of God and man.

II. Concerning the norm of morality:

• Catholic norm:
• The intrinsic distinction between good and evil.
• God as the ultimate norm discriminating good and evil, and conscience as the proximate norm.
• God as the ultimate norm commanding.
• Corollary concerning sanction.
• Conclusion concerning the excellence of the Catholic norm.
• Non-Catholic systems:
• Utilitarianism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
• Kantism: it is set forth; it is refuted.
• Independent ethics: it is set forth; it is refuted.
• Comparison between the Catholic norm and the others.

Since in Theology we use a twofold light, reason and faith together, here the end of man is treated, both natural and supernatural. Therefore we presuppose those things which in Philosophy were said concerning end, and which in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology we established concerning the elevation of man to the supernatural state.

Nevertheless, that the matters may be understood more clearly, we recall to memory the things more necessary to know: 1. concerning end, especially concerning the ultimate end; 2. concerning moral good, by which we tend toward the end; 3. concerning perfection, which is the complete evolution of this good; 4. concerning beatitude, which arises from perfection.

2. 1. Concerning end. (A) Notion. End in general is that toward which some being tends. Namely, every being, when it acts, tends toward something certain, determinate, and defined, which therefore is aptly called end, because it completes and, as it were, terminates the being itself; wherefore it is also called appetible, good, perfection.¹ And indeed every nature by its action spontaneously seeks its own perfection and completion. But man has this above other creatures, that he is master of his own operations, and thus not only is moved, but further moves himself toward his own end and good.²

¹ Properly speaking, "good either is an end, or is said in order to an end." Sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 1, ad 2. But "the end principally has the nature of good." Ibid., q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

² St. Thomas, De veritate, q. XXII, a. 1.

(B) Species. End is twofold: the end of the work and the end of the worker.

(a) The end of the work is that to which the work is destined by its own nature, independently of the intention of the agent: thus the relieving of a poor man is the end of almsgiving. This is called: 1. proximate, or intermediate, when it itself is ordered to another further end; 2. ultimate, however, when it is not ordered to another: ultimate in a certain respect, when it is such only in some series of things (for example, health with respect to medicine), ultimate absolutely and simply, when it is such in relation to all beings.

This ultimate end is more expressly called by St. Augustine "the end of our good,"¹ as it were the full completion of our good.

¹ De Civit. Dei, XIX, 1, P.L. XLI, 621.

Hence: a) the ultimate end, from its notion, is necessarily one; b) other goods cannot be desired except as beginnings or means relative to the ultimate end, and thus from the desiring of the ultimate end; c) our ultimate end and our perfect beatitude coincide: "For beatitude is the perfect good, which totally quiets the appetite."²

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 8.

(b) The end of the worker is the motive on account of which the agent works: thus the end of the worker in almsgiving can be love of neighbor on account of God, or vain glory. This likewise is called proximate when it is so intended that something else is sought through it; ultimate, when one rests in it, and indeed either absolutely or in some series of operations.

3. 2. Concerning good. (A) Notion. Good in general is that which is fitting to some being, or that which terminates and quiets the appetite, or that which perfects a being. These notions complete one another: (a) indeed, that which is fitting to some nature is deservedly called good; (b) but a being deservedly quiets the appetite³ in the apprehension of some object fitting to itself; (c) on the other hand, it is perfected in the attainment of this good.⁴

³ Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas writes (I, q. 5, a. 1): "Good consists in this, that something is appetible"; and C. Gent., III, 3: "This belongs to the nature of good, that it terminates the appetite."

⁴ "Each thing is called good insofar as it is perfect" (I, q. 5, a. 5).

(B) Species. Good is distinguished as threefold: honorable, delightful, and useful: honorable, that which perfects a rational being and therefore is consonant with right reason; delightful, that which brings some sense of delight; useful, that which is apt as a means for attaining some other good. - But since the useful good is not desired for its own sake, but insofar as it is a means for obtaining something else, there are only two genera of goods: honorable, which perfects rational nature, and delightful, which delights the appetite. It must likewise be noted that these two genera of goods are indeed diverse, but not necessarily opposed; for some delight can be honorable, namely when it is conformable to right reason.

The honorable good is also called moral, and is a certain reality perfecting and completing man in order to his end: for every being is called good insofar as it pursues its end and comes nearer to it. - Moral evil, on the contrary, is a certain defect of entity, in some way diminishing man, and turning him away from his end, or at least delaying him.

4. 3. Concerning perfection. (A) Notion. The perfection of some being is its complete evolution; for, as St. Thomas says, "that is called perfect to which nothing is lacking":¹ therefore it consists ultimately in the attainment of the end: "Each thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing."²

¹ In 4 Sentent., q. 1, a. 4.

² St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 1.

Whence "the perfection of anything is its good";³ for perfection arises from the attainment of the end, which itself also is some good.

³ Cont. Gent., III, 16.

(B) Species. Perfection is twofold: absolute, in which a being totally attains its end; relative, by which a being tends toward the end because it will have attained it. Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas says: "But each thing, if it lacks its proper perfection, is moved toward it, so far as it is in itself; but if it has it, it rests in it."⁴

⁴ C. Gent., III, 16.

5. 4. Concerning beatitude. (A) Beatitude, which belongs only to intellectual nature, when man is being treated is called "the perfect good of man,"⁵ or the stable possession of the perfect good; for it can be nothing other than that which perfectly befits him.

⁵ Sum. theol., Ia, q. 26, a. 1.

(B) It can be twofold: a) begun, which sufficiently, but not perfectly, quiets man; b) perfect, which totally quiets him, as it will be in the other life. Perfect beatitude, after Boethius, is described as a state perfected by the gathering together of all goods, or more accurately, the stable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets the soul.

Division. With these things noted beforehand, we shall demonstrate that God is the ultimate end of man, and indeed in a twofold sense: 1. insofar as we are bound to tend toward Him by a free movement and to glorify Him; 2. insofar as in Him we find supreme beatitude; 3. we shall show that Christ is the mediator for glorifying God and attaining beatitude. Whence there will be a threefold thesis.

6. Thesis I: God is the ultimate end of man, in both the natural and supernatural order, insofar as we are bound to glorify Him formally, or by a free movement. It is certain.

It is declared. Irrational creatures tend toward God by necessity of nature and promote His glory only objectively, insofar as they are a trace of His perfections; rational creatures, such as man, are moved freely toward God and formally, or with full consciousness, glorify the Creator by praise, worship, love. - Here it is a question of external glory, which is defined as "clear knowledge with praise,"¹ or the rendering of honor to some person because of his excellence; but it is not a question of the internal glory of God, which consists in the knowledge and love of Himself, and cannot be increased.

¹ Sum. theol., Ia IIae, q. 2, a. 3.

Since man, from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator, nn. 152-176, was destined to a supernatural end, he ought to tend toward God not only in the natural order, but also in the supernatural order. Now the natural end of man consists in the knowledge and love of God proportioned to the powers of human nature; but man naturally does not see God intuitively, but knows Him deductively, understanding in some way His existence and attributes from those things which have been made. But there is another mode of knowing God, namely the mode by which God Himself knows Himself, by contemplating His own essence directly, immediately, intuitively. This mode, as altogether exceeding the proper powers of man and of the other creatures, is deservedly called supernatural.

7. It is proved. 1. God is the ultimate end of man in the natural order.

(A) God, in creating man, as a supremely intelligent being, had some end: for every intelligent being acts on account of an end. But God, supremely and infinitely perfect, cannot create on account of any other end than Himself; for every other end, as lower, is wholly unbecoming to Him. Therefore God created man on account of Himself.

(B) Every being is master of those things which it has produced, especially when it is the author of their whole being. But God created man from nothing, giving to him his whole being, and continuously conserving the same; therefore He is master of the whole man. But He would not truly be his master unless man ordered his life to God, by knowing, loving, and worshiping Him. Therefore man is bound to glorify God. - In other words: man, all that he is, is from God; therefore man, all that he is, depends on Him, and ought to tend toward Him by glorifying Him.

8. 2. That God is the ultimate end of man in the supernatural order is established from the things said in the treatise concerning God the Creator and concerning God the Consummator, where it is proved that man is destined to the beatific vision. Here let it suffice to relate the principal texts, from which it is evinced that men in heaven enjoy the immediate vision of God, are already adoptive sons of God, and that all things are to be referred to God.

(a) Men in heaven see God immediately and clearly: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma; but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know, even as I am known";¹ - "Beloved, now we are sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."² Therefore in heaven we shall see God face to face, that is, directly, immediately, intuitively; we shall see Him as He is, in the same mode (but not in the same degree) in which He sees Himself. But from Philosophy it is established that this is above all the powers and exigencies of man.

¹ I Cor., XIII, 12.

² I John, III, 2.

(b) By such an elevation we do not remain simply servants of God, but we are made partakers of the divine nature, and adoptive sons of God, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.³ For God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons,⁴ and as many as received Him, He gave them power to become sons of God.⁵ And indeed, since we are sons, God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying: Abba, Father;⁶ for the Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God: but if sons, also heirs, heirs indeed of God, and coheirs of Christ.¹ Whence John deservedly exclaims:² "See what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called sons of God and be so." Now divine adoption and also inheritance are in no way owed to man.

³ Which we set forth in the treatise concerning Grace, 139-145.

⁴ Galat., IV, 5.

⁵ John, I, 12.

⁶ Galat., IV, 6.

¹ Rom., VIII, 16-17.

² I John, III, 1.

But to this beatific vision, and to the perfect love which follows it, we are disposed in the present life through the practice of supernatural virtues, and especially of faith, hope, and charity; and thus already we begin to glorify God.

9. (c) From this Scripture infers: 1. that all things were created on account of God, and therefore that all things are subject to His dominion, and conspire unto His glory: "For from Him, and through Him, and in Him (in Greek, eis auton, that is, on account of Him) are all things: to Him be glory forever."³ Therefore we are as things of God, and ought to act on account of Him: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself; for whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord; therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."⁴ 2. Especially the works of the Incarnation, Redemption, and Sanctification tend unto the glory of God: thus, when Christ was born, the angels sing: Glory to God in the highest;⁵ but Christ, when about to die, says to the Father: "I have glorified Thee upon earth";⁶ the Blessed in heaven say:⁷ "Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power"; finally Christ Himself will be subject to Him who subjected all things to Himself, that God may be all in all.⁸ - From these things it is deservedly inferred that God is the ultimate end, toward which we ought to tend, by promoting His glory: "All things are yours, but you are Christ's; and Christ is God's."⁹

³ Rom., XI, 36; cf. Hebr., II, 10; Apoc., XXI, 6; Ps. XVIII, 2.

⁴ Rom., XIV, 7-8.

⁵ Luke, II, 14.

⁶ John, XVII, 14.

⁷ Apoc., IV, 11.

⁸ I Cor., XV, 28.

⁹ I Cor., IV, 22-23.

10. Thesis II: God is the ultimate end of man in the natural and supernatural order, insofar as in Him alone we find supreme beatitude. It is certain.

It is declared. The Vatican Council¹⁰ deservedly declares that God created the world "not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures." For God, since He is the fullness of being, is altogether sufficient to Himself, and in the possession of Himself is perfectly blessed; for beatitude consists in the possession of the good which totally satisfies and quiets the appetite; but God, by possessing Himself, infinitely perfect, possesses such a good, since there is nothing outside God which is not already eminently contained in Him; therefore God did not create man in order to obtain something for Himself. - On the other hand, He proposed to Himself some end; therefore He willed to impart His perfection to others in some way, namely by communicating to them some participation of His being and of His beatitude.

¹⁰ Sess. III, cap. I.

11. It is proved: 1. By reason. For true beatitude two things are required and suffice: the possession of the perfect good, which totally quiets every legitimate desire, and the stable or interminable possession of this good. For (a) if we investigate the matter metaphysically, an imperfect good is not appetible for its own sake, but only on account of another, and therefore does not confer true and integral beatitude; on the other hand, if the good possessed is lost or can be lost, beatitude already fails: for that which passes cannot quiet the immortal desires of man. (b) Psychologically the same is established: when we look into our inward aspirations, we are conscious that we wish to attain perfect beatitude by fully developing our faculties, and that we wish to live not only for a long time, but perpetually.

But this possession of the perfect and perennial good is not found in created goods, but in God alone.

12. (A) Man cannot attain beatitude in created goods.¹ For these are of three kinds: external goods of fortune, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But goods of this kind, although in manifold respect they are desirable, lack the two aforesaid conditions.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 11, a. 1-8; Cont. Gent., lib. III, cap. 26-36; Suarez, De ultimo fine hominis, disp. V; Meyer, t. I, n. 59-60; P. Lescoeur, La Science du Bonheur, Paris, 1873, pp. 9-44; 110-144; 321-341.

(a) External goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, fame, etc.: 1. are not appetible of themselves, but only on account of another, insofar as they help toward procuring goods of soul or body; thus riches are sought to sustain life or to enjoy pleasures, honors suppose that some excellence is present in a man, but they do not confer it. - Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate aspirations of man; for often the more riches and honors abound, the more they inflame desire; not rarely also, after some time, they bring on nausea and weariness of life; furthermore, many other things necessary for felicity can be lacking to those who have all these things, such as bodily health, wisdom, tranquility of soul, etc.

2. Nor are they stable; for they are easily lost by some misfortune; hence they are possessed with solicitude, and at length sometime they pass away at the time of death.

13. (b) Goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, beauty, and the delight of the senses, do not confer true felicity: 1. by their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul; for what does strength of body profit, if the mind is weak and the will depraved? Nor do they fulfill all the legitimate desires of man; for they are common to beasts and men, and therefore do not satisfy the nobler faculties of the soul; indeed, when someone indulges immoderately in bodily delights, the powers of the soul are depressed, morals are corrupted, and man, since he delights in the same pleasures and rests in them contrary to the right order of reason, becomes like a beast.

2. Moreover, how uncertain and unstable they are, there is no one who has not experienced it.

14. (c) Goods of the soul, namely those which are acquired through the exercise of the faculties, such as wisdom and virtue, indeed contribute more to man's felicity, especially when they are found joined together with the moderate and legitimate use of the other goods, but they do not perfectly satisfy our desires. For the adequate object of the intellect and will is not any truth or good whatsoever, but universal truth and good, which is found only in God. 1. And indeed our intellect is so constituted that from the knowledge of finite beings it rises to the knowledge of the infinite, and from the notion of particular truths it in some way reaches to universal truth itself. Hence, however great may be the breadth of things which it knows, it wishes to learn many more things, and curiously to search out things unknown. 2. The same must be said of the will, which is able to rest only in the absolute good; wherefore friendship, even the most perfect, which brings friends so many and such great consolations, at least for a time, does not fulfill the desires of the heart; hence the noblest men exclaim with Augustine: "Thou hast made us for Thee, O God, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee."¹

¹ St. Augustine, Confess., lib. I, n. 1, apud Migne, P.L., XXXII, 661.

15. (B) Man finds his beatitude in the attainment of the ultimate end, or in the perfect knowledge and love of God.

Here it is a question of knowledge and love of God relatively perfect, that is, with respect to the capacity of each man: for absolute perfection belongs to the infinite alone. But man is truly blessed when his capacity, whatever it may be, is sufficiently fulfilled.

It is proved. The supreme good of each being is known from its nature, faculties, and legitimate tendencies: for the most wise Creator placed these in it, as a manifest sign of its destination. But since man's proper faculties are intellect and will, he is perfectly blessed when faculties of this kind rest in the attainment of their object. Now the intellect and will of man, from what has been said, are capable of all truth and good, or of universal good and truth. Therefore they are perfectly satisfied when, according to their capacity, they know and love God, who alone is the highest truth and the highest good.

16. It is declared. 1. Man attains knowledge and love of God only imperfectly in the present life, whether naturally through reason or supernaturally through faith: for he is on the way in relation to perfection, and daily ought to reach a higher degree; and consequently he attains greater felicity the more perfectly he orders his whole life to God.

2. It must likewise be noted that for perfect beatitude the legitimate satiety of man's sensitive faculties is desired. This indeed does not belong to the essence of beatitude, but to its natural complement. For the sensitive faculties are truly a part of man, although subordinated to the intellectual powers; therefore they ought to be subjected to the spiritual part, and to aid it in attaining beatitude; and since the tendencies of these faculties are diverse among themselves, and also often contrary to the higher tendencies of the soul, in the present life they ought to be mortified, so that the spiritual man may be able more easily to attain his end. Nevertheless, when they are subjected to the will, they can attain a certain proper felicity even in the present life;¹ but in the future life, when the struggle between body and soul has ended, the sensitive faculties will enjoy legitimate joys more fully.

¹ The matter can be demonstrated historically, by showing that those who turn themselves to God are much happier than those who turn themselves away from Him. Cf. Baunard, op. cit., and La Foi et ses victoires, 7th ed., Paris, 1901-1902.

17. 2. By authority. (A) In the Old Testament, again and again Moses and the Prophets, the Sapiential books and the Psalms call him blessed who loves God from his whole mind, from his whole heart, and with all his powers, but unhappy him who departs from the way of God.

Ecclesiastes declares this clearly: "I have seen all things that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit."² For indeed he had rejoiced in riches and pleasures, but in all these he had found nothing except vanity and affliction of spirit: "I enlarged my works, I built houses for myself and planted vineyards... And all

² Eccles., I, 14.

which my eyes desired, I did not deny them, nor did I forbid my heart from enjoying every pleasure... And when I had turned myself to all the works which my hands had made, and to the labors in which I had sweat in vain, I saw in all things vanity and affliction of soul, and nothing remaining under the sun."¹ Wherefore he passed over to contemplating wisdom, and proposed to investigate all things which are done under the sun, but soon recognized that in these also there is labor and affliction of spirit, and that there is one and the same end of the wise man and the fool; whence again he exclaims: "If the end of me and the fool shall be one, what does it profit me that I have given greater labor to wisdom?... And therefore my life wearied me, seeing all evils under the sun, and all things vanity and affliction of spirit."²

¹ Eccles., II, 4-11.

² Eccles., II, 15-18.

(B) In the New Testament, Christ defines the conditions of perfect and eternal beatitude throughout the whole Gospel, but especially in the sermon on the mount, where He proclaims blessed those who, willingly renouncing earthly things, serve God alone, love Him perfectly, and their neighbor on account of God, and thus pursue the kingdom of God. Wherefore the Apostle, writing concerning piety, which embraces love of God and neighbor, exhibits it as most efficacious for earthly and eternal beatitude: "But piety is profitable for all things, having promise of the life which now is and of that which is to come."³

³ I Tim., IV, 8.

Therefore man's beatitude is found in God alone; therefore God is our end insofar as He is the author of our beatitude.

18. Conclusion. From this it is inferred that the glory of God and the beatitude of man are connected intimately, not only extrinsically from the will of God, but also intrinsically, from the very nature of the matter, and in fact fall back into the same thing: for man is blessed by glorifying God, and by pursuing true beatitude he glorifies God: for by the same acts of knowledge and love of God each end is acquired, and deservedly St. Thomas⁴ says: "God does not seek His glory on account of Himself, but on account of us."

⁴ Sum. theol., IIa IIae, q. 131, a. 1 ad 1.

If, however, we compare one end with the other, the glory of God is the primary ultimate end, man's beatitude the secondary end, since this beatitude by its nature is referred to glorifying God and is subordinated to Him. Therefore let us do all things for the greater glory of God, and by that very fact we shall be blessed.

For attaining each end, we need Christ as mediator.

19. Thesis III: For glorifying God and attaining eternal beatitude, man, in the present state, needs the grace of Christ the Redeemer. It is certain.

It is declared. In the treatise concerning God the Creator we proved that man, raised to the supernatural state, fell, and in the treatise concerning the Incarnate Word that the same man was redeemed by the infinite satisfactions and merits of Christ, so that the Lord is the necessary mediator to God. Therefore it will be enough to touch briefly on a matter proved elsewhere.

It is proved. 1. Christ is the perfect mediator of religion, by whom we are able to glorify God: "One mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself as a redemption for all."¹ Hence St. Peter exhorts all that they honor God through Christ: "That in all things God may be honored through Jesus Christ."²

¹ I Tim., II, 5.

² I Peter, IV, 11.

In reality the Lord instituted the sacrifice of the Mass, in which anew He offers Himself to the Father as a victim of praise, not only in His own name but in our name, since He is truly the head of the mystical body of which we are members. Moreover, through holy communion, He communicates Himself to us with the spirit of religion, so that through Him and with Him and in Him, not only at the very moment of communion, but throughout the whole day, we may be able to glorify God, by offering our actions to the Father with Christ as so many spiritual victims.

2. Christ is also the perfect mediator of sanctification, insofar as He merited for us all graces by which we may be able to attain perfection and beatitude. For He Himself not only revealed to us the truth which we ought to believe, nor only showed by His virtues the way which we ought to follow, but also merited all graces by which we are able not only to be freed from sin but also to cultivate all virtues, and we tend toward eternal beatitude: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life³... And for them I sanctify Myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth⁴... Blessed be God... who has blessed us with every blessing in the heavens in Christ⁵..." - Therefore Jesus is not only the exemplary cause, but also the meritorious cause of our justification: "The causes of this sanctification," says Trent,¹ "are indeed the final cause: the glory of God and of Christ and eternal life; but the efficient cause: the merciful God... and the meritorious cause: His most beloved Only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, on account of the exceeding charity with which He loved us, by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross merited justification for us and satisfied God the Father for us."

³ John, XIV, 6.

⁴ John, XVII, 19.

⁵ Ephes., I, 3.

¹ Sess. VI, cap. VII (Denzing., 799).

There is, therefore, an obligation of tending toward God the ultimate end, of glorifying Him, and thus of attaining salvation through Christ.

20. Corollary. From this it follows that the means for attaining our end are the cooperation of God and of ourselves.

A) Namely, God, out of superabundant goodness, makes deiform the essence and faculties of the soul which He created, through habitual grace, infused virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit; moreover He not only assists the exercise of human faculties through natural concurrence, but also fittingly elevates it through actual graces. But God provides these internal supernatural means, in order that He may accommodate Himself to human nature, constituted of soul and body, through external means, especially through the Sacraments.

B) Thus elevated and made a partaker of the divine nature, man moves himself freely to the end, by acting under God and with Him cooperating, according to the norm of the precepts imposed by God both naturally and supernaturally, with Christ as leader and helper, the perfect exemplar and meritorious cause of all virtues.

This indeed will be clearer from what is to be said concerning the norm of morality.

That man may attain his end, he needs a rule or norm to which he may render his deliberate acts conformable. This norm can be twofold: general or fundamental, by which a distinction is established between good and evil, obligatory acts and non-obligatory acts; special, by which it is determined in species which actions are licit or not, commanded or not. Here it is a question only of the general norm.

We shall set forth: 1. the Christian norm of morality; 2. various systems of non-Catholics.

21. State of the question. From the things said concerning the ultimate end it is permitted to infer what is the true norm of morality, or that rule by which the distinction is constituted between good and evil acts, between acts obligatory or not. For since the perfection of man consists in the attainment of the ultimate end, actions which tend toward God are good, but those which turn us away from Him are evil; those which are necessary to the end are obligatory, those which are only useful are non-obligatory. We shall weigh three things: 1. whether there is an intrinsic distinction between good and evil; 2. what is the norm discriminating between good and evil; 3. what is the commanding norm, or that which imposes obligation.

As to the first question, certain things are to be noted beforehand.

That there is some distinction between good and evil all philosophers of sound mind admit, but they by no means agree concerning its nature.

(A) For not a few contend that the reason of this distinction arose from man himself: (a) namely from civil laws, according to Hobbes (1588-1679), who teaches that the rules of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, are civil laws, and therefore that is to be held as good which the legislator has commanded, that as evil which he himself has forbidden;¹ this theory J. J. Rousseau renewed and many modern politicians embrace; (b) from education, according to Montaigne (1533-1592); or from public opinion and the tradition of peoples, as Saint-Lambert² held (1717-1803); or from the evolution of social sense, as the evolutionists hold.

¹ Hobbes, Elementa philosophica de Cive, c. XII, § 1.

² St-Lambert, Principes des moeurs chez toutes les nations, Paris, 1798. - To this also pertains the opinion of those who, with Levy-Bruhl (La Science des moeurs, Paris, Alcan, 1904), hold that ethics is occupied with morals as they exist, not with duties to be fulfilled: for these duties, they say, arise only from social influence (pression sociale); these A. Fouillee refuted in the periodical Rev. des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1, 1905, p. 519-550.

(B) Some teach that the distinction between honorable and dishonorable acts must be placed in the free will of God, so that, before every law and apart from God's good pleasure, what is good and what is evil cannot be defined; thus Scotus, Descartes, and Samuel Pufendorf³ (1632-1694).

³ Pufendorf, De jure naturae et Gentium, l. I, c. 2, § 6.

Against these we shall establish that at least certain actions, from their own nature, independently of every will, are good or evil, and that this distinction is ultimately to be placed in the divine reason or nature, which is the supreme norm of good and evil.

22. Thesis I: There are certain actions intrinsically good or evil, even if they had been commanded or prohibited by no law, even divine law. - We indeed confess that there are many actions which are morally good for this reason, that they have been commanded by some divine or human law, and others similarly evil, because they have been prohibited; but there are certain actions which are commanded or prohibited for this reason, that in themselves they are honorable or dishonorable. - This indeed is declared rather than demonstrated.

23. 1. Historically and psychologically it is established that there are certain actions which, by the common and perpetual persuasion of men, have always been held as essentially honorable or dishonorable; thus, for example, to love parents, to do good to one's neighbor, to speak the truth, and other things of this kind, are deservedly reputed good; on the contrary, to pursue parents with hatred,¹ to kill the innocent without legitimate reason, to betray friends unjustly, to utter a lie harmful to one's neighbor, and other things of the same kind, are deservedly judged as something base and dishonorable.² This persuasion indeed flourishes among all nations, even barbarous ones, nor is it diminished or lost except when the moral sense is diminished or destroyed.

¹ There are indeed barbarians who cultivate piety toward parents in a singular way, for example by killing the aged, lest they suffer bitter pains longer or be reduced to captivity by enemies; thus they indeed err concerning the manner of cultivating piety, but not concerning the obligation itself of loving parents.

² J. L. de Lanessan confesses (La Morale des Religions, Paris, Alcan, 1905, p. 557) that in all religions, whether ancient or modern, these duties are found prescribed. - It is evident, on the other hand, from the things to be said below, n. 213, concerning the existence of natural law.

But so constant and universal a persuasion, deeply inhering in minds so diverse and disagreeing about almost all other things, does not arise from civil law, which is diverse among various nations, nor from education or public opinion, which likewise is not the same among diverse peoples, but is derived from nature itself. For public opinion is nothing else than the manifestation of ideas which flourish among individual citizens; education transmits only notions which appeared rational to ancestors; if therefore the distinction between good and evil is recognized by all today, that surely cannot arise except from the common persuasion that such a distinction is so consonant with reason that it draws its origin from nature itself.

Nor can it be said that the morality of these acts depends on a free institution of God; for just as there are certain speculative truths which are true independently of the divine will (for example, that which is, is; two and two make four, etc.), so likewise there are certain moral actions which of themselves are so honorable or dishonorable that not even the divine will can change their morality; for example, God cannot make blasphemy a praiseworthy act, nor piety a sin: this will be clear from the following argument.

Principles concerning guilt

53. That conscience is bound by the laws concerning the censorship and prohibition of books is not doubted. But the guilt of fault must be estimated both of itself, or with the law of nature considered, by which we are forbidden to cast ourselves or others into danger of sinning and to cooperate in the sins of others; and accidentally, that is, when positive law is added, whose violation introduces moral fault.

I do not know whether this estimate is customarily made with sufficient care and with the variety of circumstances sufficiently weighed. Therefore we shall diligently try, according to our powers, to weigh this matter.

Grave or light obligation

105. You will ask concerning the grave and light obligation of conscience by which the laws on previous censure are to be observed.

In itself the obligation of obeying the laws on previous censure is grave. Yet in order that you may judge a particular fact, these things especially are to be observed:

a) With what strictness of usage the laws themselves are observed in the place where the work is published. For from this the account of scandal varies very much. Where strict observance is in force, the law cannot be passed over without suspicion of contempt being introduced; and this contempt is easily to be judged mortal. While in another place the matter, in a certain oblivion, ignorance, or at least imperfect good faith, obtains a milder explanation. But grave scandal and contempt being excluded, there remains to be considered:

b) The objective gravity of the matter, which is different according to the different importance and subject matter of the book, and appears far less in a new edition of an approved book than in the first.

Discretion of the Bishop

116. 1. If nothing seems to stand in the way of the publication of the book. Therefore the faculty of denying approval is greater for the Ordinary than that of reprobating a book already published. Which books can be reprobated by him, we saw above, n. 102.

But in order that he not concede the faculty of publishing, it is enough that a truly just cause stand in the way, for example, of protecting peace, concord, of awaiting opportuneness.

At the same time, however, if nothing seems to stand in the way, he must concede the license. He cannot at will give or deny a faculty which in itself is to be given, unless something stands in the way.

Yet the reasons for rejection are to be indicated

2. From the rescript of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, September 3, 1898, if the book seems capable of correction or expurgation, the Ordinary must indicate to the writer the reasons why he was unwilling to approve the book. This is an equitable disposition, and one by which arbitrary rejections are guarded against.

Whether remuneration of the censor is excluded?

3. Necessary gratuitousness does not exclude, strictly speaking, congruous remuneration for the labor of the censor. Yet provision for the decent sustenance of the censor will be better made by another arrangement. Cf. Desjardins,¹ Peries,² Pennacchi.³

What if the faculty is given orally?

4. The faculty must be given in writing. Yet one which has been conceded only orally does not therefore become null, or without effect. Pennacchi, cited work, n. 77.

How the obtained faculty is to be expressed

5. You will ask whether the obtained faculty must be published in the very words by which it was given, or whether it is enough to use a formula by which it is clearly and distinctly indicated whose license was obtained?

C. Gennari⁴ and Hollweck⁵ hold the former; and formerly it was thus resolved.⁶ They argue from the text by which the license, which was given in writing, is said to be printed; and from the fact that otherwise it could not authentically be established concerning the license obtained.

Dilgskron,⁷ Genicot,⁸ Pennacchi,³ Wernz⁹ admit the latter, as quite sufficient for the end of the law; and consonant with the character of this Constitution, by which the solemnities have been made simpler. And this is confirmed by practice. Wherefore the law is obeyed if a secular man uses this or a similar formula: "with the permission of the Ordinary of such a diocese"; but a regular: "by the license of the Superiors of the Order and of the Ordinary of such a place."

Whether it can sometimes be suppressed

6. Formerly, if a just cause, for example lest the public utility of the book be impeded, demanded this, they admitted that, with the Bishop consenting, the obtained faculty could be suppressed.¹⁰ We are not compelled to be more severe today. And unless the omission, unduly made, is going to be for scandal or seems to contain contempt of authority, it does not seem to introduce grave guilt.

Gravity of the obligation

¹ Etudes, t. 71, p. 366.

² Pp. 205, 206.

³ Cited work, n. 77.

⁴ Monit., cited place, p. 112.

⁵ Cited work, p. 58.

⁶ Cf. Albitius, cited work, chapter 30, n. 125, or Arndt, cited work, n. 209, p. 296.

⁷ Analecta Ecclesiastica, 1897, p. 228.

⁸ Cited work, I, 459.

⁹ N. 121, note 109.

¹⁰ Dilgskron, in the same place, citing De Brabandere, II, 1348.

1. DEFINITION. —Catholic Moral Theology, broadly speaking, is the scientific exposition of the ethical teaching of the Gospel, or, more definitely, that theological discipline which sets forth the laws, rules, and precepts man must know and obey in order to attain his supernatural destiny.

There is a distinction between "moral" and "ethical." "Ethical" is derived from the Greek ἦθος, which means in the singular, custom, usage, habit; in the plural (ἤθη), disposition, temper, character (Latin, mores).¹ Every free act, good or bad, performed by a rational being is "ethical;" but no act is "moral" unless it be ethically good.²

¹ Cfr. 1 Cor. XV, 33.

² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 1 (Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. I, London 1896, p. 167); Comment, in Sent., III, dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 4. English text-books use "moral" and "ethical" synonymously, as a generic term and then specify morally good and morally bad.

The words "moral" and "immoral" are sometimes used with sole reference to the Sixth Commandment. Their true meaning is much larger. Morality is by no means confined to the sexual sphere. Other vices, such as injustice, hatred, revenge, can be and are quite as immoral as the vice of impurity. The fact of the matter is that the use of the expressions "immorality" or "immoral life" for the vice of impurity is merely an idiomatic euphemism adopted to avoid a clearer description of what is meant, and is not intended to restrict immorality to the sexual sphere.

2. SCOPE. —In order to give a scientific exposition of the laws that govern human conduct, Moral Theology must first ascertain the conditions under which man's actions will enable him to reach his final destiny, and then draw from Revelation the correct principles for guiding him aright both in private and public life. All the problems of human existence, including those of the social and economic order, have a religious and an ethical bearing, and they can not be completely solved except in the light of Christian justice and charity.⁴

⁴ Cfr. John I, 9; XIV, 6; 1 Cor. X, 31; Col. III, 17.—Cfr. J. Hogan, Clerical Studies, Boston 1898, pp. 197 sqq.; (A. Boudinhon, Les Etudes du Clergé, Rome and Paris 1901, pp. 240 sqq.); F. Walter, Theorie und Praxis in der Moral, Paderborn 1905; J. Mausbach, Die kath. Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsätze und Aufgaben, 2nd ed., Cologne 1902; A. Meyenberg, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., Stans 1901; A. Müller, Ist die kath. Moral reformbedürftig? Fulda 1902.

Moral Theology must avoid two extremes: —overemphasizing the ascetic point of view and resolving itself into mere casuistry.

³ See E. R. Hull, S.J., in the Bombay Examiner, Jan. 11, 1919.

Moral Theology is an independent science with a well-defined scope and object, and it is neither its sole nor its principal aim to train preachers or confessors.⁵ The latter function belongs to casuistry, which is "the study of cases of conscience" with a view ''to define the exact limits and frontiers of wrong-doing."⁶

⁵ Cfr. H. E. Plassmann, Die Moral gemäss der Schule des hl. Thomas, Soest 1861, p. 8; M. Jocham, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, Sulzbach 1852, p. 31.

⁶ Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, London 1902, p. 197.

READINGS.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 601-11.—J. B. Hogan, Clerical Studies, Boston 1898, pp. 197 sqq.—Thos. Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 3rd ed., Bruges 1903, Introduction.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Short History of Moral Theology, New York 1909, pp. 3 sqq.—A. Krawutzky, Einleitung in das Studium der kath. Moraltheologie, 2nd ed., Breslau 1898.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, London 1902, pp. 197 sqq.—J. Mausbach, Die katholische Moral, ihre Methoden, Grundsätze und Aufgaben, 2nd ed., Cologne, 1902.—IDEM, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), New York 1914.—J. Bucceroni, S.J., Commentarius de Natura Theologiae Moralis, Rome 1910.—A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 5 sqq.—A. Caldara, Il Problema Morale nei Tempi Moderni, Rome 1918.

Catholic Moral Theology is essentially theistic, that is, it presupposes belief in God and the freedom of the human will.¹ Without these suppositions there could be neither responsibility nor duty. Materialism, Pantheism, and such other systems as exclude theistic belief in God and in the freedom of the human will, may evolve the notion of "utility," but they will never arrive at the concepts of "good" and "bad," in the strict moral sense of the terms, viz.: as things to be done or to be avoided under the sanction of an absolute and imperative duty. Lacking a religious basis, these systems have not "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." ² One who holds that morality is autonomous will occasionally do that which is commanded, and sometimes avoid that which is forbidden by the divine law, but not because it is commanded or forbidden. An atheist may abstain from murder, or help his neighbor, but being an atheist, he does these things from motives different from those that impel the theist.

¹ On the freedom of the will see M. Maher, S.J., Psychology, 4th ed., London 1900, pp. 394 sqq.; IDEM, in the Cath. Encycl., Vol. VI, pp. 259-263; Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 291 sqq.; R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, New York 1899, pp. 95-116; V. Cathrein, S.J., Die kath. Weltanschauung, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1909, pp. 44 sqq., 76 sqq.; W. G. Ward, Philosophy of Theism, London 1884; H. Gründer, S.J., Free Will, the Greatest of the Seven World-Riddles, St. Louis 1911; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Free-Will and Four English Philosophers, London 1906. A good survey of the free-will controversy in Fonsegrive's Essai sur le Libre Arbitre, 2nd ed., Paris 1896.

² Rom. I, 16.

As ethics is impossible without metaphysics, so there can be no Moral Theology without dogma. Dogma and Morals are the two great branches of systematic theology (theologia scholastica) and together cover the entire domain of Christian belief and practice. Dogmatic Theology furnishes the rule of faith (regula credendorum), which in turn determines the rule of conduct (regula agendorum). The two sciences may be said to postulate each other because dogma must bear fruit in good works, and Christian morality could not exist if there were no revealed faith.³

³ Cfr. John XVII, 3; Heb. XI, 6; Mark XVI, 16; Matth. VII, 21; Jas. II, 26.

Though Moral Theology thus stands in a most intimate relation to Dogmatic Theology, the two sciences are separate and independent. For whereas the latter deals with God, His essence, attributes, outward operation, etc., and shows Him to be the sovereign good and source of all created goodness, the former is entirely concerned with directing man to his eternal goal.

Moral conduct results from the cooperation of three separate and independent factors. Man must first perceive the difference between right and wrong; second, will to do that which is right; and, third, conform his actions to the moral law. "No excess of the aesthetic faculty," says B. Bjornson, "can outweigh a moral defect." And Ch. F. Gounod: "An ocean of talent does not equal a single drop of holiness." Moral autonomism, so called, is false and pernicious.⁴

⁴ Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Religion, Münster 1892, pp. 193 sqq.; V. Cathrein, S.J., Religion und Moral, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1904, pp. 70 sqq.; IDEM, Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 372 sqq. On the “ethical movement” and the Society for Ethical Culture see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 561; the New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, Vol. IV, pp. 183 sq.; W. L. Sheldon, An Ethical Movement, New York 1896; W. R. W. Sullivan, Morality as a Religion, New York 1899; H. J. Bridges, The Ethical Movement, Its Principles and Aims, 2nd ed., London 1912.

Though the moral teaching of the Catholic Church is drawn from Revelation, it is not without mysteries. There is a mystery of iniquity (mysterium iniquitatis) as well as a mystery of faith (mysterium fidei).⁵ Not all ethical problems can be solved by a short and clean-cut formula.

⁵ Cfr. 1 Tim. III, 9; 2 Thess. II, 7.

READINGS.—F. Hettinger (tr. by V. Stepka), Timothy; or Letters to a Young Theologian, St. Louis 1902, pp. 372 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Die kath. Weltanschauung, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1909.—Ph. Kneib, Die “Heteronomie” der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1903.—IDEM, Die “Jenseitsmoral” im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, Freiburg 1906.—J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 3 sqq.—J. B. Hogan, Clerical Studies, 2nd ed., Boston 1898, pp. 197 sqq.—De Broglie, La Morale sans Dieu, Paris 1903.

1. Catholic Moral Theology is based on the dogmatic teaching of the one true Church. Protestant ethics rests on arbitrary doctrinal assumptions. ¹ Hence the fundamental difference between the two sciences. Catholics acknowledge an infallible authority in questions of both dogma and morals, whereas Protestants possess no objective rule for either, but are buffeted to and fro by the winds of subjectivism and error.

¹ The dogmatic differences in the systems of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin may be clearly traced in their moral teaching. Cfr. H. Denifle, O.P., Luther and Lutherdom, tr. by R. Volz, Vol. I, Somerset, O., pp. 53 sqq.; C. von Kügelken, Ethik H. Zwinglis, Leipsic 1902; P. Lobstein, Ethik Calvins, Strassburg 1877.

Besides these there are other points of difference. Thus Catholics, unlike Protestants, do not regard the Bible as the sole source of knowledge in matters of faith and morals. Nor do they hold that man by the fall of Adam and Eve has lost his freedom, or that God overpowers the will by grace. Catholics regard free-will as an essential condition of morality and hold that man could perform no moral act if he were not free.

Furthermore, Catholics do not look upon justification as a wholly subjective and purely internal act, but regard it as an ethical process, conditioned (ordinarily) upon the reception of the Sacraments, either in re or in voto.

Finally, true liberty, i. e., the "liberty of the children of God" (sanctity), is not the beginning but the end and object of morality and religion. ² It is not faith in Christ, making sin harmless, but victory over sin and passion, the result of a constant and patient cooperation with grace.³

² John VIII, 32; Rom. VIII, 21.

³ Cfr. 2 Cor. III, 17-18.

Whoever denies the above-mentioned truths has no foundation upon which to erect a system of moral teaching. Protestant ethics really owes its existence to an inconsistency and in some measure also to the fact that Protestants, consciously or unconsciously, retain many Catholic practices, though they have long ago rejected the principles underlying them.

2. Protestant writers deny or ignore the fundamental distinctions just outlined. They claim that the chief difference between Catholic Moral Theology and Protestant ethics lies in the fact that the former is addicted to a false empiricism, which wrongly distinguishes between mortal and venial sin and between perfect and imperfect contrition, thereby catering to human frailty and derogating from the spirit of the Gospel.

They furthermore allege that the Catholic Church attributes a magical effect to her Sacraments and regards the process of justification as independent of the disposition of the sinner.

Another favorite accusation is that the Church, harking back to the Old Testament, imposes purely human laws and thereby inculcates a false morality, which, like that of the ancient Pharisees, exaggerates external acts at the expense of character and thus breeds servility and hypocrisy. All this, they declare, is opposed to the Protestant idea of morality, which claims to be drawn from the teaching of St. Paul.

The fourth and last objection against Catholic Moral Theology is that it is dualistic because it makes a distinction between precepts and counsels, and measures religious and seculars by a different rule, discriminating against the latter in favor of the former.

All these charges will be refuted in the course of this treatise. Here let us merely remark that the erroneous notions which so many non-Catholics entertain of the Catholic teaching on perfection, are to a certain extent pardonable in view of the hyperbolic language sometimes employed by Catholic writers in describing the religious state. Perfection is not a matter concerning solely the select few or attainable by a small minority only. On the contrary, it is within reach of all. There is but one perfection, and that is charity, or the love of God, which manifests itself by obedience to the divine will, i. e., keeping the commandments and doing good. Christian perfection is nothing more or less than a complete and willing observance of the law of God.

READINGS. —J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 131 sqq. —P. Höveler, Harnack und die kath. Aszese, Düsseldorf 1902. —H. A. Kröse, S.J., Der Einfluss der Konfession auf die Sittlichkeit, Freiburg 1900. —Ph. Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, pp. 65 sqq., 79 sqq. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Die kath. Weltanschauung, 2nd ed., pp. 441 sqq., 453 sqq. —Hettinger-Stepka, Timothy; or Letters to a Young Theologian, pp. 376 sqq. —A. Devine, C.P., art. "Perfection" in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 665 sq. —IDEM, A Manual of Ascetical Theology, London 1902. —E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 40 sqq., Vienna 1887. —Thos. Slater, S.J., The Foundation of True Morality, N. Y. 1920.

As there is a purely philosophic discipline treating of God (theodicy), so there is a purely philosophic discipline dealing with morality. The latter, among Catholics, is commonly called Ethics.¹

¹ Rom. I, 19 sqq.; Apoc. XIV, 14—16. —Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 2: "The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the principle and end of all things, can be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason." —Can. de Rev., 1: "If anyone says that the one and true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty through the things that have been made by the natural light of human reason, let him be anathema." — Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1914, pp. 15 sqq.; Th. H. Simar, Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1883, pp. 75 sqq.

Ethics and Moral Theology differ from each other in three respects: (1) as to their source, (2) as to their object, and (3) as to their contents. 1. Ethics, or moral philosophy, derives its principles and motives entirely from unaided human reason. Its object is to ascertain what is right and what is wrong, and how man must regulate his conduct to be naturally good and (supposing him in the pure state of nature) how to attain his natural destiny.

2. Moral Theology, on the other hand, draws its precepts and proofs from Revelation and from reason enlightened by supernatural faith. It takes for granted that man is no longer in the pure state of nature and regards him as a rational creature raised to the supernatural order, showing how he must regulate his conduct in order to attain his supernatural end.

Hence Moral Theology is more perfect than Ethics. Its superiority may be further seen from the fact that it inculcates its principles with absolute clearness and certainty ² and furnishes supernatural motives (fear, hope, charity) and supernatural aids (the example of Christ and the saints, the Sacraments, etc.) to a moral life. History shows that, with proper cooperation on the part of man, Catholic moral teaching is able to produce saints.

² John XIV, 6; Matth. V, 17-44: But I say to you. —Cfr. Grasset, Morale Scientifique et Morale Évangélique, Paris 1909, pp. 7 sqq.

3. Despite the essential differences existing between the two sciences, Ethics is a valuable help to Moral Theology, for the reason that faith presupposes natural intelligence. Thus Moral Theology may be said to comprise within its scope natural Ethics, and to derive from it its scientific substructure, while on the other hand Ethics possesses in Moral Theology an unfailing loadstar.

It would be wrong to assert that there is no morality outside the Christian religion. The Church has repeatedly and formally condemned the proposition that the virtues of the heathen are but glittering vices.³ Moreover, pagan philosophy has exercised an undeniable influence on Christian moralists.⁴

³ Prop. Baii Damnat., prop. 25; Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandro VIII, prop. 8; Prop. Damnat. Quesnelli, prop. 42, 48 (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 10th ed., by Fr. Clement Bannwart, S.J., n. 1025, 1298, 1392, 1398); Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 7; Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1917, pp. 179 sqq.

⁴ Cfr. F. Hasler, Über das Verhältnis der heidnischen und christlichen Ethik, Munich 1866; W. Redepenning, Der Einfluss des Aristoteles auf die Moral des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Goslar 1875; C. Merk, Klemens Alexandrinus in seiner Abhängigkeit von der griechischen Philosophie, Leipsic 1879; E. de Faye, Clément d'Alexandrie, Étude sur les Rapports du Christianisme et de la Philosophie Grecque au IIe Siècle, Paris 1898; B. Barthel, Über die Benutzung der Schriften Ciceros durch Laktanz, Strehlen 1903; P. Ewald, Einfluss der stoisch-ciceronianischen Moral auf die Darstellung der Ethik bei Ambrosius, Leipsic 1881; R. Thamin, S. Ambroise et la Morale Chrétienne au IVe Siècle, Paris 1895; Ph. Schmidt, Ambrosius und die Stoa, Göttingen 1897; Th. Zielinski, Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte, 2nd ed., Leipsic 1908.

Pagan Ethics as such, however, is very imperfect. It misconceives man's relation to his Creator and thereby robs the concept of morality of its prime constituent. Though the science of ethics attained to a high stage of development among the heathen philosophers of antiquity, it never succeeded in stripping off its innate egotism. The true idea of humanity and the great Christian motive of charity remained entirely outside its ken.

A non-Catholic writer who has made a special study of the ethical teaching of the Greeks and Romans outlines its leading characteristics as follows: " It never entered into the pagan concept of humanity to show mercy, much less love, to an enemy. This virtue is not a postulate of human nature or of natural reason. Even among Christians it is not practiced as universally as one might be inclined to expect especially of those who would establish amicable relations between Christianity on the one hand and human nature and civilization on the other. ... To love one's enemies is a supernatural virtue, found only among those who clearly perceive that Christianity requires its followers to sacrifice to God even the natural sentiments of the heart, —in other words, that it imposes regeneration and sanctification. I must admit that I have in mind particularly the saints of the Catholic Church. The noble and humane practice of treating wounded enemies with kindness, which flourishes among the Christian nations of modern times, is quite a different thing. Men as a rule feel no personal grudge against individual members of an enemy nation, and if one of them is hurt, they naturally sympathize with him. The humanity of the ancients scarcely went beyond the feelings of natural sympathy and antipathy. Cicero finds it quite in conformity with natural ethics to hate one's fellowmen heartily (libenter), and says it is impossible to serve all.⁵ Yet it is precisely this that Christianity demands for the sake of God and as a supernatural duty. Tacitus regarded it as an honor to have many enemies.⁶ True, the pagan philosophers distinguish between a mere difference of opinion (opinionum dissensio) and a quarrel (animorum contentio),⁷ and hold that the former should never degenerate into the latter. Cicero plumes himself upon the fact that he and Pompey did not allow their political differences to disturb their friendship.⁸ But where real enmity existed, the average pagan took no pains to conceal the pleasure he derived from his enemy's discomfiture.

⁵ Ad Attic., XIII, 40, 2.

⁶ Dial., 40: "Ipsa inimicitiarum gloria."

⁷ Cicero, Ad Famil., II, 13, 2.

⁸ Phil., II, 38.

... Cursing an enemy and wishing him evil, was quite common.... Christianity exercised a strong influence against slavery, which it opposed in principle, though out of regard for existing conditions and the lot of the unfortunate slaves themselves, the Church discountenanced revolutionary measures." ⁹ If we wish to draw a fair comparison between pagan ethics and the moral teaching of Christianity, we must not detach single propositions from their context but weigh system against system. Doing so we shall find that the latter far surpasses the former.¹⁰ "What ancient Greek culture did for the intellect," says Houston Stewart Chamberlain, "Christ did for the moral life; it was from Him that humanity first received moral power."¹¹ ll "To profit by suffering," writes Bishop Keppler, "was the highest stage attained by ancient philosophy; the religion of the cross teaches us to practice charity while we suffer and to make our suffering productive of charity." ¹² Christianity, as even Protestants admit, was the first to recognize the importance and value of personality; the philosophers of ancient times did not even know the term and hence were unable to appreciate its ethical bearing. 13 READINGS. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, or Ethics and Natural Law, London 1908. —Chas. Coppens, S.J., A Brief Text-Book of Moral Philosophy, New York 1895.—V. Cathrein, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 556 sqq. —J. L. Perrier, The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy, New York 1909, pp. 136 sqq. —Th. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1906; Vol. II, 1900. —A. Castelein, S.J., Institutiones Philosophiae Moralis et Socialis, Bruxelles 1899. —L. du Roussaux, Éthique, Bruxelles 1890 —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, especially pp. 13 sq. —E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 38 sqq., Vienna 1887.—J. Elliot Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, New York 1919, pp. 7 sqq.

⁹ M. Schneidewin, Die antike Humanität, Berlin 1897, pp. 202 sq., 209. Cfr. M. Waldmann, Die Feindesliebe in der antiken Welt und im Christentum, Vienna 1902; S. Randlinger, Die Feindesliebe nach dem natürlichen und positiven Sittengesetz, Paderborn 1906, pp. 22 sqq., 101 sqq.; F. Steinmüller, Die Feindesliebe, Ratisbon 1909, pp. 17 sqq. —On the attitude of the Church towards slavery see C. S. Devas, The Key to the World's Progress, Being an Essay on Historical Logic, London 1906, pp. 143 sqq.

¹⁰ Cfr. H. Kellner, Hellenismus und Christentum, Cologne 1866; A. Chollet, La Morale Stoicienne en Face de la Morale Chrétienne, Paris 1889, pp. 43 sqq., 59 sqq.; A. Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, Stuttgart 1890; A. Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten Stoa, Berlin 1897, pp. 327 sqq.; M. Baumgarten, L. A. Seneca und das Christentum, Rostock 1895; Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhältnis zum Christentum, 2nd ed., Erlangen 1895; K. Jentsch, Hellenentum und Christentum, Leipsic 1903; L. E. M. Bautain, La Morale de l'Évangile, Paris 1855; Germ. tr. by J. M. Gaisser, Die Moral des Evangeliums, Tübingen 1856, pp. 349 sqq., 377 sqq.

¹¹ Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts, Vol. I, 4th ed., Munich 1903, p. 207.

¹² P. von Keppler, Das Problem des Leidens in der Moral, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1904, p. 26.

The Catholic idea of the value of personality is beautifully explained by F. Sawicki, Wert und Würde der Persönlichkeit im Christentum, Cologne 1906, especially pp. ¹³ sqq. and 35 sqq.

¹³ Cfr. G. Wobbermin, Der christliche Gottesglaube in seinem Verhältnis zur heutigen Philosophie, Berlin 1902, p. 80; 2nd ed., 1907, pp. 130 sq. Wobbermin is a Protestant.

According to the dogmatic teaching of the Church, the final end and object of moral conduct is man's eternal happiness in Heaven (beatitudo).¹ Basing its teaching on Sacred Scripture,² the Council of Trent declares that man is free to do good propter retributionem, i. e., for the sake of gaining a reward.³ But may he do good to be happy?

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, Confessiones, l. X, c. 22: " This is the happy life: to rejoice concerning You, toward You, and because of You; this is it, and there is no other. But those who think that it is something else pursue another joy, and not the true one. Yet their will is not turned away from some image of joy." — Ibid., c. 23, n. 33: "For the happy life is joy in the truth. For this is joy in You, who are the truth." —St. Ignatius Loyola says: "Man was created that he might praise the Lord our God, show Him reverence, and through these things save his soul." (Lib. Exercit.). — Cfr. E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. I, Paris 1904, pp. 45 sqq.—J. S. Vaughan, Happiness and Beauty, London 1913.

² Ps. CXVIII, 112 (Vulg.): "I have inclined my heart to perform Your justifications forever, for the sake of reward." (Cfr. G. Hoberg, Die Psalmen der Vulgata, Freiburg 1892, p. 351). —Heb. XI, 26: "For (Moses) looked to the reward."

³ Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, c. 11. — On man's true happiness see St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 1 sqq.; V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, pp. 81 sqq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 78 sqq.; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, London 1908, pp. 6 sqq.

The Catholic Church has been accused of Eudemonism or Hedonism for answering this question in the affirmative. We are told that the desire for happiness is a mean motive, incompatible with the idea of perfect morality. 1. The Stoics and the followers of Kant⁴ assert that any system of ethics that commands men to do good, not because it is a duty, but in order to obtain a reward, is egoistic and unworthy of a true philosopher. This is a very plausible objection, yet it has absolutely no basis in fact. Those who raise it misunderstand human nature. Man is so constituted that he cannot truly desire anything which does not afford him interior satisfaction. Whatever he may do or omit, he is in a certain sense always seeking his own happiness. Even the wicked sin to be happy.⁵ When a man desires something for others, he does not desire it purely for their sake, but partly also because the desired object has some value for himself. In this sense the desire for happiness and egoism are necessary constituents of every human act. A wholly unselfish act of the will, i. e., one in no way related to the personal satisfaction or happiness of the agent, is impossible. Even the so-called unselfish love that causes men to make sacrifices for others or for the sake of ideals, is not entirely free from "selfishness," because when man makes a sacrifice, he does it for his own satisfaction as well as for the sake of others.

⁴ On Kant's ethical teaching see K. Fischer, Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. IV, 3rd ed., Munich 1882; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 115-119, London 1908; Wm. Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 540 sqq., Boston 1903. —For a refutation of Kant see C. Didio, Die moderne Moral und ihre Grundprinzipien, Freiburg 1896, pp. 64 sqq.; Ph. Kneib, Die "Lohnsucht" der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904, pp. 7 sqq.; IDEM, Die "Jenseitsmoral," pp. 6 sq. and 109 sqq.; Schneider, Göttliche Weltordnung, 2nd ed., pp. 517 sqq. —On Eudaemonism cfr. F. J. Stein, Historischkritische Darstellung der pathologischen Moralprinzipien, 2nd ed., Würzburg 1879, pp. 55 sqq.; J. Holtzmann, Moderne Sittlichkeitstheorien und christliches Lebensideal, Strassburg 1907; Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 369 sq.; Vol. VI, p. 640; Vol. VII, p. 132.

⁵ St. Augustine, Serm. in Ps., CXVIII, 1, n. 1: "Happiness, which there is no one who does not seek. For who ever can be found, or could have been found, or will be found, who does not wish to be happy? ... Indeed, to be happy is so great a good that both the good and the wicked desire it. It is no wonder that the good are good for this reason; but what is wonderful is that even the wicked are wicked for this reason: that they may be happy. For whoever, given over to lusts, is corrupted by luxury and debauchery, seeks happiness in this evil and considers himself miserable when he does not attain the pleasure and delight of his concupiscence, but does not hesitate to proclaim himself happy when he attains it. And whoever burns with the torches of avarice gathers riches in whatever way he can for this purpose, that he may be happy; ... in all crimes he seeks happiness." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1501 sq.) IDEM, Serm. in Ps., CL, c. 3, n. 4: "For even he who is good is good for this reason, that he may be happy; and he who is wicked would not be wicked unless he hoped that through it he could be happy." (ibid., XXXVIII, 809).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 29, art. 4.

Moreover, man's will and destiny are inseparable from his nature because it is of the very essence of the will to desire and tend towards beatitude, which, being "a state made perfect by the aggregate sum of all things good,"⁶ is identical with God as the sovereign good and source of all goodness. Now if God and eternal happiness are synonymous terms, it is perfectly consistent to be good in order to attain eternal happiness, and there is no sense in inculcating "pure" duties, i. e., such as abstract entirely from the motive of self-love. Therefore, whilst we do not deny that Catholic moral teaching, like every other rational system of ethics, contains a eudaemonistic element, nay even a strain of "egoism," ⁷ we must insist that this admixture is justifiable and supplies a most effective antidote against precisely that false egotism which our enemies charge against us, inasmuch as it emphasizes true charity (love of God and neighbor).⁸ We claim that the moral teaching of Christ effectively reconciles and combines altruism with egoism.

⁶ "Status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus" (Boethius). — St. Thomas, Summa c. Gent., l. II, c. 48, n. 3; IDEM, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 26, art. 1, ad 1; 1a 2ae, qu. 3, art. 2, ad 2. —Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God, the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 190 sqq.; God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 93 sqq.

⁷ Cfr. S. Huber, Die Glückseligkeitslehre des Aristoteles und des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Freising 1893; C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Religion, pp. 158 sqq.; C. Didio, Die moderne Moral, Freiburg 1896, pp. 21 sqq.; B. Peters, Die christlichen Begriffe der Sittlichkeit und Seligkeit, Münster 1902.

⁸ Cfr. Matth. XXII, 37-39-

2. Certain Quietists and pseudo-mystics denounced the habit of doing good for the sake of obtaining an eternal reward as at best an imperfect virtue, and demanded an absolutely unselfish and disinterested love (amour désintéressé), which expects no reward and would even surrender its claim to eternal beatitude if God so willed. This is construing an imaginary opposition between God as the highest, and eternal happiness as a merely secondary good.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, St. Louis 1917, pp. 136 sq.; H. Heppe, Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik, Berlin 1875; E. A. Pace in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 608 sqq.

Such teaching is philosophically untenable and opposed to Revelation. Sacred Scripture again and again exhorts men to strive for eternal happiness and promises the joys of Heaven as a reward for obeying the law of God.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cfr. Matth. V, 12, 46; X, 41 sq.; Luke VI, 23, 32-35.

If God did not reward virtue, He would be unjust, the moral order would hang in the air, and the so-called moral law would be nothing but the fiat of an absolutistic tyrant, and consequently immoral.

The proper character and usefulness of our Moral Theology seem to us to be manifested, or at least intimated, by the very title with which it is inscribed.

For we promise Principles, Responses, and Counsels.

Principles cannot be handed down without an intrinsic examination of causes.

By Responses, cases are to be solved clearly, for the necessary and prudent instruction of practice.

Finally, Counsels are given concerning the better good. Wherefore our solicitude will not be only about weighing sins which are to be avoided; but it will also extend itself to the positive part of Christian justice, to be explained and recommended.

Written wholly after the Code, the book will more easily be accommodated to the present norms of law than treatises which have merely been revised after the Code. That it may serve use the more, it seemed good to set down the usefulness of the argument before chapters or titles; moreover summaries will be subjoined to the individual chapters, which will present a brief repetition of the chapter.

With the kindly work of friends expert in these matters having been brought in, in treatises which must be completed by the ordinances of civil laws, we shall be able, and shall not neglect, briefly to sketch not only Latin law but also American, English, and German law; in liturgical and disciplinary institutes, the historical beginnings of the present discipline and its successive preparations.

The public apostasy of the nations corrupts not only the intellect, but also the morals of men. From the flood of neo-paganism those must be preserved whose light, as the Lord admonishes ¹, ought so to shine before men that from their good works the heavenly Father may be glorified.

May it be possible, with the help of God's grace, that this work of ours, such as it is, contribute something to the sublime end of the divine glory!

Rome, on the sacred day of Pentecost, June 4, 1922.

¹ Gospel of St. Matthew, 5, 16.

I. Fundamental Theology.

II. On the Duties of the Virtues.

III. (Canonical-liturgical and moral) On the Precepts of the Church and the Sacraments.

IV. Special Treatise on Chastity and the Opposed Vices.

There is no true science if its object is presented to the mind only confusedly. But a distinct setting forth of the object to be investigated, of the method to be employed, and of the comparison with related sciences, no less than a clear image of the material thing itself to be considered and of its location in space, wonderfully assists both the intellect and the memory.

Moral theology, or practical theology ¹, is defined by us as: The science which, from the articles of faith, regulates for man elevated and repaired his own human acts.

The definition is explained. a) "Science" signifies the systematic proposition and rational deduction of conclusions from principles known through themselves. But since the principles of theology are not known to us through themselves, but are divinely revealed, theological science is, under this respect, in us only imperfectly and defectively.

Does not this very science, of a diminished name, seem to be lacking in books which omit binding their conclusions to principles by an internal connection, and pursue almost this one thing: that, after various opinions have been cited, they may demonstrate by the enumeration itself which are common, which at least probable?

b) "Which, from the articles of Faith." Articles of Faith, strictly, "are divinely credible things, which both are explicitly revealed and cannot be deduced from others prior to them" ¹. Moreover, in the articles which are referred to use or practice, moral theology finds its first principles and hence its formal object.

The other articles of Faith, that is, the speculative ones, found dogmatic theology. But since each theology, speculative and practical, assumes the articles of Faith as revealed and believed, so that in each there is one ultimate motive of assent, each has the same formal object. Therefore dogmatic theology and moral theology are not to be proposed as two sciences specifically distinct and coming together into one genus, which would be Theology; rather they must be called two integral parts of one divine science.

The matter is otherwise in rational sciences, which are drawn out from first principles known through themselves. Then each set of principles possesses its own proper evidence; the habit of first speculative principles is not the same as the habit of operable principles; a man most apt for metaphysical matters can be found almost unfit for discerning moral matters; whereas all the articles of Faith are believed by acts of the same habit of faith with equal ease or difficulty. Wherefore ethics, or the natural science of morals, differs formally or specifically from theodicy, or the natural science of God.

Nevertheless, since in gathering conclusions we use our own reason, we by no means deny that it can happen, and that the matter is not infrequent, that one who is a distinguished expositor of dogmatic theology may stumble in moral theology.

c) "Regulates." By this word we assign to moral theology its proximate object, which is the scientific proposition of practical dictates or statements. But a practical dictate is a speculative-practical judgment ² by which pronouncement is made concerning some more general principle or concerning an application to a particular case: that principle is right or perverse; that action must be done, or can be done, or is forbidden.

Concerning a principle, I say, as when it is said that damage unjustly inflicted must be repaired; or when it is denied that dishonest means can be purified by the goodness of the end. Concerning an application, as when it is declared: a precept given in these circumstances is to be executed; such a walk or such a transaction is licit; the usurpation of such a temporal thing is to be marked with the vice of theft.

d) "For man elevated and repaired," that is, for man in his present condition, who, by the gratuitous benefit of God, was called to a supernatural order and end, was miserably cast down from that noble state by the sin of Adam, and finds in Christ, the new Adam, a new Father by whom he is regenerated and is reformed more wonderfully than he had been created. Contrary, therefore, to Ethics, which imagines man as he could have been but never was and never will be, moral theology considers man as he truly is in reality. Thus moral theology alone is the absolutely prior science of morals.

The definition, however, could have omitted express mention of the subject for whom the studies of moral theology were destined. For that subject's being man elevated and hence repaired was already established from the fact that the rules of moral theology were taken from the articles of faith. For articles of faith could have been revealed for no other man than man elevated; practical dictates can be gathered from the articles of faith for no other man than man elevated and repaired.

Our definition, as to the matter itself, is not different from others by which moral theology is said to be the science concerning human acts insofar as they have an order to a supernatural end. Cf., for example, Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., Prolegomena.

e) "His own human acts," that is, acts which are sufficiently in man's power that practical dictates concerning them may usefully be sought, or, what is the same thing, that they can and ought to be regulated.

Human acts, therefore, are the remote material object of moral theology; human acts to be regulated, or their "regulation," are the proximate material object of the same science.

¹ The very word theology for a long time signified various things, for example, Sacred Scripture itself or the divine page. Sources are indicated by de Ghellinck, S.J., Le mouvement theologique du XIIe siecle, p. 66.

¹ Desan, S.J., De Deo, n. 7.

² It is called speculative-practical because it is remotely ordered to practice, and therefore is still speculative, insofar as it does not yet regard an action to be done here and now.

In what way moral theology is distinguished from the sciences related to it is gathered without difficulty from the definition itself.

It is distinguished from Dogmatic Theology by the difference of the material object, as has been said.

It is separated from Ethics both by its end and by its formal object. For Ethics considers a hypothetical and fictive direction to a natural end; moreover, it employs its principles as evident or demonstrated by reason, whereas moral theology, even when its own principles seem materially the same as those of ethics, assumes them as revealed or confirmed by revelation. And although moral theology itself also makes much use of natural reasoning, it does this only because we know that the supernatural order is not the overthrow of the natural order, but its perfection; so that the inchoate goodness of an action considered naturally cannot be neglected by us, nor can an action naturally evil become supernaturally good.

It indeed cannot be denied that the direct use of the revealed source becomes far less in moral theology than in dogmatic theology; this is sufficiently explained by the very material object of each part of divine science. For dogmatic theology has as its end the scientific exposition of Faith; it proposes truths which, at least for the most part, are inaccessible to human reason, or concerning which definitions of the ecclesiastical magisterium are usually made; then, because it is a merely speculative science, it abstracts from the man who must believe the dogmas. On the contrary, moral theology, since it regulates human actions, can prescind neither from the agent nor from his nature. But the laws of human nature, which are not to be violated, but are fulfilled more sublimely by a more dignified subject, that is, by man elevated, are accessible to reason itself and are not, for the most part, revealed in particular. Wherefore their demonstration enters moral theology itself. Thus many precepts are materially common to the natural order and to the supernatural order. Some, indeed, are proper to the present order of elevated nature; yet these also are observed by an acting man, who, according to the fundamental laws of his nature, must obey every divine law. Wherefore, if revelation proposes new objects to our action, our action always belongs to our nature, sane but normally informed and strengthened by grace. But those objects themselves, that is, dogmas to be believed, sacraments to be administered and received, are, as it were, loaned to moral theology by dogmatic theology. Besides, when it touches an object which is revealed only accidentally, or which is known to reason, then dogmatic theology itself has many things in common with human science. Thus, in the treatise on the one God, dogmatic theology is scarcely distinguished materially from theodicy. But what rarely happens in dogmatic theology is wont to happen in moral theology.

Therefore there is no other science which makes so manifest what we were just recalling: that human nature is by no means destroyed by grace, but is elevated.

There are not a few questions common to canonists and moralists; but canon law directly regards laws, partly divine and partly human, of ecclesiastical society; and it observes human acts, at least exterior acts (of internal acts the praetor does not judge), under the respect of the external forum, or insofar as they agree with or differ from the laws of visible society. On the contrary, moral theology considers ecclesiastical laws only insofar as, by obliging conscience, they become a rule of human acts. Cf. Wernz, Ius Decretalium, I, n. 57.

We have deliberately described moral theology in such a way that it would not exclude the ascetical and mystical parts. Can a rule of morals be called complete which neglects more perfect things, and is in no way solicitous concerning the special communication of God with his creature? Indeed, can neglect of the study of the more perfect be composed with perfect honesty ¹? For this reason, in the very title of the present work, we judged that counsels must be added to moral responses. They are indeed accustomed to say that in moral theology, taken more strictly, there is defined what is licit and what is forbidden, while ascetical and mystical discipline are solicitous about perfection. We place the distinction rather in this: that ascetical and mystical discipline are not content with the notion of more perfect actions, but inquire into the ways of pursuing those more perfect things, and thus approach a certain spiritual art.

Ascetical discipline itself, insofar as it is distinguished from mystical discipline, is concerned with the ordinary means of acquiring Christian perfection, while mystical discipline investigates the more sublime and less ordinary ways by which the soul is led to special union with God.

¹ Wherefore rightly and deservedly the periodical booklet La vie spirituelle, from its first beginning, vindicated the place of ascetical science in moral theology.

Place and dignity of moral theology. The comparison made also teaches us in what place and rank moral theology is to be put among the sciences.

For it is manifest through itself that moral theology surpasses the human sciences both by its end and by its object.

As to the sacred sciences, the dogmatic part of theological science excels the moral, insofar as it regards higher truths upon which, as foundations, moral theology rests; and it has God, not only, as does every theology, as the subject of attribution (or that to which all things are referred), but also as its principal material object. Yet in a certain respect the practical part excels the speculative, on account of the greater use which it has in the very ordering to the end of eternal life.

To ascetical theology, moral theology more strictly so called is related as a subalternating science, since ascetical theology must borrow its principles from moral theology; yet the end of ascetical theology is accidentally, or by degree, more sublime, at least insofar as it is more directly solicitous about perfection.

Both by its more noble proximate end, by which it intends rectitude before God, and by the source whence it draws its chief conclusions, and by the very breadth and universality of its object, moral theology is more excellent than canon law.

Pastoral theology instructs sacred ministers concerning their duties, and forms the same ministers for rightly undertaking their offices. And because pastoral theology insists upon the very way by which the salvation of souls will be better procured, rather than upon science, it must be called an art, just as ascetical discipline itself. But ascetical discipline makes a man solicitous concerning his own perfection, while pastoral discipline makes the sacred minister solicitous concerning the salvation and perfection of others. Yet neither the duties of pastors nor the rules of prudently administering the sacraments are passed over in moral theology. Wherefore pastoral discipline enters moral theology almost as a part, especially that moral theology which adds counsels to responses, so that it seems to differ from moral theology almost only by a fuller exposition of matters.

1. We have distinguished juridical discipline from moral discipline; yet we do not want them so separated that we proclaim the jurist released from moral consideration.

But in non-Catholic schools today there are not lacking supporters of a divorce of this kind, which conceives the province assigned to the jurist in approximately this way.

2. To the science of law there are offered for investigation the norms by which the exterior action of men in the society about which the discussion is being made is coercively directed. By these rules the life of the people is in fact imbued, so that their force and efficacy can be measured.

What then will the science of law do? It will try to reduce all the rules concerning individual objects to some synthetic unity, so that by this effort it may arrive at a certain abstract definition which virtually contains the various rules, and from which, consequently, they can be deduced. Thus there will be composed, for example, the abstract notion of the State, of the Family, of Property, such as can be defined in our age in Italy, in France, in Germany, in Europe.

This is the proper work of the jurist. He ignores metaphysical norms as such; he attends only to the vigor which public opinion attributes to them. But positive institutions he judges according to their proportion to the prevailing opinion: he will approve those which agree with it, he will disapprove those which differ from it.

Today all will readily acknowledge that those institutions are mutable and perfectible. Indeed, they think the same institutions are in perpetual motion. But their greater perfection is not to be gathered from some absolute norm to which they become more conformable, but from the fact that they participate in the inclination and tendencies of opinion itself.

Thus institutions which are an image of the prevailing opinion will be proclaimed good by the jurist; but those will be called better which already sketch the image of the opinion soon to come.

Does there exist an absolute norm superior to positive law? Let the philosophers see to that. What is more fitting for such a people? Let politicians effect that. The jurist adheres to the consideration of facts alone.

Indeed, there were once some (rather than there are now) who with Marx denied all force and efficacy of moral persuasions upon juridical institutions. But this historical materialism is refuted by the most manifest facts of every age. It is enough to recall how much the matrimonial regime, for example, has been changed by Christianity.

3. Censure of that divorce. It is certainly in man's power to consider things precisively, and consequently to weigh the relation between institutions and the persuasions of men. And such precision, if it is made opportunely and prudently, can have its political and social utility.

But why the jurist must be content with that inadequate consideration in no way appears, nor is it demonstrated. Who, besides him, will refer the positive institutions of men to the divinely established order theoretically and practically? Since the metaphysical philosopher, occupied with abstract things, is ignorant of positive institutions as such, if the jurist observes only the relation of facts, no comparison with absolute norms will be made, no effort will be made to attain them practically, and that which is at once the honor and the duty of man will be wholly neglected: namely, that in his private and public action he imitate God.

In what way also will you deny to the jurist that, by the authority which he possesses, he should influence the very persuasions of the people, and thus fulfill his own part in procuring common happiness?

What of this, that from the natural law rules must be supplied for cases which were not foreseen by the human legislator? Moreover, common sense itself cries out that from the same law there are many things in human decrees to be condemned and corrected. By what title are reforms of laws demanded? That injustices may cease; that greater justice may reign. Therefore an absolute norm is invoked by all reformers, so that a certain ideal image of absolute good is set before the eyes of all. If that image were fallacious, if it were a dream without reality, we would be deceived by our very nature.

But he who, without respect to a superior law, proclaims good whatever is received among men, will often praise what is to be condemned, will blame what is to be praised, and thus will become a pernicious sower of error.

4. That a divorce of this kind, by which juridical matters are separated from moral matters, has been devised must be blamed on metaphysical skepticism and the present intellectual anarchy.

The province which, in such a system, is assigned to the expert in law could befit only beings which are subject to a fatal evolution. But it is opposed equally to human psychology and to objective truth. A role diminished and harmful to the common good would be imposed upon the jurist.

5. Therefore it is necessary that we hold these things firmly: every true progress is either required by absolute good, or is desirable according to that good. From meditation on that good there arises a greater hope of true progress. Opinion, however, and common persuasions are only imperfect criteria, in which alone we cannot trust.

Besides, we freely acknowledge this: moral persuasions alone do not avail for having or changing juridical institutions. The force also of economic utility is by no means to be denied. Not rarely it will stand in the way of the better good. And if it favors the moral matter, it is rather a removal of an obstacle than a positive element of progress. This formula can be given: progress is made according to the absolute good to which lower utility does not stand opposed.

But in bringing about the happy advancement of peoples and men, no Catholic will deny that supreme direction is in the hand of God Provident.

Concerning the province of the jurist and the various opinions which have been proposed about this matter, let the excellent work of Professor Francis Geny be consulted: Science et technique en droit prive positif, 3 vols., Paris, 1914-1915-1921.

The sources of knowing, from which moral theology must draw forth its arguments, are the same as those offered for use to theology in general.

Therefore the first place is owed to the Word of God, both that which is written and that which has been handed down by mouth.

Then comes the magisterium of the Church, to which the deposit of faith is committed to be guarded and proposed. This is exercised in an extraordinary manner in the solemn definitions of Councils.

Moreover, from the end of the persecutions to the year 1139, or before Gratian, ten ecumenical Councils were held, besides several particular Councils which obtained great authority. For several canons of the Oriental Councils were received universally. "In the Western Church, the Roman, African, and Spanish Councils excel by singular authority, such as the Council of Elvira (300-306) and the Councils of Toledo, likewise the Gallican Councils celebrated in these centuries" (Wernz, Ius Decretalium, I, n. 203).

Afterward it is known that ten other ecumenical Councils were celebrated, if you count the Council of Constance, of which the last, the Vatican Council, has not yet been closed.

The same magisterium is exercised in an ordinary manner in common preaching and instruction. Cf. canon 1323.

Then come human authorities. Approved authors together, as Koch astutely observes ¹, almost like the Holy Fathers, bear witness to the doctrine of the Church for us, and by their own reasonings and conclusions provide for the advancement of theological science. To desert their unanimous opinion would be rash; while he is secure who follows positions proposed by many notable authors.

Among these authorities, as regards our discipline, St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus stand out. Yet they are in an unequal place and kind. St. Thomas, "the illustrious ornament and light of the Christian world," Leo XIII "declared and established as heavenly patron of all Catholic schools" for "the increase of the sciences and the common utility of mankind" (cf. Lesson of the second Nocturn in the feast of St. Thomas). Therefore his philosophy is especially commended, and his principles are to be held. St. Alphonsus "among the complex opinions of theologians, whether laxer or more rigid, laid down a safe way, by which directors of the souls of Christ's faithful could walk with unoffending foot" (Pius IX, March 23, 1871, cited by Koch, loc. cit.). Therefore his practical prudence is commended and proclaimed. Yet no approval and commendation impose the individual opinions of a most approved Doctor. Indeed, after the Sacred Penitentiary, on July 5, 1831, declared that a confessor who, in the practice of the sacred tribunal of penance, simply followed all the opinions of St. Alphonsus was by no means to be disturbed, and pronounced that a professor who professes the opinions of the same Doctor is safe, it expressly added: "Yet without its being thought from this that those are to be blamed who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors."

And it is far from the mind of the Church that distinguished Doctors should, as it were, dispense later theologians from personal study and labor. Koch opportunely cites this saying from Lacordaire: "St. Thomas is a lighthouse, but must not be a boundary."

Finally, Reason must scrutinize and prudently apply the principles and documents of sound doctrine and philosophy. And it is to be desired that present-day moral theologians restore that splendid method by which the great moral Doctors of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century deserved so well of moral science, and that they not be content with ever smaller handbooks ¹, which have nothing in common with the handbooks which the scholastic Doctors of the Middle Ages adorned with the name of Theological Summa for the use of students.

¹ Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, Introduction, § 8.

¹ By these words, however, we by no means intend to detract from the merit and practical utility of summaries such as, with no mediocre art, the recent Fr. Arregui, S.J., and other Doctors have composed. But science of the true name cannot be restricted to works of this kind.

That it may deserve the name of science, moral theology is necessarily solicitous concerning the reasons of its conclusions and concerning the principles to which they are referred; that it may be practical, it must translate principles to concrete cases. Therefore no moral theology is conceived which merely exhibits a catalogue of conclusions, or which is occupied solely in discussing principles.

Nevertheless, according to the principal intention, the method is distinguished as positive and scholastic. The former inquires less than the latter into the reason why; it more dogmatically expounds what the latter polemically defends; it cares less about joining truths among themselves and reducing them into unity. The latter strives to connect them scientifically among themselves.

We shall use a method rather scholastic, yet in such a way that we permit a fuller exposition of principles and polemical defense either to other disciplines, for example, moral philosophy, or to special treatises ² already written by us or to be published.

Moral theology is called remotely practical or proximately practical, that is, casuistic, according as it dwells more upon general principles, or thinks of foreseeing and resolving practical doubts. We shall try to cultivate both kinds at the same time, while after proposing principles we shall not omit to subjoin the principal applications.

Finally, moral theology can be called individual or social, according as it is destined for directing the singular man alone in his private dealings, or is also solicitous concerning man's social duties. And they turn to the fault of not a few who, in our age, have given their work to moral theology, that, being too solicitous about the singular man alone and about domestic society alone, they did not sufficiently study to provide for public society. Therefore we shall by no means put social considerations after the rest.

Concerning method this can be doubted: whether in arguments which also require dogmatic treatment, for example, in the sacraments, it is better to separate moral conclusions from dogmatic discussion, or, on the contrary, whether it is preferable to join both respects, the dogmatic and the moral, in the same school. Each way of proceeding has its own advantages and disadvantages. Simultaneous presentation favors synthetic unity, avoids every repeated exposition, and is also commended by the example of St. Thomas and of distinguished scholastic theologians. Yet again today, because of many controversies, dogmatic exposition must be much more lengthy than formerly, and it is very remote from moral applications. Moreover, different qualities of mind are required in the school of dogma and in the moral school. Therefore, if one and the same professor is ordered to be at once dogmatician and moralist, there is danger lest, according to his special aptitude, he neglect one or the other part too much, or lecture on it less well.

But it is altogether to be desired that principles which are not so remote from practice be explained solidly together with the conclusions.

A canonical-moral treatment of matters which pertain at once to the discipline of law and to moral discipline also seems to be commended. We shall try to accomplish this in the volume on the sacraments.

To the right method of moral theology this also pertains: that it teach how to use moral or juridical sayings or aphorisms prudently, and that it appeal, in their proper place, to the censures of condemned propositions in such a way that it neither increases nor diminishes their force.

We call "sayings" the various formulas or dictates which are frequently appealed to by writers in order, in few words, either to confirm a conclusion or to solve a knot or difficulty. Some are rules of law; others are philosophical distinctions. For excuse, for example, to what is appeal more often made than to the distinction per accidens?

We do not deny the utility of brevity; nevertheless care must be taken lest we increase the force of rules, lest we employ distinctions outside their proper place, and thus lest we seem content with a merely "verbal" solution.

Therefore, concerning the prudent use of sayings, we think these things must be observed.

² We have already written questions on religion, on justice, and a work on chastity.

I. On rules of law. We must begin from the wise admonition of the legislator: "A rule is that which briefly narrates the thing as it is. Not that law is taken from the rule, but that from the law which exists the rule is made" (Digest, De regulis iuris [L, 17], Rule 1).

Therefore they are sometimes called principles, or, at least by philosophical reason, axioms, by a rather improper usage. For principles strictly so called must contain in themselves the reason of the conclusions or corollaries of which they are sources, whereas employed sayings not rarely rest upon a reason extrinsic to them; thus that common saying: in doubt one must answer in favor of the validity of the act. An axiom, philosophically, signifies a sentence whose truth we immediately intuit, whereas several sayings, for example, concerning the privileges of the possessor, need demonstration. Therefore:

1. When the reason of some saying is external to the saying itself, its true reason must be investigated, lest, beyond that reason, we make a fallacious use of the saying.

Let the saying be, for example: "In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act." Since men perform acts, some good, some evil, some valid, some invalid, the truth of the saying is not immediately manifest. Yet the rule must be proved because of these added reasons:

a) Man must employ only that diligence which is human. But it would be inhuman to demand that, without a positive and serious motive, acts once performed should have to be recalled again to the scales. Therefore this first reason already teaches us this correct use of the saying: in negative doubt, solicitude about our past acts can safely be laid aside.

b) In the external forum, matters must often be determined by presumptions. And since acts are for the most part done validly, the presumption by which, at least in the external forum, an act is presumed to have been done validly in doubt, even positive doubt, is just and fair. Yet the force and value of that presumption will vary according to the will of the legislator and according to the efficacy of that will. According to his will, I say. Thus, what before the canonical Code was disputed, the legislator now wills that the presumption for the validity of marriage be stronger than for the validity of baptism. Wherefore, where the baptism of one or the other party has been doubtful, canon 1070, § 2, says that one must stand "for the validity of the marriage until it is certainly proved that one party was baptized, the other not baptized." Yet it reserves the privilege of the faith, because in favor of the faith the same marriage can be held as null ¹.

We added "according to the efficacy of that will." For there are acts which the legislator can render certain from doubtful by his will, whereas others are necessarily left in their objective state, notwithstanding the presumption of the external forum. Thus public authority can render the jurisdiction of an inferior certain by supplying the defect. Wherefore use of probable jurisdiction is always honest, since canon 209, in a positive and probable doubt whether of law or of fact, supplies jurisdiction. On the contrary, no will of a human legislator will be able to supply deficient baptism. Hence it will happen that consciousness of doubtful baptism obliges you to receive baptism again under condition, for example, in order to your own eternal salvation, even though, in order to marriage, it is presumed to have been valid.

c) Finally, if we consider an act as the source of obligation, in positive doubt no simple answer is supplied to us by the praised saying. For if your obligation alone comes to be considered, an act concerning whose validity there is positive doubt will bear only an uncertain obligation, which can be passed over. For this reason a private vow whose validity is doubtful is not to be urged. But if the utility of another private man or a public cause intervenes, many other things will have to be considered, which will be weighed in their own place. The case will have been: a doubtful marriage, a doubtful religious profession, a doubtful payment of a debt.

And thus our inquiry has led us to this conclusion: a saying which must be admitted because of a reason extrinsic to itself does not have perpetual use.

2. Other sayings indeed contain in themselves the reason of their truth, but must be completed in order that their use can be prudent.

Thus, once the nature of ordered charity has been seen, it appears true that "charity does not oblige with excessive inconvenience"; but the proportion of inconvenience must be gathered from elsewhere, so that we may prudently judge the inconvenience to be excessive.

3. Other sayings, even when complete, require that attention be given to the condition which is expressed together with them or understood beneath them.

When we say, "In an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better," we enunciate something complete, which is made true from the very nature of possession. Yet it can be doubted, and is doubted, when a cause is to be called equal. And besides, the very principle of possession cannot exert its own proper efficacy unless true possession is had. But possession supposes two persons who can contest concerning a right; it also supposes a fact, or exercise of a right, which exists, or can exist, separated from the right. Thus one man can possess a field of which another has the right of ownership. Now, neither law nor liberty are two persons. But if you take them metaphorically for the legislator and the subject, the subject, in matter in which the legislator is competent, cannot contest with him concerning any right, but is within the decision of the one legitimately commanding. Finally, law and immunity from law either are or are not: a law cannot be conceived which obliges in fact but not in right, or an immunity from law which is at once moral and illegitimate. For this reason, not a few writers who try to solve moral doubts by considering whether law or liberty is in possession use an argumentation which we call futile, because it is fictive. For there is no possession of liberty with respect to the legislator, and the principle of possession occupies its proper seat in the matter of justice. Cf. Bouquillon, Theologia fundamentalis, n. 296; De Bock, Trac. fundam., I, p. 280, observation IV.

¹ Cf. what we wrote in Periodica de re canonica et morali, X, p. 25.

II. On excuse through "accident." There is very much use and abuse of the distinction between per se and per accidens in moral matters.

1. First, the twofold meaning of the distinction must be attended to. a) A thing is said to happen per se which for the most part, by way of rule, seems to flow as it were from the nature of the thing or from the circumstances; but that is said to happen per accidens which occurs rarely, by way of exception. This distinction is useful, because our human providence generally ought not extend itself beyond those things which regularly happen or follow. Which words, for example, are to be avoided as harmful, insulting, offensive; which occasions of sinning are to be held grave or proximate, before experience, are estimated according to that norm. b) By a more philosophical usage, we do per se what, by our voluntary causality, we effect or produce; but that happens per accidens which, besides our intention, follows because of the intervention of another cause which we cannot impede. Wherefore Almighty God indeed wills some things per accidens, but is said to do nothing per accidens. Thus, for example, to use the classic example, a commander of an army intends to explode a fortress with instruments of war. With the explosion of the fortress his causality per se is ended. But it can happen that, by chance or by the will of another, innocent persons have been shut up in that fortress. The commander, as we suppose, cannot procure that they leave from there or be expelled. The killing of these accompanies the explosion of the fortress per accidens.

From the same example it appears that some effect can be called per se according to the first signification, which according to the other follows per accidens. The killing of the innocent, in the proposed case, follows per se, from the circumstances in which the explosion is made, if we attend to the first signification; it follows per accidens according to the other signification.

Now to speak of the very frequent excuse: if we wish to avoid fallacy, it will have to be weighed what is held per accidens, and at what time of our action.

For per accidens, or because of a concurrent cause which is not in my power, some condition required for the very honesty of the action can be lacking, or the effect to which the action has an order; and it can also happen that a new evil effect is added.

In the first case, whether the condition of honesty was lacking per se or per accidens, the action remains equally dishonest. In the second case the action will preserve its species morally, just as physically.

It is not licit to kill a hare with danger to human life: whether the danger arises per se or per accidens, that hunt will remain illicit. But that food moderately taken is not digested in the stomach per accidens will not morally vitiate the eating. These things must be attended to greatly in the question concerning the use of marriage. Cf. Suarez, De Legibus, l. 3, c. 25, n. 12.

Finally, in the third case, which will be proposed more distinctly later, the action will be honest or dishonest according as you have, or have not, satisfied the positive duty of preventing that evil effect from following from your action. The force of that duty is one thing in one matter and another in another matter, and will be weighed in its own place.

III. On proscribed propositions. There can also be an incorrect use of the judgments of the Holy See, especially those by which certain propositions or theses are disapproved.

For in dogmatic theology the various notes with which propositions are branded are accurately distinguished. For they are condemned as heretical, as proximate to heresy, as erroneous, as proximate to error, or savoring of heresy or error, as rash, as scandalous, as offensive to pious ears. Now the three latter notes, and to a certain extent also the fourth, "savoring of heresy or error," contain no positive and direct judgment of the Holy See concerning the falsity of the proposition itself. Directly, only the enunciation, at least public or open, of a thesis proscribed in this way is forbidden.

Therefore, in order that you may bring a certain argument from authority, it is not enough to recall that the contrary, or rather contradictory, proposition was condemned by such a Pontiff, unless it was struck at least with the stigma of error.

It indeed happens that the Holy See imprints its note upon individual propositions, which is then authentically declared to us; but it also happens that it condemns a series of propositions collectively with various notes which nevertheless do not fall upon the individual propositions.

Then, authoritatively, the individual propositions are affected at least by the smallest note; but which ones deserve a worse note private Doctors will have to teach.

Thus in moral matters, by Alexander VII, in decrees of September 24, 1665, and March 18, 1666, forty-five propositions were condemned "at least as scandalous"; by Innocent XI, in a decree of the Holy Office, March 2, 1679, sixty-five propositions were "all condemned and prohibited, as they stand, at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice"; by Alexander VIII, on August 24, 1690, two propositions, of which one is declared and condemned "as heretical," the other as "scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous"; and by the same Pontiff, in a decree of the Holy Office, December 7, 1690, thirty-one propositions, some dogmatic, some moral, "as rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, injurious, proximate to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, schismatic, and heretical respectively."

Yet very often appeal is made to these proscriptions as though they contained an infallible declaration of falsity.

It is also manifest that condemned propositions are wrongly alleged to demonstrate theses which are not so contradictory to them that the negation of the one is the affirmation of the other. This, however, in moral matters, is to be received with a grain of salt, since the open mind of the legislator can indicate a somewhat broader use of certain words.

All moral theology admits this first division, by which the more general, or fundamental, part is distinguished from the special part.

What general theology of morals contains is easily gathered from the very definition of moral theology. For fundamental theology can be called a certain explanation of that definition.

For we shall have to treat in as many treatises:

1. On man elevated and repaired, or on the subject for whom moral theology is written;

2. On his human acts, which we have said are the remote object of moral theology;

3. and 4. On the rules by which those acts are to be ordered. For a regulative science ought to know and apply those rules. And from the articles of faith themselves we are taught that human acts are to be ordered according to a twofold rule: the remote rule, such as law is, and the proximate rule, such as conscience is;

5. Our deficient liberty has evil acts, which demand a treatise on sins;

6. For doing good acts we are helped by various actual and habitual aids, concerning which there will be the sixth treatise.

Special theology embraces two great parts. One is on the exercise of virtues and the connected duties; the other on the right use of the sacraments. For it pleased the divine munificence to open to us, from the merits of Christ, fountains of graces in the sacraments, and by sacramental actions to help, confirm, and perfect our human actions.

To these parts there is usually added, by way of a kind of appendix, a treatise on the canonical matter of ecclesiastical penalties, since those penalties are to be avoided by our human action, and they affect not a little the right use of the sacraments.

But the treatise on laws, on the sacraments, and on penalties claims for itself a place not secondary in canon law, although the respect is different. Wherefore we have prepared a separate canonical-moral volume on the positive obligations of Christians, on the sacraments, and on penalties, so that it can be useful to each school.

Indeed, the same plan could have been taken concerning Laws in general, concerning which the same reason held. Nevertheless, notions concerning laws are so necessary before the most weighty treatise on justice, and in the whole of moral theology they find such frequent applications - since everywhere natural law is mixed with positive law, whether divine or human - that we have not dared to separate that treatise from moral theology.

Besides, there could be uncertainty concerning the place in which the treatise on Chastity and the opposed vices might more suitably be proposed. Since the right use of the generative faculty is reserved to the conjugal state, its norms are not well grasped before sufficient knowledge of the matrimonial state has been acquired. Wherefore several approach that delicate argument twice: in the treatise on virtues they treat only of carnal vice; what use of the faculty is honorable and praiseworthy they explain in the treatise on matrimony. This division of one argument, this interposition of vice among the virtues, are strange and not without inconveniences. Yet again, a treatise which is wholly moral is not well placed among parts that are rather canonical. Therefore, all things having been weighed, we have preferred to devote a separate little book to that treatment.

The part of theological science which is called moral seeks and proposes practical dictates by which, in the present order of elevated and repaired nature, according to faith and reason, human acts are to be regulated.

II. It differs from dogmatic theology by its material object, that is, human acts, and those to be regulated, while dogmatic theology is occupied with the truths themselves of faith, as such, to be proposed systematically to the intellect; from canon law, by the justice which it pursues, which is justice in the internal forum or before God, while canon law makes a citizen just in the external forum of the Church; from ascetical, mystical, and pastoral science, by the greater extension of the object, which is every honorable thing and not only the better good, and by a more speculative proposition, while ascetical and mystical science, concerned with perfection, and pastoral theology, at the same time inquire into the ways of attaining their objects. It transcends all human sciences, even Ethics itself, by its formal object, which it finds in the articles of faith.

Although the science of law and the science of morals must be distinguished, nevertheless they must not be so separated that the expert in law can abstract from moral truth. Those who preach such a separation spread an anti-natural error harmful to society.

Below dogmatic theology, moral theology subordinates to itself ascetical science, to which it ministers fundamental principles, although by its end ascetical science is superior to it in degree.

III. The sources of moral theology are the sources common to all theology: the Word of God, the Magisterium of the Church, human authorities, and reason. Although, because of its material object, moral theology ought more often than dogmatic theology to appeal to reason.

Among authorities St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus stand out; nevertheless their individual opinions are by no means imposed as to be followed; their commendation dispenses theologians from no personal investigation.

Authorities, moreover, at the same time attest the accepted doctrine of the Church and by their own labor enrich the science.

IV. The method, which can be scholastic or casuistic, will rather be scholastic, insofar as we shall devote labor to seeking the intrinsic reasons of conclusions. Nevertheless our treatment will be brief, because we shall send a fuller exposition and polemical disputations to the special treatises joined with this work of ours.

V. Historical notes. Already in the sacred letters themselves of the New Testament there are many moral parts in which we read principles, precepts, counsels, reproofs, and definitions of authority. The Fathers of the Apostolic age are exhorters; in the second and third century they are exhorters and apologists; then, in the golden period which runs from the fourth century to the middle of the fifth century, they hand down to us the doctrine of morals drawn from the revealed sources, and at the same time they struggle against invading pagan morals. In the subsequent period, the Fathers rather preserve and collect things said before, which then the Fathers less properly so called (from the middle of the seventh century in the West, the eighth in the East) order more methodically, while in abbatial and episcopal schools the age of the Scholastics of the Middle Ages is prepared (from the thirteenth century to the sixteenth). Then, by the cultivation of dialectic (even excessive) and the philosophy of Aristotle, minds perfected moral doctrine by the aids of human reason. The Scholastics of the modern age, who flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, adorned this doctrine, already thus expounded, with a fuller exposition and a more careful application to facts, so that that age can be called the golden age of moral theology. Then, already from the middle of the seventeenth century, because of excessively subtle lucubrations and the Jansenist plague, there succeeded an age which we can name from civil wars, when Catholic writers themselves contended so sharply among themselves concerning probabilism and the administration of the sacrament of penance. The prudent science and labor of St. Alphonsus recalled minds to concord, while at the same time inaugurating an age more practical than doctrinal. It is now permitted to hope for a new golden age, in which, with St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus as leaders, modern erudition may be joined with a greater penetration of principles, souls may be more confidently stirred up to pursuing the positive parts of Christian justice, and the very examination of applications may be completed by psychological observation.

Nevertheless controversies have never been lacking: there has been dispute concerning the value of the baptism of heretics, concerning penance, concerning virginity and widowhood, concerning simoniacal ordination, concerning voluntary poverty, concerning mysticism, concerning usury, concerning probabilism. Present-day questions are concerning "active" virtues with Americanism, concerning the ascetical method, concerning the liturgical informing of piety, concerning matrimony and the duties of spouses, concerning cooperation with modern liberties.

After, in the twelfth century, canon law was separated from moral discipline, nevertheless each science evolved in a sufficiently parallel manner: not rarely the same men were moralists who were outstanding canonists. The Decretum of Gratian came to light with the books of the Sentences; the Decretals of Gregory IX with the Summa of St. Thomas; and now the recently promulgated Code of Canon Law increases the hope conceived concerning moral theology.

Historical facts also demonstrate this: dissensions of Catholics harm solid moral science less than heresies to be attacked; the forgetting of sound philosophy harms it more than exterior calamities.

Moral theology needs both the documents of faith and the labor of reason; applications to concrete cases must be connected with principles.

Today it is necessary with great care to demonstrate Catholic conclusions; to join solicitude concerning perfection with responses concerning things strictly necessary; and not to consider only individual persons, but to attend more to social respects.

VI. This will be the natural order of general theology: that successively we treat of the subject for whom moral theology exists, or of man elevated and repaired; of his human acts; of the remote and proximate rule of those acts, or of laws and conscience; finally, of sins, and of the aids for the right use of our free will.

To forestall fallacies and errors, we have warned beforehand that prudent use must be made of rules of law, lest they be appealed to beyond what the reason on which they rest permits, or where there is no place for them. We demonstrated this concerning these three sayings: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act; Charity does not oblige with excessive inconvenience, or with grave and proportionate inconvenience; In an equal cause, the condition of the possessor is better.

We also spoke of the right use of the very celebrated distinction between per se and per accidens, which can be referred either to the plurality of cases or to causality itself, observing that no excuse arises if a condition of honesty has accidentally been lacking, but indeed there is an excuse if the consequent effect has accidentally been impeded; and that an evil effect which must be attributed to a concurrent cause is not imputed to him who avoided that evil effect as much as he was bound by a positive duty to take care of it.

Finally, lest we be deceived in alleging condemned propositions, we said that the various notes by which propositions are branded must be observed, and the strict meaning itself of the thesis which is disapproved.

Thus we have prepared the approach to the more general or fundamental theology itself.

Usefulness of the treatise. It is helpful first of all to know to whom moral rules are to be proposed and accommodated.

The subject of moral theology is man, in his present condition as a wayfarer.

"Man," I say, that is, a rational creature, a person, and a part of the human race divided into perfect societies.

"Creature": therefore fully constituted under God, from whom he received being, with the absolute obligation of preserving the order promulgated by God, whether in human nature itself, or by superadded positive will.

"Rational": therefore a formal praiser of God, who ought to refer both himself and the world to God.

"Person," that is, existing for himself, or made for a personal end or beatitude, and, by an intimate appetite which shows itself in every pursuit by which he seeks the true, the good, and the beautiful, tending toward God.

"Part of the human race divided into perfect societies": therefore, with his personal dignity preserved, subordinated to the society of which he is a member.

"In his present condition," of man elevated and redeemed by Christ. As elevated, man is called to the immediate possession of God, which is now begun through sanctifying grace, but will be fully perfected in heaven through glory. As redeemed by Christ, he is his adoptive brother, called to assimilation to the Son of God, with whom, as with the head, he becomes one body as a member.

"As a wayfarer," that is, moving himself toward the terminus, or a being not yet perfect, who ought to perfect or complete himself.

Yet do not think that these various aspects and connected functions are opposed or disparate. On the contrary, they conspire into a wonderful unity. To whichever one he fittingly tends, man fulfills all the others. Thus, he who obeys God praises God, becomes blessed, tends toward God, serves society, imitates Christ, and perfects himself. Nor can anyone render himself useful to society in the due manner without at the same time perfecting himself and performing or obtaining all the other things. You may say the same of him who truly pursues his own perfection.

Man perfect in the terminus is man deified by the beatific vision. Man perfect on the way is man who is wholly disposed toward that deification, turned toward it with full will. For the perfection of the imperfect is disposition toward perfection. But man is disposed toward deification insofar as he renders himself conformable to God in that part which it is in his power to join to God or to separate from God, that is, in the will. This now, as we shall see later, is done through charity.

This same thing is shown in another and perhaps better way. In the present condition of our elevation, our perfection is less our own work than a divine benefit to be accepted by us. Wherefore, the disposition toward deification stands in our adaptation to the will of God, which, just as it alone gave the vocation, alone can complete the same by the beatific possession of God. And this perfection is also an imitation of Christ, who taught us to pray: "Thy will be done"; and from the beginning of his mortal life was the most perfect follower of the divine will, according to that saying: "In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do thy will, O God" (Heb. 10, 7).

Corollary. If things stand thus, moral theology is at the same time the science of rectitude, of perfection, and of beatitude.

Man, a rational creature, a person, and at the same time part of a perfect society, in his present condition as a wayfarer, ought both to serve God and society, and to consult for himself and imitate Christ. Yet these functions are so closely joined with one another that, by the formal execution of one, the others at the same time are materially fulfilled. But the perfection of the wayfarer is that he dispose himself to deification through conformity with the divine will. Insofar as it teaches these things, moral theology is at the same time the science of rectitude, perfection, and happiness.

Usefulness. By accurate notions the distinct knowledge of things is prepared for the intellect. Especially to be attended to are the notions of the commanded act and the elicited act, and of moral liberty.

The notion of a human act. An act is called human insofar as it is voluntary, that is, insofar as it proceeds from the will, with advertence of reason, toward human finality.

For it belongs to the specific dignity of the rational animal that he act by conscious reason and will. The acts by which we seem to operate in a way similar to the other living beings have customarily been called acts of man. Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 1, art. 1.

Therefore a fully human act is a fully voluntary act.

In our present life, an act is at the same time human and free. For in heaven the most fully voluntary act of adhering to God, our beatific end, cannot be psychologically free.

For we know from philosophy that a psychologically free agent is one who, all things required for acting being posited, can do or omit the action (liberty of contradiction), and can choose this action or a different one (liberty of specification).

Whether an act can be free without some attention to finality, or to the order of reason; or whether, when only temporal utilities are adverted to, then we necessarily embrace the greater utility: this is disputed. Those who think that this attention is not required admit human acts which are not moral. We, as is evident from our very definition of a human act, rather hold the contrary side with St. Thomas, l.c.; cf. Suarez, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum, d. 1, s. 1, n. 9, 10.

¹ Recently Victor Frins, S.J., treats the matter fully and learnedly in De actibus humanis, 3 vols., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1897-1904.

The notion of a moral act. An act is called moral insofar as it pertains to morals, or to the manner and custom of human life. Therefore acts are formally moral insofar as they give quality and value to life in rational estimation ¹.

According to St. Thomas, the genus of morals begins where dominion of the will is first found. Wherefore all human acts are at the same time moral. Cf. 1, 2, q. 18, art. 5, 9; and q. 19, art. 1, ad 3.

Therefore there will also be a twofold division of human acts: one psychological, by which they are considered in their physical constitution, or as acts; the other moral, by which they are considered in their rational estimation, or as human. A third division, from efficacy, is not common to all acts.

¹ In explaining the notion of morality, theologians labor rather considerably. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 93.

I. Psychological division of human acts. 1. Human acts are internal or external. The former are completed by internal powers, and do not appear outwardly in any way: to think, to imagine. The latter either are manifested by some sensible sign, or proceed to external powers: words by which interior affections are expressed; genuflection for adoring.

Strictly speaking, the act which is called external ought to be called mixed: for unless the will had a part in it, it would not be human.

2. Acts are natural or supernatural. The former are done by the natural powers alone, with the ordinary concurrence of the First Cause; supernatural acts are done with the aid of grace transferring the act to the supernatural order.

Moreover, graces are granted which are called medicinal, insofar as they confer strength for avoiding sins. Yet are they purely medicinal, so that, when they are given to unbelievers, acts consonant with these graces do not transcend the natural order? Many, perhaps most, admit such graces as purely medicinal; we rather incline to the negative side.

3. Human acts are elicited or commanded.

To command is to move someone toward doing something, by intimating or announcing (proposing) to him the thing to be done, as if you were to say: Do this. We can command ourselves and others. Yet others only if they are inferior to us; and then the external manifestation of our will is necessary.

Now acts are elicited or commanded in a twofold way.

a) With attention to their efficient causality, elicited acts are acts which, commanded by no other act, are consummated in the will itself which determined itself to acting: such can be an act of love of God. Commanded acts, on the contrary, are those which, from the command of the will, are effected by other powers, whether internal or external, indeed even by the will itself. Think of the various acts of divine worship which the will exercises through mind and body: prayer, psalmody, inclinations of the head.

b) With attention to final causality, or motive, acts are called elicited with respect to the proximate motive; commanded, with respect to another motive by which the agent is moved to perform the act under its proximate motive: as if from fear you were to make an act of charity.

Since the question concerns final causality, not efficient causality, a nobler action can be commanded by an inferior one. But it is clear that, for the command to be efficacious, the powers for making the nobler act must be at hand, or, in the example alleged, grace for making an act of charity.

An act can be done under its own proper motive, and also simply under a nobler motive. Thus, a poor man asks alms of me. I can bestow alms upon him from mere charitable benevolence; and the same charity can command in me an affection of mercy or compassion, under which, with charity commanding, I bestow the alms. In the latter case the act is strictly commanded; in the former, only broadly, because not mercy itself, but charity alone, is exercised in it.

Moral division. As moral, human acts can be right or depraved, according as they are done according to the order of reason, or apart from or against that order.

They are licit or illicit, according as they are consonant with a law that commands or even counsels, or are repugnant to a law that commands.

They are good or evil, with attention to the proportion which they have to the agent, to whom they can be fitting or unfitting.

We do not add indifferent acts, because, as they are received in the subject, they cannot affect him except well or badly. Yet those acts are called indifferent which, with attention to their object or genus, cannot yet be denominated good or evil.

Insofar as they are referred to another, the same acts are imputable unto praise or blame, unto reward or punishment, and consequently meritorious or demeritorious.

Moral liberty. Just as psychological liberty coheres with the psychological account of a human act, so moral liberty is connected with the moral account of the same act.

This, however, is understood in two ways.

1. In the more frequent use, moral liberty denies an obligation of the will: I have moral liberty of praying, studying, walking.

2. In the less frequent use, it denies an impediment of the will, when, as much as the will itself wishes, so much can it unfold itself. Therefore it denies those several servitudes, more or less full, of concupiscences or of bodily weight, which we have to undergo with groaning, as when we complain that the mind was lacking to us for rising at the appointed hour.

This moral liberty has been wounded by original sin, yet not destroyed. Therefore the proposition was condemned that, in the present state, man, left to himself, would have power only for sinning. Cf. propositions 25, 27 and 65 of Baius, among the propositions condemned by St. Pius V, respectively as "heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous, and offensive to pious ears." 1 Oct. 1567. Prop. 25: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." Prop. 65: "Only by Pelagian error can some use of free will be admitted as good or not evil; and he who so thinks and teaches does injury to the grace of Christ." Prop. 27: "Free will, without the aid of the grace of God, has power only for sinning." (Denz., n. 1025, 1917, and 1065.)

Wherefore the love of charity, in heaven, will be at the same time psychologically necessary and morally supremely free: by loving God there, the will perfectly effects what it wills to effect.

Division of certain acts from efficacy. Not all acts, but not a few, are done less for their own sake than for a further efficacy: thus the buyer and the seller make a contract of sale in order to have the thing or the money. These acts are distinguished as valid or invalid. The former have what is essentially required for that efficacy; the latter lack an essential element. Valid acts themselves are, some, rescindable by human authority: for example, several contracts, on account of injury to the other party; others cannot be rescinded; and this either absolutely, as a consummated marriage, or less absolutely, as a ratified marriage, which, by power divinely conferred, can be destroyed by the Supreme Pontiff for a just cause.

Concerning not a few acts, questions of no small importance arise in law and in moral theology: whether they are invalid ipso facto and from the beginning, and by what law, divine or human; or whether they can be weakened only by the sentence of a judge or by the authority of a legitimate superior.

Not every valid act is licit: for instance, a marriage made against a legitimate prohibition; nor is every invalid act illicit: for instance, a testament lacking form. Yet in ecclesiastical law an invalid act must be said to be per se prohibited.

Various things to be noted. 1. The will, both by acting and by omitting an act, can observe or violate the order of reason. Wherefore, under the name of human act comes also a conscious and free omission, which can be good and meritorious, evil and deserving of punishments.

2. Although we refer human acts to the will, the intellect also has its own parts in these acts. No understanding is mere understanding, no willing mere willing; but each faculty, in various degree, conspires in every action.

3. Nor do acts exist separated as we consider them; but they are prepared in a certain continuous series of actions, and are completed by various consequences. None is without antecedent roots, none without subsequent effects. But no less than physical science, moral science must estimate continuous motion as an infinite series of disjoined or momentary motions, so that in some imperfect way it can know and explore them.

Arrangement of the treatise. The human act is essentially voluntary. In our present condition it is at the same time free, moral, and imputable. Yet per se it is not repugnant to its essence that it be psychologically necessary; and we have adduced the example of the beatific vision. Likewise the observance of precepts was psychologically necessary to Christ. For this reason liberty, morality, and imputability unto merit or punishment ought rather to be called properties of the human act as it is done by a wayfarer. Nevertheless liberty is joined more closely with voluntariety, so that a separate exposition of liberty and voluntariety would be without usefulness and not without inconvenience. Therefore this will be the arrangement of the treatise, that we treat: 1. Of the human act as voluntary and free; 2. Of the impediments of the human act; 3. Of the human act as moral; 4. Of the human act as imputable.

I. A human act, under which name also omission comes, is an act which proceeds from the will with advertence of reason. In this life this act is psychologically free; according to the estimation of reason, it qualifies our life, whence it is called moral; and, according as it is referred to another, it is meritorious or demeritorious.

II. Psychologically it is distinguished, with attention to the executing power, as internal or external; with attention to the subjective principle, as natural or supernatural. With attention to its consummation in the will or in a power moved by the will, or also with attention to the proximate or remote motive under which it is done, it is called elicited or commanded.

III. As moral, an act can be, with attention to the order of reason, right or depraved; with attention to law, licit or illicit; with attention to proportion to the agent, good or evil (in the subject, none is indifferent); with attention to relation to another, meritorious or demeritorious.

With this notion is connected liberty, which is called moral, insofar as it signifies either licitness or human possibility.

IV. With attention to further efficacy, some acts are valid, others invalid. Valid acts can be rescindable or not. An invalid act is not necessarily illicit, nor is a licit act always valid.

V. The intellect does not act without the will, and vice versa; nor do acts exist separately from the continuous actuation of human energy; and none fails to flow into the following disposition.

VI. The reason for the order to be followed is established.

Usefulness. In moral theology one must frequently recur to the divisions of the voluntary, especially in questions on imputation, on sins, on chastity and the opposed vices, on laws, and on the sacraments. It is of the greatest importance to possess a distinct notion of intention, election, and permission; and accurately to separate the virtual, habitual, and interpretative voluntary, or that presumed for the future. The conditions of liberty must be known, so that the impediments of the human act may be better understood.

Usefulness. It is of no small moment, and often of no small difficulty, that a moral theologian, for example in the sacrament of penance, be able prudently to discern guilt, and to judge concerning the value of promises and of obligations undertaken. To this end the present title has been written.

Account and division of impediments. 1. Although we speak of impediments of the intellect and will, nevertheless the spiritual faculties cannot properly either fall sick or be affected by an intrinsic impediment. Therefore all impediments cohere with our present necessity of using the body and material powers even for the noblest acts. And so by the same bonds by which the senses, whether interior or exterior, are bound, the intellect itself is externally bound. Now we distinguish the impediments and limits of free choice in a healthy man, and the impediments which must be ascribed to a morbid state. The former are either common to all, insofar as all men per se experience those states in which the higher faculty, impeded in its act, can make no free act, at least not perfectly; and accidental impediments, such as ignorance, which bring it about that, not indeed per se but per accidens, a faculty, even when unimpeded for its own acts, nevertheless does certain things involuntarily.

Distribution of the argument. Both by age, sleep, and the state of drunkenness, even the free choice of a healthy man is commonly impeded. Moreover various movements of appetite anticipate deliberation, beyond which psychological liberty cannot extend itself.

Hence:

I. Common impediments. 1. A child is not free. For, the development of the brain being deficient, he lacks conscious possession of universal notions.

2. One sleeping is not free. For, according to the varied perfection of sleep, the senses are impeded more fully or less fully. Nor is liberty restored by any dream. For in a dream phantasms are joined in the fatal order in which either they were already previously connected, or by some accidental fact, as for instance by hearing a sound or by contact with a heavy or cold thing; one thing succeeds another ¹; and, the normal communication between the higher centers and external perceptions being broken, consciousness cannot judge concerning the objective state; finally every conscious direction is taken away from the will. If sometimes we seem to ourselves to deliberate and to act freely, we rather dream the use of free choice than truly have it. If we resist an evil suggestion, it is an indication of virtue which, confirmed by long exercise, has phantasms of its own acts sufficiently strong that they are presented together with the phantasms of the passions and of lower propensions. Yet men are accustomed to be led through dreams more by instinct than by acquired virtue. Nor are the commands of dreams completed by execution.

3. One perfectly drunk is not free in act, although the drunkenness could have been voluntary.

4. One imperfectly awake does not yet enjoy an unimpeded use of the exterior senses and of the interior sense. And by those impediments of the senses the higher powers are prohibited from procuring for themselves the supplements of strength which would be necessary for overcoming the temptation or suggestion ². Therefore the efficacy of command is deficient, and a perfect consciousness of things and of self is not yet present. Wherefore, if the respect of moral goodness or malice was not present before the mind, then there will be no liberty; but if thought about a good action or about moral obligation has entered the mind, the will which with diminished strength overcomes the temptation can greatly merit; but if it has yielded to the temptation, it cannot be gravely blamed. For as long as man is prohibited by his subjective state from estimating and intending the ultimate end according to its dignity and with fitting efficacy, he cannot by his own proper act determine concerning that end, so that his disorder is only venial.

¹ Often two recent memories are mingled. A friend occurs; then, with another, a question was raised about a meal: we dream that we dine with the friend.

² Helps are sought by diverting the mind to other things, by renewing purposes or vows.

On non-deliberated movements. 1. In the sense itself, various concupiscences ¹ spontaneously follow sensible apprehension. These are not from the will. Wherefore only the act by which those concupiscences thereafter either are admitted or fostered, or are repelled, can be free. With what obligation of repelling: this will be said in the proper place.

2. The will itself, as it is the appetite of man, experiences in itself spontaneous affections toward all things which also by lower reason are proposed in some way as goods of man. (We call lower reason that which proposes motives drawn from the present goods of this life and of the world; which goods, moreover, with the aid of sense, are represented more vividly.) Those movements of the will, since they precede comparison with the motives of higher reason, or considerations of the honorable good, are not from the will as it is rational appetite. Wherefore those movements, which are called first-first, are outside the limits of liberty and are not governed by moral law.

3. Moreover the will has, even in the state of wakefulness, on account of distraction of mind or the force of involuntary concupiscence, imperfectly deliberated acts, concerning which one must pronounce as concerning the acts of a half-sleeping man. Wherefore those movements, second-first, if good, will be very praiseworthy; if they tend toward evil, they cannot induce grave guilt.

¹ We are not treating here of concupiscence insofar as, according to its force, it makes the use of free choice more impeded, but of spontaneous concupiscences which can even aid honorable appetite: for example, the movement of love toward offspring.

I. Notion. Deceit is not any lie whatsoever, but denotes lying arts employed for deceiving another. Deceit per se begets error; hence its efficacy upon the voluntary is to be estimated. It happens, however, that beyond the connatural force of error an act is made weaker by positive law.

In penal law deceit is the deliberate will of violating the law (c. 2200); and also in the civil forum harms inflicted by the will of harming are judged to have proceeded from deceit; this deceit is thus distinguished from simply blameworthy negligence.

The Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 2, establishes concerning deceit the same thing as concerning grave fear unjustly inflicted: acts done from deceit are valid unless something else is provided by law, but they give place to an action for rescission. Yet they are invalidly admitted to the novitiate who, induced by deceit, enter religion, or whom the Superior, induced in the same manner, receives (c. 542, 1°); for the validity of any religious profession it is required that it be emitted without deceit (c. 572, § 1); the renunciation of an office or benefice, made by deceit, is void by the law itself (c. 185).

¹ For instance, blasphemy (v. 2323).

² If, in order to mock the faith, someone is commanded to dine, drink wine, and then celebrate Mass.

³ If a priest is commanded to violate an interdict in order to empty out the authority of the bishop.

⁴ In certain circumstances it will not be licit to flee persecution, if the flock would thereby lose courage.

I. Man's free choice is finite; and even within its own limits it is suppressed or diminished by impediments.

For healthy men, of whom we speak first, there are common impediments and accidental impediments.

II. On account of common impediments, the following lack liberty: a child, one sleeping, one perfectly drunk. A semi-wakeful person uses diminished liberty, which makes glorious the victory of one then overcoming temptation, but is not sufficient for sinning mortally.

III. As to the ends within which free choice is enclosed: the motions of lower concupiscence, and also motions of the will itself which are called first-first motions, anticipate deliberation. Second-first motions give place only to imperfect deliberation.

IV. Accidental impediments. 1. Ignorance,. or the privation of knowledge, differs from simple nescience and from actual forgetfulness or inadvertence.

a) In the subject, ignorance is distinguished as invincible and vincible, according as it could not or could be driven away by at least moral diligence. Vincible ignorance is attributed either to negligence, which can be crass, supine, or simple, according as an easy occasion of knowing, or merely sufficient diligence, has been omitted; or to the direct will: then it is called affected. The existence or sense of a law can be unknown: ignorance of law; or the condition of application: ignorance of fact.

It can antecede or follow an act of the will; be a cause, removing what prohibits, or have no causality. Antecedent ignorance is called that which is at once involuntary and a cause of willing; concomitant, that which is not a cause of willing; consequent, that which is at once vincible and a cause of willing.

b) Positive laws can be invincibly unknown, and also conclusions not so remote from the natural law, if you except a few too near to the first principle: good is to be done, evil is to be avoided.

The habit itself can produce inadvertence; nevertheless it is not presumed to do this.

c) The gravity of vincible ignorance is estimated from the conscious degree of negligence or of evil will. He who carries culpable habitual ignorance sins as often as he wills to be ignorant and as often as he exposes himself to the danger of harmful error. But the sin is opposed either to a special precept of knowing, or takes its species from the transgressions which are foreseen to follow.

d) Antecedent ignorance makes involuntary; concomitant ignorance makes non-voluntary; consequent ignorance makes voluntary in the cause, but not in itself. Affected ignorance is a sign of a great propensity to the thing for the sake of which someone wills to be ignorant; yet it diminishes or increases the voluntary according to the motive by which the will of being ignorant is determined. Note that affected ignorance can also be praiseworthy, like the reason of every ignorance. In general, ignorance at least diminishes the voluntary.

e) What it effects in the voluntary it effects also in merit or demerit.

f) Canonical penalties, though for the most part not likewise civil penalties, are diminished or even taken away on account of ignorance of law. Affected ignorance excuses from no penalty; all non-affected ignorance excuses if the law has the words "shall have presumed," etc., or similar words; simple ignorance, but not crass ignorance, excuses from medicinal penalties latae sententiae.

g) Insofar as voluntariness is required for validity, for the same reason ignorance will be able to obstruct the validity of an act.

h) What has been said about habitual ignorance holds also concerning inadvertence.

The science of Medicine is progressive; genius irradiates its onward march. Few other sciences have advanced as rapidly as it has done within the last half century. Hence it has happened that in many of its branches text-books have not kept pace with the knowledge of its leading minds. Such is confessedly the case in the department of Medical Jurisprudence. This very term, Medical Jurisprudence, as now used in colleges, is generally acknowledged to be a misnomer. There is no reason why it should be so used. The leading medical writers and practitioners are sound at present on the moral principles that ought to direct the conduct of physicians. It is high time that their principles be more generally and distinctly inculcated on the younger members, and especially on the students of their noble profession. To promote this object is the purpose aimed at by the author. His brief volume is not intended to be substituted for existing text-books on Medical Jurisprudence, but to supply some chapters imperatively demanded by science for the thorough treatment of this important subject.

Gentlemen:—When I thoughtfully consider the subject on which I am to address you in this course of lectures, i.e., Medical Jurisprudence, I am deeply impressed with the dignity and the importance of the matter.

The study of medicine is one of the noblest pursuits to which human talent can be devoted. It is as far superior to geology, botany, entomology, zoölogy, and a score of kindred sciences as its subject, the body of man, the visible lord of the creation, is superior to the subject of all other physical sciences, which do so much honor to the power of the human mind; astronomy, which explores the vast realms of space, traces the courses and weighs the bulks of its mighty orbs; chemistry, which analyzes the minutest atoms of matter; physics, which discovers the properties, and mechanics, which utilizes the powers of an endless variety of bodies—all these noble sciences together are of less service to man than that study which directly promotes the welfare of his own structure, guards his very life, fosters the vigor of his youth, promotes the physical and mental, aye, even the moral, powers of his manhood, sustains his failing strength, restores his shattered health, preserves the integrity of his aging faculties, and throughout his whole career supplies those conditions without which both enjoyment and utility of life would be impossible.

The physician, indeed, is one of the most highly valued benefactors of mankind. Therefore he has ever been held in honor among his fellow-men; by barbarous tribes he is looked upon as a connecting link between the visible and the invisible world; in the most civilized communities, from the time of Hippocrates, the father of medicine, to the present day, he has been held in deeper veneration than the members of almost any other profession; even in the sacred oracles of Revelation his office is spoken of with the highest commendation: “Honor the physician,” writes the inspired penman, “for the need thou hast of him; for the Most High hath created him. The skill of the physician shall lift up his head, and in the sight of great men he shall be praised. The Most High has created medicines out of the earth, and a wise man shall not abhor them. The virtue of these things is come to the knowledge of men, and the Most High has given knowledge to men, that He may be honored in His wonders. By these He shall cure and shall allay their pains, and of these the apothecary shall make sweet confections, and shall make up ointments of health, and of His works there shall be no end.” (Ecclus. xxxiii. 1–7).

It is well to remind you thus, gentlemen, at the opening of this new year of studies, of the excellence of your intended profession; for you cannot help seeing that a science so noble should be studied for a noble purpose. In this age of utilitarianism, it is, alas! too common an evil that the most excellent objects are coveted exclusively for lower purposes. True, no one can find fault with a physician for making his profession, no matter how exalted, a means of earning an honest livelihood and a decent competency; but to ambition this career solely for its pecuniary remuneration would be to degrade one of the most sublime vocations to which man may aspire. There is unfortunately too much of this spirit abroad in our day. There are too many who talk and act as if the one highest and worthiest ambition of life were to make as large a fortune in as short a time and in as easy a way as possible. If this spirit of utilitarianism should become universal, the sad consequence of it to our civilization would be incalculable. Fancy what would become of the virtue of patriotism if officers and men had no higher ambition than to make money! As a patriotic army is the strongest defence of a nation’s rights, so a mercenary army is a dreadful danger to a people’s liberty, a ready tool in the hand of a tyrant; as heroism with consequent glory is the noble attribute of a patriot, so a mercenary spirit is a stigma on the career of any public officer. We find no fault with an artisan, a merchant, or a common laborer if he estimate the value of his toil by the pecuniary advantages attached to it; for that is the nature of such ordinary occupations, since for man labor is the ordinary and providential condition of existence. But in the higher professions we always look for loftier aspirations. This distinction of rewards for different avocations is so evident that it has passed into the very terms of our language: we speak of “wages” as due to common laborers, of a “salary” as paid to those who render more regular and more intellectual services; of a “fee” as appointed for official and professional actions; and the money paid to a physician or a lawyer is distinguished from ordinary fees by the especial name of “honorary” or “honorarium.” This term evidently implies, not only that special honor is due to the recipients of such fees, but besides that the services they render are too noble to be measured in money values, and therefore the money offered is rather in the form of a tribute to a benefactor than of pecuniary compensation for a definite amount of service rendered.

Wages may be measured by the time bestowed, or by the effect produced, or by the wants of the laborer to lead a life of reasonable comfort; a salary is measured by the period of service; but an honorary is not dependent on time employed, or on needs of support, or on effect produced, but it is a tribute of gratitude due to a special benefactor. Whatever practical arrangements may be necessary or excusable in special circumstances, this is the ideal which makes the medical profession so honorable in society.

From these and many other considerations that might be added, it is evident, gentlemen, that in the pursuit of the distinguished career for which you are preparing, you are expected to make yourselves the benefactors of your fellow-men. Now, in order to do so, it will not suffice for you to understand the nature of the various diseases which flesh is heir to, together with the specific powers of every drug described in works on materia medica. The knowledge of anatomy and surgery, and of the various branches that are taught by the many professors with whom I have the honor of being associated in the work of your medical education, no matter how fully that knowledge be mastered, is not sure by itself to make you benefactors to your fellow-men, unless your conduct in the management of all your resources of science and art be directed to procure the real welfare of your patients. Just as a skilful politician may do more harm than good to his country if he direct his efforts to improper ends, or make use of disgraceful means; as a dishonest lawyer may be more potent for the perversion than the maintenance of justice among his fellow-citizens; so likewise an able physician may abuse the beneficent resources of his profession to procure inferior advantages at the sacrifice of moral rights and superior blessings.

Your career, gentlemen, to be truly useful to others and pursued with safety and benefit to yourselves, needs to be directed by a science whose principles it will be my task to explain in this course of lectures—the science of Medical Jurisprudence.

It is the characteristic of science to trace results to their causes. The science of Jurisprudence investigates the causes or principles of law. It is defined as “the study of law in connection with its underlying principles.” Medical Jurisprudence, in its wider sense, comprises two departments, namely, the study of the laws regarding medical practice, and, more, especially, the study of the principles on which those laws are founded, and from which they derive their binding power on the human conscience. The former department, styled Medical Law, is assigned in the Prospectus of this College to a gentleman of the legal profession. He will acquaint you with the laws of the land, and of this State in particular, which regulate the practice of medicine; he will explain the points on which a Doctor may come in contact with the law courts, either as a practitioner having to account for his own actions, under a charge of malpractice perhaps, or as an expert summoned as a witness before a court in matters of civil contests or criminal prosecutions. His field is wide and important, but the field of Medical Jurisprudence, in its stricter or more specific sense, is wider still and its research much deeper: it considers those principles of reason that underlie the laws of the land, the natural rights and duties which these laws are indeed to enforce to some extent, but which are antecedent and superior to all human laws, being themselves founded on the essential and eternal fitness of things. For things are not right or wrong simply because men have chosen to make them so. You all understand, gentlemen, that, even if we were living in a newly discovered land, where no code of human laws had yet been adopted, nor courts of justice established, nor civil government organized, still even there certain acts of Doctors, as of any other men, would be right and praiseworthy, and others wrong and worthy of condemnation; even there Doctors and patients and their relatives would have certain rights and duties.

In such a land, the lecturer on Medical Law would have nothing to explain; for there would be no human laws and law courts with which a physician could come in contact. But the lecturer on Medical Jurisprudence proper would have as much to explain as I have in this country at present; because he treats of the Ethics or moral principles of Medical Practice, he deals with what is ever the same for all men where-ever they dwell, it being consequent on the very nature of man and his essential relations to his Maker and his fellow-man. Unfortunately the term “Medical Jurisprudence” has been generally misused. Dr. Ewell, in his text-book on the subject, writes “While the term ‘Medical Jurisprudence’ is a misnomer,—the collection of facts and conclusions usually passing by that name being principally only matters of evidence, and rarely rules of law,—still the term is so generally employed that it would be idle to attempt to bring into use a new term, and we shall accordingly continue the employment of that which has only the sanction of usage to recommend it” (Ch. I).

I prefer to use terms in their genuine meaning; for misnomers are out of place in science, since they are misleading. Yet, to avoid all danger of misunderstanding, I will call my subject “Moral Principles and Medical Practice,” and distinctly style it “The Basis of Medical Jurisprudence.”

On what lines will my treatment of the subject depart from the beaten path? On the same lines on which most other improvements have been made in the science of medicine. Science has not discovered new laws of physical nature that did not exist before; but it has succeeded in understanding existing laws more perfectly than before, and has shaped its practice accordingly. So, too, the leaders of thought among physicians, especially in English-speaking countries, now understand the laws of moral nature—the principles of Ethics—more thoroughly than most of their predecessors did, and they have modified their treatment so as to conform it to these rules of morality. Hitherto Medical Jurisprudence had regulated the conduct of practitioners by human, positive laws, and sanctioned acts because they were not condemned by civil courts. Now we go deeper in our studies, and appeal from human legislation to the first principles of right and wrong, as Jurisprudence ought to do; and, in consequence, some medical operations which used to be tolerated, or even approved, by many in the profession are at present absolutely and justly condemned. The learned physician these days is no longer afraid to face the moral philosopher; there is no longer any estrangement between Ethics and Medical Practice. Medicine, sent from Heaven to be an angel of mercy to man, is now ever faithful to its beneficent mission; it never more performs the task of a destroying spirit, as—not in wantonness, but in ignorance—it did frequently before.

On these lines, then, of the improved understanding of first principles, I will now proceed to develop the teachings of Medical Jurisprudence.

The first principle that I will lay down for explanation is, that a man is not to be held responsible for all his acts, but only for those which he does of his own free will, which, therefore, it is in his power to do or not to do. These are called human acts, because they proceed from a distinctively human power. A brute animal cannot perform such acts; it can only do under given circumstances what its impulses prompt it to do; or, when it experiences various impulses in different directions, it can only follow its strongest impulse; as when a dog, rushing up to attack a man, turns and runs away before his uplifted stick. When a bird sings, it cannot help singing; but a man may sing or not sing at his choice; his singing is a human act. When, however, under the impulse of violent pain, a person happens involuntarily to sigh or groan or even shriek, this indeed is the act of a man, but, inasmuch as it is physically uncontrollable, it is not a human act. So whatever a patient may do while under the influence of chloroform is not a human act, and he is not morally responsible for it. His conduct under the circumstances may denote a brave or a cowardly disposition, or it may indicate habits of self-command or the absence of them. His prayers or curses while thus unconscious are no doubt the effects of acquired virtues or vices; yet, in as far as his will has no share in the present acts, they are not free or human acts. He deserves praise or blame for his former acts, by which he acquired such habits, but not for his unconscious acts as such.

From this principle it follows that a physician is not responsible to God or man for such evil consequences of his prescriptions or surgical operations as are entirely beyond his will and therefore independent of his control. If, however, his mistakes arise from his ignorance or want of skill, he is blamable in as far as he is the wilful cause of such ignorance; he should have known better; or, not knowing better, he should not have undertaken the case for which he knew he was not qualified.

But it often happens that the best informed and most skilful practitioner, even when acting with his utmost care, causes real harm to his patients; he is the accidental, not the wilful, cause of that harm, and therefore he is free from all responsibility in the matter.

The practical lessons, however, which all of you must lay to heart on this subject are: 1st. That you are in duty bound to acquire sound knowledge and great skill in your profession; since the consequences involved are of the greatest moment, your obligation is of a most serious nature. 2d. That in your future practice you will be obliged on all occasions to use all reasonable care for the benefit of your patients. 3d. That you cannot in conscience undertake the management of cases of unusual difficulty unless you possess the special knowledge required, or avail yourselves of the best counsel that can reasonably be obtained.

A second principle of Ethics in medical practice, gentlemen, is this, that many human acts may be highly criminal of which, however, human laws and courts take no notice whatsoever. In this matter I am not finding fault with human legislation. The laws of the land, considering the end and the nature of civil government, need take no cognizance of any but overt acts; a man’s heart may be a very cesspool of vice, envy, malice, impurity, pride, hatred, etc., yet human law does not and ought not to punish him for this, as long as his actions do not disturb the public peace nor trench upon the happiness of his neighbor. Even his open outward acts which injure only himself, such as gluttony, blasphemy, impiety, private drunkenness, self-abuse, even seduction and fornication, are not usually legislated against or punished in our courts. Does it follow that they are innocent acts and lawful before God? No man in his right senses will say so.

The goodness and the evil of human acts is not dependent on human legislation alone; in many cases the moral good or evil is so intrinsic to the very nature of the acts that God Himself could not change the radical difference between them. Thus justice, obedience to lawful authority, gratitude to benefactors, are essentially good; while injustice, disobedience, and ingratitude are essentially evil. Our reason informs us of this difference; and our reason is nothing else than our very nature as intelligent beings capable of knowing truth. The voice of our reason or conscience is the voice of God Himself, who speaks through the rational nature that He has made. Through our reason God not only tells us of the difference between good and evil acts, but He also commands us to do good and avoid evil;—to do certain acts because they are proper, right, orderly, suitable to the end for which we are created; and to avoid other acts because they are improper, wrong, disorderly, unsuitable to the end of our existence. There is a third class of acts, which, in themselves, are indifferent, i.e., neither good nor evil, neither necessary for our end nor interfering with its attainment. These we are free to do or to omit as we prefer; but even these become good and even obligatory when they are commanded by proper authority, and they become evil when forbidden. In themselves, they are indifferent acts.

These explanations are not mere abstractions, gentlemen, or mere philosophical speculations. True, my subject is philosophical; but it is the philosophy of every-day life; we are dealing with live issues which give rise to the gravest discussions of your medical journals; issues on which practically depend the lives of thousands of human beings every year, issues which regard physicians more than any other class of men, and for the proper consideration of which Doctors are responsible to their conscience, to human society, and to their God. To show you how we are dealing with present live issues, let me give you an example of a case in point. In the “Medical Record,” an estimable weekly, now in almost the fiftieth year of its existence, there was lately carried on a lengthy and, in some of its parts, a learned discussion, regarding the truth of the principles which I have just now explained, namely, the intrinsic difference between right and wrong, independently of the ruling of law courts and of any human legislation. The subject of the discussion was the lawfulness in any case at all of performing craniotomy, or of directly destroying the life of the child by any process whatever, at the time of parturition, with the intention of saving the life of the mother.

I will not examine this important matter in all its bearings at present; I mean to take it up later on in our course, and to lay before you the teachings of science on this subject, together with the principles on which they are based. For the present I will confine myself to the point we are treating just now, namely, the existence of a higher law than that of human tribunals, the superiority of the claims of natural to those of legal justice. Some might think, at first sight, that this needs no proof. In fact we are all convinced that human laws are often unjust, or, at least, very imperfect, and therefore they cannot be the ultimate test or fixed standard of right and wrong; yet the main argument advanced by one of the advocates of craniotomy rests upon the denial of a higher law, and the assertion of the authority of human tribunals as final in such matters.

In the “Medical Record” for July 27, 1895, p. 141, this gentleman writes in defence of craniotomy: “The question is a legal one per se against which any conflicting view is untenable. The subdivisions under which the common law takes consideration of craniotomy are answers in themselves to the conclusions quoted above, under the unfortunate necessity which demands the operation.” Next he quotes the Ohio statute law, which, he remarks, was enacted in protection of physicians who are confronted with this dire necessity. He is answered with much ability and sound learning by Dr. Thomas J. Kearney, of New York, in the same “Medical Record” for August 31, 1895, p. 320, who writes: “Dr. G. bases his argument for the lawfulness of craniotomy in the teachings of common law, contending, at least implicitly, that it is unnecessary to seek farther the desired justification. However, the basis of common law, though broad, is certainly not broad enough for the consideration of such a question as the present one. His coolness rises to sublime heights, in thus assuming infallibility for common law, ignoring the very important fact that behind it there is another and higher law, whose imperative, to every one with a conscience, is ultimate. It evidently never occurs to him that some time could be profitably spent in research, with the view to discovering how often common-law maxims, seen to be at variance with the principles of morality, have been abrogated by statutory enactments. Now the maxims of common law relating to craniotomy, the statutes in conformity therewith, as well as Dr. G.’s arguments (some of them at least), rest on a basis of pure unmitigated expediency; and this is certainly in direct contravention of the teachings of all schools of moral science, even the utilitarian.”

Dr. Kearney’s doctrine of the existence of a higher law, superior to all human law, is the doctrine that has been universally accepted, in all Christian lands at least, and is so to the present day. Froude explains it correctly when he writes: “Our human laws are but the copies, more or less imperfect, of the eternal laws so far as we can read them, and either succeed and promote our welfare or fail and bring confusion and disaster, according as the legislator’s insight has detected the true principle, or has been distorted by ignorance or selfishness” (Century Dict., “Law”).

Whoever calmly reflects on the manner in which laws are enacted by legislative bodies, under the influence of human passions and prejudices, often at the dictation of party leaders or of popular sentiment, of office-seekers or wealthy corporations, etc., will not maintain for a moment that human laws and human tribunals are to be accepted as the supreme measure or norma of right and wrong. The common law of England, which lies at the basis of our American legislation, and is an integral portion of our civil government, is less fluctuating than our statutory law, and is in the main sound and in conformity with the principles of Jurisprudence. But no one will claim infallibility for its enactments; the esteem we have for it is chiefly due to its general accord with the requirements of the higher law.

There is, then, a higher law, which all men are bound to obey, even lawgivers and rulers themselves as well as their humblest subjects, a law from which no man nor class of men can claim exemption, a law which the Creator cannot fail to impose upon His rational creatures: although God was free to create or not to create as He chose, since He did not need anything to complete His own happiness,—yet, if He did create, He was bound by His own wisdom to put order into His work; else it would not be worthy of His supreme wisdom. As the poet has so tersely expressed it, “Order is Heaven’s first law.”

How admirably is this order displayed in the material universe! The more we study the sciences—astronomy, biology, botany, physiology, medicine, etc.—the more we are lost in admiration at the beautiful order we see displayed in the tiniest as well as in the vastest portions of the creation. And shall man alone, the masterpiece of God in this visible universe, be allowed to be disorderly, to be a failure in the noblest part of his being, to make himself like to the brute or to a demon of malice, to waste his choicest gifts in the indulgence of debasing pleasure? The Creator is bound by His own wisdom to direct men to high purposes, worthy of their exalted intellectual nature. But how shall He direct man? He compels material things to move with order to the accomplishment of their alloted tasks by the physical laws of matter. He directs brute animals most admirably to run their appointed careers by the wonderful laws of instinct, which none of them can resist at will. But man He has made free; He must direct him to do worthy actions by means suitable to a free being, that is, by the enacting of the moral law.

He makes known to us what is right and wrong. He informs every one of us, by the voice of reason itself, that He requires us to do the right and avoid the wrong. He has implanted in us the sense of duty to obey that law. If we do so, we lead worthy lives, we please Him, and, in His goodness, He has rewards in store.

But can He be pleased with us if we thwart His designs; if we, His noblest works on earth, instead of adding to the universal harmony of His creation, make monsters of ourselves, moral blots upon the beautiful face of His world? It were idle for Him to give us the knowledge of His will and then to stand by and let us disfigure His fairest designs; to bid us do what is right, and then let us do wrong without exacting redress or atonement. If He is wise, He must not only lay down the law, but He must also enforce it; He must make it our highest interest to keep His law, to do the right; so that ultimately those men shall be happy who have done it, and those who have thwarted His designs shall be compelled to rue it. He will not deprive us of liberty, the fairest gift to an intelligent creature, but He will hold out rewards and punishments to induce us to keep the law and to avoid its violation. Once He has promised and threatened, His justice and His holiness compel Him to fulfil His threats and promises. A man can commit no rasher act than to ignore, defy, and violate that higher law of which we are speaking, and which, if it must direct all men, especially requires the respect and obedience of those into whose hands he has placed at times the lives of their fellow-men, the greatest of earthly treasures.

I have insisted so much, gentlemen, on the existence of the higher law, on its binding power and on the necessity of observing it, because it is the foundation of my whole course of lectures. If there were no higher law, then there would be no Medical Jurisprudence, in the true sense of the word. For Jurisprudence studies the principles that underlie legal enactments, and if there were no higher law, there would be no such principles; then the knowledge of the human law would fill the whole programme. This in fact is the contention of the defendant of craniotomy to whom I have referred; and he boldly applies his speculation to a matter in which the physician has the most frequent opportunity to exhibit his fidelity to principle, or his subserviency to the requirements of temporary expediency at the sacrifice of duty.

You will find, gentlemen, as we proceed in our course, that Doctors have very many occasions in which to apply the lessons of Jurisprudence in their medical practice. I even suspect that they need to be more conscientious in regard to the dictates of the higher law than any other class of men, the clergy alone, perhaps, excepted. They need this not only for their own good, but also for the good of their patients and of the community at large. The reasons are these:

A. The matters entrusted to their keeping are the most important of all earthly possessions; for they are life itself, and, along with life, health, the necessary condition of almost all temporal enjoyment. No other class of men is entrusted with more weighty earthly interests. Hence the physician’s responsibility is very great; hence the common good requires that he be eminently faithful and conscientious.

B. With no other class of men does the performance of duty depend more on personal integrity, on conscientious regard for the higher law of morality than with the Doctor. For the Doctor’s conduct is less open to observation than that of other professions. The lawyer may have many temptations to act unjustly; but other lawyers are watching him, and the courts of justice are at hand to check his evil practices. As to the judge, he is to pronounce his decisions in public and give reasons for his ruling. The politician is jealously watched by his political opponents. The public functionary, if he is unjust in his dealings, is likely sooner or later to be brought to an account. But the physician, on very many occasions, can be morally sure that his conduct will never be publicly scrutinized. Such is the nature of his ministrations, and such too is the confidence habitually reposed in his integrity, that he is and must be implicitly trusted in matters in which, if he happens to be unworthy of his vocation, he may be guilty of the most outrageous wrongs.

The highest interests of earth are in his hands. If he is not conscientious, or if he lets himself be carried about by every wind of modern speculations, he can readily persuade himself that a measure is lawful because it is presently expedient, that acts can justly be performed because the courts do not punish them; and thus he will often violate the most sacred rights of his patients or of their relatives. Who has more frequent opportunities than a licentious Doctor to seduce the innocent, to pander to the passions of the guilty, to play into the hands of greedy heirs, who may be most willing to pay him for his services? No one can do it more safely, as far as human tribunals are concerned. As a matter of fact, many, all over this land and other lands, are often guilty of prostituting their noble profession to the vilest uses. The evil becomes all the more serious when false doctrines are insinuated, or publicly advocated, which throw doubt upon the most sacred principles of morality. True, the sounder and by far the larger portion of medical men protest against these false teachings by their own conduct at least; but it very frequently happens that the honest man is less zealous in his advocacy of what is right than is the propagandist of bold speculations and dangerous new theories in the spreading of what is pernicious.

The effect thus produced upon many minds is to shake their convictions, to say the least; and I need not tell you, gentlemen, that weak convictions are not likely to be proof against violent and repeated temptations. In fact, if a physician, misled by any of those many theories which are often inculcated or at least insinuated by false scientists, can ever convince himself, or even can begin to surmise that, after all, there may be no such thing as a higher law before which he is responsible for even his secret conduct, then what is to prevent him from becoming a dangerous person to the community? If he see much temporal gain on the one hand, and security from legal prosecution on the other, what would keep him in the path of duty and honesty? Especially if he can once make himself believe that, for all he knows, he may be nothing more than a rather curiously developed lump of matter, which is to lose forever all consciousness in death. Why should he not get rid of any other evolved lump of matter if it stand in the way of his present or prospective happiness? Those are dangerous men who inculcate such theories; it were a sad day for the medical profession and for the world at large if ever they found much countenance among physicians. Society cannot do without the higher law; this law is to be studied in Medical Jurisprudence.

It is my direct object, gentlemen, to explain this law to you in its most important bearings, and thus to lay before you the chief duties of your profession. The principal reason why I have undertaken to deliver this course of lectures—the chief reason, in fact, why the Creighton University has assumed the management of this Medical College—is that we wish to provide for the West, as far as we are able, a goodly supply of conscientious physicians, who shall be as faithful and reliable as they will be able and well informed; whose solid principles and sterling integrity shall be guarantees of upright and virtuous conduct.

That this task of mine may be successfully accomplished, I will endeavor to answer all difficulties and objections that you may propose. I will never consider it a want of respect to me as your professor if you will urge your questions till I have answered them to your full satisfaction. On the contrary, I request you to be very inquisitive; and I will be best pleased with those who show themselves the most ready to point out those difficulties, connected with my lectures, which seem to require further answers and explanations.

The subject of the present lecture, gentlemen, is “Insanity.”

I. This subject belongs to a course of Medical Jurisprudence, because a physician who treats patients for insanity is liable, from time to time, to be cited before a court of law either as a witness or as an expert. His conduct in such cases is to be guided by the principles of natural and legal justice.

Various important cases at law turn upon the question of a person’s soundness of mind; and frequently the medical expert has it in his power to furnish the court with more reliable information in this matter than any one else. At one time, the validity of a last will may be contested, and the possession of a fortune by one party or another may hinge on the question whether the testator at the time of making his will was in sufficient possession of his mental powers to perform an act of so much consequence.

At another time, interested parties may plead for or against the validity of a sale or other bargain made by a person of doubtful competency of mind; or a life-insurance company may be interested in ascertaining the mental condition of an applicant for membership; or it may be questioned whether the payment of an insurance policy is due to the family of a suicide, the doubt depending for solution on the sound or unsound condition of his mind at the moment of the fatal act. Again, there may be a real or pretended doubt whether a certain property-owner is so far demented as to be unfit to manage his estate; or whether he needs a guardian to take care of his person; or it may even seem necessary to confine him in a lunatic asylum. There may be objections raised to the mental soundness of a witness in a civil or a criminal suit; or, finally, a criminal prosecution will depend mainly on the sanity or insanity of the culprit at the moment when the crime was committed; as was the case with a Prendergast and a Guiteau.

You see, then, gentlemen, that important interests are dependent on the thorough and correct understanding of this matter; and therefore much responsibility rests upon the experts consulted in such cases: property, honor, liberty, nay, even life itself may be at stake.

That cases involving an insane condition of mind must be of frequent occurrence, both in the medical and in the legal professions, is apparent from the large and rapidly increasing amount of lunacy in our modern civilization. Wharton and Stillé’s “Medical Jurisprudence” states (sec. 770, note) that in 1850 there was in Great Britain one lunatic to about one thousand persons; only thirty years later the Lunacy Commission of Great Britain reported one lunatic to 357 persons in England and Wales, that is, nearly three times as many. In New York there is one to 384 persons. It appears certain that its increase of late is out of all proportion to the increase of population; and even though I see reasons to distrust somewhat the figures quoted for England, enough is known to create serious alarm regarding the fruits of modern manners and customs on the minds of thousands. This fact makes the matter of insanity very important for the medical and the legal student.

II. Still it must be noted that the responsibility of deciding cases of lunacy does not rest chiefly with the medical expert. In cases of doubtful insanity the decision is to be given not by the Doctor but by the court of justice. Except on very special occasions, as when a physician is appointed on a committee or commission of inquiry, he appears before a court either as an ordinary witness, stating what facts have fallen under his personal observation; or as an expert, explaining the received opinion of medical men with regard to cases of a certain class. Even though he feels convinced that the culprit or the patient is as mad as a March hare, the physician cannot expect that his statement to that effect will be received as decisive. It is for the judge to instruct the jury what kind or degree of insanity will excuse a culprit from legal punishment, or will disqualify a person from testifying as a witness, or from being a party to a civil contract in certain cases; and it is for the jury to decide whether, in the case in hand, the fact of such insanity exists or not. In criminal cases, the jury pronounces on the double question, whether the accused did the act charged to him, and whether he has been juridically proved to have been accountable for the act under the laws as expounded by the judge.

1. To come to a decision on this double question, the jury might need to hear the facts stated which the physician has personally observed, and of which he is summoned to be a sworn witness. In such a situation all that is required of the Doctor is that he shall give a most faithful and intelligent account of the facts.

It would disgrace his standing in society if any fault could be found with his testimony; and, as a sworn witness, he is bound in conscience, like any other witness, to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This is always the case when the purpose of the inquiry is the discovery of the sane or insane condition of a person’s mind. But if the inquiry concerns the performance of the guilty act, the commission of the crime, many States of the Union, as explained before, consider the Doctor’s professional secrets as privileged, just like those of the lawyer and the clergyman; i.e., the Doctor must not use against his patient any knowledge he has become possessed of while acting as his medical adviser.

2. When the physician appears before a court or commission as an expert, he is expected to give the views of the medical profession upon hypothetical cases resembling the one under examination, and the scientific reasons and authorities on which those views are advanced.

3. But here a considerable difficulty presents itself; it is so serious that, owing to it, the weight of the medical expert’s testimony with judge and jury is often much less than could reasonably be desired. The difficulty is to ascertain what really are the views of the medical profession on any given subject. Of course no individual Doctors can put themselves up as representing the convictions of the medical profession, nor can they always appeal to the unanimous agreement of their leading men. Leading physicians, unfortunately, are far from entertaining concordant views on many most vital questions. It is this want of agreement that has made the testimony of experts so powerless to sway the minds of judge and jury.

The medical profession has no organization through which it can pronounce judgment. In fact, many of its most conspicuous members have adopted principles at variance with the deepest convictions of mankind generally; such, for instance, are the followers of Darwin, Huxley, Maudsley, and similar agnostic and materialistic leaders of modern thought.

4. What still further diminishes the credit of medical experts is the fact that, both in civil and criminal trials, they are summoned either by the defence or by the prosecution, and are thus naturally selected, not on account of their thorough knowledge, but on account of their peculiar views known beforehand to the parties citing them. Thus their testimony is likely to be partial to either side, and is distrusted; at least it fails to command perfect confidence. The only way in which the prejudices thus created against the physician can be overcome is by his acquiring thorough knowledge of his specialty, and showing himself on all occasions to be as honorable and faithful as he is evidently experienced and intelligent.

5. The medical profession could be brought to be much more useful to society for the discovery of insanity if we could have here something like what exists in some parts of Germany. “The practice obtains there of requiring the medical faculty of each judicial district to appoint a special committee, to which questions of this kind are referred. This committee is examined directly by the court, and gives testimony somewhat in the same way, and with the same effect, as would a common-law court when reporting its judgment in a feigned issue from chancery, or as would assessors called upon under the canon law to state, in proceedings under the law, what is the secular law of the land on the pending question” (Wharton and Stillé, sec. 274).

The matter of introducing some such practice into this country has been agitated of late, and may by and by lead to beneficial results. Dr. Shrady has taken steps to promote this object by striving to have a law enacted by the New York legislature providing for the regulation of expert medical testimony in jury trials. According to his plan, once such a commission has been established, the court is to send the medical issue to these experts, just as it sends other issues to special juries to be decided. The regular petit jury will then decide only upon the facts constituting the crime.

This would do away with special pleas of insanity before a jury that knows little or nothing about the nature of the disease, and whose sympathies may readily be worked upon by shrewd lawyers to render a verdict of acquittal.

As things are now, the medical expert, summoned to testify in a case of contested sanity or insanity of mind, ought to rise above minor considerations, and promote the cause of justice, by giving all the valuable information that his profession enables him to acquire on the very difficult subject of mental unsoundness.

6. For this purpose, he must be skilled in three departments of science.

(a) In law—sufficiently to understand what are considered by the courts as characteristic marks of an insane mind, and what amount of sanity the courts require to hold a culprit responsible for his crime or a contract valid in its effects.

(b) In psychology—to such an extent that the expert witness can speak analytically and correctly as to the properties and actions of the human mind.

(c) In medicine—so far as concerns the treatment of the insane, and the understanding of their peculiarities, so as to reason from them by induction to the real condition of the client’s or patient’s mind.

But the main requisite for an expert witness is to understand clearly in what insanity properly consists, and how far it ought to excuse an insane man from bearing the consequences of his acts.

III. This two-fold knowledge is obtained by the psychological study of insanity, on which study we are now to enter, and it is the principal point in this whole matter.

Insanity means a want of soundness; he is insane whose mind is not sound, but is deranged, and therefore, like a machine out of order, it cannot properly perform its specific task, namely, to know the truth of things. An insane man cannot judge rightly.

1. Insanity takes various forms, which may be reduced to two kinds, with the doubtful addition of a third kind, namely, moral insanity, of which we shall speak in our next lecture.

The first kind consists in the total want or gross torpor of mental activity. When there is a total, or nearly total, eclipse of the intellect, the disease is called idiocy, the state of an idiot. When there is an abnormally low grade of the reasoning power, it is styled imbecility. The failure or decay of reason in old age is called dotage.

The second kind of insanity is called illusional or delusional. In it the intellect is not impotent; on the contrary, it is often unusually active; but its action is abnormal, its conclusions are false. Not that it reasons illogically or draws conclusions which are not contained in the premises. Very keen logicians may be demented. Their unsoundness arises from the fact that they reason from false premises; and they get their false premises from their diseased imaginations, whose vagaries they take for realities.

2. Here a difficulty presents itself, which we must explain at once, namely, how can there be unsoundness of mind at all? Is not the intellect of man a simple power, and his soul a simple being? How can a simple being become deranged? Can that which has no parts become disarranged, disorganized? I answer, the soul is a simple being, its intellect is a spiritual faculty; and therefore we never say that the soul is insane, nor should we say that the intellect is insane or diseased; but we say that the mind is deranged or insane; the mind comprises more than the intellect; it designates the intellect together with those lower powers that supply the materials for our thought, the chief of which is the imagination. Now the imagination is an organic faculty: it works in and by a bodily organism, which is the brain. Therefore, when the brain is not in a normal condition, the action of the imagination may be disordered. And the intellect or understanding of the spiritual soul is so closely united in its action and its very being with the organic body that the two ever act conjointly, like the two wheels of a vehicle. If one wheel breaks down, the other is thrown out of gear. Thus it is readily understood that mental unsoundness is an affection of the brain, a bodily disease, which may often be relieved and even cured by bodily remedies, by the use of drugs or wholesome food, healthy exercise, fresh air, and all that benefits the nervous system.

Pathologically considered, the nerves may be too excited or too sluggish and torpid; and we have as the result two subdivisions of mental insanity—mania and melancholia. The differences between these two are very striking; as they proceed from opposite causes they produce opposite effects, and, therefore, they betray themselves by very different manifestations; but in one point the two agree, and with this point precisely we are concerned, because in it lies the essence of mental insanity, namely, that both produce a disordered action of the imagination.

3. The manner in which the imagination co-operates in mental action is this. It presents to the intellect the materials from which that power forms its ideas. When we see, feel, hear, taste, or smell anything by our bodily senses, our imagination takes note of the object perceived by forming a brain-picture of it which is called a phantasm. I do not mean to say that it forms a photographic picture of the object; for there can be no photographing taste or smell or feeling; but it forms an image of some kind which it presents to the intellect. This power at once proceeds to form, not a brain-picture, but an intellectual or abstract image of the object presented. For instance, you see this book, and at once you, in some mysterious way which has never yet been explained, impress some image of it on your brain. That you do so is clear from the fact that the image remains when the book is withdrawn. That material image or brain-picture is the phantasm. It is not an idea, though it is often improperly so called. But your intellect forms to itself an idea of a book; that is, you know what is meant by a book. You distinguish between the mere form of a book and the book itself. Your idea of a book is a universal idea, which stands for any book, no matter of what shape or size. Every phantasm, or brain-picture, is a representation which presents its object as having a definite shape or size, while your idea of a book ignores any shape or size. And yet, when your intellect conceives a book, your imagination will picture some particular form of book. If your brain became so affected by disease as to be unfit for the formation and retention of the proper phantasms, then your intellect either would not work at all or it would work abnormally; your mind would then be insane.

4. Now, in an infant the brain is still too soft and imperfect to form the proper phantasms from which the intellect is to elaborate its ideas. A false school of psychology would say that the infant’s brain cannot yet ideate; but that is incorrect language. No brain can ideate or form ideas; an idea is an intellectual or mind image, not a brain image; it is an abstract and universal image, and matter cannot represent but what is concrete and individual. Only a simple and spiritual being, the rational soul, can form ideas. Nevertheless our soul, in its present state of substantial union with our body, is extrinsically dependent on the body; to form ideas it needs to have the sensible object presented to it by a phantasm or brain-picture. Now, a child born blind and deaf, and thus having its mind, as it were, cut off from communication with the outer world, could scarcely form the necessary phantasms, because the clogged senses could not supply proper materials for them; such a child would, therefore, be apt to remain idiotic. And even in children whose outer senses are sound the brain or the nervous system may be too imperfect to allow of its forming proper phantasms. In this torpor of the mind then consists the first kind of mental unsoundness, that of idiocy, or its milder form imbecility. In old age, and in peculiar diseases, the worn-out system may return to a second childhood, then called dementia or dotage. The existence of such species of insanity is not difficult to discover.

5. The second and more common form of insanity, and that which it is often difficult to discover and pronounce upon with certainty, is that which I have called delusional or illusional. Its characteristic trait, its very essence, lies in this, that the insane man mistakes what he imagines for what is real; and he cannot be made to distinguish between imagination and reality, though the difference is obvious to an intellect in its normal state.

St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., ed. G., preface to the edition; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2), Preliminary Dissertation and Appendix, 2; Zacharia, Historical, Didactic, Apologetic Dissertation (ed. Theol. mor. S. Alph., III to VII); Muller, Theol. mor. (ed. 9), Introduction; Bouquillon, Introd. ad Theol. fund.; Mausbach, die kath. Moral; Christent. u. Weltmoral.

1. Moral theology is a part of sacred doctrine. Sacred doctrine, according to the opinion of St. Thomas (P. I, q. 1, a. 7), treats all things under the aspect of God, either because they are God Himself, or because they have an order to God. Hence it is called theology, from the two Greek words Theos and logos, which have the same sound as discourse concerning God. It embraces all things which religion (in its broader acceptance) teaches concerning God and concerning divine things, proposing both what things are to be believed and what things are to be done. Dogmatic theology discusses the things to be believed, but moral theology the things to be done.

This latter part is what we here undertake to treat, with St. Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, Doctor, especially as leader and master, whose "moral theology is most celebrated everywhere on earth, and plainly furnishes a safe norm which directors of conscience may follow."¹ But before we enter upon the work undertaken, we judge that some things must be premised, both concerning the nature, excellence, and necessity of moral theology itself, and concerning its method, history, sources, and partition.

2. Definition. Moral theology can be defined: A science directing human actions according to the law of God, that man may attain his end, that is, eternal life.

It is called, 1. a science: for it is certain and firm knowledge deduced by discourse from certain and immutable principles.

2. directing human actions: by these words its material object is expressed, namely all acts which proceed deliberately from the will of man.

3. according to the law of God: by these words its formal object is designated, namely the conformity to be impressed upon human actions with the divine law; under this name, however, come all laws, insofar as they have the force of obliging from the divine law.

4. that man may attain his end: these words show the supreme end to which all theology is referred.

3. From the aforesaid definition it can at once be gathered how moral theology, according to its nature, is distinguished from all other disciplines which in some way are concerned with the morals of men.

It is distinguished, 1. from dogmatic theology, which discusses faith and divine things universally, in order that it may propose the rules of believing and prove them by fitting arguments; while moral theology itself disputes concerning virtues and vices and sins, in order that it may establish and confirm rules of acting, especially in the internal forum.

2. From ascetical, mystical, and pastoral theology. It belongs to moral theology to measure and define all duties necessarily to be fulfilled by man, and to indicate to him the limit beyond which he cannot pass without incurring the guilt of sin. And hence it is that this sacred science is occupied more with sins than with virtues.

But indeed, the end of theology, both ascetical and mystical, is different: for each discusses much less the sins to be avoided than the virtues to be exercised; each teaches the exercise, motives, and means of Christian perfection itself, yet with this difference, that ascetical theology teaches the ordinary way of perfection, but mystical theology the extraordinary way. But the end also of pastoral theology is different. For this treats of the government of souls, by teaching the pastor how he may withdraw the sheep committed to him from harmful things, direct them to salutary things, and always keep them in the path of virtue, whether these sheep proceed by a slow step through the ordinary and necessary way of salvation, or advance with a greater step in the way of perfection.

3. From the science of canon and civil law; which science hands down rules according to which the Church and civil society are to be governed, while moral theology more generally inquires whether and how much these rules oblige in conscience.

4. From ethics, and indeed both by reason of the principle of knowledge and by reason of the object. For ethics has only one principle of knowledge, and this darkened and weakened, namely the light of reason. But moral theology, besides this slight light of reason, has also another principle, namely the most splendid light of divine revelation, to which there is added besides, as a perfect complement, the infallible magisterium of the Church. It is distinguished also by reason of the object: for this in moral theology extends itself to many more things than in ethics, namely to the supernatural end of man, and to the means by which this end is obtained.

4. Excellence. "Of practical sciences," writes St. Thomas (P. I, q. 1, a. 5), "that one is worthier which is ordered to a further end. But the end of this doctrine, insofar as it is practical, is eternal beatitude, to which, as to the ultimate end, all the other ends of practical sciences are ordered." And hence it is manifest that, just as dogmatic theology excels all speculative sciences in dignity, so moral theology surpasses all practical sciences in dignity.

Necessity. Nor this only; but it surpasses them all also in necessity. And indeed, what science is equally necessary as that which teaches how the supreme evil can be averted and the supreme good acquired? But this, as has been seen, moral theology provides.

Since these things are so, it is clear that this sacred science, before all other sciences, and even before dogmatic theology itself, is to be learned by clerics. "Certainly there is need," said St. Alphonsus, "of dogmatic theology, but there is more need of moral theology. For if this science is lacking, there will be neither good confessors nor capable pastors."² Nor indeed is it enough to have learned this science once. For just as it is the most necessary of all sciences, so it is the most difficult of all. Aptly to the matter the Holy Doctor (Prax. conf., n. 17): "St. Francis de Sales used to say," he says, "that the office of hearing confessions is the greatest and most difficult of all. In reality it is so. It is the greatest of all: because it is the end of all sciences, which ought to be nothing other than eternal salvation. And it is the most difficult of all: first, because the office of confessor requires knowledge of all sciences, of all offices and arts; second, because the science of moral theology embraces so many matters diverse among themselves; third, because in great part it consists of so many positive laws and sacred canons, whose understanding must be taken according to their true signification. Moreover, each of these laws is rendered difficult, since, by reason of the circumstances which make cases dissimilar, resolutions must be varied. Some... say that, for confessions to be received rightly, it suffices to know the general principles of morals: by these, they say, all particular cases can be resolved. Who can deny that all particular cases are to be resolved by these principles? But the whole work and the whole labor is in adapting principles of this kind to particular cases, entangled in so many different circumstances, and in discerning which of the principles agrees with the occurring circumstances; nor can this be done without a great discussion of the reasons which stand for either side. And this is what the moralists have accomplished, while they labored in explaining from which principles many particular cases should be resolved. Moreover, in this our age, as has been said, there are so many positive laws, so many Bulls, so many decrees, which cannot be known unless casuists are read, who have gathered them together, and according as the variety of matters demands, there they are found opportunely; and therefore, the more recent these moralists are, the more useful they are than the ancients."

From this the Holy Doctor infers that the study of moral theology must never be abandoned by the confessor.

5. By method here is understood the form which the treatment of moral theology assumes, or the mode which the theologian follows in treating moral matters.

Now a threefold method is given: the first is called positive, the second speculative or scholastic, the third casuistic.

It is called positive when the dogmas of morals are proved and confirmed from the proper sources of theology, and are set forth in right order. It is called speculative, or scholastic, when the dogmas of morals are taken from positive theology as already proved, so that they may be illustrated by the principles of philosophy and their intimate connections and internal reasons may be declared. Finally, it is called casuistic when the general principles of morals are applied to particular cases accustomed to occur in life, and practical questions, according to general principles, are duly discussed and resolved. Cf. Muller, Theol. mor., Introduction, 27.

That there is in each method its own proper and special excellence is sufficiently known from the definitions set forth. From this it follows that the treatment of moral theology is to be judged the more excellent, the more perfect and universal a mixture of that threefold method is found in it. For the use of this kind of mixed method effects this: that "the dogmas of morals," as the distinguished Ernest Muller says in the place cited, "are rightly set forth, suitably proved and illustrated, solidly fortified against opponents, and also particularly unfolded and explained for practical uses." And hence it is why the writers of moral theology today generally follow this method mixed in a threefold kind. This same method we also shall try to follow in the treatment of our whole work indeed, but especially in the first part, which we shall entitle: On the first principles of moral theology. For thus a solid foundation of the whole moral matter will be laid. Then in the remaining parts, we judge that we must use especially the casuistic method, yet with the positive and speculative method by no means neglected.

6. History. The history of moral theology (the distinguished Ernest Muller bearing witness, Introduction, 211) can conveniently be divided into three periods. Its first period runs from the beginning of the Church up to the time when scholastic theology began to flourish; the second from the beginning of introduced scholastic theology up to the time of the Reformation; the third, finally, from the time of the Reformation up to our age.

I. First period. Moral doctrine, although arranged into no scientific system, nevertheless in all its points, according as necessity demanded it, is found to have been explained, indeed discussed, by the Fathers of the Church and by ecclesiastical authors already in those ancient times; and this indeed: 1. In writings against the Gentiles attacking Christian ethics (St. Justin, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and St. Cyprian). 2. In works written for Christians themselves, in which they were admonished to holiness of life, especially to defending and confessing the faith bravely, to loving enemies and persecutors sincerely, to showing obedience exactly to ecclesiastical and civil power, etc. Cf. Hermas, in the work entitled Pastor; the three works of Clement of Alexandria: Paedagogus, Stromata, and On the Right Use of Riches; likewise very many works of Tertullian; the opuscula of St. Cyprian: On the Lapsed, On the Lord's Prayer, On the Dress of Virgins, On Work and Alms, etc.; likewise some works of St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa; likewise the books of St. Augustine: On Lying, On the Combat of Christ, On the Morals of the Church, etc. 3. In public sermons, in which moral precepts were handed down to the faithful people. Let St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, and St. Gregory the Great be consulted. 4. Finally, in special instructions to priests, such as, for example, the instructions of St. Chrysostom, St. Ephrem the Syrian, St. Gregory Nazianzen: On the Priesthood; St. Ambrose's three books: On Duties; St. Jerome's letter to Nepotian; St. Gregory the Great's Moralia on Job and On Pastoral Care, etc. Among those who, from the seventh century up to the beginning of scholastic theology, treated moral matters, St. Isidore of Seville (seventh century), St. John Damascene and Venerable Bede (eighth century), and St. Peter Damian (eleventh century), chiefly deserve to be named.

II. The second period shines forth with doctors of the greatest name. Their praise is to be placed chiefly in this, that they arranged not only dogmatic truths but also moral truths into a scientific system, using especially the scholastic or speculative method. For those most learned men attained this: that they illustrated by the aid of philosophy all the moral doctrines contained in Sacred Scripture or in Tradition, and all those either expressly proposed by the Church, or at least universally received in the Church, and fortified them with solid reasons against any opponents whatever, and thence drew legitimate conclusions. In this great labor before the rest shone Peter Lombard (d. 1164), Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), Albert the Great (d. 1280), St. Bonaventure (d. 1274), called the Seraphic Doctor; then he who stands before all as prince, St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), the Angelic Doctor; and lastly Duns Scotus (d. 1308), the Subtle Doctor.

But the casuistic method was cultivated no less. For to this belong both the Summa on Penitential Cases, by St. Raymond of Pennafort, and the Moral Mirror, which is ascribed to Vincent of Beauvais, and the Theological Summa and Confessional Summa, by St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, and many other works. See more in the outstanding dissertation of Father Zacharia, on the origins of casuistic theology, etc.³

III. Third period. "The heresiarchs of the sixteenth century," says Ernest Muller, "attempted to weaken and overthrow the foundations of moral doctrine; for these, therefore, to be strongly defended, it was necessary to take arms especially from Sacred Scripture and from Tradition; for which reason, from that time, moral theology, as also dogmatic theology, was handed down more positively, without however the speculative treatment of the same lying neglected; for most scholastics still flourishing in this age (such as Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, Lugo, Gregory of Valencia, Becanus) set forth the sacred discipline of morals both positively and speculatively.

"Casuistic theology was very much cultivated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For the less the innovators admitted good works as necessary for salvation, the more Catholic theologians, with Holy Mother Church, urged the same, and the more studiously they strove to explain the rules of acting well. Very many theologians of this kind being passed over in silence, the following are celebrated with great praises by right and merit: Francis Toletus (d. 1596), heaped with encomia by the Roman Pontiffs themselves; Reginald (d. 1623), numbered by St. Alphonsus among the classical authors, whose works St. Francis de Sales, and also St. Charles Borromeo those of Reginald, commended to their clergy; Emmanuel Sa (d. 1596), highly esteemed by St. Pius V; John Azor (d. 1603), especially commended among theologians for talent and knowledge; Francis Suarez (d. 1617), whom Benedict XIV called a luminary of theology; Leonard Lessius (d. 1623), highly esteemed by Paul V, Sixtus V, and Urban VIII, and endowed with praises by St. Francis de Sales on account of his 'most useful work' On Justice and Right; Thomas Sanchez (d. 1610), held in the highest esteem by Clement VIII and called by St. Alphonsus a most pious man; Laymann (d. 1635), outstanding in doctrine and talent, consulted as an oracle from the most remote places; Martin Bonacina (d. 1631), who is deservedly numbered by St. Alphonsus among the classical authors; Cardinal De Lugo (d. 1660), whom St. Alphonsus says is easily prince among moral theologians after St. Thomas; the Salmanticenses (the theologians of the college of Salamanca in Spain), who likewise are numbered by St. Alphonsus among the classical doctors. Herman Busenbaum (d. 1668) composed a compendium of moral theology, which from the year 1650 to the year 1770, in more than two hundred repeated editions, had been spread everywhere, imitating, as he himself says, little bees, which gather the most useful things from the best flowers and arrange them in order in the hive."

When, in the seventeenth century, the Jansenists poured forth assertions opposed to the sound doctrine of Christ, moral science experienced very sad fortunes. For those heretics, deceitfully simulating great piety and a singular fervor for protecting moral science, brought it about that in France, Italy, and other provinces they drew many learned men to their side: among whom were also Peter Collet (the celebrated continuator of Honore Tournely), Louis Habert, and Natalis Alexander, who, although they rejected other errors of the Jansenists, nevertheless accommodated themselves in many things to their immoderate rigor. Indeed there were not lacking those who defended more benign opinions, such as Louis Abelly, Eusebius Amort, Castropalaus, Gobat, Roncaglia, Cardenas, Viva, Lacroix, Sporer, Reiffenstuel, Reuter, Voit, Holzmann, Elbel, Mazzotta, etc., without however being able wholly to repress the swelling rigor of doctrine.

While these things were being done, St. Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, not without the most provident counsel of God, undertook to write moral theology, that he might accurately and solidly defend the truly Catholic doctrine of morals, holding the middle between excessive severity and excessive benignity. First indeed (in the year 1748) he published the Medulla of Herman Busenbaum, with notes and cases added; but since this work did not fully satisfy his end, he began to elaborate another very extensive work (in the year 1753), in which, with singular perspicacity, most profound learning, and rare facility and clarity of discussion, he treats of all moral matters "which serve more for practice." With what method this most wise man proceeded in composing this work, he himself declares in these words worthy of remembrance (Apolog., 1): "I protest before God that I certainly did not send the Moral Theology to press in order that I might receive from men the name of learned; but the end of this work was no other than the glory of God and the salvation of souls. For the space of almost thirty years I read innumerable authors, both strict and benign, and in this time I continually prayed God that He deign to enlighten me. Finally, I built the moral system not upon my own reason, but upon the doctrines of theologians, and first of all of the prince of theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas; if, therefore, I err, I err with this Holy Doctor. The texts drawn from canon law I examined and noted in the sources with the greatest care. If I found cited the text of some Father bearing on the matter concerning which there is controversy, I noted it with its proper words, and with all the study owed to such authority I investigated the sense. Besides, also in more intricate controversies, where I could not resolve doubts from the authors, I consulted various learned men; and I learned many things by the experience of thirty years of confessions and missions."

As regards the method observed in this work, St. Alphonsus follows the same order which H. Busenbaum held in his Medulla of Moral Theology; indeed, he sets forth first the whole text of that author, to which afterward he is accustomed to add those things by which the opinions alleged from the Medulla are accurately discussed, or confirmed, or rejected, or modified, with very many things also added which are lacking in the Medulla, and which he himself treats at length. Then in individual controversies he is accustomed to bring forward all the opinions of doctors with their reasons, and to interpose his own judgment concerning them, with reasons added. Moreover this work, which while St. Alphonsus was still living obtained nine editions in Italy, was reduced (in the year 1757) by the same Holy Doctor into a compendium, which first was entitled Istruzione e pratica, then, turned into Latin, Homo Apostolicus. To these he added the little work whose title is Praxis confessarii, which had already been published in the Italian idiom in the year 1755 (cf. preface to the edition), and in the year 1764 another brief compendium, which he entitled Confessore diretto. This compendium indeed is the more commendable, because it was written after the Blessed Doctor had already established his moral system in a definitive manner, and because it sets forth more openly the opinions which he holds in practice (cf. Vind. Alph., Preliminary Dissertation).

Finally, as regards the authors who in this century have written on moral matters, it remains for us to say that most of them, because of the singular esteem with which the Holy See has followed the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, have chiefly attended to this: that they might follow him as teacher and leader (cf. Concession of the title Doctor, Response to the observations, c. 4, n. 196).

7. Sources. The sources of moral theology, in the stricter sense, are theological places, or documents in which known moral truths are contained and from which they are drawn.

Commonly the following eight are cited: 1. Sacred Scripture, both of the Old and of the New Testament. 2. Councils, both general and particular. 3. Decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, issued either through Constitutions (Encyclicals) or through responses of the Sacred Congregations. 4. Works of the Holy Fathers, who are both witnesses of Tradition and doctors of truths pertaining to morals. 5. Works of theologians, especially of those whom the Church highly esteems; she attributes singular authority to St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus. 6. Ecclesiastical and civil law. 7. The usage and practice of the Church. 8. Moral philosophy (Zacharia, Dissertation already cited).

It must be noted that, since moral theology is sacred doctrine, some of these sources are constitutive, others auxiliary, and not all are by nature fitted to enjoy equal authority in every matter.

8. In every science, one is accustomed to proceed from general and universal principles to the proper and special object; whence the treatment of any science embraces two parts, the one general, the other special.

9. I. On the ultimate end of man. It belongs to dogmatic theology to institute the question concerning the ultimate end of man; and in truth, among the authors versed in that science, it is possible to find arguments on this matter at once splendid and profound. We wish to note the following for remembrance.

1. The end of God the Creator is His intrinsic glory, that is, His perfection. For the Lord has wrought all things for Himself (Prov. 16:4). In other words, God created all things, not that from this He might obtain usefulness, but that He might manifest His perfection, His goodness, through goods communicated to creatures. So the Vatican Council (Sess. 3, c. 1).

2. The ultimate end of man is primarily the extrinsic glory of God; secondarily, however, perfect beatitude in God. The reason is clear: for that must be the primary ultimate end of man which God Himself intends in creating him and all other things. But on account of His extrinsic glory (that is, that He may be known, praised, loved), God has wrought all things, as Sacred Scripture often testifies. But in procuring this extrinsic glory, man finds perfect beatitude. For the attempts of man are vain when he seeks beatitude among created things, which are not of themselves desirable, nor stable, nor open to all. Man attains true beatitude when especially those faculties which are proper to him are perfected, namely intellect and will. But since intellect and will are capable of universal truth and good, it follows that man will attain perfect beatitude only in the knowledge and love of God. So all theologians. Cf. Palmieri, Mazzella, Satolli, Van Noort, Herrmann, in the Treatise On God the Creator, article on the end of creation. This is the ultimate end of man. It is the noble office of moral theology to indicate both the means apt for the end, and the dangers and snares by which man is surrounded, and which attempt to turn him away from attaining the end.

II. Means to the end; order of things to be said. The means to the end are human acts, by which the knowledge and love of God, in which beatitude consists, are exercised or prepared. Concerning these in the body of the work.

The first principles of moral theology regard the morality of these human acts in general. Since this morality is the relation of a human act to its rule, it is expedient that in this general part each term of the relation be weighed separately: namely the rule, and the thing ruled.

And first, as regards the RULE, it is necessarily twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate rule is the law of God subjectively taken, that is, conscience, which immediately and universally directs the act of any man whatever. But the remote rule is the divine law considered objectively, or in itself; and this is what must direct conscience itself. For conscience, that it may be a right and perfect rule of human acts, must itself also be directed according to the norm of the various laws which God prescribes to the human will, whether directly or indirectly.

Then as regards the THING RULED, that is, human acts, we shall consider these under a twofold aspect: 1. insofar as they are human, that is, insofar as they proceed deliberately from the will of man and are imputable to him; 2. insofar as they are good or evil, that is, conformable to the rule or discrepant from it.

10. With St. Alphonsus and most of the older theologians, we shall assign the first place to the treatise on Conscience, which is the subjective norm of acting; there will follow the treatise on Laws, or on the objective norm which must inform conscience itself. In the third place we shall speak of the matter to be ruled, or of Human Acts; to this treatise we shall subject the treatise on Sins, because the one is intimately connected with the other, and the former is, as it were, an introduction to the latter.

Finally we shall assign the last place, as though to an appendix, to the treatise on Virtues in general; this treatise is useful, indeed in a certain way necessary, that the matter of human acts and of the laws of the Decalogue may be known more deeply.

Surely logical order seems to demand this for itself: that the treatise on Virtues be placed before the treatise on Vices and Sins, since logically good is prior to evil; but since those things are chiefly to be considered by the moral theologian which are opposed to the ultimate end, namely sins, there is sufficient reason why the aforesaid order should be inverted. Besides, it is fitting that the two treatises on Human Acts and on Sins not be separated, and that the generic notions concerning virtues immediately precede the treatment of the Decalogue, which is wholly concerned with virtues and with the offices of virtues prescribed by the law of God.

Therefore the general treatises will follow in this order:

Treatise I. On Conscience.

Treatise II. On Laws.

Treatise III. On Human Acts.

Treatise IV. On Sins.

Treatise V. On Virtues in General.

St. Thomas, Eth., VI, 1, 2; 3 D. 33, q. 1; 1.2, q. 19, a. 5; q. 57, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., 1; H. Ap., 1; John of St. Thomas (ed. Vives), VI, q. 31, disp. 22; Sylvius-Maurus, in Eth., VI; Suarez, in 1.2, tr. 3, disp. 12, sect. 1, 2, 4; the moral works of more recent writers: Lehmkuhl, Aertnys, Noldin, Tanquerey, Gopfert, etc.; Beaudouin-Gardeil, de Consc.; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. (ed. 3).

11. Definition. Conscience is a practical judgment or dictate of reason, by which we judge what here and now is to be done as good, or avoided as evil (I, 2).

It is called: a practical judgment, namely one which directs the one operating in acting; by which we judge, that is, by which without any fluctuation of mind we affirm; what here and now, that is, in the individual case, and with all circumstances considered; is to be done, that is, ought or can be done; as good, or avoided as evil; by these words is expressed the formal respect under which the agent exercises his judgment concerning acts to be placed. For he does not judge concerning the utility or facility of an action or omission, but concerning its relation to the moral law, namely whether it is according to it, against it, or beside it (1.2, q. 19, a. 5).

12. Division. 1. Conscience, by reason of the acts to which it is referred, is either antecedent or consequent. Antecedent conscience is that which precedes human acts, so as to compose them according to the norm of right. Consequent conscience is a judgment concerning past acts; it approves or disapproves, praises or condemns with remorse; it is not conscience properly so called.

All the more, that habit by which the one who is endowed with it promptly obeys the dictate of conscience, and is called a conscientious man, is not conscience properly so called.

Antecedent conscience obtains various names according to its various office. When it judges what is to be avoided as evil, it is called prohibiting conscience; when it judges what is to be done as a good of precept, it is called prescribing conscience; finally, when it judges that something has been left to free choice, it is called permitting conscience; and it is also named counseling conscience, when it declares a thing to be better and of counsel.

2. By reason of the object, conscience is true or erroneous; by reason of the subject, it is certain or doubtful. These will soon be explained more fully. Conscience, whether true or certain, is prohibiting, or prescribing, or permitting or counseling, as was said above.

13. That the nature of conscience may be better known, it is pleasing to note the following.

I. Conscience is an act of the practical intellect.

1. It is an act, not a power or a habit; for conscience is said as though knowledge with another, because it is the application of knowledge or notice to a particular action: but the application of knowledge to something is made by some act. Besides, conscience can be put aside and is easily changed, which cannot be said of a power (St. Thomas, P. I, q. 79, a. 13).

2. It is an act of the intellect, not of the will; for it goes before the will, and signifies to it what in a particular case is good or evil, which evidently pertains to the cognitive faculty.

3. It is an act of the practical intellect. For according to the twofold respect under which the intellect is considered, it is called either speculative or practical. The speculative or theoretical intellect is that which rests in the contemplation of its object, whether the matter concerns fact (that is, the existence, nature, properties, or effects of a thing), or right (that is, law, or its disposition, extension, or interpretation). The practical intellect is that which extends or applies knowledge to work (ibid., a. 11). Cf. Cajetan, 1.2, q. 57, a. 5; Beaudouin, work cited; John of St. Thomas, Logica, P. II, q. 1, a. IV.

From these things it is understood what, in things operable, is a speculative judgment and what is a practical judgment. A speculative judgment, when operations are in question, is that by which the intellect declares that the thing objected to it, in itself, is objectively good or evil, for example, this war is just or unjust. A practical judgment is that by which the intellect decrees that the same thing, the present circumstances considered, here and now, subjectively, can or ought actually to be chosen or rejected, for example, it is lawful for me to fight in this war.

II. Although synderesis, moral science, and prudence concur in forming conscience, nevertheless conscience differs from them.

It differs from synderesis. Synderesis is not an act but a habit naturally instilled, by which we know the first principles of things to be done, for example: good is to be done, evil is to be fled; God is to be worshiped; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another (St. Thomas, place cited, a. 12).

It differs from moral science. This also is a habit of the speculative intellect, but acquired, and is concerned with general conclusions deduced from first principles in this or a similar way: synderesis brings forth the first principle: evil is to be fled; science subsumes: theft is evil, and concludes: therefore it is not lawful to steal. Therefore moral science is concerned with the objective and material morality of an act; but conscience with the subjective and formal morality of the same.

It differs also from prudence. Prudence is a habit of the practical intellect, and has a broader scope than conscience. For prudence, besides those parts which it obtains in forming the dictate of conscience, especially in weighing the peculiar circumstances of the fact, also inquires into the means suitable for attaining the end. Thus, for example, when a superior must correct some guilty person, conscience indeed declares the obligation of correcting; but prudence suggests how one must proceed, that the end, namely amendment, may be obtained (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. 5, a. 1).

III. Conscience is a judgment concluding from two premises, whether the syllogism is made implicitly or explicitly. Synderesis or science furnishes the major premise, which declares the disposition of the law; the particular fact to which the application of the law must be made supplies the minor; prudence watches lest either be asserted rashly; the conclusion is the practical judgment which is called conscience. For example: A superior legitimately commanding must be obeyed. But this superior commands legitimately. Therefore he must be obeyed (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 2).

14. Order of things to be said. Conscience, as we intimated above, must, on the part of the object, be conformable to truth; but on the part of the subject, it must rest upon moral certitude. Whence there must be treated: 1. true conscience, and erroneous conscience opposed to it; 2. certain conscience, and doubtful conscience opposed to it. But since the question of solving doubts arising from the occurrence of probable opinions is of particular importance, it must be treated specifically. Hence: 3. probable conscience.

15. Definition. True conscience is that which dictates the truth of the thing. It rightly concludes from true principles that something is lawful or unlawful, which in reality is such. Erroneous conscience is that which dictates the false as true, whether it assumes for itself a false principle, or deduces false conclusions from a true principle (I, 3).

True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although it is sometimes used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, TRUE is that which in reality is such in itself; RIGHT is that which is done according to the rules of prudence, in other words, that which truly and really is conformed to right appetite, as St. Thomas says (Eth., VI, 1. 2). Hence right conscience can be predicated, although per accidens, even of him who labors under invincibly erroneous conscience, as will be said below. Cf. Beaudouin, q. 1, § 1.

16. Division. Erroneous conscience is either invincibly or vincibly erroneous.

1. Invincibly erroneous conscience is that whose error morally cannot be overcome or laid aside; because, a) either the thought or doubt of error in no way, not even confusedly, comes into the mind of the one acting, while he places the action or its cause; or because, b) although doubt of error has come into the mind, nevertheless, with moral diligence applied for attaining the truth, the error cannot be driven away.

2. Vincibly erroneous conscience is called that whose error man does not lay aside through neglect. Therefore he operates with vincibly erroneous conscience who a) either already notices the error in some way, or b) at least

doubts about the error, and at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it, and nevertheless does not inquire into the truth.

But diligence in inquiring into the truth is not required to be the greatest; ordinary and common diligence suffices, such as prudent men of the same condition are accustomed to apply in like circumstances.

Note. Those things which later in the various treatises, on Laws, on Sins, on Censures, etc., will come to be said concerning ignorance will explain the present matter more perfectly. See n. 22.

17. Principles. I. We are always bound to obey a true conscience, whether prescribing or prohibiting. This is clear from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 14:23): But all that is not from faith (that is, from the dictate of conscience) is sin. And from Innocent III (c. Litteras, de restit. spol.): "Whatever is done against conscience builds toward gehenna." The reason is that true conscience is the right application of the law, and a manifestation of the divine will, to which it is always unlawful to resist.

St. Bonaventure very beautifully expresses this office of conscience, saying: "Conscience is like the herald of God and His messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as though from God, as a herald when he publishes the edict of the king" (L. 2 Sentent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3).

18. II. We can obey a true conscience permitting or counseling, but we are not bound. For 1. it belongs to a permitting conscience truly and absolutely to dictate that some action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, therefore; 2. but it belongs to a counseling conscience to declare that something is better and of counsel. But this is the nature of counsel, that it indeed brings in the merit of reward in the one carrying it out, but no guilt of fault and penalty in the one omitting it. Hence that saying: "He who passes over counsel does not sin, provided contempt is absent" (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3 and 4).

19. Nevertheless it must be noted that what the law in general only counsels or permits can in the particular case be prescribed or prohibited by conscience, namely when there are peculiar circumstances which, in a special case and for a determined person, clearly manifest the obliging will of God; as will be clear from the things to be said concerning vocation to the clerical or religious state (cf. n. 1916, q. 3 and n. 2141).

20. The principal means by which the treasure of a true and right conscience is acquired are these: 1. knowledge of the law of the Lord, in which each one can progress by continual study, by reading good books, by consulting the doctors of the Church, and especially by questioning and humbly listening to the Church herself, who is the supreme mistress of consciences. 2. Mortification of vices. This mortification is absolutely necessary, because the practical judgment of reason, on account of the evil inclination of the will, often turns away from the truth. 3. Prayer, or assiduous conversation with the Divine Teacher, who speaks within without the noise of words, and raises up to Himself a docile mind in a point of time so that it grasps more reasons of eternal truth than if it had studied in the schools for ten years (Imit. Chr., l. 3, c. 43).

21. III. It is right to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience permitting; one must follow it when it prescribes or prohibits. The reason for both is that "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, quodl. 3, a. 27; St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

The first is also clear: 1. From the words of the Lord (John 15:22): If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. 2. From the saying of St. Augustine (de Lib. arb., l. 3, c. 19, n. 53): "That which you unwillingly do not know is not imputed to you as fault." 3. From the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although there be invincible ignorance of the natural law, this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin." So Baius and Jansenius (cf. Viva, on this proposition).

The second is proved: 1. From the doctrine of the Apostle (Rom. 14:22), saying that one who eats meats which he judges it unlawful to eat, as having been sacrificed to idols, truly sins, because he acts against faith, that is, conscience.

2. From reason: the will is borne toward the object not according as it is in itself, but according as it is proposed by reason. Hence St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 19, a. 5): "When erring reason proposes something as a precept of God, then it is the same thing to contemn the dictate of reason and the precept of God."¹ Hence he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience (if it obliges) commits sin of the same species as if he acted against a true conscience.

It is useful to note that one acting with invincibly erroneous conscience not only does not sin, but also more probably acquires merit for himself. "The reason is that, in order to call some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Therefore, since the one acting acts prudently, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end by which he is led in acting, namely the end of the glory of God or of charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he would demerit who does a good work, but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end by which he carries out that work" (I, 6). So the doctors very commonly with St. Bernard, "who teaches that a subject obeying a prelate from a right intention acts meritoriously, although materially he errs against the law" (de Praec. et disp., c. 14, n. 21). Cf. I, 7 and 173, 174.

22. IV. No one can follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting, nor contemn one prescribing or prohibiting; but each one is bound to lay it aside. For 1. By operating according to a permitting conscience of this kind, a man sins, because he does what in reality is evil in itself; nor does ignorance excuse him from fault, since, as vincible, it makes his act voluntary in its cause (cf. n. 288). Thus a judge who already notices that he does not sufficiently know a case debated in court cannot cast his vote for either side; but he is bound to acquire for himself a more perfect knowledge of the matter, so that he may thus be able to render a just sentence; otherwise he would rashly commit himself to the danger of erring, and accordingly would stain himself with sin. 2. By operating against an obliging conscience of this kind, he likewise sins, because he chooses what he judges to be evil. Thus, he who erroneously judges that he must lie or steal in order to help his neighbor, and at the same time notices the obligation of further inquiring into the truth, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it (I, 4).

Yet in order that one sin by acting against erroneous conscience, his action must be free. Hence the ignorant man does not sin, even if he believes himself to sin, when, being unable, he omits to hear Mass on a feast day; when he suffers involuntary distractions in prayer, or nocturnal pollutions in sleep.

Note. That the confessor may more easily judge whether the conscience of a penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, let him ask him: a) whether he truly doubted concerning the lawfulness of the act, b) whether he attended to the obligation of searching into the matter further? If he answers affirmatively, we have one laboring under a vincibly erroneous conscience. Nevertheless the responses of a scrupulous person must be weighed according to the things soon to be said. Cf. n. 319, 337.

23. To vincibly erroneous conscience can be reduced: 1. lax conscience, which loosens obligations too much; 2. scrupulous conscience, which increases them too much; 3. perplexed conscience, which apprehends sin in both terms of a contradiction.

We shall treat of each only briefly here, because practical rules will be set forth at length below in the treatise on Penance.

24. Notion. A lax conscience is that which, from light and contemptible reasons, judges that what in reality is evil is not evil, or thinks that a grave evil is light, although either can easily be detected (H. Ap., tr. ult. 31). How great a danger threatens from this sort of conscience the Savior Himself declares, crying out: Broad is the way that leads to perdition (Matt. 7:13).

Lax conscience can be distinguished in three ways:

1. Simply lax conscience, which tends to extending liberty beyond what is fair, for example if it rests upon a slightly probable or improbable opinion.

2. Cauterized conscience, when, from a long-standing habit of sinning, it counts grave or even most grave sins as nothing, calling evil good and good evil (Isa. 5:20), and drinking iniquity as though water (Job 15:16).

3. Pharisaical conscience, when it makes great things small and conversely small things great; of which sort were the Pharisees straining out a gnat but swallowing a camel (Matt. 23:24).

25. The principles to be adapted to a lax conscience are these:

I. He gravely sins who, knowingly obeying a lax conscience, transgresses some law in a grave matter.² The reason is that he could easily overcome ignorance of this kind, as being voluntary, and therefore cannot, under the pretext of ignorance, be excused from lethal sin.

II. Indeed, he can gravely sin in a light matter, if his temerity drives him to acting after any dictate whatever has been passed over and contemned.

III. He who labors under a lax conscience ought, far more strictly than others, to apply effort to laying it aside, if a doubt about the honesty of an action arises.

26. The causes of lax conscience are: 1. a soft life, which enervates; 2. neglect of prayer, which wholly casts us down; 3. excessive solicitude for temporal things, which makes us earthly; 4. the custom of sinning, which removes the horror of sin; 5. familiarity with vicious men, to whom we become accustomed; 6. luxury, which prevents the Christian from inclining and tending toward spiritual things.

The effects are: 1. blind tranquillity of soul after sin; 2. insensibility to pious warnings; 3. mockery of pious exercises; 4. an impenitent heart treasuring up wrath for itself on the day of wrath (Rom. 2:5).

The remedies of such a conscience are: 1. spiritual retreat for several days; 2. frequent and humble prayer with meditation on the last things; 3. daily examination of conscience; 4. frequent reading of pious books; 5. diligent confession; 6. flight from the wicked and conversation with the good (Haine, Elem. Theol. mor., n. 44).

27. Notion. A scrupulous conscience, or one agitated by scruples, is that which, from a slight motive, doubts concerning the honesty of some action, and therefore often fears that there is sin where there is none (H. Ap., I, 8).

Scruple is said from scrupus, which is a rough little stone entering the shoe of one walking, whence the foot is injured and the step impeded. Therefore a scruple is a vain apprehension, or an empty specter of sin, by which the eyes of the mind are struck, as infants are terrified by apparitions. But it belongs to the malignant spirit to inject a greater anxiety of sinning than is proper, so that the soul, rushing into the abyss of despair, may no longer truly fear any sin.

Three things concur for a scruple: 1. a futile reason, whose solution does not appear; 2. a vain fear of sinning arising thence; 3. disturbance of soul (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. 5, a. 5).

You will infer: 1. Scrupulous conscience, as such, is not conscience, but only a shadow and likeness of conscience; for it is not the dictate of reason, but of imagination. Yet if someone were to judge firmly that sin is present where it is not, he would have a conscience formed by scruples and therefore erroneous, but properly so called. 2. It differs entirely from a tender and timorous conscience, which indeed solicitously, but wisely, according to the rules of Christian prudence, avoids every sin, even the slightest.

28. Since the present matter is to be treated elsewhere (n. 1835 seqq.) in order to practice, it suffices here to note two things:

I. To act against scruples is always licit, and often obligatory. 1. It is licit, because a scruple is not a dictate of reason, but an empty fear, as lacking a prudent and reasonable foundation. Therefore that fear does not prevent the one acting from forming for himself a practically certain conscience from extrinsic principles, especially from the authority of the confessor. Hence, to act against a scruple is not to act against conscience.

2. It is obligatory, because excessive anxiety greatly harms spiritual progress, and brings grave detriment to body and soul at once (I, 19).

II. The principal and almost sole remedy against scruples is to acquiesce in the judgment of a superior or confessor. - Thus very commonly the Doctors, and the reason is clear. For since the scrupulous, while they are agitated by scruples, cannot form for themselves a true dictate of conscience, nothing else remains except that they hand themselves over to be ruled by the counsel of others, and use extrinsic reasons rather than intrinsic ones (I, 12).

The universal and distinguished esteem which the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus always had has greatly increased among all from the time when the Saint was numbered among the Doctors of the Church. From this very esteem there arose the desire that, since it is lawful safely to put his genuine doctrine into practice, this doctrine should be written not only compendiously, but also in that method which would be more suitable for public lectures. For a long time it has been, moreover, among the wishes of our venerable clergy that in a compendious and methodical exposition of this kind of Alphonsian doctrine account be taken of the condition which is proper to our ecclesiastical Provinces and to these regions. I have endeavored, according to my powers, to fulfill the expectation of this desire by this little work of whatever kind. In this matter indeed I frankly confess that I have played the part of compiler rather than of author. For the doctrine which I hand down, and from which I have endeavored not to recede even the breadth of a fingernail, is the doctrine of St. Alphonsus; the things which pertain to our affairs I have taken for the greatest part from the Acts and Decrees of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore and from the Moral Theology which Kenrick, of good and clear memory, wrote, with his rather difficult and at times more obscure style somewhat changed. But most especially I turned to my own use the Compendium of Father Gury, whose method and order I have followed, and several of the notes which Ballerini, Cretoni, and the Ratisbon editor added to the same; yet with very many things added and changed, as will be plain to those who read through this fifth edition of my work, and striving before other things that I should bring it as completely as possible into conformity with Alphonsian doctrine. The things which I wrote about Probabilism I owe for the greater part to a friendly confrere; the things concerning the specific and numerical distinction of sins, and likewise very many things concerning scandal and cooperation in the sins of others, and concerning certain contracts, I have from the Notes of the distinguished Van Egeren. To the work whose title is Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I frequently refer the reader who desires more concerning certain questions.

The things which I have written from my opinion alone, or from that of others than St. Alphonsus, concerning certain points which are not touched by the Holy Doctor, I have labored, as much as I could, to hand down according to his mind. The things which I have taken from our civil laws, often in the vernacular idiom, I submitted to the judgment of a most illustrious jurist of our country, to whom I render due thanks in this place.

Lest the text of the compendium be unpleasantly interrupted, and in order that I might have regard for brevity, those Decrees, Declarations, and Instructions of the Supreme Pontiffs and of the Sacred Congregations which pertain to the moral matter, and which are longer and are not exhibited in the acts of our Plenary Council of Baltimore, and likewise the faculties which are customarily granted by the Holy See to our Bishops, I have placed before the work, referring the reader to them in their own places.

I judged also that I would do something pleasing to a disciple of St. Alphonsus, if I prefixed to the Compendium certain excerpts from the Vindiciae Alphonsianae concerning the excellence and authority of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus, and also a Key of his moral works, or Rules for discerning the genuine opinions of the Saint.

It remains that I declare certain abbreviations which I have used in this Compendium.

1 For the sake of those who use earlier editions here, or the second edition of Father Haringer, I note: What in this edition is inscribed Book II is, in the earlier editions, Book V; what is Book III here is Book II there; what is Book IV here is Book III there; what is Book V here is Book IV there.

39. The state of the Republic, as being the origin and source of all rights, is endowed with a certain right circumscribed by no limits.

Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.

40. The doctrine of the Catholic Church is opposed to the good and advantages of human society.

Encyclical letter Qui pluribus, November 9, 1846. - Alloc. Quibus quantisque, April 20, 1849.

41. To the civil power, even when exercised by an infidel ruler, there belongs an indirect negative power in sacred things; therefore there belongs to the same not only the right which they call exequatur, but also the right of appeal which they name from abuse.

Apostolic Letters Ad Apostolicae, August 22, 1851.

42. In a conflict of the laws of both powers, civil law prevails.

Apostolic Letters Ad Apostolicae, August 22, 1851.

43. The lay power has authority to rescind, declare, and make void solemn conventions (commonly Concordats) entered into with the Apostolic See concerning the use of rights pertaining to ecclesiastical immunity, without its consent, indeed even while it protests.

Alloc. In consistoriali, November 1, 1850. - Alloc. Multis gravibusque, December 17, 1860.

44. The civil authority can mix itself into matters which pertain to religion, morals, and spiritual government. Hence it can judge concerning the instructions which the Pastors of the Churches publish, according to their office, for the norm of consciences; indeed, it can even decree concerning the administration of the divine Sacraments and the dispositions necessary for receiving them.

Alloc. In consistoriali, November 1, 1850. - Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.

45. The whole government of public schools, in which the youth of some Christian Republic is instructed, with episcopal seminaries excepted in some respect, can and ought to be attributed to the civil authority; and indeed so attributed that no right be recognized in any other authority whatsoever of involving itself in the discipline of schools, in the governance of studies, in the conferral of degrees, and in the selection or approval of teachers.

Alloc. In consistoriali, November 1, 1850. - Alloc. Quibus luctuosissimis, September 5, 1851.

46. Indeed, in the seminaries themselves of Clerics, the method of studies to be employed is subjected to civil authority.

Alloc. Nunquam fore, December 15, 1856.

47. The best plan of civil society demands that popular schools, which are open to all boys from every class of the people, and public Institutes generally, which are destined for handing down letters and more serious disciplines and for caring for the education of youth, be exempted from every authority, moderating force, and interference of the Church, and be subjected to the full choice of civil and political authority, according to the pleasures of those ruling and according to the standard of the common opinions of the age.

Letter to the Archbishop of Freiburg, Quam non sine, July 14, 1864.

48. That plan of instructing youth can be approved by Catholic men which is separated from the Catholic Faith and from the power of the Church, and which looks only to the science of merely natural things and to the ends of earthly social life, or at least primarily to them.

Letter to the Archbishop of Freiburg, Quam non sine, July 14, 1864.

49. The civil authority can impede the sacred Prelates and the faithful people from communicating freely and mutually with the Roman Pontiff.

Alloc. Maxima quidem, June 9, 1862.

50. The lay authority has by itself the right of presenting Bishops, and can exact from them that they enter upon the administration of dioceses before they receive canonical institution and Apostolic Letters from the Holy See.

Alloc. Nunquam fore, December 15, 1856.

51. Indeed, the lay Government has the right of deposing Bishops from the exercise of pastoral ministry, nor is it bound to obey the Roman Pontiff in those things which regard the Episcopate and the institution of Bishops.

Apostolic Letters Multiplices inter, June 10, 1851. - Alloc. Acerbissimum, September 27, 1852.

52. The Government can by its own right change the age prescribed by the Church for the religious profession both of women and of men, and command all religious Families that they admit no one to pronounce solemn vows without its permission.

Alloc. Nunquam fore, December 15, 1856.

53. Laws which pertain to protecting the state of religious Families and their rights and offices are to be abrogated; indeed, the civil Government can furnish aid to all those who wish to fall away from the institute of religious life they have undertaken, and to break solemn vows; and likewise it can entirely extinguish those same religious Families, as well as Collegiate Churches and simple Benefices, even of the right of patronage, and subject and vindicate their goods and revenues to the administration and choice of the civil power.

Alloc. Acerbissimum, September 27, 1852. - Alloc. Probe memineritis, January 22, 1855. - Alloc. Cum saepe, July 26, 1855.

54. Kings and Princes are not only exempt from the jurisdiction of the Church, but are also superior to the Church in deciding questions of jurisdiction.

Apostolic Letters Multiplices inter, June 10, 1851.

55. The Church is to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church.

Good manuals of moral theology are not lacking. Yet few in the past century have proceeded from the Thomistic school. And those which have their origin elsewhere generally fail in the method or doctrine of St. Thomas, or also in the accurate declaration and demonstration of notions and principles. Many of the moralists are more attentive to practical applications, or are content to recite the more or less probable opinions of others; and very many of their works, it has quite recently been said, by their slightness or by the very catechetical form of questions and answers, have seemed to profess a less mature age of the science.

The return to the doctrine and method of St. Thomas, which has had such salutary fruits in metaphysics and dogmatics, has not extended itself in the same degree to moral theology, because of the harmful and persistent divorce between speculative and practical theology.

Having considered these things, perhaps it will not be unwelcome to hear from the Thomistic school a voice which, more than may be in the wishes of some, sets forth doctrine scholastically and by principles, yet within the limits of a certain moral summa. But since again and again they affirmed that the lectures which we were delivering in the theological college of Louvain for the elementary course answered, however imperfectly and deficiently, the aforesaid end, we now intend to make these public. They are according to the mind of St. Thomas, the Common Doctor; and according to the norm of the New Law, canonical and civil.

Roman law has everywhere been abolished, and to expound it practically in this work would rather generate confusion in minds than scientific usefulness. Therefore we consider only present-day law, especially French law, which, having been worked out earlier and being partly in force in our own country, has in many things been the model of others, although certain very recent codes may seem capable of having been more aptly formed and more perfectly.

In like manner, leaving aside the Decretals and the Corpus Iuris, we consider only the Code of Canon Law promulgated by Benedict XV, without, however, choosing that its order should be followed, because, however much it may be congruent with the science of law, nevertheless in moral questions all things must be adapted and subordinated to the order of theology, the supreme science.

May God grant that, under the patronage of the Blessed Virgin, mediatrix of all graces, this work may be able to contribute to the instruction of the clergy and the usefulness of schools.

Rome, in the Angelicum College, on the feast day of the Sacred Heart, June 27, 1930.

The Author.

1. Notion of Theology. - Theology is a science deduced from the principles of revelation concerning God and other things in order to God. For, led by the light of supernatural revelation, it treats scientifically of the deity itself, that is, of God as God. Now God, under the aspect of deity, is a supernatural being, inasmuch as He is elevated absolutely above every created nature and natural knowledge, and knowable by revelation alone, and is the supernatural principle or cause and end of things, especially of man.

Theology embraces a twofold part: first, one is merely speculative, "concerning God in Himself and as He is the principle and end of things," which treats of God in Himself, one and triune, and of His works ad extra, especially of man, whom God has destined to a supernatural end: the intuitive vision of Himself, to which man can come through divine grace, which Christ bestows upon us. From this, secondly, there spontaneously arises the other, practical part: for if God is our principle and end, duties follow in us toward Him; namely, we must acknowledge Him as our author and tend toward Him as our ultimate end. This part immediately treats of human acts by which we tend toward God, and also, but consequently, of their rules and principles. Hence it is inscribed by St. Thomas: "concerning the motion of the rational creature toward God."

Thus in I, q. 2, in the proemium. - It is a treatise on man as the image of God "insofar as by image is signified what is intellectual, and free by choice, and possessing power over itself" (Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa II, 12), that is, "insofar as he himself is the principle of his acts, as having free choice and power over his works." St. Thomas, I-II, in the prologue.

In brief: theology is the science of supernatural religion. Religion is the moral bond between God and man. Hence theology treats not only of God, the author and end of supernatural things, and of man destined to a supernatural end, but also of the bonds and duties by which man is bound to God, and of the moral relations also which intervene between the two.

2. Difference between Speculative and Practical Theology.

Speculative and practical theology differ:

1. In end: speculative theology directly and solely tends to the knowledge of truth, which it seeks for its own sake, that is, for the perfection of the intellect, and in which it rests; practical theology tends further to right operation and seeks truth for the sake of something else, that is, for the perfection of the will. Namely, it seeks those truths which are necessary for acting well; indeed, because it is a rule of acting, it directly and principally intends to direct human acts and morals. Hence it speculates concerning practice.

2. In matter: speculative theology treats of those things which are merely to be known or also believed, which are called matters of faith or dogmas, and therefore it is called dogmatic; practical theology treats of things to be known and at the same time to be done, which are called matters of morals, whence it is called moral.

3. Definition of Moral Theology. - Moral theology is defined: the part of theological science which treats of human acts to be ordered to God as supernatural end according to revealed principles. It is said:

1. Of science: for it is an evident and certain knowledge of truths which are deduced from certain principles and are coordinated among themselves into a synthesis by a logical connection and order; and thus it is distinguished from common and catechetical knowledge, which all the faithful in some way have concerning human acts and their duties.

2. Theological, that is, deduced from the principles of revelation; and thus it is distinguished from human and merely rational sciences, which proceed from the light of natural reason alone.

3. Part, because it is not a distinct species but only an integral and constitutive part of theological science. For theology does not embrace several sciences as philosophy does, but is an entirely one science, because it has one subject: God, and one formal reason (formal object by which): revelation. Hence moral theology is one and the same science with dogmatic theology, although they are different parts.

4. Which treats of human acts: this is the special matter of which moral theology treats and about which it is immediately occupied, namely, all human acts; and therefore it regards all things which pertain to them, and thus it is distinguished from dogmatic theology.

5. To be ordered to God as supernatural ultimate end: moral theology considers all things in order to God, the supernatural ultimate end, or to God as God. For theology has one principal subject, God, of whom dogmatic theology treats; and all other things, even human acts to be ordered, it considers in order and conformably to God, who is their supernatural principle, exemplar, and end. Hence moral theology is not a merely descriptive science, but a normative one, which judges human acts and directs them to the ultimate end; and yet it differs in species from natural ethics, which directs them to the natural end.

6. According to revealed principles: this is the formal reason, or the proximate motive and immediate medium by which the subject, which is the supernatural end, and the acts necessary for it are known. For revealed principles, admitted by the divine light of faith, are the medium for arriving at theological conclusions and for understanding them.

The conclusions themselves are properly the object of theological science, and they are concerning God and concerning things in order to God, especially, for the moral part, concerning human acts; although these are also customarily called by moderns the object: namely, God the primary object, other things the secondary object. But they understand the object about which theology treats, not the object which it asserts: the latter is theological conclusions.

4. Relation between Moral Theology and Other Disciplines.

From the preceding definition it is understood:

1. From Moral Philosophy: the latter considers human acts in order to the natural end and relies on the principles of reason alone; the former, however, considers human operations as they are ordered to the supernatural end, and its proper medium of knowledge is divine revelation; whence they differ in matter and end, and at the same time in the formal motive.

Nevertheless, a) the supernatural end does not exclude but rather contains the natural end, as the perfect contains the less perfect; likewise b) revelation does not destroy reason but rather perfects it; finally c) revelation also teaches and expressly confirms many rational moral truths, and has others connected with itself. And therefore moral theology agrees in many things with moral philosophy and includes the matter of the latter. But it exceeds it, because it extends more widely even to revealed things, namely, to supernatural actions, virtues, and laws, and because it directs us by a higher light.

2. A fortiori, from the Science of Civil Law, Politics, Sociology, Economics, etc., which have a proximate end that is temporal, or also particular, not the ultimate end itself.

3. From Dogmatic Theology, as has already been said, n. 2.

4. From Ascetical and Mystical Theology: moral theology in the stricter sense treats more of acts necessary to the end insofar as they are under precept (according to the purgative way from sin); ascetical and mystical theology treat of acts insofar as they are of perfection and counsel, that the end may be attained better and more fully. For they teach the ways of perfection, either for progressing in virtue and acquiring perfection (according to the illuminative way), or for exercising perfection and contemplative union with God (according to the unitive and mystical way).

Yet if moral theology is considered in its full and complete sense, it includes ascetical and mystical theology, which rest upon the same principles. But, just as dogmatic and moral theology are now usually treated separately, although they are two parts of one and the same theological science, so nothing prevents those things which are more of precept and those things which are of perfection and counsel from being specially and distinctly explained, as is usually done, yet as integral parts of one practical science ordered to the supernatural ultimate end.

5. From the Science of Canon Law and of Liturgy, which study the scientific knowledge of laws, that is, of their origin, interpretation, and mutual relation to one another and to their proper end. For they are immediately concerned with the laws by which the external order of the Church or public worship is determined, and consequently certain acts of the faithful are directed, but proximately to the order and governance of Christian society, not to the ultimate end. Hence they directly regard the social order and the external forum; moral theology, however, is immediately concerned with acts, and only consequently with laws, even ecclesiastical laws, but it takes these laws in relation to the ultimate end and treats of their value in the forum of conscience. And considered in this way, positive laws already pertain to moral science, of which they are an integral part.

6. From Pastoral Theology: this properly is not a science, but a practical method and art by which the pastor of souls, according to the principles of moral and ascetical theology, leads the souls entrusted to him to salvation and perfection.

B. That it excels the other practical sciences 1) in end and necessity, for unlike them it does not tend toward a further end but is concerned with the ultimate end itself; 2) in extension, for it touches all operations in order to the ultimate end; 3) in certitude, for it rests upon the divine light itself. Hence it is the supreme practical science, and therefore is a) the norm of the others, by which they are to be regulated, insofar as, with respect to their proper end and with respect to the choice and use of means, they must be honorable, conformable to the ultimate end; likewise b) their mistress, because the others serve it insofar as it uses them as aids, disposing of them for its own end.

D. That, unlike Ethics, which hypothetically supposes and feigns man such as he could have been but never was nor will be, namely, in the natural state, Moral Theology considers man such as he truly is. And therefore it alone is absolutely the practical science of morals.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis I, n. 1.

E. That it is inferior to Dogmatic Theology: 1) for it treats of human acts, which are a certain secondary matter, whereas dogmatic theology treats of God, who is the chief and proper subject of theology; whence 2) dogmatic theology is the foundation of the moral part; indeed 3) the end, since the moral part is ordered to speculative theology perfected in heaven, where, namely, the motion into God ceases, and there is now perfect rest in God.

5. Division of Moral Theology. - Moral theology is divided into a twofold part:

a) The general part explains the general and common notions and principles upon which one must rest as upon a foundation in solving various moral questions. Hence it treats:

VIII. A scrupulous conscience is not a rule of acting prudently, both because it is uncertain and because it is vincibly erroneous; but it is to be put aside, at least by a judgment from indirect principles handed down by the confessor, e.g., in the following manner: Whatever may be the case concerning the material liceity or illicitness of this action, it is certain that in such doubts one must obey the confessor; that I can and must act as the confessor said; that I can neglect my doubt or judgment; that by obeying I cannot sin, etc. But in the case such a doubt or such an apprehension is present. Therefore...⁷

⁷ You will find this proposed among theologians in various formulas. Thus, for example, Lessius: "Although I, as regards myself, would rather judge this to be sin, nevertheless because my confessor says the contrary, I can and will do this which he told me, since he is for me the interpreter of the divine will." And Reuter, o. c., n. 263, remedy 2: "Although I judge this to be sin, nevertheless because my judgment is fallible, and the confessor told me that this is licit for me, I can and will do what he told me must be done, and I am certain that I do well, because God wills that I obey him"; and remedy 7: "In rightly forming conscience there is no difficulty or danger. Only think: 1) that it is the will of God that I contemn scruples; theologians indicate this to me..., my confessor who bears the place of God; but by following the will of God I cannot sin, and if it should happen that I erred materially, this cannot be imputed, since I follow directors given by God. 2) Besides, by yielding to scruples I harm body and soul, I render myself inept for God's service and become burdensome to the neighbor: I will live in perpetual torture... God does not oblige me to these things. For what brings excessive difficulty is morally impossible, nor does God oblige to it... 3) What I see prudent and upright persons do or contemn as trifles, this is licit also for me; I see prudent and upright persons do this or contemn it as trifles; therefore, etc."

Hence, although to act against a scrupulous conscience is not licit, nevertheless one can act against scruples; indeed, lest he incur grave damage, sometimes he is bound to do so even under grave obligation. Not indeed if he remains in full doubt, for to act with a doubtful conscience is illicit, but provided that he in some way puts this aside and forms for himself a certain conscience, by judging, e.g., from the judgment of the confessor, that it is a scruple and by contemning it. For a scruple, because it is an empty apprehension of phantasy, does not render the doubt serious, and does not impede the judgment of conscience previously formed from being practically certain. Lessius, de Prud., c. 1, n. 2, is to the point:

"Prudence is not always able to exclude scruple totally. For this often perseveres with the judgment of prudence; nevertheless in order that then the judgment be prudent, it must be reputed a scruple, and thus prudence also in a certain way excludes the scruple. For although the imagination of sin perseveres with a certain anxiety, nevertheless through prudence it is reputed a shadow, not truth."

But one need not always actually remember the principles and rules handed down above and by them form for oneself an actual dictate concerning the honesty of the action, because this is often morally impossible for the scrupulous person. As St. Alphonsus says, Th. M., l. I, n. 19:

"Nor is there need that in each particular act he form this judgment... for it is enough that from the judgment once formed he act against the scruple; because on account of past experience that judgment exists virtually or habitually in his conscience, although obscured by darkness. Moreover while the scrupulous person operates in that confusion, often he does not operate with scruple or deliberate fear, for ordinarily he would not wish to omit what he knew to be pleasing to the divine will."

From this certain conclusions for practice can be noted with Fr. Vermeersch, Th. mor. I, n. 382:

1. After he has been admonished by the confessor concerning scruples, the consents which he says he has given, whether into an interior depraved suggestion, or into a purpose here and now of acting even if it is evil, or into a purpose of sinning, are to be ascribed to the phantastic order. For the scrupulous person imagines himself to say: I will this, or: thus I will do, whether it is good or evil, or I will sin and then expiate the sin by confession. But phantasy represented an assent of this kind to him, so that he seemed to himself as if to behold himself thus acting. Nevertheless, not otherwise than in a dream, he gave no free consent to those suggestions or purposes; and perhaps he made this use of the foreseen confession, that from it he might become more courageous for acting against scruples. Therefore for the scrupulous person who, e.g., from the counsel of the confessor, knows habitually that his doubts must be contemned by himself, it is lawful to act while the scruple remains. For that knowledge provides him a certain conscience...

2. It can happen that in the process of his doubts and little reasonings the scrupulous person labors for a long time, and is thus wearied and disturbed from the struggle, so that he rushes into the action in a blind manner: then he is deprived of true liberty necessary at least for sinning gravely.

3. Similarly, promises, vows, and blasphemies which some imagine they have often, indeed almost daily, made or said can be held as fictitious. Let the confessor simply refuse to hear or esteem these things.

4. Although the obligation of acting against scruples can be grave, since from them grave damage can be feared in spiritual progress, abandonment of spiritual exercises, desperation, suicide, or in nervous depression and health of body or mind, nevertheless the scrupulous person scarcely incurs subjective fault provided that with his infirm will he wishes to strive against scruples in general; indeed often it is not expedient to insist, lest a new disturbance and perplexity arise, and danger of desperation, which is especially to be feared in the sensitive.

I. What lax conscience is. - Much more numerous than the scrupulous are found in this world, alas, those who labor under a more lax conscience. But lax conscience properly is that which doubts, suspects, or probably thinks, on account of light and contemptible reasons, that an act here and now to be placed, though evil, is not evil, or is less evil than it is, e.g., venial when it is mortal. Hence it is as if moral anesthesia.¹

¹ Theologians have few things concerning the lax, especially in the treatise on Conscience. Before others Haine, Raphael of St. Joseph, Beaudoin, Prummer can be seen; likewise Legrand in Coll. Brug. 1923.

It is called a) properly; for lax conscience is often said improperly for the habitual disposition which inclines to more lax judgments and to having a lax conscience;

b) doubts, suspects, or probably thinks: for if it judges certainly, then it now becomes a conscience simply erroneous, although this could have arisen from preceding laxity;

c) on account of light reasons that an evil act is not evil...: this is its proper object by which it is distinguished from every other positively doubtful and probable conscience, indeed also from a scrupulous conscience;

d) an act here and now to be placed: thus it is distinguished from a consequent lax conscience which judges an act placed.

II. Lax conscience is threefold: a) simply such, which leans on an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable, or applies more benign reflex principles too frequently and wrongly; it arises from defect of attention, rather often voluntary, and from lightness of soul;

b) cauterized, I Tim. IV, 2, which makes even very grave sins nothing and reputes evil as good without any remorse, Is. V, 20, and arises from gross ignorance and a long-lasting habit of sinning. For thus, from perverse morals, the moral sense can be obscured so that man does not abhor even grave sins, but drinks iniquity like water, Job XV, 16. This conscience is opposed at once to the fearful and the scrupulous, so that the fearful conscience holds the middle between the cauterized and the scrupulous.

c) pharisaic, so called from the Pharisees straining out a gnat but swallowing a camel. This makes great things, e.g., duties of state, internal things, things of the natural law, small, and makes small things, e.g., works of supererogation, external things, things of positive law, great, Mt. XXIII, 24. It often arises from malice, and is opposed at once to the tender and the narrow conscience, so that the tender mediates between the pharisaic and the narrow.

III. The conjectural signs by which a lax conscience is discerned and its difference from a scrupulous conscience are enumerated by Lacroix, Th. M. l., n. 526, from Stoz, Tribunal Poenitentiae, n. 223:

1. He is lax who spurns and holds as nothing those things which others commonly think are sins; but he who fears those things which others hold as nothing is scrupulous.

2. He who generally does not believe preachers and confessors, but judges their reproofs to be immoderate exaggerations, is lax; but he who does not believe confessors or other learned and upright men excusing the fact is scrupulous.

3. He who, trusting in his own judgment, is accustomed to proceed with no one consulted, is lax; but he who, even in clear matters, or concerning which he has elsewhere received a resolution, asks again and again, wishing through this to render himself more secure, is scrupulous.

4. He who in confessing is in no way solicitous about expressing the species or number of sins is lax; but he who confesses all things doubtfully and hesitantly, repeating the same thing rather often, saying now this number, now that number, or a different circumstance, and never satisfies himself, is scrupulous.

5. He who precipitately and without any consideration does whatever, is lax; but he who proceeds so hesitantly in all things that he does not trust the common doctrine of theologians, but always seeks evidences and demonstrations, is scrupulous.

6. He who quickly and vaguely hurries through any prayers, interrupts them without cause, looks around while praying, or talks, is lax; but he who prays anxiously, rather often stops in order to have attention, repeats the same things, is scrupulous; and so concerning other matters.

From these things it follows that a lax conscience is found even among the pious, at least in light matter, e.g., if they make certain light sins nothing, or act precipitately and without consideration in whatever they do, or are accustomed to proceed trusting in their own judgment with no one consulted, etc., cf. the things said under 1, 3, and 5.

Specifically, in confession a penitent is to be judged of lax conscience if there is discerned:

a) an evidently insufficient accusation, such as ordinarily exists among those who on the occasion of annual confession say that they have committed no evil, neither theft nor homicide, or confess only a few distractions in praying, or even certain similar things;

b) absence of remorse of conscience and delay of confession until some external circumstance as if compels one to confess;

c) defect of all sorrow concerning the sins declared, as among those who seem rather to defend their sins than accuse them, who distracted and insensible hear the exhortations of the confessor, who by certain little reasonings try to persuade themselves that God is too good to condemn to hell for omission of Mass or for meats eaten.

But if by these or other signs set forth above the confessor recognizes a lax conscience: 1) he cannot simply trust such a lax penitent who recognizes himself guilty of no grave sin, but by suitable questions, as far as possible, let greater integrity of confession be procured; 2) where he accuses himself doubtfully concerning consent, he is to be presumed to have consented, otherwise he would not doubt but would be certain that he did not consent, or he would in no way remember; 3) above all, contrition is to be inculcated to him.

IV. Several causes of lax conscience are enumerated, which on the part of the intellect are reduced to vincible ignorance, and on the part of the appetite to perversity of will. For the most part they are:

1. depraved or neutral education, which is unequal to establishing the difference of good and evil and inculcating the true sense of obligation; and familiarity with vicious persons, to whose morals we become accustomed and with whose sentiments we are joined;

2. defect of consideration and counsel in ordering the moral life, whence by use, in an external and mechanical manner, good works are done rather than from love of good and hatred of evil;

3. a soft life which enervates the soul and causes lightness of soul, or defect of moral discipline in the will, which is acquired only through the practice of mortification and self-denial;

4. vehement inordinate passions, especially in youth, by which reason is obscured and easily judges licit what we desire too much, e.g., anger, ambition, cupidity, empty glory, sensual pleasure, especially lust, by which it happens that the animal man does not perceive the things which are of the Spirit of God. Thus, for example, motions of anger seem nothing other than pious indignation, unbridled ambition nothing other than noble emulation, avarice is held as legitimate providence, commercial frauds are judged a display of industry, pleasure an honorable or necessary recreation, etc.;

5. excessive solicitude for temporal things, which makes us earthly, in mature age;

6. life immersed for a long time in vices, or the custom of sinning;

7. presumptuous confidence in God, from which arises neglect of prayer, examination of conscience, confession, which altogether casts down the soul and leaves it fasting from spiritual food;

8. tepidity of soul.

Literature. Franc. Zacharia, S.J., Prolegomena de casuisticae theologiae originibus, locis atque praestantia, which dissertation St. Alphonsus added to some earlier editions of his Moral Theology, but afterward omitted. Vinc. Patuzzi, O.Pr., Prodromus ad universam morum theologiam (ap. Migne, Theol. curs. tom. XI). Jos. Bouquillon, Theol. moralis fundamentalis (Bruges 1903, Beyaert). Noldin, S.J., Sum. theol. mor. de principiis (Innsbruck 1924, Rauch). Otto Schilling, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie (Munich 1927, Huber).

In this introduction we shall treat: 1. of the notion and end of Moral Theology; 2. of its sources; 3. of its method; 4. of its history.

1. Nominal definition. If the name itself is considered, moral theology is nothing other than the theological consideration of morals, that is, of moral or human acts. Now human morals can be considered in many ways, which diverse ways, however, can be reduced to two more principal categories, namely, to the philosophical and theological consideration of them.

Philosophically human morals are considered if they are judged and directed by the guidance and light of natural reason alone toward the last natural end, that is, earthly beatitude. This is performed by the discipline which is commonly called Moral Philosophy or Ethics. St. Thomas Aquinas writes to the point:¹ "It belongs properly to moral philosophy ... to consider human operations, according as they are ordered to one another and to the end.... The subject² of moral philosophy is human operation ordered to an end, or also man, insofar as he is voluntarily acting on account of an end." - More briefly still it can be said: Ethics is the science of the licit and the illicit, or the science of the rules of human activity toward the last end.³ A twofold principal office falls to moral philosophy: 1. by natural light to judge and indicate what is licit and what is illicit in human acts; 2. to command, by the authority of natural reason, what is to be done and what is to be omitted, after judgment has been passed concerning licitness or illicitness. Since this office embraces the whole free activity of man, it immediately follows that natural Ethics must cultivate a vast field of operations. Accordingly there are joined to it many subordinate sciences, for example, sociology, which considers human actions, namely obligations and rights, in order to human society; economic science (in the Aristotelian sense), which considers the rights and obligations of any domestic society or family; political science, which under a moral aspect considers the activity either of individuals or of communities in the governing of the state, etc.

Theologically human morals are considered if not only human reason is consulted and the natural end intended, but also if a) divinely revealed faith is established as the supreme rule, and b) the supernatural end, namely eternal beatitude or union with God in heaven, is intended. From what has been said it is plain why moral theology is very well described, according to the nominal definition, as the theological consideration of morals. For by it all human morals (whether good or evil) and all free acts (whether merits or demerits) are considered under the aspect of God, namely insofar as, divine revelation teaching, they lead to God or lead away from God. Wherefore the Angelic Doctor⁴ very well, succinctly, and profoundly teaches: "All things are treated in sacred doctrine [in Theology] under the aspect of God, either because they are God Himself, or because they have an order to God as to their principle and end. Whence it follows that God truly is the subject of this science." God is the principle, because His revelation is the first rule of morality; but He is the end, because the last end of all moral actions is conjunction with God in eternal beatitude. Hence true moral theology is necessarily theistic or theocentric, but not deistic nor autonomous in the Kantian sense.

Real definition. From what has been said concerning the nominal definition or explanation of Moral Theology, the way is now prepared for the real definition. 2 Among the ancients there is scarcely found a real definition of Moral Theology. But definitions given by moderns are not rarely obscure or incomplete. The following definition seems to be rather good: Moral theology is that part of theological science which judges and directs human acts in order to the supernatural end according to revealed principles.

It is said, 1°: it is part of theological science. Theology is divided by moderns in many ways: dogmatic, mystical, ascetical, exegetical, patristic, symbolic, liturgical, catechetical, positive, speculative, scholastic, polemical theology, etc. The old doctors are not accustomed to speak of these divisions; indeed the Angelic Doctor⁵ expressly teaches that Theology is one science, because it has only one formal object, which is God as principle and end. Nevertheless the same St. Thomas⁶ admits that, notwithstanding the unity of Theology, it is speculative and practical; which, according to him in this place, signifies dogmatic and moral theology. - Whatever may be the case concerning the parts of Theology, Dogmatics and Morals are intimately joined and cannot be separated from each other. For Dogmatics must always carry the torch before Morals, and Morals is bound to judge and direct human operations conformably to the truths illumined by Dogmatics. Therefore dogmatic Theology also is practical, namely, illuminating reason. Yet because it is occupied principally with the divine mysteries (the divine attributes, the Trinity, Redemption, etc.), whereas Morals is occupied with human actions, hence Dogmatics and Morals are suitably distinguished from each other as speculative and practical science, and Morals can be called a part of Theology. - It was said pointedly and deliberately, "of theological science"; for Morals is a science properly so called, equally as Dogmatics is. For science is commonly defined: knowledge of things through causes. Now moral Theology does not set forth rules of acting nakedly and crudely, but draws them out from the highest principles and investigates their causes; nor moreover is it merely casuistry, but from true theoretical principles it is bound to solve individual practical cases.

It is said, 2°: which judges and directs human acts... By these words the material object of this science is declared, which is human acts. But moral Theology is not a merely descriptive science of human acts, such as, for example, psychology is, but is a practical and normative science. For just as the cardinal virtue of prudence, so also moral Theology has a threefold act, and generally almost the same thing must be said of moral science as of the virtue of prudence, at least if moral Theology is considered as it is a habit existing in the mind. Now St. Thomas⁷ teaches that the acts or functions of prudence are three: to take good counsel, to judge, and to command. Thus similarly the office of moral Theology is first to take good counsel, namely to inquire with great diligence concerning principles and concerning the connection of the conclusion with the principles. It is by no means sufficient (as not rarely was done by Moral Casuistry of an inferior stamp) to heap together the opinions of some authors and then to admit some opinion proposed by them as probable; rather it is altogether necessary always to recur to indubitable principles, so that it may appear whether some opinion is right or not. Such recourse having been employed, the second office of moral Theology is: to judge concerning the licitness or illicitness of acts. But it must not stop here; rather its further office is to command or prohibit human acts in particular, or to direct them to the last end according especially to the norm of divine law.

It is said, 3°: in order to the supernatural end, to indicate the formal object or respect under which human acts (the material object) are considered. For whatever this science teaches must dispose toward obtaining the supernatural end better and more securely. For God, as He is the last end, is the proper object of moral Theology. Hence it appears why in the sacrament of penance, in which sinful man is joined anew (or more closely) with God, so fertile a field of labor is offered to moral Theology.

Since man cannot attain the supernatural end except by the exercise of virtues and the fulfillment of duties, hence moral Theology can also not unfittingly be defined: the doctrine concerning Christian virtues and duties, which man must fulfill in order to attain the supernatural end. But it is said: must, because it pertains not so much to moral Theology as to ascetical Theology to instruct concerning virtues to be exercised freely and in the most perfect degree.

Dignity and necessity of Moral Theology. As is clear from what has been said above, the principal end of Moral Theology is to direct human acts to the last end, or to meriting eternal life. 3 This end indeed is the highest. From this is plain both the dignity and the necessity of this discipline.⁸ Moreover moral Theology is a wholly necessary means for fruitfully exercising the government of souls, which deservedly is called by St. Gregory "the art of arts."⁹ For not all priests laboring for the salvation of souls need to be great orators, illustrious doctors, learned historians; nevertheless all must be well instructed in moral Theology. For how otherwise will they be able fruitfully to administer the sacrament of penance and to teach the Christian people the science of salvation? Accordingly the learned Mabillon¹⁰ deservedly admonishes: "The study of Moral Theology is to be cultivated before the others; ... to this, as long as one lives, labor must altogether be given."

Corollary. On the relation of Moral Theology to allied sciences. From what has been said, it can easily be drawn out what relation Moral Theology has with other allied disciplines, and indeed:

4 1. With Ethics. In the present condition of things the whole human race has been elevated to the supernatural order; and accordingly every action ethically good or evil is also morally good or evil, that is, it has an order to the supernatural end. Wherefore there is not given something ethically evil (a so-called philosophical sin) which is not at the same time theologically evil.¹¹ Therefore, although Ethics and moral Theology are intimately connected and in no way opposed, nevertheless they differ in many things, namely: a) by reason of the breadth of the object: Ethics considers only natural practical truths, whereas moral Theology adds to these supernatural practical truths; b) by reason of the means of knowledge: Ethics knows all things through natural reason, but moral Theology also through supernatural faith; c) by reason of the end: Ethics considers man as a creature of God whom it directs to the natural end and happiness, whereas moral Theology considers man as a son of God and directs him to the supernatural end and happiness.

¹ Lect. 1 in l. 1 Ethic.

² What the Angelic calls the subject of some science, modern authors are accustomed to call its object.

³ Thus Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 8.

⁴ S. theol. I, q. 1, a. 7.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3.

⁶ Ibid., a. 7.

⁷ S. theol. II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

⁸ Cf. S. theol. I, q. 1, a. 5; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 20.

⁹ Regula past. officii c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 77, 14). In the strict sense moral Theology itself cannot be called an art, because the same thing under the same respect cannot be simultaneously science and art. Now moral Theology is a science properly so called, as was proved above, whose object is truth, namely the truth concerning the morality of human actions. But since moral Theology is so necessary for the art of the government of souls that that government is almost nothing other than the application of moral Theology, hence moral Theology itself is sometimes (but less properly) called "the art of arts."

¹⁰ De studiis monast. part 3, c. 2.

¹¹ Cf. below, concerning the morality of human acts, n. 99 sqq.

2. With Dogmatics. The great theologians of old did not distinguish, that is, did not treat separately, Dogmatics and Morals, as was already said above. But if by the more moderns Morals is separated from Dogmatics, still Dogmatics must always remain its foundation and principle. For Dogmatics deduces from theological faith the conclusions to be believed, which conclusions to be believed Morals supposes and applies to the directing of human acts. Dogmatics therefore is as it were the root, while Morals is as it were the tree full of sweet fruits, which must draw its sap from the root, and which would at once wither if it were torn from the root; or Dogmatics is as it were the solid foundation, but Morals as it were a splendid palace built upon this foundation.

3. With Pastoral Theology, which is instruction concerning the care of souls rightly to be exercised, and which accordingly treats of the office of the pastor of souls. Pastoral Theology as a special discipline and distinct from the others was not in use before the eighteenth century; but now it is commonly a special discipline, which, upon moral Theology as upon a solid foundation, treats of those things which particularly concern the pastor of souls, and rightly instructs him in fruitfully performing his office.

4. With canon and civil law. Each of these bodies of law contains laws which (clothed with the due conditions) oblige in conscience. Wherefore moral Theology must attend to and rightly explain the moral obligations arising from ecclesiastical and civil laws.¹² But the juridical interpretation of those laws does not pertain to moral Theology, but to the disciplines of ecclesiastical or civil law.

¹² Em. Card. D'Annibale rightly says: "To give no attention at all to law and to promise oneself as a moral theologian is to be foolish" (Summula Theol. mor. Proemium n. 16).

The sources of existence¹⁴ of some science are called the places or storehouses from which it takes its arguments. Moral Theology does not have other sources than dogmatic Theology, namely Sacred Scripture, Tradition, the Holy Fathers, the decisions of the Roman Pontiffs, general Councils, the authority of theologians, and natural reason. Only a few things may be touched here which pertain more specially to Moral Theology.

¹⁴ Besides sources of existence, sources of knowledge are distinguished, that is, the means of knowing some science. The sources of knowledge of Moral Theology are divine revelation manifested to us through the magisterium of the Church and natural reason.

5. 1. On the use of Sacred Scripture in moral matters. Sacred Scripture, which indeed is nothing other than the written Word of God, or, as St. Augustine beautifully says,¹⁵ "letters sent by God to men, which exhort us to live well," is the clearest source of Moral Theology. Whence St. Paul¹⁶ teaches: "All scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, instructed for every good work." - From these things it is plain that any priest studying Moral Theology is bound frequently to read and search Sacred Scripture. Therefore in the Corpus iuris¹⁷ it is held: "Ignorance, the mother of all vices, must especially be avoided in the priests of God, who have taken up the office of teaching among the peoples. For the Apostle Paul admonishes priests to read the Sacred Scriptures frequently.... Therefore let priests know the holy Scriptures and the canons, and let all their work consist in preaching and doctrine." Let St. Bonaventure¹⁸ also be heard writing these things: "Since according to Blessed Gregory the government of souls is the art of arts, and since the wounds of thoughts are more hidden than those of the viscera, it is truly horrible to see certain priests of our time, who either through torpor neglect to read Sacred Scripture, in which the art of the aforesaid government is most sufficiently handed down, ... or through ignorance do not know it. And nevertheless they do not shamelessly fear to profess themselves physicians of the heart in hearing confessions." - Certainly neither is the so-called philological or critical study of the Bible among moderns required nor is it sufficient for Moral Theology. Far be it indeed from us to disparage anything of this sort of study, which, when corrected within just limits, certainly can be very useful; but for Moral Theology it is exceedingly dry and unfruitful, at least if it alone is had. On the contrary, a truly theological study of Sacred Scripture is required, in order to draw from it the living truths of faith and morals.

In the Old Testament ceremonial, judicial, and moral precepts are commonly distinguished.¹⁹ Ceremonial precepts (for example, concerning circumcision, concerning sacrifices) no longer oblige, nor now can they licitly be observed in the New Law. Judicial precepts (for example, concerning the restoration of goods in the jubilee year, concerning usury, etc.) now no longer oblige, but can be prescribed anew by ecclesiastical or civil power, and this has sometimes been done; for example, certain impediments of marriage of the Old Testament have been sanctioned again by the Church. But moral precepts, for example, the precepts of the Decalogue, still remain in force, as being precepts of the natural law. - The things which are contained in the New Testament all remain in force and oblige; some indeed as precepts, for example, the reception of the Eucharist, but some as counsels, for example, the so-called evangelical counsels. By custom, however, the prohibition issued by the apostles (Acts 15:20) concerning not eating blood and what has been strangled has been taken away. Not a few places in Sacred Scripture need right interpretation concerning moral duties, for example, those things which are said there concerning the prohibition of an oath (Matt. 5:34), concerning communion under both species (Matt. 26:28), concerning divorce (Matt. 5:32), etc.

¹⁵ On Psalm 90 (Migne, Patr. lat. 37, 1159).

¹⁶ 2 Tim. 3:16-17.

¹⁷ Dist. 38, c. 1, from the Fourth Council of Toledo.

¹⁸ In the Prologue of his Confessional.

¹⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 99.

6. 2. On the use of Tradition in Moral Theology. "The sacred, ecumenical and general Synod of Trent,²⁰ ... following the examples of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with an equal affection of piety and reverence all the books of both the Old and New Testament, since one God is the author of each, and also the Traditions themselves pertaining both to faith and to morals, as having been dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Spirit and preserved in continuous succession in the Catholic Church." Therefore Sacred Scripture is not the sole infallible rule both of faith and of morals, but Tradition preserved in continuous succession is such in an equal manner. In Moral Theology Tradition is especially to be attended to. For there are many things which become known to us only by Tradition (divine or apostolic or ecclesiastical), and oblige us, for example, the matter and form of confirmation, of orders, of extreme unction, etc. Tradition is manifested, if it is lawful so to speak, through the life of the Church, namely by actions (for example, liturgical actions), signs and doctrines (for example, catechetical doctrines), admitted in the Church herself by universal custom, although all these things have not been explicitly declared by her infallible magisterium. But I say: admitted by universal custom. For a particular custom or the doctrine of some particular doctor, however great, is not an irrefragable witness of Tradition, and accordingly does not so strictly oblige. St. Thomas²¹ teaches to the point: Theology uses "the authorities of other doctors of the Church as if arguing from proper sources, but probably," that is, the authority of one or of a few doctors asserting something, the others being silent, is of itself only probable. St. Augustine²² expresses this very well: "Nor ought we to have the disputations of any men whatever, although catholic and praiseworthy men, as canonical Scriptures, so that it would not be lawful for us, with the honor due to those men preserved, to disapprove and reject something in their writings, if perhaps we have found that they thought otherwise than the truth has, understood by divine help either by others or by us. Such am I in the writings of others; such do I wish the understanders of my writings to be." Therefore neither the opinion of St. Augustine, nor of St. Thomas, nor of St. Alphonsus, if their authority alone is attended to, makes something morally certain and strictly obligatory in Moral Theology; nor is any theologian alone a sufficient witness of ecclesiastical Tradition. Nevertheless it would be a matter of great rashness to contradict such great doctors without a most efficacious reason.

²⁰ Sess. 4, Decree concerning the canon of Scripture (Denz. n. 783).

²¹ S. theol. I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

²² Ep. 148 to Fortunatianus n. 15 (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 638).

7. The authority of St. Alphonsus. Certain things are here subjoined concerning the authority of St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, Doctor of the Church, in Moral Theology. Several times the Supreme Pontiffs and Roman Congregations have extolled the Moral Theology of this holy Doctor with the highest praises.²³ For the sake of brevity let us here weigh only the more principal points. In the first place comes the decree of the S.R.C. of 18 May 1803, concerning the revision and approbation of the works of Venerable Alphonsus in order to his beatification: "A full report having been made both of the aforesaid printed works and of all the other manuscripts, nothing worthy of censure was found in them." - Such or a similar decree is always required and given when there is question of the solemn beatification of some author who has published books. Whence from a decree of this sort no special commendation can be drawn out. This is also plain from the fact that this decree speaks not only of the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus, but also of his other works. Now among the other works of this Saint are found some (for example, his doctrine concerning grace) which certainly have no special commendation of the Holy See. Generally Benedict XIV²⁴ teaches that "it can never be said that the doctrine of a servant of God has been approved by the Holy See, but at most that it can be said not to have been disapproved, if the revisers reported that nothing is found in his works which is opposed to the decrees of Urban VIII."

In the second place comes the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, given on 5 July 1831 to the Archbishop of Besancon, Rohan-Chabot. Two questions had been proposed: I. "Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus a Ligorio professes in his Moral Theology?" II. "Whether a confessor is to be disturbed who follows all the opinions of Blessed Alphonsus a Ligorio in the practice of the tribunal of Sacred Penance for this reason alone, that nothing worthy of censure was found by the Apostolic Holy See in his works?" The Sacred Penitentiary judged that the answer should be: To I: "Affirmatively, yet without it being judged from this that those are to be reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." To II: "Negatively, regard being had to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approbation of the writings of servants of God for the effect of canonization." This response was approved by Gregory XVI; but as Bouquillon²⁵ says: "It appears clearer than the midday light that this response is nothing other than the consequence and application of the preceding decree." For from it nothing else follows except that it is licit to follow the opinion of St. Alphonsus just as of any canonized author.

In the third place come other encomia bestowed by the Holy See upon the holy Doctor, for example: "Let him consult approved authors, especially St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, book VI, n. 321, and Benedict XIV, and conform himself to their opinions."²⁶ - "St. Alphonsus moreover elucidated obscure things and declared doubtful things, since amid the entangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or more rigorous, he laid out a safe way"; thus Pius IX, Apostolic Letter concerning St. Alphonsus, Doctor of the Church. Pius X, in the letter given on 12 June 1905 to Leonard Gaude, calls St. Alphonsus the Doctor "whom all can safely follow in doctrines of morals" (at the beginning of vol. I of the new edition of the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus). - Certainly also from these or similar words nothing else follows except that St. Alphonsus is a very approved author and that his doctrine, considered in its complex whole, is altogether eminent; but it does not also follow that the individual opinions of this holy Doctor are to be preferred to others or even that they are true. For, as regards his opinions touching canon law, not rarely have the Sacred Congregations not admitted them, for example, concerning a confessor hearing the confession of an accomplice but not absolving him,²⁷ concerning mixed marriages as probably permitted without dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff.²⁸ But even in some merely moral questions the opinion of St. Alphonsus is opposed by many theologians not without reason, for example, concerning a doer of damage excused from restitution, who burns the house of Caius instead of the house of Titius (Theol. mor. 3, n. 629). Since these things are so, we approve those things which Bouquillon²⁹ says: "These things seemed to have to be proposed sincerely, namely by the study of truth alone. For so great is the authority of St. Alphonsus that it is not necessary to increase it by gratuitous praise. But to us they seem to exceed the just limits of praise who deduce from the documents brought forward that St. Alphonsus is the greatest among the moralists, that he can be in the place of the others, since he read eight hundred, discussed them, etc.; that St. Alphonsus is of as much value in Morals as St. Thomas is in Dogmatics (as if the Angelic did not equally shine forth in each science); likewise those who conclude from the alleged approbations that all opinions of St. Alphonsus are altogether founded, eminent, probable, common; that it is scarcely possible that any opinion of St. Alphonsus lose its probability otherwise than by a judgment of the Holy See, etc."³⁰

²³ You may see these encomia in Marc, Inst. moral., at the beginning of the work.

²⁴ De beatif. et canoniz. Sanct. book 2, c. 34, n. 12.

²⁵ Theol. mor. fund. n. 81.

²⁶ S.C.C. 29 Aug. 1860.

²⁷ Book 4, n. 556; cf. S. Poenit. 1 March 1878; S. Offic. 5 Dec. 1883.

²⁸ Book 6, n. 56; cf. S. Offic. 3 Jan. 1871.

²⁹ L. c. n. 85.

³⁰ c. 1366, § 2. Cf. Mausbach, Die kath. Moral I (1913); Koch, Lehrb. der Moralth. § 8; Pruner, Lehrb. der Moralth. 12, and others.

8. 3. On the use of reason in Moral Theology. Right reason is never employed too much in Moral Theology, provided that it is truly right reason. Indeed Moral Theology is a science which primarily rests upon revealed faith; but since between faith and right reason no true contradiction can ever arise - as the Vatican Council defined, and as can easily also be shown, since one and the same truthful and infallible God is the author both of faith and of reason - it follows that reason can inquire with all its powers concerning the objects of Moral Theology. The best guide in this matter is St. Thomas Aquinas, who strives to explain even the highest mysteries of religion by reasons, insofar as this is possible. We shall try according to our powers to follow this Angelic Doctor as guide, and we shall indicate also the internal reason of almost all our assertions. For in this way knowledge will be more perfect and assent firmer. There is no reason for us expressly to note - for it is plain of itself - that we utterly repudiate the attempts of many moderns who wish moral science to be entirely independent from faith, and who patronize the so-called "voraussetzungslose Ethik," that is, an Ethics which is altogether independent from religion. For the end of moral science is to lead to the supernatural end, or to bind us again with God. Therefore moral science without religion is altogether impossible.

Scholion. On other sources of Moral Theology. Here we omit the question of how the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, of the Holy Roman Congregations, and Canon Law are sources for moral science. This matter will be treated better when the discussion is concerning the obligation of laws. For the present let this stand as a general rule: certain ecclesiastical laws introduce a moral obligation for Christians, that is, for those rightly baptized, and accordingly are sources of moral science.

9. By the method of Moral Theology is here understood the mode and form which is employed in handing on and learning moral science. Now a threefold method is commonly distinguished:

1. The scholastic or speculative method, which considers all moral truths more accurately and more profoundly, illustrates them, compares them among themselves and with others, proves and defends them against adversaries, yet without neglecting practice. Besides the great scholastics of the Middle Ages, St. Thomas and St. Antoninus, Cajetan above all, de Lugo, Suarez, Billuart, and others used this method.

2. The casuistic method, which gathers together very many particular cases, whether true or fictitious, and concerning them judges what is licit and what indeed is illicit (gravely or only lightly). Deeper doctrine is often not present. This method has been called by some, not ineptly: spiritual pathology, or even the science of sins (Sundenlehre), because it labors especially in discerning sins. Many so-called "Summists" of the Middle Ages used this method, and besides them: Diana³¹ (who was called "Atlas of the casuistic world"), Escobar, Busembaum, and others (among moderns Berardi perhaps is to be numbered among the Casuists).

3. The ascetical (mystical) method, which above all considers the virtues and divine grace, and impels man toward Christian perfection in the threefold way, namely the purgative, illuminative, and unitive. St. Bernard, the Mellifluous Doctor, St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor, Thomas a Kempis, Henry Suso, O.Pr., Tauler, O.Pr., St. Francis de Sales, Scaramelli, S.J., Contenson, O.Pr., in his celebrated Theologia mentis et cordis, Valgornera, O.Pr., Ludovicus Blosius, O.S.B., Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, Order of Carmel, and many others used this method.

Certainly each of these methods is good and licit, nor has the Church prescribed any determinate method. But in order to discern which one is to be preferred, account must be taken both of the end and of the circumstances of times and places. The objective end of Moral Theology is to judge and direct human acts to the supernatural end. The subjective end is deservedly called that which each person intends in the study of Moral Theology. If someone chiefly intends to become a good confessor and to hear many confessions, then certainly he must cultivate the casuistic method; if someone intends to be a good preacher or instructor, he must cultivate the ascetical method; if someone intends to become a good apologist against the impugners of Catholic Moral Theology, or if he wishes to have a profound knowledge of moral truths, he must labor in the scholastic method. Certainly the best method is that which is at once scholastic, casuistic, and ascetical, and for this reason certain authors (although rare) have attempted to unite these three methods; and the better, more simply, and more briefly this has truly been done, the more perfect the method is. I deliberately said: the more simply and briefly this has been done; for usually any more prolix method makes Manuals too extensive, which harm rather than profit the study of disciples. Since these things are so, I also shall try according to my powers to unite this threefold method, and indeed with as much simplicity and brevity as I shall be able.

³¹ Cf. Concina, Apparatus ad Theol. christ. book 3, diss. 1, q. 2.

14. The treatise of Moral Theology is conveniently divided by considering separately the individual parts of the definition given: Moral Theology is that part of theological science which judges and directs human acts in order to the supernatural end. Therefore the office of Moral Theology is twofold: 1. to judge, that is, perfectly to know human acts, not indeed as they are in the psychological order, but as in the moral order they are ordered to the supernatural end; 2. to direct those acts to the supernatural end. And therefore the whole of Moral Theology is also conveniently divided into two parts, namely: the first part, concerning all things which pertain to this perfect knowledge of human acts; the second part, concerning the proximate means for attaining the supernatural end. These means indeed, in the present state of things, are sanctifying grace and actual grace, which are chiefly conferred or increased for us in the sacraments of the New Law. - To the perfect knowledge of human acts there belongs above all the knowledge of the last end, from which acts receive morality and on account of which all our acts are done. Then the human acts themselves are to be considered, insofar as they serve for obtaining this end. The morality of human acts is measured by a twofold rule: one remote and objective, namely law (eternal law); the other proximate and subjective, namely conscience. Whence, after the treatise on human acts, one must first treat of laws and then of conscience. The causes of human acts are habits, whether good or evil. Whence consequently one must treat of good habits or virtues, and of evil habits or vices; and indeed first in general and then in species. And thus the first part of Moral Theology is ended. - The other part will be, as was already said above, concerning the proximate means⁶⁵ without which it is impossible to arrive at the supernatural end, that is, concerning grace, which is conferred upon us in the sacraments. Therefore one must treat of the sacraments in general and in species.

To one looking carefully it appears that this division of the matter almost agrees with the division of the Summa theologica of St. Thomas. There is, however, this difference: St. Thomas treats of the sacraments in Dogmatics; we, on the contrary, in Morals, because the administration of the sacraments pertains so much to the daily practice of the priest that Moral Theology, if it did not instruct perfectly concerning this practice, would be altogether maimed.

Therefore the division of the whole of Moral Theology is contained in the following brief conspectus.

Part I

1. On the last end and beatitude.

2. On human acts; there is subjoined a treatise on the passions, insofar as they influence human acts.

3. On laws.

4. On conscience.

5. On sins in general.

6. On virtues in general.

7. On faith and the opposed vices.

8. On hope and the opposed vices.

9. On charity and the opposed vices.

10. On prudence and the opposed vices.

11. On justice and the opposed vices. - There is added a treatise on contracts.

12. On fortitude and the opposed vices.

13. On temperance and the opposed vices.

Part II

1. On the sacraments in general and on sacramentals.

2. On baptism.

3. On confirmation.

4. On the Eucharist.

5. On penance, where there is added a treatise on censures and indulgences.

6. On extreme unction.

7. On order.

8. On marriage.

⁶⁵ Besides the proximate means of salvation, namely grace, there also exist remote means, whether natural, for example, the intellective powers, created things, human society, etc., or supernatural, for example, the Church, revelation, etc.

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 1-6; Contra gent. 3, 1 sqq.; Billuart, Sum. S. Thomae, treatise on the last end; L. Lehu, Phil. mor. I, De fine ultimo; V. Cathrein, Moralphil. I, Von der Bestimmung des Menschen.

Preliminary note. Already the old pagan philosophers admonished: "Whatever you do, do prudently and look to the end." The Psalmist teaches us to pray: "Make known to me, O Lord, my end,"¹ and on the contrary rebukes those who turn aside from their proper end: "They have all turned aside, they have together become unprofitable."² In the New Testament the end of human life is called the one necessary thing. "Martha, Martha, thou art anxious and troubled about many things. But one thing is necessary."³ Hence it is plain of how great importance a living knowledge of the true end of human life is. Hence also it is easily understood why men of all times have proposed to themselves the questions: Whence have I come? and whither am I going? The old pagans thought that they were going to Elysium; modern rationalists not rarely confess that they are ignorant of the end of human life. Whence Du Bois-Reymond said concerning it: Ignoramus et ignorabimus. - Before St. Thomas, in the moral part of the theological Summa, treats of human acts, that is, of the material object of Moral Theology, he first treats of the last end and of beatitude. In a similar way, also in the so-called spiritual Exercises, the beginning of the meditations is commonly taken from consideration of the last end; and in catechisms used in schools the first question is commonly put: "What is the end of human life? or for what are you on earth?" From all these things it appears most clearly that a brief dissertation on the last end is most conveniently placed at the beginning of Moral Theology. Certain notions must be set forth first.

¹ Ps. 38:5.

² Ps. 13:3.

³ Luke 10:41-42.

15. Definition of end. End "is that for the sake of which something is done,"⁴ or "that on account of which an agent operates." But it is called end because, once it has been obtained, the operation is ended or ceases, and the one operating rests; for example, the end of the physician operating is the health of the sick person to be effected; for the sake of recovering health the physician prescribes medicine, makes incisions, etc.; but when health has been recovered the action of the physician ceases. Accordingly end can be considered in two ways: 1. as the principle of willing (end in intention): in order to procure health the physician begins to labor; 2. as the term of action (end in execution): once health has been obtained the physician ceases to labor. Wherefore St. Thomas briefly says: "the end is compared to the act as principle or term."⁵

Divisions. Several divisions being passed over (which you may see in Billuart⁶), the following divisions seem to be noted for our purpose:

⁴ Aristotle, Ethic. Eudem. book 3, c. 11: "The end is that for the sake of which [something is done]."

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3 ad 1.

⁶ Treatise on the last end, diss. 1, a. 1.

16. a) The end of the work, or intrinsic and objective end, and the end of the one operating, or extrinsic and subjective end. The end of the work is that to which the work or action directly and immediately tends from its nature, whether it is done by this agent or by another; for example, the giving of alms tends from its nature to relieving the necessity of the neighbor. Therefore the necessity of the neighbor to be relieved is the end of the work or the objective end of almsgiving.⁷ - The end of the one operating is that which the agent intends by operating, whether principally or secondarily. The end of the one operating can indeed coincide with the end of the work, as if one giving alms explicitly intends the assistance of the poor person; but it can also altogether disagree with the end of the work, for example, if one giving alms were to intend vain glory or the seduction of the poor person.⁸ The end of the one operating is materially the same as the moral motive of the action.

⁷ The end of the work is the same as the moral object of the action. This indeed must be noted especially in the indirectly voluntary. Cf. below n. 57.

⁸ Cf. S. theol. II-II, q. 141, a. 6 ad 1.

17. b) Principal or primary end, and secondary or less principal end. This division is rather a subdivision of the end of the one operating (although it can also have place in the end of the work), and is of great importance in discerning the morality of acts. The principal end is that which is intended chiefly and principally, and which before the others impels the agent to acting. The secondary end is that which is joined with some principal end and for this reason is not intended by reason of itself alone, nor by itself alone moves the agent to acting. For example, the principal end of a priest saying Mass ought to be to worship God; his secondary end can be: to receive a stipend or alms for the application of the Mass. Or another example: the principal end (at least implicit) of a Christian ought to be, in any action, the glory of God; but the secondary end can be any honorable good.

18. c) Last end and intermediate end. The simply last end (Endzweck) is that which is so desired that it is referred to no other; on the contrary, all other things are referred to it. The intermediate end (which is also sometimes called proximate) is that which is indeed desired by reason of itself, but nevertheless with relation and dependence upon the last end.⁹

Note 1. The principal end can at the same time be last, but it is not always necessary that it be so. Thus the principal end of him who, existing in sanctifying grace, knowingly commits a venial sin is some created good loved inordinately; but the last end of this sinner remains God. Let there be an example: a just man, who knowingly tells a small lie because he is placed in some difficulty, has in this act as principal end liberation from the difficulty; but nevertheless he does not wish to be turned away from God as his last end.

⁹ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3, where the Angelic very wisely teaches "that the same act in number, insofar as it once proceeds from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end, from which it has its species." - Some theologians undeservedly affirm that an intermediate end is not truly and properly an end, but only a means for obtaining the true end. Cf. Billuart, De ult. fine a. 1.

19. Note 2. End and good are the same materially, because the will cannot be moved or enticed except by good (true or apparent); or in other words: all acts which are produced by the human will are on account of some end or on account of some good to be obtained. Hence even the suicide, who intends his own annihilation, intends together with that end some good (indeed in reality a false one), namely liberation from the evils pressing upon him. Therefore no one can will evil as evil; but if he knowingly intends evil, nevertheless he wills it under the aspect of good. For this reason the scholastics said briefly indeed but most truly: "Evil is not desirable"; and the Angelic Doctor writes very well to the point:¹⁰ "It is impossible that any evil, insofar as it is such, be desired, either by natural appetite, or by animal appetite, or by intellectual appetite, which is the will." - But it was deliberately said that good is the end of acts which are produced by the will. For there are some acts produced by man, but not by his will, for example, the acts so-called "first-first," which happen suddenly and before deliberate will, as when someone, unexpectedly struck by pain, suddenly cries out. Acts of this kind are commonly called acts of man, but not human acts. Even those acts are done materially on account of good and end, but not on account of good and end known.¹¹ - Although end and good materially agree, nevertheless they differ formally, or the concept of good differs from the concept of end. For good is conceived as something suitable to appetite, but end as something to be obtained by means employed.

Proposition 1

¹⁰ S. theol. I, q. 19, a. 9.

¹¹ Cf. below n. 26 sqq.

20. God is the last end of man and of his acts, so that man is bound to tend toward God and to glorify Him.

Proof. We presuppose, both from sound philosophy and from Catholic faith, that a personal God, infinitely perfect, exists, and that He freely created the world and man. These things having been presupposed, the stated proposition can easily be proved. For man and every creature must tend toward that last end which God wished to obtain by creating; otherwise God would not be the supreme and omnipotent Lord of creation. Now the end which God proposed to Himself in creating cannot be something outside Himself, but He Himself is His own end. For every end placed outside the one operating is intended as some good not yet possessed. Therefore the one operating would intend something foreign, if he already had that thing in himself? - Therefore God, in all His operations and accordingly also in the creation of man, cannot intend something outside Himself, because He is infinitely perfect, containing all goods in Himself. "The Lord has wrought all things for Himself."¹² It follows therefore that God Himself, that is, the manifestation of His glory, is the end of the creation of man and of the whole world; and accordingly all creatures ought to intend the glory of God as the last end. Hence St. Thomas says: "The whole universe with its individual parts is ordered to God as to an end, insofar as in them, by a certain imitation, the divine goodness is represented unto the glory of God."¹³

Irrational creatures intend this end by a coerced necessity; for they are as it were vestiges of the divinity,¹⁴ and the perfections and beauties shining in them necessarily manifest the majesty of God the Creator. Whence the Psalmist¹⁵ exclaims: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of His hands." But rational creatures, such as man and angel, are bound to glorify God freely; for they are not only vestiges but also images of the divinity,¹⁶ and they are endowed with free choice. Rational creatures ought to glorify God insofar as they willingly acknowledge His majesty with subjection and praise, and venerate and love Him. Certainly this glorification offered to God by creatures does not increase His beatitude, for the Psalmist¹⁷ says: "Thou art my God, since Thou hast no need of my goods." For God is infinitely perfect and infinitely blessed. Therefore the Vatican Council¹⁸ deservedly teaches that "God, by His goodness and omnipotent power, not for increasing His beatitude, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel, together from the beginning of time created each creature out of nothing"; and it pronounces anathema upon him who should deny that the world was created for the glory of God. But since man is immortal, he must also glorify God in the other life; and this indeed is done by the damned through the manifestation of divine justice and omnipotence, but by the just who are blessed through the manifestation of divine mercy and goodness. Throughout all eternity the blessed will glorify God through intimate union with Him. Therefore God, just as He is the principle, so also is the last end of man; or, as it is said metaphorically, God is Α and Ω.

Man is bound to glorify God by all his acts, by serving and obeying Him and by loving and venerating Him. I say: by all his acts. Therefore if he should fail to do this even by one deliberate act, he sins. In this sense the Apostle St. Paul¹⁹ admonishes: "Therefore whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God." - It is not required, however, that man in all his acts explicitly and expressly intend the glory of God; but it suffices that he at some time elicit an act of charity, and that his remaining acts be virtually ordered to the last end, or God. But if man elicits acts which cannot be referred to the last end, he sins; and indeed gravely, if acts of this kind are altogether opposed to the last end, or God; but venially, if in the elicited acts there is not aversion, but only some deflection from the last end on account of an inordinate affection for a temporal good.

Proposition 2

¹² Prov. 16:4.

¹³ S. theol. I, q. 65, a. 2.

¹⁴ Job 11:7; S. theol. I, q. 93, a. 2.

¹⁵ Ps. 18:2.

¹⁶ Gen. 1:26 sq.; S. theol. I, q. 93, a. 1 sqq.

¹⁷ Ps. 15:2.

¹⁸ Const. "Dei Filius" cap. 1, can. 5.

¹⁹ 1 Cor. 10:31.

21. a) In the attainment of this last end consists human beatitude; b) and the more perfect the attainment is, the greater the beatitude is; c) but in no other thing does true beatitude of man exist or can it exist.

Preliminary note. Before the proof of this assertion, there must be recalled to mind a fact confirmed by daily experience: that there is in man an innate desire for beatitude.²⁰ All, as many as there are in the world, wish to be happy, and no one wishes to be unhappy and miserable. But since this desire is innate, it is also natural and necessary, so that man cannot cast it out. Thus all teach, beginning from Aristotle and Plato down to our contemporaries. Indeed the pessimist Schopenhauer²¹ admits this. But a natural desire cannot be vain;²² and therefore something must exist which can truly satisfy this desire. Otherwise the author of nature would have acted irrationally, indeed even cruelly. - Beatitude is commonly distinguished as objective and formal; objective beatitude is the beatifying thing itself, but formal beatitude is the use or enjoyment of that beatifying thing. Thus, for example, the objective beatitude of the miser is riches, but formal beatitude is the enjoyment of riches. Yet this distinction of objective and formal beatitude does not designate two distinct beatitudes, but two formalities or two integral parts of the same beatitude. For man is not happy from the thing alone, but from the enjoyment of the thing. We treat at the same time of the objective and formal beatitude of man. These things having been noted beforehand, the first part of the proposition is proved.

Proof. a) Beatitude is conveniently defined: the stable, that is, interminable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets our desire.²³ But a possession of this kind is had in the attainment of the last end. Therefore in the attainment of the last end consists human beatitude. The major is explained: for perfect beatitude there is required stable or interminable possession of good; for if the beloved good is lost, indeed if it can be lost, beatitude is no longer present; for a lost good or fear of losing the good stands in the way of perfect beatitude. Moreover there is required possession of a good perfect in every respect, which totally quiets desire. For if the good possessed is imperfect and does not totally quiet desire, beatitude necessarily remains imperfect. The reason is that unsatisfied desire causes unhappiness. Wherefore briefly and yet adequately St. Thomas²⁴ describes beatitude: "Nothing else is understood under the name of beatitude except the perfect good of an intellectual creature, to whom it belongs to know his sufficiency in the good which he has." - The minor of the syllogism is plain from the first proposition, which asserted that God is the last end of man. That God is a good altogether perfect is plain of itself. But there is no reason why God should wish again to dissolve the union of the creature with Himself once had. Therefore this union will be interminable or eternal, and in union with God, the infinite good, human desire is satisfied in the most perfect way,²⁵ and the beatitude of man consists. Wherefore Benedict XII on 29 January 1336 declared: "By apostolic authority we define, ... that the souls of the saints ... enjoy the divine essence, and also that from such vision and enjoyment the souls of those who have already departed are truly blessed and have eternal life and rest."²⁶ - Since God is pure spirit, and since man according to his better part, that is, according to the soul, is likewise spirit, hence the union of man with God will be spiritual, and that most intimate. Spiritual union is made through knowledge and love. Therefore man will be united with God, the last end, and accordingly blessed, if he clearly knows God and perfectly loves Him. While in this life man is a pilgrim away from God, he knows God very imperfectly, enigmatically and as if through a mirror; but in heaven he will see God face to face. But although, with the light of glory assisting, the blessed in heaven clearly behold the majesty of God, nevertheless they cannot perfectly comprehend God, inasmuch as He is incomprehensible and infinite. But no finite intellective power can comprehend an infinite being. The knowledge or vision of God will be the first and essential constitutive element of (formal) beatitude in heaven; or formal beatitude is the best operation of the best human power with respect to the best object. Yet with that vision or contemplation of the divine essence there is intimately joined the perfect love of God above all things.²⁷

²⁰ St. Thomas says: "It does not pertain to free choice that we wish to be happy, but to natural instinct," S. theol. I, q. 19, a. 10.

²¹ Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik II, 196, § 14. Therefore Hilty (Das Gluck I, 179) rightly says: "Happiness is properly the key of all our thoughts.... It is the final ground of all learning, striving, and of all civil and ecclesiastical institutions. One may scold that as Eudaimonism, if one will; but it is the life-goal of men: they wish to be happy at any price."

²² S. theol. I, q. 75, a. 6.

²³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 5, a. 3 and 4. "Beatitude, since it is a perfect and sufficient good, excludes every evil and fulfills every desire."

²⁴ Ibid. I, q. 26, a. 1.

²⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 5, a. 4.

²⁶ Denz. n. 530.

²⁷ It has been much and sharply disputed among theologians in what eternal beatitude more essentially and formally consists: whether in vision or in love, whether in some habit deifying the essence of the soul or in some transfusion of God into the soul of the blessed. (Concerning all these things see Billuart, De beatitudine a. 2.) St. Thomas (S. theol. I-II, q. 3, a. 5) writes: "The last and perfect beatitude, which is awaited in the future life, consists wholly and principally in contemplation."

22. b) The second part of the given proposition, The more perfect the attainment of the last end is, the greater the beatitude is, can easily be proved. For the last end is God, infinitely perfect and blessed. But the more perfectly this infinite good is possessed, the more perfect the beatitude of the possessor necessarily is. This becomes clear by diverse examples: the nearer someone comes to fire, the greater heat he receives from the fire. The nearer someone is to light, the greater illumination he receives. In this earth, indeed, God is possessed in a very imperfect way by the just, because the knowledge of God in this state is very imperfect, and because so many dangers of losing God are present. But in heaven beatitude is more perfect; nevertheless it is not equal for all the saints. "In My Father's house there are many mansions,"²⁸ said Christ. All the saints indeed see God face to face, or have the beatific vision, but not all see God in an equal way. The reason is that the "light of glory," by means of which the beatific vision becomes possible, is not possessed by all the saints in the same degree. For the light of glory corresponds to the sanctifying grace had in this earthly life. Now just as the same degree of sanctifying grace is not had by different men at the time of death, so after death the blessed do not have the same degree of the light of glory in heaven. Whence the saints in heaven are compared by St. Paul to the stars in the firmament. And as star differs from star, so one saint differs from another. The old scholastics are accustomed to express this truth briefly and forcefully in this way: all the saints see the same object, namely God, but not in the same degree of perfection.²⁹

²⁸ John 14:2.

²⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, l. c. I, q. 12, a. 6.

23. c) The third part of the proposition, But in no other thing does true beatitude of man exist or can it exist, is altogether denied both by ancient and by modern rationalists. Some of them think that the beatitude of man consists in pleasure or the best enjoyment of all the goods of life. Thus the ancient and modern Epicureans. Others place beatitude in virtue and in even-minded endurance of pains. Thus the Stoics. Others think that supreme beatitude consists in the destruction of the world, as being the receptacle of all evils. Thus Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and generally the pessimists. Others have devised other opinions. Already Lactantius³⁰ enumerates ten opinions concerning beatitude: "Epicurus judges that the highest good is in pleasure of the soul; Aristippus, in pleasure of the body; Callipho and Dinomachus joined honorableness with pleasure; Diodorus, with privation of pain. Hieronymus placed the highest good in not suffering pain; but the Peripatetics in goods of soul and body and fortune; the highest good of Herillus is knowledge; of Zeno, to live congruently with nature; of certain Stoics, to follow virtue; Aristotle placed the highest good in honorableness and virtue." Moderns have devised still other opinions, which there is no time to enumerate here. But that all of them together are false is demonstrated by this evident argument: all those contrary opinions place supreme beatitude in some created and finite good. But no created and finite good, whatever finally it may be, can be the perfect beatitude of man. Therefore all contrary opinions are false. The major of this syllogism is plain by running through the individual opinions of the adversaries. The minor is proved: no created good lasts perpetually, but passes away in the course of time. Now nothing which is thus transitory can perfectly satisfy the human appetite, as was already said and proved above. Moreover, even if those created goods were stable, nevertheless they could not perfectly satisfy the human appetite, because, experience testifying, the more they abound, the more they inflame desire, according to that worn adage: "The more waters are drunk, the more they are thirsted for." Moreover history offers many examples of men who, although truly heaped up with all earthly goods, nevertheless denied that they were happy. The richest Solomon is witness, most wise and satiated with all pleasures, who nevertheless exclaimed: "Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity,"³¹ and: "I have seen all things which are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit."³² But the intrinsic reason of this insufficiency is that the object of our will and desire is universal and every good.³³ Now no created thing is universal good, but a particular or determinate good, and accordingly is not the adequate object of the human will. This indeed St. Augustine,³⁴ inwardly sensing, exclaims: "Our heart is restless until it rests in Thee, O God." St. Bernard,³⁵ however, says: "The rational soul can be occupied by all other things; it cannot be filled. Whatever is less than God will not fill that which is capable of God"; and St. Thomas³⁶ affirms: "Nothing finite can quiet the desire of the intellect, which is shown from this, that the intellect, any finite thing being given, strives for something beyond."

Proposition 3

³⁰ De instit. book 3, c. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 6, 364). Indeed St. Augustine (De civ. Dei 19, 1 [Migne, l.c. 41, 621]) says that according to Marcus Varro, 288 diverse opinions of philosophers concerning the highest good of man can be established.

³¹ Eccles. 1:2.

³² Ibid., v. 14.

³³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 2, a. 8.

³⁴ Confess. book 1, c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 661).

³⁵ Declamationes de colloquio Simonis cum Iesu (Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 455).

³⁶ Contra gent. 3, 50; cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 2, a. 8.

24. The last end of man, that is, perfect beatitude, cannot be obtained without supernatural grace, which indeed is given sufficiently to all on account of the redemption of Christ.

Proof. The first part of this proposition is easily proved. For above it was proved that perfect beatitude consists in the vision of the divine essence and in intimate conjunction with God. Now by merely natural powers, without supernatural help, man is not able to elevate himself to this intimate conjunction with God, nor can any created intellect see the essence of God.³⁷ For knowledge takes place according as the known object is in the cognitive faculty, as the scholastics rightly teach. Now the human intellect cannot by its natural power receive into itself the divine essence to be known, since that essence exceeds its mode of being. For the eye of the created intellect is with respect to the essence of God like the eye of the owl, which cannot look upon the sun. Therefore, for obtaining beatitude, there is required some supernatural help, which is grace and the light of glory. What this grace is, and what this light of glory is, belongs rather to Dogmatics to investigate.

³⁷ Cf. S. theol. I, q. 12, a. 4, and Cajetan's Commentary on this article. Moreover S. theol. I-II, q. 62, a. 1.

25. In the second part of the proposition it is affirmed that this supernatural grace is given sufficiently to all. For God has implanted in the soul an ineluctable desire of true and perfect beatitude. Therefore it would be unfitting if the same God had not given sufficient means for satisfying that desire and for obtaining perfect beatitude. - Moreover, Christ died for all and merited sufficient graces for all, so that they could be saved.

It does not belong to this place to search more intimately into the essence and existence of that sufficient grace, because this rather pertains to Dogmatics. Nevertheless two things are to be noted:

1. To baptized infants and to all those who, not having attained the use of reason, die in the state of sanctifying grace, beatitude is given as an inheritance; but to adults having the use of reason, as a reward. Accordingly adult men are bound by their good acts to merit eternal life, and indeed by cooperating well with the grace received.

2. All theologians are accustomed to distinguish between the natural order and the supernatural order. The natural order is understood as that which can be observed by proper natural powers, and in which natural reason is the supreme rule and norm of human acts. The supernatural order is that order which exceeds natural human powers, and in which human actions are regulated also according to theological faith. The purely natural order, or, as it is also commonly called, the state of pure nature, is indeed possible, but in reality it has never existed. For God from the beginning at once elevated the first parents, and in them the whole human race, to the supernatural order; indeed, according to St. Thomas,³⁸ the first man was immediately created in sanctifying grace and accordingly in the supernatural order. In other words: from creation God preappointed a supernatural end for man, so that all human acts ought at least implicitly to be directed to the supernatural end. If they are directed to it, they are good; otherwise they are evil. From these things there follow two corollaries of great importance: 1. there are not human acts indifferent in the individual, as will be proved more broadly below at n. 129; 2. there is not a purely philosophical sin, that is, a human act which would indeed be against right natural reason, but not against the supernatural end. That philosophical sin is not given is now certain, since the contrary opinion was condemned by Alexander VIII on 24 August 1690: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal [sin] is a free transgression of the divine law. The philosophical, however grave it may be, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment." This proposition was declared "scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous."³⁹ John de Lugo,⁴⁰ before the condemnation of this proposition, keenly defended philosophical sin, for example, philosophical adultery.

³⁸ S. theol. I, q. 95, a. 1.

³⁹ Denz. n. 1290.

⁴⁰ De incarn. disp. 5, sect. 5 (Paris ed. 1868, t. II, pp. 338-356, especially 352-353). Likewise Maes, Musnier, Caramuel, and others admitted philosophical sins. Cf. Hurter, Nomenclator IV, 407.

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 6-48; Billuart, Sum. S. Thom., treatise on human acts; G. Walsh, Tract. de actibus hum. 2nd ed. (Dublin 1891); V. Frins, De actibus hum. (Freiburg 1897 sqq., Herder); Noldin, De principiis n. 40-105.

Preliminary note. The supernatural end is not obtained by an adult man except as a reward owed to his good acts, as was said above. Hence, after the treatise on the last end, there is conveniently a discussion on human acts. But our intention, writing on practical Moral Theology, is not to discuss all the subtleties which the scholastics devised concerning human acts, but rather to hand down those things which are more useful and accommodated to practice, following the doctrine and method of St. Thomas in his Summa theologica I-II, q. 6-21. We divide the whole treatise on human acts into four chapters, namely: 1. on the nature and divisions of the human act; 2. on its principles; 3. on its morality; 4. on its merit. From the second article onward subdivisions will have to be made, as will appear below.

26. Definition. A human act can be defined: an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or: which proceeds from reason knowing and will moving; or: of which man is master.

The Angelic Doctor writes very well to the point:¹ "Actions which are done by man are properly called human only when they are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts; whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will. Whence free choice is also said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." - Acts of man are commonly called those acts which indeed proceed from man as man, but without the intervention of reason or will, as the acts indicated below under nn. 2, 3, and 4.

From the given definition it is plain that the following acts are not properly human acts:

1. All natural acts and all acts of the vegetative power in man, for example, nutrition, digestion of foods, motion of the heart, bodily excitations coming from an influx of humors or from extrinsic causes not freely admitted by the will. But because of the intimate conjunction between soul and body, the will can exercise some influence upon those acts; for example, the will can vividly excite the imagination and, by means of the imagination so excited, is able to produce palpitations of the heart or motions of sensuality. In these cases acts of sensuality of this kind are certainly human and moral acts, but not if they arise without the intervention of the will.

2. All acts elicited by the perfectly insane, by those sleeping, by infants lacking the use of reason, by persons put to sleep by hypnotism, by the drunk (if, however, the hypnosis or drunkenness is perfect and the acts committed could not have been foreseen before the hypnosis or in the state of sobriety). The reason is that acts of this kind proceed without the use of reason and therefore are not produced by man as a rational animal.

3. All acts so-called "first-first,"² which are indeed produced by a man having the use of reason, but occur so suddenly that they precede every use of reason and will, for example, instantaneous and unforeseen motions of anger from an unexpected grave offense. Such acts are neither human nor moral, but amoral. But the motions so-called "second-first," which occur with half-full deliberation and advertence, are human acts, and therefore moral, although imperfect.

4. All coerced acts, that is, those which occur under the influence of force or violence. Hence violent rape is not for the virgin an act either human or moral, but merely physical. For the virgin is not mistress of this act, which is altogether against her will.

¹ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

² Concerning the controversy whether the first motions of sensuality are venial sin, see Billuart, De peccatis diss. IV, a. 2, § 1. The negative opinion seems to be far truer.

27. Scholion. On the love of felicity and beatific love. Authors dispute whether the love of felicity on this earth and beatific love in heaven is a human act or not. Suarez, Sylvius, Billuart, Haine, and others stand for the negative side. Wiggers³ and Vermeersch^3a are for the affirmative side. It seems to be a dispute about words. The love of felicity on this earth, just like beatific love, is psychologically necessary, but it is not an act, but a habit (either innate or infused). But the individual acts which from this habit are indeed elicited necessarily, but not coercively,^3b are altogether according to and in no way against the will; moreover they are proper to man insofar as he is man, and for this reason nothing prevents them from being called human acts.^3c Whence Wiggers⁴ deservedly says: "It seems very absurd to despoil the most perfect operations of man, and those for which he was chiefly created, of the name and dignity of human action." Therefore some theologians do not call the act of beatific love human, but superhuman. But there is no disputing about words.

³ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

^3a Theol. mor. I, n. 38.

^3b St. Thomas (De malo q. 6, a. unic.) says: To desire beatitude is necessary to man "as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can then not wish to think about beatitude, since even the particular acts themselves of intellect and will are."

^3c If an act otherwise necessary could not be a human act, then Christ on this earth would not have elicited human acts in observing the divine precepts, because He could not transgress those precepts.

⁴ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

28. Note. St. Thomas⁵ says: "Moral acts and human acts are the same." Nevertheless the account of each is not the same; for an act is called human because it proceeds from reason and will, but it is called moral insofar as it is conformed to or deformed from right reason and divine law (cf. below, on the notion of morality, n. 99).

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3. This opinion of the Angelic Doctor is much truer than the opposite opinion defended by some, for example by Noldin, De princip. n. 63 at the end.

29. Divisions. Of human acts one is:

1. An elicited act and a commanded act. This division occurs very often in Moral Theology, but it is not explained by all in the same way. We call an act elicited which is produced immediately and formally by some power or habit; but a commanded act is one which is elicited by one power or by one habit, but from the command of another power or habit. Elicited acts of the will are, for example, to love, to hold in hatred, to consent, etc. An elicited act of the habit of faith is to believe; an elicited act of the virtue of justice is to render to each one what is his.⁶ A commanded act is a fast performed from the motive of penance; for it is elicited by the virtue of temperance, but commanded by the virtue of penance. Every act indeed is elicited, but not every act is commanded.

Even the highest powers of man not rarely act under the command of another. Thus the will itself can elicit commanded acts, as the Angelic Doctor expressly teaches: "An act of the will can be commanded."⁷ Only the first act of the will is to be excepted, namely, the simple volition of the end, which is not from the command of reason, but from the instinct of nature or of a higher cause.⁸ Experience testifying, inordinate passions in some men altogether command both the will and reason. - By the way, it is already permitted here to observe that, in a case in which one and the same act is elicited by one habit and commanded by another, that act derives its morality rather from the commanding habit than from the eliciting habit; for example, the virtue of mercy elicits an act of succoring the poor man, but this act of mercy is done from the motive or command of the love of God. In this case the act thus perfected pertains rather to the virtue of charity toward God. More broadly on this below, where there is discussion of the morality of acts from the end (n. 99 sqq.).

⁶ Many authors, such as the old Scholastics and Noldin, Tanquerey, Aertnys-Damen, take an elicited act as that which is immanent in the will, by which it is perfected and consummated, such as volition, choice, etc. But they call commanded acts those which are produced by other powers from the command of the will, for example, to think, to walk.

⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 17, a. 5.

⁸ Cf. ibid. ad 3.

30. 2. An internal act, an external act. Again, authors do not use this division in the same way. According to some, internal acts are only acts elicited by the will, such as to love; for they are and remain in the will. But external acts are all acts commanded by the will, since they are outside the will and are elicited by internal powers (an interior act, for example, to understand) or external powers (an exterior act, for example, to walk). According to others, in the more common and clearer sense, those acts are called internal which are manifested by no external sign, for example, acts of faith, meditations, morose delectations, of evil joy, of evil desire, etc.; but those acts are external which are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as to steal, to fornicate, to genuflect, to sing psalmody, etc.

Note. a) An act outwardly perceptible remains external, although accidentally it is perceived by no one; and this indeed must be well attended to in the matter of censures. For a censure is not incurred unless, besides the other requisites, an external act has been committed. Hence if someone has denied the faith interiorly, he is not excommunicated; but if he has committed his denial to writing or uttered it, although no one else knows this, he incurs the censure.

b) There are authors who, besides external and internal acts, also distinguish mixed acts, namely, those which are exercised by external and internal powers at the same time; but this distinction is superfluous, not to say erroneous, since every external human act must at the same time proceed from an internal act, otherwise it is no longer a human act. Yet we concede that several interior acts can be joined to some external act; for example, mental prayer, study, etc., can be joined to walking.

31. 3. A good act, an evil act, an indifferent act, according as it is either conformed to right reason as the norm of morality, or deformed from it, or indifferent to right reason. For example, a good act is prayer to God, an evil act is a lie, an indifferent act is walking (considered objectively). Below (n. 129 sqq.) we shall prove that indifferent acts are not given except when taken in the abstract, but that in the concrete every act is either good or evil because of the end or the adjoining circumstances. A good or indifferent act is called a licit act insofar as it is prohibited by no law; but an evil act is the same as an illicit act.

32. 4. A natural act and a supernatural act, according as it is elicited by natural powers alone (for example, to think, to speak) or is produced by the help of supernatural grace (for example, to elicit an act of contrition, of faith, etc.). An act is not supernatural from the fact that it turns upon a supernatural object, but from the fact that it is elicited by a supernatural principle. Hence if someone considers the mystery of the Trinity by the light of natural reason alone, he does not elicit a supernatural act; on the contrary, if someone by the help of grace resists a carnal temptation, he performs a supernatural act. - All supernatural acts elicited in this life are meritorious⁹ (either de condigno or at least de congruo, properly or broadly so called).

⁹ Cf. below, on merit, n. 139.

33. 5. A valid act and an invalid act, according as it either has or lacks the necessary conditions prescribed by positive law for producing some certain effect. This distinction often comes into use in sacraments and contracts. Thus, for example, the act of baptizing is valid if all things pertaining to the essence of baptism are observed; otherwise it is invalid. An invalid act is not to be confused with a rescindible act, since the latter is valid in itself, but can be annulled by competent authority.

34. Scholion. On the genesis of the human act. Here it is permitted briefly to add the series of acts both of the intellect and of the will which, according to St. Thomas,¹⁰ must concur for any external moral work. They are twelve, namely, six on the part of the will, five on the part of the intellect, and one on the part of the executive powers. Therefore, first there are six acts elicited by the will, of which three turn upon the end and three upon the means to the end. Concerning the end: simple volition, intention, and fruition. Concerning the means to the end: consent, choice, and active use. To these six acts of the will correspond five acts on the part of the intellect, and on the part of the executive powers only one act. On the part of the intellect there are two concerning the end, namely, simple apprehension and judgment; three concerning the means, namely, counsel, discretive judgment, and command. That act which is elicited by the executive powers is called by the scholastics passive use. Now the order of all these acts is the following: The first act is on the part of the intellect, namely, cognition or simple apprehension of the end to be obtained, for example, health of body to be recovered. This act of the intellect is followed in the will by simple volition, which is the bare complacency or love of the good to be had. This act in itself is ineffective, for it is only a wish; yet it disposes the intellect to considering whether the loved good can be had. Therefore a third act approaches, and indeed on the part of the intellect, namely, judgment that the loved end can be obtained, for example, that lost health is truly recoverable. After this act of the intellect there follows in the will an efficacious intention of actually obtaining the proposed and possible end through means.¹¹ These four acts having been posited concerning the end itself, the intellect attentively inquires about suitable means to be employed for obtaining the end; this act indeed is called counsel or consultation about means. In the example brought forward this counsel would be the deliberation of the sick man or of the physician, by what means health is to be obtained. Such counsel having been had, there follows on the part of the will an act which is called consent, by which it approves and appetitively seeks the usefulness of the means. By force of this consent the intellect is applied to discerning in particular what means are to be employed; this discernment indeed is called discretive judgment. This having been had, the will truly chooses or appetitively seeks the means thus proposed in particular by the intellect; this act is called choice or the appetite of what has been pre-counseled.¹² For example, all things having been weighed, the sick man chooses a surgical operation for recovering health. Once the particular choice has been completed, the intellect commands the execution of the means chosen; this act is called command. To this command on the part of the will there corresponds the application of the executive powers to the work, which act is called active use. The executive powers obey this application of the will and truly execute the external work, which act is called passive use; for example, the sick man goes to the hospital and prepares all things for the surgical operation. Finally, all these acts having been premised, the intended end is obtained and the will rejoices and rests in it; this act indeed is called fruition in the possessed end; for example, the surgical operation having been happily performed, health is recovered, and the man, who previously was sick, now rejoices in perfect health. - All these things are explained more broadly by the Angelic Doctor in the cited place. We have made mention of them, not indeed because of immediate practical utility, since that twelvefold number of acts is wont to be performed so quickly that the agent does not become conscious of all of them, but to show how accurately and wisely the scholastics made an analysis of human acts.

¹⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 8-17.

¹¹ Intention is distinguished from simple volition in this, that simple volition has as its object the good as such; but intention has the good as attainable through the means necessarily to be employed (cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 12, a. 1 ad 4). Whence, properly speaking, God indeed wills His goodness, but He does not intend it, since He does not need means for having it.

¹² S. theol. I-II, q. 14, a. 1. Concerning the relation between consent and choice, see ibid. q. 15, a. 3.

The intrinsic principles of the human act are called those intrinsic causes which produce the act. But from the definition already given of a human act, its intrinsic principles appear, namely, intellect and will. For there is no human act unless it has proceeded from deliberate will, that is, with cognition premised and will acting. But cognition must necessarily precede an act of the will according to the axiom: "Nothing is willed unless it is foreknown." Hence the present chapter is conveniently subdivided into two articles, namely: 1. on the cognition required for a human act, and 2. on the voluntary which is required for a human act.

35. Cognition is the first foundation of a human act, so that without sufficient cognition a truly human act is altogether impossible. But cognition can turn chiefly upon a twofold object, namely: 1. upon the act itself, and 2. upon the morality of the act. As to the first, the agent must be conscious to himself of the action itself which he elicits, or he must have sufficient advertence to the action itself.¹ If this advertence is present, the elicited act is truly human. But besides this it is required that the agent attend to the morality of the action. Thus, for example, a man eating meat on Friday adverts to the act of eating; but he can totally forget the morality of this action, because he does not advert that it is Friday. - Inadvertence differs from ignorance in this, that it is the privation of actual cognition, while ignorance is commonly taken for the privation of habitual cognition. Hence wherever there is ignorance, there is also inadvertence, but not contrariwise. For one who knows something habitually can, from actual distraction, not attend to it. For the sake of clarity one must speak separately: 1. of advertence, 2. of ignorance, 3. of the influence of ignorance or inadvertence on human acts.

¹ Modern philosophers call this apperception.

Divisions. Advertence, which is the act by which the mind attends to something, is distinguished:

36. 1. Full and half-full. Full advertence is that by which a man capable of the use of reason perfectly notices the things which he does. Half-full is called that in which, because of some obstacle, the mind does not fully advert to the act or its morality. Thus, for example, actions are wont to occur with half-full advertence during drowsiness.

2. Distinct and confused. The first is that by which a man clearly and distinctly perceives the act and its morality; for example, if one committing incest clearly knows that a twofold malice is included in this act. The other is that by which a man indeed adverts that he is acting badly or well, but does not clearly distinguish the morality of the act.

3. Actual and virtual. The first is that by which a man actually attends both to the physical act and to its morality. The other is that which indeed is not actually present, but could and morally ought to have been present; because of an obstacle, however, the mind does not fully advert to the act.

37. Principle. Virtual advertence (which by some is less correctly called interpretative) certainly suffices so that some act can truly be called human.

The reason is that although virtual advertence is physically actual inadvertence, nevertheless morally (by force of advertence and of an actual intention previously had) it truly flows into the act and causes it so that it occurs according to the free intention of the agent. From this three things follow:

1. Virtual advertence suffices for constituting a venial sin. Thus all.

2. Virtual advertence suffices for the valid administration of sacraments. Thus again all; at least if the sacrament of matrimony is excepted, in which not unsuitably actual advertence is required by some in the contracting parties, who are the ministers of this sacrament.

3. Virtual advertence suffices for true prayer and notably for the divine office. Thus also all. - As a general rule it can be held: Other things being equal, the degree of the morality of the act is measured by the degree of advertence. Whence the less advertence there is, the less voluntary is the act thus arisen. And concerning the morality of acts committed with actual inadvertence, that which the Angelic Doctor writes concerning ignorance is valid - for inadvertence is nothing other than actual ignorance: "Because every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin insofar as it diminishes the voluntary. But if it does not diminish the voluntary, in no way does it diminish sin."²

It was disputed between Patuzzi and St. Alphonsus whether virtual advertence would suffice even for mortal sin, or whether actual advertence would be required.³ Yet there seems not to be so great a real difference between the disputants. For among all it is agreed that perfect cognition and perfect liberty are required for mortal sin, and therefore, if either one is lacking, mortal sin is not present. Therefore the question remains whether virtual advertence is still sufficiently perfect cognition. Theoretically speaking, a negative response must be given, since virtual advertence is truly actual lack of consideration and distraction of mind, which certainly are incompatible with perfect cognition. But practically speaking, one must first investigate whether actual inadvertence is indirectly willed and gravely culpable or not, for example, because of culpable negligence or passion or an evil habit. But if it is indirectly willed and culpable, it certainly suffices for mortal sin. Hence, for example, he who has a habit (not retracted) of blaspheming, even if here and now while blaspheming he does not attend to the malice of this act, nevertheless sins gravely. The reason is that he who knowingly does not fight against an evil habit of blaspheming foresees with moral certainty that he will often break out into blasphemies with or without actual advertence. But if he does not prevent this, all following acts of blasphemy are truly mortal sins, because they are indirectly willed. On the contrary, a good Catholic who is accustomed diligently to observe ecclesiastical laws, if from inadvertence he eats meat on Friday, sins in no way.

² S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 4. Billuart treats this whole question concerning inadvertence very well, De peccat. diss. 5, a. 6.

³ Cf. Patuzzi, Eth. christ. tract. 2, c. 3, and St. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 4, who explains the true doctrine very well.

38. Note. According to the diverse actual advertence of the mind, acts of three kinds are customarily distinguished: 1. first-first acts, which precede all advertence;⁴ 2. second-first acts, which proceed with half-full advertence, for example, acts which occur in drowsiness, when a man neither sleeps perfectly nor is perfectly awake; 3. second acts, which proceed from perfect advertence.

⁴ Cf. above, n. 26.

DISSERTATION III

ON HUMAN ACTS SPECIALLY TAKEN

St. Thomas, Iª 2ae, from q. 8 to q. 17.

The general condition of human acts having been explained, namely by reason of voluntary and free, we must now treat of the acts themselves specially : first of elicited acts, then of imperated ones. Now six acts are elicited by will : three concerning end, namely simple volition, intention, and fruition; and three concerning means, namely consent, election, and active use. To these six acts of will there correspond on the part of intellect five directing acts, and one on part of executive powers. On part of intellect, two concerning end, namely simple apprehension and judgment; three concerning means, namely counsel or consultation, practical or discriminative judgment of means, and command. On part of other powers, passive use.

Of these Author treats quite fully through ten questions. Several things also concerning volitional power itself he intermingles in first questions, unto more accurate knowledge of acts. We shall select what are more useful.

[ The action elicited by some power is called that of which the power itself is at once the immediate principle and subject. Thus vision is from the sense of sight and is in the sight; to imagine is the action of the imagination and existing in imagination, etc. Vision is said to be an action elicited by sight, and imagining an action elicited by the imagination or phantasy.

To will is generically an act elicited by the will. However, according to the various mode in which it is borne toward objects, it acquires various names, not vain, but most useful to know. There are therefore five acts especially elicited by the will, namely intention, election, consent, use, and fruition: of which the first and last are about the end, the rest about those things which are toward the end, or means.

1° Intention¹ etymologically taken signifies to tend into another. But both that which moves and that which is moved tend toward something which is an end. Yet the motion of that which is moved toward the end proceeds from the motion of that which moves it. Therefore to tend toward the end, or intention of the end, is first and principally the action of one moving another toward the end. Yet the will moves all the other powers of the soul toward the end as to exercise. Therefore intention is an action of the will, namely that action whereby the will looks to the end as a term to be attained. ¹ 1-2a, q. 12, a. 1-5.

Since however the end is twofold, relative or intermediate, which is referred and conduces to another, and ultimate, in which one stops, intention must be considered in two ways, as the Angelic Doctor teaches and explains² : « The motion of the will toward the end and toward what is toward the end can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as the will is borne toward each absolutely and in itself; and thus they are simply two motions of the will toward each. In another way it can be considered according as the will is borne toward what is toward the end on account of the end; and thus one and the same in subject is the motion of the will tending to the end and toward what is toward the end. For when I say: 'I will medicine on account of health,' I designate but one motion of the will, whose reason is that the end is the reason of willing the things which are toward the end... And it is similar with the intellect; because if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, there is diverse consideration of each; but in this, that it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect. » ² Ibid., a. 4, o.

2° The second act of the will is election¹ , which is the essential endowment of liberty. Election however is « the preacception of one with respect to another, » and consequently supposes many things that can be chosen, at least willing and not willing. Whence in things determined to one, such as brutes, election has no place; for although brute animals take one thing before another, yet they do not determine themselves to it from themselves, as happens in election, but are determined by nature. ¹ Ibid., q. 13, a. 1-6.

I said that election is an act of the will. For although the election of the will be only in a good foreknown by reason, and therefore reason be said to concur formally to election, nevertheless the substance of the act, or the act materially taken, belongs to the will, not the intellect: for election is perfected in a certain motion of the soul toward the good chosen; but good is the object of the will. « It is manifest, says St. Thomas² , that reason in a manner precedes the will and orders its act, namely insofar as the will tends toward its object according to the order of reason, because the apprehensive power represents its object to the appetitive. Thus therefore that act whereby the will tends toward something proposed as good, from this that it is ordered through reason to an end, is materially of the will, formally indeed of reason. » ² Ibid., q. 15, a. 1, o.

Election however does not fall upon the end as end, but is concerned about means; for about the end is intention, not election. I said, « about the end as end; » for if the end itself be assumed as medium, as happens in intermediate and subordinate ends, nothing prohibits the end, because it becomes a medium, from being the object of election.

Hence it is understood that several other acts precede election, partly on the side of the intellect, such as counsel, which is the intellectual inquiry concerning the means to be chosen; the discretive judgment concerning the apter means for attaining the end, etc.; partly on the side of the will, such as intention of the end, consent, and others.

3° To consent, if you regard the etymon, is at once to sense, and imports the application of sense to something. Consensus is defined generically as « an act of the appetitive virtue adhering to some thing, » quasi namely taking a certain experience of appetite from the thing to which it adheres, insofar as it pleases itself in it. With respect however to the will, to which in man it pertains to consent or not consent, it is « the adherence of the will to those things which are judged by the intellect useful for attaining the end. »

Hence it is manifest that consensus is not of the end but of the means toward the end. But consensus differs from election in this, that election adds above consensus a certain relation with respect to that toward which something is pre-elected; and therefore after consensus election still remains. For it can happen that through counsel many things are found leading to the end, and while each pleases, one consents to each; but from the many that please we pre-elect one, by electing.

This consensus, as appears of itself, supposes dominion over one's own act. It belongs therefore not to brutes ¹ , which have not the appetitive motion in their own power, because such motion in them is from the instinct of nature; for they are rather acted upon than acting themselves toward the end. Consequently even in man himself the motion of the sensitive appetite, regarded in itself, is not properly consensus, because it lacks liberty. So long therefore as the will does not in any way consent to those sensitive motions, although sometimes they be so vehement that they seem voluntary, they are neither acts of vice nor of virtue, because they are not human acts, as Augustine observed, saying lib. XII de Trinit., c. 12, n. 17 : « The sensual motion of the soul which is common to us and to beasts is shut off from the wisdom of reason. » ¹ Ibid., q. 15, a. 1, o.

^{2 2} Ibid., a. 2, o.

4° The election of the will is followed by use, which, as Augustine says in lib. X de Trinit., c. 11, n. 17, « is the assumption of some thing into the faculty of the will; » whence the same Doctor says, ibid., that « use is in the will. » For as to consent is to apply appetite to something to be desired, so to use is to apply some principle of action to action. « Use of some thing, says the Angelic Doctor¹ , imports the application of that thing to some operation: whence also the operation to which we apply some thing is called its use, just as riding is the use of a horse and striking the use of a staff. But we apply to operation both the interior principles of acting, namely the very powers of the soul, or the members of the body, as the intellect to understanding and the eye to seeing; and exterior things, as the staff to striking. But it is manifest that we do not apply exterior things to any operation except through the intrinsic principles, which are the powers of the soul, as habits of the powers, or organs, which are the members of the body... Whence it is manifest that to use belongs first and principally to the will as first mover, to reason as director, but to other powers as executors, which are compared to the will, by which they are applied to acting, as instruments to the principal agent. » ¹ Ibid., l. 16, a. 1, c.

Hence it follows that use is of means, not of the end as end, which is not ordered to anything else, as I said of election.

Likewise use belongs not to the animal part ² , but only to the rational. For to apply something to another is only of him who has dominion over that which is applied. Dominion however, or arbitrium, necessarily supposes reason, whereby one can be referred to another, as is known from the notion of free will. ² Ibid., a. 2, c.

5° Fruition is « the love or delight wherewith the will adheres to some thing on account of the thing itself. » This Augustine teaches lib. X de Trinit., c. 10, n. 13 : « We enjoy, he says, things known, in which the will, delighted by them for their own sake, rests; but we use those things which we refer to something else whereby we are to enjoy. » Here you have the difference between fruition and use.

« From sensible fruits, says the Angelic Doctor¹ , the name of fruition seems derived. But sensible fruit is that which is expected last from the tree and received with a certain relish. Whence fruition seems to pertain to the love or delight which anyone has concerning the last expected thing, which is the end. But the end and good is the object of the appetitive power. Whence it is manifest that fruition is an act of the appetitive power. » That however fruition pertains to love, Augustine teaches lib. I de Doctrina christ., c. 4, n. 4, saying: « To enjoy is to adhere to something by love for its own sake. » Yet love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power ² . ¹ Ibid., q. 11, a. 1, c. ² Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

Aptly Augustine says in the place cited above that « we enjoy things known. » For where there is no knowledge, no delight can be given; but where there is knowledge, there fruition is had.

Hence « to enjoy food and any bodily pleasure is not absurdly thought to belong also to beasts, » as the same Aug. says in lib. LXXXIII quaest., q. 30, since beasts too lack not some cognition. Yet imperfect is the cognition in beasts whereby the end and good is known particularly, because their appetitive powers are not freely commanding, but moved according to natural instinct toward those things they apprehend. But we know perfectly the end and good, who rise up to the universal notion of end and good through the intellect. Whence, as the Angelic Doctor concludes ³ , « to rational nature belongs fruition according to perfect reason, but to brute animals according to imperfect reason, while to other creatures in no way. » ³ Ibid., a. 2, c.

It follows from the foregoing that perfect fruition is of the ultimate end only ⁴ . For fruition is the rest of the will. ⁴ Ibid., a. 4, c.

But rest is found perfectly only in possession of the ultimate end, which is the complete good and term of the will. From which it must be concluded that, although some imperfect fruition can be had even of the ultimate end not yet really possessed but only intended, nevertheless perfect fruition cannot be in the soul except from real possession of the ultimate end itself.

You will ask 1° whether there is in man dominion with respect to himself and his operations.

I answer. affirmatively¹. Because, besides election, there is given in the will an active use. Therefore, besides the judgment directing election, there must be given another act in the intellect directing the use and execution, which is called dominion or command. The consequence is clear, because the will never operates without the direction of the intellect. The antecedent also holds, because election is concerned with the means in the order of intention, as it is future and the effect of the end. Active use is concerned with the same mean in the order of execution, as it is present and the efficient cause of the end had in reality. Therefore these two acts are concerned with formally distinct objects, although they are materially the same. — I subjoin. But acts are essentially distinguished according to formally distinct objects. Therefore. — Moreover, where there is a new and distinct difficulty, there is required a new and distinct act. But in execution a new, distinct, and far greater difficulty is found than in election, as is evident to all. For how many are there who choose easily and fail in execution! ¹ Here q. 17, a. 3, ad 1.

You will ask 2° whether command is an act of reason or of will.

I answer. 1¹. Command is substantially an act of reason, presupposing an act of the will by whose power reason moves through command to the exercise of an act. ¹ Ibid., a. 1, c.

It is proved. To command says three things: first, to order him who is commanded to the doing of the work and to the means to be executed here and now for attaining the end; second, to intimate or declare the work to be done, not in the indicative mode, saying: « This is to be done, » as would be by a discriminative judgment, but in the imperative mode, saying: « Do this; » third, to move him or the power that is commanded to the execution of the work. But these three things belong to reason. 1° To order is to refer or compare one thing to another; which, since it is something intelligible, is proper to reason. 2° To intimate or declare is to make manifest and to speak; which also pertains to the intellect. 3° Although it belongs to the will per se primo to move, because it is the first mover to exercise, it nevertheless belongs secondarily and participatively to the intellect, from a preceding act of the will, because the virtue of the prior act remains in the following act: whence, as in election there remains something of the virtue of the preceding act of counsel, namely the order of the means, so in command there remains something of the virtue of election, namely the efficacy of moving.

Therefore command is an act of reason, presupposing an act of the will, by whose power reason moves through command to the exercise of an act.

You will ask 3° which acts are subject to the command of reason.

I answer.² and let this be the general rule: Those acts which are in our power and arbitrement, and to which persuasive reason can move us, can be commanded; but those which are not in our power and arbitrement, and to which persuasive reason cannot move us, cannot be commanded. This rule is gathered from the very nature of command. For to command belongs to a superior governing and having the power to move and oblige so that he be obeyed; otherwise command would be vain. ² Ibid., a. 5-9, c.

From this general rule you will deduce which acts in particular are subject, or not subject, to the command of reason¹. ¹ St. Thomas here considers from art. 5 to 9 whether there are commanded acts of the will, of reason, of the sensitive appetite, of the vegetative soul, and of the exterior members. See the solutions there.

A moral act can be defined : « An act proceeding from deliberate will, with subjection to the rules of morals, » which are eternal law and right reason.

I say 1° : Morality in common does not consist in extrinsic denomination drawn from the rules of morals.

It is proved². Moral being, and above all moral goodness, is a perfection existing in human acts on the side of the thing, caused by virtue, by free will, and by God. Therefore it is not mere extrinsic denomination and being of reason. ² Here q. 18, a. 4, ad 2.

It is confirmed. God rewards and punishes unto eternity on account of acts good or bad morally. But it is absurd that eternal reward, or torment, be decreed on account of extrinsic denominations and beings of reason. Therefore.

I say 2° : Liberty is requisite unto morality; nevertheless morality does not formally consist therein.

A human act is called only that act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man. The reason from St. Thomas is that only that act can be called truly human by which man acts insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures; but he differs from them precisely from this, that through free will he is master of his own acts. Therefore.

Nor say, 1st, that man differs essentially from brutes through the act of understanding; for it is answered that this difference must be considered here not only as to the substance of the work, but also as to the mode of operating; wherefore the act of understanding can be called the proper act of man, but not a human act taken strictly.

Nor say, 2nd, that the act by which we seek our beatitude in general is a human act properly so called, since it is perfectly voluntary and proceeds from perfect knowledge; for it is answered that here we consider man as he is a moral being, and his actions as they are worthy of praise or blame; but such they are not except insofar as they proceed from free will, which is the foundation of imputability. Hence although a necessary act of the will, if it is regarded according to its physical entity, can be called human, nevertheless in moral consideration, and in the usage especially current among theologians, it cannot. Hence it follows that human, moral, and free acts signify the same thing in moral matters, and can be used promiscuously.

But other acts, which are not referred to morals and are done in man or by man without any deliberation, such as first-first movements, or acts of a man wholly distracted, dreaming, raving, insane, drunk, or deprived of the use of reason in any manner whatever, are called acts of man, but not human acts. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 1, art. 1. - Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 1, disp. 2, sect. 2, n. 7. Baller., note (a), p. 1.

A human act is distinguished in many ways; for it is:

1st. Elicited or commanded. It is called elicited when it is consummated in the will itself, as an act of love, hatred, desire; but commanded when, at the command of the will, it is completed by another power, either internal, as an act of thinking, or external, as an act of walking, writing.

2nd. Internal or external. An internal act is that which is completed only by the internal powers of the soul, such as an act of thinking, loving; but an external or mixed act is that which the will completes through the organs of the body. An internal act is more specially called an act, and an external act is rather named an action.

3rd. Good, bad, indifferent. A good act is called that which is conformable to right reason; bad, that which is repugnant to the same; indifferent, that which is neither conformable to, nor repugnant to, the norm of reason.

A good or indifferent act, because it is prohibited by no law, is also called licit; but a bad act, because it is opposed to natural or positive law, is called illicit.

4th. Natural or supernatural. The former is that which is produced by the powers of nature alone; but the latter, that which is completed by the aid of divine grace. A supernatural act is further called meritorious either de condigno or de congruo, according as some retribution is repaid to it either from justice, or from mere fittingness and from the benignity of God.

5th. Valid or invalid. A valid act is that which enjoys all the essential requisites for producing its proper effect; but an invalid act is that which lacks even any one of the essentials.

As is gathered from the very definition of a human act, three things concur to constitute it, namely knowledge, volition, and liberty. Since discussion concerning knowledge will occur throughout the whole Treatise on Conscience, here only volition and liberty will be spoken of under the single word voluntary; not because voluntary and free are the same, but because in the acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end, in reality they are never separated, and thence they are used promiscuously by the moral theologian. First, then, some notion will here be given of the voluntary in general, and then of the voluntary in species, or rather of the indirect voluntary, for this species of the voluntary is very necessary to know and liable to difficulties.

The voluntary, according to St. Thomas, is that "whose principle is in the one operating . . . yet in such a way that the one operating himself knows the individual circumstances which concur for the operation": or, it is an act proceeding from the will illumined by intellectual knowledge of the individual things, namely of the object, end, and circumstances. Cf. St. Thomas, 3 Ethic., lect. 4.

The voluntary is distinguished in many ways, namely:

1st. Perfect or imperfect. The former is that which is done with full knowledge and full consent of the will; but the latter is that which proceeds from somewhat obscure knowledge, or from imperfect consent.

2nd. Voluntary simply or in a certain respect. The former is sometimes defined as that which is done from full deliberation and inclination of the will; the latter, as that which is done with consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or some inclination of the will toward the opposite. But more often the Doctors understand and explain this division in a different way. For they call voluntary simply that which proceeds from the absolute and efficacious will of man, even if there is given, to the contrary, a certain conditioned nolleity, so that apart from this case it would not be done, as happens in a sailor who, when a storm is pressing, casts merchandise into the sea; then they call that voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect, or more briefly a mixed voluntary simply. But if there is present no mixture of the involuntary, because no actual conditioned nolleity is given, as happens in a sinner seriously penitent from fear of hell, then it is called a pure voluntary simply. But voluntary in a certain respect is called by the same Doctors that which is according to the conditioned and inefficacious will of man, although here and now a prevailing unwillingness is present; for example, a player would gladly prolong the game, unless the time of Mass were pressing. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 9 and 21. - Voit, n. 4.

3rd. Direct or indirect. The former is that which is intended in itself, or through itself, that is, which in the order of intention is the immediate object of the will, although perhaps it is very remote in the order of execution; but the latter is called that which is not willed in itself but in another, or rather is foreseen as about to follow from another thing directly willed, as an effect from a cause, or as something connected with it; for example, drunkenness in excessive drinking, or homicide from the rash throwing of a stone. Hence the Doctors often express the same division by the name voluntary in itself and voluntary in cause; but they use the name direct and indirect voluntary with St. Thomas to designate the positive and negative voluntary. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 9.

4th. Positive or negative. The former is called that which is from the will really acting, or which requires a positive action, for instance reading; but the latter is that which proceeds from the omission of an act depending on the will; not insofar as no act is posited by the will which is the cause or occasion of the negative voluntary, but insofar as no positive act is required which is of its essential nature. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 71, art. 5; and q. 6, art. 3.

5th. Express or tacit. It is called express if it is manifested by words or signs; but tacit if from some fact, or omission, it is apprehended to be present.

6th. Actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. That is called actual which proceeds from the will actually acting, as for example contrition in one who here and now elicits an act of penance. Virtual is an act of the will already posited, which nevertheless still so perseveres that here and now it exercises its power upon that which is being done, of which therefore it exists as the true cause. Such is the intention of a priest who, from an actual will of consecrating or absolving, begins Mass or enters the confessional, but a little afterward is so distracted that he no longer adverts to the words which he utters; nevertheless he truly consecrates and absolves by virtue of the intention which he had, and which morally perseveres and acts. Habitual is called that which indeed was actually emitted by the will, has not yet been revoked, but does not flow into the present action, because it has been interrupted either by sleep, or drunkenness, or a notable delay of time; whence it bespeaks pure concomitance, but not causality in relation to the action now to be posited. It is named interpretative if in no way it has been had, but can prudently be presumed, and would be had if it were thought about, or could be thought about. Thus a sick man deprived of his senses, if he has lived as a Christian, is judged to will to receive Extreme Unction.

Conscience can be defined: a judgment concerning the honesty or dishonesty of an act to be placed here and now. It is called, 1st, a judgment, for conscience is not some special faculty, but the intellect itself insofar as it actually judges. It is called, 2nd, concerning the honesty or dishonesty of an act, because this judgment does not regard the utility, fittingness, or facility of the act, but only its morality, or its relation of order or deformity to right reason. It is called, 3rd, to be placed here and now, for that judgment regards the action at hand which it ought to direct, but not a past action. Hence conscience differs from synderesis, which is: a habit of first principles concerning things to be done. Cf. St. Thomas, p. 1, q. 79, arts. 12 and 13. - St. Alphonsus, n. 2. - Bouquillon, n. 248.

Conscience is distinguished in many ways, for it is:

1st. Right or erroneous, according as it dictates what is true or false.

2nd. Certain or doubtful, according as the mind firmly judges something to be good or bad, or, on the contrary, remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action.

3rd. Scrupulous or lax, according as, either from an empty motive, it apprehends sin where there is none, or, on the contrary, from a lighter cause, presumes sin to be absent, or holds as light what is grave.

4th. Probable or improbable, according as the mind is inclined to opine from a grave or from a weak motive. Concerning each separately.

Right conscience, which some prefer to call true, is that which represents the object as it is in itself; otherwise it must be called erroneous, and indeed it is called invincibly or vincibly erroneous, according as ignorance or error is inculpable or culpable.

Right conscience, if it commands, must always be followed, because conscience is the proximate rule of the will, derived from the first and supreme rule of all human actions; but if it permits, it altogether exempts from every sin, because there can be no sin there where it is known that no objective malice is present. But erroneous conscience, if it is such vincibly, must not be followed, whether it commands or permits, because vincible error is considered voluntary, and is imputable as demerit; but if it is invincibly erroneous, then the same must be said of it as of right conscience, because subjectively it is compared to it. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 3 and 5.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He who thinks it is a fast when it is not, because of erroneous conscience sins against the precept which he supposes, if he does not fast.

2nd. If someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger of life, thinking inculpably that from charity he is bound to this, he performs a good act; and if he does not lie, he sins against charity.

3rd. He who, with some doubt, thinks that he must lie or steal in order to aid his neighbor, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it; but he must, if he can, inquire, lay it aside, and afterwards act; for such error is vincible.

4th. He who acts from a vincibly erroneous conscience is never immune from sin. For his very ignorance is voluntary and culpable; and this is always present, whether he acts according to conscience or against conscience, and it was committed when he omitted due diligence for knowing the things necessary to be known. Such a man, if when about to act he does not advert here and now to his error and acts against conscience, is stained with a twofold guilt, the former sin in its cause and the present actual fault contracted when he violates the dictate of conscience; but if the same man acts according to conscience here and now, as is evident, he does not sin, because he does not advert to his error, but nevertheless the former guilt of sin in its cause remains. But if when about to act he adverts in some way to his ignorance, he is surely bound to inquire and to obtain due knowledge. Moreover, if he retracts the fault of that ignorance by true penitence and applies a sufficient effort to driving away the ignorance, even if perhaps it remains, it will no longer be held culpable. Cf. Baller., Op. Mor., vol. 1, tr. 2, n. 32 sqq.

Question. By what signs can the confessor know that error is vincible in a penitent?

Response. Let him ask, 1st, whether he adverted to some indecency in this act; 2nd, whether his conscience dictated to him that at least the confessor or another prudent man should be asked; 3rd, whether from shame or fear he neglected an occasion of asking. If the penitent answers affirmatively to one or another of these, he can be judged to be living in culpable error; otherwise, if he denies all of them. And generally, if there is question of first principles and obligations of state, vincible ignorance ought to be presumed; but invincible ignorance if the penitent is diligent in those things which the pious are accustomed to observe, or grieves when he adverts to the error, which grief is rather a sign that no present fault is present, not that there was none past in the cause. Cf. Baller. tr. 11, n. 43.

Certain conscience is that by which someone firmly and without fear of erring judges something to be good or bad.

Although certainty is distinguished in three ways among philosophers, that which is called moral is chiefly considered by moralists. This certainty, which rests upon the laws by which men are ruled in their acts, is subdivided into perfect and imperfect. The former is that which is so founded upon moral laws that the proposition is clearly perceived to be unable to be false. This is reduced indirectly to metaphysical certainty. The latter is that which belongs to those propositions in which it is not absolutely repugnant that there be error, although this can happen most rarely. This admits various degrees.

Doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action; for doubt is the suspension of assent between opposites.

Multiple doubt is distinguished, namely: 1st, positive or negative; the first is had when the intellect suspends assent on account of grave reasons for doubting, or at least reasons apparently such; but the other when assent is suspended on account of a defect of motives; 2nd, of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or its obligation, or with some particular fact; 3rd, speculative or practical, according as it is concerned with the abstract cognition of truth and in common, or with truth which here and now is ordered to work.

Only certain conscience is the right rule of morals, and therefore it is never licit to operate with a practically doubtful conscience. The reason is both because, according to the Apostle, Rom. xiv, 23: "all that is not from faith is sin"; and because the agent with a conscience not certain voluntarily admits the danger of transgressing a precept, and therefore, by virtually consenting to its violation, formally sins. But morally certain conscience, even imperfect, suffices; because only that certainty is required which alone for the most part can be had; otherwise the rule of acting, to which man is proximately subject, would be very little accommodated to the human condition. Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 41.

You Will Resolve. 1st. As often as someone doubts whether the act which he is about to place here and now is licit or not, he is bound to apply diligence congruent to the gravity of the matter and the condition of person and place for the inquiry of truth; let him consult upright and skilled men, investigate their practice, and weigh the reasons with the sole zeal for truth; otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of violating the law from negligence in inquiry, and by that very fact sins.

2nd. If he cannot inquire, nor by himself is able to weigh the reasons of each side, nor in another way, for example through reflex principles, free himself from doubt, let him embrace the safer part; because otherwise he would act in practical doubt, that is, with a conscience truly doubtful and without any certain judgment concerning the honesty of the action.

3rd. He who, after diligent and sufficient inquiry has been completed, still doubts whether there is a law commanding or prohibiting, is not bound to obey this law, if nevertheless he can form for himself a conscience from a reflex principle, namely that a law which cannot be found cannot oblige, as will be said below, where probabilism is treated.

4th. Merely negative doubt is to be held as nothing, because it is founded upon no reason at all, or upon a very light one. Therefore, even if it remains, because it cannot bring it about that the opposite moral certainty is overthrown, nevertheless the obligation presses, or liberty stands, according as it existed before. But if a prudent suspicion of error, resting upon a grave motive, arises for you, the doubt ceases to be merely negative, and you are bound to inquire. And so, when hereafter cases of negative doubt occur, you will easily dissolve them, this rule having once been established, and therefore we shall attend only to positive doubt. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

Question 1. Does he who operates with practical doubt concerning the gravity of sin sin gravely?

Response. Affirmatively. For he who acts with a practically doubtful conscience, according to the common principles, sins in that species of sin, both moral and theological, concerning which practically, while he acts, he doubts. The reason is that he surely violates the grave obligation of taking care lest through voluntary ignorance or inadvertence he fall into transgressions of the law which could be grave.

Question 2. What is to be done in the case of a perplexed conscience, namely when someone, placed between two precepts, remains doubtful which of the two he ought to follow?

Response. 1st. Consult, if you can, a confessor or other prudent men, because in that case ignorance is vincible. 2nd. If you cannot consult and there is a necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave harm, choose what seems to you the lesser evil, yet not so that you do evil, but so that you recede more from evil. Know, moreover, that the law of an inferior order ought to yield to the law of a superior order. 3rd. If each precept seems to you equally grave, choose anything, and you will not sin; for there is not given a necessity of sinning. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

A conscience is called scrupulous which, from a slight, indeed even empty cause, doubts concerning the honesty of some action, and therefore fears sin where there is no sin. For a scruple is an empty apprehension, or slight suspicion, by which someone falsely judges something to be a sin. But the word scruple is said to be derived from little stones, or pebbles, which, inserting themselves into the shoes of travelers, create trouble for the feet.

But a lax conscience is called that which from a rather slight reason judges that what is illicit is licit; or finds only a venial sin there where there is a mortal one: it is namely that which, without sufficient reason, bends judgment in favor of liberty, either for avoiding the law, or for diminishing the gravity of fault. This conscience can be distinguished in three ways, namely: 1st, a lax conscience simply, which tends to extend liberty more than is fair; 2nd, a cauterized conscience, which from a long-standing habit of sinning regards grave sins, indeed even most grave sins, as nothing; 3rd, a pharisaical conscience, which makes great things small, and in turn small things great. It takes its name from the Pharisees, who spurned the most grave mandates of the law, while by eating with unwashed hands or passing over empty traditions, they considered themselves guilty of great sin.

For correcting the scrupulous, or at least for dealing more usefully with them, there will briefly be said here something concerning the signs, causes, harms, and remedies of scruples, and also concerning practical rules to be followed both by scrupulous penitents themselves and by their confessors.

It is of very great importance that directors of souls discern the truly scrupulous from the false. For often those are thought scrupulous who are not, and vice versa; and from this immense errors in direction flow, with no small danger of spiritual harm. Therefore much circumspection is needed here. But the principal signs of scruples are:

1st. Pertinacity of judgment, by which someone refuses to obey the counsels of a confessor or of wise men; and while he consults several, he acquiesces in the judgment of none; indeed the more men he hears, the more he is entangled.

2nd. Frequent change of judgment from slight motives, whence frequent inconstancy in acting, and continual disturbance of mind.

3rd. Fear of sinning in all things, joined with pertinacity of mind against the judgment of the confessor, of prudent men, or even against one's own judgment; whence follows frequent questioning concerning the responses of the confessor, and repeated inquiry whether, in acting according to counsel, the conscience can be immune from fault.

4th. Impertinent reflections concerning the circumstances which were present in an action, or could have been present, and certainty anxiously sought in all things.

5th. Obstinacy in always repeating the same sin in confession, or in holding as a sin that which already several times has been declared by the confessor not to be such.

6th. Continual anxiety concerning past confessions, notwithstanding the judgment of the confessor, or repetition of confessions.

But he cannot be judged scrupulous, at least immediately: 1st, who is moderately solicitous, or anxious lest he offend God; 2nd, who after a life passed in sins is still troubled, nor after confession seems to himself to have satisfied, but rather wishes to confess and expiate sins; 3rd, who deliberately still consents to grave sins, although after the committed sin he is greatly troubled and confesses anxiously, for there is a just cause of anxiety, at least moderate: nevertheless even in this there can be a truly scrupulous person; 4th, who in only one or another case has a scruple in a passing way, nor he who doubts whether he has sinned in this or that.

Moreover, it sometimes happens that the confessor cannot, after the penitent has been heard the first or second time, immediately decide whether he is scrupulous, even if he appears anxious concerning many things; since some just and reasonable cause of anxieties can be present. But much less can a scrupulous confessor easily judge whether the penitent is scrupulous, or only fearful. Cf. Lacroix, lib. 1, nn. 517 and seq.

The principal causes of scruples are the following:

1st. Divine permission. Not indeed as if God sends in false apprehensions, but because, permitting these, He withdraws His light, so that namely man, having fallen into anxieties, may return to the heart, bring himself back to better fruit, learn to run back to God, and by patiently sustaining anguish, make satisfaction for sins, increase merit, etc.

2nd. Operation of the devil. For the devil knows skillfully how to fashion scruples, by moving the blood, altering the humors, objecting various images to the imagination, composing diverse species, so that he may form a gloomy and false image of sin, trouble the mind, draw it back from spiritual progress, and finally cast it into dejection of soul, or even into desperation.

3rd. A melancholic and phlegmatic temperament. For melancholic persons are for the most part suspicious and tenacious of the things which they apprehend, and therefore prone to every suspicion of evil; and since they are of a cold temperament, they are more easily subject to fear and pusillanimity, and are terrified at the first appearance of evil.

4th. Weakness of the head, or defect of natural judgment in persons inclined to fear; likewise pusillanimity and dejection of soul, on account of which one does not know how to contemn fears.

5th. Excessive solicitude for avoiding everything which has the appearance of evil; for while the scrupulous person continually cries out to himself: Beware of sin... Attend to yourself..., he frightens and disturbs himself without cause.

6th. Association with the scrupulous; to which pertains also direction received from a scrupulous confessor, the reading of cases of conscience and of stricter ascetical writers done by someone incautious and less understanding; likewise the excessive flight from every human conversation.

Scruples generally draw along with themselves grave inconveniences and spiritual harms, and often also bodily ones, provided they are not specially permitted by God and do not persevere without fault of man. But the principal harms of scruples are the following:

1st. They harm the body; for through continual anguishes they constrict the heart, corrupt the blood, consume the vital spirits, and weaken the head.

2nd. They render the scrupulous person unfit for acting fruitfully with his neighbor; for most scrupulous persons are gloomy, and morose toward those at home no less than toward strangers.

3rd. They harm obedience, or even totally impede it; since the scrupulous person rather follows trifles and the mockeries of imagination; thus he is driven to act against the will of God, which is manifested to him through the spiritual father or director.

4th. They weaken the practice and love of prayer, or even remove it altogether from the midst; because they enervate the force of the mind, distract by leading it away to trifles, fill the soul with anxieties, and render it unfit for union with God. Hence follows not only spiritual gain ceasing, but also immense damage arising.

5th. They break down fortitude; for what great thing would he dare, who is wholly occupied in trifles, and, with the victory over his passions neglected, is so easily cast down in soul?

6th. They greatly diminish hope, or even destroy it; because the matter is at length brought to this, that, confidence in God having been lost, it declines into laxity. For how will he duly trust in God, who always beholds Him as a most severe exactor? Therefore the scrupulous person, unless he fights bravely against scruples, being vexed by them, will shortly be driven into desperation, and will loosen the reins to his desires, or at least will lead a most miserable life and one with great danger of damnation.

Scruples are frequently concerned: 1st, with daily actions; 2nd, with depraved thoughts; 3rd, with confessions. Therefore:

I. To scrupulous persons who in all actions are troubled by the fear of sinning, it must be enjoined that they act vigorously against scruples, and abstain from confessing them, unless they are most certain that sin is present there. For although by acting thus they sometimes sin materially, nevertheless they will not sin formally by reason of the obedience which they ought to render to the confessor. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 17.

II. To scrupulous persons who fear to give, or to have given, assent to any depraved thought against chastity, faith, or charity, it must be imposed that they despise these thoughts as mere phantasms, and abstain from confession of thoughts of this sort, unless they can swear that they have truly consented to the same. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

III. To scrupulous persons who are always anxious concerning confessions, especially past ones, it must be prohibited that they think any more about the faults of their former life, nor say a word about them in confession, unless they can swear: 1st, that they have perpetrated mortal sins; 2nd, that they have never confessed them, especially if they have already made a general confession. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 16.

Moreover the scrupulous and the timorous, anxious about past confessions, are to be questioned thus: 1st. Have you knowingly concealed a grave sin? 2nd. Were you proposing to repeat sins? If they answer negatively to each question, their confession must be pronounced valid.

1st. In moral matters certainty is not to be sought in all things. This is valid for all; but it must be applied especially to the scrupulous person.

2nd. The greatest and blind obedience is to be rendered to the confessor, and one must proceed in all things with great humility and confidence.

3rd. A doubt which in others could seem reasonable is altogether to be spurned in the scrupulous.

4th. It is licit, indeed often obligatory, and sometimes under grave obligation, to contend against scruples. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 7.

5th. Confession is never to be repeated, unless it was certainly sacrilegious; nor is the examination of the last confession ever to be renewed, even if a doubt concerning a grave sin omitted seems to arise.

6th. Scruples are to be contemned; nor are the scrupulous ever to dispute with themselves about these things.

1st. Let the confessor scrutinize whether the penitent is truly scrupulous..., whether in all things..., and what is the origin of the scruples.

2nd. Let him be patient, kindly, and strong. To him pertain these words of the Apostle, II Tim. iv, 2: "Be urgent in season, out of season; reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine."

3rd. Let him respond to one asking without hesitation and with command; let him not easily add reasons to responses; nor let him permit sins already confessed to be repeated several times.

4th. Let him commend to the scrupulous person great confidence in the goodness of God, frequent prayer, flight from idleness, brevity of examination, humility of heart.

5th. With the scrupulous person let him use general, not particular rules; for the scrupulous person cannot be directed by these, because he is unfit for applying them.

Probable conscience, or, as others prefer, a probable opinion, properly and through itself, is that act of the intellect by which we adhere to some proposition, yet not without fear concerning the opposite. Therefore it differs from doubtful conscience, not indeed on the part of the motives, which exist in each case and can be of the same weight, but from the diverse mode by which the intellect holds itself toward them: for if it adheres to them, it is called probable; otherwise it will remain doubtful. I said properly and through itself, because often by the name of probable opinion or even probable sentence, among many authors, there comes the very complex of motives or reasons by which the intellect could prudently be supported, if it wished to adhere to one part rather than another. But this complex of motives is indeed better accustomed to be designated by the name of probability, and concerning this alone we shall have to speak here. Cf. Lacroix, n. 387.

Probability is nothing other than that motive, one or multiple, which, all the circumstances having been inspected, is capable of extorting the assent of a prudent man, yet not in such a way that no fear of error remains with him. Wherefore, when we say this or that proposition is probable, we understand two things, one positive, the other negative. The first is that a proposition of this sort is supported by so great a motive that a prudent man can safely assent to it; but the other is that that motive is not so great that it must necessarily and without any fear of error extort the assent of a prudent man. If the first is lacking, the proposition will be improbable; if the other, it must be called certain.

Probability is divided in many ways, but four divisions are chiefly considered here. Therefore it is:

1st. Intrinsic or extrinsic, according as it rests proximately either upon reasons deduced from the nature of the thing, or upon authority. It is called proximately, because extrinsic probability necessarily supposes intrinsic probability; namely so far does the authority of Doctors have force, insofar as it can or ought to be judged that they were moved to hold some opinion by some grave reason.

2nd. Speculative or practical, according as it regards the action considered in itself, namely without attending to those concrete circumstances which are commonly joined to it, or rather according as these circumstances are well weighed in each particular case.

3rd. Of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the law itself, or rather some fact.

4th. Greater, equal, or lesser, according as the foundations upon which some probable proposition rests, comparison having been made with its contradictory, appear more solid, equally solid, or less solid. Cf. Lehmkuhl, n. 79.

Things To Be Noted. I. Probability which is everywhere among authors called slight or doubtful is understood as that which is so light that he who assents to it is judged imprudent; for St. Alphonsus says: "Slight probability is not probability, but only a certain false appearance, or empty apprehension of probability." Therefore some authors rightly observe that those two terms, slight probability, are as it were opposite and fighting with one another. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 82. - Lacroix, n. 126. - Bouquillon, n. 308.

II. A proposition or sentence which in St. Alphonsus is called most probable is, according to him, that "which rests upon a most grave foundation; wherefore the opposite is judged slightly or doubtfully probable." The same, in the holy Doctor, is the sense of the word more probable, when one of these four adverbs is added to it: notably, certainly, truly, absolutely. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 40 and 54.

III. Some proposition can be more probable and at the same time less safe, and vice versa safer and less probable. The reason is that probability is measured from the weight of the motives, and safety from the absence of danger of harming the law.

IV. An opinion is to be held certainly probable which is asserted by most theologians to be probable; or even which five or six theologians outstanding in probity, judgment, and knowledge absolutely hold as true, unless a certain reason is brought against that opinion; for every probability, however great it may have been, when certainty of the contradictory proposition arrives, is altogether destroyed.

V. That opinion is certainly probable for a learned and upright man which he himself knows he has diligently examined, and experiences himself, without inordinate affection, on account of grave reasons, to find as true or certainly probable.

VI. Concerning the intrinsic probability of law, commonly only the learned and those versed in moral matters can judge, since only they can know that nothing certain is opposed to them. But concerning the extrinsic probability of some opinion, a moderately learned man can well judge, if, rightly understanding the state of the question, he finds this opinion asserted by authors greater than every exception, that is, altogether approved among theologians.

VII. A single author, if he is greater than every exception, and brings forward a reason which others have not examined or have not sufficiently solved, while he himself conveniently solves the reasons of others, can make his opinion certainly probable, although this is contrary to the common opinion.

Besides the general principles by which the theory of probabilism has been established above, namely: an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, or, a doubtful law does not oblige, there are also recounted some special rules by which those principles are confirmed, or are applied in particular cases. They are the following:

I. In doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands. The reason is that presumption produces moral certainty, at least broad certainty; and in this sense alone the cited principle or rule ought to be understood. Hence if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the whole Breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, the presumption favors you, and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating it. Likewise, if you doubt whether a superior justly commands or dispenses, presumption stands for him; because he can be led by reasons unknown to you, or is judged to judge prudently concerning those known. Besides, right order and the common good require that in such a case deference be shown to him.

II. In doubt one must judge from things ordinarily occurring. This rule nearly falls back into the preceding one, since in each presumption is the reason for judging thus. But the former extends more broadly; since presumption can be drawn not only from things ordinarily occurring, but also from particular circumstances.

III. In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act. It is a rule of civil law; but also commonly applied to theological matters. It is applied if the principal fact is certain, and there is doubt concerning some necessary circumstance or condition, or concerning the due mode; for example, if you doubt whether you confessed a sin with sufficient sorrow, or if you doubt, without being able to drive away the doubt, whether you contracted matrimony duly, which certainly and in good faith was entered into, you are not bound to repeat the confession, and the matrimony must be held as valid.

IV. In doubt favors are to be enlarged and burdens restricted. It is rule 15 of canon law in the Sixth, and signifies that in doubt the more benign things are to be preferred. Whence, according to this principle and the more common interpretation, these things seem to be established: 1st. As often as burdens and favors can be separated, burdens are to be restricted and favors enlarged, as much as can be done without force being brought upon the sense of the words. 2nd. If burdens and favors are indivisible, then one must judge concerning the intention of the legislator from his words, from the subject matter, or from the connected circumstances. 3rd. If the intention of the legislator cannot clearly be determined, one must attend more to the favor than to the burden. But here burdensome is understood as whatever tends to penalty, or harms the right of a third party, or is opposed to common law. But favor, or favorable, is whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace without detriment to private persons, or to the community, or to the law itself.

V. In obscure matters that which is least is to be held. It is rule 30 of canon law in the Sixth, and it is to be understood thus: where it is not certain concerning the true sense of a law or statute, and, inquiry having been premised, it cannot be determined either from the nature of the thing, or from the context of the words, or from the custom of the place, or from another circumstance, the less burdensome interpretation, or one more benign to liberty, is to be admitted. The reason is that the legislator is not judged to will to oblige beyond that which is clearly expressed in the law. Hence in doubt concerning the quantity of penalty to be inflicted, the minimum is to be chosen. Likewise, if it is not certainly clear concerning the delict, the accused must be absolved.

VI. In a doubt of fact the following axioms have force, or rules of civil law received among all, namely: 1st. In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. But this is to be understood concerning doubt about the principal act, for example, if it is doubtful whether someone struck another, this fact ought not to be presumed, but he who affirms must prove it positively. 2nd. In doubt it is presumed rightly done, what had to be done by law. This is to be understood concerning doubt about an accessory act, the certainty of the principal act being supposed; for if something had to be done by law, or if it is ordinarily accustomed to be done, or is favorable to the one doing it, it is presumed to have been done. 3rd. In doubt no one is presumed bad unless he is proved. This has force as often as there is question of the doubt of some delict, which ought not to be imputed unless it is certainly clear concerning it. Therefore, since delicts are not presumed, no one is presumed bad, but must be proved.

VII. In doubt the safer part is to be followed. It is a rule of canon law, which is had in cap. Illud Dominus, de sent. excomm., and in cap. Ad audientiam, de homic. But this rule must be restricted to cases of practical doubt, or to those in which an end must necessarily be obtained, namely where probability would not remove the danger which the law commands altogether to be avoided, as, for example, in confecting the sacraments, according to the things said above, and as is ascertained from all things thus far set forth. But if it is extended to speculative doubts, it ceases to be a rule or precept, but is a mere counsel. Cf. St. Alphonsus, throughout, but especially lib. 1, nn. 26 and 99; Systema Mor., Obj. 4; and lib. 6, n. 505. - Voit, nn. 38 and seq.

Law is defined by St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 90, art. 4: "A certain ordinance of reason for the common good, and promulgated by him who has care of the community." - It is said, 1st, an ordinance, because law is imposed by way of a rule and measure by which human acts are subjected to order; 2nd, of reason, because that ordinance ought not to be violent but to proceed from right reason; 3rd, for the common good, because the end of law, at least immediate and direct, is to provide for the community; 4th, by him who has care of the community, because to make laws is an act of jurisdiction; 5th, promulgated, because a rule cannot order except through application, and the application of this rule is made through promulgation. Hence it follows:

1st. There is present a manifold distinction between law and precept. For they differ, 1st, by reason of the one commanding, because a legislator is always a public person, but one giving a precept can be a private person; 2nd, by reason of the subject, because law is made for a community, but a precept even for a private person; 3rd, by reason of the end, because although ultimately the good of individuals redounds to the community, and conversely, nevertheless directly and immediately law regards the common good, a precept the private good; 4th, by reason of place, because law affects the territory, but a precept affects persons, and, as they say, clings to the bones; 5th, by reason of duration, because a precept ceases with the death of the one giving the precept, but law remains in force even after the legislator has died.

2nd. It follows that the properties or conditions of human law consist in this, that it be, 1st, possible, that is, accommodated to the morals and circumstances of persons, etc.; 2nd, honorable, that is, establishing nothing repugnant to right reason or to positive divine law; 3rd, useful, namely apt for procuring the common good; 4th, just, that is, according to the norm of distributive justice; 5th, promulgated, that is, applied to the community for directing actions.

3rd. Laws are instituted when they are promulgated. Thus the Code, can. 8, § 1. Cf. C. 3 D 14; c. 1. X, I. 5.

Law is distinguished in many ways; for it is:

1st. Divine or human, according as it has God or man as its immediate author.

2nd. Natural or positive, according as it is intimated by rational nature itself, or by a positive act of the legislator.

3rd. Ecclesiastical or civil, according as it is made by ecclesiastical or civil power.

4th. Moral or penal or mixed, according as it obliges under guilt alone, or under penalty alone, or under both at the same time.

5th. Affirmative or negative, according as it commands the placing of an act, or prohibits it. Hence it is also called preceptive or prohibitive.

6th. Simply prohibiting or invalidating or permitting, according as it renders an act illicit only, or invalid, or prohibits the agent from being disturbed.

Those laws alone must be held invalidating or inhabilitating by which either an act is expressly or equivalently established to be null, or a person to be incapable (Can. 11).

7th. Favorable or odious, according as it grants a benefit or favor, or brings in a burden or grievance.

8th. Written or preserved by use, according as it is made by written mandate, or introduced and preserved by custom alone.

9th. A personal or territorial law, according as it directly regards the person and then the territory, or directly the territory and then the person.

§ 2. A law is not presumed personal, but territorial, unless something else is clear (Can. 8).

It can, however, be both territorial and personal; a clear example of this was the chapter Tametsi of the Council of Trent.

A legislator is called a superior in whom there is present either independent and supreme power, or subordinate power, of making laws for a community over which he has jurisdiction.

I say, 1st. The Church has the power of establishing laws which conduce to the end proper to herself. The reason is that the Church is a perfect society in her own kind, and therefore she ought to be able to provide for her own governance, which she obtains through legislative power. The positive arguments are handed down more fully by the canonists.

I say, 2nd. Those who hold supreme power in civil society can establish laws which conduce to the end of temporal happiness. For the power of making laws is a necessary means for preserving society. Therefore it ought to be present in him to whom supreme authority over it belongs.

Question 1. Who in the Church possess the faculty of establishing laws?

Response. The Pope, a general Council, Bishops, and particular Councils.

1st. The Pope or Roman Pontiff for the whole Church. For it was said to him in the person of Peter: "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep." John xxi, 15 and 16. - But the word to feed signifies the same as to govern and rule.

2nd. A general Council likewise for the whole Church. For a general Council juridically consists of all the Bishops of the whole world convoked by the Pope, and of the Roman Pontiff, the supreme head of the whole Church, by whose authority its decrees must necessarily be confirmed. Therefore it has the fullest jurisdiction over the universal Church.

3rd. Bishops for the diocese. This is clear from Acts xx, 28: "The Holy Spirit has placed you Bishops to rule the Church of God."

§ 1. Bishops are successors of the Apostles and by divine institution are placed over particular churches, which they govern with ordinary power under the authority of the Roman Pontiff (Can. 329).

§ 1. It is their right and duty to govern the diocese both in spiritual matters and in temporal matters with legislative, judicial, and coercive power, to be exercised according to the norm of the sacred canons.¹

§ 2. Episcopal laws begin to oblige immediately from promulgation, unless something else is provided in them; moreover, the mode of promulgation is determined by the Bishop himself (Can. 335).

And therefore he can also simply make laws even outside a synod and without the chapter having been heard. For to him must be attributed the principal authority of all things to be done. An abbot or prelate nullius has the same ordinary powers which belong to bishops in their own dioceses. Cf. Can. 323, § 1.

Apostolic Vicars and Prefects enjoy in their territory the same rights and faculties which belong to bishops in their own dioceses. Cf. can. 294; 323, § 1; 198, § 11. Concerning Apostolic Administrators, see canons 312-318.

Archbishops, however, and Patriarchs cannot make laws for the diocesans of their suffragans, because they are not their superiors properly so called, although they can settle lawsuits brought before them.

4th. Particular Councils for the province. For if Bishops, taken separately, are able to establish laws for dioceses, similarly also in a Council, whether plenary for the whole nation or provincial, they can establish laws for the nation or province. Concerning these councils the new Code decrees as follows:

§ 1. When the plenary or provincial Council has been completed, the president is to transmit all the acts and decrees to the Holy See, and these are not to be promulgated before they have been weighed and reviewed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council; moreover, the Fathers of the Council themselves are to designate both the mode of promulgating the decrees and the time at which the decrees, once promulgated, begin to oblige.

§ 2. The decrees of a plenary and provincial Council, once promulgated, oblige in the whole territory of each one, and local Ordinaries cannot dispense from them except in particular cases and for a just cause (Can. 291).

But confirmation of Synods by the Apostolic See can be done in two ways, to be carefully distinguished: in common form, or in specific form. In common form, by which their statutes are neither approved absolutely, nor, much less, sanctioned by Apostolic authority, but are only permitted to be promulgated; in specific form, by which, after diligent examination has been premised, their decrees are confirmed by the Apostolic See motu proprio and from certain knowledge, and therefore put on the nature of pontifical law with regard to those to whom they are directed. - Cf. Bened. XIV, de Synod. dioec. lib. 13, cap. 5, n. 11; and lib. 12, cap. 5, n. 13. - Nevertheless transmission to the Sacred Congregation of the Council, and much less confirmation by the Apostolic See, is not necessary for the statutes of a diocesan Synod.

The Bishop is the only legislator in a Synod, the others having only a consultative vote; he alone subscribes the synodal constitutions; and if these are promulgated in the Synod, by that very fact they begin to oblige, unless something else is expressly provided (Can. 363).

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1126, n. 83.

Question 2. Are the statutes of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore to be said to have been approved in common form, or rather in specific form?

Response. It seems it must be said that they were approved only in common form. For the approval which they received was neither given to them from certain and personal knowledge of the Supreme Pontiff, nor with the formalities required for specific form having been employed. This is clear from the letter of the Supreme Pontiff, Pope Pius IX, to the Fathers of the Council, where it is said: "As regards the acts of the aforesaid Council ... you will receive a suitable response concerning those same acts from Our Congregation set over the Propagation of the Faith." - Cf. Acta Conc. Plen. Balt. II, p. cxxxv. - It is also clear from the decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith for the recognition of the Council, p. cxxxvi. - Cf. Smith, Elem., vol. 1, n. 74.

Question 3. Must the same be said concerning the statutes of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore?

Response. Affirmatively, as is gathered from the Decree of recognition, which is prefixed to the acts of the Council itself. For there it is said that "the Most Eminent Fathers set over the Sacred Council for Propagating the Christian Name, in general meetings held on the days 17, 24, 27, and 31 of the month of August, and also on the 5th day of September in the year 1885, after diligent inquiry had been employed, and after all things had been weighed with careful study and due maturity of judgment, examined the Decrees of the same Council and, with some emendations and modifications added, recognized them, that they may be observed inviolably by all to whom it pertains." Then it is added: "Moreover, His Holiness deigned benignly to approve this sentence of the Sacred Congregation, reported to the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII by the Most Reverend Lord Dominic Jacobini, Secretary of the same Sacred Congregation, in the Audience of the 10th day of September 1885, and commanded that the present Decree be issued concerning these things."

Question 4. Can the Administrator of a Diocese, while the see is vacant, Prelates of Religious, and Abbesses or Superioresses of Nuns establish laws?

Response, 1st. The administrator of a vacant diocese has all and only those faculties which belong to a Capitular Vicar, and therefore, just as ordinary episcopal jurisdiction passes to the latter, so it passes to the former, in spiritual and temporal matters, excepting those things which in law are expressly prohibited to him. Hence he cannot innovate or abrogate anything, but can only govern the Diocese according to laws already existing. Yet he can make statutes which would be necessary for the circumstances, so that laws already made may have force. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 104. - Cf. Can. 431, § 2; 435, § 1, 2, 3; 436.

Response, 2nd. Chapters or general Congregations and Prelates of Religious are able to establish true laws, within the limits of their jurisdiction, according to the proper constitutions of the Order. For they have statutes approved by the Supreme Pontiff, which bestow this faculty upon them.

Response, 3rd. Abbesses or Superioresses of Nuns cannot make laws properly so called, since they are not capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They can, however, exact obedience in conscience concerning things commanded, or concerning those things which conduce to the progress of the Nuns according to the rules. For they have the right of commanding both from the vow of obedience emitted by the subjects, and from the necessity of discipline which ought to be preserved in a community.

The object of law, generally, is whatever law can command or prohibit. Hence the object of law can be all and only those acts whose placing or omission favors the common good.

Concerning the object of law the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII speaks thus: "Among human laws, some are concerned with that which is good or evil by nature, and command that the one be followed, the other fled from, with the due sanction added": decrees of this sort are by no means derived from human society, but rather precede human society itself and are entirely from the natural law. "Therefore the precepts of natural right, comprehended in the laws of men, have not only the force of human law, but chiefly embrace that much higher and much more august command which proceeds from the law of nature itself and from the eternal law."

"But other prescriptions of the civil power follow not immediately and proximately from natural right, but more remotely and obliquely, and they determine various matters concerning which provision has been made only generally and universally. Thus nature commands citizens to contribute their effort to public tranquility and prosperity; how much effort, in what manner, and in what matters is established not by nature but by the wisdom of men. Now human law properly so called is contained in these particular rules of living, discovered by prudent reason and proposed by legitimate power. This law indeed commands all citizens to work together toward the end proposed to the community, and prohibits them from turning aside; and the same law, insofar as it is attendant upon and consenting to the prescriptions of nature, leads to those things which are honorable and deters from the contrary." "The liberty of those who preside is not placed in this, that they may command rashly and according to desire, which would equally be shameful and joined also with the greatest destruction of the commonwealth; but this ought to be the force of human laws, that they be understood to flow from the eternal law and to sanction nothing which is not contained in it, as in the principle of all right." - Encyclical Letter Libertas.

Question 1. Can acts already placed be the object of law?

Response. Negatively, according to the common axiom: law does not look backward. The reason is that law does not extend itself to past acts by reason of guilt, which, in the absence of law, was none, nor by reason of penalty which follows guilt, nor by reason of rescission, except in some case expressed by law. Besides, that retroaction would induce great disturbance in society. - Cf. Scav. n. 218. The Constitution of the United States is consonant with this; for in art. I, sect. ix, n. 3, it is had: "No ex-post-facto law shall be passed"; and art. I, sect. x, n. 1: "No State shall pass any ex.post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."

Laws regard future things, not past things, unless provision is made in them by name concerning past things (Can. 10).¹

C. 13. X, I. 2. Thus in fact, C. 4. I. 15 in VI extended the canon of the Church not only to future affairs, but also to past and still pending affairs.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1093, n. 26.

Question 2. Do heroic acts fall under human law?

Response. Generally, and with prior acceptance excluded, they do not seem to fall under law, because they are judged morally to exceed human powers, and therefore a law of this sort could not be called possible. Nor should you say that this reason has equal force for divine law; for when God commands some heroic act, He at the same time gives and strengthens powers through grace. I have said, 1st, generally, because sometimes, when the common good requires it, heroic acts can be commanded by human law; thus, for example, soldiers on guard cannot desert their post even when danger of life is imminent. I have said, 2nd, with prior acceptance excluded, because a precept is not reputed morally impossible for the few who voluntarily receive it; thus, for example, the Church commands perpetual enclosure for Nuns.

77. Question 3. Can human law command merely internal acts?

Response. Civil law certainly cannot, both because it cannot judge concerning internal things, and because without these acts the proper end of that law can be obtained. But it is controverted whether ecclesiastical law can, and the sentence which denies it is more probable, at least extrinsically. - Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 100, art. 9. - St. Alphonsus, n. 100. - Suarez, de Leg. lib. 4, cap. 12.

The same must be said concerning internal acts which are joined accidentally with external acts, as would be, for example, true devotion in giving alms. But those internal acts which are joined with external acts necessarily, whether as form, for example, the consent of the will in contracts, or as cause, for example, the desire of harming in homicide, can indeed fall under human law, but only indirectly. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 4. Do acts indeed external but hidden fall under human law?

Response. Affirmatively, because hidden acts by their nature do not differ from others; and besides, they can be judged by sentence, as hidden heresy which does not escape censure. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 5. Can a confessor enjoin merely internal acts?

Response. Affirmatively, and the reason is both because the office of directing the penitent in the way of salvation demands this, and because the confessor represents Christ Himself and participates in His divine power. - Cf. Voit, n. 163. - Scav. n. 217, and the note to n. 209, Paris edition.

Every man is born and remains subject to the natural law; but by human law only subjects are bound, provided they are habitually possessed of reason. The reason for the first is that, as St. Thomas says, 1-2, q. 91, art. 2, "the natural law is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature"; therefore wherever a rational creature is found, there is present there a subject of the natural law. But the reason for the second is that human law cannot be made except through an act of jurisdiction, which can be exercised only over subjects. Finally, the reason for the third is that men habitually lacking the use of reason cannot be directed by laws.

I. Several difficulties requiring examination are contained in the proposed question. For the doubt regarding the matter of a vow can be manifold. First, you can doubt whether you made the vow, or not. Second, when you are certain that you made it, you can doubt whether you have fulfilled it; you can also doubt about the quantity of the thing promised by the vow. The more celebrated controversy among authors is whether, when the doubt concerns the very making of the vow, the one vowing is bound. And the resolution of this question depends on that never-sufficiently-lamented invention of Probabilism. Much would therefore need to be said here pertaining to that treatise, which, God granting, we shall handle according to its importance, yet within the limits of our own slight ability.

II. Before I approach the matter, I must first set forth the distinction between doubt and light suspicion, or scruple, that is, imprudent doubt. Our discussion here, then, does not concern doubt resting on no probable foundation, which is not a true doubt, but an imprudent suspicion of an anxious mind, or a scruple; and that this is to be rejected, all teach. Castropalao, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and other Probabilists soon to be cited, omit this distinction here, and speak absolutely of "doubt," in the sense of the true opinion; whereby a not inconsiderable disservice is done — since, when many inept and irrational doubts occupy the mind, and torment the conscience of certain scrupulous people, the less experienced reader easily persuades himself that the one vowing, doubtful about the making of the vow, is absolutely not bound.

III. Now, then, we speak not of empty doubts, not of scruples and suspicions, but of true doubt, which, on account of probable conjectures on either side, leaves the intellect so suspended and undecided that it cannot form a judgment on either side: it is concerning this true doubt, I say, that there is controversy among authors. Some teach that no one is bound to fulfill a vow whose very making the one vowing doubts. Sánchez (Bk. II, on Marriage, disp. 40, sect. 6, n. 14), López (Part I, Instructions, ch. 25), Henríquez (Bk. XI, ch. 11, n. 9), Egidio de Coninck (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 16), Suárez (Vol. V, disp. 34, dub. 10, n. 26), Malder (in III, I-II, q. 19, art. 7, disp. 87), Layman (Bk. II, tract. 1, ch. 5, §4, n. 31), Filliucci (tract. 21, ch. 4, n. 165), Del Bene (tract. 3, on conscience, dub. 3), Martínez de Prado (ch. 31, q. 5, §1), Medina (Bk. I, ch. 14, §7), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 2), Tamburini (Bk. II, ch. 3, §7, near the end, n. 2), Cardinal Diana (Vol. VIII, tract. 12, resol. 18), Sporer (tract. 1, preamble, ch. 1, §1, n. 145), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, n. 84), and Probabilists commonly, resting on the principle: "The condition of the possessor is the better one" — the one vowing is in possession of some liberty against the vow, since it is certain that a man is free, but doubtful whether he has bound himself by a vow.

IV. The contrary opinion is upheld by almost all the ancient theologians, and by all those, among more recent ones too, who have declared a righteous and just war on Probabilism. First, I will produce the testimonies of some holy Doctors. St. Thomas, in express words, teaches that in a doubtful vow the safer part is to be chosen (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2, ad 3): "If, however, he doubts how he behaved in vowing, he ought to take the safer way, lest he commit a wrong." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §5, before §6): "If, however, they doubt whether they intended to bind themselves, it must be said that, since one is in doubt whether one can, or cannot, fulfill it, it is safer to do so, lest that day be prolonged, or transferred to some other good thing." Likewise §10, near the end: "In the third case, however, when there is doubt, since one who exists in doubt whether he transgresses the vow, and consequently sins mortally, is bound to place himself in a safe position — namely, that he not transgress the vow." The reason for this is drawn by these Doctors from the sacred canons; for Pope Eugene I, in a certain decree (Bk. IV, tit. 1, on betrothal and marriage): "In matters that are doubtful, what we consider more certain, we ought to hold." And Innocent III (ch. Illud, on excommunicated Clerics): "In doubtful matters, the safer path is to be chosen." And Clement III (ch. Ad audientiam, on voluntary or accidental homicides), says: "In doubtful matters we ought to choose the safer opinion." Nearly all the more ancient theologians agree with these Fathers — the Summae of Rosella, Trovamala, Pisanella, Sylvestrina, Armilla, whose texts, when we treat of doubt, we shall give in their own express words, for all of them may be read at the source. I will now indicate some among the more recent ones. Vázquez (I-II, q. 1, art. 6, disp. 65, ch. 3, and disp. 66, ch. 1), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 15, q. 4), Salas (unique treatise, sect. 17), Turrianus (q. 49, q. 2), Natalis Alexander (Bk. IV, art. 21, and disp. 66, ch. 2, q. 21, tract. 8, n. 162), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 9 and 36), Luiz (Vol. II, disp. 25, q. 21, n. 6), Basile de Marriage (Bk. X, ch. 15, n. 3), Pérez (in Laurea Salmanticensis, cert. 10, dub. 1), Montefinos (I-II, disp. 29, q. 4, §3, n. 121), Pedro Cornejo (in St. Thomas, tract. 8, q. 19, disp. 4, ch. 1), Pontas (s.v. Votum, dub. 3, n. 6), Gonet (tract. 11, on the first precept of the Decalogue, q. 8, dub. 2, n. 1), Antoine (tract. on the virtue of religion, ch. 3, q. 5), and all the other rigorous Probabilorists.

V. The reason for this opinion rests entirely on the sacred canons, which prescribe that in doubtful matters the safer opinion is to be chosen. What of the fact that the very light of rational nature prescribes, in all matters of every kind — whether pertaining to obtaining bodily health or avoiding temporal loss, or acquiring goods — that the safer course be embraced in doubtful matters?

VI. The theologians of Salamanca, and Probabilists commonly, respond that the sacred canons, St. Thomas, and other Doctors, must be understood of practical doubt, but not of speculative doubt. A charming, and quite empty, response indeed! What, I ask you, is this "speculative doubt"? The canons, and the aforesaid Doctors, speak of a doubt of fact — namely, whether the vow was made or not. What speculation is there here? They speak of a doubtful conscience, which has probable reasons for asserting the making of the vow, and equal reasons for denying it — and it is therefore called doubtful because the mind cannot form a judgment on either side, since it hesitates because of equal reasons on either part. If you call this "speculative," all doubts will be speculative. They perhaps understand a "practical doubt" as that which occurs while one must act: for then the agent doubts practically, whenever, while acting, he doubts. But this speculation is vain, and quite ridiculous: for it is necessary that the agent always doubt whenever, while acting, the intellect, on account of equal reasons on either side, remains suspended.

VII. You are mistaken, they say. For there are given principles by which the doubt is laid aside, and a judgment is formed which is called "practically practical." By this judgment, which is also called the "reflex," the clouds of any doubt whatsoever are dispelled. What, I ask you, are such principles, which, the doubt having been dispelled, induce moral certainty? They are, they say, hidden in the depths of human liberty, which cannot be dislodged from its possession except by certainty — since the condition of the possessor is the better one. But this rule holds only in matters of justice, to avoid disputes and confusion in civil society, as jurists themselves, and the Doctors, explain. In other doubtful matters, however, that rule by no means holds — especially in the matter of eternal salvation, which must be preferred to human life, let alone liberty. But more on this invention in its proper place. For now let it suffice to have stated the true opinion concerning the doubtful vow alone.

VIII. I will only point out this: that the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 144), following Diana, Trullench, Palao, and the other Probabilists, have descended into such laxity as to teach that the one vowing is free from the vow, even if, being in doubt, he leans more toward favoring the vow — since he has stronger reasons on this side — because, they say, although stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, if these are nonetheless not so efficacious as to generate a certain assent for that part, but still leave the matter doubtful, then the certain possession of the other side must outweigh that inequality, and a prudent judgment must pronounce in its favor.