Sin

288. Therefore there is no philosophical sin which is not at the same time theological, i.e. in this order of things there is no morally evil action which is not an offense of God: because it is impossible that a man perfectly using reason be ignorant of God without fault, and in his actions not advert, not even confusedly, to God the supreme legislator.

a. There were those who affirmed that morally evil actions could be given which are against right reason, because they are against the dictate of conscience, but which nevertheless are not offenses of God, because they are not known to be against the law of God, namely in those who either are ignorant of God or, while they sin, do not think of God and his law. Their doctrine was condemned by the Church as erroneous.¹

b. Indeed, philosophical sin is called an action which is and is known to be against right reason; theological sin, however, is an action which is and is known to be against the will of God. But he who through the dictate of conscience knows that something is against right reason, by this very fact confusedly and implicitly, yet actually, knows also that it is against the will of God. Therefore there is no action which through the dictate of conscience is known to be against right reason without its at the same time being confusedly known to be against the will of God and thus an offense of God. For in this order of providence it cannot happen that someone invincibly be ignorant of God, or know some action to be morally evil, without at the same time at least confusedly knowing that it is against the law of God, because through conscience the supreme legislator manifests himself to man. Therefore in this order there is no morally evil action which is not an offense of God, which is manifestly gathered from the epistle of St. Paul to the Romans.²

¹ This proposition (2) was condemned as erroneous by Alexander VII (August 24, 1690): "Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offense of God nor worthy of eternal punishment ..." By these words there is not proscribed the sentence of those who hypothetically teach that, if someone in fact labored under invincible ignorance of God and, while performing an action which he nevertheless adverts to be unfitting to rational nature, invincibly did not even implicitly think of God, he would not commit an offense of God, because it is impossible for God to be offended unless he is known in some way. Cf. Viva on this proposition.

² Cf. Rom. 1, 18 ff.; 2, 5 ff.

n. 289.

289. Division of sin. Sin is divided in many ways.

Into original sin, which, committed by Adam's will, is poured into descendants through generation; and personal sin, which is committed by each man's own will.
Into actual sin, which is an action or omission against the law of God; and habitual sin, which is the effect left in the soul from actual sin and is customarily called the state of sin. The divisions which follow pertain to actual sin.
Into sin of commission, which is the placing of a prohibited action against a negative precept, as theft; and of omission, which is the omission of a prescribed action against an affirmative precept, as omission of Mass.
Into external sin, which is committed by word or by some exterior deed, and internal sin, which is committed by the mind and heart alone; whence sins are also distinguished into sins of the heart, which are completed interiorly, of the mouth, which are completed by word, and of work, which are completed by external action.

Therefore by St. Augustine sin is defined as something said, done, or desired against the eternal law of God.¹

There are sins which are completed interiorly by the heart alone, as heresy, hatred. These sins are complete in their species, even if they are not manifested exteriorly. There are other sins which are not perfect in their species unless they are consummated exteriorly by work, as sacrilege, theft, homicide, fornication. In these the internal sin, e.g. the purpose of stealing, has itself toward the external as incomplete toward sin complete in its species. In each case the internal and external sin pertain to the same objective species; but they are said to differ from one another in species, entitatively, because the mode of sinning only internally or also externally is essentially diverse and must be distinctly declared in confession.

Into sin against God, which is against virtues whose object is God himself, as blasphemy; against neighbor, which is against virtues which regard neighbor, as theft; against oneself, which is against virtues which moderate one's own passions, as drunkenness and lust.
Into sin of ignorance, which proceeds from culpable ignorance; of infirmity, which proceeds from passion soliciting the will; and of malice, which proceeds from full knowledge, with no passion drawing, and therefore from the perversity of the will alone.

Not only sins of malice, but also of infirmity and ignorance, can be grave sins. As regards the degree of subjective malice, indeed, these three genera of sins differ among themselves; but as regards essence, any one of them can be grave and mortal. And sins of ignorance in a grave matter are grave if the ignorance is gravely culpable; but sins of infirmity in a grave matter are grave, in a light matter light. Experience establishes that a great part of mortal sins are sins of infirmity.

Mortal or grave sin is called that which turns man away from God, the ultimate end, which brings death to the soul because it deprives it of sanctifying grace, which of itself is worthy of eternal punishment. Venial or light sin is called that which does not turn man away from God, which does not bring death to the soul, which merits not eternal punishment but only temporal.
Into material sin, which is an involuntary transgression of law and therefore not imputable as fault; and formal sin, which is a voluntary transgression of law and therefore imputable as fault.

Material sin, or sin taken objectively, is opposed only to law; formal sin, or sin taken subjectively, is opposed to law and conscience. In a twofold way it can happen that sin remains only material: either because the act is not human, as if one fully drunk does an evil thing, or because the act is indeed in itself human, but the agent is ignorant that it is against law, as if someone violates abstinence not knowing it is a day of abstinence.

Into carnal sin, which consists in disordered pleasure of the flesh, as gluttony, drunkenness, lust; and spiritual sin, which consists in disordered pleasure of the mind, as hatred, pride, envy, avarice.²
Into one's own sin, which is the act or omission of the sinner himself, and another's sin, which is the act or omission of another, but nevertheless is imputed to us by reason of scandal, inducement, cooperation.

This distinction is to be explained in such a way that one sin is called one's own only, another another's and one's own at the same time, because the sin which is committed by another becomes one's own for us by reason of scandal, etc.

¹ Contra Faustum, l. 22, c. 27.

² St. Paul does not understand works of the flesh in the same sense, since he also counts idolatry, anger, enmities, etc. among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5, 19 ff.). By the name flesh he rather understands human nature corrupted by original sin and prone to sins. Cf. Gal. 5, 13. 16; 1 Cor. 3, 3.

n. 290.

290. On sin of omission. Sin of omission can be committed by omission of a commanded internal act, as if the precept of eliciting an act of faith or charity is not fulfilled; or by omission of a commanded external act, as if the precept of hearing Mass, giving alms, is not fulfilled. Here the discussion is about external omission.

The internal sin of an external omission is committed when the cause of the future omission is deliberately desired; the external omission then occurs when the time for fulfilling the precept is at hand.

If someone gives himself over to sleep, so that he foresees that on account of this he will not be able to hear a commanded Mass soon to be celebrated, he commits the internal sin of omission when he gives himself over to sleep; he is guilty of the external omission when the time of hearing Mass occurs, even if then he is not in possession of reason. Hence if, when the time of Mass occurs, he wakes and hears Mass, he is guilty of the internal sin of omission, but by no means of the external omission.

External omission in the cause of the will has the nature of sin, although it is not actually free, if he who placed the cause has not meanwhile retracted his will; but if he has retracted the will, the external omission is not a sin, but only the effect of a sin.

If someone commits himself to a journey, foreseeing that in this way he cannot hear Mass, and on the journey, before the time at which the precept can no longer be fulfilled, he revokes the evil will, because he would wish to hear Mass if he could, the omission is no longer a sin, because it is no longer voluntary either in itself or in the cause, which he would remove if he could.

The actions which are done at the time of the commanded act become evil if they are causes of the omission of the commanded act; but they do not become evil if they are not causes of the omission, but have themselves toward it merely concomitantly.

If someone determines to omit the commanded Mass in order to be free for study at home, the study becomes morally evil because it is the voluntary cause of the sinful omission; if someone determines to omit Mass from another undue cause and afterward, lest he be idle at home, is free for study at the time of Mass, the study is not morally evil.

The malice which an action contracts that is the cause of an omission is not distinct from the omission, but is the malice itself of the omission: for it contracts the malice of that sin of which it itself is the cause.

Therefore if the action which is the cause of the omission is evil in itself, two sins are committed; if it is indifferent or good, one sin is committed. Thus if someone omits Mass in order to read prohibited books, two sins are committed; if he omits Mass in order to occupy himself with licit studies, one sin is committed.

Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology, On the Principles of Moral…, Book Sixth. On Sins., Question Third. On the Conditions of Sin.

It is asked what conditions are required so that formal sin, or sin considered subjectively, may be mortal, and what are required so that it may be venial: for since formal sin is a voluntary transgression of law, not every sin which objectively, with the matter considered, is grave or light can be imputed to the agent as a grave or light sin.

Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology, On the Principles of Moral…, Book Sixth. On Sins., Question Fourth. On the Gravity of Sin.

n. 320.

320. On the diverse gravity of sins. The gravity of sin is the quantity of malice which belongs to a sin from its object. Now it is asked whether grave sins, considered objectively, are of the same or of diverse gravity.

Not all sins are of the same gravity, but some are graver than others. Thus sins against religion are graver than sins against justice.

a. This is gathered from Sacred Scripture: He who delivered me to thee has the greater sin.¹ Yet for Tyre and Sidon it shall be more tolerable on the day of judgment than for you.² Everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment; but he who says to his brother, raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who says, fool, shall be liable to the hell of fire.³ It can be disputed what the Lord wished to signify by the name of judgment, council, hell of fire; nevertheless this is certain, that to the diverse degrees of punishment which are signified by those words there correspond diverse degrees of fault.

b. The same is clear from reason. Sin is a transgression of the divine law; but laws are not all of the same moment and perfection, but some are more excellent than others and more necessary in relation to the ultimate end, according as the good is greater for the preservation of which they were established.

The Stoic philosophers, and in the Christian age Jovinian the monk, whom St. Jerome refutes, contended that all grave sins are equal. Their argument is this: the formal nature of mortal sin consists in aversion from the ultimate end; but there cannot be greater or lesser aversion from the ultimate end, since aversion consists in something indivisible. But it is clear that aversion from the ultimate end cannot be greater and lesser insofar as it is the negation of conversion; but it can be greater and lesser insofar as it signifies positive opposition to the ultimate end, or conversion to creatures.

For bearing judgment concerning the diverse gravity of sins, P. Lehmkuhl (n. 1224) establishes the following rules:

a. A sin is graver in proportion as the virtue to which it is opposed is nobler and higher; but within the range of the same virtue, other things being equal, sins against a prohibiting law are graver than sins against a prescribing law.

b. A sin is graver in proportion as the person against whom the sin is directed is nobler. Thus, of themselves, sins which are directed directly against God are graver than sins which are directed against man.⁴

c. A sin is graver in proportion as the good which is injured by the sin is greater. This rule indeed must be attended to in the first place in sins against neighbor.

With these things premised, sins, as regards gravity, follow one another in about this order.

a. Sins which are committed directly against God, or the internal divine goods: hatred of God, infidelity, despair.

b. Sins which are committed against God's external goods: blasphemy, idolatry, superstition, perjury, and tempting God. In this place are to be inserted sins which are committed against the humanity of Christ and the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist.

c. Sins which are committed against God indirectly, or against things consecrated to God, namely diverse sacrileges, as simony, profanation of sacred things, unworthy reception and administration of the sacraments, violation of a vow, etc.

d. Sins by which human persons are injured, and indeed in this order: sins which a man commits against himself, against those joined to him, as parents or superiors, and against strangers.

e. Sins by which human goods, of life, honor, reputation, fortune, are injured: homicide, lust, calumny, detraction, theft; drunkenness follows after these.

¹ John 19, 11.

² Matt. 11, 22.

³ Matt. 5, 22.

⁴ Cf. St. Thomas III, q. 80, a. 5.

Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology, On the Principles of Moral…, Book Sixth. On Sins., Question Fifth. On the Origin of Sin.

n. 321.

321. Genesis of sin. 1. Sin, which is a deliberate act of the will, is completed by these, as it were, grades.

a. First there is the proposal of an evil thing, in that by the work of some power, sense, phantasy, or intellect, some object is offered to the will which it cannot embrace without violation of law.

b. Then there arises in the appetite, sensitive and rational, or in the rational alone according to the nature of the object, an inclination toward the proposed object with a certain pleasure: for by natural necessity the appetite is borne toward its object and is delighted in possession of it.

Since motions of concupiscence arise by their nature in man when an object, good or evil, has been proposed, it follows that any man experiences motions of this kind, and that they are more or less frequent and vehement according to the diversity of temperament and circumstances.

c. Afterward the intellect adverts both to the object toward which the will is inclined and to its moral malice, i.e. to the law prohibiting the volition of it, and therefore to the obligation of repelling the temptation.

If the will adheres to the object toward which it is inclined before the intellect adverts to its malice, that adherence cannot be sin.

d. Finally the will freely determines itself to the act, and indeed either turns itself away from the object offered, resisting the temptation, or does not turn itself away from it. But if it does not turn itself away, voluntary adherence to the evil thing now begins on account of the temptation not rejected, which adherence is consummated through positive consent.

Sacred Scripture graphically describes the origin of sin with these words: Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. Then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been consummated, generates death.¹ That is, concupiscence, offering the object of sin, entices the will to consent; but if the will, not repelling the temptation, begins to adhere to the evil thing, from this, as it were, marriage between concupiscence and the will, positive consent, sin, is generated as fruit, whose effect is the spiritual death of the soul.

The efficient cause of sin is the human will alone, freely determining itself to an act prohibited by law; nevertheless it can be allured and incited to sin in diverse ways. That which allures the will to sin is either temptation to sin or is at the same time an occasion of sin; but each contains a danger of sinning.

¹ Jas. 1, 14 ff.

Slater, Manual of Moral Theology

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 47 passages

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. I, Chapter I. The Nature of Sin

A SIN is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be defined as a free transgression of the law of God. For a bad human act is a disturbance of right order either because in itself it is against right reason, as murder or suicide, or because it is against the command of a legitimate superior, which imposes a strict obligation, and which right reason bids us obey. But such a disturbance of right order is against the law of God.

Every voluntary act against right reason is an offence against God and a sin, for although the sinner in committing sin does not always think explicitly of God, yet he always apprehends that he is doing a wrong action, an action which his conscience condemns, and in the condemnation of conscience is implicitly contained the condemnation of God himself.

A sin must be distinguished from an imperfection, which is either negative or positive. A negative imperfection is merely the omission of a good action which is not of precept; and such an omission when grace moves one to perform the act, though not a sin, yet is a falling short of the perfection which was within one’s reach. A positive imperfection is a violation of God’s will made known to us, but which does not strictly oblige us. God wishes a religious to observe his rule, but frequently this does not bind under sin. A positive imperfection, then, is a falling short not only of the perfection which was offered to us and which we might have had, but also of that which God wished us to have, though he did not oblige us to have it.

Sin in the sense defined is called actual sin; habitual sin is the state which follows the commission of actual sin until this be forgiven.

A formal sin is committed knowingly and wilfully; a material sin is committed without knowledge or free consent.

Sin is said to be against God, our neighbour, or ourself, as it is against some virtue which immediately regards God, or our neighbour, or ourself. All sin is ultimately against God.

Sins of ignorance are committed through culpable ignorance; sins of infirmity through passion or bad habit; sins of malice with cool deliberation and forethought. The last, as is obvious, are the least excusable.

A sin of commission is an act against a negative precept; a sin of omission is the wilful neglect of a positive precept.

The meaning of the terms sins of thought, word, and deed, is obvious.

To commit sin there must be actual advertence to the malice of the action done, either when the action is performed, or when the cause is put. This follows from what was said above about human acts, which must be voluntary either in themselves or at any rate in their cause. But no act is voluntary without previous knowledge and advertence. It is not sufficient, then, for sin that a man could physically advert to the wrongfulness of his action, and should have done so; if there was no advertence, either at the time of the action or when its cause was put, there is no sin. However, advertence to what is likely to follow when the cause is put is sufficient to contract the malice of sin; and so wrong done through wilful negligence, or passion, or habit, or carelessness, is imputable to the agent.

Advertence to an evil thought or motion does not constitute sin without free consent of the will. The will consents when it voluntarily accepts an evil suggestion presented by the mind, and it is immaterial whether the evil originates in the will, or whether the will accedes to evil when suggested to it from without. For sin, then, there must be both advertence to the evil and free consent to it; a man who takes another’s money, thinking it to be his own, does not commit theft, nor does the kleptomaniac who is powerless to refrain.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. I, Chapter II. The Gravity of Sin

With reference to the gravity of its malice, sin is divided into mortal and venial. Holy Scripture teaches us that there are certain sins which exclude from the kingdom of God,¹ and, on the other hand, that the just, even while they remain just, frequently fall into slight faults.² The same truth is taught by the Church. There are, then, mortal and venial sins.

The essence of mortal sin consists in turning aside from God, our last end, and virtually placing our supreme happiness in some created good. But our last end is the vital and guiding principle of moral conduct, and to throw that aside is to make complete shipwreck of the moral life. It is not merely to wander out of the direct path, as is done by committing venial sin; however much this is done, if the ship be kept moving toward the port, it will come to harbour at last; but if the ship be steered altogether away from the port, it will never get there. By committing mortal sin, then, we turn away from God, our last end; we rob our souls of the sanctifying grace of God which is their life, and we incur liability to eternal separation from God and punishment in hell. Venial sin is indeed an offence against God, but it does not turn the soul away from him, nor rob it of his sanctifying grace; and it is more easily pardoned than mortal sin.

¹ Prov. xxiv 16; Jas. iii 2.

² Trent, sess. 14, C. 5.

Mortal sin is sin in the fullest and most complete sense; it is an act of consummate wickedness. A bad act must have three conditions in order to be mortally sinful:

(a) There must be full advertence to the grave malice of the act. A child that has not yet attained the full use of reason, a person half asleep, or half drunk, or half-witted, cannot know and appreciate sufficiently the malice of mortal sin, and so cannot commit it. , It is not, however, necessary to reflect explicitly on God; or on the grave wickedness contained in the act in order to sin mortally. It will be sufficient if one who has the full use of reason consciously does what 1 x Cor. vi 9. he knows to be seriously wrong, although there is no actual weighing of motives for doing or avoiding the act, no actual thought of God, no explicit calling to mind of the terrible consequences of mortal sin. Men who never think of God from morning till night, men who do not believe in hell, certainly commit mortal sins when they do what their consciences tell them is seriously wrong. Their conscience, as we saw above, is the voice of God.

(b) Besides advertence of the mind to the malice of the act, there must be full and free consent of the will to do it. If a man does not give full consent, but only dallies with the temptation, there is venial but not mortal sin; if, through being only half conscious or partially deranged, he has not full control over his will, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin.

After a temptation to sin is over, the conscience is sometimes uncertain and troubled as to whether full consent was given to sin. Often one may form one’s conscience on the point by reflecting whether he was fully awake or conscious of what he was doing, whether the sinful act to which temptation impelled him was executed if there was the opportunity of doing so. If doubt remains, it should be settled by presumptions drawn from what usually happens. If he usually yields to such temptations, the presumption is that he did so on this doubtful occasion; the presumption is in his favour if he does not usually yield consent.

(c) The object or the matter to which consent is given must be seriously against the moral law in order that a sin may be mortal.

The matter is serious as a rule when the sin committed is directly against our duty to God, as blasphemy, heresy, hatred of God, idolatry, despair of God’s mercy.

The matter is also serious when the sin causes great harm to our neighbour, as do sins against justice, charity, and obedience.

When sins cause great harm to the sinner himself the matter will also be serious and the sins mortal. This is the case with sins of intemperance and lust.

Some grievous sins are always mortal if there be full advertence and consent in the act. They do not admit parvity of matter, as theologians say. On the other hand, some sins, which if the matter be serious are mortal, become venial when the matter is light; sins against justice and charity are of this kind. It is a mortal sin to steal ten pounds, it is a venial sin to steal a penny. Some sins are of their nature venial, and only become mortal when they contract some special malice from the circumstances. Fidelity to a simple promise binds under pain of venial sin, but when the promise is bilateral and the matter serious, as in espousals, it binds under grave sin and in justice.

From what has been said about mortal sin, it will be clear that a sin will be venial if anyone of the three conditions required for mortal sin be wanting.

Mortal sin may in certain circumstances become venial, and, on the contrary, venial sin may become following paragraphs will make this clear: mortal. The (a) Mortal sin may become venial on account of an erroneous conscience which wrongly judges a grave sin to be only venial.

(b) The same may happen on account of imperfect advertence or imperfect consent to an act which in itself is gravely sinful.

On the other hand, a venial sin may become mortal:

(a) On account of an erroneous conscience which falsely judges a venial sin to be mortal.

(b) On account of a gravely sinful intention with which a venial sin is committed, as when a lie is told in order to commit adultery.

(c) On account of the proximate danger to which one is exposed of committing grave sin, as when one reads a slightly indecent book, but foreseeing that it will be the proximate occasion of grave sin.

(d) On account of grave scandal caused by venial sin.

(e) When light matter coalesces and becomes grave by additions, as when one who is bound to fast frequently in the day takes small quantities of food, which are notable in the aggregate; or when a considerable amount of money is stolen in small thefts.

Although no mere multiplication of venial sins can ever amount to a mortal sin, yet venial sin frequently committed disposes the soul to commit mortal sin both directly and indirectly. Directly, by forming a habit which becomes stronger and stronger, continually requiring greater indulgence for its satisfaction, and finally leads to mortal sin. This is often seen in such sins as theft and lust. Indirectly, because venial sin familiarizes the soul with wrongdoing, lessens the fear of God in the soul, diminishes the fervour of charity, and causes God to withhold those more abundant graces which he would otherwise give, and which would preserve the soul from sin, but without which the soul falls grievously.

To deliberate whether we shall commit mortal sin or not, weighing the reasons on either side, is itself a grievous sin. It is against the precept of charity, by which we are obliged ever to cling unswervingly to God; it is a grievous injury to God, as if a subject were seriously to deliberate whether he should or should not be faithful to his king and country.

In this chapter we have for the most part kept in view the objective malice of sin. As a rule, the confessor should judge of sins confessed according to the objective malice, but he will, of course, bear in mind that the subjective malice of sin may be very different from the objective. The subjective malice of sin will depend upon the degree of instruction and knowledge, the graces which the sinner had received, the violence of the temptation to which he was subjected, whether he was influenced by habit, perhaps unconsciously formed, or whether he was the subject of hereditary tendency, and many other considerations. It is obvious that the question of subjective malice must be generally left to the infinite knowledge of God, who alone sees and penetrates the inmost recesses of the heart.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. I, Chapter III. Different Species of Sins

THE Council of Trent teaches¹ that all Catholics are bound by divine law to confess to a priest all the mortal sins into which they may have fallen after baptism. A confession of sin in general terms will not suffice, but as far as is possible the confession must be integral—that is, each and every mortal sin must be confessed according to number and species. The confessor, then, must know when this duty is sufficiently fulfilled, or he must know how to distinguish the different species of sin. To enable him to do this, theologians have formulated three rules, of which sometimes one, sometimes another, is more serviceable for determining the species of any particular sin.

¹ Trent, sess. 14, C. 5-

Rule I.—Sins differ specifically according as their formal object differs. This rule is merely an application of the universal principle that acts are specified by their formal objects. Sins are bad human acts, and so, as we saw when treating of human acts, their formal object gives them their specific moral quality. The formal, not the material, object specifies the sin—that is, the object, inasmuch as it is morally wrong, causes the will which tends to it to be a vicious will in a certain definite way. And so adultery is a specifically different sin from fornication, because in the former case right order is doubly violated in a way that does not belong to fornication.

Rule II.—Sins are specifically different according as they are opposed to specifically different virtues. The reason of this rule is fundamentally the same as that of the former, for virtues are specifically distinguished according to their acts, and acts are specifically distinguished according to their formal objects. And so, inasmuch as charity is a different virtue from justice, hatred, as being opposed to charity, is a specifically distinct sin from theft or detraction, which are against justice.

Rule III.—Those sins are specifically distinct which are transgressions of formally distinct laws.

Laws, however, are formally distinct not because they are made by different authorities; the same sin of theft is against the natural, divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law. But when the motives of two laws are different, and the legislators wished to impose on their subjects the obligation of the special motive which they had in view, the laws will be specifically different, and sins against them will be specifically distinct. Thus the Church commands her children to abstain from flesh meat on Fridays, in order to exercise themselves in the virtue of temperance by curbing their appetite; she forbids anyone to receive Holy Communion who has not been fasting from midnight, out of reverence to the Blessed Sacrament; these two laws, then, are formally different laws, and violations of them are specifically distinct sins. Sometimes the Church, in forbidding an action, does not choose to clothe her precept with the obligation of the motive which induced her to make the law, and then violations of the law will be simply sins of disobedience. Thus bad books are frequently forbidden with a view to safeguarding the faith, but one who reads such books unlawfully does not thereby and necessarily sin against the faith.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. I, Chapter IV. Numerical Distinction of Sins

If a man steals five pounds from A on one day, and another five pounds from B the day after, he commits two distinct sins of theft. There is no difficulty about such cases. But how many sins does a man commit who, with the intention of seducing a woman, begins with bad talk, immodest looks and touches, and finally attains his end? Or how many sins are committed by one who is almost all day long occupied with bad desires, which are, however, interrupted by his taking his meals and by other occupations ? Or how many sins does he commit who sets fire to a building where a dozen people were asleep who all perished in the flames? In order to decide as far as possible such difficult questions as these, and enable penitents to confess the number of their sins according to the divine precept, theologians have drawn up the following rules:

Rule I.—There are as many sins as there are total objects in sinful actions. By total object is meant an object of the will which either in itself or by the intention of the agent forms a complete whole, and is not referred to another action as a part of the whole. Thus the theft of a sum of money is a complete whole in itself, and forms a total object of the will. Immodest touches may form a complete whole if the intention be restricted to them without an idea of going farther; but if immodest touches are intended as a means to commit further sin, they form one complete whole with the subsequent sin, and make one sin with it.

The reason of the rule is clear from what has been said before. The object specifies the act, and if there be one whole object from a moral point of view, there will be one complete moral action and one sin.

Rule II.—There are as many sins as there are moral interruptions in the sinful act. We say “‘ moral interruptions ” because the laws for confession are to be understood according to the common estimation of ordinary men, not according to the subtle distinctions of the philosopher. And so, if common sense tells us that on account of some interruption in the course of a bad desire, there are two human acts, and not one continuous action, there will be two sins and not one. However, the main difficulty in this question is to decide what moral interruption is sufficient and necessary to break the moral continuity in an action and to multiply the sin.

It is clear that if a person gives up his sinful design, and then returns to it again, there will be a break of continuity, and two distinct sins. Moreover, without explicitly relinquishing his evil design, there may be such an interruption in entertaining it that when it is taken up again there will be a new action and a distinct sin. The interval which is necessary for such an interruption will vary according to the nature of the act and the circumstances.

(a) In merely internal sins of thought, any complete cessation from the bad thought would seem to be sufficient to interrupt the moral continuity of the action and to multiply the sin. However, if the interval is short, and the thoughts proceed from the same impulse of passion, or one depends on another and issues from it, the moral unity will not be broken, and there will be only one sin.

(b) A determinate purpose to commit an external sin— murder, for example—is not multiplied by ordinary interruptions demanded by sleep, meals, or daily occupations. Such a purpose, persevered in for a week or so, would constitute only one sin. The same would hold for a longer period if the purpose were renewed at short intervals, and never retracted, If, however, it were not renewed within a short interval, mere lapse of time would eventually cause the purpose to evaporate and cease to exist, so that renewal of the purpose after a considerable interval would constitute a new and distinct sin, It is very difficult to define precisely what interval of time would be required to break the moral continuity of the act. Much depends upon circumstances; a longer interval would be required when the act was not renewed through forgetfulness, or because no occasion of renewal presented itself; a shorter would suffice if the ceasing to entertain the sinful purpose were voluntary. No better rule can be given than that the question of time must be left to the judgement of a prudent man.

(c) If the purpose to commit sin is from time to time externalized by the taking of some means to the end in view, the act remains one and the same for a long interval of time, and such a purpose entertained for months and years under those circumstances would constitute only one sin. Similarly a purpose persevered in for years not to pay a: debt that is owing constitutes only one sin, though, of course, it is more grievous the longer it is entertained.

It is a disputed point among theologians whether a sinful act which is directed to many distinct objects is only one or many sins. An example will illustrate the difficulty. If an anarchist throws a bomb into a crowd of people and kills a score of them, does he commit a score of distinct sins of murder which must be mentioned in confession if he goes to confession, or does he commit only one big sin, whose malice indeed equals twenty, but which is adequately confessed by saying, ‘I killed a number of people by throwing a bomb”? It will not suffice to say, “I committed homicide,” for that would mean the taking of one life only, which was not precisely what was done.

In this controverted question it would seem better to distinguish, and say that if the objects were capable of being grouped together and actually were conceived as one object by the mind, there was one act and one sin. If, however, the criminal distinctly thought of the several objects and intended to kill each and all, there will be as many sins as there are distinct objects. A priest who, when starting for a fortnight’s holiday, intends to omit his breviary during the whole time, commits one big sin; but if he executes his design, he commits a new sin every day that he neglects his duty, for the Office of each day forms one total object, and the precept of saying the divine Office is virtually multiple, and falls on each and every day.

If the means used to commit a sin are themselves evil and of the same species as the sin, and if they can be regarded as parts of one total object, as, for example, immodest talk and touches with a view to fornication, such means need not be distinctly confessed, as we saw above. If, however, the evil means are of a different species from the sinful end, as, for example, lying in order to commit a theft, the evil means are a separate sin, and must be distinctly confessed. If the means used to commit a sin are not in themselves sinful, they need not be confessed, unless the end was not attained, and in that case it will be sufficient to express in general terms in confession the use of means to give effect to a sinful purpose, by saying, for example, ‘“‘ I tried to commit theft,” if the intending thief merely entered a house, but failed to effect his design.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Chapter I. Sins of Thought

THERE are as many kinds of bad thoughts as there are different kinds of sin, but for the purpose of this chapter they are commonly reduced by theologians to two kinds: bad desires and morose pleasure in evil imaginations. Desire, therefore, is here understood in a wide sense and comprises a longing, a wish, purpose, or intention of doing something wrong. Morose pleasure is voluntary joy, delight, and satisfaction in an evil imagination, and what is said about it is also applicable to voluntary sadness and sorrow on account of something good, which should cause the opposite sentiments.

Desires are efficacious when there is the intention of taking the necessary means to obtain what is desired; they are inefficacious or conditional when this is not the case.

An efficacious desire of doing what is wrong is a sin of the same kind as the external action would be; it contracts the malice of the object and of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is plain. The external action in the concrete with all its circumstances is the object to which the will tends in forming an efficacious desire; and as an act is specified by its object, the evil desire belongs to the same species of sin to which the external act would belong when . performed in the circumstances contemplated.

The same must be said of inefficacious or conditional desires, unless the condition takes away all the malice of the act, as it frequently may do, ‘There is no harm, for example, in saying, “‘ I should like to eat meat on a Friday, unless the Church forbade it’’; and the same is true generally whenever the condition, “if it were lawful,” is annexed to a merely positive prohibition. If this condition is annexed to a desire against the natural law, as ‘1 should like to steal if it were lawful,” or ‘‘ I should like to commit fornication if it were not forbidden,” the condition does not remove all the malice of the vicious will, for the very tendency of the will toward such objects is against right reason. Such conditional desires, then, are sinful, unless they indicate a mere propensity towards such sins without any voluntary affection of the will. In any case, however, they are dangerous, and should not be indulged or expressed,

Morose pleasure in the imagination of what is evil is what ordinary Catholics mean by a bad thought in the restricted sense, It is sinful when voluntary, for it is an approbation, a satisfaction in what is wrong; it is an act of the will which is specified by a bad object, and so it derives its special character and malice from the object. To take pleasure, then, in the thought of revenge, is a different sin from taking pleasure in the thought of adultery.

There is a difference, however, between the source of the malice of evil desires and of morose pleasures. We have seen that evil desires contract all the malice of the object and of its circumstances. Morose pleasure, too, contracts the malice of its object and of any circumstance which is a motive of the pleasure, but not of other circumstances which may belong to the object in the concrete. For the will in morose pleasure tends to the object not as it exists in the concrete with all its circumstances, but as it is represented in the imagination, and precisely in so far as the object thus represented allures the appetite. Morose pleasure, then, takes its malice from the object, but not from all the circumstances of the object.

Taking pleasure in an evil imagination must be distinguished from taking pleasure in the thought of sin. It is not sinful to take pleasure in thinking about pride, for example, and trying to penetrate its malice. Knowledge naturally gives pleasure and in itself is not sinful. But it is dangerous to think about some sins, about sins of lust or revenge, for example, and on account of the danger it is wrong to think about sins of the flesh without good reason. Thinking about such sins with good and sufficient reason is not sinful, for the danger of sin is not sin, and it may be neglected for sufficient cause; if there is not sufficient reason and the danger of consent is small, it will be a venial sin; if the danger of consent be proximate and the matter grave, the sin will be mortal.

Morose pleasure in certain definite sins of one’s past life has for its object the sins as they were actually committed with all their circumstances, and so it will be infected with all the malice of the circumstances. Morose pleasure in past sins is thus similar in its malice to evil desires, and on this account obtains the special name of “joy” in theology. A penitent who has been guilty of this sin should say what sins they were whose remembrance gave him pleasure.

Those who are not yet married and those who have been married may not take pleasure in the thought of what is allowed to married people, for in practice such pleasure cannot be confined to the intellect; it also excites the sensua appetite and this causes temptation and sin.

It is not sinful to take pleasure in a good result which followed from some evil, as, for example, in the good results of a war or of a revolution. We may lawfully rejoice in the death of someone who was causing great harm to public morality, or to the public good in general, not precisely because he is dead, but for the reason that the cause of public harm is removed. We prefer the public good to the good of the individual, especially if he is doing harm. In this connection mention may be made of certain propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the following is a specimen: “It is lawful for a son to rejoice that he killed his father in a drunken fit on account of the great wealth to which he has thereby succeeded.”’ It is obvious that such joy is morally wrong, for the act of parricide was at any rate materially wrong even when committed while drunk, and joy on account of what was, and is, wrong is unlawful; nor does succession to the father’s wealth, a good of a lower order than human life, especially a father’s life, furnish a just cause for such unfilial rejoicing.

As it is unlawful to take pleasure in evil, so it is sinful to entertain voluntary sadness on account of good. To be sorry, therefore, for what is good and matter of precept is a mortal or a venial sin according as the precept binds under mortal or venial sin; and so a reprobate sins grievously who laments the years that he spent in leading a virtuous life. Even though the good be not matter of precept, as, for example, the vows of religion, it is irrational and at least venially sinful to be sorry for having taken them; it will be grievously sinful if it leads to the danger of transgressing them.

On the questioning of penitents concerning bad thoughts, see Genicot, I, n. 175.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Chapter II. The Capital Vices

THEOLOGIANS divide the chief vices to which human nature is subject into seven heads or capital sins, as they are called. The name implies that they are the source and origin of many more, inasmuch as the inordinate love of any temporal good is apt to give rise to many inordinate ways of pursuing it. The seven capital sins are: Pride, Covetousness, Lust, Anger, Envy, Sloth, Gluttony.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, 1. Pride

Pride is the inordinate love of our own pre-eminence. There is a tendency deeply seated in human nature, which arises from the self-love which is innate in every man, and which leads him to prefer himself to others, to wish to lord it over them, and to bear with impatience the yoke of subjection to authority. Truth requires that we should look upon any qualities and gifts that we possess as coming to us from the bounty and goodness of God, and as giving us no right to exalt ourselves above others who have received similar or even greater benefits from the generosity of our common Father. Pride, on the contrary, would willingly close its eyes to this salutary and humbling truth; it looks upon whatever it possesses as its own, as the fruit of its own labour and merit; it is prone to magnify its gifts, and to consider them to be greater than they really are, while on the other hand it is blind to the good qualities of others. This leads to the growth of a spirit of independence which is impatient of subjection to any authority, human or divine, and to a depreciation and contempt of others. The proud man has no need to ask God for anything; he thanks him that he is not as the rest of men; he is self-sufficient and independent of all the world. This is the pinnacle of pride, the inordinate love of one’s own pre-eminence.

Consummate pride, which refuses to be subject to God and to lawful authority, and which looks down upon other men with profound contempt, is a mortal sin. If it does not go to these lengths, but merely magnifies self without grave insubordination and contempt of others, it is a venial sin.

Pride is so serious an evil because it strikes at the root of the primary obligations of reverent obedience towards our Lord God and love of our neighbour, because it is opposed to the truth, and because of its universality; it is in the heart of every man and quickly grows to fearful dimensions unless corrected and subdued.

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, 2. Covetousness

Covetousness or avarice is the inordinate love of wealth, It is not sinful to value and seek after money in moderation, but the love of money becomes inordinate when it causes a man to be too close and niggardly in spending it, too eager and absorbed in acquiring it, and ready to do what is wrong in order to come at it.

It is of itself a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it leads to the transgression of a precept which binds under grievous sin. Although it is of itself only a venial sin, yet it is very dangerous because of man’s proneness to it, and because the vice is apt to grow fast by what it feeds upon, until it becomes mortally sinful. Holy Scripture frequently condemns it and warns us against it.¹

¹ 1 Tim. vi 9, etc.

Covetousness is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of wealth and inclines us to spend it well, according to the dictates of right reason. Prodigality inclines a man to squander his wealth on unworthy objects, or to give more than he should do, so that he is not able to live according to his state of life, or he is unable to fulfil his obligations, or he reduces his family to beggary.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, 3. Lust

Lust is an inordinate appetite for the pleasure which has its seat in the organs of generation. A wise and provident Creator has taken care that those actions which are most necessary for the individual or for society should be accompanied by great pleasure in order that they may be exercised more certainly and more readily. If there were no pleasure connected with eating and drinking, few men would trouble themselves about those necessary actions. The great pleasure felt in the act of procreation induces men to do what is necessary for the preservation of the race which otherwise would excite only shame and disgust. This, however, can only be done lawfully in wedlock. It is lawful then, according to the rules of married life, for husband and wife to indulge in venereal pleasure; outside marriage it is inordinate and sinful.

Any act of wrongful indulgence in venereal pleasure by those who are not married is grievously sinful if directly sought for or to which deliberate consent is given. But the fuller treatment of this subject must be left till we come to the Sixth and Ninth Commandments.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, 4. Anger

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

To be angry in moderation for a just cause is not sinful: “ Be angry, and sin not.”¹ Sin may even be committed through defect of anger, as when a parent or superior is never moved to anger against the faults of children or subjects, but permits them to go unpunished to their loss and the public inconvenience.

¹ Eph. iv 26.

The daughters of anger, or the sins which spring from the same root, are indignation and the swelling of passion, blasphemy, imprecation, quarrelling, and contumely; fighting, sedition, striking, and wounding; which are for the most part treated of in other chapters, or present no difficulty.

Contumely is an insulting word or gesture said or done in order to dishonour our neighbour. It is against charity, and of itself is a mortal sin except when the matter is trivial. A superior may, however, with moderation and caution treat a subject contumeliously, not in order to dishonour him, but to correct or humble him. Chaffing another about his foibles for the sake of recreation is not sinful unless it goes too far and provokes to anger or cuts too deep.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, 5. Envy

Envy is sadness on account of another’s good, inasmuch as it is regarded as lessening one’s own. It is directly opposed to charity, which inclines us to rejoice in the good of our neighbour, and is mortally sinful if the matter is serious. We must carefully distinguish envy from various other dispositions which bear some resemblance to it. Thus, if one is sorry because another has obtained something desirable, thereby making it impossible for himself to obtain it, it is not envy but emulation, which in itself is praiseworthy. Sadness because another has obtained a post of influence of which he is unworthy, is not envy nor sinful. In the same way, if one is sad because his enemy has obtained the means of doing him harm, there is no sin in such a disposition. Envy comes in where an equal, or one who is not much more than an equal, rises in position, power, or influence, and his rise is regarded with ill will because it seems to lower one’s self.

The ambitious are usually also envious, inasmuch as they see others enjoying what they wish to have for themselves. The mean-spirited, too, are commonly envious, since they look upon trivialities as matters of great importance, and the promotion of others, especially of the young, as a lowering of themselves.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, 6. Sloth

Spiritual sloth is a sluggishness of the soul in the exercise of virtue. If the reason for the sluggishness is the labour and difficulty which accompany the practice of virtue, sloth will be a mortal sin whenever on account of it a grave precept is violated; otherwise it will be a venial sin. If sloth makes the friendship of God tedious and irksome because of the trouble it takes to preserve it, it is a mortal sin, inasmuch as it is directly against our obligation of loving God with our whole heart.

Vol. I, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. II, 7. Gluttony

Gluttony is the inordinate indulgence in food or drink. The use of food and drink should be regulated by temperance according to right reason. As a standard right reason will be guided by the necessities of bodily health and strength, interpreted in a wide sense, and the uses of the society in which one lives. Inordinateness will come in if through appetite we anticipate the proper time for taking refreshment, or demand too exquisite dishes, or indulge in excess, or devour our food voraciously, or require too great care in the preparation of food, paying a chef as much as all the other servants put together.

…and 7 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 24 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Section III. On the Evil Act, or on Sin

(St. Thomas, I-II, qq. 71-89; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, bk. V).¹

We shall speak first of sins in general, then specifically of certain classes of sins.

¹ Cf. Cajetan, In I-II, qq. 57-58; Billuart, I-II, De peccatis; Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus, tract. XIII, De vitiis et peccatis; Pegues, Commentaire francais litteral de la Somme theologique, t. VIII; Pesch, Praelectiones dogm., t. IX, tract. II, De peccato; Billot, De personali et originali peccato; Landgraf, Das Wesen der laesslichen Suende in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Chapter I. On Sins in General

We shall discuss first the nature and conditions of sin, then the distinction, then the causes, next the effects, and finally the remedies of sins.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Article I. On the Nature and Conditions of Sin

n. 247.

I. Nature. Sin is usually defined with St. Augustine as: a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.¹ It is understood as free; for "sin is nothing other than an evil human act" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6). But a human act imports a free act. Besides, it is said:

A word, deed, or desire, by which the material element of sin is indicated, i.e., the word itself (sin of mouth), deed (sin of work), and desire (sin of heart); likewise the omission of a word, deed, and desire when their obligation is present (St. Thomas, cited place, body and ad 1).
Against the eternal law, by which the formal element of sin, or its malice, is assigned; this consists in the fact that it is opposed to the eternal law.

"Augustine," says St. Thomas, "placed two things in the definition of sin: one which pertains to the substance of a human act, which is quasi-material in sin, when he said: a word, or deed, or desire; the other, which pertains to the character of evil, which is quasi-formal in sin, when he says: against the eternal law" (cited place). Besides, observe:

a) The definition handed down agrees to original sin to this extent, insofar as Adam acted in the person of all of us, and therefore sin was in some way voluntary and free even for us.

b) Although the definition speaks only of the eternal law, nevertheless the transgression of other laws also, even ecclesiastical and civil laws, is comprehended, since all other laws borrow their force from the eternal law.

Corollary I. There is no purely philosophical sin, i.e., a sin which would indeed be opposed to right reason but not to the law of God, whether because the sinner was ignorant of God, or because he did not think about God. For reason is nothing other than a participation of divine law, so that what is repugnant to reason is ultimately repugnant also to law. Hence Alexander VIII condemned this proposition: "Philosophical sin, however grave, in one who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think about God, is grave sin, but it is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment" (St. Alphonsus, V, 11).

Corollary II. In sin one can distinguish the material element, or the material of sin, and the formal element, or the formal of sin. The material of sin is the physical act or its omission which is found in sin; the formal of sin is the very disorder or malice which is found in the act or in the omission.

Now it is asked in what the disorder or malice of sin consists, whether in privation or in something positive. Now the formal element of a sin of omission is situated in the privative, since it is nothing other than the omission of a due act.² But it is sharply disputed, even among Thomists,³ whether the formal element of a sin of commission consists in the privative or in the positive. But it seems to consist in the privative; for if it consisted in the positive, God, as the author of every positive thing, would seem to become the author of malice itself.

Corollary III. Sin involves a manifold ugliness; for it is a disorder:

Against rational nature, according to these words of St. Thomas: "Vice is against the nature of man insofar as it is against the order of reason" (I-II, q. 71, a. 2).
Against God, whom the sinner offends: a) as Legislator; b) as Judge, by not fearing his sentence; c) as Witness, by not revering his presence; d) as the Supreme Good in himself, by despising his friendship and embracing those things which displease God exceedingly; e) as our Supreme Good, by not caring for God insofar as he is our exceedingly great reward; f) as Lord, by injuring God's supreme right over our actions; g) as Benefactor, by not taking account of God's gifts, abusing them to offend him.
Against Christ the Redeemer. Under this respect sin is in some way deicide;⁴ for sins are the cause why Christ willed to undergo death. Hence one who, although he knows these things, nevertheless sins, constitutes himself the cause of the passion and death of Christ.
Against the Sanctifying Spirit. Under this respect sin in a Christian is in some way sacrilege, by which the faithful person, specially consecrated through the sacraments and the Holy Spirit dwelling within, is violated.

There is added that through sin a man is constituted a slave of the devil.⁵

Observe, however, that the described uglinesses are not contained according to formal species in every sin; for sin takes its species only from opposition to the motive on account of which the evil act is prohibited, as was explained elsewhere (n. 148). Hence, even if in every sin the aforesaid reasons of opposition to God are found, nevertheless for that reason it does not contain several species of malice or circumstances which must be declared in confession.

¹ Contra Faustum, bk. 22, c. 27.

² Billuart, diss. 1, a. 3.

³ Cf. Billuart, cited place.

⁴ Heb. 6:6.

⁵ Sweens, Theol. Mor. fund., n. 770.

n. 248.

II. Conditions of formal sin. For every formal sin there are required:

An act deficient from the rules of morals or contrary to some law, at least according to the apprehension of the agent. But it suffices that the act be repugnant to the rules of morals either on the part of the object, or on the part of the end, or on the part of the circumstance. "Any single defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3; St. Alphonsus). Cf., however, the things said in n. 69 sq., where we noted that the goodness of an act is not totally destroyed by just any evil end or circumstance.
Some advertence to the malice of the act, or to the act insofar as it is deficient from the rules of morals. Nevertheless it suffices that actual advertence was present when the cause of the evil act was placed; likewise that it be present or have been present only confusedly (St. Alphonsus, V, 4).
Some consent of the will, whether full or half-full (n. 19). But it is not required that the malice be intended; it suffices that the malice of the act be apprehended and the act nevertheless be placed. The reason is that evil must be avoided; and this is not done by one who chooses an act which he knows to be evil.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Article II. On the Distinction of Sins

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Definition · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Divisions · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Mortal Sin · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Venial Sin · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Comparison of Sins · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, The Subjects of Sins

Since it belongs to the confessor as judge to know what kind of sins there have been, and how often they have been committed, so that according to the words of Christ he may be able to remit or retain them, it follows, as the Council of Trent observes,¹ that a man must set forth in confession his mortal sins according to their species and number; and the Confessor himself will have to assist the penitent, perhaps less conscious of this obligation, in this declaration. Therefore the distinction of sins, both specific and numerical, must be treated.

¹ Session XIV, chapter 5 and canon 7.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Art. II, § I. On Specific Distinction

n. 249.

I. The notion of specific distinction. Specific distinction is the distinction by which one mortal sin differs from another, or one venial sin from another, in a morally diverse mode.

n. 250.

II. The root of specific distinction. 1. Sins of omission are distinguished by the omitted acts specifically distinct in moral being. For they are mere privations of a due act. Now privations are distinguished specifically by the forms specifically distinct of which they deprive. Therefore those sins of omission are of diverse species by which due acts of diverse moral species are omitted, for example, the omission of Mass and the omission of due alms (St. Alphonsus, III, 32).

With regard to sins of commission it is disputed whence their specific distinction is to be taken. Some, with Scotus,¹ take it from the specific distinction of the virtues to which they are opposed, or from the diversity of honorableness of which they deprive; others, with Vasquez,² from the specific distinction of the laws or precepts to which they are opposed; others, with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 72, a. 1), from moral objects diverse in species, because every act of commission is specified by the terminus ad quem, and not by the terminus a quo. Besides, the opinions set forth do not seem to differ very greatly among themselves, and in the end seem to return to the same thing; since virtues and precepts are distinguished in species according to objects (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 32).

¹ In II Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, n. 9.

² I-II, disp. 98, c. 2.

n. 251.

III. Norms determining specific distinction. Once it is posited that specific distinction is taken from the specific distinction of objects, the norms which determine the specific distinction of objects also assign the specific distinction of sins. Now objects, and consequently sins, are specifically diverse when they contain a special repugnance with the eternal law; this has place:

When they are opposed to diverse virtues. For just as any virtue has distinct goodness, so the object opposed to it contains distinct malice. Hence, for example, fornication, which is opposed to chastity, and theft, which is opposed to justice, are specifically distinguished (St. Alphonsus, III, 31).
When they are opposed to the same virtue, but according to a diverse reason (St. Alphonsus, cited place). Now objects can be opposed to the same virtue according to a diverse reason in two ways:

a) In a contrary mode, i.e., through excess and through defect. Thus, for example, prodigality through excess, and avarice through defect, are opposed to liberality.

b) In a mode not indeed contrary, but nevertheless morally diverse. Thus, for example, superstition, blasphemy, perjury, and sacrilege are opposed to religion in a diverse mode.

When they are opposed to laws or precepts morally diverse, i.e., issued from a diverse formal motive (n. 148). Thus, for example, violation of a fast imposed by law of the Church is opposed to temperance; violation of a fast obliging from a vow is repugnant to religion. Since in this case diverse virtues, or diverse offices of the same virtue, are injured, this rule is to be reduced to the preceding ones (St. Alphonsus, V, 33).

Sins specifically distinct are not had if someone injures several laws distinguished only materially, for instance, issued by different legislators, but from the same formal motive. Hence he is guilty of only one sin who commits theft prohibited by both divine and human law. The same must be said of him who "culpably omits Mass on a feast day occurring on a Sunday, because for both cases the hearing of Mass is prescribed on account of the formal motive of religion" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).¹

Corollary I. One act can contain several malices diverse in species. Thus, for example, he commits three sins specifically diverse who breaks a fast to which he is held by ecclesiastical law, by vow, and by the precept of a confessor. For he violates temperance, which the Church intends; religion, which commands the observance of a vow; and penance, from the motive of which the confessor imposes satisfaction (St. Alphonsus, V, 33). Likewise "a beneficed cleric, if he omits the Office and is unwilling to restore the fruits, will sin not only against religion, but also against justice" (St. Alphonsus, IV, 145).

Corollary II. Common estimation does not indeed found specific distinction, as is clear, but nevertheless it is an argument for it. Moreover, since sins diverse in species are usually indicated by diverse names, commonly from diversity of name one can conclude to diversity of sin.

Corollary III. Sins which are not repugnant to a determinate virtue, but to honorableness in common, such as the will of living badly, are said to be of an unnamed species.

¹ Resp. Buscod., 1873, p. 403.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Art. II, § II. On Numerical Distinction

n. 252.

I. Notion. Numerical distinction is the distinction among several sins with respect to their individuality; or it is that by which several sins are distinct in the individual, for example, two fornications.

Now inquiry into numerical distinction has less regard to several malices distinct in species, which, according to what was said in n. 251, are sometimes contained in one act. It is rather commonly admitted that, where by some act several malices specifically distinct in themselves are involved, there are also in fact and formally several malices specifically diverse,¹ and consequently several sins in number. But the question is when sins which are of the same species are distinguished from one another in number. The difficulty of discerning this arises from the fact that sometimes several physical acts are only one sin in number, while sometimes one physical act contains several sins.

¹ Few deny this with respect to some acts, for example, with respect to adultery, incest, and carnal sacrilege, and think that in the stated acts only one species of sin is formally contained (cf. John of St. Thomas, on I-II, q. 18, disp. 9, a. 6). But the controversy is not practical, because the Council of Trent (session XIV, canon 7) teaches that both the species of sins and the circumstances changing the species must be confessed.

n. 254.

III. Plurality of acts. The general rule is this: there are as many sins as there are morally distinct acts, or as there are physical acts not morally united into some one thing. "According to the unity of the will," says St. Thomas, "judgment is to be taken concerning the unity of that which is said to be in the moral genus" (In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1). Therefore where there is a morally diverse act of the will, there is a distinct sin. It remains to inquire when there is a morally diverse act; the particular rules will provide this, i.e., rules which regard diverse acts considered specifically. Now in relation to this matter acts are distinguished into internal acts, i.e., acts to be consummated in the will alone, and external acts.

Internal acts are divided into acts which do not tend toward another act, such as morose delectations, hatred, etc.; and acts which tend toward another act, such as the purpose of perpetrating an internal or external sin.

External acts are distinguished into complete and incomplete acts. Complete acts are those which by their nature are not ordered to another act of the same species, such as self-pollution, fornication, homicide. Incomplete acts are called acts which by their nature are ordered to another more principal act of the same species; thus an immodest touch is ordered to intercourse or to self-pollution. Sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts. There are added acts which, considered according to the notion handed down, are neither complete nor incomplete, namely acts indifferent by their nature, which are employed by the agent as means of arriving at a sinful act, such as taking the road in order to steal, preparing weapons in order to commit homicide. With these things noted, take the particular rules which follow:

Internal acts which do not tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation, i.e., a contrary act either of efficacious unwillingness or of simple displeasure; 2. after voluntary cessation, namely when someone indeed does not formally revoke the prior act, but nevertheless, reflecting upon it, either simply turns himself away from it, for example, from weariness, or turns himself to a work incompatible with the prior act, as if someone deliberately ceases from morose delectation and applies himself to study; 3. after indeliberate cessation, i.e., through natural inadvertence and distraction to other things, of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and so to be united with the prior act or acts in the same cause; practically, after a cessation of some delay. I say, of some delay, because these sins, since they do not tend toward a work and therefore are plainly consummated in themselves, commonly do not proceed from the same impulse of passion as long as purposes do (St. Alphonsus, V, 37; Homo Apostolicus, tract. III, n. 58).
Internal acts which tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose does not remain virtually in some effect leading to the intended work. It is said:

a) If this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion. But how great a delay or sufficiently long interval is required depends on the intensity and firmness of the purpose. Nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus, commonly an interval of two or three days suffices, because the same impulse of passion is with difficulty prolonged longer. "Hence he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days must explain the time, so that in this way the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be morally understood" (St. Alphonsus, V, 39).

b) And the purpose does not virtually remain in some effect leading to the intended end. If this happens, the first purpose, whatever interval has intervened, is not morally interrupted. "Hence it is inferred: 1. that if someone proposes to kill a man, and for that reason prepares weapons, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although he has sought him for many days and has repeated the will several times... 2. If someone resolves not to restore another's property, and always remains in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin, because in that retention never retracted the first will virtually remains, as Roncaglia probably says... Nevertheless Diana rightly thinks... with authors cited by him, that if the thief becomes unable to restore, and then, having become able, does not restore when the opportunity is given, he commits a new sin. The reason is that in that case, through that time of inability, the will of not restoring does not persevere in the effect" (St. Alphonsus, V, 40). Understand this if the thief adverts that on account of inability he is not held to restitution and repudiates the depraved will which he had; otherwise the will morally perseveres in the effect, and it suffices for the penitent to declare the time during which he persisted in such a will (St. Alphonsus, III, 683). Finally, observe that a purpose not morally interrupted constitutes one sin in number with the external act.

Complete external acts constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated. Except if the acts, although complete in themselves, nevertheless constitute one whole with others and are not morally interrupted.

Corollary I. He commits several sins in number who twice defiles himself, twice fornicates, twice neglects Mass, etc.

Corollary II. Much more probably he commits several sins who successively absolves several persons. The reason is that each confecting of a sacrament constitutes an action complete in itself, nor do the diverse absolutions, although they may be done on the occasion of one session, constitute one whole. Thus, against several, St. Alphonsus (V, 50, q. 6), Billuart,¹ De Smet,² Pesch,³ Prummer,⁴ and others.

Corollary III. It is more doubtful how many sins are committed by one who celebrates in the state of mortal sin. Some think that only one is committed, because all these actions constitute or integrate one sacrifice. Others admit two sins, one of unworthy consecration, the other of unworthy communion. Others add a third, namely of ministration to an unworthy person. But with St. Alphonsus (V, 44; VI, 35) it seems it must be said that four sacrileges are committed by a celebrant of this kind, namely: being unworthy, he consecrates; being unworthy, he receives communion; being unworthy, he ministers; and he ministers to one unworthy. The reason is that the aforesaid acts, for example the reception, confecting, etc., of a sacrament, seem so disparate that it is scarcely admitted that they coalesce into one sin in number, although they integrate one sacrifice. There is added that, for example, unworthy consecration and unworthy reception are so diverse that they seem to constitute sins of diverse species and therefore also distinct in number.

Corollary IV. Sufficiently probably he commits only one sin who, in the state of mortal sin, distributes the Eucharist once to several persons. The reason is that all the administrations constitute one banquet (St. Alphonsus, V, cited place).

Corollary V. He who from one intention omits all the canonical hours commits one sin, because the different hours constitute one whole, i.e., the Office of the day (St. Alphonsus, IV, 148).

Corollary VI. He who, from the intention of stealing 100 florins, commits several successive thefts, or, having taken the purpose of reading a bad book, completes the reading over several times, seems to commit only one sin, because the stated acts by force of the intention seem sufficiently to constitute one whole, namely the theft of 100 florins, or the reading of the whole book. Except if in the cases brought forward the acts are morally interrupted, for instance through a rather long delay.

Incomplete external acts multiply sins in this way:

a) If they are ordered by the agent to a complete act, and the complete act follows, they constitute one sin in number with the complete act, unless they are morally interrupted. The reason is that on the part of the matter they form one moral whole with the complete act, and by reason of the intention they are placed as such. The same must be said of incomplete acts which immediately follow a complete act, because they can be regarded as the complement of the complete act (St. Alphonsus, V, 41). If in the case the complete act does not follow, the incomplete acts constitute one sin among themselves, unless they are morally interrupted.

Incomplete acts, however, are morally interrupted: 1. by formal revocation; 2. by voluntary cessation; 3. by indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the incomplete acts cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose of arriving at the complete act does not remain virtually in some effect (p. 200).

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it must be said as follows: 1. if the intended complete act followed, it suffices to confess: I committed fornication; or: I committed adultery; etc. (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, 41); 2. if the intended complete act did not follow, one can say, for example: From the intention of fornication, adultery, etc., I acted shamefully by kisses and touches (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

b) If they are not ordered by the agent to a complete act, they constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion; practically, after an indeliberate cessation of a longer interval. Hence he commits one sin in number who "from the same impulse strikes several times, touches dishonestly several times, blasphemes the same saint or several holy days, reviles or detracts from someone several times in the same matter" (St. Alphonsus, V, 41).⁵

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it suffices to confess, for example: I acted shamefully with a girl by kisses and touches.

The things which have been said about incomplete acts not ordered to a complete act are valid even if, after those acts have been perpetrated, with lust boiling over, someone proceeds to the complete act. Hence "if someone, having kisses, touches, etc., had not from the beginning willed intercourse, but afterward, because lust had increased, completed intercourse, it does not suffice if he confesses only intercourse" (St. Alphonsus, V, 43); but he is held to declare that, independently of intercourse, he acted shamefully with a girl by kisses, touches, etc.

¹ De peccatis, diss. 2, art. 4.

² Collationes Brugenses, 1905, p. 555.

³ Tractatus dogmaticus, VI, n. 261.

⁴ Manuale Theologiae Moralis, I, n. 380.

⁵ Cf. p. 199, where we said that sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts.

n. 255.

5. Acts indifferent by their nature, which, considered according to the notion handed down above, are neither complete nor incomplete, but are employed by the agent as means of arriving at a sinful act - these acts, I say, are sinful, as having the malice of the intended end; but, like incomplete acts, they also form one sin with the intended and subsequently placed sinful act, unless they are morally interrupted. If the intended sinful act does not follow, they constitute one sin among themselves, unless again they are morally interrupted. Now they are morally interrupted by the same reason by which incomplete acts ordered by the agent to a complete act are interrupted. "Hence if someone, in order to commit homicide, buys weapons, takes the road, seeks his enemy, and kills him, he commits one sin" (St. Alphonsus, V, 41); and this is valid even if he has sought the enemy for many days. I said concerning acts indifferent by their nature; for otherwise it must be said concerning acts which involve a malice diverse from the sinful act, as if you use sorcery in order to be able to kill someone; in which case certainly a new sin, and indeed one of another species, is added.

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid acts not morally interrupted, it must be said as follows: 1. if the intended sinful act follows, it suffices to confess the stated act; if it does not follow, it suffices to say: From the intention, for example, of theft, I employed means (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

IV. Plurality of objects, i.e., of objects which are numerically distinguished and cannot coalesce into one object. Thus, for example, the lives of two men. Now an evil act which regards numerically distinct objects not coalescing into one object - as an act by which someone kills three men - contains as many sins as there are objects of this kind regarded. The reason is that that from which sin is caused must also, if it is multiplied, multiply sins. But sin is caused from an evil object. The major is confirmed from the fact that, as the adversaries concede, a married man who has intercourse with a married woman commits a double malice in number, i.e., injustice - one with respect to his own wife, the other with respect to the husband of the other woman - and consequently, as it seems, a double sin in number. The reason for this must be that the act placed regards two objects or injures two numerically distinct rights. Thus teach, against several, St. Alphonsus (V, 45; VII, 28), Billuart, Prummer, Sweens. Nevertheless, distinct objects are not so rarely conceived and reached by the agent in the manner of one thing, namely under the concept of a multitude or of harm inflicted upon a multitude; in which case I do not deny that there is only one sin in number (St. Alphonsus, V, 50, q. 5, the third opinion, however, etc.). But from this some undeservedly conclude that the opinion of St. Alphonsus is false; since the question is whether there are several sins in number if the thing is conceived and reached as it objectively stands.

Corollary I. In themselves, several sins are committed:

By him who by one act kills several persons, defames several, gives scandal to several, or wishes evil upon several; likewise by him who proposes to kill several, defame several, etc.
By him who in one speech detracts from someone in diverse matters or affects someone with diverse insults. For the right that I not be detracted from in one matter is distinguished from the right that I not be detracted from in another; likewise the right that I not be affected with this insult differs from the right that I not be affected with another (St. Alphonsus, V, 48).

"Nevertheless, here it is well to observe that... little women and common people, who while quarreling together load one another with diverse insults from the same impulse, commit one sin. The reason is that according to common estimation these do not injure reputation and honor; because, on the one hand, insults among persons of this kind are not apprehended as grave, and on the other hand, hearers place no trust in them, thinking that they proceed rather from the impulse of anger than from the mind and truth of the matter. And therefore such quarrelers are for the most part excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary about some particular fact" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

By him who by one act, or by acts not morally interrupted, wishes diverse evils upon someone. For the right that one evil not be wished upon someone differs from the right that another not be wished upon him.
By him who in one speech defames an entire family, because each member has a distinct right to reputation; likewise by him who injures goods belonging by distinct ownership to several owners. It is otherwise "if someone were to injure goods which a city, monastery, or chapter possesses in common; for then the right does not belong to the individuals in particular, but only to the whole community; hence one right is injured" (St. Alphonsus, V, 46).

I said that in the cases set forth several sins are committed in themselves; for in practice, as has already been noted, distinct objects are often conceived and reached in the manner of one thing, so that commonly there is no obligation of asking penitents, for example, before how many persons they had immodest conversations, etc.

Corollary II. One sin is committed:

By him who denies several articles of faith, because the right of God that I assent to one truth revealed by him is one with his right that I assent to others (St. Alphonsus, V, 50).
By him who blasphemes, for example, against the twelve Apostles, because the right of God, to whose dishonor the blasphemy tends, is one (St. Alphonsus, V, 47).
By him who detracts from someone before several persons, "since the right to reputation is single before all, and not multiple" (St. Alphonsus, V, 49).

Concerning the practice of asking penitents about the species and number of sins, cf. the treatise on Penance.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Art. II, § III. On the Unequal Gravity of Sins

n. 256.

I. Existence of unequal gravity. Not all sins are equally grave. This is of faith against the Stoics, Jovinian, and others. It is proved: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "He who handed me over to you has the greater sin."¹ It is proved: 2. by reason. Sin involves a departure from the rectitude of reason; "and therefore it is of great importance for the gravity of sin whether there is a greater or lesser departure from the rectitude of reason; and according to this it must be said that not all sins are equal" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 2).

¹ John 19:11; cf. John 7:26; Matt. 5:22; 12:31; 1 John 5:16-17.

n. 257.

II. Root of inequality. Unequal gravity is taken from the object, circumstances, and end of the sinful act. For "everything is naturally increased from the same thing from which it is caused" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 7). But sin is caused from the disorder of the object, circumstance, and end.

From the object, or, practically, from the dignity of the virtue to which it is opposed; "for contraries are about the same thing, and in this way it is necessary that a graver sin be opposed to a greater virtue" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 3). Now virtues, considered according to their dignity, come in this order: 1. charity; 2. faith; 3. hope. The cardinal virtues follow, and their parts, concerning each of which it is difficult to determine in what order, considered according to their dignity, they should be counted. There is added that account must also be taken of the particular good of some virtue which is injured by sin; and when all these things are considered, the inequality of gravity can scarcely be determined accurately.

I add these things from St. Thomas:

a) Hatred of God is the gravest of sins (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 3).

b) "Sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed in themselves according to the harms which are inflicted upon one's neighbor, because from this they have the character of fault. But the harm is greater insofar as a greater good is taken away. Now there is a threefold good of man, namely the good of the soul, the good of the body, and the good of external things. The good of the soul, which is greatest, cannot be taken away by another except occasionally, for example, through evil persuasion, which does not impose necessity. But the other two goods, namely of the body and of external things, can be taken away violently by another. But because the good of the body surpasses the good of external things, sins by which harm is inflicted upon the body are graver than those by which harm is inflicted upon external things. Hence among the other sins which are committed against one's neighbor, homicide is graver, by which the life of the neighbor already actually existing is taken away. Consequent to this is adultery, which is against the due order of human generation, through which there is entrance into life. Consequent to this are external goods, among which reputation surpasses riches, because it is nearer to spiritual goods; hence it is said in Proverbs 22: 'A good name is better than many riches.' And therefore detraction according to its genus is a greater sin than theft; yet less than homicide or adultery" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 3).

From circumstances and end, for example, from circumstances:

a) Of the person sinning. Hence in themselves the sins of the faithful are graver than those of unbelievers (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 10).

b) Of the person against whom the sin is committed. Hence sins against God are graver than sins against oneself and one's neighbor (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 9).

c) Of the perfection of the depraved act, for example, on account of greater deliberation, intensity, duration, etc. Hence spiritual sins are graver than carnal sins (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 5), and sins of malice are graver than sins of weakness (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 78, a. 4).

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Article III. On the Causes of Sins

n. 258.

The discussion is of the efficient causes of sins. Now the efficient causes of sin can be distinguished as: 1. immediate; 2. mediate.

The immediate cause of sin is the perverse will of man. "It is certain that sin is committed by the will, as all teach with St. Augustine and St. Thomas" (St. Alphonsus, V, 5). The reason is that the whole essence of sin is founded on the free voluntary. But the immediate cause of the free voluntary is the will. "If you say that not all sins are elicited by the will, but many are commanded by it, such as heresy, intemperance, etc.; I respond that these and similar things indeed are not elicited by the will as to their material element, yet they are as to their formal element, namely as to the character of the voluntary and aversion from God."¹

The mediate causes, i.e., the causes which induce the will to sin, are some external and some internal; and to know these causes is of the highest importance, so that the priest may be able to speak to the penitent more aptly and efficaciously concerning the state of conscience and manner of life, and may select more suitable remedies and make them acceptable to the penitent. Hence we shall speak of each.

¹ Billuart, De peccatis, diss. 4, art. 1.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Article IV. On the Effects of Sins

n. 265.

I. Corruption of natural good consists in this, that personal sin causes the wounds inflicted by original sin to become worse. These are:

Ignorance, insofar as reason is so deprived of its order to the true that it is prone to assenting to the false, and finds assenting to the true difficult, and is deprived of knowledge of necessary things.
Malice, insofar as the will is so deprived of its order to the good that it is prone to evil and finds choosing the good difficult.
Weakness, insofar as the irascible appetite is so deprived of its order to the arduous that it is weak for tolerating adversities.
Concupiscence, insofar as the concupiscible appetite is so deprived of its order to sensible good that it is prone to desiring it against the order of reason.

Now "these four are wounds inflicted upon the whole of human nature from the sin of the first parent. But because the inclination to the good of virtue in each person is diminished by actual sin, as is clear from what has been said, articles 1 and 2 of this question, these also are the four wounds resulting from other sins; namely, insofar as through sin reason is dulled especially in practical matters, and the will is hardened toward the good, and greater difficulty of acting well increases, and concupiscence burns more intensely" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, a. 3).

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Article V. On the Remedies of Sins

n. 268.

I. Flight from occasions of sin. "He who loves danger will perish in it."¹ "And if your hand or your foot scandalizes you, cut it off and cast it from you: it is good for you to enter into life maimed or lame, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into eternal fire. And if your eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you: it is good for you with one eye to enter into life, rather than having two eyes to be cast into the hell of fire."²

¹ Ecclus. 3:27.

² Matt. 18:8-9.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Chapter II. On Some Classes of Sins in Particular

n. 273.

I. First, sins are divided:

Into original and personal. The former is what we have from Adam; the latter, what we have committed by our own will.
Into actual and habitual. Actual sin is a sinful act; habitual sin is the state of the soul remaining from a sinful act not yet remitted.
Into sin of commission and omission, insofar as a prohibited act is placed, or a commanded act is omitted.
Into internal and external. Internal sin, which is also called sin of the heart, is that which is consummated in the heart alone, such as heresy. External sin is that which is indeed begun in the heart, but completed by an external work, for example, by the mouth or speech, as a lie; or by deed, as theft. Hence external sins are distinguished into sins of the mouth and of deed.
Into sin of ignorance, weakness, slothfulness, and malice, insofar as it is committed from culpable ignorance, or from vehement passion, or from slothfulness, or from perversity (nn. 261-264).
Into sin against God, neighbor, and oneself, insofar as offices proximately due to God, to one's neighbor, or to oneself are injured.
Into spiritual and carnal, insofar as it consists in disordered internal delectation, as pride, or in disordered external delectation, as lust and drunkenness.¹
Into mortal and venial, insofar as it overturns the due order as to substance, or only as to integrity (n. 285).
Into formal and material. Formal sin is a culpable transgression of law. Material sin is an inculpable transgression of law; this definition of material sin needs a fuller explanation on account of questions to be treated later. It is said:

a) Transgression; by this word an act of the person is designated, not an act, or rather a passion, of nature. Hence a merely natural pollution, as it is called, is not even a material sin. It must be said otherwise if an act of the person is added, as if pollution is excited by the touch of one sleeping. Nor is there material sin if someone by absolute force is compelled, for example, by touch to produce pollution; for then he is a pure and simple instrument of the one compelling, so that the act does not proceed from an intrinsic principle, and therefore cannot be called an act of the person.

b) Of law, i.e., of a law existing here and now with respect to the one who acts. Hence material sin is not had if someone, for example, eats on a fast day, either because he has been dispensed or because he is excused from the law on account of inconvenience.

c) Inculpable, either because the law was entirely unknown, or because someone erroneously thought that he was dispensed or excused from the law.

Corollary I. If someone does not observe a law while in doubt whether it exists or has ceased, it is doubtful whether there is material sin; or material sin is had or not had insofar as the law objectively has been made or has not ceased, or objectively has not been made or has ceased.

Corollary II. It is illicit to induce someone to material sin; for it is dishonorable to induce someone to an act which in first act is prohibited to him, and which you know to be so prohibited.

¹ We use this word because the divisions to be assigned do not in any way constitute just as many species of sins. Namely, the notion of sin is found fully and perfectly only in personal mortal sin; in the others it is found only defectively, so that personal and original sin, and likewise personal mortal and personal venial sin, are called sins not univocally but only analogically (n. 285).

n. 274.

II. Besides these, there are distinguished:

Sins against the Holy Spirit, i.e., sins which are more directly directed against the very direction of the Holy Spirit, and from this are graver and more difficultly remitted by God. They are: despair; presumption of arriving at salvation by the mercy of God alone, excluding repentance and cooperation; attack upon the known truth of faith; envy of fraternal charity, namely by which someone is saddened over God's love toward his neighbor; obstinacy in sinning, refusing the influence of grace and counsel; impenitence, or the deliberate exclusion of repentance. These sins are called against the Holy Spirit because through them the influence of the Holy Spirit upon the heart of man is deliberately impeded and repelled (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 14).
Sins crying to heaven. Namely, certain crimes are said by Sacred Scripture to cry to heaven; this indicates their special and monstrous gravity in injuring the order constituted by God. First this is said of deliberate homicide: "The voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the earth";¹ then of the sin of Sodom: "The cry of Sodom and Gomorrah has been multiplied";² of the oppression of the poor, widows, and wards: "You shall not hurt a widow or an orphan. If you hurt them, they will cry out to me, and I will hear their cry";³ "If he," that is, the poor man, "cries out to me, I will hear him, because I am merciful";⁴ "Do not the tears of the widow run down upon her cheek, and her cry against the one bringing them down?";⁵ finally, of the defrauding of the wages of workers: "Behold, the wage of the workers who have reaped your fields, which has been defrauded by you, cries out; and their cry has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."⁶
Others' sins, which are perpetrated by others but are imputed to us as causes, either because we have cooperated positively in them, or because we have not impeded them although we should have impeded them. The discussion of these will be in the treatises on charity and on justice.

Once these things have been noted in general concerning classes of sins, we shall speak specifically of some of them, because several things must be noted about them; of some, I say, namely of sin of commission and omission, of mortal and venial sin, and of internal sins.

¹ Gen. 4:10.

² Gen. 18:20.

³ Exod. 22:22-23.

⁴ Exod. 22:27.

⁵ Ecclus. 35:18.

⁶ James 5:4.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Article I. On Sin of Commission and Omission

n. 275.

I. Notion. Sin of commission is situated in the placing, sin of omission in the omitting, of a commanded act. It is disputed whether a free and culpable omission can physically be given without any positive act morally affecting the omission. Certainly, however, it ordinarily occurs with a positive act, namely with the will of omitting or with another act which is known to be incompatible with the commanded act.

n. 276.

II. Morality. With respect to the morality of sin of commission, nothing special needs to be noted.

With respect to sin of omission, these things must be observed specifically:

a) Sin of omission begins to be imputed as soon as someone wills to omit the prescribed act, or places an act incompatible with the prescribed act.

b) Sin of omission, in the case in which the depraved will has not been retracted, is externally completed or consummated at the time when the prescribed act begins to bind; and the consummation lasts until the time for fulfilling the precept expires. If the depraved will is truly retracted before the precept binds, the sin is not consummated; if it is retracted after the precept has begun to bind, the consummation ceases (St. Alphonsus, V, 10; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 79, a. 3, ad 3).

With respect to acts joined with omission, such as playing, eating, etc., I note:

a) They become sinful if they are the cause of the omission, as if someone from love of play omits Mass. An act causing malice is necessarily itself infected by the malice. Nevertheless, its malice is not diverse from the malice of the omission, so that it suffices to confess the omission alone. Except if the cause of the omission is gravely evil in itself, as if someone omits Mass in order to steal. Nevertheless, in that case "theft can be stated in confession separately from the omission of Mass, because then theft is only a cause aggravating, not changing, the species" (St. Alphonsus, cited place) of the omission.

b) They do not become sinful, and therefore do not have to be confessed, if they only accompany the omission, as if someone omits Mass and meanwhile, lest he remain idle, reads a book (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § I. On Mortal Sin

n. 277.

I. Existence of mortal sins. There are mortal¹ or grave sins. This is of faith from these words of the Council of Trent: "If anyone shall say that there is no mortal sin except unbelief, or that grace once received is lost by no other sin, however grave and enormous, except the sin of unbelief, let him be anathema."² The same Council teaches that "all mortal sins must be recounted by penitents."³ It is proved: 1. from Sacred Scripture, which very often declares that there are sins because of which men are deprived of divine friendship and are damned eternally. Thus, for example, "The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God";⁴ likewise, "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire."⁵ It is proved: 2. from the holy Fathers. Thus St. Jerome: "There are light sins, there are grave ones";⁶ St. Augustine: "For who would say that one must sin, even if one sin is damnable, another venial?";⁷ likewise St. Basil,⁸ St. John Chrysostom,⁹ St. Ambrose.¹⁰ It is proved: 3. from reason, because there are sins which plainly turn one away from the ultimate end, as we shall soon explain more fully.

¹ It is called mortal because it takes away the principle of spiritual life, namely habitual grace, and brings death to the soul (St. Alphonsus, V, 51; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5).

² Session 6, canon 27.

³ Session 14, chapter 5.

⁴ Wis. 14:9.

⁵ Matt. 25:41.

⁶ Bk. 2, Against Jovinian, n. 30.

⁷ Contra mendacium, c. 8, n. 19.

⁸ Homily on Psalm 7, v. 3, n. 2.

⁹ Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Romans, n. 18.

¹⁰ Bk. 2, De poenitentia, c. 18, n. 95.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § II. On Venial Sin

n. 284.

I. Existence of venial sins. There are venial¹ sins, distinct from mortal sins. Luther and Calvin taught that all sins by their nature are mortal and worthy of eternal punishment; nevertheless they are called venial: according to Luther, because they are not imputed to one having faith; according to Calvin, because they are not imputed to the predestined. Likewise Baius taught that no sin is venial by its nature, but that some are such from the mercy of God.

Concerning the stated proposition the Council of Trent has these words: "For although in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not on that account cease to be just. For that voice of the just is both humble and true: Forgive us our debts."² There is added the condemned second proposition of Baius: "No sin is by its nature venial, but every sin merits eternal punishment."

The proposition is proved from Sacred Scripture, which compares some sins to very light things, others to very grave things. Thus some are compared to a gnat, others to a camel;³ some to a mote, others to a beam;⁴ some to hay and stubble placed upon the foundation of Christ.⁵ Then Sacred Scripture declares that all men sin, although some persevere in the justice and friendship of God: "In many things we all offend";⁶ "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."⁷

¹ It is called venial because, with the principle of spiritual life, namely grace, preserved, it inflicts upon the soul a languor easily curable, and easily obtains pardon (St. Alphonsus, V, 51).

² Session 6, chapter 11.

³ Matt. 23:23-24.

⁴ Luke 6:41.

⁵ 1 Cor. 3:12 ff.

⁶ James 3:2.

⁷ 1 John 1:8.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. III, § I. On Morose Delectation

n. 293.

I. Notion. Morose delectation¹ is a free complacency of the will concerning an evil act taken objectively. It is said:

Complacency, i.e., rest in some object.
Of the will, i.e., of the rational appetite. Therefore, strictly speaking, the discussion is not of complacency of the sensitive appetite, but of the consent of the will in the complacency of the sensitive appetite. Namely, the will does not immediately delight in a sensible object, but mediately, i.e., through the mediation of the sensitive appetite (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, aa. 6 and 8).
Free, i.e., that to which the will assents after the advertence of the intellect to the malice of the act.
Concerning an evil act taken objectively, without addition. Hence the object of morose delectation, as we have already insinuated, is not an evil act whether future or to be perpetrated, whether past or perpetrated, whether present or being perpetrated here and now; nor is its object the thought about an evil act; nor even the evil act thought about, although thought is the condition without which the will cannot be borne toward the evil act, or the operation by which the evil act is presented to the will. The object of morose delectation is the evil act itself taken objectively. "Therefore," says St. Alphonsus, "one thing is delectation concerning an evil work, so that the evil work is the object of the delectation, which is always evil. Another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the thought itself about the work is per se the object of the delectation" (V, 17; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8, ad 4).

¹ It is called morose not from a delay of time, but from a delay or lingering of the will, which can take place in an instant.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Article IV. On Capital Sins

n. 299.

Capital sins are those which before the rest are causes and as it were heads from which other sins proceed. They would more correctly be called capital vices, because capital sins are not sources of sins except insofar as they are vices. Ordinarily seven are enumerated: pride, avarice, lust, envy, anger, sloth, and gluttony. "The reason for this number seven from St. Thomas (I-II, q. 84, a. 4) is this: Man can either pursue or flee that which is good in itself in a manner discordant with reason. Goods of this kind in themselves, which man can pursue in a manner discordant with reason or inordinately, are either honor and glory, and their inordinate pursuit is called pride; or the conservation of the individual through food and drink, and the inordinate pursuit of this is called gluttony; or the conservation of the species through acts destined for the propagation of the human race, and the inordinate use of these acts is lust; or riches, and the inordinate appetite for these is avarice. The good which someone can flee in a manner discordant with reason is either his own good, and thus sloth has place; or another's good, and this is either envy, which by sadness, or anger, which by appetite of vengeance, is hostile to another's good."¹ We shall speak of each one.

¹ Konings, Theologia Moralis, n. 235.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 54 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Definition

n. 167.

Definition

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 71-89.)

Definition.—A vice is a habit inclining to moral evil. A sin is an act resulting from a vice, or tending to the formation of a vice; or it is any thought, word, deed or omission against the law of God.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Divisions

n. 168.

Divisions

Divisions.—There are various divisions of sins. Thus:

(a) according to the kind of delight that is taken in evil, sins are either spiritual (e.g., vainglory) or carnal (e.g., intemperance);

(b) according to the person who is more directly offended by evil, sins are either against God (e.g., heresy, despair, blasphemy), or against one’s neighbor (e.g., theft, calumny), or against oneself (e.g., intemperance, suicide);

(c) according to the greater or less gravity of the evil, sins are either mortal (e.g., blasphemy) or venial (e.g., idle thoughts);

(d) according as the evil is done by acting or not acting, sins are either of commission (e.g., theft) or of omission (e.g., failure to pay debts);

(e) according to the progress of a sin, there are three stages: first, it is a sin of the heart when it exists only in the mind, as when one entertains a wish for revenge; secondly, it is a sin of the mouth, when it is manifested in words, as when one uses contumelious language; thirdly, it is a sin of work when it is carried out in act, as when one strikes another in the face;

(f) according to the manner in which they deviate from the golden mean, sins are either of excess (e.g., extravagance) or of defect (e.g., miserliness);

(g) according to the manner in which its guilt is contracted, sin is either original (i.e., the loss of grace inherited from Adam) or actual (i.e., the stain derived from one’s own wrongdoing; sec 272 sqq.).

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Mortal Sin

n. 169.

Mortal Sin

Mortal Sin.—A sin is mortal or deadly, when by it a person turns away from God, his Last End, and prefers to Him some created good, thereby incurring the debt of eternal punishment.

n. 171.

The matter of a sin is known to be grave: (a) when the law of God or of the Church declares that it is seriously displeasing to God, or that it will separate one from His favor or rewards; (b) when right reason shows that it does great injury to the rights of God, of society, of one’s neighbor, or of oneself.

n. 172.

The matter of a sin is grave in two ways. (a) It is grave from the character of the act and without exception, when the good which is injured is infinite, or is a finite good of greatest importance and indivisible, Thus, heresy, despair, and simony against divine law are always serious, because they offend against an infinite good; while murder, though it injures only a finite good, is nevertheless always grave matter because earthly life is of highest importance among finite goods, and if taken away is taken entirely. (b) The matter of a sin is grave from the character of the act but with exceptions, when the good that is injured is of grave importance, but finite and divisible. Thus, the worship we give to God is finite and admits of more and less; and hence a sin against worship, though serious from the nature of the offence, may be slight on account of the smallness of the irreverence. Similarly, though theft injures a grave right, it is not grave matter when the amount stolen is small.

n. 174.

Advertence is the act by which the mind gives attention to something. It is of two kinds: (a) full advertence, when there is nothing to impede perfect attention, as when a person is wide awake, in full possession of his faculties, and not distracted; (b) partial advertence, when there is something that, prevents entire attention, as when a person is only partly awake; or not entirely conscious, or distracted with many things.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Venial Sin

n. 180.

Venial Sin

Venial Sin.—A sin is venial, or more easily pardonable, when by it one turns inordinately towards some created good, not so, however, as to forsake God as one’s Last End or to prefer self-will to the divine friendship.

n. 181.

The first condition required that a sin be called venial is that its matter be light, either in reality, or in the invincible belief of him who commits it. The criteria by which we may know what matter is light are authority and right reason (see above, 171).

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects

n. 186.

Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects.-An imperfection becomes a sin: (a) if the motive for omitting what is of counsel only is sinful (e.g., to neglect a Mass that is not of obligation out of contempt); (b) if a slight indeliberate transgression has a cause that was voluntary (e.g., involuntary distractions caused by previous neglect).

n. 187.

Venial sins become mortal when that which in itself is a slight offense, becomes in the individual agent a grave offense by reason of some change in the object or of some grave malice in the purpose, circumstances, or the foreseen results (see above 97 sqq.).

n. 189.

It should be noted that, while the matter of venial sins may coalesce so as to form grave matter and constitute a mortal sin, as just explained, venial sins themselves do not, from mere multiplication, ever become mortal, since the difference between mortal and venial sin is not one of quantity, but of kind. Hence, when acts are slightly sinful but do not coalesce, they multiply venial sins, but do not form mortal sin. Example: Coming a few minutes late for Mass every Sunday.

n. 190.

The multiplication of venial sins, especially when they are held as of no importance, disposes for the commission of mortal sin: (a) directly, by forming a habit that calls for ever greater indulgence (e.g., petty thefts lead to dishonesty on a large scale); (b) indirectly, by familiarizing one with wrongdoing and chilling the love for virtue.

n. 191.

The wrong purpose of the agent makes an act that is only venially sinful (as far as the object is concerned) to become mortally sinful, when the purpose contains a grave malice in itself, for the act is then intended only as a means to what is seriously wrong (see above 80). Example: To tell a small lie in order to break up friendships and sow hatreds.

n. 194.

Mortal sins become venial when that which in itself is a grave offense, becomes light by reason of some change in he object or lack of full consent in the subject.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Comparison of Sins

n. 220.

Comparison of Sins

Comparison of Sins.—Sins that differ in species differ also in gravity, those being more serious that depart further from the norms of reason and the law of God.

n. 221.

Other things being equal, those sins are worse that offend against a more noble object or a more noble virtue. Hence, sins that are directly against God (such as infidelity, despair, and hatred of God) are the most serious of all; while sins against human personality (such as murder) are more serious than those against human rights (such as theft).

n. 222.

Of those sins that are opposed to the same virtue, that one is worse which is opposed to the principal inclination of the virtue. Thus, avarice is more foreign to the virtue of liberality than the opposite vice of prodigality; timidity is more contrary to bravery than its opposite rashness.

n. 223.

The gravity of a sin is increased in the following ways:

(a) by the circumstances, in so far as they give it a new species of malice (e.g., theft from a church) or increase its malice within the species (e.g., money given prodigally and to those who do not deserve it, or money stolen in a large quantity);

(b) by the greater willingness with which the sin is committed. Hence, those who sin through ignorance or under the excitement of passion are less guilty than those who sin in cold blood;

(c) by the condition of the person offended. Thus, a sin is made worse according as the person offended is nearer to God by reason of his personal holiness or the sacredness of his state or the dignity of his office, or is nearer to the offender himself. Hence, an injury is greater if done to a priest, a public official or one’s own family, than if done to another who has not the same claim to honor or justice;

(d) by the condition of the person who sins. Those who are better instructed or otherwise better advantaged, or who are supposed to give good example to others, sin more grievously by reason of their greater ingratitude and of the greater scandal they give, whenever they sin deliberately;

(e) by the evil results that follow from the sin, when these are willed, even indirectly or implicitly, as when one spreads stories that are bound to cause enmities, strifes, and a lowering of ideals (see 96).

Spiritual and carnal sins, considered precisely as such, and other things being equal, may be compared from two viewpoints, viz., of malice and of reputation. (a) From the viewpoint of malice, spiritual sins are worse, since, while a carnal sinner is carried away by strong passion and offends directly only his own body, he who commits spiritual sins acts with greater freedom and offends directly against God and his neighbor. Hence, the Pharisees, though they despised the fallen woman, were worse than she, since in the eyes of God their pride, envy, detraction, hypocrisy, etc., were more hateful crimes.

(b) From the viewpoint of reputation, carnal sins are worse, since they liken man more to the beast, and are thus more infamous.

In actual experience, carnal sins are frequently more grave than non-carnal sins.

(a) Many carnal sins are not purely carnal, but also contain other malice, and cause directly more injury to God or the neighbor than a non-carnal sin of the same category. Example: Adultery combines both lust and injustice, and is a greater injustice than the non-carnal sin of theft. Rape combines lust and injury, and is more injurious than the non-carnal sin of anger resulting in bodily blows. Lascivious conversation combines impurity and spiritual damage to another, and is more harmful than the non-carnal sin of detracting that other and causing him some temporal injury.

(b) Many carnal sins are accompanied by greater malice or greater scandal, or are followed by greater evils than purely spiritual sins. Example: Sins of impurity or drunkenness, committed habitually and deliberately or by adults, are more malicious than sins of pride or anger committed rarely or without full deliberation, or by children. Drunkenness or licentious language and suspicious intimacies, committed by those from whom good example is expected, do more to undermine religion than sins of impatience or uncharitableness in the same persons. The results of a man’s pride (such as ambition, arrogance, luxurious living and deceitfulness) are often less disastrous than the results of his intemperance (such as detraction, immodesty, fights, extravagance, disgrace of family, etc.).

Vol. I, On Human Acts, I. On the Nature of the Human Act · Vol. I, On Human Acts, II. On the Impediments of the Human Act · Vol. I, On Human Acts, III. On the Morality of Human Acts · Vol. I, On Human Acts, IV. On the Various Sources of Morality · Vol. I, On Conscience, II. On Certain Conscience · Vol. I, On Conscience, V. On Doubtful Conscience · Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, I. On the Nature of Sin · Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, II. On the Specific Distinction of Sins · Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, III. On the Numerical Distinction of Sins · Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, IV. On the Gravity of Sin

Sins different in species rank in the order of gravity, as said above, according to their objects. For, just as diseases are considered more serious when they affect more important vital organs or functions, so sins are more grave when they affect more radical principles of human conduct. The greater the object or end of action that is injured, therefore, the greater is the harm done and the greater the sin committed. Hence: (a) sins committed directly against God are worse than sins committed against creatures, for God is the end of all creatures; (b) sins committed against persons are greater than sins committed against things, for persons are the end of things.

n. 227.

Of the sins committed against God, the rank according to gravity is: (a) sins against the personality of God—that is, against the divine nature—such as hatred of God (the greatest of all sins), infidelity, despair; (b) sins against the peculiar possessions of God—that is, His external honor and glory, and those things that belong to Him in a special way, such as the humanity of Christ hypostatically united to the Word, the Sacraments, and things consecrated to God. Such sins are idolatry, superstition, perjury, the sins of those who had Christ crucified, simony, sacrilege, unworthy reception of the Eucharist or other Sacrament, violation of vows, etc.

n. 228.

Sins committed against creatures, other things being equal, rank in gravity as follows: (a) Sins against personality are greater than sins against possessions. Example: The sin of murder, which is against personality, is worse than the sin of theft, which is against possessions. (b) Sins against being are greater than sins against wellbeing. Examples: Murder is worse than mutilation, and scandal that causes another to lose his soul is worse than scandal that only diminishes another’s goodness; murder and the irreparable scandal take away life, mutilation and the lesser scandal only diminish the perfection of the life that is had. (c) Sins against those who have a greater claim are greater than sins against those who have a less claim. Examples: It is a greater sin to neglect one’s own salvation than that of a neighbor; to murder a member of one’s own family, a benefactor, or a person distinguished on account of his position or virtue, is a greater crime than to murder a stranger, an enemy, a private individual, or one of bad life. (d) Sins against possessions that are dearer are graver offenses. Examples: It is worse to steal away the peace of a household than to carry off its material treasures; it is worse to rob a man of his good name than to defraud him of his wages.

n. 229.

The above rating of sins is based on their natures considered in the abstract, that is, according to the essential relations they have to their own proper objects. It is impossible to consider any other factor when drawing up general rules of comparison; for the circumstances that enter into concrete cases of sin are innumerable, and hence have to be left out of consideration. By reason of these factors other than the object, however, the ranking of sins according to gravity given above may be changed or reversed.

(a) In the act of a greater sin there may be extenuating circumstances, or in the act of a lesser sin aggravating circumstances that change their respective order. Example: Detraction is from its nature worse than theft; but, if the detraction does only small harm and the theft great harm, the theft is worse on account of the circumstances.

(b) In the persons who commit the sins there may be circumstances that change the order of guilt, so that he who commits the greater sin is less guilty. Examples: By his careless handling of a revolver, Balbus unintentionally causes lasting injury to a bystander. Caius without malice aforethought, but enraged by an unexpected insult, strikes a blow that destroys the sight in one eye of his adversary. Titus, angry because he has been dismissed from his employment, revenges himself by defacing a precious work of art. The bodily injuries caused by the first two men are more harmful than the injury to property done by Titus; but they sinned, the one from ignorance and the other from passion, whereas Titus sinned from malice. Hence, while the sins of Balbus and Caius are objectively or materially greater, that of Titus is greater subjectively or formally (i.e., as to guilt).

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, The Subjects of Sins

n. 230.

The Subjects of Sin

The Subjects of Sin.—By the subjects of sin we understand the powers of the soul in which sin is found. These powers are sometimes called the material causes of sin, just as the objects to which the sins tend are called their formal causes.

n. 231.

Just as virtuous habits have their seats in the will (e.g., justice), in the reason (e.g., prudence), and in the sensitive appetites (e.g., fortitude and temperance), so also contrary habits of vice may be found in these same faculties. (a) From the sensitive appetites proceed impulses caused by sense apprehension or bodily states, which, when they are inordinate and voluntary, are sinful (e.g., lust, envy; see 129, on Second Motions). (b) From the reason proceed false judgments caused by vincible ignorance, wrong direction deliberately given to the passions, pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts, etc. (c) From the will proceed consent given to sins of the other powers, desires to commit sin, joy over sin already committed, etc.

n. 232.

As was said above (89-93), the external acts of the members of the body have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject to the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if classification is made according to the faculties from which the sins proceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we treated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of desire and reminiscent approval.

n. 233.

Pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts occurs when one deliberately, even though it be only for a moment, turns over in his mind some sinful object, delighting in it as if it were actually present, but not desiring that it be actually done. Example; One who imagines his neighbor’s house burned down, and rejoices at the mental picture, though for interested reasons he does not wish any conflagration in the vicinity.

n. 234.

The sinful thoughts just described are not to be confused with thoughts in which the object of the delight is something else than a sinful picture represented in the mind.

Thoughts of this latter kind are: (a) those in which one takes delight in an external act of sin being committed, as when one destroys one’s neighbor’s property with great internal satisfaction; here the thought forms one sin with the outer act; (b) those in which one delights in the mental image, not as it represents something morally wrong, but as it contains some object of lawful delight. There is a distinction between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad. Examples: A moralist may think with pleasure about theft, not because he approves of it, but because it is a subject he has to know. A person may read detective stories with great interest, not because crime appeals to him, but because the style of the author is good, the details of the plot exciting, the manner of the crime mysterious, etc. There is danger in thoughts of this kind, however, if one indulges in them from mere curiosity, or immoderately, or if sin itself may take an attraction through them.

n. 235.

The gravity and species of pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts vary according to the thing thought on (see on Objects, etc., 70 sqq.). (a) If pleasure is taken only in the object represented, the sin has the moral character of that object. Example: He who delights at the thought of theft, is guilty of theft; and if he thinks of a great theft, he is guilty of mortal sin. (b) If pleasure is also taken in the circumstances imaged in the mind, the sin takes on the added malice contained in the circumstances. Example: He who delights over the thought of the robbery of a church, is guilty of mental theft and sacrilege.

n. 236.

The following are signs that delight taken in a thought about sinful things is about their sinfulness, and not about some other of their properties: (a) if one thinks about them without any lawful necessity (such as that of study), but through mere curiosity, or without any good reason; (b) if at the same time one loves to think on them frequently and lingeringly, or shown great satisfaction whenever they are mentioned. Example: One who thinks about injustices for pastime and admires them as great exploits, who idolizes criminals as heroes or martyrs.

n. 237.

Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in sins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish between sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.

(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts, either because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it as the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man rejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some helpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy the perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.

(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is confined to the second part of the news.

n. 238.

The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same character as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to rejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it in will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over the times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those sins, with their number and circumstances adverted to.

n. 239.

What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to boasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the sin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one approves of sin rather than virtue.

n. 240.

To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.

n. 241.

Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately intends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz., absolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those in which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come what may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which the purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or circumstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.

n. 242.

Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as that to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the object, end and circumstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large sum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and dissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of ingratitude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in his heart.

n. 243.

Conditional evil desires, if they are indeliberate and express rather the propensity of nature than the considered will of him who makes them, are not formally sinful. Examples: A poor man who unthinkingly wishes that stealing were lawful; a sufferer who under the influence of pain wishes that the Almighty had not forbidden suicide.

n. 244.

Conditional desires, if made deliberately, are of two kinds. (a) There are some desires in which the condition willed (e.g., if this were not a sin, if this were lawful, if this were allowed by God, etc.) takes away the malice of the act desired, since some laws may be dispensed or changed. Examples: “Would that God had not pronounced against taking the property of others!” “I would stay away from church, if this were not Sunday.” Desires of this kind are not sinful on account of their object, which is not really wished, but on account of their end, or their lack of useful purpose, and of the danger that the conditional may become absolute. (b) There are other desires in which the condition does not take away the malice of what is desired, either because the condition is not at all concerned with the malice, or because it wishes something to become lawful which even God cannot make lawful. Examples: “I would steal, if this could be done safely.” “I would blaspheme, if God permitted.” These desires partake of the malice of the things that are wished.

n. 245.

Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and desires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities are sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is physically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake, but for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred that a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one wished this as a means to save the neighbor’s life, while he still desires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is intended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.

…and 14 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 81 passages

Vol. I, On Human Acts, I. On the Nature of the Human Act

n. 37.

Is the effect which follows, gravely evil, voluntary only indirectly or in the cause, always imputable as grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if he illicitly posits the cause without any sufficient reason? - R. 1. Affirmatively, if that cause of itself, or from its intrinsic nature, gravely influences the effect. The reason is that if the cause of itself gravely influences the effect, the grave malice from the effect redounds into the cause. Therefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect itself by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, one who wills the cause, of itself gravely influencing an effect gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in reality directly wills the grave malice of that effect, and does not merely permit it; since the cause and effect are inseparably connected with one another, so far as concerns the very nature of the thing, and no other honorable reason is present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed.

R. 2. Negatively, if that cause of itself influences that effect only lightly. The reason is that, since the cause of itself has only a light influence upon that gravely evil effect, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and accordingly, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with one another. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. Accordingly he does not contract the grave malice proper to the effect. But since the malice of the effect redounds into the cause by reason of the influence which the latter has upon the effect, where the influence is light there is only light malice; and consequently, with the direct intention of the gravely evil effect always excluded, someone willing a cause that influences such an effect only lightly, although he will not sin gravely, nevertheless will sin lightly. And this is the proper reason why, although there is no smallness of matter in venereal matters, nevertheless there is such in those acts of mere sensuality, as are looks, from a cause of mere curiosity, at less honorable things, with the intention of the venereal thing itself again excluded, as the very common opinion of theologians holds.

R. 3. Again negatively, if the cause in no way of itself influences that evil effect, but the effect follows merely accidentally, or from extrinsic circumstances. The reason is that since the effect follows only accidentally, there is no connection, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause of itself, but merely accidentally, someone willing the cause, with every intention of the evil effect excluded, contracts none of its malice, neither grave nor light, although perhaps otherwise he also sins gravely. And thus, if someone foresees pollution from some excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly, or perhaps even gravely, by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of lust. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing only accidentally into some evil effect, by reason only of that evil effect itself. For in actions only this one thing must be attended to: whether they are the cause of this effect, or not. For if they do not have the force of a cause, it is ridiculous that they must be avoided on account of an effect of this kind. And in no way is someone bound to abstain from positing such a cause, if a reasonable motive is present for positing a cause of this kind.

Cf. 40. 1, 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, 5; Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 14 ff.; L. 1. 3. n. 484; Salm., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5; 3. p. q. 30. a. 7; d'Annibale, 4th ed., p. 1, n. 157, note 15.

n. 39.

Note: Since the cause, as such, participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a different malice, it suffices in confession to accuse only the malice of the effect; or if the cause has in itself another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if because of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if because of theft you likewise omitted Mass, you can then accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. L. 1. 5. n. 9; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 15, n. 479.

Vol. I, On Human Acts, II. On the Impediments of the Human Act

n. 51.

Whether ignorance diminishes sin? - Antecedent, invincible, efficacious ignorance, or ignorance that is the cause of sin, "which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but altogether removes it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. "Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it." S. Th. l. c., since it in no way influences the act of sin; nor consequently does it take away sin, insofar as it does not render it involuntary, but it takes it away only insofar as it renders it non-voluntary. S. Th. l. c. a. 3. But cf. 48.

Consequent ignorance that is purely vincible, or even crass or supine, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "diminishes the voluntary and consequently sin." S. Th. l. c. For the voluntary is had only indirectly or in the cause. Consequent affected ignorance, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "seems to increase the voluntary and sin; for from the intention of the will to sin it comes that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the liberty of sinning." Thus S. Th. l. c. a. 3 and others. But others deny this, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. tr. 19, n. 8, truly cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat. But one must distinguish; for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives.

If someone affects ignorance because of weariness of learning, or not precisely so that he may not be drawn back from sin, but so that he may not be drawn back from such an action to which he strongly adheres, or even so that he may not be drawn back from sin, the sin is not thereby increased. For ignorance of itself diminishes the notion of a human act and formal contempt of the law. Moreover, if for this reason he wills to be ignorant, so that he may not be drawn back from sin, therefore if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows a will not so confirmed in such a sin.

But if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, then the sin is increased, because that ignorance is a sign both of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt; since with such affection he pursues sin that he is willing also to suffer the loss of ignorance, and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not a sin. Therefore although that ignorance also excuses, because it always conceals the condition of the work, nevertheless it accuses and increases the sin by reason of its cause. Luke 23:34; Acts 3:17; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, s. 4, n. 183; Struggl, l. c. n. 36.

Since sins which proceed from ignorance are voluntary only in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in the positing of the cause itself, the gravity or lightness of the sin which follows from it must be taken from that cause, not from the gravity or lightness of the thing which is derived from it. For this latter is voluntary and culpable only insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary and culpable. And thus from lightly culpable ignorance of a physician or confessor, grave effects can follow, which consequently do not bring grave fault.

n. 52.

Is vincible ignorance of law a special sin of itself? - R. Negatively. For every law commanding its own observance implicitly commands knowledge of the same law. But it commands this only in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression of the law itself, for which it provides the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of them, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and through itself, and therefore, standing in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is culpable of itself, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the same virtue of faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence dissents from those things which are said by God. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 182 ff.; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 10; Viva, de Act. hum., q. 3, final article.

n. 53.

Are actions which someone does from a contracted habit to be held as human, and accordingly imputable? - A habit is a certain disposition of the soul by which something is done when there is need; and, if it is acquired by acts, it is called acquired. Hence habit contains a certain special propensity to an act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 49.

Now speculatively: They are human and imputable if he adverts to them, in themselves; otherwise only in the cause, as long nevertheless as he foresaw, at least confusedly, that they would follow from the habit when he was contracting the habit, and has not retracted the habit, nor tries to extirpate it. Practically: "Sinners of this kind badly habituated, although they have less ready knowledge than others, nevertheless always have some actual knowledge of their crimes sufficient to render the acts deliberate and mortal." L. 5. n. 4, par. Third; l. 3. n. 127; tr. de Act. hum. XIV. "It is manifest that he who sins from habit sins from certain malice." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. "He is said to sin from certain malice or industry, as if knowingly choosing evil," S. Th. l. c. a. 1, with full affection of the will.

For he who neglects to amend a custom of sin is convicted of loving and fostering sin, freely conserving a habit freely acquired; from this the will is borne into the act with greater readiness and propensity. Hence the voluntary is increased, although the free is diminished. And this applies whether the habit is bad or good. But sin of this kind "from certain malice, according as it comes from the inclination of habit, is not a special sin, but a certain general condition of sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 14. a. 1 ad 3; 1. 2. q. 73. a. 4.

n. 54.

Does concupiscence cause the involuntary? - The sensitive appetite is distinguished into the concupiscible and the irascible. The concupiscible is that by which it reaches after or flees from those things which are represented through imagination as good or evil. The irascible is that by which it strives to remove those things which stand in its way as it reaches after the former things or flees from the latter. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23.

By the name concupiscence is understood here any movement whatever of the sensitive appetite which is borne toward the good or flees from the evil proper to itself. But those things which are said concerning the affection of the sensitive appetite can easily be applied to the affection of the will; for just as the movement of the will can be caused from sensitive concupiscence, so one affection of the will can be caused from another affection of the will itself. And thus from love of children, of God, of honor, someone voluntarily undertakes dangers, and that will will be the more fervent, the greater that affection was.

One concupiscence is antecedent, another consequent. The former precedes the free act of the will, and consequently is excited merely naturally. The latter follows upon the free act of the will. The former draws and inclines reason and the will. The latter redounds from the will. The former is not voluntary; the latter is voluntary, either in itself, if the will deliberately wills and excites it, or in the cause, if it naturally results from a free act of the will. "The sensitive appetite," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6, "can have itself to free choice both antecedently and consequently. Antecedently indeed, according as the passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines reason or the will. But consequently, according as the movement of the higher powers, if they are vehement, redounds into the lower powers. For the will cannot be moved intensely into something without some passion being excited in the sensitive appetite."

Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the voluntary both under the notion of voluntary and under the notion of free. Therefore an act proceeding from it is the less voluntary under both notions, the more intense it is. The reason for the first part is that an act is voluntary insofar as it is from an intrinsic principle. But concupiscence is extrinsic to the will. Therefore an act proceeding from its impulse is less voluntary under the notion of voluntary. Hence S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6 ad 3 says: "It must be said that, although the movement of the will is more intense when incited by passion, nevertheless it is not so proper to the will as if it were moved by reason alone to sin." And ibid. in the body: "An act is sin insofar as it is voluntary and existing in us. But something is said to be in us through reason and will. Hence the more reason and will do something from themselves, not from the impulse of passion, the more it is voluntary and existing in us."

The reason for the second part is that an act is the less voluntary under the notion of free, the less dependence it has on the part of free will and advertence on the part of reason. But when a preceding passion is more vehement, so much less is the dependence of this consequent act upon the will freely determining itself and upon reason considering. For the more the free will finds the soul already inclined by passion, the less it itself influences the determination of the consequent act. Then, although passion cannot directly influence judgment, nevertheless it can indirectly influence it in three ways: 1. Through a certain distraction, for the sense is less attentive to individual things when it is intent upon many. 2. Through a certain contrariety, insofar as it inclines to the contrary of what ought to be judged, and the soul becomes weak and feeble. 3. Through bodily alteration; for it perverts the phantasy, which does not present itself to the right operations of the intellect, as is seen in the insane and in those raging from the vehemence of passions.

But although from antecedent concupiscence the act of the will is less voluntary, nevertheless it becomes more intense and easier, because it inclines the will to willing. And according as the passion is greater, it renders the effort of the will easier. And thus soldiers from hope of glory, parents and friends from love of children and friends, gladly endure all kinds of burdensome things. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7 ad 3; q. 10. a. 3; q. 33. a. 3; q. 48. a. 3; q. 73. a. 6 ad 2; q. 77. a. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7; 2. 2. q. 154. a. 3 ad 1; q. 158. a. 3 ad 2; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 3, 4.

Consequent concupiscence presupposes an act the more voluntary the more intense it is. The reason is that consequent concupiscence is excited in us consequently upon an act of the will freely determining itself. Therefore whether it is excited naturally, through a certain redundancy into the lower part from the higher; or whether it is excited voluntarily, either indirectly through voluntary negligence and omission of repressing rising motions, or directly, deliberately and studiously, by exciting motions in the lower part; concupiscence, as consequent and not preceding the free act of the will from which it proceeds, cannot exercise any causal influence upon that act, but presupposes the same act of the will, which rather exercises influence upon it. And, if the discussion again is of concupiscence which is excited from the very act of the will, whether voluntarily or naturally, since an effect must be proportioned to its cause and cannot surpass it, consequent concupiscence does not diminish the voluntary, but rather increases it, insofar as it signifies and demonstrates a greater propensity and inclination of the will to the act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3 ad 1; q. 73. a. 6 ad 2; q. 77. a. 6.

Consequent concupiscence which arises from a merely natural resulting and redundancy of the superior part into the inferior, renders that which proceeds from it voluntary and more voluntary in the cause, the more interior it is, by the very fact that it proceeds from the will. But it renders that less voluntary in itself, since it always somehow clouds reason and somehow impedes the free exercise of the will.

But consequent concupiscence directly excited for acting, for example if someone deliberately excites hatred in himself against an enemy by turning over received injuries in his mind, so that he may seek vengeance more obstinately and execute it with greater daring, renders that which proceeds from it more voluntary simply, because that passion directly and voluntarily excited is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger. S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 10, 11; 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3 ad 1, 3; E. M.

n. 58.

Are the first motions of evil concupiscence always sins, and of what kind? - There can be no doubt that the first motions of evil concupiscence are sins, and mortal sins, for there is question of a grave matter, if, when they arise, the will consents in the following time, and by consenting morosely delights in them, whether with a long, or short, and very brief delay. For the act is concerning a gravely base matter and is fully deliberate; and that first motion of concupiscence, although it was excited entirely independently of the will, once the consent of the will accedes, now begins to be a commanded act in its delay and permanence.

Likewise there is no doubt that the first motions of evil concupiscence naturally excited and independently of the will, which afterward dissents from and resists them according to its powers, are in no way sins. For the acts are altogether involuntary, and without the voluntary there is no sin. Indeed, merit is thence had for the will resisting. "The first motion," says S. Th. 2. d. 40. q. 1. a. 4 ad 3, "does not have the notion of fault except according as it is in some way in the power of the will. Hence, when the will does not resist, it has the notion of sin. But when the will already begins to resist, then man merits."

If finally, when the first motion of concupiscence arises, the will neither consents nor dissents, but permits it, not prohibiting it, such a motion already has the notion of sin, because in some way it is in the power of the will. For that motion is now not against and outside the will, which certainly does not intend it, but at least permits it. But the sin is not mortal, but light. For mortal sin is in aversion from God, which cannot be had without reason turning itself away from God through deliberation, which aversion is not had here. Therefore that sin is not mortal, but venial. For it is sin, since it is a certain disorder against natural honesty. S. Th. 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2; Quodl. 4. a. 21; E. M.

Vol. I, On Human Acts, III. On the Morality of Human Acts

n. 75.

Is it necessary for the moral goodness of human acts to direct all actions to the glory of God; and do human acts, insofar as they are good or evil, have the notion of merit or demerit before God? - R. To the 1st: The more common and truer opinion affirms it. The reason is most clearly evident from what has been said; since every moral action, in order that it be good, must tend to the ultimate end and be ordered to it by reason. But if a human action tends and is ordered to the ultimate end, it is already directed to the glory of God. Therefore it is as necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God as it is necessary for them to be morally good. "The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end: but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. "The whole that man is, and what he can and has, must be ordered to God." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. a. 4 ad 3. - 1 Cor. 10:31.

Hence it is enough to direct them to God virtually on the part of the work, or by the very act exercised, namely by acting for the end of some virtue, or for what is honorable and consonant with rational nature; for such an act tends to the glory of God from its intrinsic nature. To the point S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3 ad 2: "Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; but not conversely." And q. 21. a. 4: "He who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor of God which is due to the ultimate end." Cajetan on the same q. 8. a. 3: "one who always seeks what is for the end seeks the end, not habitually, but actually, as actually extends itself to virtually. For virtually to use something is within the breadth of actual use; otherwise that precept would never be fulfilled: Do all things for the glory of God; for to do imports to operate actually."

Much more, moreover, is it enough to direct all actions to God virtually on the part of the one operating himself, who by an act of charity has ordered his whole life to God and remains in habitual charity. Cajetan says this on 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3: "Between the movement of the will toward something habitually and actually, there is the middle movement of the will toward it virtually.... For when one having charity sins venially, he indeed habitually loves God, but not actually, as is clear, nor virtually, because sin is not directable to God. But when one having charity walks or preaches, and whatever else he does not do evilly, although he does not actually think of God, nevertheless that act is not only an act of such virtue, but of charity, and the will then is borne virtually toward God, and not only habitually, which belongs to one sleeping and to one sinning venially." S. Th. 2. D. 10. q. 1, a. 5; E. M.

R. To the 2nd: A human act has the notion of laudable or blameworthy, or of fault, from the fact that it is from the power of free will: "For to be praised or blamed is nothing other than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. It has the notion of good or evil from the fact that it is suitable or unsuitable to right reason. It has the notion of rectitude from the fact that it has order to the end. It has the notion of honorable or of sin from the fact that it is conformable or deformable to law. Finally it has the notion of merit or demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another, from the fact that it is performed in service of another. Retribution is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the advancement or harm of another. By giving something from those things which are in our dominion, we acquire for ourselves a certain right to receive something from another's. S. Th. De Verit. q. 29. a. 6. Therefore from the fact that a human act is referred to God as to the ultimate end, and consequently promotes his honor and glory, and God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, to whom it belongs to make retribution for those things which are done well or badly in it, human acts have before God the notion of natural merit or demerit. For a human act considered precisely according to its moral goodness, in the present order of divine providence, is not formally meritorious of grace and eternal life; for grace is necessary for supernatural merit, by which it is elevated to a supernatural condition. Materially, however, such an act is capable of becoming meritorious of supernatural reward, presupposing divine ordination and grace being added. For if these are removed, there is had only natural merit toward a merely natural reward, from the fact that good works yield to God's service. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7, q. 21. a. 2. 3. 4, q. 114. a. 1. 2; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 3; E. M. 75. 89.

Vol. I, On Human Acts, IV. On the Various Sources of Morality

n. 94.

How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? - They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they accidentally affect it. Otherwise they would no longer have the notion of circumstances. - Therefore:

Who does not signify the substance of the one acting, but his quality or condition, for example, that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. To this circumstance Lugo, De Poenit. d. 16. n. 200, brings back the habit of sin; for through it is explained how someone is disposed to sin more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a union, office bringing a special obligation, vow, or state; as if a priest fornicates, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty only of blasphemy, just as another blaspheming. Malach. 2:1. 8; C. Trid. sess. 22. C. 1 de R.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 45. a. 4, q. 110. a. 4 ad 5; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. s. 4.
What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity, for example in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing belongs to another, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with damage thereby to a poor person, to wards, to girls to be married, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be species-changing. But what, that is, the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species. To this circumstance can be brought back how often, or the multiplication of acts. Nevertheless S. Th. did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are around the same act. But the number of operations does not stand around one and the same operation. For a second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely; nor the third of the second, and so on. From this it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole many times, but he must explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he must express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. Lugo l. c. s. 4. § 7. s. 5. 6. 9.
Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that every act of man happens somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example, that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of a sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only those into the species of grave sacrilege which are directly opposed to the sanctity of the place, or to the immunity annexed to it, such as effusions of blood or of human seed, which impede the divine worship to be exhibited there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals, which are contrary to immunity. Lugo l. c. s. 10.
By what aids signifies accidental instruments, or means, which the one acting used, for example, if someone used sacred vessels for poisoning, employed the aid of the devil, induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to relate to sin merely materially, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. Lugo l. c. n. 475. 476.
Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end, and that of the one acting, as if someone steals in order to get himself drunk. Why can manifestly give another species to an act. Lugo l. c. n. 477 seq.
How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example, intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, for example, that you killed by poison, by the sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although ordinarily aggravating or diminishing sin, can sometimes also give species. - Lugo l. c. n. 497 seq.; Laym. l. 3. de Iust. tr. 3. p. 3. c. 4. n. 1; Tambur. Meth. Confess. l. 2. c. 6. n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 3 ad 1, a. 4.
When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example, on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time aggravates sin, but does not add the grave species of sacrilege, unless it is done in contempt of the sacred time. Lugo l. c. n. 515 seq.; Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; L. 1. 6. n. 923; S. Th. 4. D. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4. Sol. 2.

Vol. I, On Conscience, II. On Certain Conscience

n. 101.

Note: 1. Sin, precisely because it is against conscience, does not have a special malice, unless it is done so that conscience may be conquered. The first reason is because this is intrinsic and common to every sin, that it is against conscience. The second reason is because then there is had a directly willed contempt of the rule of every good operation, and thus someone exposes himself to the danger of all crimes, which, as is clear, is a special and most grave disorder of the will, against the natural inclination of the will toward good. - Lessius on q. 19. a. 6. d. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 14. a. 1. 4.

Likewise it is a special sin if someone sins from certain malice through contempt, by casting aside and removing that which could impede the election of sin; and it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. - Six species of this are enumerated: desperation, presumption, impenitence or the resolve not to repent, obstinacy or the resolve to cling to sin, attacking acknowledged truth so that one may sin more licentiously; envy of fraternal grace, by which someone envies not only the person of his brother, but also the grace of God increasing in the world.

n. 107.

Note: "A sin committed against conscience has its species from the particular matter in which it is thought to be concerned; or from order to the particular precept which it is thought to oppose. For example, if you think the thing which you take is not yours, yet in fact it is yours, it will be the sin of theft; if you think it is against the obligation of a vow, it will be the sin of sacrilege. The reason is that sins receive species from the object either of the external action or of the will. Nor does it matter whether this object is evil in reality, but whether it is apprehended as evil, because the will is borne toward it according as it is proposed by reason." Lessius on q. 19. a. 6. d. 3; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 5 ad 3.

Vol. I, On Conscience, V. On Doubtful Conscience

n. 152.

Of what species of sin is he guilty who acts with a practically doubtful conscience? - This person will be guilty of a sin of the same notion and species as the sin about which he doubts. The reason is that one doubting about that malice, and nevertheless acting, has an affection toward that malice. Hence if you doubt whether it is mortal, you sin mortally; if you doubt generally whether it is sin, not attending even confusedly to the grave malice which may be present, you sin venially. L. 1. 1. 22. 23; Elbel 140.

n. 153.

Note: He who sinned from an erroneous conscience is not bound in confession to explain that circumstance of erroneous conscience, because it does not change the species; since every sin is against conscience, and does not depend on the objective truth of the thing except insofar as that is judged through conscience and proposed to the will. Except the case of censure and reservation: since then the erroneous conscience must be explained so that the exemption from censure and reservation may be established. Except also the case in which otherwise the sin would not be understood, for example, if someone by omitting Mass on a weekday believes that he sins gravely.

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, I. On the Nature of Sin

n. 287.

What is sin? - Since "where there is no law, neither is there transgression," Rom. 4:15, sin, which is an evil human act, is rightly defined by St. Augustine as: a word, deed, or thing desired against the eternal law. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6. Deed, for "sin can happen whether someone does what he ought not, or by not doing what he ought." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 5, ad 1. By doing, it is a sin of commission; by not doing, of omission. Against the eternal law, because every law, whether human or divine, has its force from this law; because there is no power except from God; because no transgression of law would be a sin unless it offended God; because in this which is said, against the eternal law, aversion from the end and all other disorders are touched.

Against law; if it is not against law but against counsel, it is imperfection, which is merely negative if it is a mere defect in a human act of further perfection, e.g., of greater fervor in an act of love of God; and positive if it is an involuntary transgression of a law lightly obliging, e.g., praying with distraction. But it is rather only material sin than imperfection. Or it is the voluntary omission of a greater good, notwithstanding divine inspiration of it; and this, practically and regularly, is not without venial sin, by reason of the disordered motive or end, as, e.g., for a religious to violate rules not obliging to sin. Sin is formal if the law is violated freely and knowingly; it is material if the transgression of the law is altogether involuntary. - Sin is a delict. Delict is so called because good is abandoned. Hence "delict, taken commonly, signifies any omission; sometimes, however, it is taken strictly for this, that something is omitted from those things which pertain to God; or when knowingly, and as if with a certain contempt, a man abandons that which he ought to do; and thus it has a certain gravity, by reason of which it needs greater expiation." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79, a. 4, ad 1. L. 1, 11; S. Th. de Malo, q. 2, a. 1, 2; 1 p., q. 63, a. 1; a. 7, ad 2; 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6, ad 5; q. 87; q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; 2. 2. q. 20, a. 3; Compend. Theol., c. 119; Wirceburg., D. 1, c. 1, 2; E. M.

Is actual advertence and consent of the will necessarily required for actual sin? - R. Affirmatively. For sin is the free transgression of law. But an actual free transgression cannot be had without an actual act of the will, either here and now or in the cause. Likewise an actual free transgression of law cannot be had unless someone in some way, either here and now or in the cause, at least confusedly notices the sin; for nothing is willed unless first known. - But he who here and now is ignorant, notices nothing, doubts nothing, here and now sins in nothing, although perhaps the ignorance or inadvertence was culpable in the cause. For if previously he foresaw the effect of his ignorance or inadvertence, he is indeed guilty of what he does in the cause, but only in act. Yet it is not necessary for sin that the offense of God be apprehended explicitly and reflexively; but it suffices that it be apprehended implicitly and directly, namely by knowing that the thing is evil; for then it is also implicitly apprehended as prohibited by God. Proposition 2 condemned by Alexander VIII. Nor indeed are faith or charity simply required for avoiding sin. Proposition 31 condemned by Leo X; proposition 8 condemned by Alexander VIII; proposition 48 condemned by Clement XI. L. 1-5, 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74; q. 75; q. 76, a. 3; de Malo, q. 2, a. 1, 2; q. 7, a. 6; E. M. 287, 288, 313.

n. 289.

Resolves: No sin is had if the use of reason is disturbed and freedom is taken away, as in a most vehement movement of anger; if advertence is had, but consent of the will is lacking, as in depraved movements against chastity as long as they are displeasing; if advertence and consent are had, but not as to an evil thing, e.g., if someone on a day of abstinence indeed eats meats advertently and altogether voluntarily, but thinking nothing of the precept of the Church. A human act has only that malice which is apprehended. Wherefore, if in some matter of multiple malice, the malice of only one species is noticed, only this is contracted. Likewise if negligence, e.g., of guarding against drunkenness or the events usually following from it, was only venial, even the evils which could have been foreseen are only venial. Since they are free not in themselves, but in the cause, they cannot have greater guilt than in the cause itself. - L. 2, 4; l. 1, n. 165.

n. 290.

Is sin contained only in an internal act, or also in an external one? Sin formally is an internal act of the will. For sin according to its nature is properly only from free will and in the will. "Sin," says St. Thomas, de Malo, q. 3, a. 1, "according as it is properly said in morals, has the nature of fault, and comes from this, that the will falls short of the due end, through this, that it tends toward an undue end." Another internal act, and the exterior action of other faculties, are the object of the internal act of the will, and as it were its complement. For from that internal act of the will, and from the internal act of other faculties, or an exterior action, one total moral concrete is effected; for that other internal act, or exterior action, as moral acts, in their whole extent, pertain to the very moral individual of the internal act of the will, to which they are subject, and from which they receive their moral being. Therefore sin is begun by the internal act of the will; it is perfected and consummated by another act or another action of other internal or external faculties. Hence, since a part differs essentially from a whole, the sin which is contained only by the internal act of the will differs essentially, morally speaking, from the sin which is perfected by another internal act of another internal faculty, or which proceeds even to an external work, which consequently must necessarily be accused in confession. Whence it is not sufficient to confess the will of homicide, but it is necessary also to confess the homicide itself committed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17, a. 4; q. 72, a. 7; q. 74; q. 75; L. 5.

n. 291.

What are the merely internal sins of the will, and what is their nature? All sins which are committed by the interior will alone can easily be reduced to desire and delectation. - Desire is the purpose of some thing, or an act of the will by which we will to attain some good. One is efficacious, and is a purpose absolutely efficacious of itself, whence it is that someone in reality undertakes means to lead it to effect. Another is inefficacious, and is a purpose only conditionally efficacious, which someone would execute if he could; e.g., if he could steal the treasure of the Church, he would steal it. Now the desire of an evil thing is evil, since the object of action and of desire is one and the same. Hence a depraved desire has the species and malice, mortal or venial, of the sin which the exterior thing has toward which it is borne. Namely desire tends to this, absolutely or at least conditionally, that it execute the thing and constitute it as really existing. But if someone truly executed the thing, he would contract every malice both of the object and of the circumstances. Therefore the same must be said if someone pursues the thing by affection and desire; for since this affection of desire is joined with the very existence of the object, it is necessarily joined with all things necessarily connected with the object itself. Wherefore Titius having relations with Caia, another's wife, commits adultery if he knows her to belong to another, even if he would not wish her to belong to another; in the same way one desiring Caia, another's wife, is also guilty of adultery if he knows her to belong to another, and even if he would not wish her to belong to another, because desire tends, as the execution itself does, into the same existing work, and thus concrete with all its circumstances. Consequently in confession of the desire, e.g., of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, marriage, the vow of chastity of the person, etc., are to be declared. L. 12. By no means, however, is there need to add whether the act concerning the object was absolute or conditioned. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1032.

Delectation is a certain simple rest and complacency of the will from the presence of a fitting good, either possessed according to the thing, or according to cognition and apprehension. Delectation does not properly differ from joy, except insofar as joy is rather called the delectation of the rational appetite, and delectation rather is called that which belongs to the sensitive appetite with a certain transmutation of the body; and this delectation is also called sensible or sensual, and if it is with transmutation of the organs and spirits serving generation, it is called carnal or venereal delectation. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31; q. 72, a. 2; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 33. - But according to St. Alphonsus, 15, as desire regards future time and the work to be committed, so joy regards past time, namely when someone is pleased with himself concerning an evil work committed; and delectation regards present time, that is, when someone through imagination and thought renders present to himself the work of sin, e.g., fornication, and with deliberate consent delights in it, as if he were actually fornicating, yet without the desire of executing it. Morose delectation in a depraved thing is sin, because love is present in delectation. For that depraved thing would never delight unless it were loved according to itself. Suarez, de Pecc., d. 5, s. 7, n. 5. Moreover delectation is the rest of the appetite in good. "And therefore according to the delectation of the human will a man is chiefly judged good or evil. For he is good and virtuous who rejoices in the works of virtues, but evil who rejoices in evil works." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 34, a. 4. Morose delectation is voluntary delectation; for it is called morose not on account of a necessary delay of some time, but on account of the necessary consent of the will. For not delectation, but consent to delectation, is sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 6, 8; q. 88, a. 5, ad 2. In a depraved thing; for delectation is twofold. One is concerning a depraved work, so that the evil work is the object of delectation, and this is always evil; another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the very thought concerning the evil work is of itself the object of delectation. And this can either be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, e.g., for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes be even gravely evil, if there is proximate danger of consent. S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 16, 17.

Morose delectation in a depraved thing, insofar as delectation is distinguished from joy according to time, has malice and species according only to the variety of objects exhibited by the mind. For simple delectation does not tend into the object as something to be placed in reality, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object except that one which moves delectation. L. 15, 28. But joy, as desire, takes on the malice and species both of the object and of the circumstances really annexed to it. For joy, since it is a volition pleased with itself, and therefore approving the past thing, is borne into it such as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Hence, in recollection and complacency over past sins, it is necessary in confession to declare the nature and specific circumstances of the object. L. 15. In recollection and complacency. For sin is not had by simple recollection of a sin formerly committed, from the fact that it neither pleases nor displeases the one remembering, because by no law are we commanded to repent several times of sins, if we have already done penance for them, or here and now to repent, if we have not yet repented of them. Laymann, de Poenit., d. 2, s. 8; Sporer, de Poenit., n. 192; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 376 ff.; S. Th. Quodl. 12, a. 33.

Lest in this matter the confessor scandalize the penitent by indiscreet questions, it must be noted that the confessor, from the general rule, ought to make judgment concerning sins as they are set forth, according to the obvious and natural sense of the accusation. Thoughts about a venereal matter, delectations, desires, are regularly borne, the former into carnal commotion, the latter into pollution and copulation. Wherefore the confessor satisfies his duty if he asks the penitent concerning consent furnished; for the aforesaid acts are not always voluntary and deliberate, nor is consent always explicitly explained. Consent often in these acts is not concerning some determined object, but is indeterminate consent into venereal delectation, pollution, and copulation, which is regularly followed by delectation arising from the commotion of the genital organs. And into this ordinarily are simple delectations borne. Desires, on the contrary, are borne into the completed act. Therefore the confessor will then be able to ask the penitent only whether the aforesaid acts regarded himself or another person, of a different or the same sex. But even from this question one must abstain if the penitent is still ignorant of these matters, especially since it is a lesser evil that confession not be exact than that the penitent be scandalized. Besides, if at times extraordinary species are present, and penitents know them, they are ordinarily accustomed to declare them themselves. Reuter, p. 2, n. 209.

n. 292.

Resolves: To rejoice concerning the manner, e.g., new, clever, vigorous, by which a thing was accomplished is not illicit, since the object of delectation is not evil. L. 18. If the thing, as it happened, is not evil, not even materially, nor harmful to another, to desire it is not of itself illicit, although otherwise it would be intrinsically evil, e.g., pollution which naturally happens in sleep. To desire, namely by simple affection and without any cooperation. But if it is licit to desire, it is also licit to rejoice concerning it already done. The reason is, "because what it is licit to desire that it be done, it is also licit to rejoice that it has been done; and conversely, if it is right to rejoice concerning the fact, it is also licit to desire that it be done; for these are of the same morality: for joy necessarily results from the desired good obtained, and supposes or implicitly includes desire." Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; Laymann, l. 3, s. 4, n. 17; Lugo, l. c., n. 389. "I, however," says the same Lessius, l. c., "am not an author that desires of this sort be admitted to anyone; both because, although they are not evil in themselves, nevertheless they indicate an imperfect affection of chastity; and because holier remedies, and those used by holy men, are not lacking. I would say the same about joy. Also in all matters of this sort, as we have already often warned, every cooperation and danger of consent must be avoided." - Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 4, Obj. III; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154, a. 5; L. 19, 20; l. 3, n. 478.

It is not a sin, speaking in itself, at least not mortal, if spouses delight, only by the rational appetite, concerning an act of marriage past, future, or possible, with respect to the co-partner present or absent. The same must be said if a spouse-to-be desires future copulation, or likewise delights in it only by the rational appetite, or a widow concerning a past one, with the danger of consent into venereal delectation arising from it set aside. The reason is that these acts have a licit object. Nevertheless they are full of danger on account of the aforesaid venereal delectation often arising from them. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 19, n. 376, 385; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 47, n. 1, 4, 7; L. 23, 24, 25.

Sadness concerning a good accomplished which was commanded under grave obligation is gravely culpable; concerning a good which was commanded under light obligation, it is light. Likewise concerning a good under neither grave nor light precept, it is light, unless there is a just cause now of regretting it; for it is a certain disorder to be saddened over a good accomplished, although not commanded by precept. But if sadness is borne not into the good itself, but into the annoyance, the labor, etc., it is of itself not a sin. Sanch. in Dec., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2; Suarez, l. 5 de Voto, c. 7, n. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 39.

n. 293.

Is it licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

R. Affirmatively in itself, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the work, e.g., I would eat meats in Lent, unless the Church prohibited it. For such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object, from which all malice is excluded by the condition. - But otherwise negatively, e.g., I would sin if there were no hell, because the affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however added, cannot remove malice, e.g., if it were licit, I would destroy God. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed; and therefore the condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish such things is to desire that the law and order of nature be changed, which would be still worse. Yet probably he would be excused from grave sin who, by such a desire, would not certainly will that what is intrinsically evil become licit, but would only show his natural inclination toward that object, e.g., I would avenge myself if it were licit, but I do not wish it because of the law of God; or would state the matter only enunciatively, e.g., younger, I would have avenged myself, signifying not what he would now wish if he were younger, but what perhaps as a younger man he would have done; yet with the danger of efficacious desire always removed, and also of true inefficacious desire, namely every will of doing, and every simple affection of the will. What has been said of desire must consequently also be said of delectation and joy of the rational appetite. For it is not licit to rejoice and delight in that good which it is not licit to love and desire; and, conversely, it is licit to rejoice and delight by the rational appetite in that good which it is licit to love and desire. For love and desire are the way to joy and delectation, as motion tending to rest. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 284 ff.; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 22 ff.; Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 15, § IV, You ask third; S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 12, 13, 14.

n. 294.

Is it licit to delight concerning some evil thing, if it was done without any guilt? - If that thing is intrinsically evil, it is not licit to delight in it according to itself. The reason is that that object is evil in itself; but that it was not sin is for this reason, that it was not voluntary. Therefore, if now the will accedes, approving such an act, or rejoicing concerning it, which happens in delectation, it will be sin.

La-Croix 89; Suarez, de Peccat., d. 5, s. 7, n. 14. - If that thing is not intrinsically evil, and delectation concerning it is not had under the aspect of prohibition, e.g., if someone delights that he inadvertently ate meats on Friday, some think it licit to delight in it according to itself, because according to itself it is not evil; but others think it illicit, because it was not without material sin, or was materially evil. Lessius, de Iust. et Iure, l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; L. 20, 27.

If delectation is referred to a past act evil not according to itself, insofar as it is objectively evil, but exclusively insofar as it was the cause of a good effect, and the right order of justice or charity is not perverted, some affirm that it is licit, others illicit. The reason of the first opinion is that then we do not rejoice concerning the evil work on account of the good effect, in this sense, insofar as on account of the good effect we rejoice that that evil work was done; but, supposing that that evil work was done, we rejoice concerning the causation of good, which belongs to such a work. This is not illicit, since it concerns an honorable object, namely that good quality and power which an otherwise evil work had. Abstraction is made from the objective malice, which does not move the affection, and delectation falls precisely upon the predicate which is causative of good, which is good. But the restriction added, nor is the right order of justice, etc., is clear in itself, and is confirmed from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI. The reason of the second opinion is that by the very fact that someone delights concerning an evil work insofar as it is causative of good, he already implicitly delights in the evil work itself according to itself, or according to its existence. For real causality implicitly includes real existence.

"Nevertheless in any case it is licit, speaking in itself, for anyone to delight not concerning the cause, but concerning the effect that followed, namely concerning relief caused by pollution even voluntary, or concerning the obtaining of an inheritance on account of homicide, provided the cause is detested." L. 20. And indeed the object of this delectation is good. La-Croix 91; Suarez, l. c., n. 15; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 389; Ithur., Cas. 18, n. 6; Lessius, l. c.; S. Th. 4 D. 9, q. 1, ad 5; 3 D. 30, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; L. 19-22; E. M.

n. 295.

"Does he sin gravely who behaves negatively, and does not positively resist a movement of the sensitive appetite concerning an object prohibited under mortal sin? - There are three opinions. The first affirms that one sins gravely, even when the danger of consent ceases... The second opinion says that such a one does not sin even venially, with danger of consent removed...

The third and true opinion holds that, when the danger of consent ceases, it is venial not to resist illicit movements positively, but not mortal. And this seems expressly confirmed by St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 74, a. 4, where he says: mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, but only in reason. Therefore the reason is, both because consent to sinning gravely does not arise from the sensible appetite, but from the will, and when it does not positively consent, mortal sin is not committed; and therefore venial sin is committed insofar as man ought to beware lest the appetite draw the will after itself; but this obligation, when the danger of consent is not proximate, is only light. And also because, if under grave obligation we were held positively to repel all disordered movements, we would be held to the impossible; for it is impossible positively to coerce all these movements taken collectively." L. 6, 29; Diana, vol. 8, tr. 6, de aliq. cas. circa mat. lux., r. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 8, ad 3; q. 79, a. 1; La-Croix, l. 5, n. 111.

n. 296.

"Note: There is no obligation to resist carnal movements positively, if there is a just cause of not resisting, namely if someone has experienced that by resisting the movements are more excited and increased; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary or useful action;... if it is not an easy business to repel them. It is enough, therefore, then to behave negatively, with the firm purpose of never consenting; for the actual care of not consenting itself then suffices to free a man from fault, at least mortal fault, although not from venial fault, if the resistance is tepid." L. 9. Therefore when temptation lasts long, and it would be too troublesome continually to repel its movements positively, it is no sin to permit them by behaving negatively. And to do thus is counseled to those who are of timorous conscience. L. 9.

n. 297.

How is resistance made positively? - Positive resistance can be furnished in two ways: 1. Directly, by repelling those movements; and indeed there is no obligation to employ this direct resistance, which, as regards carnal movements, often excites them more; much less is there an obligation to material resistance, which itself also often, as regards those carnal movements, is harmful. 2. Indirectly, by diverting the mind to other things. As regards movements against chastity and against faith and charity, this indirect resistance is more to be counseled than any direct resistance or attack; and if the movements are slight, it is better to despise them. L. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 3, ad 2.

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, II. On the Specific Distinction of Sins

n. 298.

Whence is the specific distinction of sins to be derived? St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18, a. 2; q. 72, a. 1, 4, 6, 9, etc., teaches that it is to be derived from the object, because sin is a human act; and a human act takes its species from the object, and from the different aspect of the same object. And thus homicide, detraction, theft differ in species, because life, reputation, and a thing are goods which differ in species among themselves.

S. Th. de Malo, q. 2, a. 7. - Scotus, on the contrary, in 2 D. 37, q. 1, n. 9, thinks that it is to be derived from the virtue which is injured, and from the mode, whether opposite or merely different, by which the virtue is injured; because sin formally consists in the privation of the rectitude of the opposite virtue. But every privation is specified by the form opposed to it. And thus heresy, fornication, theft, are sins distinct in species, because they are opposed to virtues distinct in species: faith, chastity, justice. Presumption and despair, omission of the love of God and hatred of God, are distinguished in species, because the former injure hope in a contrary mode, the latter charity by defect and by excess. Detraction, calumny, theft, adultery, homicide, likewise differ in species among themselves, because they injure justice in a different mode. Likewise perjury, violation of vow, blasphemy, although they are against the same virtue of religion, nevertheless are diverse in species, because they are opposed to it in a different mode.

The one opinion is not opposed to the other, for sin is both: a human act and a privation, a human act materially, a privation formally. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, a. 1, 6. Wherefore one opinion perfects the other, and it can be said that sin is proximately specified from the rectitude or honorableness of the virtue to which it is opposed, remotely and fundamentally from the object. Laymann, l. 1, tr. 3, c. 2, n. 2. But both opinions fall back into nearly the same thing: "for virtues are distinguished in species according to objects." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, a. 1, ad 2. Whence the same St. Thomas, 2 D. 42, q. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, says: "Therefore it must be said that the division of sin into its essential species is through the opposite of virtue, because it must be according to the object, from which sin and virtue are specified." For the matter is the same "about which virtue operates rightly, and the opposed vices recede from rectitude." S. Th. 2. 2, Prologue.

Cf. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 1; q. 72, a. 4, 8. But then there is had either a different object, or a different aspect of the same object; or a different virtue, or a different mode of injuring the same virtue, which bear before themselves a new moral species of sin, when these exhibit before themselves a special order of reason, or a special agreement or disagreement with right reason, namely when from this there is had a special reason why something is morally good or evil. "Wherever a different motive occurs, inclining the intention to sinning, there is a different species of sin." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, a. 8, 9; q. 71, a. 2; q. 79, a. 2, ad 3; 2. 2. q. 154, a. 11; L. 30, 31, 32.

n. 299.

Can there be a multiple species of one sin? - R. Affirmatively, since circumstances can be present to the object which change, or rather multiply, the species. And thus he who, bound by a vow of chastity, sins with a married blood relative commits four sins, diverse in species: against chastity, religion, piety, and justice. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 73, a. 7.

n. 300.

Are several sins distinguished in species from different precepts concerning the same thing? - When positive laws command or prohibit something, they constitute the act in that virtue with a view to which they command or prohibit it. Wherefore the transgression of the law is attributed to the vice opposed to that virtue. But this happens in four ways: 1. When they command or forbid something indifferent with a view to some special virtue, as, e.g., to abstain from servile works on a feast day with a view to religion; whence not to abstain from them is irreligiosity; to observe the natural fast by reason of due reverence toward the Most Holy Eucharist, whence not to observe it is sacrilege. - 2. When they command or prohibit an act of some special virtue or vice with a view to the same virtue, as to be present at Mass on a feast day with a view to religion, whence to be absent is likewise a species of irreligiosity; ecclesiastical fast with a view to temperance, whence to break it pertains to intemperance; marriage not to be entered with blood relatives, relatives by affinity, adoptive relatives, with a view to piety, whence to marry those persons is incest. - 3. When they command or prohibit an act of some special virtue or vice with a view to another virtue; whence he who steals a thing of the church, or strikes a cleric, from the intrinsic nature of the act itself, or by natural law, injures justice; but from the extrinsic law of the Church, he besides offends religion. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 139; L. l. 1, n. 167; l. 6, n. 808. 4. If law commands or forbids something with a view to no special virtue, e.g., not to read proscribed books, that which is done according to that law looks to the virtue of obedience; that which is done against it pertains to the vice of disobedience. Of obedience, namely broadly taken, because in the proper signification of obedience its object is precepts, not laws; these are properly the object of legal justice.

Now, if various precepts all look to the same virtue, and are distinguished only on the part of the legislators, as in theft, which is prohibited by natural, divine, canonical, and civil law, they by no means induce a specific distinction of sins; because diversity of legislators does not make the precept formally diverse, but only materially. It is otherwise, however, if the precepts are distinguished on the part of the object itself, namely on the part of the proximate motive of the precept itself; because then diverse virtues are injured, as if someone were to break a fast commanded by the Church, and to which he had also bound himself by vow; for then he would injure temperance, from which the Church commands fast, and religion, from which God commands vows to be observed. L. 33; l. 1, n. 167; l. 4, n. 145; Lugo, l. c., n. 144 ff.

n. 301.

Resolves: Diverse causes by which some precept is imposed do not change the species of sin, nor increase sins in number. Hence, although by one and the same virtue of religion, with the precept of the Church acceding, both one who possesses a benefice and one who is constituted in sacred orders are obligated to the canonical hours, nevertheless a priest, for example, who has a parochial benefice commits one sin by not reciting the canonical hours. Likewise a religious priest who acts shamefully commits one sin of sacrilege besides the sin against chastity, although he is held to chastity both as priest and as religious. L. 33; l. 3, n. 455; l. 4, n. 145; l. 6, n. 808.

n. 302.

Note: He who sins from culpable ignorance, or because he acts while doubting, and he who sins in the cause, admits a sin of that species whose danger he undergoes and at least confusedly foresees; for each implicitly and, as it were, consequently wills it. Sanch., de Matr., l. 11, d. 41, n. 7. "Acts concomitant with omission, such as playing, eating, while, e.g., Mass is omitted, are not sinful unless they are the cause of the omission, for instance when play is the cause of omitting Mass.... But then the influencing acts put on the same malice of the omission, not a diverse one.... Wherefore it then suffices only to confess the omission. But if the action which is the cause of the omission is also a grave sin, namely if someone omits Mass in order to steal, the theft can be said in confession separately from the omission of Mass, because then the theft is only an aggravating cause, not one changing the species." L. 9, 60.

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, III. On the Numerical Distinction of Sins

n. 303.

Whence is the numerical distinction of sins to be taken? It is to be taken: 1. from the diversity of total objects; 2. from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. Here that is called a total object which, either from its intrinsic nature or from the extrinsic intention of the agent, is completed in itself, and is not referred to another as a part. Thus in homicide there is had one total object, although the homicide has placed beforehand various previous acts, e.g., by seeking weapons, laying ambushes, and striking several times; because all those previous acts are to be held as parts of the principal act, and are ordered to it.

But if the homicide first intended only a striking, and afterward, with the will changed, killed, there will be a double total object; because from the intention of the agent one is not ordered to the other, but is intended separately in itself. - Morally interrupted; because, although any interruption physically suffices for the numerical distinction of acts, nevertheless in order to confession they are not multiplied unless they are morally many; because, just as a moral act is to be attended to in confession, so also moral multiplication and distinction must be attended to. Proof of the first part. Because the object, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2. q. 18, a. 2, is in a certain way the form of the act.

Therefore the act is such as the object is. Therefore where there are several objects in number in the genus of morals, there are several acts in number in the same genus; where there is one object, there is reputed to be one act. Therefore there are as many sins as there are total objects. - Proof of the second part. For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, they become complete in number, and each is constituted in its own malice; since the following act cannot be called the continuation of the preceding one. Therefore those acts by moral interruption become diverse; therefore by repetition they are multiplied. Thus he who, on several occasions morally interrupted, strikes another or steals, commits as many sins as there are those strikes or those thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts. L. 35, 36; Lugo, d. 16, s. 14.

n. 304.

Is there one sin or several when there are several objects materially and physically total, but they are referred together to one act of the will? - It is disputed. There are two opinions, and for each many and grave theologians stand. The first opinion, which St. Alphonsus follows, 45, teaches that diversity of objects materially and physically total constitutes in one and the same act different sins in number. The reason is that sin is the motion of the will into its term, or object. Therefore, just as by specific diversity of objects it is distinguished in species, so by their numerical distinction it is distinguished in number. Ioann. De Dicastillo, De Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 216 ff.; La-Croix 150. "Hence it is inferred that the following commit sins diverse in number: 1. He who by one blow kills several men, or detracts from several... And the same must be said if someone intends to kill or defame a whole family.... But otherwise, if someone were to injure goods which some city, monastery, or chapter possesses in common; for then the right does not belong to individuals in particular, but only to the whole community, whence one right is injured. 2. He who by one act desires to approach several women, or several times the same woman; much more, he who in the same night several times knows the same woman... for each fornication has its own completed term. 3. He who steals from several. 4. He who on one occasion gives scandal to several. 5. He who by one act wills through several days to omit the canonical hours or fast. 6. He who by one act desires evil to three persons." L. 46.

The second opinion holds that diversity of objects materially and physically total, in one and the same act, constitutes only one sin in number. The reason is that those objects, materially and physically several, are attained by one act after the manner of one adequate object, and therefore constitute one total formal and moral object. In one and the same act, namely one and the same interior act of the will; and if there is question of an efficacious act of the will, also one and the same exterior act. For if the exterior act is not one and the same, but there are several, since each is terminated and completed at an object total in itself, it can no longer be united with another. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 126 ff.; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 34. Hence resolves: He commits one sin who by one blow kills several men. But he would not sufficiently explain his sin by saying, "I committed homicide," which signifies the killing of one man; but it ought at least to be explained under some confused generality signifying plurality, e.g., by one blow I killed several, or many. Lugo, l. c., n. 141. The same must be said of him "who by one act of the will wills to approach, for example, ten women of the same condition, or wills to approach the same woman several times. For it is enough if he says: I willed to approach several times an unmarried woman, or unmarried women, or married women, without necessity of expressing the number of objects of such a single volition." Tambur., Meth. Conf., l. 2, c. 1, § 9, n. 59; Dicastillus, de Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 256, 257. "He who by one act of detraction has injured many at the same time, for the same reason, need not open the number of persons injured.... If someone detracts from a family or house or religion, whether it is numerous or small, it is enough if he says: I detracted from a certain family, etc." Tambur., l. c., n. 63; Lugo, l. c., n. 135. It is also one sin if someone detracts from another before many, since the right to reputation is not multiple, but one among all. Likewise it is one sin if someone by one act gives scandal to several. Lugo, l. c., n. 112, 164; L. 49. Likewise it is one sin if someone by the same act denies several articles of faith, because the formal object of faith is not multiple, but one, namely the authority of God revealing. L. 50; Lugo, l. c., n. 288 ff. He who by the same impulse of passion wishes several diverse evils to an enemy, for instance infamy, death, poverty, commits one sin in number and species, namely if all are sought under the generic aspect of evil. Lugo, l. c., n. 260; L. 50. Besides, it is one sin if someone steals a purse belonging to several, or a thing which exceeds grave matter several times. Lugo, l. c., n. 137; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 18, n. 8. "I infer that one willing not to recite the office through the whole year, and afterward executing this, commits several sins.... Similarly, he who wills to practice robberies and slaughters on the road through his whole life, does not afterward commit one sin, but several." Lugo, l. c., 546; L. l. 4, n. 149. The same must be said of sin committed with three women: it is triple, not one, etc.

n. 305.

Does he commit diverse sins who detracts from someone in several matters, or affects him with diverse insults? St. Alphonsus, 48, more probably affirms. But the common opinion of grave doctors denies it. For reputation and honor are always of the same species, whatever the matter concerned may be. Whence this is not necessarily to be explained in confession. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 14, n. 2, 3; Elbel 552.

n. 306.

Note: If someone married sins with a married woman, or one having a vow of chastity sins with one also having a vow of chastity, he admits a double sin, by reason of marriage and vow. "For the prior malice is against the fidelity which he owes to his wife.... But the latter is insofar as he is the cause, by his cooperation, that his accomplice violates the laws of marriage." Likewise "one species of malice is contracted from the violation of one's own vow; but another from cooperation in the violation of the vow of someone to whose observance I am not held by vow, as is established." Lugo, l. c., n. 140, 141; L. l. 2, n. 46; l. 3, n. 456.

n. 307.

When is there had a moral interruption of acts? - An act of the will is interrupted in three ways, namely: 1. By retraction or express revocation of the will, because this prevents the later act from being joined with the prior one, e.g., if someone retracts a depraved will of acting evilly, and afterward resumes it, unless a very brief delay intervened. 2. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to diverse objects, e.g., if someone freely ceases from an evil purpose, and then returns to it; unless there is present the purpose immediately of continuing the same sins, as if someone conversing shamefully with a woman, when another arrives, ceases meanwhile, but with the intention of continuing when he departs. 3. By involuntary cessation sufficiently notable, account being taken of the nature of the act, according to the judgment of prudent persons, e.g., by sleep, distraction, etc. Sufficiently notable; for if a sufficiently brief time intervenes, the acts, morally speaking, are not discontinued. These three things can easily be applied to a threefold class of acts, namely merely internal acts, internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action, and external acts, or acts externally consummated. L. 35, 38; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 551; Struggl, q. 1, 41.

Merely internal acts, which are altogether perfected inwardly, e.g., hatreds, heresies, morose delectations, shameful inefficacious desires, rash judgments, etc., speaking in themselves, are multiplied as soon as they are retracted or abandoned by free will, or involuntarily deserted. The reason is that such acts, since they have an object complete in itself and are ordered to no external effect by reason of which they could be continued with one another, are acts altogether complete in themselves. And therefore the penitent must explain, if he can, how many times he consented by internal will to a depraved thing; but if he cannot, because, e.g., the depraved mind was long-lasting, then it suffices to say approximately, or at least to confess the time in which he persevered with such a mind, and whether very frequently or rarely. For thus the confessor will sufficiently understand that ordinary interruptions intervened, or, on the contrary, more rare ones. Speaking in themselves, for if several acts of this sort proceed from the same impulse of passion, they constitute one mortal sin, even if some brief interval intervenes between the acts. Likewise one mortal sin is had if the depraved wills have order among themselves, so that one depends on another. For then the later wills, without new deliberation or consultation, are placed by force of the first will. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 562 ff.; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 11; Struggl, q. 1, n. 36; Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, § 5, n. 30 ff.; L. 35, 37.

Internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action are likewise multiplied: 1. By retraction of the will. For then, if someone returns to an evil will, there will be a new sin, since the later act does not proceed from the first. 2. By voluntary cessation, namely if someone voluntarily and freely ceases from a depraved purpose, with a notable delay interposed; for then also it is verified that the later act is a new sin, since it does not proceed from the first. 3. By involuntary cessation, if a long time intervenes; for if a brief time intervenes, the acts are not morally discontinued. - L. 35, 38, 39. Difficulty is present here as regards defining the aforesaid notable delay and long time. Now a double hypothesis can be made: the first, that the internal acts are ordered immediately to several external acts, directed and subordinated to some one and common end; the second, that the internal acts are ordered to one external act. In the first hypothesis the first thing which St. Alphonsus has, 40, holds: "Acts of the will, if they proceed from the first will, and morally remain in some effect, through whatever time the depraved will lasts, constitute only one sin. Hence it is inferred that if someone proposes to kill a man, and for this reason prepares weapons, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although through many days he has sought him, and several times repeated the will." But in the first and the other hypothesis, if no exterior effect is yet had, what is to be judged a brief time or a long one, so that the aforesaid acts are judged to be continued or discontinued, no certain rule can be assigned. That brief or long interval can be defined in particular cases by the judgment of prudent persons alone. For the same purpose endures for a greater or lesser time according to its varying intensity, and also according to the varying circumstances of persons, age, sex, character, etc. A purpose of committing theft can be continued for several days; a purpose of reading a prohibited book ordinarily scarcely endures for one or two hours. Generally speaking, however, the aforesaid acts are not discontinued by brief and common, or ordinary, interruptions, which occur through sleep, a meal, conversation with a friend, etc. Therefore, suppose that after these you again repeat the depraved purpose of killing an enemy, fornicating, etc.; you commit one sin, because, since the first will remains virtually, it is united and continued with the second. Salmant., tr. 20, c. 12, n. 38. But something else must be said concerning an extraordinary interruption, which indeed removes the moral unity of the human action. For then the prior will no longer persists. If someone, for example, wills to kill an enemy, so that for a month he continues this will, notwithstanding brief and ordinary interruptions, but afterward for a year, for several months, or for a month he is ill, and by this change of circumstances he no longer thinks about killing the enemy, that prior will growing cold, indeed entirely vanishing, if after he has recovered he again resumes that prior will, this later will can no longer make one with that prior one, since wills so distant cannot any longer be joined among themselves even by moral estimation. Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, § 5, n. 34; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 545.

External acts, or acts externally consummated, are multiplied as often as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even with a notable interval of time interposed, when they are like parts of a more principal act, or tend to one end, because they effect something morally one, which is not completed except when the principally intended act has been consummated; or when, although those partial acts are not ordered to the principal act, they nevertheless proceed from the same impulse of passion. Understand that all preceding acts effect something morally one with the more principal and intended consummated act, unless by themselves they introduce a new species, which of itself does not tend to the completion of the sin. Let the example be one who, wishing to kill a man, burns his house so that he may perish by the fire. For since these things are disparate, they cannot effect one thing. Therefore he commits one sin who, intending fornication, shamefully touches a woman, kisses her, entices her by shameful conversations, and finally fornicates; because all the preceding acts by their nature are ordered to the consummated act. But if from the beginning he had wished only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed copulation, there will be a double sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses the copulation.

A priest commits one sin who wills to omit the whole office on one day, because the individual hours are ordered to completing one office. But he would commit two sins who had wished only to omit Matins, and afterward did not wish to recite the remaining hours, because there would be a twofold distinct act of evil will, having an object terminated in itself. He perpetrates one sin who from the same impulse of passion repeats an evil act many times, e.g., one who several times shamefully touches himself or another, even with some interruption; one who several times strikes an enemy, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; because there is one depraved affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. Likewise he probably commits one sin who blasphemes against God in several matters, as, for instance, if he said that God is false, unjust, cruel; and he who by the same continued act blasphemes against several Saints, e.g., against the twelve Apostles, since all blasphemies against the Saints derive their malice from one relation to God.

He commits one sin who, intending to steal some definite sum of money, takes it away at several times, morally not interrupted, lest he be discovered, because there is one depraved act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft. On the contrary, he commits several sins who at several times steals something from the same money without having decided from the beginning to carry off the whole, because the individual thefts effect a total object in themselves. He commits several sins who fornicates successively several times with the same woman, although on the same night. Likewise he commits several sins who omits a prescribed fast through several days, although those fornications and omissions arise from one and the same will; for any fornication and omission successively made is terminated in itself, and constitutes a total object. Nevertheless, if someone in mortal sin hears several confessions successively but continuously, one after another, there are theologians who affirm that one sin is present because of moral union. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 135, 546, 556, 557, 561; Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, n. 52; Struggl, q. 1, n. 43; L. 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50; l. 3, n. 538.

n. 308.

Resolves: If someone consents in mind to heresy, and then, while reading a book about religion, or hearing a sermon about religion, positively does not wish to amend the sin, he sins as often as he again positively does not will it; since individual acts of this sort of the will are independent among themselves, and stand perfectly by themselves. If someone, on the contrary, decides not to restore another's thing, and always remains in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin, although he also often renews this purpose of his. The reason is that in that retention, never retracted, the first will virtually remains, and the later wills are morally united. Elbel 551; L. 40, l. 3, n. 683; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 158, nn. 3, 4. Moreover, as D'Annibale well observes, p. 1, n. 288, ed. 4, in practice the conscience alone of those sinning numbers sins; for such persons commonly do not know these subtle and refined distinctions. This also must be attended to in practice concerning the various species of sins. Indeed, as the praised author notes, ibid., n. 290, note 14, many things are most certainly lethal for theologians which to rude or unlearned persons seem scarcely reprehensible.

n. 309.

Are touches which immediately follow fornicatory copulation a new sin? All these acts, as also complacency concerning the copulation had, are not a new sin if they are had immediately after copulation, and are in no way directed to a new copulation, because they are very probably employed as the complement of the copulation obtained. L. 41; Tamb., l. c., 72.

n. 310.

Must the means used for sinning be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated? - R. It seems that it must be denied altogether, if those means are not evil in themselves, for then they constitute no special sin; but it suffices to say generally, in order to explain the external action of the sin: I tried, for example, to kill an enemy; I prepared the means for killing him, etc. - But it must be affirmed if those means are evil in themselves; and then they must be indicated, and indeed all of them according to species, if they are diverse in species, such as touches had with oneself, or obscene words used for soliciting. And the reason is that, the sin not having been consummated, those various means, evil in themselves, can no longer be referred to the end and constitute something one in the consummation of the sin, whence they would take their ultimate species.

Therefore those individual acts are to be considered with their own proper malice. Therefore they are to be accused separately in confession. - But if those means, evil in themselves, repeated several times in the same way, or diverse among themselves, are of the same species, all must also be explained according to number, if they have not coalesced morally into one act; for the sin not having been consummated, from which they receive moral unity, they remain acts distinct and many in themselves. Otherwise, however, if they constituted morally one act, for instance because they proceeded from the same impulse of passion, or because one was ordered to another and was continued by it. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 240; Tambur. 66 seqq.; L. 42.

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, IV. On the Gravity of Sin

n. 311.

What is the gravity of sin, and whence is it to be derived? The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice by which a sin is more or less offensive to God, and consequently worthy of a greater or lesser punishment. The greater or lesser gravity of sins is to be derived generally: 1. from the object, end, and circumstances, as they are more or less repugnant to rational nature or to law; 2. from the excellence of the virtues or precepts to which sins are opposed; 3. from the various modes by which virtues or laws are violated; 4. from the greater or lesser advertence to the malice of the act, or from the different degree of consent given to the depraved act; 5. from the duration of the evil act, or from its intensity; 6. from its effects. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, 73, 77, 78, 79, a. 4; 2. 2. q. 39, a. 2; q. 65, a. 4; Quodl., 5, a. 20; Wirceb. D. 2, c. 1, 2.

Hence sins are distinguished as sins of ignorance, infirmity, and malice. For those are committed from culpable ignorance, these from weakness of powers, the latter from the full affection of the will. Sins are moreover distinguished as deliberate and surreptitious or semi-deliberate; sins of heart, mouth, and deed, according as they are completed by mind alone, or also by words or deed; sins of commission and omission, perpetrated by action against the law or by neglect of the law; spiritual and carnal, according as they are opposed to goods merely spiritual or sensible, or bodily; against oneself, against one's neighbor, against God, according to their various object. Likewise certain graver sins are said in the Scriptures to cry to heaven, namely because they most vehemently provoke the wrath of God, and merit most grave punishments. They are voluntary homicide, Gen. 4:10; the unspeakable crime of impurity, Gen. 18:20; 19:13; injury inflicted upon the poor, especially the widow and orphan, Ex. 3:7; 22:22, 23; defrauding the wages of workers, Deut. 24:14, 15; Jas. 5:4. Furthermore certain sins are specially said to be against the Holy Spirit, which most greatly oppose divine grace, and as it were close the approach to pardon, Matt. 12:31, 32; Mark 3:29; Luke 12:10; 1 John 5:15, 16, namely presumption concerning the mercy of God, Ecclus. 6:6; despair, Eph. 4:19; impugnation of acknowledged truth, Matt. 12:31; obstinacy in sins, Acts 7:51; envy of another's spiritual good; final impenitence, 1 John 5:16.

n. 312.

How many kinds of sin are there? - Sin is either mortal, or venial, according as it is the transgression of a law obliging gravely or lightly, a grave or light offense against God. Mortal sin of itself, as it is such, has some disorder distinct in species from every disorder which is in venial sin. For that depravity which is directly contrary to the last end, and by reason of which man is turned away from it and turned toward a creature as toward his last end, is a proper species of disorder and moral depravity; and this is proper to mortal sin, and cannot be found in venial sin. Suarez, de Peccat., d. 2, s. 5, nn. 2, 3; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 4; q. 72, a. 5; q. 74, a. 9; q. 88, 89; de Malo, q. 2, a. 8; Quodl. 6, a. 16.

Mortal sins are such: 1. By their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it may finally be, contains a grave disorder, as in lust, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc. 2. By their genus, but not the whole genus, when their matter, remaining in the same species, can be grave, although it also can be light, as are sins against justice. But venial by their genus are called sins which, considered according to the matter or nature of the object, do not admit grave guilt, and therefore, so long as they remain within their species, that is, another species does not accede, mortal by its genus, they cannot be mortal. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77, a. 8 ad 1; q. 88, a. 5; L. 11, 51; Trid. s. 6, C. 15, cc. 27, 28; E. M.

n. 313.

What things are required for mortal sin? For mortal sin there are required and suffice: 1. grave matter; 2. full advertence to the grave malice; 3. full consent in the prevarication. Proof of the first part. For light matter induces only a light obligation, and therefore its transgression cannot be a grave sin. Proof of the second and third parts: because, since by mortal sin man totally recedes from God, his last end, so that he may totally adhere to creatures, and rest in them as in his end, this cannot happen unless man fully, deliberately, and consequently with full knowledge of the thing, prefers the creature to the Creator. Therefore sin mortal by its whole genus can become venial by reason of imperfect advertence and imperfect consent. He does not sin gravely who indeed knows that he acts badly, but nevertheless does not attend to the gravity or lightness of the matter, namely if he does not even confusedly have knowledge of the gravity; this can more easily be presumed to have been lacking in rude persons and children, but not likewise in others, where the matter treated is notably grave. And indeed the sin would always be grave if someone were so disposed in mind that he wished to act even if there were grave fault. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 10; q. 88, a. 6; 2. 2. q. 35, a. 3; q. 36, a. 3; L. 52 seqq.; E. M.

…and 41 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 14 passages

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Sins

n. 287.

On Philosophical Sin

"2. Philosophical or moral sin is a human act discordant with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in one who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment." Proposition condemned as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous by Alexander VIII, 24 Aug. 1690.

On the Voluntary in Sin

"Sin is twofold, namely original and actual: original is that which is contracted without consent; actual is that which is committed with consent. Therefore original sin, which is contracted without consent, is remitted without consent by the power of the sacrament; but actual sin, which is contracted with consent, is by no means forgiven without consent." Innocent III, chapter Maiores 3, De Baptismo et eius effectu.

"67. Man sins even damnably in that which he does necessarily." Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

"1. In the state of fallen nature, for formal sin and demerit there suffices that liberty by which it was voluntary and free in its cause, in original sin and the liberty of Adam as he sinned." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, Decree of 7 Dec. 1690.

"46. Voluntariness does not pertain to the nature of sin; nor is it a question of definition, but of cause and origin, whether every sin ought to be voluntary. - 47. Hence original sin truly has the nature of sin without any relation or regard to the will from which it had its origin. - 48. Original sin is voluntary by the habitual will of the infant, and habitually dominates the infant, because he does not bear a contrary judgment of the will. - 49. And from the habitual will dominating it comes about that an infant dying without the sacrament of regeneration, when he shall have attained the use of reason, will actually hate God, blaspheme God, and resist the law of God. - 50. Evil desires to which reason does not consent, and which a man suffers unwillingly, are prohibited by the precept You shall not covet. - 51. Concupiscence, or the law of the members, and its evil desires which men feel unwillingly, are true disobedience to the law. - 52. Every crime is of such a condition that it can infect its author and all his descendants in the manner in which the first transgression infected them. - 53. Insofar as it depends upon the force of the transgression, those who are born with lesser vices contract from the begetter as much evil desert as those who are born with greater ones. - 56. In sin there are two things: the act and the guilt; but when the act has passed, nothing remains except the guilt, or obligation to punishment." Propositions of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

n. 312.

On Venial Sin

"20. No sin is venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment." Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

n. 294.

Delight and Desire Concerning an Evil Thing

Cf. nn. 288, 389.

Not All Works Are Sins. Neither Faith nor Charity Is Required for Avoiding Sin

“31. In every good work the just man sins. — 32. A good work done in the best manner is a venial sin. — 35. No one is certain that he is not always sinning mortally, because of the most hidden vice of pride. — 36. Free will after sin is a thing in name only; and while it does what is in its power, it sins mortally.” Propositions of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“8. It is necessary that an unbeliever sin in every work.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

“35. Everything that a sinner or servant of sin does is sin. — 40. In all his acts the sinner serves the lust that dominates him.” Propositions of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

22. On the Nature of Sin · 23. On the Specific Distinction of Sins · 24. Numerical Distinction of Sins · 25. On Capital Vices

“48. What else can we be but darkness, but wandering, and but sin, without the light of faith, without Christ, and without charity? — 49. Just as there is no sin without love of ourselves, so there is no good work without love of God. — 59. The prayer of the impious is a new sin; and what God grants them is a new judgment upon them.” Propositions of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

n. 318.

Occasion of Sin

“62. A proximate occasion of sin is not to be fled when some useful or honorable cause for not fleeing it occurs. — 63. It is lawful directly to seek a proximate occasion of sin for our own spiritual or temporal good, or that of our neighbor.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

n. 329.

Eating and Drinking for Pleasure

Cf. n. 82.

n. 343.

On Sloth

“28. Weariness of spiritual things is good, since through it self-love is purged. — 29. When the inward soul loathes discourses about God and the virtues, and remains cold, feeling no fervor in itself, it is a good sign.” Propositions of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 59 passages

22. On the Nature of Sin

Stanislaus is accustomed to be harassed by evil thoughts. He indeed rejects them, but immediately they return, and remain in the mind for a rather long delay. He himself always fears concerning consent given. The confessor adds courage to him, saying that fully deliberate consent is required for mortal sin, and that the mere thought of an evil thing, and even its delay in the memory, does not suffice; and that mortal sin is a monster so horrible that he who is stained by it knows this well; nor indeed does anyone sin unknowingly. Stanislaus, thinking these things over, has the thought occur to him that, in order to free himself from the most troublesome anxiety of mind concerning consent given to evil thoughts, he might sometimes consent to them, so that he may experience the different state of mind. But soon he is vexed by a greater anxiety concerning the sin committed by this thought.

Q. 1. What is required for grave sin? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 287-289, 311-314. To the second: Stanislaus is without doubt too much liable to scruples; nevertheless let him be consoled, because he is not to be blamed for grave sin. For sin is not without consent, and consent is not in the thought, nor in the importunate and even long-lasting thought of an evil thing against the will, nor even in the most importunate thought of delectation, or consent, or mortal sin, as when scrupulous persons of this sort, on account of such a thought, then fear concerning delectation, consent, and sin committed. Thought is in the intellect; consent is in the will. But the anxiety itself and the fear by which Stanislaus is continually vexed, lest he have sinned in thoughts of this sort, sufficiently shows that every consent was lacking in him. But in the case of doubt, the presumption favors him, if, as appears, he himself is not accustomed to consent with full advertence; because from things commonly happening a prudent presumption is made. A fortiori, indeed, this very thing must be presumed concerning a scrupulous person, as one whose whole solicitude tends to this, that he not offend God. For from what other cause is he so vehemently distressed and disturbed? Cf. Elbel 226 seqq., 548 seqq.; Reuter, Neoconfess., 267, 8; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 740; G. 141.

But what if Stanislaus deliberately conceived that proposal? Without doubt he would have sinned gravely. But of what species such a sin would have been depends on the nature of those evil thoughts to which he had resolved to consent. For if those evil thoughts occurred to Stanislaus against some determinate virtue, charity, justice, chastity, etc., the evil proposal of Stanislaus would have been in the same species. But if no determinate evil thought was being objected to Stanislaus, that evil proposal of his would have been against no determinate virtue, nor consequently of a determinate species, but would have been of generic malice against that general rule of morality: Turn away from evil and do good. Elbel 548; I. M. 315.

Parthenius promised by vow that he would give to the parish church two most beautiful golden candlesticks, so that the Marian month might be celebrated with greater solemnity in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Meanwhile, while he is at home, he often looks at those candlesticks, and is affected by grief and displeasure. Nevertheless, the month of May being near, although with still greater grief and displeasure, he calls a servant, and orders him to carry the candlesticks to the parish church. Seeing them on the altar on the first day of the month of May, furnished with many lit candles, before the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary, he is affected by great joy and great gladness.

Q. 1. Is grief and sadness over a completed work of virtue a sin? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 392. To the second: "He who, after he has bound himself by a grave vow, then seriously grieves that he has done so, does not sin gravely, provided that he retains the mind of fulfilling it." L. 123. But the displeasure of Parthenius does not seem serious and deliberate; but rather natural displeasure, on account of the beauty of those candlesticks, which, as is gathered from the case, were very dear to him. This is gathered from the prompt mind with which he exactly fulfilled the vow, from the fact that Parthenius appears a very good man and devoted to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and from the joy by which he is then affected. Wherefore from that natural displeasure his vow in no way loses its merit. "If however," says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 6, ad 2, "the work itself, considered according to itself, were sad and involuntary after the vow, provided nevertheless that the will of fulfilling the vow remains, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without a vow." Indeed, with that natural repugnance standing, and by conquering and expugning it, acting against it, merit increases. Cf. I. M. 56. Nor indeed is it established from the case that the grief and displeasure of Parthenius were over the vow performed; but merely over a thing dear to him being given up, which is clearly different.

Quirinus, desiring to avoid every sin, judges this altogether impossible for himself. For, he says, every act, in the concrete, is either good or evil, since indifferent acts are not given in the individual. Moreover, when I act, I could always indeed do something more perfect. But to omit the more perfect act is not an act of virtue and good. Therefore by choosing the less perfect I sin, and consequently I always sin. Hence Quirinus is agitated by great anguish, and approaches various confessors that they may resolve his doubt, and he acquiesces in the resolution of none.

Q. Is it always a sin, in the concrete, to do what is less perfect?

R. Negatively. This is clear 1. from this very thing, that otherwise it would follow that anyone sins in every act, which is absurd. For no one necessarily sins. 2. Because by the very fact that someone chooses a lesser good, he indeed chooses a good; and therefore he acts honorably. Whence 1 Cor. 7:25-40: "Therefore, he who joins his virgin in marriage does well; and he who does not join her does better.... Let her marry whom she wishes.... But she will be happier if she remains thus." 3. For if someone, by choosing a lesser good, had a will actually contemning the greater good, or delighting itself in the rejection of the greater good, then certainly sin would be present. But this perverse will does not necessarily and always accompany the choice of the lesser good. For often and ordinarily a man leaves behind the greater good by simply pursuing the lesser good, without by a positive act of the will abstaining from the pursuit of the greater good, to which he is not held. And then indeed there is no sin, and no evil act; but the act is only good and virtuous. But if he leaves behind the greater good by a positive act indeed of the will, and pursues the lesser good, because he sees this to be good, and that not to be commanded, nor necessarily to be done, but free; because he sees this at present to be suitable for himself, within the limits of the virtues of prudence, temperance, modesty, etc.; because he wishes to use his own right, to preserve liberty for himself, not to form for himself a too strict conscience, nor to become liable to scruples, etc., certainly choosing the lesser good and leaving behind the greater, he sins in nothing, and acts honorably and virtuously, although less virtuously and less perfectly. - Hence let Quirinus strive always to act from right reason and from the motive of some virtue; and not to be led by sensual inclination or a less right motive; and he will always act honorably and virtuously, without it also being necessary always that by a reflex act he institute that comparison between the greater and lesser good. Let Quirinus acquiesce in this doctrine, reduce it to practice, and he will be freed from all anguish and will avoid every sin.

23. On the Specific Distinction of Sins

Pauperius, pressed by grave misery and a large family, burned with anger against God, because He had enriched other evil men with many riches, but had oppressed him, an honest man, with most grave poverty. Hence he proposed that thereafter he would no longer avoid any occasion of sinning, nor observe any precept, which he carried out for many years.

Q. 1. How are sins specifically distinguished? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 298 seqq. To the second: Pauperius, burning with anger against God, sinned most gravely against the charity of God. He also sinned most gravely by efficaciously proposing that thereafter he would avoid no occasion of sinning and no sin. But this sin is not a sin of some certain species, but of an unnamed species, which implicitly embraces all species of sins. Elbel, De Act. hum., 71; I. M. 318.

Confundius accuses himself, in sacramental confession, of evil thoughts had, to which he consented, saying: I had evil thoughts three times against chastity, four times against charity, five times against justice, and to these I always gave consent. But he omits explaining other circumstances. He is accustomed to do the same in his confessions where there is question not of simple delectation, but of inefficacious desire.

Dominicus, in confessing, says that he had the thing with a woman, and once detracted from the reputation of his neighbor. But as regards the first sin he omits saying that he sinned with his maidservant, who was at the same time consanguineous with him in the third degree, and on a Sunday, on which in the morning he had approached the sacred synaxis. As regards the other sin, he omits saying that he detracted from the reputation of a priest, and did this in church while he was hearing Mass.

Q. What as to the various cases?

R. 1. Confundius, speaking in itself, does not accuse himself rightly. For delectation is specified by the object thought, and by the apprehended circumstances of the same object. Wherefore the nature of an object of this sort and of the apprehended circumstances must of itself be declared, so that the lowest species of those evil thoughts and of the delectations in them may be declared. Likewise the nature of the object of an inefficacious desire, and of the circumstances changing its species, must be declared. And the desires themselves, although inefficacious, must be declared. For desires, although inefficacious, or although they lack the purpose of applying means to their execution, nevertheless differ essentially from simple evil delectation, and introduce a different species. Indeed, not otherwise than efficacious desires, they are clothed with all the species of the object toward which they tend. G. 158.

But Fr. Gury 160 notes: "The object specifically different of evil delectation must indeed of itself be declared, because complacency in a representation, for example, of a shameful look, differs in species from the representation of forni- cation, etc. But in practice it would be more difficult for the confessor to ask about these in particular, and this would induce most grave inconveniences, which are altogether to be avoided. Furthermore, those who easily give consent to evil thoughts are easily also judged to have adhered to whatever representations." Yet there is often no need of questioning. For first, penitents themselves, declaring other sins, or returning to what has already been accused, often explain the nature and lowest species of internal sins; without there being need on any part of the confessor for direct questioning, but only patience and due attention to an integral confession. Besides, often penitents in good faith from ignorance do not apprehend, in the object or in the interior act, a different specific malice, and therefore then, since they have not contracted such malice, they are not held to explain it. Finally, if there is inconvenience and danger in making an interrogation, the confessor can stand by the general rule, namely of judging concerning the sins heard in the obvious and natural sense, with attention to the matter of which there is question and to the condition of the penitent; nor then is there need of a subtler and troublesome inquiry. - I. M. 291; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1028 seqq.; Reuter, p. 2, n. 209.

The omission of the circumstance of the maidservant does not render the confession defective, because, speaking in itself, and excluding a special contract of committing the young woman to the special custody of the master, the sin of the master with the maidservant does not introduce a new species. Yet a circumstance of this sort can be asked by the confessor, so that the confessor may know the nature of the occasion in which the penitent is found. 2. The omission of the circumstance of consanguinity, on the contrary, renders the confession defective; since that circumstance introduces the species of incest. 3. The circumstance of Sunday and of Communion does not introduce the grave species of sacrilege, and therefore it did not have to be declared necessarily. Yet grave sacrilege would be had if someone immediately after Communion should perpetrate a shameful sin. 4. Detraction made from the reputation of a priest and in a sacred place and at the time of Mass does not constitute grave sacrilege, nor consequently must circumstances of this sort necessarily be declared. G. 146, 147, 148; I. M. 493, 502, 507, 798, 806-808; v. 2, n. 711-714.

24. Numerical Distinction of Sins

Lupinus, making a confession, says that for a year he retained another's property and did not wish to restore it; likewise for a year he nourished hatred in his mind against his brother; but for a month he had the desire of fornicating, and afterwards renounced it; but then for a month he was delighted with lingering thoughts of fornication.

Vulpinus efficaciously proposed to himself to corrupt a virgin. For this end over several days, weeks, and months he flatters her, kisses her, and touches her, and at last completes the work itself. Then he confesses, saying that he once fornicated. At another time, wishing also to seduce a girl, he employed various means for this end, namely words not very chaste and flattering, amatory letters, shameful looks, dishonest touches; but, being about to complete the sin of fornication, by a fortuitous event supervening, he could not consummate it. Then he confesses, saying that he wished to fornicate and tried to do it, but could not because of an involuntary obstacle supervening.

Q. 1. How are sins numerically distinguished? 2. What as to the cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 303 seqq. To the second: Lupinus, precisely from this, that he delayed restitution for a whole year, even if he could have restored sooner, committed only one sin. The reason is that, morally speaking, there is judged to be one unjust detention of another's property. Granted even that it be supposed that he repeated this his purpose more often, nevertheless all those repetitions, as united in the same real omission, do not integrate anything except one sin in number; in the same way as an intention, for example, of stealing or killing, although often repeated, does not make many sins, but one sin in number with the theft that finally followed by force of the same intention. It would have to be said otherwise in the case in which he had often interrupted the malicious purpose, or had even retracted it, and then had reassumed it anew; for then purposes of this sort of not restoring would remain sins numerically distinct among themselves, and necessarily to be expressed in the act of confession. In such a case, since for the most part it is at least morally impossible to express the number of internal acts, therefore ordinarily it suffices to express the delay of time, by saying, for example, for a whole year I persisted in the malicious purpose of not restoring, which I renewed often. And in a similar case confessors ought not to be too anxious in themselves, too troublesome to penitents, in investigating the number of interruptions, since it is morally impossible to know it exactly. Elbel 551.

As regards the remaining cases of hatred, desire of fornication, and lingering delectation in evil thoughts, Lupinus did not satisfy the integrity of confession. For here there is question of merely internal sins, which are multiplied more easily by interruption; and perhaps a multiple interruption was present. But again, since the exact number of sins in these matters for the most part cannot be obtained, it will be enough to say whether he renewed sinful acts frequently, whether several times in the day, etc. G. 151.

Vulpinus satisfied the integrity of confession in the first case; for all those acts, as by their nature tending to the same end and repugnant to the same virtue, are judged to be in some way united in the same end, and morally completed. Elbel 555. But in the second case he did not satisfy the integrity of confession; for generally he made as many sins as there are evil means by their nature, and as many as are different in species, which he used. Therefore Vulpinus had to accuse separately the shameful words, the amatory letters written for seducing the girl, the shameful looks, and the dishonest touches. The reason is that, the sin not being consummated, those various means evil in themselves can no longer be referred to the end, and constitute one thing in the consummation of the sin. Wherefore those individual acts must be regarded with their own proper malice, and accused separately in confession. G. 156; Elbel 637, 640; I. M. 310, 783.

25. On Capital Vices

Augustus, a veteran soldier, desires to be placed over the remaining fellow-soldiers, because he has firmly persuaded himself that he surpasses all of them both in strength of mind and in skill of war, already proved by deeds many times, or at least is second to none. But since he is a fervent Catholic, he has persuaded himself that no other of his fellow-soldiers will be able to benefit the spiritual good of the soldiers as he himself will, if he is placed over them. Wherefore, by efficacious but honest means, through the intercession of friends, he tries to obtain the aforesaid prefecture.

Q. 1. What is pride and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 321. To the second: that Augustus judges that he excels others in the military art, and is pleased in himself in this his excellence, is not grave sin in itself. Indeed it is not even a light sin if, without contempt of God and of others, he neither extols himself more than is fitting, nor is excessively pleased with his own excellence. - If Augustus in reality is a strong and capable soldier, and worthy of a higher public office, he did not sin by desiring promotion to it moderately. The reason is that to seek one's own promotion to nobler offices, and one's own excellence, is a thing of itself altogether indifferent, free from all fault, and if it is done from a good end and with due moderation, it becomes praiseworthy. For only an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence is vicious. But Augustus, by hypothesis, is in reality worthy of further promotion, procures it by honest and licit means, and is led by the best end; nor from elsewhere does excessive desire of it appear. Wherefore he does not seem to be disturbed. Elbel 611.

Angelus, a doctor in philosophy and theology, canon of the cathedral church, famous in the whole diocese both for knowledge and for holiness of life, is agitated by great anguish of conscience. For when he sees that the present bishop does not rightly govern the diocese, whence many detractions and many rumors pervade the whole diocese against the bishop, he is very saddened by this, and prays God for the diocese, that after the death of the bishop, now octogenarian and infirm, a prudent pastor may be placed over it. For there are many discords in the clergy on account of various candidates who are proposed for the episcopal see. Yet often he thinks that, if he himself in reality were chosen, he would govern all things wholly in a holy and just way, would extirpate these or those abuses, would promote these or those pious works. While he turns these things over in his mind, he experiences in himself a desire of the episcopate. But immediately he fears that he has wished for the episcopate by culpable ambition. Meanwhile the bishop dies, and without Angelus doing anything, by unanimous vote of the canons he is named capitular vicar, and then is announced as bishop by the Supreme Pontiff, beyond every opinion and expectation of his. But Angelus is uncertain whether he ought to renounce or accept the episcopate.

Q. Has Angelus sinned in a desire of this sort, and does he sin by not renouncing the episcopate?

R. The desire of Angelus was rather will as nature than will as reason, I. M. 80, and therefore no sin was present. This is clear from all the circumstances of the case; from which it indeed appears that Angelus is not ambitious. But if it is supposed that perhaps that desire was semi-voluntary, or altogether voluntary, then it also does not seem that Angelus sinned by ambition. For "in the episcopate three things can be considered. Of these one is principal and final, namely episcopal operation, by which the utility of neighbors is intended.... Another is the height of the grade, because a bishop is constituted over others.... But the third is what consequently has itself to these, namely reverence and honor, and sufficiency of temporal things. Therefore to seek the episcopate by reason of goods of circumstances of this sort is manifestly illicit and pertains to cupidity or ambition.... But as regards the second, namely the loftiness of grade, to seek the episcopate is presumptuous.... But to seek to benefit neighbors is in itself praiseworthy and virtuous." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 185, a. 1. But Angelus certainly does not seem to seek the episcopate on account of the loftiness of grade, but on account of the utility of his neighbor. Therefore his desire, speaking in itself, is praiseworthy and virtuous. Speaking in itself; for, as the same St. Thomas continues in the cited place, "because, according as it is an episcopal act, it has the loftiness of grade annexed, it seems presumptuous that someone should seek to preside for this, that he may benefit subjects, unless manifest necessity is imminent..., especially when someone by the zeal of charity is divinely urged to this. Yet without presumption anyone can desire to do such works, if it should happen to him to be in such an office, or even that he be worthy of executing such works; so that the good work falls under the desire, but not the primacy of dignity." Moreover Angelus does not seem to desire to benefit subjects without some grave and manifest necessity existing. For since the clergy, and consequently also the seculars, are already being split into various factions, it is certainly to be feared lest by secular protection someone less suitable perhaps be chosen to the still greater harm of the diocese. But Angelus, since in the whole diocese he already enjoys the reputation of a learned and holy priest, seems suitable, as is also gathered from the very fact of the election, who by his authority can restore peace and tranquility and the right order of things. Whence it also is that it now happens that he is in such a dignity, and that Angelus is worthy of it. Nor indeed does Angelus seem in any way to seek anything else than the good work itself, so that it truly seems possible to say of him that, desiring the episcopate, he desires a good work, 1 Tim. 3:1; because in it he desires nothing except the good work. For this reason also, absolutely speaking, it does not seem that Angelus ought to fear concerning presumption of himself. - Lig. l. 6, n. 804.

Finally the doubt of Angelus, whether he ought to renounce the episcopate or accept it, the Angelic Doctor himself resolves thus, in the cited place, a. 2: "It must be said that in the assumption of the episcopate two things are to be considered. First indeed, what it is fitting for a man to seek according to his own will. Second, what it is fitting for a man to do according to the will of another. Therefore, as regards one's own will, it is fitting for a man principally to insist upon his own salvation; but that he attend to the salvation of others, this is fitting for a man from the disposition of another having power. Whence, just as it pertains to the disorder of the will that someone by his own motion be carried into this, that he be placed over the government of others, so also it pertains to the disorder of the will that someone altogether, against the injunction of a superior, finally refuse the aforesaid office of government, for two reasons: first indeed, because this is repugnant to the charity of neighbors, for whose utility someone ought to expose himself according to place and time.... Second, because this is repugnant to humility, by which someone subjects himself to the commands of superiors." Wherefore, since Angelus himself did nothing to obtain the episcopate, of which he himself had no ambition, he is not held to renounce the episcopate. And, if the command of the Supreme Pontiff accedes, on the contrary he is held to accept it. But if no command of the Supreme Pontiff and no injunction accedes, then let Angelus make the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, and according to the most wise rules which St. Ignatius hands down there for the election of a state of life, he himself will be able, under the direction of a spiritual master, better to define what is to be done by him in the case for the greater glory of God, and the salvation of his own soul and of neighbors. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, a. 11; Quodl. 3, a. 9; Quodl. 5, a. 22, 24; Quodl. 12, a. 17; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 2, d. 5; M. E. v. 11, p. 74.

Maximus, a very rich and most noble man and very pious and religious, seeing the Franciscan Fathers in public ways clothed with rough and coarse clothing, is disturbed in mind. For he thinks that he continually sins venially, because he does not imitate that vileness and roughness of garments. Hence he manifests to the confessor his anxiety and his purpose of changing the garments which he himself wears, proper to a noble man, into cheaper garments. He himself indeed would have done this immediately; but a difficulty occurs to him, that then perhaps he could no longer appear in the company of friends of equal condition, and that from this all his blood relatives would take grave displeasure.

Q. Is it always a sin to use costly garments?

R. To the proposed question St. Thomas responds thus, Quodl. 10, a. 14: "It must be said that here one must speak otherwise concerning a private person. For in a public person both the state of dignity and the condition of the proper person are considered; concerning these two he ought so to bear himself that the authority of the dignity not come into contempt, and that he himself not be carried away into pride. Therefore each can be praiseworthy: both that he use costly things to induce reverence for authority, and that he use cheap things by reason of his own humility; only thus, lest the things which are done for conserving authority degenerate into pride; and lest, while the humility of the ruler is too much preserved, authority be broken.... But in him who is a private person, it is virtuous if, on account of humility, he uses more abject clothing even than his own state requires.... But it is licit that he use costly things according to the measure of his own person; but it is a sin if he exceeds his own measure. And because costly is said relatively, as also great, since that which is costly to one is not costly to another, costliness of garments always sounds in excess of one's own measure. And according to this, it is always a sin to use costly garments."

But since Maximus, from the case, does not seem to exceed this proper measure, let him altogether acquiesce, and persuade himself that he is not for this reason in continual venial sin. Let him avoid every immoderation, with attention to the custom of those who are of equal condition, and with whom he himself must converse. Let him furthermore avoid every inordinate affection of vain glory, delights, excessive solicitude, and then there will be no sin. Indeed, even in this matter disorder can also be from "the negligence of a man who does not apply study or labor to this, that he use exterior adornment according as he ought." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1.

Nor indeed do the Franciscan Fathers therefore sin, but on the contrary they use more abject garments virtuously and praiseworthily. "Yet he who uses cheaper garments than others does not always sin. For if he does this on account of boasting or pride, so that he may prefer himself to others, it is a vice of superstition. But if he does this on account of maceration of the flesh, or humiliation of the spirit, it pertains to the virtue of temperance.... But especially it befits those to use cheap garments who exhort others both by word and by example to penance." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1, ad 1.

Leopoldus, professor of a certain faculty, seems in a certain way born for contentions. He is accustomed to attack most sharply the opinions of his colleague Modestinus, although he himself holds them as true. He does this so that he may be held by the students in the Lyceum as wiser than Modestinus. And in reality he obtained this shortly and easily, both on account of a certain subtle manner of arguing, and on account of facility of eloquence, and also on account of a clear and sonorous voice, in which he prevails over his colleague not a little.

Q. 1. What are discord and contention? 2. What as to the case?

Vol. I, Treatise On Sins · Vol. I, Treatise On Sins, Part One. On Sins in Gener…, Gravity, and Distinction o…, Chapter I. On the Nature of Sin · Vol. I, Treatise On Sins, Part Two. On Sins in Species

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 322. To the second: Leopoldus without doubt incurs the sin of discord, because he does not consent with his colleague in the good of truth, but rather, from mere forwardness or pride, is accustomed to attack recognized truth for this end, that he may seem more learned. Yet discord of this sort is not a grave sin unless it turns upon the matter of faith and morals, unless it is done with notable injury of honor or some other grave damage of the adversary, and unless it is done with grave scandal of others, which will have to be judged from the various circumstances. - He also incurs the sin of contention, because he attacks truth with confidence of clamor, as also the sin of pride, because he contends for this end, that he may extol his own authority and diminish that of the other. If the truth of which there is question is merely philosophical, it will not be a grave sin by reason of the matter, because then it is precisely against truth, whose violation is not gravely sinful from its own genus. But if there is question of certain theological truth, speaking in itself, it is a grave sin. Likewise the circumstances must be attended to, so that it may be defined whether contention of this sort, by reason of them, is a grave sin. - Elbel 346, 347.

…and 19 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 20 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On Sins

We must treat 1. of sins in general; 2. in species.

Vol. I, Treatise On Sins, Part One. On Sins in Gener…, Gravity, and Distinction o…, Chapter I. On the Nature of Sin

- DEFINITION. Sin is commonly defined: A free transgression of divine law, that is, of any law obliging in conscience. - St. Lig., book 5, no. 1. - Or "it is a voluntary departure from the law of God." - Thus St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 72, art. 1. - Or "it is a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law of God." - St. Aug., book 22, Against Faustus, ch. 27.

DIVISION. Sin is distinguished in manifold ways, namely:

Actual, or habitual, according as it is either an act or omission disconformed to law, or a state of sin not yet destroyed.

Mortal, or venial, according as it either dissolves divine friendship, or is only a light offense of God, which can easily obtain pardon.

Sin of commission, or omission, according as it is done by placing a prohibited act, or by omitting a commanded act.

Sins against God, neighbor, and oneself, according as they specially and immediately are opposed to God, or are adverse to justice and charity due to the neighbor, or especially regard temperance and moderation of the passions ¹.

¹ ** Perhaps you would say better: according as they violate duties due either to God, or to neighbor, or to oneself. For otherwise there are certain sins against the neighbor which are opposed properly neither to justice nor to charity, for example disobedience.

Sins of malice, or ignorance, or infirmity, according as they are committed either from mere malice, or from vincible ignorance, or from mere frailty.

Sin is called formal when the law is violated freely and knowingly. But it is called material when the transgression of the law is wholly involuntary.

We shall say nothing about original sin, the treatment of which pertains to speculative theology.

Principles. - I. For formal sin, besides the objective malice of the act, advertence of mind and consent of will are required. And 1. advertence of mind to the malice is indeed required, because the malice of sin cannot be the object of the will unless it is known in some way by the help of the intellect: for there is no desire of a thing unknown; 2. consent on the part of the will is required; for sin is completed by the will, according to that saying, Matth. 18.19: For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, adulteries, etc. - Recall what was said On Human Acts, no. 3 and following.

II. For actual sin actual advertence is necessarily required. For it is repugnant that a man should sin unless in some way, either here and now, or in the cause, at least confusedly, he adverts to the sin. For nothing is willed unless it has been known beforehand. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., book 5, no. 4. - Suarez, etc. ².

² ** Even in this question the VV. (page 910) wished to find a discrepancy between the opinions of the Holy Doctor and Gury; and for this end they bring forward the words of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 4), saying that many evils, although actually and expressly they are not adverted to, ... nevertheless are imputed to fault to those perpetrating them, if their ignorance is in some way voluntary either because of negligence, or because of passion, or a depraved habit, or because of voluntary inconsideration in acting.

I answer: In bringing forward Gury's text the VV. (l. c.) ought not to have cut off those words: For it is repugnant that a man should sin, unless in some way either here and now, or in the cause, at least confusedly, he adverts to the sin. These words indeed contain that some advertence which even the Holy Doctor admits both to be present and to be necessary, so that those many sins which proceed from voluntary inconsideration and ignorance may be imputed. And advertence of this kind the Holy Doctor explicitly mentions not only when he explains that fourfold origin, but sufficiently and more than sufficiently asserts it when he calls that ignorance voluntary. For nothing can be voluntary without any advertence.

But, what is more to be wondered at, see the text of the Holy Doctor, which you would say was transcribed almost to the letter by Gury. It must be concluded, he says (l. c.), that the opinion of those, if perhaps there are any, who say that all errors which he commits are to be imputed to one acting against the law, even if no actual advertence ever intervened, neither direct nor indirect, in itself or in the cause, at least confusedly, but only interpretative advertence was present, consisting in this alone, that he ought and could, by physical and remote power alone, advert to the malice: this opinion can in no way be sustained.

Some indeed contradict this, asserting that virtual or interpretative advertence suffices for sin, which consists in this, that a man ought and is able to advert, although he does not actually advert. - Thus Collet, Concina, etc. - But this opinion must be entirely rejected. For nothing can be willed except in the manner and at the time in which it is known; for the effects of a voluntary cause are not determinately voluntary unless they are determinately known. Therefore sin committed without any actual cognition is merely material. Nor should they say that it is perhaps voluntary in cause: for if it was truly voluntary in the cause, then some cognition was necessarily present, and therefore then the sin was perpetrated ³.

³ ** The VV. (page 911, no. 15) exhibit the last period of this paragraph, and likewise the last of the sixth resolution, as discrepant from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus.

I answer: 1. A priori every sensible man will not believe this. For here are contained the first principles of ethics, from which no one will believe St. Alphonsus to have departed.

2. In the first text which the VV. bring forward, St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 4) says that to one acting according to his passion, which he deliberately follows, every depraved effect connected with such a passion is imputed, even if it is not known in particular. But then the VV. cut off these following words: Which (effects), although they are not foreseen in particular, are foreseen at least confusedly... Whence the effects proceeding, although they are not voluntary in themselves, are nevertheless voluntary in their cause. Where then is the disagreement of opinions?

3. The VV. then bring forward as a text of St. Alphonsus a text which is not St. Alphonsus's, but Collet's, the very unhappy continuer of Tournely (vol. 2, On Sins, ch. 4, art. 1). Truly strange! For do the VV. not know that Collet defends the doctrine which St. Alphonsus there attacks, concerning the sufficiency of interpretative advertence, so that he does not hesitate to accuse as guilty from erroneous conscience even those who, nourished in heresy by condition of birth, have drunk in, as it were with milk, this persuasion: that the religion which they hold is the one which is true; and concerning this they never suffer any remorse? Let it be then that the Holy Doctor reported certain words of this many-colored writer, as though arguing ad hominem; for the rest, whatever finally this man wished for himself, it is of no concern.

But what the VV. add (page 911, note 1), that from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus those things which are noted at § 300, resolution 3, vol. 1 of Gury are not to be admitted, will be weighed in its place.

Resolves. - 1. Vincible ignorance concerning some precept is a sin, and in a grave matter can be grave, if the negligence was notable; the reason is that every law obliges first to knowledge of itself, and consequently the precept is violated not only through an act opposed to it, but also through voluntary ignorance of it.

Evil acts have that malice which is apprehended. Hence if cognition falls upon such malice, or malice specific in such a way, this is truly contracted by the act of the will. - Thus commonly.

If some sin has been foreseen in the cause, and then is placed with advertence, there will be a twofold sin, namely 1. in the voluntary cause, 2. in itself ⁴.

⁴ Namely, by two acts, as we suppose, formally distinct, and he consents into the same sin. See below, On the numerical distinction of sins.

If ignorance, culpable in the beginning, becomes invincible, the evil act is not a sin in itself, but the reason of sin must be sought from the cause alone. Now it will become invincible if no thought any longer arises concerning the past negligence or the actual ignorance, because then proximate and ready power for driving away the ignorance is lacking. Ignorance also becomes invincible if a doubt arising concerning it cannot be driven away.

Those blinded and habitual sinners, although because of the defect of clearer cognition at that time they perhaps sometimes sin less gravely in act than others, nevertheless are not excused, because a state of this kind, where there is no care for amendment, is voluntary and culpable for them ⁵.

⁵ State the opposite if, as is fitting, they apply themselves to amendment.

Moreover perfect inadvertence is scarcely to be admitted in habitual sinners, because at least confusedly they advert to the malice of sin. Yet if at any time they perpetrate evil acts wholly inadvertently from custom, these acts indeed cannot be called actual sins ⁶, because here and now they are not voluntary; nevertheless they are voluntary in the cause, and therefore are always imputed to them, because the strict obligation of correcting a depraved custom always urges. The very same must be said of other sins which are voluntary merely in the cause; namely, then guilt is contracted when the cause is placed voluntarily; and since the whole guilt resides in the cause, it will be present here in the same way, whether acts of this kind follow or not, and whether these same acts are repeated in a smaller or greater number ⁷.

⁶ It is said less exactly and against the opinion of all the Doctors that sins of this kind cannot be called actual. For that division is common to all, according to which actual sin is distinguished from original, and therefore whatever of sin is not original must be called actual. But the Author, as is clear, here uses the word actual in a less usual sense to signify sin which is voluntary in itself, and is distinguished from that which is voluntary only in the cause.

⁷ But all guilt will cease if, the cause having been retracted through penance, one applies care for amendment equal to the necessity.

Vol. I, Treatise On Sins, Part Two. On Sins in Species

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Fourth Commentary: On the …, Preliminary Notes · Ch. II, Article II: On Concubinage and Prostitution · Chapter V: On the Internal Sins of Lust

We must treat 1. of internal sins; 2. of capital sins.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 34 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Fourth Commentary: On the …, Preliminary Notes

By the sixth precept of the Decalogue all things are prohibited which are repugnant to the ordered propagation of the human race. For all these, in their own way, are reduced to adultery, as to the primary act repugnant to this ordered propagation. But by the ninth precept all interior concupiscence is prohibited concerning those external works which already had been previously prohibited by the sixth precept. Each of these precepts prohibits lust, which is: the inordinate appetite or use of venereal things. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, a. 1; L. 412, 414. Therefore the malice of lust consists in this: that man uses venereal things, that is, the motion of the genital spirits and semen, which by nature and by God as author of nature is ordained to the due propagation of the human race, inordinately for pleasure or for another perverse end.

Inordinately, that is, outside marriage, or contrary to the laws of marriage within marriage.

Now then: 1. Lust, of whatever genus or species, is per se a grave sin. The reason is: 1. Because it fights gravely against nature. For the use of the venereal matter from its nature was instituted and is necessary for the conservation and propagation alone of the human race; therefore it cannot be usurped outside marriage; indeed, not even in marriage except in the due mode, without grave disturbance of right order. 2. Because it is prohibited under grave obligation by God the Author of nature, as is clear from innumerable places of Sacred Scripture. And thus the Apostle Paul, in the Epistle to the Galatians 5:19, says: manifest are the works of the flesh, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust... which I foretell to you, as I have foretold: that they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. - L. 414; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 153, a. 2, 3.

Directly voluntary lust in any genus never admits smallness of matter. The reason is that any delectation directly sought necessarily introduces subversion, in a most grave matter, of the natural order established by the Creator. This is clear also from proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, which lies thus: It is a probable opinion which says that a kiss had for carnal and sensible delectation, which arises from the kiss, is only venial, the danger of further consent and of pollution being excluded. - Sporer, de Matrim., n. 689-690; L. 475, 476; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 153, a. 2, 3.

But indirectly voluntary lust admits smallness of matter, because then there is no consent or intention toward venereal pleasure, but only toward the cause, which is lightly sinful, since it influences venereal delectation only lightly. G. 412 (Gury, Comp. Theol. mor., t. 1, n. 412); L. 482, 483. And indeed, since that cause per se influences that pleasure only lightly, and therefore ineffectively, there is had indeed a permission of it, in no way a willing of it. But if someone not only permits that venereal pleasure, but also actually wills and intends it, in that cause, he will be guilty of grave fault; because in reality he wills and intends a venereal thing, which is gravely illicit.

Moreover, lust is directly opposed to chastity, which taken generally is: the moral virtue which moderates the inordinate appetite and use of venereal things. A part of chastity, and indeed the most perfect part, is virginity, which imports two things: namely integrity of body, and integrity of mind, or the purpose of preserving that integrity of body forever. Virginity is lost physically in a girl by the opening or breaking of the virginal cloister, and in a male by the effusion of semen; but morally it is lost, more or less, both by a woman and by a male, through voluntary pollution, or merely venereal delectation, or only through consent to these, although in reality neither pollution nor venereal delectation takes place. Yet as regards the political state and in the face of the Church, a girl remains a virgin so long as the cloister of virginity has not been violated by intercourse, and a male so long as he has not carnally known a woman. Whence "a nun who before profession or consecration voluntarily polluted herself, although she loses, as was said, virginity according to virtue, nevertheless since she does not lose it according to state, because she rejoices in an intact virginal cloister, needs no dispensation for making profession and for receiving the veil granted only to virgins. And for the same reason, the same woman can without scruple accept a legacy left to virgins alone, and pronounce herself a virgin in order to marry, etc. Azor, citing Bonac. and others, teaches that a virgin secretly violated in the cloister cannot put herself forward for requesting the veil of consecration, even if from this she is going to incur infamy; but that she can exercise the offices proper to a virgin, indeed offer herself for them, lest she be defamed; because, he says, ecclesiastical institutes do not oblige with so much rigor. But with peace to Azor, a most learned man, this reason proves that in a similar danger of infamy she can not only put herself forward for the aforesaid offices, but also request the veil of consecration, as he holds, citing Suarez and Pell., because that likewise is from an ecclesiastical institute." Tamburini, Explic. Decal., l. VII, c. 5, n. 2, 3; Sporer, after tr. V, append. ad VI praecept., n. 6; Struggl, tr. 7, q. 4, art. 1, n. 2; Billuart, tr. de Temper., Dissert. 4, de Cast., etc., art. 1, 2, 5; Dissert. 5, de Luxur., art. 1, 2; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 152.

Note 1. In order that the object of lust be rightly understood, in this matter a twofold delectation must be distinguished: one venereal, which is also called carnal, another sensible. Venereal delectation, or delectation concerning a base thing, can be either merely spiritual, namely that which is in the mere will, without any base commotion in the body, or not merely spiritual but at the same time carnal, as if there is present a base commotion in the body. La-Croix, l. 3, n. 890-892. This venereal and carnal delectation is felt in the genital parts through the commotion of the genital spirits and semen; on the contrary, sensible delectation is felt in other senses from their application to their own object, and from the proportion of this object to its proper sense. If venereal delectation is intended either directly in itself, or indirectly in the cause, it is called sought; but if, after it has followed besides the intention, free consent of the will is added, the delectation is called admitted.

Sensible delectation is twofold: one is purely such, the other is sensible-venereal. Purely sensible delectation is that which arises from an object which of itself precisely is not apt to move to venereal delectation; as, for example, the delectation which arises from the touch of silk, the smell of a flower, the hearing of music, the taste of sugar. Sensible-venereal delectation is that which arises from an object which of itself in some way is apt to move to venereal delectation, as, for example, the delectation which arises from touch, from the embrace of a woman, from her kiss, etc. L. 412, 413, 415.

Venereal delectation deliberately voluntary among persons to whom intercourse is illicit properly looks to lust and is a grave sin from its whole genus, not admitting smallness of matter. The reason is that venereal delectation of itself is ordained to the generative act and the propagation of the human race, which is a most grave matter; and if besides it is notable, it contains from its intrinsic nature the proximate danger of pollution, which is directly repugnant to generation. This is confirmed from proposition 40, condemned by Alexander VII, already cited in n. 1, 2. For that condemnation of the proposition is to be understood: 1. of warmer and lingering kisses, which from their nature proximately dispose to venereal delectation; by no means, however, of lighter kisses and those transitorily impressed, which only remotely dispose to venereal delectation; 2. of even lighter kisses, but had for the sake of carnal or venereal delectation. For in that proposition carnal and sensible are joined, so that by the name sensible delectation you understand carnal delectation itself, or delectation which is sensible and at the same time carnal. If, therefore, those kisses are grave on account of the proximate danger and on account of the intended end of venereal delectation, venereal delectation of itself is grave. Hence "he sins gravely who spontaneously consents to light carnal motions spontaneously occurring." L. 415.

Purely sensible delectation, as such, does not properly pertain to lust, but to sensuality, and of itself it is not evil, but indifferent. Nor indeed can another malice be found in it except that which generally is in an act which is not referred to a rational end; such certainly would be the case if someone not only acted with that delectation, but also for the sake of that same delectation, positively excluding a further honest end and resting in it.

Finally, sensible-venereal delectation either from its nature proximately disposes to venereal delectation, or only remotely. If proximately, it is a grave sin on account of the proximate danger of venereal delectation. If remotely, it does not per se exceed venial sin, if it is directly intended, on account of the inordination which is directly intended in it, yet not a grave one, since the proximate danger of venereal delectation is absent. Whence, from some sensuality only, to look at a beautiful woman, to touch her face or hand, or to give her a light kiss, another depraved intention or danger of consent to another grave thing being excluded, is only a venial sin. Struggl, tr. 2, q. 2, n. 15, 4, 5, 6, 7; Tamburini, Expl. decal., l. 7, c. 8, n. 1 et seqq.; Sporer, de Matr., n. 686, 688, 691; Billuart, Dissert. 5, de Luxur., art. 1, 2; Ithurriaga, Cas. 51, n. 3 seqq.; Cas. 18, n. 1 seqq.

The theologians commonly warn, however, as regards practice, that "from sensual delectation to venereal, especially in the sense of touch or sight, the progress is easy." Billuart, de Temp., diss. 5, art. 2; L. l. 3, n. 416; l. 6, n. 854.

Note 2. In order that it may also be rightly understood how virginity is a part, and indeed the most perfect part, of chastity taken generally, and is not confused with it, a threefold chastity must be distinguished: conjugal, vidual, virginal. Conjugal chastity is that which in marriage moderately uses lawful pleasures. Vidual chastity is that which, after the death of a spouse or after virginity lost from some other source, thenceforth abstains from the appetite and use of venereal things by a firm purpose. Finally, virginal chastity is that which proposes perpetually to abstain from all carnal pleasures, both illicit and those lawful in marriage. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 151, 153.

Note 3. Finally, that what has been said concerning the nature of virginity may be rightly understood, it must be known that some place the virginal cloister in women in a certain membrane, which is called the hymen and is situated at the entrance of the vagina, and this, having been torn by male intercourse or by another extraneous cause, is abolished; but others wish it to be nothing other than the compression or folding together of the orifice of the female vessel, which is dilated by the congress of a man or by another extraneous cause, and thus the vessel is opened. But although the hymen is commonly found in virgins, nevertheless its presence or absence is not indeed a certain sign of virginity; for several cases of virgins are cited who have lacked it. Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 3; Milne Edwards, Lecons sur la Physiologie, Paris 1870, tome 9, pag. 59, 65, 66; Debreyne, Moechialogie, l. P., ch. 1, art. 2, sect. 2; Longet, Physiologie, Paris 1850, t. 2, pag. 139; Ant., p. 113, 115 (Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, second edition, pag. 113, 114, 115).

Lust is one kind interior, another exterior. The former is the voluntary occupation of fantasy, intellect, and will through joy, morose delectation, or desire concerning a venereal thing for the sake of pleasure. The latter is the very use of venereal things for the sake of pleasure, and it is multiple in species; for one kind is in non-consummated acts, another in consummated acts, which differ in species from the former; and both this kind, which is in consummated acts, and that which is in non-consummated acts, is subdivided into other species according to the specific diversity of objects. - But consummated acts in this matter are those acts which reach all the way to the effusion of prolific humor. Acts which do not reach this term are non-consummated acts, which properly are acts of sensuality and immodesty. - St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 151, a. 4; q. 154, a. 1, ad 5; q. 155, a. 2, 3, 4; L. 412.

We shall explain these various species of lust step by step here in various chapters and articles.

Ch. II, Article II: On Concubinage and Prostitution

n. 55.

Note. "Remedies for those who are found in the proximate occasion especially of base sin are greater prayer, more frequent use of the Sacraments, daily renewal before an image of the Crucified of the promise of sinning no more and of avoiding being alone with one alone, fleeing from the sight of the accomplice, and similar things." L., l. 6, n. 455, 464.

Chapter V: On the Internal Sins of Lust

We have hitherto explained the external sins of lust; it remains that we speak of internal sins.

In this matter, besides thought on the part of the intellect and imagination on the part of the phantasy, three internal acts are chiefly and generally distinguished: morose delight, desire, and joy.

Impure thoughts and imaginations excite venereal delight, and of themselves they have a great influence upon it.

Thoughts of dishonorable things of themselves contain no sin. Consequently, to have them from an honorable end, even not without the wrong effect of venereal delight, is of itself no sin.

But if an honorable and just end is lacking, if they are had from a wrong affection, or if they are of things very dishonorable, even from mere curiosity or levity, or if one dwells on them too long, they contain a grave influence upon venereal delight, and then they cannot be excused from grave sin. But impure thoughts of things not very dishonorable and only slightly moving are not of themselves, by reason of their light influence upon venereal delight, except a light sin. And, since impure thoughts of this kind tend only to exciting venereal delight, they are all of the same species; and consequently then there is no need to explain their various objects in Confession.

Delight, in its most general acceptance, is the resting of a cognitive or appetitive faculty in its own proper object, from the conformity of such an object with that faculty. It is threefold according to the threefold faculty: spiritual or intellectual, which has place in the intellect and the will; such, for example, is the delight of the intellect in the contemplation of truth; sensible, which arises in an organ of sense, the organs of generation being excluded, for example, the delight of sight from a beautiful thing, of hearing from music, of touch from smoothness, of taste from flavor, of smell from sweetness of odor; carnal or venereal, which is felt in the organs of generation, and so is the resting of the sensitive faculty in matters of generation.

Sensible delight and carnal or venereal delight look to exterior acts. Concerning both, with respect to the present matter, it has already been said above, n. 2, and in the preceding chapters.

But spiritual delight is contained under interior acts; and when it regards a prohibited thing, it is usually called in moral theology morose delight; and it is a simple and voluntary complacency concerning an illicit thing. Simple, that is, without desire and intention of accomplishing it by deed, so that one is content with delight alone, with an interior thought, for example, concerning the killing of an enemy, or carnal copulation. Voluntary: hence delight is not called morose on account of any delay of time whatever, but on account of its continuation after full advertence of the intellect to the malice of the thing; and so delight is morose, even if the will, after such advertence, persists and freely dwells in it for one instant, or moment of time.

Therefore morose delight concerning a venereal thing merely spiritual, namely one which remains in the will alone, even joined with no base commotion of the flesh, will always be grave sin outside legitimate marriage, because it concerns an object gravely prohibited. Cf. here n. 2. And consequently the same must be said of desire and of joy concerning a venereal thing, which likewise are always grave. - Morose delight regards an object present according to apprehension, as "when through the imagination of the phantasy someone renders the work of sin present to himself, namely the act of fornication, and delights in it by deliberate consent, as though he were actually fornicating, yet without a desire of executing it." L. l. 5. numero 15.

Desire is an act of the will by which someone deliberately intends the object itself as future, and therefore as to be placed in himself. It is twofold: one is simple desire, or desire of itself inefficacious, and it is the mere concupiscence of the external work and of the means without intention of executing such a work, the means not being applied; the other is desire of itself efficacious, or purpose, and it is the interior concupiscence of the external work and of the means with an absolute intention, or at least a hypothetical one, if it could be done, of executing the work, the due means being applied.

Joy, finally, is an act of the will by which someone deliberately approves, and is complacent within himself concerning, the past object itself, that is, the object carried out in execution, and therefore as that object was placed in himself. Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 2-6.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. 1. III.; Lugo, de Poenit. D. 16. n. 363 and following.

Note. "Not a few, especially from the ruder sort, are involved in this deception, that they think they consent only when they have the will of executing, and of perpetrating by the work itself, fornication, deflowering, or some other external lustful act. This error is enormous and must be extirpated by priests, according to their strength." Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 5.

Desire, whether it be efficacious or inefficacious, takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances of that object. Joy likewise takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances annexed to it. Morose delight varies in species according to the variety of the apprehended objects and of the circumstances exhibited to the mind. - This is established from the very intrinsic tendency of such acts, already explained. Billuart, l. c.; Lugo, l. c.

Corollary 1. The sentence is very probable "that if someone delights concerning copulation with a married woman, not because she is married, but because she is a beautiful woman, etc., he does not contract the malice of adultery; for the circumstance of adultery then does not enter into the delight. For this reason chastity only is harmed, not justice. And Tamburini probably says the same, if someone, with venereal affection, without desire, looks upon a married woman. Yet, this notwithstanding, what Holzmann has greatly pleases me, namely that although by reason of the delight there is no obligation of explaining the circumstance of adultery, nevertheless in practice it must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of coveting, at least inefficaciously, that married woman, into which danger one casts himself who delights concerning her. But there is no doubt that adultery is committed as often as joy, or complacency, is had concerning copulation had, or desire concerning copulation to be had, with a married woman, because then the will embraces the whole wrong object with all its circumstances, and cannot prescind from them, and therefore harms chastity and justice. Likewise, if someone delights concerning sodomitic copulation. Likewise, if the person who delights is bound by a vow of chastity, he also sins against the vow." L. l. c. Cf. Billuart, l. c. Sect. III.; Lugo, l. c.

Delight concerning the evil work itself, for example, of fornication, etc., is always evil, gravely or lightly, according as the work itself is gravely or lightly evil. But delight concerning the thought of an evil work, so that not the evil work itself, but only cognition of it, is the object of the delight, is of itself indifferent; and so it can be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, for example, for the sake of study, consultation, etc., always with abhorrence of the object itself; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, levity, etc.; or it can also be gravely evil, if it is done from an end mortally evil, or if proximate danger is present of deliberate delight in the object itself. What has been said concerning delight of thought must also be said concerning delight in the artful, skillful, etc., manner of an evil work carried out; for example, if you delight in the ingenious abduction of a bride carried out by another, from an honorable end the delight will be honorable, but if from an evil end, the delight is evil. St. Thomas, Quodl. 12. a. 33.

The doctrine of St. Thomas saying, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 4, that it is not a sin if nocturnal pollution pleases as an unloading or relief of nature, can in no way be understood of the delight inherent in pollution, which, as being base, is in itself and objectively evil; and in this way the holy Doctor explains himself in IV. Dist. 9. q. 1. a. 4. q. 1. ad 5. Indeed St. Alphonsus, lib. V. n. 20, wishes St. Thomas to be understood of a purely natural pollution, which naturally proceeds from nature unloading itself, and by no means of nocturnal pollution which has happened from touch or from a base dream, because under this respect it is again objectively evil. Moreover, in practice complacency of this kind, although in itself and speculatively honorable, is to be avoided because of the danger which it brings. G. Dumas, v. 1. n. 173. "Concerning pollution had in sleep," says Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 6, "someone can rejoice, not insofar as it is venereally delightful, but insofar as it is useful, either for quieting temptations, or for consulting health." Cf. Scavini, Tr. 4. d. 1. c. 2. a. 4. q. 13.; Ithur. Cas. 23. n. 31 and following.; Sanchez, in Dec. l. 1. c. 2. n. 19.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 14, I say 1, I say 2.; D'Annib., p. 1. n. 275. (18), ed. 4.

"It is not a sin, at least not mortal, if spouses delight by the rational appetite only concerning a past, future, or possible act of marriage, with respect to the partner present or absent. Likewise if a betrothed man desires future copulation, or delights concerning it; or a widow concerning past copulation. The reason is because these acts have a lawful object. I said: by the rational appetite; because if a betrothed man or a widow voluntarily consents to sensitive and carnal delight, which arises naturally from the remembrance of future or past copulation, he or she sins mortally, as Lessius, Bonacina, Tanner, Palaus, and Diana teach against Medina. But since sensitive and carnal delight, and indeed also the danger of consent to fornication, for the most part follows the aforesaid delight of the will, that delight of the will scarcely has a place in practice, at least in a widow and the betrothed; among spouses, however, provided danger of pollution is absent, Filliucci, Bonacina, Sanchez, Lessius, and Diana teach that even sensitive and venereal delight is not mortal; both because the state of marriage excuses these things, as also immodest touches undertaken for the sake of pleasure alone, and because these tend of themselves to the conjugal work, although by accident the work is not exercised." Busembaum apud S. Alph., l. V. n. 23. - Struggl, Tr. VII. q. 7. art. 2. nn. 18. 19.; Sporer, de matr. n. 505.; Ithur. Cas. 18.; L. l. c. n. 24, 25, lib. VI. n. 937.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. IV.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 148 passages

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Sins and Vices

Art. I. Concerning Sins.

Division: 1. The concept of sin in general. 2. Concerning mortal sin. 3. Concerning venial sin. 4. Concerning the distinction of sins.

§ I. The Concept of Sin in General.

We shall set forth: 1. the biblical notion of sin; 2. the theological notion; 3. the causes which induce to sin.

n. 429.

I. The Biblical Notion of Sin.

Etymological notion.¹ Sin is designated by various names among the sacred authors.

¹ Schleusner, Novus thesaurus philologico-criticus, Leipzig, 1821; Grimm, Lexicon graeco-lat. in libr. N. Test., Leipzig, 1903; Trench, Synonyms of the N. Testament, 9th ed., London, 1880, rendered in French by C. de Faye, Synonymes du N. Testament, Paris, 1869.

In Hebrew: hatta't, that is, aberration from the mark or end, because the sinner recedes from his end; awon, that is, iniquity, depravity; pesha, or rebellion, defection; sarah, secession, because the sinner withdraws from the law.

But in Greek it is called: ἁμαρτία, that is, aberration from the mark;¹ or ἁμάρτημα, which has the same sound, with this distinction, however, that the former word signifies sin whether habitual or actual, while the latter always designates a sinful act; ἀνομία or παρανομία, that is, violation and contempt of the law² (in the Vulgate it is rendered iniquity); παράβασις, or transgression of the law;³ παρακοή, that is, the will not to hear the voice of God, disobedience;⁴ παράπτωμα, that is, fall, because by sin we slip and lie prostrate;⁵ ἀγνόημα, ἄγνοια, or ignorance, because every sin imports a certain error, although not altogether excusable;⁶ ἥττημα, that is, diminution, defeat, because sinners, overcome by temptations, experience defeat;⁷ πλημμέλεια, or that which is beyond measure and harmony, inharmonious.⁸

¹ Rom. 5:12; 7:7, etc.

² 1 John 3:4; 2 Pet. 2:16.

³ Gal. 3:19; 1 Tim. 2:14, etc.

⁴ Rom. 5:19; Heb. 2:2.

⁵ Mark 11:25-26.

⁶ Heb. 9:7; Acts 17:30.

⁷ Rom. 11:12.

⁸ Lev. 5:15; Num. 18:9, etc.

n. 430.

1. Historical notion. Sin is exhibited in a general way by the sacred authors as something negative, or as something contrary to justice and rectitude, yet in a diverse way.

(A) In the Old Testament. (a) In Genesis, sin is exhibited as disobedience, or the transgression of a divine precept,⁹ which not only is reproved by God, but is strictly punished;¹⁰ hence Cain, after killing his brother, suffers remorse of conscience and the divine curse;¹¹ and, when iniquities were multiplied upon the earth, men are punished by the flood,¹² because especially "every thought of the heart was intent upon evil at all times."

⁹ Gen. 2:16; 3:11.

¹⁰ Gen. 3:14-19.

¹¹ Gen. 4:9-16.

¹² Gen. 6:5-7 and 11-13.

(b) After the election of the Israelite people and the promulgation of the Mosaic law, positive precepts are multiplied, and therefore various species of sins against various laws; but, since God is the special legislator and king of Israel, transgressions of the law assume a special malice of rebellion. Among graver sins, idolatry is principal, by which false gods are preferred to the one and perfect Deity: wherefore whoever indulges idolatry is severely chastised.¹³ Among lesser sins are numbered legal impurities, which, although they by no means suppose internal fault, had to be expiated by various ablutions and sacrifices.¹⁴ - Lighter offenses were destroyed by expiatory sacrifices;¹⁵ but graver ones were punished by the penalty of death.¹⁶ In order that the people might be more efficaciously turned away from sinning, abundant blessings are promised to those keeping the law, and dreadful evils, especially temporal ones, are denounced against those violating the same.¹ Yet the fulfillment of the law is also urgently commended on account of gratitude and love toward God.² - Another motive for fleeing sin is taken from the fact that one person's offense affects the whole nation because of the law of solidarity;³ in truth God sometimes punishes the sins of fathers even in sons, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of those who hate me."⁴

¹³ Exod. 32:30-35.

¹⁴ Lev. 11-15.

¹⁵ Lev. 4-6.

¹⁶ Lev. 18:29; 20:6-21, etc.

¹ Deut. 7:11-26; 10:12-22; 11:13-28.

² "Love therefore the Lord thy God and observe his precepts." (Deut. 11:1; cf. 8:2-20.)

³ Josh. 20:20.

⁴ Exod. 20:5.

n. 431.

(C) From the time of the Prophets, sin is exhibited more vividly as an offense against God and neighbor, and true repentance of heart is more urgently preached as a means for satisfying for offenses. For sin is contempt of God as benefactor and father, and therefore impiety: "I have nourished and exalted sons; but they have despised me";⁵ infidelity toward God, who is as it were the spouse of the chosen nation: "But thou hast fornicated with many lovers."⁶ It is also often denounced as injustice against neighbor, because it oppresses the poor: "Who crush the heads of the poor upon the dust of the earth, and turn aside the way of the humble."⁷

⁵ Isa. 1:2; cf. Jer. 2:4-37.

⁶ Jer. 3:1.

⁷ Amos 2:7.

Moreover sinners, by leaving God, the fountain of living water, inflict upon themselves the greatest evil: "But they who commit sin and iniquity are enemies of their own soul."⁸ Hence sin is truly a certain kind of foolishness, concerning which the impious will grieve bitterly.⁹ - Therefore, in order to obtain mercy, nothing remains except to do penance; nor is it sufficient to offer victims or to rend garments, but it is necessary to offer to God a contrite and humbled heart: "Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning; and rend your hearts and not your garments... A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."¹⁰

⁸ Tob. 12:10; cf. Jer. 2:13.

⁹ Wis. 5:2-13.

¹⁰ Joel 2:12-13; Ps. 50:19.

n. 432.

(B) In the New Testament. (a) Christ from the beginning is exhibited as the lamb who takes away the sins of the world, and therefore He speaks more concerning the destruction of sin than concerning its nature.

Nevertheless He supposes sin to be a transgression of the law, an offense against God and neighbor, a disordering of the will, by which one's own glory is preferred to the glory of God.¹¹ From another side, by teaching and inculcating a more perfect law, by that very fact He indirectly declares the nature and extension of sin: thus, in the sermon on the mount, He reproves as sinful many acts which were presented as honorable by the doctors of the law and the scribes, for example, anger, hatred of enemies, boasting, pride, etc. In a special manner He denounces hypocrisy, scandal, infidelity, and sin against the Holy Spirit.¹ From another side He takes away merely legal sins from the midst, and openly declares that sins go out from the heart:² "For from the heart go forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies: these are the things which defile a man; but to eat with unwashed hands does not defile a man."

¹¹ John 12:43.

¹ Matt. 23:5-32; Matt. 18:6; Luke 17:1-2; Matt. 12:31-32; Mark 16:16.

² Matt. 15:19-20.

(b) According to St. Paul, sin is a certain servitude, from which we are freed by grace: "But being freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice";³ it is also the cause of death: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death";⁴ it is deservedly called disobedience and prevarication,⁵ and therefore is punished with a terrible judgment, because the sinner tramples underfoot the Son of God and grieves the Holy Spirit.⁶

³ Rom. 6:18.

⁴ Rom. 5:12.

⁵ Heb. 2:2.

⁶ Heb. 10:26-31; Eph. 4:30.

(c) According to St. John, we all indeed sin, but we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just, who is the propitiation for our sins;⁷ but sin is iniquity and the work of the devil; everyone who is born of God does not commit sin⁸ (namely, as long as he remains a son of God, by imitating divine morals). Among sins, two especially are to be fled: those which are opposed to charity, and those which are against Christ, especially the denial of His divinity.⁹ With regard to gravity, sin is twofold, one which is not unto death, but another which is unto death,¹⁰ that is, to which the will adheres so obstinately that there is scarcely hope of obtaining pardon.

⁷ 1 John 1:8-10; 2:1-2.

⁸ 1 John 3:4-10.

⁹ 1 John 3:15; 5:10-12.

¹⁰ Ibid., 16-17.

n. 433.

II. The Theological Notion of Sin.

1. Definition of sin. It is commonly defined as a free transgression of the law, according to that saying of Augustine: "Sin is some deed, or word, or desire against the eternal law. But the eternal law is divine reason or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed."¹² - Hence a twofold element is found in sin: a voluntary act,¹³ whether of deed or of mouth or of heart, which Augustine does not mention in his definition, but supposes; and a defect of rectitude, or privation of due order toward the ultimate end, and therefore lack of conformity with divine reason, which is the ultimate rule of morals, and with the dictate of conscience, which manifests the same to us. - This indeed is true even of the transgression of human law: for this is not truly law except insofar as it is consonant with divine reason; and therefore the transgressor of human law indirectly violates divine law.

¹¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-72; Suarez, De Peccatis, disp. I-IV; Salmant., Tr. XX, De principiis moralitatis, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, lib. II, n. 1-10; Billuart, De peccatis, diss. I, art. 2-4; L. Billot, Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati, 3rd ed., Rome, 1900.

¹² St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. XXXII, c. 27; Migne, P.L. XLII, 418. - Concerning the eternal law, we spoke above, n. 210.

¹³ Wherefore for formal, or subjective, sin there is required advertence of the intellect and consent of the will, concerning which above, n. 78-84.

n. 434.

Corollaries. (A) From this it follows that there is not per se a merely philosophical sin, that is, one opposed to right reason without nevertheless being an offense against God. (a) For the following proposition 2 was condemned by Alexander VIII, 24 August 1690, as scandalous, rash, and erroneous: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment."¹ - And deservedly; for of itself he who apprehends some action as morally evil, by that very fact at least implicitly perceives it as prohibited by the supreme legislator, and therefore logically and interpretatively as an offense against God.² (b) Yet from this it cannot be inferred that the opinion of Lugo and of certain other theologians was reproved, who assert that a merely philosophical sin can hypothetically be given, namely in those who inculpably are ignorant of God;³ for these do not offend God even implicitly, since they by no means know His existence. - But the proposition was condemned because it did not distinguish between vincible and invincible ignorance of God, and from another side supposed this ignorance to be common enough.

¹ Denzing., n. 1157; Viva, on this proposition, where he observes that that proposition, ascribed to a certain professor of Dijon (Musnier), had not been defended by him so absolutely; Mangenot, Dictionn. de theol., t. I, p. 749; A. Vermeele, La morale de Kant et la theorie du peche philosophique, apud Annales de Philos. caret., Sept. 1894, p. 543-565.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 7, ad 3.

³ Lugo, De Incarnat., disp. V, sect. 5; Viva, cited place, n. 22.

n. 435.

(B) From this can also be gathered the difference between evil, sin, and fault; for evil indeed is any deformity, whether moral or physical, consisting in the privation of due perfection; but sin is a morally evil act, whether voluntary or involuntary (material, or objective, sin); finally, fault is a morally evil and voluntary act. Yet sin and fault are often taken promiscuously.

(C) It must likewise be noted that, in St. Paul and in ancient authors, by the name sin is also designated that which induces to sin, for example, concupiscence,¹ or that which follows from sin, for example, the stain impressed on the soul by sin; indeed, by extension, the penalty of sin, or sacrifice for sin, or the object of sin.² Wherefore, from the context the genuine sense must be defined.

¹ "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin." (Trent, sess. V, can. 5, apud Denzing., n. 674.)

² Lev. 20:20; 2 Cor. 5:21; Deut. 9:21.

n. 436.

1. Divisions of sin. Sin is divided in many ways, because it can be considered under a manifold respect: -

(a) By reason of the principle from which it arises, sin is original or actual: the former is not committed by the proper consent of each one, but is transfused from Adam into his descendants, from a certain moral connection between these and him, as we declared in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 189-193. But the latter, concerning which alone we treat here, is committed by the proper will of each one.

(b) By reason of the mode in which it is completed, sin of commission consists in a positive act against some forbidding precept, such as homicide; while sin of omission consists in omitting an action prescribed by law, as is the omission of fasting: sin of this kind requires a positive act of the will, by which someone wills to omit the thing commanded, or at least wills something else incompatible with the thing commanded,³ as was declared above, n. 84.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 5.

n. 437.

(c) By reason of malice, sins of ignorance are distinguished, which proceed from ignorance, although culpable (above, n. 90-97); sins of infirmity, which arise from the impulse of passion, although not without free consent (above, n. 102-106); sins of malice, which especially draw their origin from an evil and perverse will, without being excused by ignorance or the vehement impulse of passion: these, other things being equal, are graver.

(d) By reason of the powers by which they are committed, sins are of heart, of mouth, and of deed, according as they are completed by the mind alone, or by words externally brought forth, or by external action; suppose if someone first conceives anger in the heart against a neighbor, then expresses it by harsh words, and finally strikes the enemy with blows and wounds. But what malice the external act adds to the internal act of the same kind, we have already explained, n. 162-166.

(e) By reason of gravity, sin is called mortal, from a certain analogy with physical death, when it brings spiritual death upon the soul, by depriving it of sanctifying grace,¹ which is supernatural life; but venial, if it does not deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and therefore in some way deserves pardon, even when it has not been remitted.

¹ In the state of mere nature, grave sin would not deprive the soul of grace, but of that rectitude and beauty which arises from the ordering of the faculties to God, the ultimate end.

n. 438.

From this it follows that the word "sin" is not univocal, but analogous, insofar as it does not have altogether the same sense when it is predicated of certain kinds of sins. For, other divisions being passed over, actual mortal sin, venial sin, and original sin so differ among themselves that they can be reduced to the same genus only analogically; since mortal sin not yet remitted turns us altogether away from the ultimate end, while venial sin indeed retards us from the attainment of the end, but does not turn us away;² from another side original sin is not voluntary by one's proper will, while actual sin supposes one's proper fault.

² "The division of sin into venial and mortal is not the division of a genus into species which equally participate in the notion of the genus, but of an analogue into those things of which it is predicated according to prior and posterior." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1.)

Wherefore, original sin being set aside, concerning which something has been said elsewhere, we shall speak separately of mortal and venial sin, since their nature and effects differ as much as heaven from earth.

n. 439.

III. Concerning the Causes Which Induce to Sin.

That God is not the author of sin, whatever the Manicheans and not a few Protestants said to the contrary, we have already proved in the Treatise on the One God, n. 94-99; which from another side is established from Trent:¹ "If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as He works good ones, not only permissively, but also properly and of Himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is His proper work no less than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema." Therefore the efficient cause of sin is the free will of man itself, which, from infirmity or malice, and often from both at the same time, deviates from the right path of virtue, and prefers its own advantage to the will of God. But the will is drawn to sin by various motives or causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. The prior and principal intrinsic cause is our corrupted nature, or concupiscence, which, with Trent as witness, is from sin and inclines to sin; but the extrinsic causes are the world and the devil; concerning these three we must speak separately. Afterward concerning temptation, which is nothing other than an incitement to sin arising from this threefold cause.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, can. 6, apud Denzing., n. 698.

n. 440.

1. Concerning the Internal Cause, or Concupiscence.

St. James explains that this is a cause of sin thus:² "But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; then when concupiscence has conceived, it brings forth sin; but sin, when it is consummated, begets death." Therefore concupiscence is not sin in itself, but the principal internal cause of sin, or incitement to sinning; if the will freely consents to it, then a sinful act arises. - But St. John teaches that concupiscence is threefold:³ "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." (a) Now concupiscence of the flesh is a certain inordinate propensity toward carnal pleasures, especially toward intemperance and lust. (b) Concupiscence of the eyes, according to St. Augustine and St. Thomas,¹ designates inordinate curiosity for knowing, through the eyes of the body or of the mind, all things which please, even dangerous things; or an inordinate propensity toward riches, resources, magnificent houses, and other things of this kind, by whose sight men are delighted, and whose possession they covet. (c) The pride of life is the inordinate desire of honors, dignities, and similar things which render life conspicuous and procure vainglory. Therefore the principal internal propensities which incline to sin are: intemperance and lust, curiosity and covetousness, and also ambition. - But the root of all these is inordinate love of self: "That someone inordinately desires some temporal good proceeds from this, that he inordinately loves himself";² for he does not desire riches, pleasures, and honors except in order to enjoy them and to please himself. - Moreover all passions, concerning which above, n. 99-107, can allure us to sin: concerning the principal ones it will be treated where we discuss the capital vices.

² Jas. 1:14-15.

³ 1 John 2:16. Cf. Bossuet, Traite de la Concupiscence. - A certain concupiscence is natural to man; this, besides, received an increase from original sin, as was proved in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 171, 198.

¹ St. Augustine, Confess., l. X, c. 35, P.L. XXXII, 802; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 5.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4.

n. 441.

2. Concerning the Extrinsic Causes of Sin.

There are especially two external causes soliciting to sin: the world and the devil.

(A) The world, concerning which the question is, is not the complex of men who live in the world, but that depraved spirit which flourishes among many men; this is often exhibited in Scripture, especially apud St. John, as an occasion of sin. Thus Christ anathematizes the world because of the scandals which it offers,³ nor does He pray for the world,⁴ but for the disciples, not indeed that God take them out of the world, but that He preserve them from the evil which is in the world;⁵ He predicts that the disciples will suffer persecution from the world, but inspires confidence in them, because He Himself has conquered the world.⁶ The reason for fleeing the world is because the world "is wholly set in the evil one,⁷... since all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life."¹ Or, in other words, the world in these places is held as the tinder of threefold concupiscence.

³ Matt. 18:7.

⁴ John 17:9.

⁵ John 17:5.

⁶ John 16:33.

⁷ 1 John 5:19.

¹ 1 John 2:16.

In truth it often induces us to sinning: (a) by deceiving the incautious with fallacies which are directly opposed to the doctrine of Christ; for while the Master calls blessed the poor in spirit, the meek and humble, the peacemakers, and those who mourn and suffer persecution for justice, - the world on the contrary pronounces these unhappy and foolish, and places the highest good in riches, pleasures, and honors; (b) by allurements it draws us, by placing before the eyes all those things which please the senses or favor ambition, so that it may deter us from the right path, and by promising any delights to those who wish to serve it; (c) by depraved examples it draws those weak in soul, and terrifies the timid with threats, lest they fulfill their office.²

² Cf. Marion, De la solidarite morale, Paris, 1883, p. 163-231.

Yet it must be noted that those who are strong in soul, and trust in God, not with difficulty despise the vanities of the world and reject its solicitations: "Have confidence, I have overcome the world... And this is the victory which overcomes the world, our faith."³

³ John 16:33; 1 John 5:4.

n. 442.

(B) The devil likewise not rarely incites man to sin: he tempted our first parents,⁴ did not hesitate to attack Christ Himself,⁵ and incited Judas the traitor to hand over the Lord;⁶ but in a general way, the Apostles warn us to beware of diabolical temptation: "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour... For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the heavenly places."⁷

⁴ Gen. 3:1-16.

⁵ Matt. 4:3-10.

⁶ John 13:2, 27.

⁷ 1 Pet. 5:8-9; Eph. 6:12.

This, according to common doctrine, he accomplishes in these various modes: (a) by acting upon the external and internal senses, namely by proposing to the eyes, imagination, and memory sensible objects or phantasms, from which passions are moved; (b) also by stirring up passions, namely by cooperating with natural causes which are able to excite the sensible appetite. Yet commonly it is said that he cannot act directly on the intellect and will, which, as being spiritual faculties, are subject to no other external agent except God: "Whence the whole interior operation of the devil seems to be concerned with phantasy and the sensitive appetite; by moving each of these, he can induce to sin."¹ - But here it can be observed that many temptations are attributed to the devil which in truth arise from concupiscence itself.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 80, a. 2. - Yet some think that the demon can also act directly on the intellect.

n. 443.

3. Concerning Temptation.

When the aforesaid causes, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, actually incite us to sinning, temptation arises: concerning which it will be helpful to establish these things: -

² Cf. Bourdaloue, Careme, Sunday of the first week.

(A) Concerning the rules to be followed with regard to temptation. (a) To feel temptation is not sin, but to consent to it is. This Trent openly teaches indeed concerning concupiscence:³ "But this holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence, or tinder, remains in the baptized: since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent; indeed he who shall have contended lawfully will be crowned." - This surely is established from the things which were said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where it was proved that for merit or demerit a free act, and therefore the consent of the will, is required.

³ Trent, sess. V, can. 5.

Therefore the whole difficulty is in this: that the distinction between feeling and consenting be clearly established. To understand this better, three things can be distinguished in temptation: evil suggestion, delectation, and consent. The suggestion itself, or evil thought or imagination, however depraved and long-lasting, is not sin, since in it the will has no part. But often from this suggestion, especially if it perseveres for a long time, some natural and as it were necessary delectation arises in the sensitive appetite, and sometimes a commotion of the senses: up to this point, however, there is no sin, because, as is supposed, this motion of the sensitive appetite is indeliberate and involuntary. When the intellect now perceives the depraved suggestion and its malice, and also the delectation arising from it in the sensitive appetite, the will cannot conduct itself passively; if it immediately rejects the pleasure, there is no sin; but, if it freely consents to it, there will be sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the matter, and the consent more or less full.⁴

⁴ St. Francis de Sales declares this lucidly, Introduction a la vie devote, Part II, ch. 18 and Part IV, ch. 3-6, where he illustrates the matter by various comparisons and examples.

n. 444.

(b) It is not licit rashly to expose oneself to temptation, without sufficient reason. For temptation imports a certain danger of sinning more or less grave or proximate; but it is not licit to go to meet the danger of sinning without sufficient reason: for he who foresees and intends to incur the danger of sinning, by that very fact wills the sin very probably joined with the temptation.¹

¹ Concerning the danger which arises from the occasion of sin, it is said in the moral Treatise on Penance, n. 451-469.

It was said "without sufficient reason"; for if a grave reason is present, it is licit to expose oneself to temptation, provided that there is well-founded hope of overcoming it; for here the principle concerning an indirectly willed effect, n. 175-182, can be applied. For the action placed is supposed to be honorable in itself, although it is foreseen that temptation will arise from it; from another side the good effect compensates for the evil, by hypothesis; therefore it is licit to place this action. Thus a physician, confessor, and other men of similar condition, who in the exercise of their office experience certain temptations, even grave ones, can nevertheless persevere in their state, provided they apply means for overcoming temptations; for the exercise of an office of this kind is honorable in itself; and from another side the evil effect which sometimes follows from it, that is, grave temptation, is compensated by the good effect which results from the same exercise both to the agent himself and to society.

The sin committed by him who rashly exposes himself to temptation is of the same nature and species as the sin whose danger he undergoes. - But to judge concerning its gravity, one must weigh whether the agent clearly and certainly foresees the danger of sinning, or only confusedly and probably (above n. 80, 179).

n. 445.

(B) Concerning the manner of overcoming temptations. In order that temptations may be more efficaciously conquered, these means especially are to be employed: (a) vigilance, to guard against many temptations, according to that saying of St. Peter:² "Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about, seeking whom he may devour." For even if all temptations cannot be guarded against, nevertheless by vigilance their number is diminished and their force weakened. The reason why we ought to watch is because our will, although good and ready, remains weak and infirm, and therefore ought always to be prepared for repelling spiritual enemies.

² 1 Pet. 5:8.

To furnish this, occasions of sinning which are not necessary must be diligently avoided, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 458-469. Besides, our faculties must be turned toward the good, by which they may more easily decline from evil; thus, if we wish to avoid depraved thoughts, it is not enough to repel them when they have preoccupied the mind: but vain and useless wanderings of the soul, from which dangerous phantasms often arise, must be expelled insofar as can be done, not only negatively, but also positively, by turning the soul toward good and useful things. Passions likewise, which often induce us into temptation, must be directed toward the honorable and religious good, as we noted above, n. 107.

n. 446.

(b) To vigilance must be joined prayer, by which we are able to obtain the actual grace of God at the opportune time. For, as was proved in the Treatise on Grace, n. 39-45 and 57-60, fallen man cannot, without the grace of God, overcome all grave temptations; and therefore by urgent, frequent, and humble prayer, he ought to ask divine aid, by which, sustained, he may be able to overcome the attacks of the world and the devil and also the movements of his own concupiscence: "Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation."¹

¹ Matt. 26:41.

Nor is it sufficient to pray at the very time of temptation, but it is expedient before and after temptations often to have recourse to God, according to the warning of Christ, who inserted these words into the prayer which He taught the Apostles: "And lead us not into temptation." This prayer indeed becomes much more efficacious when joined to meditation; for then, reconsidering the mysteries of faith and the principles of morals, we are moved to pray more fervently and to flee sin and the occasions of sin more vigilantly. The reconsideration of God living everywhere and in the intimate heart will likewise help greatly: for who would rashly wish to offend God present? "Walk before me and be perfect."²

² Gen. 17:1.

(c) But when temptation presses, one must immediately and strenuously resist: "Resist him, strong in faith."³ For in the beginning, when the enemy is still weak, victory is easier, while it becomes much more difficult if he has already fixed his foot in our camp.⁴ Wherefore, if he has appeared from afar, let us defend the citadel of our soul by diverting the soul toward some honorable thing: for nothing is more useful for avoiding the conflicts of rushing temptations than to occupy the mind in good thoughts or assiduous labors; for then the attack of the enemy, having been frustrated, vanishes. - But this must be furnished strenuously: for if we fluctuate hesitatingly, or resist only weakly, the enemy becomes more daring, and attacks us more bitterly. - Whence those who conduct themselves passively toward temptation, by applying no means to overcome it, expose themselves to the danger of sinning, and therefore sin more or less gravely according to the gravity and proximity of the danger. Yet it is licit to contemn temptation, by diverting the soul to other things, from what has just been said, since this is the best means of conquering it.

³ 1 Pet. 5:9.

⁴ What Ovid said about love (Remedia amoris, 91-92) is valid concerning all passions:

"Resist beginnings: medicine is prepared too late,
when evils have grown strong by long delays."

n. 448.

(C) Concerning the usefulness of temptations. In truth temptation is not without usefulness. (a) For virtue is perfected in temptations; just as soldiers become stronger by fighting strenuously, so Christians, by fighting manfully against the enemies of salvation, are strengthened in virtue; namely thus, mindful of their own frailty, they begin to think humbly of themselves, and to place their whole confidence in God; they also understand better how necessary it is to mortify the senses and passions, lest perhaps, allured by enticements, they fall into sin; by resisting temptations strongly on account of God, by that very fact they begin to love God more fervently. (b) They have the opportunity of satisfying for past sins: if once they indulged base delectation, now by contemning pleasure they undergo a penalty which contributes not a little to destroying the sins of past life. (c) From this our merits are increased: other things being equal, the more difficult the work to be performed is, the greater is the merit; therefore when storms of temptations arise and it is more arduous to row back to the harbor of salvation, by that very fact merits are increased. Surely a stone would be ungrateful if, sculpted by art, it complained of the sculptor who carved a beautiful figure in it; so also we would be ungrateful if we lamented because God, by various temptations, engraves upon our soul a more perfect image of Christ.¹ Merits being increased, the reward is likewise increased, and for each victory won we shall obtain new degrees of glory, to remain forever.

¹ The Church indeed sings this on the day of Dedication:

"By the blows of the saving chisel,
and by very much pounding,
polished by the hammer of the craftsman,
stones build this mass,
and joined by fitting bonds
are placed in the summit."

§ II. Concerning Mortal Sin.

We shall speak: 1. concerning its nature; 2. concerning its effects; 3. concerning the conditions required for mortal sin.

Chapter VIII: Obligation of Conscience. Gravity of Fault · Title II: On the Censure of Books · Tit. II, Ch. II, Article 40

I. Concerning the Nature of Mortal Sin.

It has already been said that mortal sin, by the force of its very name, brings spiritual death upon the soul; but, in order that its nature and its difference from venial sin may be more deeply declared, we shall successively set forth what Scripture, what the Fathers, and what theologians have taught concerning this matter.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-73; Suarez, De peccatis, disp. I-III; Gonet, Clypeus Theol. thomisticae, Lyons, 1681, De vitiis et peccatis, disp. I-IV; Billot, Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati, Rome, 1900, th. I-III; Manning, Sin and its consequences, rendered into French by Maillet, Le Peche et ses consequences, Avignon, 1894, ch. I-II.

n. 449.

1. The Doctrine of Scripture Concerning Grave Sin Is Set Forth.

(A) That there are grave sins which bring death upon the soul and are the cause of damnation is evidently gathered from Scripture. (a) Thus Christ, in the sermon on the mount, reproving sins against neighbor, says: "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to the judgment; and he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say: Thou fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire."² Now words of this kind: shall be liable to the judgment, to the council, signify, from a certain analogy with the penalties inflicted by the tribunals of the Jews, that those who gravely offend their brothers, not only in deed, but in heart or word, are to be punished with a grave penalty; but gehenna designates eternal damnation. This indeed He declares more clearly, by prophetically describing the last judgment:³ "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you did not give me to eat"...

² Matt. 5:22; cf. Maldonat on this place. - The mind of Christ is that not only homicide is grave sin, but also anger internally conceived, when it leads to homicide, or to very contumelious words. From this, however, it is not licit to infer that every motion of anger is grave.

³ Matt. 25:41-42.

(b) The Apostle lucidly sets forth the same doctrine, both with regard to the sin of our first parents and with regard to actual sins: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death... That as sin reigned unto death, so also grace might reign through justice unto eternal life."¹ Hence those who sin gravely are excluded from the kingdom of heaven:² "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with males, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." (c) According to John, mortal sin is privation of light for the mind, and privation of life for the soul: "For everyone who does evil hates the light, and does not come to the light, that his works may not be reproved... He who says that he is in the light, and hates his brother, is in darkness even until now... He who does not love remains in death."³ The reason is because sin separates us from Christ who is truth and life.

¹ Rom. 5:12, 21. The question concerns each death, corporal and spiritual.

² 1 Cor. 6:9-10; cf. Gal. 5:19-21.

³ John 3:20; 1 John 2:9; 3:14.

n. 450.

(B) Among sins, some are graver than others. Thus God, apud Jeremiah,⁴ complains of the Jews thus: "They have hardened their neck, and have done worse than their fathers." Christ Himself, addressing Pilate, says: "Therefore he who delivered me to thee has the greater sin."⁵ This indeed is especially clear from the fact that certain sins are called irremissible, while others can be remitted: "Therefore I say to you: every sin and blasphemy shall be remitted to men; but the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be remitted."⁶ The context having been inspected, the question here concerns the sin of the Pharisees who attributed the miracles of Christ to the devil, and thus deliberately and pertinaciously denied His divine mission; but this sin is said not to be remitted, because it is altogether difficult for those who pertinaciously abuse grace to repent sincerely. In the same way the words of John can be understood, who distinguishes between sin unto death and sin not unto death.⁷

⁴ Jer. 7:26.

⁵ John 19:11.

⁶ Matt. 12:31; cf. Mark 3:29-30.

⁷ 1 John 5:16.

n. 451.

(C) From all these things it can be gathered that the malice of mortal sin consists especially in this, that it turns us away from God. Jeremiah had already explained this by comparison, saying:¹ "For my people have done two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, which cannot hold waters." The same is established from many texts alleged above, where sin is called the transgression of the divine law, an offense against God, hatred of God, the loss of divine friendship and divine filiation, privation of light and grace, the cause of damnation and of eternal separation from God; for by these and other words of this kind it is signified that man - who through grace is the adoptive son of God, a participant in the divine nature, a son of light, and therefore is united to God by a manifold bond - by mortal sin becomes a son of the devil, a participant in his works, and walks in darkness, and therefore is truly turned away from God. Wherefore the last sentence of the judge against impenitent sinners is situated in declaring that this departure will be eternal: "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire."²

¹ Jer. 2:13.

² This is the very sentence which Bossuet, in the sermon De la gloire de Dieu dans la conversion des pecheurs, magnificently explains, as is his custom: "Hell, if we understand it, is sin itself; hell is to be far from God." (Ed. Lebarq, t. II, p. 75.)

n. 452.

(D) But that certain sins are not mortal, or are not the cause of eternal damnation, is gathered very probably from a few texts of Scripture. (a) For Christ declares that there is lesser and greater iniquity:³ "He who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." Besides, the Apostles confess that all Christians offend in many things: "In many things we all offend⁴... If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us";⁵ nevertheless from the context it is supposed that those sins are not mortal, nor do they take away charity; thus, for example, a little afterward it is added: "But he who keeps His word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected; and in this we know that we are in Him."⁶ Therefore certain sins are given so small that they by no means destroy charity and spiritual life.

³ Luke 16:10.

⁴ Jas. 3:2.

⁵ 1 John 1:8.

⁶ 1 John 2:5.

(b) The same is indirectly deduced from the celebrated and difficult text of St. Paul,⁷ as it is understood by many Fathers: "According to the grace of God, which was given to me, as a wise architect I laid the foundation... But if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each one shall be manifest; for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire, and the fire shall prove what sort each one's work is. If anyone's work remains which he built upon it, he shall receive a reward. If anyone's work shall burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire." For there the discourse concerns certain doctors who, after Paul, had preached the Gospel to the Corinthians; if they had handed down doctrine not solid, but little useful, relying more on the persuasive words of human wisdom than on the power of Christ, the vanity of their labor will appear on the day of judgment: they indeed will not suffer eternal penalty, because they announced the faith, but, on account of their empty work, they will pay some penalty. From this it is deduced that they sinned, but not mortally.

⁷ 1 Cor. 3:10-15.

Yet we confess that these arguments are not apodictic, unless the authority of Tradition is added.

n. 453.

2. The Doctrine of the Fathers Concerning the Gravity of Sin Is Set Forth.

(A) In the first three centuries, the distinction between mortal and venial sins is not explicitly instituted, but between the greatest and the small, between those which had to be expiated by public penance and those which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. Nor from the beginning was it clearly and distinctly defined which sins in species were to be held as grave, but only gradually, according to the progress of Christian conscience: since not a few acts which did not seem gravely sinful to those recently converted from paganism were afterward held graver by those who, through Christian education, had formed for themselves a more delicate conscience, as will be clear from what must be said.

¹ Vacandard, Le traitement des peccata leviora, apud Rev. du Clerge francais, 15 August 1901; id., La Penitence publique, 1903 (collection Bloud), p. 25-44; Batiffol, Etudes d'hist. et de theol. positive, Paris, 1902, pp. 81, 144, 128 and passim.

n. 454.

(a) Already in the second century three sins were considered as most grave, indeed by some as irremissible by the power of the keys, namely apostasy, moechia or adultery, and homicide.² From this certain persons inferred that these three alone are mortal sins. But undeservedly; for Tertullian, who declares these irremissible, enumerates other sins which are grave and must be chastised by public penance: "But there are also those contrary to these (minute offenses), as graver and destructive, which do not obtain pardon: homicide, idolatry, fraud, denial, blasphemy, certainly also moechia and fornication, and whatever other violation of the temple of God."¹

² Cf. Tertullian, De Pudicitia, c. 5 and 12, P.L., t. II, 987-989, 1001-1005; cf. A. d'Ales, La theologie de Tertullien, Paris, 1905, p. 272-276; J. Turmel, Tertullien, Paris, 1905, p. 210-213.

¹ Tertullian, ibid., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

n. 455.

(b) From another side there are lesser, or small, sins, which are daily committed and can be remitted through penance. For the same Tertullian says:² "For to whom does it not happen either to be angry unjustly, and beyond the setting of the sun, or even to put forth the hand, or easily to curse, or to swear rashly, or to destroy the fidelity of a pact, or to lie from shame or necessity? In businesses, in offices, in gain, in food, in sight, in hearing, how many things tempt us, so that if there were no pardon of these, salvation would belong to no one! Therefore there will be pardon for these through Christ, the entreator of the Father." - St. Cyprian testifies that penance was necessary for these lesser offenses:³ "When in lesser sins sinners do penance for a just time, and, according to the order of discipline, come to exomologesis, and through the imposition of the hands of the bishop and clergy receive the right of communion..." Therefore these lesser offenses are not merely venial according to the present manner of speaking.

² De pudicit., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

³ St. Cyprian, epist. 9, P.L., IV, 251.

n. 456.

(B) From the fourth century, the distinction is already explicitly made between grave sins, which are to be expiated by public penance, and light sins, concerning which it suffices to do penance privately.

(a) Thus St. Ambrose:⁴ "Because as there is one baptism, so also one penance, which nevertheless is done publicly; for we ought to repent of daily sin: but this latter is for light offenses, the former for graver ones."

⁴ St. Ambrose, De Paenitent., cap. 10, P.L., XVI, 520.

n. 457.

(b) Augustine declares this more fully. Besides original sin, which is destroyed through baptism, he distinguishes two kinds of sins: grave sins or crimes, which are remitted only by long and public penance, namely those which the Apostle describes in the epistle to the Corinthians and to the Galatians; and light sins, which all commit and which are destroyed by prayer: "For those whom you see doing penance have committed crimes, either adulteries or certain monstrous deeds: thence they do penance. For if their sins were light, daily prayer would suffice for destroying these."⁵ - The reason for the difference between light and grave sins is taken from this, that the former do not destroy the foundation of faith and charity, while the latter overturn the foundation of charity: "These things therefore (light sins), because when carnally loved by affection they are not lost without sorrow, for this reason those who have them in such a way that they have in the foundation faith which works through charity, and do not by any reason or cupidity prefer them to this, when they suffer loss in the loss of them, arrive at salvation through a certain fire of sorrow... But he who, for the sake of either keeping or acquiring them, commits homicide, adultery, fornication, idolatry, and any similar things, will not be saved through fire because of the foundation, but, the foundation having been lost, will be tormented by eternal fire."¹

⁵ De Symbolo, to Catechumens, c. 7, P.L., XL, 636; cf. Enchiridion, c. 68-71, P.L., XL, 264-266; sermon 351, P.L., XXXIX, 1535-1549.

¹ De fide et operibus, cap. 16, P.L., XL, 216.

n. 458.

(c) With regard to the Eastern Church, the same is established from the canonical epistles of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and St. Basil. The former, being asked concerning the kind of penance which had to be imposed on those who had sinned on the occasion of the incursion of the Goths, sets forth how one should act with those who had eaten idolothytes, or had committed fornication, robbery, theft, invasion of others' homes, or had unjustly detained captives, or had been cooperators with barbarians.² The latter weaves a longer catalogue of offenses which are subject to canonical penance: there are numbered the killing of an animated or unanimated fetus, digamy and trigamy, fornications of deacons and of canonesses who had vowed virginity, and other grave sins against chastity, homicides, beatings, idolatry, violent motions of anger, usury, perjuries; indeed, it is equitable that involuntary killing, or killing done in war, be punished by some penance.³ Elsewhere he complains that many make little of sins which nevertheless are declared as mortal by Paul:⁴ "Assuredly a most evil custom has deceived us; assuredly a perverse tradition of men exists for us as the cause of great evils, which namely, while certain sins have been avoided, has indifferently admitted others, and while it pretends to be vehemently indignant at some, as at homicide and adultery, and at others of the same kind, it judges some to be worthy not even of simple rebuke, such as anger, or reviling, or drunkenness, or avarice, and whatever things are similar to these, against all of which also elsewhere Paul, speaking in Christ, brought forth the same sentence, when he said: Those who do such things are worthy of death." Therefore mortal sins were recognized, besides idolatry, moechia, and homicide. But elsewhere they teach that certain sins are very light, into which all fall.

² Canonical epistle, P.G., X, 1019-1047.

³ Canonical epistle, P.G., XXXII, 663-684; cf. Chardon, Hist. des Sacrements, Migne, Theol. Curs., XX, 692-721, where these and other canonical epistles of St. Basil are rendered into French.

⁴ De Judicio Dei, P.G., XXXI, 670.

n. 459.

Thus Caesarius of Arles, in a sermon to the people, says:⁵ "And although the Apostle has mentioned many capital sins, nevertheless, lest we seem to cause despair, we briefly say which they are: sacrilege, homicide, adultery, false testimony, theft, robbery, pride, envy, avarice; and anger, if it is held for a long time; and drunkenness, if it is assiduous, is computed in their number." These sins indeed must be expiated by long penance; otherwise they will be punished by eternal flame. Among minute sins he chiefly numbers these: "As often as someone either in food or in drink takes more than is necessary... as often as he speaks more than is fitting, or is silent more than is expedient; as often as he exasperates a poor man asking importunately. As often as, although healthy in body, while others fast, he wishes to dine; or, given over to sleep, rises later to church... As often as he visits the sick later. If he has neglected to call back the discordant to concord. If he has exasperated a neighbor, or wife, or son, or servant more than is fitting; if he has flattered more than is expedient... If he has not given food to the hungry poor; or has prepared for himself banquets too delicate or too costly... For these and things similar to these undoubtedly pertain to minute sins, which, as I have already said, can scarcely be enumerated, and from which not only the Christian people, but no one of the saints could ever have been, or will be, immune. Although we do not believe the soul to be killed by these sins, nevertheless by filling it as it were with certain pustules, and as with a dreadful scab, they make it deformed." Afterward he adds that these minute sins are redeemed by good works, especially fraternal charity and alms. - Elsewhere among minute sins he numbers not a few which today would be held as mortal: "Let us think, from the time when we began to be wise, what for oaths, what for perjuries, what for curses, what for detractions, what for idle words, what for hatred, what for anger, what for envy, what for evil concupiscence, what for gluttony, what for sleepiness, what for filthy thoughts, what for concupiscence of the eyes, what for voluptuous delectation of the ears..."¹ - Therefore it is clear that the difference between mortal and venial sins, from the first centuries, was first indirectly and confusedly, then explicitly and clearly recognized; but that the rules by which they are distinguished from each other were not clearly defined; and therefore some offenses, which today by a rightly cultivated conscience are held as grave, at that time were regarded as light. - This evolution will be better understood by him who attentively runs through the penitential books; for there he will find an examination of conscience which, as the centuries pass, becomes more and more prolix.²

⁵ Appendix to Serm. St. Augustine, P.L., XXXIX, 1946-1947.

¹ Sermon 257, apud Migne, P.L., XXXIX, 2220.

² You will find some of these penitential books apud Morinus, Comment. histor. de disciplina in administrat. Paenitent., Appendices; Chardon, op. cit., p. 712-725.

n. 460.

3. The Theological Doctrine Concerning Mortal Sin.

(A) Notion. In mortal sin two things can be considered: the voluntary act by which someone transgresses the law, and the defect of rectitude which is found in such an act. Under this last respect, according to St. Thomas¹ and other theologians commonly, mortal sin is defined as a turning away from God the ultimate end, through a voluntary and inordinate turning toward creatures.² Consequently mortal sin is opposed to divine goodness and wisdom, to the eternal law, and also to the rational nature of man, from what was said above, n. 25. For the most part man does not primarily and explicitly will to turn himself away from God, but, when a useful or delectable created good has been proposed to him, he sometimes chooses the disorder inhering in sin, and therefore the turning away from God, rather than to be deprived of the delectation: "They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."³ Hence, for grave sin, it is not necessary directly to intend a turning away from the ultimate end, but it suffices to will it indirectly and logically, by desiring a created good which is known to be contrary to the ultimate end. - In truth man does not desire evil insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it lies hidden under the appearance of good. This indeed is valid even concerning hatred of God: thus the worst sinners do not hate God except insofar as they apprehend Him as opposed to their own good.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

² Among Protestants, others more orthodox, as Bovon, define sin as the free transgression of the law, by which egoism is preferred to love of God; others, tending toward rationalism and determinism, as Schleiermacher and Rothe, hold sin to be as it were a necessary stage of human evolution, in which flesh lusts against spirit and turns the same away from God. Cf. Lichtenberger, Encyclop. des sciences religieuses, t. X, at the word Peche; Bovon, Dogmatique chretienne, Lausanne and Paris, 1895, t. I, p. 311-397, and Morale chret., 1897, t. I, p. 257-316.

³ John 12:43.

Wisdom graphically describes these psychological dispositions of sinners:⁴ "For they have said, thinking not rightly within themselves: short and tedious is the time of our life, and there is no refreshment in the end of man, and no one has been known to return from hell... Come therefore and let us enjoy the good things that are, and let us use the creature quickly as in youth... Let us crown ourselves with roses before they wither; let there be no meadow through which our luxury does not pass... Let us oppress the poor just man, and not spare the widow... These things they thought and erred: for their malice blinded them."

⁴ Wis. 2:1-21; the whole chapter should be read.

n. 461.

Corollaries. (a) From this the difference between mortal sin and venial sin appears: for the latter does not turn man away from God the ultimate end, but only retards him from Him, as will be explained below.

St. Thomas declares this thus:¹ "For there is a twofold disorder: one through the removal of the principle of order, another in which, even with the principle of order preserved, disorder occurs concerning those things which are after the principle; just as in the body of an animal sometimes indeed the disorder of complexion proceeds even to the destruction of the vital principle, and this is death; but sometimes, with the principle of life preserved, there is a certain disorder in the humors, and then it is illness. But the principle of the whole order in morals is the ultimate end... whence when the soul is disordered by sin even to turning away from the ultimate end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then it is mortal sin; but when disorder occurs short of turning away from God, then it is venial sin."

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

n. 462.

(b) From this also the controversy, long agitated among theologians, whether the formal constitutive element of a sin of commission consists in something positive or in something negative, can be reconciled.² A twofold element can be distinguished in sin: the voluntary act and its disorder. Now sin of commission, considered on the part of the act, consists in something positive by which someone tends toward a good at least apparent; but the disorder of the same act essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude, since the will, by inordinately desiring a created good, turns itself away from God.

² All indeed confess that sin of omission is something negative. But according to Suarez (De peccatis, disp. I, sect. I, n. 4), sin essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude; according to the Wurzburg theologians (De pecc., n. 13), it consists in the positive tendency of the act toward the prohibited object. Billuart, diss. I, art. 2, sets forth the reasons alleged on each side.

Wherefore God indeed concurs toward the positive act, by moving the will to acting; but neither directly nor indirectly is He the cause of the disorder, which proceeds wholly from the depravity of the human will. "Whence this defect is not reduced to God as to a cause, but to free choice; just as the defect of limping is reduced to the curved shin as to a cause, but not to the motive power, by which nevertheless whatever there is of motion in limping is caused."³ - Nor let it be said that God indirectly cooperates with sin from the fact that He does not prevent it; for most wisely He willed man to be free, and He offers him the helps necessary for avoiding sin; but it is altogether fitting that, after He has sufficiently instructed men toward the good, He allow them to act by their own motion, and by their own efforts to acquire merits and to attain eternal life, with the help of grace which He denies to no one well disposed. For from what was said, n. 185, it is licit to cooperate materially with sin, provided there is a proportionately grave reason.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79, art. 2.

n. 463.

(B) Concerning the malice of mortal sin.¹ The malice, or disorder, of this sin is manifold, if it is considered on the part of God, on the part of Christ, and on the part of the sinner himself.

¹ Besides the theologians, cf. Manning, op. cit., ch. I; Bourdaloue, Sermons sur les Mysteres, 1st sermon on the Passion of Jesus Christ; id., Exhortations, Sur le jugement du peuple contre J.-C.; id., Careme, Wednesday of the 5th Week, concerning the state of sin and the state of grace; Gratry, Medit. inedites, Paris, Tequi, 1878, 7th Meditation, Sin.

On the part of God, mortal sin is (a) disobedience and rebellion against God, the supreme legislator: for the sinner deliberately, although created by God and wholly depending on Him, prefers his own will to the will of God, although he knows very well that He is supreme Lord, King of kings, and Lord of lords, and that He prescribes nothing except what is consonant with reason and wisdom. Thus he becomes guilty of rebellion: for since by a manifold title he is justly subject to the dominion of God, nevertheless equivalently² he says, "I will not serve," and rejects the authority of God. (b) It is deservedly called injustice or iniquity; for God, as being the infinite good and the font of all beatitude, and also the supreme Lord, has a strict right that He be our ultimate end; and therefore the sinner, turning himself away from God the ultimate end, violates that right, and, insofar as he can, deprives Him of that external glory which he ought to render to the most perfect Being; thus he commits true injustice. (c) It imports a certain irreligiosity: for to God, because of His supreme excellence and majesty, supreme worship and honor is due; but the sinner denies this honor, indeed in some sense dishonors and contemns the Lord, preferring the vilest creature to the Creator, according to that saying:¹ "They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns which cannot hold waters." But this contempt has the character of contumely, because sin is committed in the sight of the omnipresent God: "Against Thee alone have I sinned, and I have done evil before Thee."² (d) It is foul ingratitude: for God is a distinguished benefactor: whatever of being, whatever of good we have, proceeds from Him; natural and supernatural gifts He has generously bestowed upon us; He has sanctified and redeemed our souls; but we use His benefits to offend Him, and indeed at the very time when He bestows His gifts upon us!

² It is said equivalently, or logically, by way of conclusion, not explicitly; for most often the sinner does not expressly intend this rebellion; hence sacred orators should abstain in this matter from excessive amplifications.

¹ Jer. 2:13. Hence Paul says (Rom. 2:23-24): "By transgression of the law thou dishonorest God: for the name of God through you is blasphemed among the Gentiles."

² Ps. 50:6.

n. 464.

On the part of Christ, (a) sin was the cause why Christ had to undergo such bitter pains and tortures, and a most shameful and most cruel death; therefore he who, knowing these things, nevertheless sins, by that very fact logically and indirectly becomes an accomplice of those who crucified the Lord, and, as far as lies in him, renews His agony, tortures, humiliations, crucifixion, and death, and therefore in some sense becomes guilty of deicide: "Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God."³ (b) But because through baptism he entered into a covenant with Christ, and breaks it through sin, by that very fact he is deservedly held as a covenant-breaker, just as the Jewish people when it broke the faith given many times. (c) Since he has likewise been made a living temple of God and marked by a sacramental character, the sinner commits a certain sacrilege, dedicating the temple of God to profane uses and rashly violating his own soul consecrated to Christ. Wherefore the sins of a Christian are graver than the sins of unbelievers, and the sins of a priest graver than the sins of Christians.⁴ - Yet for the most part sinners are not conscious of the whole malice which of itself is in mortal sin; and therefore sacred orators, when they speak concerning this matter, ought to have this before their eyes.

³ Heb. 6:6; here the question indeed concerns apostasy from the faith, but by analogy it can be extended to all mortal sins. Wherefore Christ could address sinners, as He addressed the Jews themselves, thus: "What more ought I to have done for thee and have not done? I indeed planted thee, my most beautiful vineyard: and thou hast become very bitter to me: for with vinegar thou hast given me to drink in my thirst and with a lance thou hast pierced the side of thy Savior." Let the whole reproaches be read, in the Mass of Friday of great week.

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 10.

…and 108 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Vermeersch, On Forbidden Books

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 3 passages

Chapter VIII: Obligation of Conscience. Gravity of Fault

n. 53.

Principles concerning guilt

53. That conscience is bound by the laws concerning the censorship and prohibition of books is not doubted. But the guilt of fault must be estimated both of itself, or with the law of nature considered, by which we are forbidden to cast ourselves or others into danger of sinning and to cooperate in the sins of others; and accidentally, that is, when positive law is added, whose violation introduces moral fault.

I do not know whether this estimate is customarily made with sufficient care and with the variety of circumstances sufficiently weighed. Therefore we shall diligently try, according to our powers, to weigh this matter.

Title II: On the Censure of Books

n. 105.

Grave or light obligation

105. You will ask concerning the grave and light obligation of conscience by which the laws on previous censure are to be observed.

In itself the obligation of obeying the laws on previous censure is grave. Yet in order that you may judge a particular fact, these things especially are to be observed:

a) With what strictness of usage the laws themselves are observed in the place where the work is published. For from this the account of scandal varies very much. Where strict observance is in force, the law cannot be passed over without suspicion of contempt being introduced; and this contempt is easily to be judged mortal. While in another place the matter, in a certain oblivion, ignorance, or at least imperfect good faith, obtains a milder explanation. But grave scandal and contempt being excluded, there remains to be considered:

b) The objective gravity of the matter, which is different according to the different importance and subject matter of the book, and appears far less in a new edition of an approved book than in the first.

Tit. II, Ch. II, Article 40

n. 116.

Discretion of the Bishop

116. 1. If nothing seems to stand in the way of the publication of the book. Therefore the faculty of denying approval is greater for the Ordinary than that of reprobating a book already published. Which books can be reprobated by him, we saw above, n. 102.

But in order that he not concede the faculty of publishing, it is enough that a truly just cause stand in the way, for example, of protecting peace, concord, of awaiting opportuneness.

At the same time, however, if nothing seems to stand in the way, he must concede the license. He cannot at will give or deny a faculty which in itself is to be given, unless something stands in the way.

Yet the reasons for rejection are to be indicated

2. From the rescript of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, September 3, 1898, if the book seems capable of correction or expurgation, the Ordinary must indicate to the writer the reasons why he was unwilling to approve the book. This is an equitable disposition, and one by which arbitrary rejections are guarded against.

Whether remuneration of the censor is excluded?

3. Necessary gratuitousness does not exclude, strictly speaking, congruous remuneration for the labor of the censor. Yet provision for the decent sustenance of the censor will be better made by another arrangement. Cf. Desjardins,¹ Peries,² Pennacchi.³

What if the faculty is given orally?

4. The faculty must be given in writing. Yet one which has been conceded only orally does not therefore become null, or without effect. Pennacchi, cited work, n. 77.

How the obtained faculty is to be expressed

5. You will ask whether the obtained faculty must be published in the very words by which it was given, or whether it is enough to use a formula by which it is clearly and distinctly indicated whose license was obtained?

C. Gennari⁴ and Hollweck⁵ hold the former; and formerly it was thus resolved.⁶ They argue from the text by which the license, which was given in writing, is said to be printed; and from the fact that otherwise it could not authentically be established concerning the license obtained.

Dilgskron,⁷ Genicot,⁸ Pennacchi,³ Wernz⁹ admit the latter, as quite sufficient for the end of the law; and consonant with the character of this Constitution, by which the solemnities have been made simpler. And this is confirmed by practice. Wherefore the law is obeyed if a secular man uses this or a similar formula: "with the permission of the Ordinary of such a diocese"; but a regular: "by the license of the Superiors of the Order and of the Ordinary of such a place."

Whether it can sometimes be suppressed

6. Formerly, if a just cause, for example lest the public utility of the book be impeded, demanded this, they admitted that, with the Bishop consenting, the obtained faculty could be suppressed.¹⁰ We are not compelled to be more severe today. And unless the omission, unduly made, is going to be for scandal or seems to contain contempt of authority, it does not seem to introduce grave guilt.

Gravity of the obligation

¹ Etudes, t. 71, p. 366.

² Pp. 205, 206.

³ Cited work, n. 77.

⁴ Monit., cited place, p. 112.

⁵ Cited work, p. 58.

⁶ Cf. Albitius, cited work, chapter 30, n. 125, or Arndt, cited work, n. 209, p. 296.

⁷ Analecta Ecclesiastica, 1897, p. 228.

⁸ Cited work, I, 459.

⁹ N. 121, note 109.

¹⁰ Dilgskron, in the same place, citing De Brabandere, II, 1348.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 148 passages

Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 1: Nature and Origin of Sin · Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 2: Mortal and Venial Sins

Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 1: Nature and Origin of Sin

DEFINITION. —The terms sin,¹ transgression,² iniquity,³ offense,⁴ and disobedience,⁵ are synonymously employed by Holy Scripture to designate a wilful transgression of the law of God, or voluntary disregard of His will.

¹ Ἁμαρτία, ἁμάρτημα. Rom. V, 13, 20; Eph. II, 1; 1 John III, 4.

² Παράβασις. Rom. II, 23; IV, 15; V, 14; Heb. II, 2.

³ Ἀνομία. Matth. VII, 23; Rom. VI, 19; 1 John III, 4.

⁴ Παράπτωμα. Matth. VI, 14 sq.; Rom. V, 18; 2 Cor. V, 19; Eph. II, 1.

⁵ Παρακοή. Rom. V, 19; Heb. II, 2.—Cfr. on the use of these terms K. Clemen, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Vol. I, Göttingen 1897, pp. 35 sqq.

"What is sin," says St. Ambrose, "but an offense against the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?"⁶ St. Augustine, who employs the words "divine law" and "eternal law" alternately, declares that: "A sin is some deed, word, or desire against the eternal law."⁷ Since all temporal laws are derived from, or contained in, the lex aeterna, every sin manifestly involves a violation of the will of God. St. Thomas says: "Sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now, that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary.... Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which no thing can depart without becoming incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will. One is proximate and homogeneous, viz., the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz., the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin; one pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says, ‘deed, word, or desire’; the other pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is, as it were, the form of sin, when he says, 'against the eternal law.'"⁸

⁶ De Paradiso, c. VIII, n. 39 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 292): "What is sin but a transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?"

⁷ Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXII, c. 27 (Migne, P. L., XLII, 418): "A sin is some deed, word, or desire against the eternal law."

⁸ Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 71, art. 6: "Sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now, that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure; and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which no thing can depart without becoming incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will. One is proximate and homogeneous, namely human reason; the other is the first rule, namely the eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin: one pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is, so to speak, the matter of sin, when he says, deed, word, or desire; the other pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is, as it were, the form of sin, when he says, against the eternal law." —Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 522 sqq. —The various definitions of sin given by the Fathers and leading Scholastics will be found in St. Bonaventure, Comment, in Sent., II, dist. 35, dub. 6 (Opera Omnia, Quaracchi 1885, Vol. II, p. 838).

The definition given by St. Augustine and adopted by St. Thomas applies alike to actual sins (i. e., acts or omissions violating the moral law) and sinful habits (habitus peccaminosi).

CHARACTERISTICS. —Sin, being a wilful transgression of the divine law, has the following, partly positive and partly negative, notes or characteristics: a) Sin does not inhere in the nature of things, nor proceed from the Divine Essence or some other independent principle, but owes its existence entirely to free-will. "By the will," says St. Augustine, "a man sins or lives a good life."⁹ St. Thomas writes: "Sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is a function of the will and of reason."¹⁰ And in another place: "A man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin."¹¹

⁹ Retract., I, c. 9, n. 4: "It is by the will that one sins and lives rightly." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 596).

¹⁰ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 6: "Sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is a faculty of will and reason."

¹¹ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1: "A man’s will alone is directly the cause of his sin."

Being an act of a created agent, sin is not a substance but merely an accident. It is not some- thing that is not (οὐκ ὄν), but something that ought not to exist (μὴ ὄν). In other words, it has no substance of its own, but is a privation or corruption of goodness (privatio boni) ; not, of course, a pure privation, but merely "an act deprived of its due order."¹² "Evil," the Angelic Doctor says, "... is nothing else than a privation of that which a man is naturally apt to have and ought to have;... but a privation is not an essence; it is a negation in a substance."¹³

¹² Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 1, ad 2: "Sin is not a pure privation, but an act deprived of its due order."

¹³ Summa contra Gentiles, III, c. 7: "Evil is nothing else than a privation of that which one is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But a privation is not an essence; it is a negation in a substance." —Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XI, c. 9: "Evil has no nature, but the loss of good has received the name of evil." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 325). —Ibid., XII, c. 9 (P. L., XLI, 355). —IDEM, Contra Epist. Manich. Fundam., c. 35, n. 30: "Who can doubt that the whole of what is called evil is nothing other than corruption? But if no evil is found in things except corruption, and corruption is not a nature, then no nature at all is evil." (P. L., XLII, 201). —Cfr. Saint Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 63, art. 1: "To sin is nothing else than to depart from the rectitude which an act ought to have, whether sin is considered in natural things, artificial things, or moral things." — IDEM, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 1: "Sin properly consists in an act done for some end when it does not have the due order toward that end." —Ibid., qu. 71, art. 1: "Sin properly denotes an inordinate act, just as an act of virtue is an ordered and due act." —Cfr. J. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen, Ratisbon 1854, pp. 29 sqq.

Aristotle regarded sin as a necessary stage on the way to goodness, or as goodness itself in so far as it has not yet proceeded from potency to act, and consequently is a mere imperfection or minus bonum.¹⁴ This is a false view, for while it cannot be denied that both in the life of individuals and in the history of the human race evil sometimes appears as the inciting cause of good, it is equally true, and a matter of common experience, that such cases are the exception, not the rule, and consequently prove nothing with regard to the nature of evil. If an evil act accidentally results in good, this is not imputable to man, but to God. Cfr. Gen. L, 20: "You thought evil against me, but God turned it into good, that he might exalt me... and save many people."¹⁵

¹⁴ Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1. XIV, c. 4: evil itself is potentially good.

¹⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 96: "It must not be doubted that God acts well even by permitting things that are done evilly to be done. For He permits this only by a just judgment, and assuredly everything just is good. Therefore, although evil things, insofar as they are evil, are not good, nevertheless it is good that not only good things but also evil things should exist. For unless it were good that evil things should exist, they would in no way be permitted to exist by the omnipotent Good, for whom, without doubt, it is as easy not to permit what He does not will to exist as it is to do what He wills." (Migne, P. L., XL, 276).—IDEM, De Praedest. Sanctorum, c. 16, n. 33: "It is in the power of the wicked to sin. But that by sinning they should do this or that evil is not in their power, but in the power of God, who divides the darkness and orders it, so that even from what they do against the will of God, nothing but His will is fulfilled." (P. L., XLIV, 984).

It would be a mistake, however, to conceive sin as a simple negation. If it were merely the lack or absence of good, sin would be a natural and necessary result of creatural limitation, and its real author would be God Himself. Deep down in his heart every man knows that sin is not the work of God but of man, and that it involves guilt.¹⁶

¹⁶ Cfr. Psalm L, 5-6; Matth. XXVII, 3-5.

b) God cannot be the author of sin as such.¹⁷ For, in the first place, sin is not a substance but merely a privation, and, secondly, Almighty God punishes the sinner. "God in no wise wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good," explains St. Thomas; "the evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached." ¹⁸ In other words, "God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault." ¹⁹ Holy Scripture frequently refers to God as the Author of holiness, and the all-holy One who is free from sin and tempteth no man.²⁰ It seems hard to reconcile this truth with the many texts in which He is described as actively cooperating in the sinful deeds of His creatures. Thus St. Paul says of the gentiles that, because they practiced idolatry, "God gave them up (παρέδωκεν) to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness, to dishonor their own bodies among themselves," and "delivered them up to shameful affections,... to a reprobate sense/' etc.²¹ In another place he declares that the heathen, "having their understanding darkened,... have given themselves up to lasciviousness." ²² The seeming contradiction cannot be solved by putting an arbitrary construction upon the sacred text. Being the first, universal, and immediate cause of all things and all operations, God works in every creature and has a share in every creatural act. Every ethical act performed by man has two causes —God and free-will. Though these causes cooperate closely, they are essentially distinct in their nature as well as in the relation they respectively bear to the act performed. Free-will is the efficient cause (causa efficiens) of every ethical act as such. But sin is never an act of God. St. Paul speaks of God as cooperating, not in the sinful acts of the gentiles, but in punishing them.²³

¹⁷ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Ordine, II, c. 7, n. 23: "You will confess God to be the author of evils—a sacrilege more detestable than which nothing occurs to me." (P. L., XXXII, 1005). — IDEM, Enchiridion, c. 23, n. 8: "We must in no way doubt that the cause of the good things pertaining to us is nothing other than the goodness of God, but that the cause of evil things is the will of a changeable good falling away from the unchangeable Good." (P. L., XL, 244).—Cfr. K. Clemen, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Vol. I, pp. 123 sqq.

¹⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 19, art. 9: "God in no way wills the evil of fault, which removes order toward the divine good. But He wills the evil of natural defect or the evil of punishment by willing some good to which such an evil is joined."

¹⁹ Ibid., qu. 49, art. 2: "God is the author of the evil which is punishment, but not of the evil which is fault." —Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 569 sqq.; Th. H. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, Freiburg 1883, pp. 82 sq.

²⁰ Lev. XI, 44; XIX, 2; Matth. V, 48; XIX, 17; Jas. I, 13; 1 Pet. I, 1 6.

²¹ Rom. I, 24, 26, 28.

²² Eph. IV, 19; cfr. Acts VII, 42.

²³ διό, διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ καθώς παρέδωκεν.

It would not be correct, even so, to describe the divine cooperation in the evil deeds of men as a mere permission or toleration. God works in all His creatures at all times, and no secondary cause, whether it be spiritual or material, can operate without His concurrence. Hence He not merely permits sin, but somehow positively cooperates in its commission (concursus divinus). "God is the cause of the act of sin," says St. Thomas; "yet He is not the cause of sin [as such], because He does not cause the act to have a defect." ²⁴ "God is the author of all that exists/' explains St. Augustine, "but He is not the author of evil, because all things are good in so far as they exist." ²⁵ Again: "Every nature, even that which is corrupted, is good qua nature, and evil [only] in so far as it is corrupt." ²⁶ God's contribution to a sinful act is in itself good. He merely enables man to employ the faculties which He has given him for a good purpose. It is man who renders the act evil by having a wrong intention. The Scholastics express this truth as follows: "Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale peccati /' The Tridentine Council condemns the assertion that "it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul."²⁷ Besides, God often employs sin as a means of punishing the sinner and thus indirectly causes good to spring from evil.²⁸

²⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 79, art. 2: “God is the cause of the act of sin; yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to be defective. The act of sin is a certain movement of free choice. But the will of God is the cause of all movements, as Augustine says. Therefore the will of God is the cause of the act of sin.”

²⁵ De Divers. Quaest., 83, n. 21: "God is not the author of evil, who is the author of all things that exist; for insofar as they exist, they are good." (Migne, P. L., XL, 16).

²⁶ St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 13: "Every nature, even a corrupted one, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is corrupted, it is evil." (P. L., XL, 16, 28).

²⁷ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 6: "If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as well as good, not merely permissively but also properly and of Himself, so that the treason of Judas is no less His own work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema."

²⁸ Cfr. Gen. XLV, 7 sq.; L, 20; Wisd. XI, 17; Matth. XIII, 29 sqq. —St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 54, n. 4: "Do not suppose that the wicked exist in this world for no purpose and that God works no good through them. Every wicked man lives either that he may be corrected or that through him a good man may be exercised." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 630). — IDEM, Enchiridion, c. 27: "God judged it better to bring good out of evils than to permit no evils to exist." (P. L., XL, 245).

Against the teaching just propounded the following objection has been raised: "Some actions are evil and sinful in their species (secundum suam speciem). Now, that which is the cause of a thing, is also the cause of whatever belongs to that thing in respect of its species. If, therefore, God caused the act which is sinful, He would be the cause of sin." This fallacy is tersely refuted by St. Thomas as follows: "Acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein the nature of evil consists, but from some object to which that privation is united; and so this defect, which we say is not from God, belongs to the species of the act as a consequence, and not as a specific difference." ²⁹ In other words, God causes the act and its species, without causing the defect that renders it evil.

²⁹ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 79, art. 2, ad 3: “It would seem that actions are evil and sinful according to their species. But whatever is the cause of a thing is the cause of that which belongs to it according to its species. Therefore, if God were the cause of the act of sin, it would follow that He was the cause of sin. Acts and habits do not receive their species from the privation itself, in which the nature of evil consists, but from an object to which such a privation is joined. Thus the defect itself, which is said not to be from God, belongs to the species of the act consequentially and not as a specific difference.” —Cfr. J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, Vol. I, pp. 74 sqq.

Some theologians hold that God merely permits evil but never cooperates in its production. This view cannot be squared with the Tridentine decision quoted above, which refers to His action in the production of evil as " permissive operari." ³⁰ c) Sin, being inspired by opposition to the will of God, who is the Supreme Lawgiver and benevolent Father of His creatures, is an act of disobedience and ingratitude.³¹ As an act of disobedience it is called an offense (offensa Dei, offensio).

³⁰ V. supra, p. 8, n. 27.

³¹ Deut. XXXII, 6; Is. I, 2-4; Jer. II, 32; V, 21-25.

But if God is absolutely perfect and incapable of suffering, how is it possible to offend Him and provoke His anger,³² especially since the sinner commonly lacks the animus iniuriandi, i. e., the deliberate intention of offending? That this is so may be admitted; yet the (metaphorical) designation of sin as an offense against God corresponds so well with its nature and with our limited human conception of Him, that it must be accepted as substantially correct.³³

³² Cfr. Ps. V, 5 sqq.; X, 4; LXXVII, 17.—Cfr. M. Pohlenz, Vom Zorn Gottes, Göttingen 1909.

³³ Cfr. B. Doérholt, Die Lehre von der Genugtuung Christi, Paderborn 1891, pp. 269 sqq.

Being an act of disobedience to the will of God and a denial of the moral order, sin is necessarily opposed to the sinner's own welfare, nay to his very nature. Instead of the beatitude for which he was created, and towards which his nature as well as the will of His Maker compel him to tend, the sinner seeks his happiness in him- self and other creatures. Hence every sin springs from inordinate self-love ³⁴ and must result in shame, discontent, unhappiness, and spiritual suicide.³⁵ The common sense of mankind has embodied this truth in many proverbs, e. g., "Every sinner is his own executioner," "Sin is its own punishment," "It does not pay to be wicked," etc.

³⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 4: "Inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin."

³⁵ Cfr. Gen. III, 5, 10; Jer. II, 13; Tob. XII, 10; Prov. VIII, 36.

ORIGIN. —For an explanation of the origin of sin we must turn to Revelation. a) The first sin, —the deliberate rebellion of Lucifer and his angels against the will of God ³⁶ —was purely spiritual. As these angels were pure spirits, the decision they made was irrevocable, and their punishment will last forever. Man also sinned, but his fall was not due to malice. He was seduced by the devil, the prince or god of this world,³⁷ who is not yet fully subdued, but continues to work havoc in the "children of unbelief." ³⁸ Man's sin, therefore, differs from the sin of the fallen angels in several respects: (i) It is not purely spiritual, but partly carnal, and hence the result, not of pure malice, but of malice and infirmity combined. (2) In man sin proceeds not merely from a momentary decision of the will, as in the case of the fallen angels, but likewise from original sin, which is a cooperating factor in every personal transgression. For this reason sin in man is not punished by death but is pardonable. True, man cannot redeem himself, but he can be redeemed.³⁹ Aside from the state of final impenitence, moreover, the soul of the human sinner is not utterly dead, but capable of being revived. In the majority of cases sin, to employ an Augustinian phrase, is "not nature, but against nature," ⁴⁰ and even the most grievous offender still remains an object of compassion in the eyes of God, who, while He hates sin, desires that the sinner be converted and live.⁴¹

³⁶ Cfr. Matth. XXV, 41; Luke X, 18; Apoc. XII, 7-9-

³⁷ John XII, 31; XIV, 30; XVI, 11; 2 Cor. IV, 3 sqq.—Cfr. Conc. Lateran. IV (a. 1215), c. 1: "The devil and the other demons were indeed created good in nature by God, but they became evil by themselves. Man, however, sinned at the suggestion of the devil." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 428).

³⁸ Wisd. II, 24 sq.; John VIII, 44; Eph. II, 1 sq.; VI, 12; I John III, 8.

³⁹ Matth. I, 21; Acts XVII, 22-31; Rom. V, 12; Gal. I, 4; cfr. Jas. I, 14.

⁴⁰ St. Augustine, Contra Epist. Manich. Fundam., c. 35, n. 39: "It is now easy to see that evil is not a nature, but contrary to nature." (Migne, P. L., XLII, 201).

⁴¹ Cfr. Ez. XVIII, 32; XXXI, n; Wisd. XI, 24 sq.; Matth. V, 45; 2 Pet. III, 9.

It is a characteristic fact of no small importance in judging the malice of sin that man was named after the lower or mortal side of his nature. Holy Scripture says: "As a father hath compassion on his children, so hath the Lord compassion on them that fear him: for he knoweth our frame."⁴²

Theologians are at variance with regard to the nature of the sin committed by the fallen angels and that of our first parents.⁴³ The crime of the angels probably was pride. Some rationalists hold that Adam and Eve died because the fruit of the tree of which they ate was poisonous. This theory is as untenable as that the first human sin was an act of fornication.⁴⁴

⁴² Ps. CII, 13 sq.—Cfr. Gen. V, 2; Ps. LXXVII, 38 sq.; Is. LXIV, 8 sq.—St. Ambrose, De Noé et Arca, c. 4, n. 9: "Man, placed in the region of earth and bearing flesh, cannot be without sin; for earth is, as it were, a place of temptations, and flesh an enticement to corruption." (Migne, P. L., XIV, 366).—Cfr. the major antiphon for Dec. 22 in the Roman Breviary: "O King of the nations and their desired one, and cornerstone who makes both one: come and save man, whom you formed from clay."

⁴³ Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 578 sqq., 593 sqq.; Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 220 sqq.; A. Schopfer, Geschichte des Alien Testamentes, pp. 47 sqq.; Pohle-Preus, God the Author of Nature, p. 342.

⁴⁴ Cfr. 2 Cor. XI, 3.

The question why God did not prevent the sin of our first parents, is answered by St. Augustine as follows: "God did not lack the power of creating man so that he could not sin, but chose to make him so that he could sin if he wished, or abstain from sin if he preferred, by forbidding this and prescribing that; thus it was first a merit not to sin, and later a just reward not to be able to sin." ⁴⁵ b) To understand the nature and gravity of sin, we must remember that the disobedience of our first parents was a very grievous, nay, in some respects the most grievous offense a human being could commit. And this for two reasons:

⁴⁵ De Continentia, c. VI, n. 16: "God did not lack the power to make him such that he could not sin, but He preferred to make him such that it lay with him to sin if he willed and not to sin if he did not will, forbidding the one and commanding the other, so that at first not sinning might be a good merit for him, and afterward being unable to sin a just reward." (Migne, P. L., XL, 359)-

«) Adam and Eve sinned in spite of the extraordinary natural and supernatural privileges which they enjoyed; 0) Their disobedience was an act of flagrant ingratitude and formal contempt, committed with the full knowledge that it would injure not only themselves but all their descendants.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XXII, c. 15, n. 1; Enchiridion, c. 27, 45, 48; De Corrept. et Gratia, C. 12, n. 35. —St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 21, art. 3, qu. 1 and 2.

Moreover, Christ became man and suffered and died because of sin.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Cfr. Matth. I, 21; Mark X, 45; John III, 16 sq.; Rom. V, 8 sqq.; 2 Cor. V, 15; Eph. I, 7.

n. ¶21.

Again, men continue to sin, though their intellect is enlightened by revelation and their will strengthened by grace, and in spite of the incomprehensible love shown in the atonement.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ John III, 16; XV, 13; Eph. I, 3-14; HI, 16-19; 1 John III, 16; IV, 9. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 14, art. 2.

n. ¶22.

Every serious transgression of the divine law, i. e., every actual mortal sin, deserves temporal and eternal death and delivers the sinner into the bondage of Satan.⁴⁹ But not every transgression of the law is mortally sinful. There are slight offenses, called "light and daily sins, which are also called venial sins," by the Tridentine Council, and these do not destroy sanctifying grace.⁵⁰ It is to the important distinction between mortal and venial sin that we must now turn our attention.

⁴⁹ Gen. II, 17; Rom. VI, 23; Jas. I, 15-

⁵⁰ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 11. Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 6, qu. 14.

n. ¶23.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 71-89. —Suarez, Tractatus de Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. 1-6 (Opera Omnia, Vol. IV, pp. 515 sqq.).—J. Müller, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, 6th ed., 2 vols., Stuttgart 1877-78.—M. Merkle, Das Wesen des Bösen, Dillingen 1847. —F. Teipel, De Peccati Natura, Coesfeld 1847, pp. 10 sqq.—J. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen, Ratisbon 1854, pp. 23 sqq. —K. Clemen, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Vol. I, Göttingen 1897, pp. 20 sqq. —C. Manzoni, De Natura Peccati, S. Angeli Laud., 1890. —J. B. Pighi, Commentarius de Iudicio Sacramentali, 3rd ed., Verona 1904, pp. 97 sqq. —E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. V, Paris 1907.—M. J. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Freiburg 1873, Vol. II, pp. 515 sqq. —Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. IX, 2nd ed., pp. 295 sqq.—Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 232 sqq.—A. C. O'Neil, O.P., art. "Sin," in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 4 sqq. —Card. Manning, Sin and Its Consequences, Am. reprint, New York 1904. —A. B. Sharpe, Evil, Its Nature and Cause, London 1906. —Card. Billot, De Natura et Ratione Peccati Personalis, Rome 1900.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 133 sqq. —Wilhelm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. II, 2nd ed., London 1901, pp. 3 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. I, pp. 320 sqq., 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914. —Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, Vol. I, pp. 186 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis et Pastoralis, Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 239 sqq.—Al. Sabetti, S.J. (ed. T. Barrett, S.J.), Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 22nd ed., New York 1915, pp. 111 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., The Foundation of True Morality, N. Y. 1920, pp. 65 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 391 sqq. —L. J. Nau, Readings on Fundamental Moral Theology, N. Y. and Cincinnati 1926, pp. 26-35.

Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 2: Mortal and Venial Sins

IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION. —The distinction between mortal and venial sins is of great practical importance, especially for the tribunal of Penance, where the sinner is obliged to state the kind and number of his mortal transgressions, which constitute materia necessaria for the validity of the Sacrament. Venial sins, on the other hand, are materia libera, i. e., they need not be confessed, though to confess them is useful and advisable.¹

¹ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., cap. 5 and can. 7; Sess. VI, cap. 11.

The teaching of the Church with regard to the distinction between mortal and venial sins is clear and definite. Nevertheless, the scientific demonstration of this doctrine is one of the most difficult problems of Moral Theology and has given rise to many heated controversies (e. g., Kleutgen vs. Hirscher; Frick vs. Linsenmann; Pesch vs. Schell, etc.)

PROOF FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE, TRADITION, AND REASON. —The distinction between mortal and venial sins has a solid basis in Sacred Scripture and ecclesiastical Tradition.

Sacred Scripture distinguishes between sins of greater or less gravity in such passages as: "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of judgment; and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council; and whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire;”² in the parables of the moat and the beam,³ of the king who took account of his servants,⁴ in the similitude of the blind guides who strain out a gnat and swallow a camel,⁵ and so forth. The Bible moreover expressly mentions sins that are "worthy of death," ⁶ the doers of which "shall not possess the kingdom of God;”7 sins “that beget death,”⁸ and others that are regularly committed by all men, even the just.⁹ Comparing the texts one cannot but see that there is a difference, not only of quantity or degree, but likewise of quality or essence, between different sins (differentia in ipsa ratione peccati). Mortal sin robs man of sanctifying grace, destroys the supernatural life of the soul, and entails eternal damnation; whereas venial sin merely weakens grace and diminishes that love which is poured out in the heart by the Holy Ghost.

² Matth. V, 22. Cfr. Matth. X, 15; XI, 22; XVI, 10; John XIX, 11.

³ Matth. VII, 3 sqq.

⁴ Matth. XVIII, 23 sqq.

⁵ Matth. XXIII, 24.

⁶ Rom. I, 32; cfr. Ex. XXXII, 30 sq.; 1 John V, 16. T 1 Cor. VI, 9 sq.; Gal. V, 19 sqq.

⁸ Jas. I, 13 sqq.

⁹ Jas. III, 2; 1 John I, 8.

We have purposely refrained from citing in support of our thesis the oft-quoted text, "A just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again;" for, as St. Augustine pointed out many centuries ago, there is question here not of sins but of misfortunes.¹⁰

¹⁰ Prov. XXIV, 16.—Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XI, c. 31: "The just man falls seven times and rises again, that is, however often he falls, he will not perish. He intended this to be understood not of iniquities, but of tribulations leading to humility." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 345). Cfr. Enarr. in Ps., 118, s. 31, n. 4 (P. L., XXXVII, 1529). —J. V. Bainvel, Les Contresens Bibliques des Prédicateurs, 2nd ed., Paris 1906, pp. 102 sq.

In I John V, 16 "sin unto death" is probably not ordinary mortal sin but that which is technically known as the sin against the Holy Ghost.¹¹

¹¹ Cfr. A, Zahn, De Notione Peccall, Halle 1872, pp. 13, 28, 51.

The scriptural locus classicus for our thesis is 1 Cor. III, 8 sqq., in which the difference between mortal and venial sin is developed very graphically and with a deep insight into human nature. This text was made much of by the Scholastics.¹²

¹² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 2; Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 530.

Ecclesiastical Tradition furnishes a long and uninterrupted series of testimonies in support of the distinction with which we are dealing.

The ancient penitential discipline distinguished between unpardonable and pardonable sins,¹³ and among the latter classed some as more grievous than others.

¹³ Matth. XII, 31 sq.; John XX, 22 sq.

St. Augustine draws a sharp line between "magna crimina" and unavoidable " quotidiana peccata" which, he says, are wiped out by the Lord's Prayer.¹⁴

The Catholic Church has constantly insisted on this important distinction and defended it against heretics.¹⁵

¹⁴ St. Augustine, Contra Iul., IT. c. 10, n. 33: "While laboring in this warfare with concupiscence, so long as human life upon earth is a temptation, we are not therefore without sin because that which is called sin in this sense works in our members against the law of the mind, even when we do not consent to unlawful things; but in those matters in which we are overcome by that rebel, though not mortally but nevertheless venially, we contract that for which we say daily: Forgive us our debts." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 696).—Enchir., c. 71: "For the daily brief and light sins without which this life is not lived, the daily prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction. This prayer entirely blots out these least and daily sins." (P. L., XL, 265).—Tr. in loann., 26, n. ii: "Though sins are daily, let them not be deadly." (P. L., XXXV, 1611).—De Symb., c. 7, n. 15: "I do not tell you that you will live here without sin, but there are venial sins without which this life is not lived. Baptism was instituted for all sins; prayer was instituted for light sins, without which we cannot exist. What does prayer contain? We are washed once in baptism; we are washed daily in prayer. But do not commit those sins for which you must be separated from the body of Christ—may this be far from you. Those whom you see doing penance committed crimes, either adulteries or other monstrous deeds; for these they do penance. For if their sins were light, the daily prayer would suffice to blot them out." (P. L., XL, 636).— Serm., 58, c. 7, n. 8: "You cannot live on this earth without debts. But one class consists of those great crimes which it is good for you to have forgiven in baptism and from which you ought always to remain aloof; another consists of daily sins, without which man cannot live here and for which daily prayer is necessary." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 397).—With regard to venial or daily sins, St. Augustine calls the Lord's Prayer "quotidiana nostra mundatio" (De Nupt, et Coniug., I, c. 33, n. 38), "quotidiana mundatio sanctae orationis" (Serm., 56, c. 8, n. 12), and "quasi quotidianus baptismus nosier" (Serm., 213, c. 8). —On the Patristic literature regarding this question see Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Todsunde, Breslau 1903, pp. I? sqq.

¹⁵ Cfr. Conc. Milev. II, can. 6-8: "The saints say in the Lord’s Prayer, not only humbly but also truthfully: Forgive us our debts." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 106 sqq.). —Among the condemned propositions of Baius is the following (n. 20): "No sin is venial by its nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1020). — Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. n; c. 15; can. 23 and 27; Sess. VII, De Bapt., can. 10. —On Luther's teaching that all sins are by nature mortal, see H. Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 501 sqq.

Everyday experience as well as the common sense of mankind and enlightened reason confirm the distinction between mortal and venial sins. As there is a state of spiritual death and moral infirmity, so there are external and internal acts that produce death and infirmity; and as there is a moral order which can be either grievously or slightly violated, so there are grievous and slight offenses against that order.¹⁶ "Could anything be more absurd or foolish," asks St. Augustine, "than to consider one who has indulged in immoderate hilarity guilty of as great a sin as the wretch who has brought ruin upon his native land?" ¹⁷ "If two acts are equal because they are both offenses," he continues, "then mice and elephants are equal because they are both animals, and flies and eagles are equal because they can fly through the air." ¹⁸ "Not only Scripture, but mankind in general," says a recent moralist, "recognize the fact that there are sins which by their nature do not involve a real lapse from morality, and which do not render the agent bad and worthless, but are committed even by just and pious men.

¹⁶ Cfr. Prov. VI, 30 sqq. —St. Jerome, Adv. lovin., II, c. 30: "There are light sins and grave sins. It is one thing to owe ten thousand talents, another to owe a farthing. We shall indeed be held guilty for an idle word and for adultery, but it is not the same thing to blush and to be tortured, to be ashamed and to be tormented for a long time." (Migne, P. L., XXIII, 327)-

¹⁷ St. Augustine, Epist., 104 (a/. 254), c. 4, n. 13: "What more absurd or more insane thing can be said than that one who has sometimes laughed too immoderately and one who has savagely set his country on fire should be judged to have sinned equally?"

¹⁸ Ibid., n. 14: "Or if they are equal because both are offenses, mice and elephants will be equal because both are animals, and flies and eagles because both are winged creatures." (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 394). —Cfr. Horace's Satires, I, 3, 96 sqq.: "Those who have decided that sins are nearly equal are at a loss when the truth is reached: feeling, custom, and usefulness itself, almost the mother of justice and equity, oppose them."

... That there is an essential difference between an offense against courtesy and battery and assault for the purpose of robbery, between a falsehood told in jest and a slander affecting a man's honor, every reasonable person perceives." ¹⁹ The truth expressed by St. James.that "in many things we all offend," ²⁰ was perceived long before the Apostle's day by Thucydides ²¹ and others.

¹⁹ J. Mausbach, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., p. 110; English translation by Buchanan, pp. 259 sq. We have modified the English version somewhat in order to render the sense of the original more accurately.

²⁰ Jas. III, 2: "For in many things we all stumble."

²¹ Hist., III, 45: "All are naturally inclined to sin both privately and publicly." —Cfr. Seneca, De Clement., I, 6: "We all sin, some more gravely, others more lightly."

SPECULATIVE ARGUMENT. —To demonstrate the distinction between mortal and venial sin speculatively was first attempted by the Schoolmen, especially by SS. Thomas ²² and Bonaventure,²³ who emphasize the fact that sin is essentially a turning away from God, due to a wrong tendency of the will. a) "When," says St. Thomas (l. c.), "the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, God, to whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when the disorder stops short of turning away from God, the sin is venial. For as in animal bodies the disorder of death, which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable in nature, whereas the disorder of sickness can be repaired, because the vital principle is preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. For in speculative matters he who errs in first principles is beyond the reach of persuasion, whereas one who errs but retains the first principles, may be brought back to the truth by the aid of those same principles. And so in matters of conduct, he who by sinning turns away from his last end, suffers a fall that is, so far as the nature of the sin goes, beyond repair, and exposes himself to eternal punishment. But he whose sin stops short of turning away from God, is under a disorder that by the very nature of the sin admits of repair; and therefore he is said to sin venially, because he does not sin so as to deserve never-ending punishment."

²² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 5: "The difference between venial and mortal sin follows the diversity of disorder which completes the nature of sin. Disorder is twofold: one by removal of the principle of order; the other in which, even while the principle of order is preserved, disorder occurs concerning things that follow the principle. Thus in an animal body a disorder of its constitution sometimes proceeds to the destruction of the vital principle, and this is death; but sometimes, while the principle of life is preserved, a certain disorder occurs in the humors, and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the whole order in morals is the last end, which holds the same place in practical matters as an indemonstrable principle in speculative matters. Hence, when the soul is disordered by sin to the point of turning away from the last end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then there is mortal sin; but when disorder occurs short of turning away from God, then there is venial sin. For just as in bodies the disorder of death, which occurs through removal of the principle of life, is naturally irreparable, whereas the disorder of sickness can be repaired because the principle of life is preserved, so it is in matters pertaining to the soul."

²³ St. Bonaventure, Brevil., P. V, c. 8: "Since sin signifies a withdrawal of the will from the first principle, insofar as the will is naturally meant to be acted upon by Him, according to Him, and for His sake, every sin is a disorder of the mind or will, concerning which virtue and vice naturally exist. Actual sin, therefore, is an actual disorder of the will. Now this disorder is either so great that it destroys the order of justice, and in this way it is called mortal sin, because it is apt to take away life by separating the soul from God, through whom the just soul is given life. Or it is so slight that it does not destroy that order, but only disturbs it in some respect, and then it is called venial sin, because we can quickly obtain pardon for it, inasmuch as grace is not taken away through it nor does man incur divine enmity."

Hence the customary definition: "A mortal sin is a turning away (aversio) from God and a turning to (conversio) creatures with a change of object/' When the (final) object remains unchanged, there is only venial sin.²⁴ Mortal sin, therefore, is a complete turning from God to the creature, whereby the creature becomes man's last end and the object of his affection. Such an act necessarily destroys the proper relation between God and man, and consequently robs the soul of supernatural life. Man is ordained towards his last end by charity, and whatever runs counter to charity (conceived either as the love of God or the love of one's fellow-men for God's sake) is mortally sinful. All such offenses are mortal sins according to their species (peccata mortalia ex suo genere). When the will is directed towards an object that is not contrary to charity, though it contain within itself some disorder (inordinatio quaedam), the sin committed is venial according to its species (peccatum veniale ex suo genere). Since, however, human acts receive their specification not only from their objects, but likewise from the end or purpose of the agent, a sin which is by nature venial, so far as its object is concerned, may become mortal in respect of the person who commits it, either because he inordinately seeks his last end in that object, or because he directs the object towards an end which is by nature mortally sinful;—as when one employs a useless word for the commission of a grievous crime. Similarly, a sin which is by nature mortal may become subjectively venial if the act remains incomplete, because there is no full advertence and consent; —as when one is tempted against the faith.

²⁴ "Mortal sin is a turning away from God and a turning toward creatures with a change of center; but where the center is not changed, venial sin is present." (St. Thomas, l. c.)

To be mortal, therefore, a sin need not be committed "with uplifted hand against God," as Schell was accused of having taught, i. e., it need not be inspired by hatred and malice or involve formal rebellion against the Almighty. Nor need it be an act of obstinate and impenitent opposition to divine truth and grace. The Church would not have drawn up a long list of mortal sins ²⁵ if she believed that there is but one mortal sin, namely, rebellion or obstinate resistance to the will of God.²⁶

²⁵ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 15; Prop, damnat. ab Alexandra VII., n. 23; sub Innocent. XI., 43, 44, 47, 49, 51 sq. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1123, 1193 sq., 1197, 1201 sq.)

²⁶ Cfr. F. A. Gopfert, Moraltheologie, 6th ed., Vol. I, p. 219. —It is but just to add that Dr. Schell protested against the construction put upon his teaching by his opponents. "I have never denied," he says, "that every wilful transgression of the divine law in an important matter is a mortal sin. On the contrary, I accept this definition: only it falls short of determining what is important or unimportant in each case.... Were I asked to define the nature of mortal sin, I should say it was a voluntary or wilful transgression of a divine law in an important matter." (H. Schell, Kleinere Schriften, edited by K. Hennemann, Paderborn 1908, pp. 580, 587.)

b) The fact that every sin implies a disturbance of the moral order does not suffice to establish an essential distinction between mortal and venial sins. For this distinction is not (or, at least, not entirely) based on the objective consequences of sin (materia gravis et levis), i. e., the greater or less degree in which the moral order is disturbed, but primarily on the subjective tendency of the will. "The external object /' says a modern theologian, "is merely the proximate aim and motive. The ultimate cause of sin is the ego, the gratification of self-love, that inordinate seeking of one's own interest which is directly opposed to the love of God. This is true of all sins, even of those whose object lies outside the sinner's own person (infidelity, despair, presumption)."²⁷

²⁷ H. Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Todsünde, p. 116. —Cfr. Cicero, Parad., Ill, i: "You say that the matter is small; but the fault is great. For sins are not to be measured by the outcome of things, but by the vices of men."

Hence, broadly speaking, it may be said that whatever is done out of malice is mortally sinful, whereas that which has infirmity for its motive is merely a venial sin, though, strictly speaking, there are sins of malice that are venial and sins of infirmity that are mortal. No man is able to fathom the secret motives of his fellow-men, and consequently God alone can tell with absolute certainty how much malice has gone into any sin.²⁸

²⁸ Cfr. Jer. XVII, 10; 1 Cor. IV, 4; 2 Thess. II, 7; Deut. XVII, 8.

St. Augustine says: "Which sins are venial and which are mortal can be ascertained only from Sacred Scripture, not from human wisdom." ²⁹ And St. Thomas: "It is perilous to decide as to the grievous character of a sin unless we have a positive teaching to go by." ³⁰ St. Raymond of Pennafort, whom the Church honors as "the eminent minister of the Sacrament of Penance," advises confessors to go slow in deciding any sin to be grievous, lest they discourage their penitents.³¹

²⁹ Enchiridion, c. 78: "Which sins are light and which are grave must be weighed, not by human, but by divine judgment." (Migne, P. L., XL, 269).— Cfr. ibid., c. 79: "There are some things that would be thought very light unless they were shown in the Scriptures to be grave beyond belief." (P. L., XL, 270). —IDEM, De Civ. Dei, XXI, c. 27, n. 5: "It is most difficult to discover, and most dangerous to define, which sins so impede arrival at the kingdom of God that they nevertheless obtain pardon through the merits of the saints. For my part, up to this time, although I have applied myself to the matter, I have not been able to trace them out." (P. L., XLI, 750). —The reason why God left this question unsolved, St. Augustine finds in the salutary admonition to avoid all sins: "And perhaps they remain hidden for this reason: lest zeal for advancement grow sluggish in avoiding all sins. But now, while the measure of venial iniquity, even if it persists, is unknown, zeal for progressing toward better things is certainly exercised more watchfully by perseverance in prayer." (Ibid.)

³⁰ Quodlibet., IX, art. 15: "Every question in which mortal sin is at issue is decided perilously unless an express truth is possessed." —Cfr. J. Gerson, De Vita Spirit., lect. 4: "Theological doctors ought not readily to assert that certain sins are mortal where they are not most certain of the matter; for by rigid assertions of this kind in universal matters men are by no means raised from the mire of sins, but are plunged into it more deeply because more despairingly."

³¹ "I counsel one thing: that you not be too prone to judge sins mortal where this is not established for you by a certain text; otherwise men might be led into despair." (CL. 3, tit. de Poenit. et Rem., § 21.) —Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Homo Apost., tr. 1 6, n. 118; J. E. Pruner, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 189.

Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter I: On Sin in the Confused Sense · Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter II: On Mortal Sin, or on Sin Properly So Called · Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter III: On Venial Sin · Vol. I, Tr. V, Title II: The Moral Specification of Sins

A conscientious Catholic will strive to avoid all sins, venial as well as mortal.³²

³² Cfr. St. Augustine, De Bapt., II, c. 6, n. 9: "Let us not bring deceitful balances, in which we weigh what we wish and how we wish, saying according to our own judgment, ‘This is grave, this is light’; but let us bring the divine balance from the Holy Scriptures, as from the Lord’s treasuries, and in it weigh what is graver—or rather, let us not weigh, but recognize what has been weighed by the Lord." (Migne, P. L., XLIII, 132).

…and 108 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 86 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter I: On Sin in the Confused Sense

Usefulness. Since the study of moral theology is chiefly ordered to the right administration of the sacrament of penance, in which the minister is in the first place a judge concerning sins to be absolved, the moment of the whole treatise on sins can escape no one. In the first chapter, moreover, we already hand down several things which in reality are fundamental, concerning the very essence of every sin; concerning its specification and its seat. Nor today can the question, once so greatly disputed, concerning philosophical sin, be neglected (1).

N.B. We shall treat of sin in the confused sense, not because we propose to speak here without order and clarity, but because, from the beginning, we wish strongly to inculcate this: that there is not some genus of sin under which mortal and venial should be placed as species. Therefore we give a confused notion of sin, when we do not speak separately of each sin. If there were a common genus, Chapter I would be inscribed: On sin in common.

n. 391.

— I. The name of sin and its confused description. The word sin was already often used by Cicero himself to designate a human act deformed from its rule or law ¹, as in the most beautiful saying: "Apart from fault and sin, nothing can happen to a man which is horrible and to be greatly feared" (Ad Fam. V, 21).

By nominal description, sin is called a morally evil act ². In these words, the word moral does not designate a genus, of which there would be the two species, good morality and evil morality. For there is no common notion of morality which indifferently becomes good or evil, as the same notion of animality is preserved in man and in the brute; but he who says a moral act already says, confusedly, a good act or an evil act, just as he who names being already insinuates such a being.

Furthermore, although the description related falls upon mortal sins and upon venial sins, and although we are accustomed to speak of the theological specification by which mortal sins are distinguished from venial, nevertheless there is not even a genus of sin whose species would be mortal and venial sin: but, as will easily appear from the notion to be handed down here, there is sin properly so called, mortal, and there is sin of diminished notion, venial.

¹ Because laws are of art, therefore by metaphorical usage an artisan can be accused of having sinned against art.

² Summa, 1, 2, q. 71, art. 6.

n. 392.

— II. Essence. Insofar as it is an evil act, sin says some privation of good, which here will be some departure from the order of reason or from the law of God; but insofar as it is a moral act, it necessarily says some good which is inordinately sought. For evil as such is not appetible, but we do not choose it except under the aspect of good, or as joined with the good which we love. Hence, as such, evil is not voluntary except per accidens. But although the act is wholly evil and the omission is wholly evil whereby, on account of some good, we choose or embrace evil, nevertheless it is a lesser evil to will evil under the aspect of good than under the aspect of evil. Therefore, in that tendency toward good, in that election of evil under the aspect of good, there remains a trace of positive order. Hence that saying of St. Thomas, that evil in morals is not pure privation; but "is a certain good joined to the privation of another good" ¹. Whereas in the physical order there is had total privation, for example of vision by blindness, and partial privation, by dimness of sight. Only observe that, in the physical order, what remains of vision in one who sees dimly is simply good, whereas in the moral order the positive appetite itself is evil, because it founds the choice of evil.

¹ Summa, 1 p., q. 48, art. 1 ad 2; 1, 2, q. 73, art. 2.

n. 393.

— III. Specification. If in every sin there is had some appetite of a good object, which of itself is voluntary, and an appetite of evil, which is only voluntary per accidens, since voluntary acts are specified according to that part by which they are voluntary of themselves rather than according to another by which they are only voluntary per accidens, hence again follows that consequence or corollary indicated by St. Thomas, that the moral specification of sins is made by the objects to which the sinner turns himself, rather than by the privation which accompanies the pursuit of the object. Hence it happens that mortal sin, or sin properly so called, and venial sin, or sin of diminished notion, can agree in the same moral species. (Cf. 1, 2, q. 72, art. 5; q. 73, art. 3, and below, n. 426-427.)

n. 394.

— IV. Distinctions. Sins are distinguished:

Into deliberate sins, which are committed from full consent, and surreptitious or semi-deliberate sins, in which full advertence was lacking, or where only a certain remissness in repelling the suggestion of evil can be charged to the will.
Into sins committed in duties toward God, toward oneself, toward one's neighbor, from the order or proximate object to which they pertain. Duties toward God, moreover, are ruled both by the theological virtues and by the moral virtue of religion. The material object of the former is God himself; the material object of religion is the worship of God, taken most broadly.
Into sins of malice, of infirmity, of ignorance, according as the free choice of evil is made without any illusion of ignorance and affection of the senses; or guilt is lightened because of the impulse of passions, of temptations, or because of a certain ignorance, although blameworthy in itself.
Into sins of heart, of mouth, of work, according as they are completed by the mind alone, or also by words, indeed by external action. Observe that there are sins, say hatred, blasphemy, which are perfected by mind or words, while others are merely begun by mind or words: say the internal intention and the external proposal of stealing.
Into sins of commission or omission, according as a prohibited action is done or a prescribed action is neglected.
Into one's own sins or another's sins: the latter consist in illicit cooperation toward another's sin.

n. 395.

— Formal sin, material sin. Sin is properly formal when it is formally opposed to the dictate of conscience and at the same time, of itself, to the dictate of law, while material sin disagrees with the remote rule of law alone, but not with the proximate rule of conscience. Material sin excludes free consent into evil.

Wherefore material sin supposes: a) a person who is subject to the law; b) an act which of itself is done freely, and therefore can be deliberated, not however a first-first movement; c) an act prohibited by law, such as passive pollution is not; d) error or a certain good faith of the agent with ignorance of the prohibition.

[Supplementary note to n. 395.] There we described the material sin which he commits who acts freely but ignorantly. But another reason of material sin is had when an evil act is done by him who, on account of madness, sleep, or drunkenness, is not master of himself.

n. 396.

— V. Subject of sin. In every power, moreover, which is a principle of acts, sin can be present, dependent, of course, on the will. Wherefore sin is had in the sensitive appetite, in reason, and in the will. (Cf. 1, 2, q. 74, art. 1-4.) It is not had in powers which we rule despotically, for example, in the locomotive power.

n. 397.

— VI. Concerning philosophical sin. We know that sin is present psychologically where action has been taken against the absolute dictate of conscience. And there is no doubt that sin is opposed at the same time to the order of reason and to the law of God ¹. Moreover, it is called theological insofar as it offends God; philosophical, insofar as it repugns the order of reason. Merely philosophical sin, therefore, would be that which is opposed to right reason but not to the law of God.

That no such sin exists objectively is most certain, for "whatever is contained under the order of reason is contained under the order of God himself" ¹, and therefore is sanctioned by the most wise will of God. Besides, without God there would be neither the order of reason nor honorable good, since the essences of things have their ultimate foundation in the divine essence, and are formally constituted by the divine intellect.

But it is asked whether a man who perfectly or invincibly is ignorant of God as author and preceptor of order and reason can sin merely philosophically: or whether, on the contrary, it is repugnant that the same man should say that something absolutely must be done or omitted, and not advert, at least confusedly, to a divine command.

That this should happen regularly, so that some ordinary division of sins into philosophical and theological should be proposed, must be altogether denied. Alexander VIII, decree of the Holy Office, August 24, 1690, condemned as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous this proposition: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in one who is ignorant of God, or who does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense of God nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God nor worthy of eternal punishment" (Denz. 1290). But not a few scholastics, holding the matter rather as hypothetical, think that this can happen in strictness: thus Lessius, Suarez, Vasquez, Lugo; while others contend that the same thing strictly repugns. Thus today C. Frins and several others.

Concerning this matter we think it must be said as follows.

He who perceives the absolute obligation of doing good and declining from evil, at the same time spontaneously, in the order perceived, perceives at least confusedly an ordering force dominating him, which he obeys while he does good and declines from evil; which he resists, from which he makes himself alien, if he does evil. In this way, however, he tacitly acknowledges God as legislator, and by his action either honors or more or less despises him. Therefore, if he has acted badly against conscience, he has at the same time acted against God. Cf. Lehmkuhl I, n. 281.

Those, however, who explicitly deny God and then turn their mind to the imperious commands of conscience are logically brought to the conclusions of modern impiety, which simply denies absolute moral duties. It is indeed decorous to preserve the order of reason; noble is the appetite of satisfaction which is begotten from an order preserved. Yet this belongs to the genus of relative goodness which alone is open to man, and which therefore can be outweighed by a greater goodness. And in very truth, with God set aside, the necessary dictate by which I judge that one must act honorably and the equally necessary appetite of one's own beatitude often cannot be reconciled with each other. That absurdity or contradiction causes each necessity, at least in an elicited act, to be denied as absolute.

¹ Not rarely here a passage of St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 71, art. 6 ad 4, is badly alleged, as if the Holy Doctor there had handed down that every moral malice is rooted in divine prohibition, so that, for this reason, when divine law is being treated, that celebrated distinction must be denied, by which some things are called evil because prohibited, but others prohibited because evil. At first sight St. Thomas seems to teach this in the place indicated. For he has it thus: "When it is said that not every sin is evil because prohibited, it is understood of a prohibition made by positive law. But if it is referred to natural right, which is contained first indeed in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural judgment of human reason, then every sin is evil because prohibited." But that interpretation is excluded by the final words which ought not to have been neglected: "for from the very fact that it is disordered, it repugns natural right." For by these words the disordered thing is proposed rather as logically prior to the right of nature. But it must be said that the question concerning that priority, or concerning the relation of divine prohibition to the malice of an act, is not touched by St. Thomas in this place. His present intention is this: to demonstrate that the definition of St. Augustine is true, by which sin is called "something said or done or desired against the eternal law." But for this it is enough that no evil exists which is not prohibited by that law, so that it draws its malice, whether first or second, initial or complete, from opposition to divine law. Here, therefore, the Holy Doctor already affirms what he will repeat more than once, that by divine law, not by human law, all sins are prohibited and punished. Cf. 1, 2, q. 91, art. 4 c. (where Augustine is alleged from the same book I On Free Will from which he was brought forward in the present objection); 1, 2, q. 93, art. 3 ad 3, etc.

¹ Summa, 1, 2, q. 72, art. 4 c.

n. 398.

— Corollary. Barbarians are not accustomed to scrutinize such things. Wherefore, in regions of the missions, the poor natives, although they are formally and explicitly ignorant of God as orderer and legislator, nevertheless, while they do what they judge to be good, are not incapable of merit before God (grace being supposed); and by acting against conscience they must be judged to sin theologically.

n. 399.

Summary

— 1. By a usage already ancient, sin says a human act deformed from its rule; and it is a morally evil act, with this observation, however, that there is no generic notion of morality which indifferently becomes good or evil, but only a confused and analogical notion is proposed, as of being. The notion of sin also belongs analogically to mortal and venial.

Since evil is always sought under the aspect of good or as joined with some good, evil in morals does not say pure privation, but is some good joined to the privation of another good. And the moral specification of sin is made, rather than by the joined privation, by the objects to which the sinner turns himself, since on that side the act is voluntary of itself.
Sins are distinguished into deliberate and surreptitious; committed in duties toward God, toward oneself, toward one's neighbor; of malice, of infirmity, of ignorance; of heart, of mouth, and of work; of commission or omission; one's own or another's.
Sin is properly formal. Material sin supposes a person subject to law, who acts freely, and with a certain good faith does an act or omission prohibited by law.
Sin is always done dependently on the will; but it can be present in any power which is a principle of acts.
Philosophical sin exists neither objectively, since by divine law every moral evil is forbidden, nor even subjectively, since conscience of absolute obligation brings with it a confused notion of God the legislator. Hence even barbarians are capable of merit (with divine grace) and of theological demerit.

Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter II: On Mortal Sin, or on Sin Properly So Called

Order of speaking. First we shall treat of actual sin, then of habitual sin, then briefly of the guilt of fault and punishment.

I. - On Actual Mortal Sin

In order we shall hand down its notion and demonstration; its psychological explanation; its definition and conditions. Then we shall complete the doctrine with various considerations concerning sin of omission, concerning the unequal gravity of sins, even mortal ones, and concerning the physical order to which sin pertains.

n. 400.

— I. Notion and demonstration of mortal sin. Sin is called mortal insofar as it closes the way to eternal life for the sinner.

That there are sins of this sort is made clear splendidly from Sacred Scripture itself. The goats who, in the solemn judgment, will be placed on the left of the Judge, who as cursed will depart into eternal fire, are certainly guilty of mortal sin ¹. Judas committed mortal sin, concerning whom the Lord says: "Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man shall be betrayed" (2). When pagan iniquities have been enumerated, St. Paul directly pronounces worthy of death those who do such things: "and not only those who do them, but also those who consent to those doing them" (3). "Neither fornicators, nor servants of idols, nor adulterers, etc. shall possess the kingdom of God" (4). "Sin," says St. James (5), "when it is consummated, generates death."

The testimonies of tradition are also most open, so that there is no need to linger in alleging the Fathers. Innocent III (6) says without hesitation: "The actual punishment of sin is the perpetual torment of Gehenna." Two ecumenical councils, Lyons II and Florence, have these words: "The souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or with original sin alone, immediately descend into hell, yet to be punished with unequal punishments (7)." Between each council, Benedict XII, Constitution of January 29, 1336: "We define that according to the common ordination of God, the souls of those departing in actual mortal sin, immediately after their death descend to hell, where they are tormented by infernal punishments" (Denz. 531).

St. Thomas elegantly proposes the reason in this way: "Wherever there is some due order to an end, it is necessary that that order lead to the end; but departure from the order excludes the end; for those things which are from the end receive necessity from the end, namely that they must be, if the end ought to follow, and with those things existing without impediment, the end follows. But God has imposed on the acts of men some order in respect to the end of good, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore it is necessary that, if that order has been rightly placed, those proceeding through that order obtain the end of good, which is to be rewarded; but those departing from that order through sin be excluded from the end of good, which is to be punished" (C. Gent. III, c. 140). Since the Holy Doctor treats in that place of punishment in general, it must be completed by the following, where, treating of the punishment due to mortal and venial sin, he has these words: "Man through works of virtues, in which chiefly there is the intention of the due end, attains his ultimate end, which is happiness. If therefore he acts in something against virtue, turned away from the intention of the ultimate end, it is fitting that he be deprived of the ultimate end" (C. G. III, c. 143).

¹ St. Matt. 25, 31-46. - (2) St. Matt. 26, 21; and St. Mark 14, 21. - (3) Rom. 1, 32. - (4) 1 Cor. 6, 9-10. And he repeats the same, to Gal. 5, 19-21. - (5) Jas. 1, 15. - (6) Denz. n. 410. - (7) Denz. 464 and 603.

n. 401.

— II. Psychological explanation. If we contemplated God in himself and the rest in God, we should see, by clear intuition, that our happiness cannot be separated from the observed moral order or law of God; and that by one and the same way one arrives at God, at Good, at Beatitude. But now that immediate evidence is lacking to us; and mediate evidence is not so strong or stable that it prevents every deception. Therefore it happens that a certain enjoyment contrary to that order or to that law seems to be appetible, an element of beatitude, and can be proposed to us as to be chosen here and now, as better for us than the preserved order itself. Yet at the same time we are conscious of the permanent necessity or obligation, whatever detriment must be borne, of remaining in the moral order, of choosing nothing which is contrary to honorable good. Therefore the opposite election is demonstrated to contain rejection of honorable good, and, as much as lies on the part of the one choosing, renunciation of the ultimate end or God, to whom the preserved order is related as a necessary means.

Therefore in him who follows the practical judgment of choosing in favor of an enjoyment contrary to the order of honesty, there appears error and imprudence of judgment, malice of the will which embraces it, practical desertion of the way which leads to eternal life, offense of God, who guards the moral order; so that the man sinning at the same time errs, sins, dies spiritually, and turns himself away from God.

Nevertheless, in the present order, since a good relation to God is preserved in habitual grace, which is formally our supernatural life, the spiritual death of the soul says the removal of grace, which God alone can infuse and withdraw. But from the man abusing his liberty and turning himself badly to creatures, God in very truth removes grace, and man spiritually dies.

n. 402.

— III. Definition. By this very explanation, this twofold definition of sin is proved true: one of which is taken from the side of voluntariness or conversion to commutable good, that is, changeable because finite; the other from the side of incommutable good (God):

"Something done or said or desired against the eternal law" ¹.

A turning away from God, the ultimate end, through voluntary conversion to commutable good.

By the former reason, that which is voluntary of itself is considered directly; by the latter, that which is evil of itself. And because it concerns an act of the will, the use of the former definition is more important ².

In this former definition, the words "against the law of God" imply that aversion from God from which the other definition takes its beginning.

Nor can it be objected against the definitions that they suppose an act, whereas sin is also committed by omission. For we conceive omission after the manner of a being, and the omission thus conceived is proposed to the will as an object which can agree with the law or plainly repugn the law. "Just as acting is imputed to a man unto sin because it is opposed to a negative precept of law, so also not acting itself, because it is opposed to an affirmative precept" (St. Thomas, De malo, q. 2, art. 1 c. Cf. the things already said concerning human acts).

¹ St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. 22, c. 27 (P. L. 42, 413).

² Cf. Summa, 1, 2, q. 72, art. 6.

n. 403.

— IV. Conditions of mortal sin. In order that mortal sin be committed, it is required and suffices that with advertence to malice, to malice which at least confusedly is apprehended as grave, there be joined consent perfectly free, with that intrinsic perfection which leaves the unencumbered use of the higher faculties. Cf. things said above, n. 41.

But the malice which is apprehended as grave can be either that of the transgression itself, which is known in itself to be grave, or that of imprudence, omitting due inquiry in a grave matter.

A doubt concerning grave sin committed will generally have to be solved from presumptions. This presumption is drawn from the habitual disposition of the agent and from the object, which at first sight appears light or notable.

Concerning each element, that is, concerning the object of the act, which is as it were the matter, and concerning consent, by which the sin is informed, and which depends, in a sane and wakeful man, on advertence, it seems that one must speak separately.

n. 404.

— On grave matter. 1. With respect to gravity, they distinguish matter grave from its whole genus, where none can be judged small, because the notion of grave disorder is found in the whole genus: blasphemy, venereal delight; and matter grave from its genus, in whose genus, grave of itself, grave malice can be absent because of the slightness of the matter. Finally there is matter light from its genus: this does not become grave unless a circumstance is added which changes the species.

Whence will grave matter be recognized? Let us distinguish internal criteria from external:

a) Concerning internal criteria. That by which matter is ultimately or formally constituted grave is the will of God commanding or prohibiting under grave obligation. But because the most wise God bears a will adapted to the essences of things, thence it is permitted to us to attempt a more intimate exploration. And the precepts of natural law are to be discerned from positive precepts. With respect to natural law (which we take as its precepts are now the object of supernatural observance), the criterion is offered to us by the very order of things. For if the observance of the essential order is a connatural condition of eternal life, every substantial violation of that order will be grave matter. But there is a threefold essential order to be observed by us: order toward God, order toward neighbor, order in ourselves.

Our order toward God is one of subjection; toward neighbor, it is one of equality, by which we are forbidden to violate his person either in himself or in his things, and of proximity, by which he must be loved by us as "another I." In ourselves order demands that, content with useful dominion of our person and of our faculties, we make no act of perfect dominion over them, but that in ourselves we venerate God, parents, and fatherland as our authors. Hence we cannot pervert the subordination of our faculties. Whatever, therefore, cannot be composed with that order thus explained, but either simply denies it or is opposed to it by so great a relation of contrariety, will be the object of grave sin.

Hence, in the order toward God, the violation will be substantial which is not only about the mode of honoring, of worshiping God (as voluntary distraction in prayer), but denies God, or his attribute, or worship itself, at least by a transient act. Wherefore there is no slightness of matter in sins directly against God or a divine attribute, for example, in those which are directly opposed to the theological virtues: heresy, despair, hatred of God; nor in blasphemy, in an assertory oath, superstition, simony of natural right.

In the order toward neighbor, substantial will be every violation which is notably harmful to the neighbor in a matter of which he is not master, or which induces a just and grave offense of him.

In the order toward the agent himself, substantial will be every direct disposal of himself or of his faculty, since these are opposed to the divine dominion of our person. This usurpation can be committed by physical destruction of oneself (suicide) or of a faculty (mutilation), or by moral abuse through acts which are against the order of the whole faculty. Since this abuse is present in every venereal delight directly sought outside marriage, therefore in that luxury there is not given light matter.

N.B. The customary words "grave matter" suggest a quantitative estimation, which, when natural law is being treated, is never formal, nor can it always be applied. For even in commutative justice itself, where, when external things are treated, quantity is truly considered, theft nevertheless is not grave precisely because it is of such a quantity, but because, on account of such a quantity, the neighbor is judged reasonably and gravely unwilling, so that the order toward him is substantially violated. But in the matter of chastity, that quantitative consideration has caused many to experience such difficulty in admitting the gravity of every lustful lewdness outside marriage, indeed of every fornication; it was also the cause why they fled to extrinsic reasons of danger of hallucination and abuse. But then the malice does not seem now intrinsic, which nevertheless is demanded by reason of the violation of nature. And that extrinsic reason is laboriously demonstrated to be universal.

Because the end of every law is charity, this other form also is proved: "Mortal from its genus is that which of itself harms the charity of God, or of neighbor with respect to persons, things, or rights, or gravely corrupts ourselves" ¹.

When positive law is being treated, this imposes an order not essential of itself, whose observance therefore is less immediately joined with the end of man. Wherefore here the consideration of the moment of the end and of the relation of the thing to that end becomes more formal. This is especially true of human law. In order that this law can obligate gravely, it is required that the law contribute notably to the common good, and that its violation notably harm that end, at least if it were multiplied. For a law can impede that multiplication by a grave prohibition.

The things thus far explained will be illustrated and completed by notions concerning venial sin.

b) Concerning external criteria. Although the principle of distinguishing mortal sin from venial, taken from contrariety to the orders of charity ², is not hidden from man, nevertheless it surpasses human art, as if from the intrinsic nature, to define concerning individual sins whether they are mortal or venial, so that St. Augustine confesses that he had labored in vain to discern all grave sins from light ones ³. And St. Thomas: "Every question in which mortal sin is being asked about, unless expressed truth is had, is determined dangerously" ⁴. Therefore St. Augustine advised this: "Let us not bring deceitful scales, on which we weigh what we will and how we will, saying according to our own judgment: this is grave, this is light; but let us bring the divine scale from the holy Scriptures, as from the treasuries of the Lord, and on it weigh what is graver; indeed let us not weigh it, but recognize things weighed by the Lord" (De baptismo, l. 2, c. 6, n. 9. P. L. 43, 132).

Furthermore, the positive will of God must be viewed, which certainly in many matters, through a precept made for a grave end, can as it were complete the gravity of the matter. Hence also Augustine: "There are some things which would be thought very light, unless they were shown in the Scriptures to be grave beyond opinion" (Enchir. c. 79. P. L. 40, 270).

Wherefore a threefold criterion of distinction is customarily handed down: Sacred Scripture, which is judged to condemn an action as mortal when it declares it "to be worthy of death," or "to exclude from the kingdom," or "to be execrable and abominable," or marks it with similar words. (Cf. Suarez, ad 1, 2, Tr. 5, Disp. 2, s. 5, n. 19.) - The accepted opinion of the Fathers and Doctors, for in a moral matter authority is of very great value. - The judgment of reason, according to the things which we have just said.

But in the absence of certain proof, matter is not to be pronounced grave. St. Raymond had already warned: "One thing I counsel, that you not be too prone to judge mortal sins, where it is not established for you by certain Scripture... otherwise men could be induced into despair ¹."

But St. Alphonsus confirms by authorities and reasons the danger of rash condemnation: for those men whom you easily condemn of mortal sin in actions in which grave malice does not appear to evident reason, those same men you make exposed to the danger of eternal damnation.

¹ Busembaum from Azor, p. 1, l. 1, c. 9; and Sanchez, Decal., L. 1, c. 1, n. 4. And cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 88, art. 2.

² Cf. the Summa, 1, 2, q. 88, art. 2 c.

³ "What are those very sins which so impede arrival at the kingdom of God that nevertheless they obtain indulgence by the merits of the saints, is most difficult to find, most dangerous to define. I certainly, up to this time, although I have labored about this matter, have not been able to arrive at the investigation of them." (Civ. Dei, L. 21, c. 27, n. 5. P. L. 41, 750. Cf. also Enchiridion, c. 73.)

⁴ Quodlibet 9, art. 16.

¹ Summa, L. 3, De Poenitentia et remissione, § 21.

n. 405.

— On advertence. Actual advertence to malice is required. It does not suffice that a man could and ought to have adverted. But he who, conscious, has omitted the obligation of adverting, then, in the cause, becomes guilty of the evil effects which he foresaw at least confusedly.

It is not required, however, that advertence endure as long as the sinful action endures, but it is enough that it was present at the beginning of the action, indeed before it was begun, when the sinner willed to begin and complete it: as one who proposes to drink until drunkenness, or to take that quantity from which he knows drunkenness will follow. Nor is distinct advertence to malice demanded, but consciousness of a gravely evil thing in the confused sense suffices. Nor must there be explicit attention to God's offense, since philosophical sin is not given. And reflex attention is not required; direct cognition which is drawn from habitual knowledge suffices. Nevertheless perfect apprehension of substantial malice is necessary; but concerning a special circumstance habitually known it is said to be enough that it be present to the intellect in a subconscious or confused way.

Here there is need of a certain discretion. Of itself (with a special reason set aside) it will not be admitted that one sinning lustfully did not advert to a vow of chastity, the memory of which so many occasions renew; but forgetfulness of a vow of abstinence will be admitted in him who, among companions, takes a drink offered. A talkative woman can, without advertence, gravely detract from her neighbor; yet if she has been taught by experience itself or by the command of a confessor concerning the necessity of greater attention, she will be excused with more difficulty.

n. 406.

— Various Complements. 1. Concerning sin of omission. The will can be borne to omission in two ways. For the omission itself can please the sinner as flight from a distasteful thing: as if assistance at Mass generates weariness for him; and it can happen that nothing in the omission as such pleases him: as if he quite gladly hears Mass; and then the will is directly borne to that by which the due act is impeded, for example, to a game on account of which he omits Mass ¹. That positive act, which is the impulsive cause of the sin of omission, nevertheless stands outside its essence. Wherefore it does not specify the sin, which consists in the very cessation from the due act. Nevertheless there is had an inordinate affection on account of which one wills to omit the sacred service. Wherefore, if one neglects the sacred service in order to study, he sins gravely by omission against religion; and besides he is infected by the venial vice of curiosity. Cf. Suarez, Rel., Tr. 5, d. 2, c. 13, n. 4. Therefore the species of the grave sin has not on that account been changed.

¹ St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 71, art. 5.

n. 407.

— II. The unequal gravity of sins, even mortal ones. That unequal gravity is demonstrated by Scripture itself, and indeed from the mouth of the Lord, where he indicated that the sin of the betrayer was greater than the sin of Pilate.

And it is proved by reason. For mortal sin also is specified by the object; and the object can be opposed to the moral order or law of God in various degree.

The gravest of all is hatred of God, which directly repugns charity; sin which is committed immediately against God, such as infidelity and blasphemy, is graver than sin of the same notion committed against man; sin concerning the substance of man, such as homicide, is graver than sin concerning external things, such as theft. (Cf. 1, 2, q. 73, art. 1 and 2.)

n. 408.

— Sin is in the natural order. III. When good was being treated, we distinguished natural and supernatural goodness at least by reason. An act in which natural goodness is present does not thereby yet participate supernatural perfection. But concerning actual sin the same distinction does not hold. For God is offended, not precisely insofar as he is author of supernatural life, but insofar as, author and lord of nature, he has bound us by his precepts, among which surely this greatest is found, that we intend the supernatural end. Nor can we turn ourselves away from the supernatural end without at the same time turning ourselves away from the natural end, which is as it were absorbed by the former. Nor can a distinction be taken from the elicitive principle (natural or supernatural), since to sin is in our power and we always complete sin by our own powers alone.

That we may repeat the same in a few words: every mortal sin is ascribed to natural disorders, both because man sins by natural powers, and because, by sinning mortally, man turns himself away simply from God the ultimate end, and not only from God the author of beatitude.

n. 409.

II. - On Habitual Mortal Sin and on the Stain of Sin

— 1. From the school of dogma we assume, as demonstrated by Scripture and tradition, that beyond actual sin there is habitual sin; faith itself hands down an example of this in original sin.

Besides, even among equal men, after a grave offense there endures a certain state of mutual enmity, in which, not only the offended one, which is clear of itself, but, what seems wonderful at first sight, the offender himself remains turned away from the person toward whom he was injurious. And in a similar way, committed sin morally perseveres until reconciliation, or at least until penance. That perseverance of sin formally constitutes the state of sin, or habitual sin, the guilt of fault ¹. It would have existed in every order of the world, even a natural one. But in the present order, after mortal sin, it materially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace (insofar as it connotes the will by which one voluntarily turns himself away from God), nor does it cease except through the restitution of that same grace.

But because that grace is at the same time the beauty of the soul, its privation infects the soul with a stain. Wherefore Scripture itself exhibits sinners as polluted, unclean, befouled with filth to be washed away ². Therefore the stain is distinguished from habitual sin only by reason.

¹ Guilt here is taken for the state of imputation.

² Cf. Job 33, 9; Prov. 21, 8; Gospel of St. John 13, 10; Is. 4, 4; Zach. 13, 1; Acts 22, 16; 1 Cor. 6, 11.

n. 410.

III. - On the Guilt of Punishment

— I. That permanent guilt of fault is the proximate title of punishment to be undergone. Therefore this is owed as long as that guilt remains.

From the dogmatic exploration of mortal sin we know that mortal sin is of itself irreparable: for no principle of reparation, by which he may restore charity and grace to himself, remains in the man who has sinned mortally.

II. Furthermore, to aversion from God, infinite good, there remains for the sinner the infinite and perpetual punishment of loss, or of privation of the beatific vision. The punishment of sense is owed properly because of the disorder of conversion to creatures. On this side, sin is finite, and could, considered in itself, be expiated by a finite and temporal punishment of sense. But because of the eternal guilt of fault, it happens that the punishment of sense itself will endure eternally. This human explanation is attempted concerning a thing which has been revealed to us by God.

But, according to the positions of St. Thomas, for the same reason, because the remission of venial fault or the payment of debt is not conceived in a permanent state of enmity, eternal punishment is inflicted on the damned also for venial sins and for mortal sins whose fault indeed had been removed but whose expiation had remained imperfect. Several other theologians do not admit this.

Observe finally that the proximate cause of eternal damnation is not sought by St. Thomas from the infinity of sin (which subjectively is none), but from the necessity, mysterious enough to us, by which the separated soul cannot change counsels without a miracle, but rather perseveres impenitent in its voluntary aversion from God.

Summary

— I. Notion and demonstration of mortal sin. From Scripture and Tradition we know that there are mortal sins, that is, sins which close the way of eternal beatitude. This is confirmed by reason. For when the order to the end has been established, once it is substantially vitiated, the attainment of the end ought to become impossible.

II. Mortal sin is explained psychologically by this, that, deprived of immediate vision of the indivisible bond by which our happiness is joined to the moral order observed, a certain enjoyment outside God and against his law is at the same time proposed to us as appetible and nevertheless forbidden to us. Hence man can choose in favor of that enjoyment, but by rejecting honorable good and renouncing the ultimate end or God, so that at the same time he errs, sins, spiritually dies, and turns himself away from God. Yet that aversion, in the present order, is not consummated except through withdrawn sanctifying grace, which God alone can take away.

III. As it is voluntary of itself, sin is defined: something done or said or desired against the eternal law; as it is evil of itself: a turning away from God, the ultimate end, through voluntary conversion to commutable good.

IV. The conditions of mortal sin are: that with advertence to malice apprehended at least confusedly as grave, there be joined intrinsically perfect consent. Doubts will have to be solved from presumption.

Matter is distinguished as grave from its whole genus or from its genus: the latter admits excuse of slight matter. An object light from its genus does not become grave unless a circumstance is added which changes the species.

But matter is grave formally insofar as, when natural law is being treated, the order of essences is substantially violated, whether toward God, toward neighbor, or in ourselves; or, when positive law is being treated, insofar as the end of the law is of grave moment, and its violation notably harms that end, at least if it becomes frequent.

In the present order, that also can be called grave which of itself harms the charity of God or of neighbor, or is contrary to right love of ourselves.

Nevertheless, to recognize mortal sins, we need external criteria of Sacred Scripture, Tradition, and even human authority.

Actual advertence is demanded, while there remains firm imputation of the evil effects which he at least confusedly foresaw who, conscious, omitted the obligation of adverting. It is not required, however, that advertence endure through the whole action; nor is distinct or explicit attention to God's offense demanded; nevertheless apprehension of substantial malice is demanded; and it must prudently be weighed whether a circumstance habitually known actually could have been unattended or not.

V. Various Complements. 1. Omission can be directly willed, or only indirectly, because of affection for a thing which cannot be composed with the action. Nevertheless the sin of omission is not specified by that affection. Wherefore not rarely, with a grave sin of omission, there is joined a venial sin of inordinate affection for the thing on account of which the omission was voluntary.

Because they are specified by the object, which can be opposed to the law of God unequally, mortal sins, as Scripture itself testifies, are of unequal gravity.
But all sins are of the physical natural order, because we sin by our own powers, and through every mortal sin we turn ourselves away from God, author of nature.

VI. After mortal sin there remains guilt of an offense of God, by which habitual sin, or guilt of sin, is formally constituted. This same guilt now materially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace.

Since that grace is at the same time the beauty of the soul, its privation stains the soul. That stain is distinct from habitual sin only by reason.

VII. Guilt of fault is the proximate title of punishment to be undergone. To aversion from God is owed punishment of loss; to inordinate conversion to a creature, punishment of sense. This latter of itself would be temporal, unless the persevering state of enmity stood in the way of its extinction. Which, according to St. Thomas, is also applied to the punishments which the damned must undergo because of venial faults and forgiven mortal sins.

The proximate cause of the eternity of the punishments of hell is in the immutable obstinacy of the separated soul in its voluntary aversion from God.

Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter III: On Venial Sin

It will chiefly be necessary to treat of actual sin; for only a few things must be added concerning habitual sin.

I. - On Actual Venial Sin

Order of speaking. First we shall confirm that there are venial sins. There will follow a psychological analysis and definition of venial sin, with certain explanations added concerning the analogy and the evil of this sin. Then we shall give criteria of venial sin; then concerning the modes by which acts venial of themselves can become mortal. And, by way of complement, two cases will be solved.

n. 412.

— There are venial sins. We call venial sin a sin which, as it is committed, does not constitute man turned away from God, or an enemy of God, nor is worthy of eternal punishment, but is of itself remissible.

But that there are such sins must be held by faith, from the Council of Milevis, c. 7; Trent, s. VI, c. 11 and 12, and can. 23, 25; and s. XIV, c. 5 and can. 7.

And it is certain that there are also sins which are such by their nature, and not merely from the mercy of God, who would punish beneath the merit of the cause.

But this third question is disputed among theologians: whether or not God, by supplying sufficient helps, could have prohibited all deliberate disorders under mortal guilt.

n. 413.

— Psychological explanation and definition.

I. In our present condition, just as indeliberate movements anticipate the use of reason, so also it happens that we have semi-deliberate acts, or acts not fully human, concerning which we spoke in the treatise on human acts. But it repugns human nature itself that man should be judged to have determined concerning his end by a semi-deliberate act. Therefore, already on account of this cause, we make acts short of aversion from God or from the ultimate end, which nevertheless are disordered.

Furthermore, even deliberately a weak man can, while he practically acknowledges and reveres God the ultimate end, act as if inconsequently in those things which, because they are not according to the order of reason, cannot be referred to God; and nevertheless, because they allow charity toward God and the threefold order (toward God, toward neighbor, in oneself) to be substantially untouched, they do not bring about aversion of the agent himself from God. Therefore the agent remains turned toward God, but his action is referred neither to God nor to another end simply and positively ultimate. Hence again there are had disordered acts without aversion from God.

II. And this is venial sin, which therefore can be defined: a voluntary disorder concerning a creature, without aversion from God. And at once it is also seen to be of twofold notion, since sin can be venial because of the imperfection of the act and because of the lightness of the object.

Sin which because of the very notion of the matter is venial, is such from its genus. Wherefore, when we are moving in a mortal genus of sin, yet in such a way that smallness of matter excuses from grave guilt, the cause of excuse is rather the imperfection of the act than the lightness of the object. That is, injury to another man is grave from its genus. But the small quantity which is taken away secretly, the small insult or detraction which is committed, cause the injury reasonably not to be judged perfect. Therefore the very quality of the action has been changed because of the modest measure of the thing. Therefore observe that the excuse is not formally quantitative but qualitative.

n. 414.

— Analogy of venial sin. Venial sin signifies another disorder, offense, and punishment than mortal sin; and therefore it is sin only analogically. It signifies another disorder, since it removes no essential order, so that it repugns God the ultimate end neither immediately nor mediately. It signifies another offense: for it does not constitute God an enemy; nor does one sinning venially prefer a creature to God, but only fixes for his will an immediate term diverse from the term which, God willing, it ought to have. Yet the command of God is not urged in the case under threat of enmity. It signifies another punishment, that is, a temporal one.

Wishing to express this, St. Thomas says that venial sin is not against the law but beside the law; but Scotus says that venial sin is opposed to counsel, not to precept. Scotus seems by the name of counsel to understand a norm whose observance is not necessary for salvation. St. Thomas, however, by his manner of speaking avoided every opposition with the definition by which St. Augustine defined mortal sin as something done against the law. In itself, the words can be explained in this way. If you consider the law of God all at once and as a whole, as the ordination by which man is directed to his end, venial sin, since it is not done according to an opposite direction, cannot be called contrary to it (cf. Cajetan in this place), but at the same time it is not according to the law; wherefore it is said to be beside the law: the sin is in the very mode of observing the law. St. Thomas himself explains his mind thus: "Venial sin is so called according to an imperfect notion and in order to mortal sin, just as accident is called being in order to substance, according to an imperfect notion of being; for it is not against the law, because one sinning venially does not do what the law prohibits, nor omit that to which the law obligates by precept; but he acts beside the law, because he does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends" (1, 2, q. 87, art. 1 ad 1). Hence the things we said above, n. 404 and 413, are confirmed.

n. 415.

— The evil of venial sin. Nevertheless venial sin is held in hatred by God, as something which repugns his infinite goodness; and, as long as it is not removed, it impedes the sight of God. It is an evil which, in its own order, transcends every physical evil, so that it cannot be committed for avoiding any punishment. It is opposed to the fervor of charity, because a man in whom charity perfectly dominates will do nothing which is not referred to the beloved God.

n. 416.

— The subject of venial sin. Venial sin, since it says an election not in agreement with the intention of the higher appetite, demonstrates an imperfect subordination of the lower appetite to higher reason. In innocent man, movements little deliberated would not have existed; and all things consequently would have been composed according to the deliberation of higher reason. Wherefore man, in the state of preternatural integrity, could not have sinned venially. Similarly the Blessed Virgin, because of the moral gift of integrity, must be said to be immune from venial stain. Where there is no discursive process, but all things are apprehended and sought in the principles themselves, venial sin cannot exist. For only a discursive process permits something to be proposed as good without order to the intended end simply ultimate. Therefore, not because light matter was lacking, but because of the angelic perfection of nature, an angel could not sin venially (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 89, art. 3 and 4).

n. 417.

— Criteria of venial sin. Let us distinguish venial sins which can be such although they are deliberate, from actions which are not venial except because of imperfect deliberation.

According to the things which we explained above, n. 413, deliberate venial actions will be violations of order which we can call accidental, because they allow the order of essences to be substantially untouched, or because they are opposed to positive law only in a light matter.

Those accidental violations of the essential order will be, in our relation of subjection to God, various negligences in fulfilling duties of religion which neither arise from formal contempt nor are so notable that they contain virtual contempt; in our relation to neighbor, they will be faults which harm him little, and do not reasonably remove the notion of friendship. Observe that these acts turn upon a thing which from its genus is grave, so that they are not light except because they are objectively imperfect.

In ourselves, on the contrary, there also occur acts venial from their genus: dissipations of things of which we have perfect dominion, which will not become grave unless for that reason a grave duty now cannot be fulfilled; so also useless and vain concupiscence (not however in a venereal matter), vain enjoyment, curiosity, superfluity of adornment and dress, trifles, idleness, excess in food, drink, sleep, use of marriage, fear, sadness, appetite of money, praise, etc. So also lies. For whether you consider the harm of error and of deception of the neighbor concerning my mind, since it concerns contingent truth, it is light by its nature; or whether you consider the denied communication of my mind, this of itself was not due; or whether you consider the abuse of the faculty of speech, since speech is immediately ordered to the good of the speaker, a lie does not break through the immediate order of the whole faculty, but badly refers to the good of the speaker the act or use of a faculty which is immediately ordered to that good; whereas in the abuse of the venereal faculty outside marriage, the sinner uses, against the immediate end of the faculty, for his own satisfaction, a faculty which is immediately for the good of the species; or finally whether you consider the social effect of lying, circumscribed by the false communication of my mind, which is not necessary, even by frequent falsity of this sort mutual communication and mutual trust are not notably harmed.

Yet the things said return concerning the necessity of recurring to external criteria.

Criteria of imperfect deliberation or imperfect consent.

Those criteria are taken: a) from presumption: if one is accustomed to be so disposed that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally; b) from the conscience of the agent: if, from habitual disposition, you judge that you would not have done it if you had fully apprehended the matter; if a God-fearing man doubts concerning his assent; if the spontaneous sentence immediately was "I did not consent"; c) from the state in which the agent was: he was half-asleep, very distracted, agitated by vehement passion, disturbed; d) from the mode of action: it was done with a very timid and as it were perplexed mind; while you wished to deliberate, the words had already slipped out of your mouth, the thing had already been done; e) from the incomplete action: he who could conveniently have executed the sin (for example, solitary sin), notwithstanding temptation, did not execute it. A certain distraction easily happens in fantasies less chaste, in detractions, and especially in sins in the cause, where effects, harms, dangers of others, fled the mind. "Recall here forgetfulnesses, ignorances lightly culpable, erroneous consciences from light negligence" (Ball.-Palm. I, tr. 4, n. 685).

Therefore let the confessor prudently ask the penitent, according to his capacity, whether he acted fully awake, whether after observing the malice of the thing he elicited no act against the temptation; but once the response "I remain doubtful," "I do not know," has been received, he will not insist too much, lest he become troublesome, but let him recur to presumptions; nor rarely will he have to commit the matter to the divine judgment (Genicot, I, 161).

n. 418.

— Passage to mortal sin. On the contrary, they say that venial sin or even an indifferent act passes into mortal, because of the depraved affection of the will or the effect of the action, by reason of the ultimate end, of an adjoined end, of contempt, scandal, danger, accumulated matter. With what truth these things are said will appear after an examination has been made.

By reason of the ultimate end: if one fosters affection for a venial or even indifferent thing (say a game, a person), not only intense but such that actually or virtually he would rather violate a grave precept than be deprived of those things.

Observe that habitual disposition according to itself does not suffice, because that to the committing of which he is prepared by habit alone is not imputed as anyone's fault. Otherwise, how many would actually sin who are so disposed that for a small cause they would neglect duties, commit shameful things!

If that affection betrays itself in grave guilt of commission or omission of which it was the occasion, it will be enough to accuse that grave guilt. If in no guilt, the sin is by affection alone.

By reason of an adjoined end: as if one lies lightly in order to extort copulation. Again, however, not the lie itself, which remains light in itself, but only the desire or contrivance of fornication must be accused.
By reason of absolute and formal contempt, whether of the Superior or of the precept as such: as if you refuse to be subject to the precept or to the Superior, which is the sin of consummated pride; if you are unwilling to do it because it is prescribed, which is the sin of formal disobedience: both gravely repugn the charity due to the Superior.

But contempt according to some respect is not grave of itself, when, the authority being admitted, one contemns only execution; when one habitually indeed wishes to be subject, but here and now in a small matter shakes off the yoke; when one contemns the Superior merely as unlearned, imprudent, imperfect; nor interpretative contempt, when the precept is violated because of another cause: anger, a depraved custom. And if the matter which gave occasion to contempt is light, contempt alone must be confessed.

By reason of scandal: if you cause a mortal ruin of the neighbor. Only the superadded malice, which is gravely opposed to charity, must be manifested in confession.
By reason of danger of falling into mortal sin, if proximate danger of grave sin is induced. The notion of proximate danger will be explained below, where the flight of sin is treated. In venereal matter, interior or exterior sensualities, venial according to themselves, can produce such danger.
By reason of accumulated matter. For if several small matters are morally joined, all are morally reputed as one, and grave matter arises. But they can be joined according to themselves, or according to the effects produced. According to themselves, as if you often steal a little and do not restore; if by intervals you omit several psalms of the same office; if on the same day of fast you eat a little rather often. But he does not sin gravely who on diverse feast days has worked a little, who daily in Lent has eaten a little or has determined to eat: these are not morally united among themselves. Nor does he sin gravely who on diverse days has violated a vow of praying a little something every day, or of giving a small alms. It would have to be answered otherwise if by small daily distributions he had wished to fulfill the execution of a vow of a great sum to be given. Nor are several vows which are to be fulfilled on the same day united among themselves. Hence he who, on one day, has violated one hundred vows of light matter, has not for that reason sinned gravely. - According to effect, as if, by repeated detractions, you render a person utterly hated.

n. 419.

— You ask whether or not matter, grave in itself, can become light, considered as a small part of a sum or of a total quantity.

This can indeed happen, but the cases must be prudently weighed. In the first place it is necessary that it concern a thing which is estimated quantitatively, as money, as prayers to be said. Furthermore, it is necessary that this matter belong as a part to the whole or to a certain universality. Hence, he who has vowed 100,000 is not judged, with one hundred notes omitted, to have sinned gravely against the vow or promise. In dividing a large patrimony, the largeness will cause things notable in themselves to be judged light by a certain tacit consent. Lehmkuhl, II, 269, thinks the same can be said of the omission of one Mass from one hundred owed for the same intention; but others do not admit this. Nor in strictly commutative contracts, as buying, selling, borrowing, do they concede that he who does not pay a sum grave in itself is excused from grave sin.

Observe that, in contracts concerning Masses, when one Mass is being treated, the obligation of paying one stipend is not grave, while grave is the obligation of celebration to which such a stipend is joined.

n. 419 bis.

— What is called the will of committing all venial sins practically signifies nothing except a general remissness in avoiding venial sins. Remissness of this sort, negligence, although dangerous and very harmful in itself, for the most part is only venial, because toward mortal sin "it is only a remote disposition, unless some peculiar circumstances come upon it, which in some matter consummate a proximate occasion." Suarez, De Relig., tr. 8, l. 1, c. 4. So also Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 50; St. Alphonsus 4, 12 (as more probable), against Sanchez, In Decal. I, 5, 4.

n. 419 ter.

— Deliberation concerning committing a mortal sin will be mortal, if it has been perfect, that is, if, fully adverting to the grave malice of the proposed act, you deliberately choose to remain wavering: for then you virtually judge that it can happen that a created good is reasonably preferred to divine friendship. But often it is only a certain negligence in expelling contrary thoughts and affections, which is venial. Lehmkuhl I, n. 347, 5.

n. 420.

II. - On Habitual Venial Sin

— Venial sin itself perseveres morally until it is retracted. Wherefore there is also habitual venial sin. But in a just man there remains the principle of charity by which venial fault can be repaired; and habitual venial fault is contained by no real privation. Certainly, repeated venial acts easily generate a certain difficulty of acting perfectly; but that difficulty, which remains after the fault has been destroyed, is a certain punishment concomitant to sin, but constitutes no habitual sin. Moreover no stain properly so called follows venial sin. For venial sin indeed impedes the splendor which the soul obtains from acts of virtues; but, since it removes or diminishes no infused habit, and since stain signifies a habitual rather than an actual detriment, the soul is stained by venial sin only according to some respect, not properly.

n. 421.

Summary

— I. From the definition of the Councils, it must be held by faith that there are venial sins, which, as they are committed, do not constitute man an enemy of God, but are remissible. And it is certain that such sins are such by their nature, and not from the mere mercy of God. But it is disputed whether or not God could by positive will have made all disorders mortal. Venial sins are explained psychologically, both because we have semi-deliberate acts, and because we can deliberately act not consequentially to our preserved voluntary ordination toward God, the ultimate end, in things which allow the substance of the order to be untouched.

Therefore venial sin is a voluntary disorder concerning a creature, without aversion from God. That which because of the notion of the matter is venial is such from its genus. Because of imperfection, acts are venial, even in grave matter, when they are semi-deliberate acts, and those which, because of the slight quantity of this matter, are excused from grave sin.

II. Venial sin is analogically sin, since it signifies another disorder and offense than mortal sin, and brings in another punishment. It is said to be beside the law, not against it, insofar as it is not done according to the direction opposite to the law, that is, to ordination to the end.

III. Yet it is an evil above every physical evil, and is held in hatred by God, and impedes his sight.

IV. The subject is only man, who has a discursive process and imperfectly subject lower powers.

V. The criteria of venial sin will be: 1. Objectively accidental violations of order, concerning the mode of worshiping God and of preserving justice and charity toward neighbor. In acts which are not referred to others, sins venial from their genus are chiefly found, such as lying itself. 2. Signs of imperfect deliberation, to be taken from presumption, from the spontaneous dictate of conscience, from the state of the agent, from the mode of action, and from its incomplete notion.

VI. Venial sin properly does not pass into mortal. But things gravely culpable can come upon it: affection, an extrinsic end, contempt, scandal, danger of mortal sin, and sometimes accumulated matter.

On the contrary, a quantity which, separated, would be grave, can, as a small part of the whole, be held as light. Nor does the will of committing all venial sins seem grave. Deliberation concerning committing mortal sin is not always perfect, and therefore not subjectively mortal.

VII. There is morally habitual venial sin; nevertheless it consists in no real privation; nor is a stain properly so called produced by venial sin.

Vol. I, Tr. V, Title II: The Moral Specification of Sins

Ch. III, Article I. On Adulterous Desires · Ch. II, Article III. On Interior Acts · Ch. II, Art. III, I. On Interior Acts Insofar as They Excite the Flesh · Ch. II, Art. III, II. On More Intellectual Acts

The usefulness of this title is both doctrinal, since a distinct notion of specification helps the understanding concerning sins not a little, and practical, since for the penitent and confessor some knowledge of moral specification is necessary for defining the obligation of sacramental accusation.

n. 426.

— I. Moral specification of venial sin. The question concerning the specification of venial sin cannot be doubtful. For in venial sin there is nothing except an undue conversion to a creature. Therefore specification will necessarily be made from the side of that undue conversion. Whether you say: specification is made from the object to which the conversion is made, or whether you say: specification is made from the disorder of that conversion, the matter falls back into the same thing: you only change what is said in the direct case or in the oblique. Suppose immoderate eating. If you specify by appetite for food, since the object is affected by privation, in estimating the object one will advert to the privation by which it is affected, or to the note of intemperance; if you specify by contrariety to the virtue of temperance, in estimating that privation, one will attend to that which remains of order in that appetite, that is, to the relation of food to the man for whom it is destined. Besides, every privation receives its quasi-species from the opposite form. That form is revealed by the object itself. Wherefore practically one comes to the same conclusions. St. Thomas himself admits this: if you prefer to distinguish sins according to the opposed virtues, "it would return to the same thing; for virtues are distinguished in species according to objects" (1, 2, q. 72, art. 1 ad 2).

Yet because disorder is not voluntary according to itself, while conversion to the object is voluntary, for the sinner intends to exercise an act of the will in such matter, it is better said that sins are specified according to objects. For a species is constituted according to that which is of itself, and not according to that which is per accidens, "because those things which are per accidens are outside the notion of the species." And therefore sins are distinguished in species from the side of voluntary acts, rather than from the side of the disorder existing in sin. Therefore, if we wish to speak accurately, we shall say that the species of venial sins are distinguished, more than by departure from the order which deforms the act, by the deficient goodness of the object.

And add this. If you specify by the object, from the beginning you exclude that error by which you might think that from the virtue to which the sin is opposed the ultimate specification is already taken; whereas several sins diverse in species are opposed to the same virtue, for example, justice. Thus homicide and theft are both opposed to commutative justice, and nevertheless are separated by no slight diversity of species.

…and 46 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Vermeersch, On Chastity

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 54 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Ch. III, Article I. On Adulterous Desires

n. 215.

Remedies for adultery.

215. - Besides the general indications of Christian piety, these things are usefully to be advised:

n. ¶1190.

A diligent and complete flight from the proximate occasion. Let the confessor endeavor to dispose the soul to the greatest liberality in this matter, so that he may obtain more than he could strictly command, and may lead the penitent to follow the safer parts.

n. ¶1191.

The other spouse will sometimes have to be admonished of imprudence. Imprudent is the wife who, from religion, refuses to accompany her husband to the theater, for it is by no means expedient that the husband go alone to these places; imprudent is she who introduces or fosters her husband's familiar association with her marriageable but unmarried sister, for, by the very reason that two sisters are accustomed to be similar, the husband is easily tempted by those allurements of that sister which he previously loved in his wife; he in turn is an occasion of temptation for that unmarried woman. Imprudent also is the wife who introduces or admits into the home governesses or maidservants who have not been cautiously selected; imprudent is she who desires to use a separate bed.

n. ¶1192.

The suppression of the cause which rendered the marriage less happy. Let the confessor, insofar as discretion permits it, inquire attentively into those things which one of the spouses casts against the other or desires in the other, in case perhaps he can remove by opportune counsel certain things done unskillfully. It happens, for example, that the wife is reluctant in rendering the debt; that she does not provide sufficiently for domestic order; that she neglects cleanliness in clothing and body; whereas it contributes greatly to a happy family that all things be well polished and carefully arranged, that appetizing foods stimulate the appetite, and that no wrongly understood piety prohibit the wife from pleasing her husband.

n. ¶1193.

Discreet severity in judging the sin of adultery. It cannot be tolerated that a Catholic man seem to make little of what he has committed against conjugal fidelity. Therefore, the adulterer will have to be reproved by the confessor with grave words, although without anger, especially if he seems to accuse himself of such things coldly and with an even mind.

Ch. II, Article III. On Interior Acts

n. 365.

The twofold genus of interior acts.

365. - The interior acts which pertain here can conveniently be gathered into a twofold genus.

n. ¶1900.

Some, more intellectual, are physically immune from carnal pleasure; others, on the contrary, stir the flesh in the present.

Ch. II, Art. III, I. On Interior Acts Insofar as They Excite the Flesh

n. 366.

On acts which excite.

366. - 1. Acts which induce commotions of the flesh and are voluntary as such are called interior acts more in name than they truly are interior. For they are accustomed to be sought and exercised on account of the pleasure which they induce here and now. They please as a cause of pleasure. Wherefore they are rather the work of imperfect or perfect lust excited and obtained by an interior act.

n. ¶1901.

What is usually an obscene thought or morose pleasure. How it is to be accused.

2. This is the more frequent species of sin which penitents accuse when they confess depraved thoughts; and it is that which, in this matter, is chiefly marked by the name of morose pleasure.

n. ¶1902.

Wherefore also, since the object then presented to the imagination does not please except as the cause of present pleasure, it is specified by this pleasure alone.

n. ¶1903.

Therefore this rule is customarily handed down: Those who, desire being excluded, have base thoughts to accuse ought to accuse neither the object nor the base movement, unless there was pollution. Not the object, since thoughts understood in this way do not vary in species according to the various object; for individual things are not loved except as the cause of venereal pleasure, toward which alone the sinners are affected. Not the base movement, for, the thought having been indicated, that movement itself is sufficiently indicated, unless there was pollution.

n. ¶1904.

Wherefore we added that pollution must be declared.

n. 367.

The morality and danger of ideal representation. Various counsels concerning this matter.

367. - You will ask on this occasion what moral judgment is to be made concerning the ideal representation of a base thing.

n. ¶1905.

1. A merely notional representation, or one without an imaginary imitation of the thing, is in itself neither evil nor proximately provocative. Thus we designate adulteries and homicides by an innocent word. If it was idle or useless, it will laudably be repelled; nevertheless no scruple is to be had concerning it.

n. ¶1906.

2. But the thing can be painted in the phantasy as upon a panel. Concerning this fictitious picture one must reason as concerning a true one.

n. ¶1907.

a) To consider briefly a representation involuntarily present, a lustful intention being excluded, will not be grave. If there was a just cause of study, etc., there will be no sin.

n. ¶1908.

Nevertheless, a cause for contemplating or looking upon an imaginary exhibition will be present more rarely than if a work made by art were to be considered.

n. ¶1909.

But if the attention was undertaken with a lustful intention, a grave sin is committed.

n. ¶1910.

This intention being excluded, a morose consideration of a gravely obscene or gravely exciting phantasm is infected with grave guilt because of the proximate danger of assent, unless a just cause, if one should ever be present, and a positive repudiation of the pleasure remove at once both the danger and the delusion.

n. ¶1911.

A morose consideration of a thing which excites lightly will be venial in itself if a cause was lacking.

n. ¶1912.

b) To excite images of this kind, or voluntarily to render them present, must be estimated by a similar rationale: it will be grave if it is done from lust, or if, because of the nature of the image, you expose yourself to a proximate occasion of assent; otherwise it will be a light sin or no sin, according as a sufficient cause was lacking or excuses the matter.

n. ¶1913.

Active procurement, however, introduces an aggravating circumstance. Cf. Noldin, De sexto, no. 61.

n. ¶1914.

Must an impure phantasm be repelled?

3. Moreover, the positive obligation of repelling impure and useless phantasms - although that repudiation is always praiseworthy and commendable of itself - is not grave, except insofar as a proximate danger of assent to present pleasure must be removed ¹. That danger is judged to be sufficiently removed of itself by an interior act of displeasure made once or twice in the same temptation.

¹ Concerning a will which bears itself "indifferently," cf. Sanchez, In Decalogum, book 1, chapter 2, no. 13.

n. ¶1915.

This danger being removed, a light obligation does not exist except insofar as it can be fulfilled sufficiently conveniently.

n. ¶1916.

What manner is to be recommended.

But the best manner is that, all anxiety having been put aside and the aid of the Blessed Virgin Mary having been implored, the mind turn positively to other, healthier, and higher things.

n. ¶1917.

What one who is accustomed to be tempted should do.

But one who knows himself to be subject to these temptations should, preferably outside the temptation, in the morning or evening, according to the usual time of temptation, elicit a firm resolution; let him pray to God; and then, intent upon his own affairs, let him pass by those thoughts as though by neglecting them.

n. ¶1918.

But if they press the mind more, it will often be very useful to promise or perform some act of penance, or even to exercise an act of humility, as if you were to disclose the matter to a spiritual man.

n. ¶1919.

But let one tempted by impure things beware, let him carefully beware lest he quickly judge himself guilty and thus be cast down or disturbed in spirit, whence worse things are accustomed to occur.

Ch. II, Art. III, II. On More Intellectual Acts

n. 368.

Simple complacency concerning an action;

368. - That we may now speak of the former, or of the truer genus of interior acts, simple complacency of affection first occurs, without desire or a will of execution. Nothing is intended; something is loved in itself. A complacency of this kind is to be judged from the object, and it becomes moral from only those notes in which pleasure was truly taken. For it concerns an abstract object. Wherefore:

n. ¶1920.

1. Deliberate intellectual complacency concerning a base action induces of itself the various guilt of that action. But if certain evil notes composing the object remain foreign to the affection, or do not positively please, they do not communicate their malice to the one taking pleasure. Thus complacency concerning inter- course with a definite person who is married or sacred will generally be only complacency in fornication, since the other notes rather displease of themselves.

n. ¶1921.

Concerning a thought;

2. Complacency concerning a thought entertained about a base thing is of itself about an honorable thing, since the thought of a base thing is not base in itself. But because of the danger of an obscene phantasm, it easily becomes suspect. Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, question 15, article 4.

n. ¶1922.

Concerning the manner in which the thing was done.

3. Complacency concerning the wondrous, rare manner in which an evil thing was performed, concerning the elegance of base speech, or concerning the art by which a statue was made, is also of itself about an indifferent thing; but again, because of the danger of evil complacency, it must be dissuaded.

n. 369.

Efficacious and inefficacious desire.

369. - Desire superadds some tendency toward the object, or some will of execution, in an efficacious or inefficacious wish.

n. ¶1923.

An efficacious will elicits an absolute resolution; an inefficacious will is subordinated to an unfulfilled condition. It is a mere wish.

n. ¶1924.

The specification of each.

Every desire is a movement of the will distinct from simple complacency. Yet as such, or in the subjective consideration of the act, if it was lustful, it induces the guilt of imperfect lust common with complacency, so that it does not of itself constitute an aggravating circumstance because of intensity. Cf. what was said, no. 356.

n. ¶1925.

But objectively, an efficacious desire embraces the whole object as it exists; it loves or admits all its notes, at least absolutely, although not all for their own sakes, so that it contracts all the specific malices of the object.

n. ¶1926.

But an inefficacious or conditioned desire must be judged from the nature of that condition.

n. ¶1927.

If the condition excludes every malice, the desire will not of itself be objectively blameworthy, as if someone were to say: I would use her if she were mine. Yet it is evident that some danger is present in these desires.

n. ¶1928.

And if the thing is evil only because it is prohibited, it is honorable to conceive the desire in this way: I would do it if it were lawful.

n. ¶1929.

But if the thing is intrinsically dishonorable, we must bear an affection entirely detached from that thing, so that it may be conformable to right order. Wherefore it is not lawful, as though grieving over the prohibi- tion, deliberately to adhere to this will: I would fornicate if it were not prohibited.

…and 14 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 3 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Chapter II. On The Division Of Sins · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Ch. II, Article I. On The Division Of Sins In General

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General

n. ¶54.

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71-89; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 1-84; Billuart, Sum. S. Thom., tract. de peccatis; Billot, Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati 3 (Rome 1900); Noldin, De principiis n. 286-352; Otto Schilling, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie I, § 41 ff.; Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. mor. de peccatis et vitiis. (It is a very commendable treatise.)

Praenotamen. The rules of human acts are law and conscience, as is clear from what was said above. Human acts which are conformed to these rules lead into man's last end, namely, into eternal beatitude; but those which are deformed constitute sins and turn away from the last end and eternal beatitude. Acts conformed to these rules are virtuous acts; but deformed acts are sinful acts. Therefore according to order one must now treat of virtues and sins. But because it seems fitting that to the treatise on virtues in general there should immediately be joined the treatise on virtues in species, we invert the order, treating first of sins in general and then of virtues in general and in species. But we refer those things which must be said about individual sins to the treatises on the individual virtues, to which the individual sins are opposed. - We divide the whole treatise on sins in general into eight chapters: 1. on the nature of sin; 2. on the division of sins; 3. on the specific distinction of sins; 4. on the numerical distinction of sins; 5. on the causes of sins; 6. on the effects of sins; 7. on internal sins; 8. on the vices called capital.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Chapter II. On The Division Of Sins

n. ¶55.

Since the division of sin into mortal and venial must be treated separately, we subdivide this chapter into three articles: 1. on the division of sins in general; 2. on mortal sin; 3. on venial sin.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Ch. II, Article I. On The Division Of Sins In General

n. 360.

360. Sins have obtained multiple divisions, of which the following seem to be the principal ones:

1. Original and personal sin. The former is the privation of original justice transmitted to us from Adam. In what exactly the essence of original sin consists, theologians are not agreed.²⁵ The latter is sin committed personally by us. Hence it can be said briefly: original sin is the sin of human nature; but personal sin is the sin of some determinate human person. This personal sin is subdivided into:

2. Actual and habitual sin.²⁶ Actual sin is a passing act or omission discordant from the rules of morals. Habitual sin is the stain left in the soul on account of actual sin. This stain indeed brings in a twofold guilt, namely guilt of fault and of punishment, and lasts until mortal sin has been destroyed by sanctifying grace. Discussion will return below in n. 391 sqq. concerning this twofold guilt. Actual sin is subdivided into:

3. Mortal and venial sin. Mortal sin, which is also called grave, is that which by destroying sanctifying grace brings death upon the soul. Venial, or light, sin is that which does not deprive one of sanctifying grace itself and therefore admits pardon from the human works themselves done with actual grace. Venial sin diminishes the fervor of charity and brings in temporal punishments. A fuller discussion will return below in n. 361 sqq. concerning the intimate nature of mortal and venial sin. - Other subdivisions of actual sin are:

4. Sin of commission and omission. The former is an act against some negative precept; for example, theft is a sin of commission, which is against the negative precept: Do not commit theft. The latter is the omission of a commanded act, or the transgression of an affirmative precept; for example, a sin of omission is culpably to omit Sunday Mass, since this is against the affirmative precept: Sanctify the Sabbath.²⁷

5. Carnal and spiritual sin.²⁸ The former is completed in disordered carnal delight; such sins are gluttony, lust. The latter is disordered spiritual delight, for example, pride, vainglory. Sometimes, however, in Sacred Scripture any sins whatever are called carnal in a broader sense, namely because they are produced by a carnal man given over to disordered passions. In this sense envy, murders, etc., are called by St. Paul works of the flesh.²⁹

6. Sin against God, against oneself, and against neighbor. The first directly violates divine rights, such as the sin of blasphemy, heresy, hatred of God. The second is directly and proximately against the proper good of the sinner himself, such as suicide, drunkenness. The third directly harms one's neighbor, for example, theft, calumny. - Certainly all sins are against God, namely insofar as they are an offense against God; likewise all sins are against the good of the sinner himself, since he who commits sin hates his own soul;³⁰ nevertheless certain sins more directly wound the honor of God, or the proper good of the sinner, or the good of the neighbor, and therefore are specially called by theologians sins against God, against the sinner himself,³¹ and against neighbor.

7. Sin of heart, mouth, and deed,³² according as sin remains in the mind alone, for example, lustful thoughts, or proceeds to speech, for example, blasphemies, or is completed by an external deed, for example, theft.³³

8. Sin of ignorance, weakness, and malice, according as the sinful act proceeds from culpable ignorance, or from passion diminishing the voluntary act, or from the perverse and evil will alone without ignorance and passion.³⁴

9. One's own and another's sin. The former is that which is committed by the sinner himself alone, for example, solitary pollution; but the latter is that which indeed is committed by another, but under the influence of another sinner. Commonly nine modes of committing another's sins are customarily assigned, according to the verses:

Command, counsel, consent, flattery, recourse, Participant, mute, not obstructing, not manifesting.

10. Sins against the Holy Spirit, sins crying to heaven, capital sins. This division indeed is not complete, so that every sin is either against the Holy Spirit, or crying to heaven, or capital; but nevertheless it is adduced because the notion of these sins must not be omitted in Moral Theology. A sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin committed from formal contempt of some supernatural gift directly³⁵ withdrawing us from sinning. But they are called sins against the Holy Spirit because they are, as it were, blasphemies against this divine person, to whom our sanctification is appropriated. Since the times of Peter Lombard, six sins against the Holy Spirit are customarily enumerated, namely: 1. presumption, 2. despair, 3. attack against acknowledged Christian truth, 4. envy of a brother's supernatural grace, 5. obstinacy in the state of sin, 6. impenitence.³⁶ Those sins are called irremissible, or "sin unto death,"³⁷ not indeed because they are altogether never remitted, but because true penance is most difficult concerning them, since by despising the supernatural gifts necessary for the remission of sin they directly attack every conversion to God.^37a - Four sins crying to heaven are enumerated: 1. homicide,³⁸ 2. sodomy,³⁹ 3. oppression of orphans and widows,⁴⁰ 4. retention of wages owed to poor workers.⁴¹ But they are called sins crying to heaven because their malice, and especially the disturbance of the social order made through them, are so great that they cry to heaven for just vengeance to be sought, and indeed already on this earth. They are customarily enumerated in these verses:

The voice of blood and of Sodom cries aloud to heaven, The voice of the oppressed, the wages detained from labors.

Capital sins are called those from which, as from roots, other sins sprout forth. Seven are enumerated:⁴² 1. vainglory, 2. envy, 3. avarice, 4. anger, 5. lust, 6. gluttony, 7. sloth. - Discussion will return below in n. 406 sqq. concerning each of these sins.

11. Formal and material sin. The former is a free and imputable transgression of divine law; the latter is a transgression of divine law from invincible ignorance or from violence destroying internal consent.

Note. These two must be well distinguished from two other expressions used among the Scholastics, namely from that which is called the formal element of sin and the material element of sin. The formal element of sin is the essential constitutive element itself of sin, which according to what was said above is either something positive or something privative. The material element of sin is the physical act which is present in sin. Thus, for example, the approach of Jacob to Leah was for Jacob a material sin, because he acted from invincible ignorance; but in voluntary fornication the material element of sin is the physical act of fornication; the formal sin, however, is the whole voluntary fornication; finally, the formal element of sin is the very disorder existing in this act.

²⁵ Dogmaticians treat of this matter more broadly. Cf. the special work on original sin written by Bernardus de Rubeis. St. Thomas treats of this question in S. theol. 1, 2, q. 82.

²⁶ Sinful deed and sinful state.

²⁷ The Angelic Doctor (S. theol. 1, 2, q. 72, a. 6) notes that sins of commission and omission differ not formally but materially.

²⁸ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 2.

²⁹ Gal. 5, 19 sq.

³⁰ Cf. Ps. 10, 6.

³¹ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

³² Sins through thoughts, words, and works.

³³ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 7.

³⁴ The Angelic Doctor treats broadly of these three sins in S. theol. 1, 2, q. 76-78.

³⁵ St. Thomas shrewdly observes (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 105, a. 2 ad 2): "For contempt of just anything which impedes sin does not constitute a sin against the Holy Spirit; otherwise contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Spirit, because through any good a man can be impeded from sin. But contempt of those goods makes a sin against the Holy Spirit which directly lead to penance and the remission of sins."

³⁶ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 14, a. 1 and 2.

³⁷ 1 Io. 5, 16. - Concerning the essence and number of sins against the Holy Spirit the ancient doctors were not agreed. Some, such as St. Athanasius and St. Hilary, taught that there is only one sin against the Holy Spirit, namely blasphemy against God. Others, such as St. Augustine, thought that this one sin against the Holy Spirit was final impenitence (cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 1). In present times theologians commonly teach, with the Angelic Doctor going before them, that this sin is a sin from a certain fixed malice, that is, committed from formal contempt of those things which directly withdraw man from sin. Hugh of St. Victor enumerates four sins from fixed malice, or against the Holy Spirit; but now, and already from the times of Peter Lombard, the six such sins indicated above are customarily enumerated (cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 2, in the first objection).

^37a S. theol. 2, 2, q. 14, a. 3.

³⁸ Gen. 4, 10.

³⁹ Gen. 18, 20.

⁴⁰ Ex. 22, 22 sqq.

⁴¹ Deut. 24, 15; Iac. 5, 4.

⁴² Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 84, a. 4.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 90 passages

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Treatise IV: On Sins

Proemium On the Notion of Sin

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 75; St. Alphonsus, V, n. 1; ed. G., II, p. 705; H. Ap., tr. III, c. 2; Suarez, tr. V, de Virt. et Pecc., disp. 3; Lacroix, Theol. mor., tr. 2, c. 4; Lehmkuhl, I, 320; Aertnys, I, n. 218.

n. ¶316.

DEFINITION. Sin is an evil human act, and is defined: A free transgression of the divine law (V, 1).

It is said: 1. transgression, as if a step outside the way; 2. free, because sin essentially consists in an act of free choice; 3. of law, that is, of any precept imposing a strict obligation, and thus it differs from imperfection, which per se is not sin, yet is so per accidens (cf. n. 341); 4. divine, under which name comes every law or precept obliging in conscience. For every law borrows its force and strength, ultimately, from the eternal law of God. Thus the immense malice of sin is sufficiently suggested, which consists wholly in this, that the created will is repugnant to the obliging divine will.¹

Sin is also sometimes called vice, but improperly; for sin is the act itself, but vice is a habit, or disposition. It is also called crime or delict, namely where it tends to the detriment of the Church or of the republic. Of this kind are apostasy, heresy, schism, simony, sacrilege, sorcery, homicide, adultery, theft, etc. It is called an offense of God insofar as it is against the will of God. An injury insofar as it is against the right of a person.

DIVISION. Sin is distinguished:

By reason of existence, into original and personal. Original is that which, committed in the will of Adam, is transmitted by way of generation: concerning this dogmatic Theology treats. Personal is that which man commits by his own will.
By reason of entity, into actual and habitual. Actual sin is the sinful act itself. Habitual sin, abstraction being made from the controversies of the schools concerning the nature of sin, is actual sin morally enduring or persevering.

ACTUAL sin, concerning which the discourse here properly is, is subdivided:

By reason of precept, into sin of commission and omission. The former is that by which a negative precept is violated: of which kind is, for example, theft. The latter is that by which an affirmative precept is violated, for example, omission of the sacred rite on a feast day.
By reason of the mode of consummation, into sin of heart, of mouth, and of work. The first is that which by its nature is consummated in the heart, as heresy, hatred, etc. The second, that which is perfected by the mouth or tongue, as detraction, perjury, blasphemy. The third, that which is completed in an external deed, as theft, homicide. Sins of heart are also called internal; sins of mouth and work, external.
By reason of object, into sin against God, against neighbor, and against oneself. Against God is said of that which is specially opposed to the reverence due to God: such is sin opposed to faith, hope, charity, or religion. Against neighbor, that which brings harm upon the neighbor, as homicide, detraction, etc. Against oneself, that by which the order of reason is violated, for the right government of oneself, as drunkenness, base delectation.
By reason of cause, into sin of ignorance, of infirmity, and of malice. A sin of ignorance is said of that which proceeds from culpable error; of infirmity, that which proceeds from temptation or antecedent passion; of malice, that which proceeds from a perverse determination of the will (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 75-78).
By reason of gravity or effect, into mortal and venial sin. Mortal is that which gravely offends God and brings death to the soul. Venial, that which lightly offends God, and which of itself preserves in the soul the root of pardon, that is, sanctifying grace (cf. n. 335, 340).
By reason of imputability, into material and formal. Material sin is the evil act itself, considered according to itself, or an involuntary transgression of law, and therefore not imputable to fault. Formal sin is the very malice of the act, or deliberate transgression of law, which therefore is imputable.
Lastly sin, by reason of the agent, can be divided into one's own and another's. One's own is said of that which is perfected by one's own action. Another's, that which indeed is committed completely by another, yet is deservedly imputed to one's own will, as to a cause in some way concurring. Concerning others' sins the matter will be treated below, where the matter concerns those cooperating in sin (n. 517), and especially where we shall treat of those cooperating in harm inflicted upon the neighbor (n. 976 seqq.). Cf. Suarez, tr. V, de Vitiis, disp. 3, sect. 1.

With these distinctions and definitions premised, we shall treat: 1. of the requisites for sin; 2. of the distinction of sins; 3. of the gravity of sins; 4. of internal sins; 5. of capital sins; 6. of the danger of sinning.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Chapter I: On the Requisites for Sin

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 9-15; St. Alphonsus, V, 4; ed. G., II, p. 707; H. Ap., III, 25; Suarez, de Vol., disp. VI, VIII; Lehmkuhl, I, 322; Cathrein, Phil. mor., n. 42; La Croix, Theol. mor., l. I, tr. 2, q. 126; Tanquerey, t. 2, p. 278; Gerigk, Wesen u. Voraussetz. der Totsünde.

For formal sin, whether mortal or venial, it is required that it have been admitted knowingly and freely; that is, that there be present: 1. advertence of the intellect to the malice of the object; 2. consent of the will.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. I, Article I: On the Advertence of the Intellect

n. ¶317.

DEFINITION. Advertence is consideration or thought of the malice and prohibition of the act, or at least some doubt or suspicion of sin, or of the danger of sinning.

DIVISION. By reason of the existence of the act, advertence is usually distinguished as threefold: 1. actual or direct or express, which is had here and now while acting; 2. virtual or indirect (interpretative in a certain respect), which was had when the cause of the sinful act was voluntarily posited; 3. merely interpretative, which exists neither in itself nor in another preceding thing, but consists only in this, that someone could and ought, by physical and remote power alone, to advert to the malice.

By reason of accidental quality, advertence is further distinguished: 1. into full advertence, if nothing impedes the mind from acting perfectly, as in one perfectly awake; 2. into protracted, which lasts as long as the sinful act lasts; 3. into clear and distinct, by which the respective species and grades of malice are known; 4. into reflex, by which the one sinning reflects upon his advertence. Cf. n. 336.

n. ¶318.

PRINCIPLE. For formal sin virtual advertence is required and suffices (V, l. c.; H. Ap., III, 25).

It is required: for the opinion of those who say that merely interpretative advertence suffices cannot in any way be sustained. For the axiom remains unshaken: Nothing is willed unless it is foreknown, either in itself or in the cause; "because where there is no knowledge, there is no liberty; and where there is no liberty, there is no sin" (VI, 610). Whence the evil which man commits and to which he in no way, not even confusedly, attends cannot be imputed to him, and is only material evil. "Otherwise," says St. Alphonsus (V, 4, v. Hinc), "it would follow that very many men would find themselves burdened with many mortal faults, although, concerning them, they had never had any knowledge," which is absurd. Hence, "if ignorance was in no way voluntary, and the man had no actual advertence to the malice or danger of that thing, neither directly nor indirectly, neither in itself nor in the cause, then in no way are the errors which he does not advert to imputed to him"... Likewise, "in order that the effects of some cause be imputed to someone, there must necessarily precede, at least in the beginning, actual and express advertence to the malice of the object" (V, 4, v. Contra). Cf. n. 314 and 315, note.
It suffices: for equally false is the opinion of those who assert that, here and now, for every sin, actual and express advertence is required. The Psalmist prays: The offenses of my youth, and my ignorances, remember not, O Lord (Ps. 24:7). Among the offenses of youth, many certainly were committed from virtual advertence. Now he calls all these just as much sins, as when he was entirely ignorant of God, most gravely offending him. Add that if actual advertence to the malice of an act were absolutely necessary, men, the more wicked they are, would be the more excusable; for the more wicked they are, the graver are the evils they perpetrate, noticing little or nothing of the malice of their acts. Indeed, there are not lacking those who, while sinning, think that they act rightly, led by their culpable ignorance, as again is gathered from Sacred Scripture: The hour comes, that everyone who kills you will think that he offers service to God (John 16:2). Cf. I, 170.

n. ¶319.

Corollaries. 1. Hence St. Alphonsus says: "It can happen in many ways that several evils, although they are not actually and expressly adverted to, nevertheless are well imputed to fault to those committing them, if their ignorance (or inadvertence) is in some way voluntary" (V, 4, v. His positis).

Ignorance, however, becomes voluntary and imputable to sinners in a fourfold way (V, 4, v. Primo):

a) Through NEGLIGENCE in learning those things which can and ought to be known. "Ignorance," says St. Thomas, "is voluntary either directly, as when someone studiously wills not to know some things, so that he may sin more freely; or indirectly, as when someone, on account of labor, or on account of other occupations, neglects to learn that by which he would be drawn back from sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself to be voluntary and sin, provided it is of those things which someone is bound and able to know" (1.2, q. 6, a. 3).

b) Through PASSION, which someone deliberately wills to follow. "For one willing to fulfill some passion, for example, vengeance, consequently admits, at least confusedly, whatever perverse means conduce to fulfilling the passion. Whence the effects proceeding from it, although they are not voluntary in themselves, are nevertheless voluntary in their cause, namely in adhering to the passion. Thus also St. Thomas teaches, who calls the ignorance of one operating through passion ignorance of bad choice" (ibid., a. 8).

c) Through a DEPRAVED HABIT, if someone, namely, omits efficaciously to amend the depraved habit. "In this case, the evil acts which proceed from a bad habit are likewise voluntary, either in their cause, namely when in its beginning the depraved custom is contracted voluntarily; or rather... because such badly habituated sinners, although they have a less ready knowledge than others, nevertheless always have some actual knowledge of their crimes, sufficient to render the acts deliberate, and (if the matter is grave) also mortal. For since they make little of sin, there is not made in their souls that sensible and memorable impression which is made in another having a less depraved conscience. And hence it happens that there does not remain in their memory a trace of that actual knowledge which they sufficiently had before concerning the sin; or the trace is so slight that, when questioned, they easily respond that they did not advert. But a cautious confessor ought not to give faith to them" (cf. n. 293).

d) Through INCONSIDERATION, "if, namely, a man in acting knowingly neglects to apply the consideration which the matter to be done deserves. For to him who already adverts that something must be considered further, and nevertheless wills to operate precipitately, all the errors which he commits are deservedly imputed." Thus all those to whom some OFFICE of great moment has been committed are admonished and stirred by their conscience that, with greater diligence applied, they fulfill the parts of their office: from which it happens that they at least advert that they ought to advert; which already suffices, so that the evils commonly resulting from negligence are deservedly imputed to them (cf. n. 125, 974).

It is not required for formal sin that the sinner expressly think of the offense of God.

For, just as implicit thought of God suffices for worshiping him, so also for offending him. "He who operates against right reason, even if he does not think that he wounds God, already in reality wounds him; for by offending rational nature, he at the same time offends the author of that nature" (V, 4, Opp. 3 and 11).

Vain is the distinction between theological and philosophical sin, which some attempted to introduce. "Philosophical, or moral, sin," they said, "is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason. But theological and mortal sin is the free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God, or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense of God, nor mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment." This proposition indeed was condemned by Alexander VIII as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous (Decr. 24 Aug. 1690). Cf. Viva, on the second proposition.

n. ¶320.

DEFINITION. Consent is the acceptance and complacency of the will in that which is proposed by the intellect.

Those things which precede consent or dissent must carefully be distinguished from the very act of the will consenting or dissenting. For although that act by which a man says in his heart, I will, or I do not will, is most simple: nevertheless, before the will gives full consent, very often it proceeds through certain distinct degrees, so to speak; this procession and gradation appears especially in the first mortal sin which is committed by an innocent person, or in a relapse into grave sin after long amendment, or in the transition from internal sins to external sins, or in the deliberation of perpetrating enormous crimes.

Therefore temptation precedes the consent of the will; in temptation man has himself passively. Hence there is solicitation to sin through motives alluring to it, together with a certain indeliberate delectation, which spontaneously follows in the inferior part, concupiscible or irascible; hence inclination, or propensity of the will. Finally there is deliberation of the mind weighing spiritual motives calling away from sin, and motives of sensible good alluring to evil. All these things precede consent, which is had only then when the will comes from potency to act by saying: I will, I accept; or to dissent, by saying: I do not will, I reject (V, 3; Pacetti, Synops. doctr. mor., p. 9).

DIVISION. Consent is distinguished in many ways, as was said above concerning the voluntary (n. 272).

n. ¶321.

PRINCIPLES. I. For every sin the consent of the will is required (V, 5). The reason is clear, because without consent the voluntary is not given, and therefore imputability is not given. The will is the principle and proper cause of sin, according to that saying (Matt. 15:19): For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, adulteries, etc. Whence St. Thomas teaches (1.2, q. 15, a. 4; q. 74, a. 7) that sin is not judged consummated unless the superior part of the soul has consented to it.

Nevertheless express or direct consent is not required; implicit or indirect suffices: for he who wills the cause also wills, though only indirectly, the effect. But merely interpretative consent by no means suffices, namely the consent which someone would have if he were placed in such an occasion. For interpretative consent is not consent, but only a certain disposition to consent: which disposition is not to be imputed as sin unless in some way it passes into act (VI, 610, obj. 4).

II. For a sin of omission a positive act of the will is required; namely the purpose of omitting the prescribed work: "For the will is not exercised nor does it sin, except through an act" (V, 9; H. Ap., III, 45). Whence an act by which the will at least chooses to have itself negatively is required, not indeed on the part of the work, but on the part of the one operating, as the internal cause of the omission (cf. n. 322, q. 2; 324, Reg. 2, 4).

n. ¶322.

Questions. QUAER. 1. How does he sin who has himself negatively, and does not positively resist a movement of the sensitive appetite, concerning an object gravely evil? (V, 6-9; H. Ap., III, 42).

It is noted beforehand. 1. Those movements are especially of pleasure and anger. 2. Resistance, or solicitude not to consent, can be, by reason of intensity, simple displeasure, a good purpose, express unwillingness; by reason of mode, direct, that is, contrary to the sensitive movement, or diverse, that is, by conversion to other things; by reason of act, positive, if it posits an act of resisting, negative, if it does nothing.

Resp. 1. If the danger of consent is only remote, the true opinion holds that it is venial not to resist illicit movements positively, but not mortal. The reason is: a) "because consent to sin gravely does not proceed from appetite, but from the will, which, when it does not positively consent, does not commit a mortal sin; ... b) because, if we were bound under grave obligation to repel positively all inordinate movements, we would be bound to the impossible: for it is impossible," as Cajetan says, "positively to coerce all these movements taken collectively." Nevertheless, resistance must be made "insofar as man ought to beware lest appetite draw the will after itself; but this obligation, when the danger of consent is not proximate, is only light." Cf. St. Thom., 1.2, q. 74, a. 4.

Where the danger is proximate, as when vivid "venereal delectation supervenes, we are bound under grave obligation to resist it positively, for example, by praying, by eliciting an act of the love of God; because movements of this kind, when they are vehement, for the most part, if they are not positively repelled (at least through an act of simple displeasure), draw with themselves the consent of the will." Thus the Doctors commonly. "It also suffices, in the act of commotion, to divert the soul to other things, since this very thing is to resist positively" (cf. n. 378).

Note. If the movements are light, it will be better to despise them.

If a just cause is present, "there is not an obligation of resisting carnal movements positively, namely: a) if someone has learned by experience that by resisting the movements are rather excited and increased; b) if the movements have arisen from a necessary or useful action, for example, from hearing confessions, from reading base things useful to be known, from touch necessary for healing, and the like ...; c) if the temptation lasts long, and it would be too troublesome continually to repel the movements positively."

In these circumstances "it will be enough to have oneself negatively (or permissively), with the firm purpose of never consenting; for the very actual care of not consenting then suffices to free man from fault, at least mortal fault, even if not from venial, if the resistance (solicitude not to furnish consent) is tepid."

QUAER. 2. Whether INDIRECT consent suffices, so that the omission or action following from it is in itself sin, in other words, so that the omission and the action themselves are sinful?

Resp. 1. Some deny it, because such an omission (or action), while it occurs, is not voluntary in itself, and because there is no liberty; whence it will be sin only in the cause.

The truer opinion affirms it. The reason is because, although for a sinful omission (or action) it is required that the voluntary be present, nevertheless the voluntary in the cause suffices, and the necessity, if it is present, is a consequent necessity which does not take away liberty (St. Alph., IV, 149; V, 10; VII, 40). But the depraved effect is called sin not from itself, but in itself, insofar as it proceeds from a cause not retracted, morally persevering, and is joined with that cause, forming with it one moral being, in almost the same way as an exterior act is denominated and is in itself sin, not from itself, but from the interior act, in which alone there is formal malice. Therefore, since that sinful effect constitutes a true sin, it must necessarily be declared in confession.¹

Hence: a) The gravity and species of sins committed from indirect consent depend entirely on the actual advertence which was directly present in the preceding consent, by thinking of vincible ignorance and of the obligation of laying it aside: because there the formal element of sin is found. But their number (unless it was already determined in the very foresight) depends on the positing of the acts proceeding from the cause not retracted; because then the material element is joined to the formal, for constituting as many sins as there are acts.

b) Sin voluntary only in the cause is imputed inchoatively and with respect to affection from the time at which its cause is knowingly posited; but consummatively and with respect to the effect, when it is completed externally in work. Whence, if the cause has been posited, although the effect has not occurred, or by reason of another supervening reason has become licit, nevertheless all the sins determinately foreseen in the cause are to be declared in confession as internal sins; on the other hand, if the effect has followed, it is not enough to confess only the cause which was posited with foresight of the sinful action or omission, but the very sin really committed must also be confessed (V, 10; cf. I, 170).

c) If the cause is not evil in itself, it assumes the malice of the effect alone: in which case it suffices to confess only the effect, for example, if play was the cause why the sacred rite was omitted. But if the cause was evil in itself, not only the effect, but also the cause, must be declared in confession: for example, if someone omitted the sacred rite in order to steal something. Nevertheless one sin can be declared separately from another (V, 9, note 2).

d) Effects are no longer imputed as sin if the cause has been retracted at least implicitly, through universal contrition, and has been removed as far as possible. For, although the effect, in its physical and material being, simply depends on the cause already posited, nevertheless it does not obtain the denomination of sin except from the cause (the past will) morally persevering, insofar as this has not been retracted through penance. Therefore, where a man repents of the cause which he posited, the effect can no longer be called sin. Thus a priest who neglected the study of theology, if once in life he truly grieved for his sins, by that very fact retracted his negligence; and consequently neither the errors which he commits, nor the harms which follow from them, are imputed to him, unless perhaps he adverts anew to his ignorance and culpably does not lay it aside.

What must be observed from this doctrine with respect to censures, and with respect to restitution, will be said in their places (n. 1264 and 978). Cf. VII, 368.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Chapter II: On the Distinction of Sins

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 72; St. Alphonsus, V, 31; ed. G., II, p. 732; H. Ap., III, 55; Lugo, de Poenit., disp. 16; Aertnys, l. I, n. 220; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 348; D'Annibale, Summula Theol., I, n. 278 seqq.; Gopfert, Moralth., vol. I, § 37.

n. ¶323.

The Council of Trent teaches (Sess. XIV, c. 7) that by divine right there must be declared in confession both the species and the species-changing circumstances of sins, and their number. Hence sins must carefully be distinguished: 1. according to moral species; 2. according to number.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. II, Article I: On Specific Distinction

STATUS OF THE QUESTION. That sins are distinguished into various species is clear. But it is asked whence this specific distinction of them must be taken, in other words, what is the reason why some sin has a special deformity or opposition with respect to the law of God.

In solving this question, the opinions of theologians do not agree. Some, with St. Thomas, think that specific distinction must be taken from objects diverse in species; because, they say, sin does not have species on the part of aversion..., but on the part of conversion, according as it is a certain act. But others, with Scotus, hold that it must be taken from the virtues to which sins are opposed; because sin, taken formally, consists in opposition to the virtue of which it deprives. Each opinion is probable, and practically each in reality coincides in the same thing, as St. Thomas also adverts (1.2, q. 72, a. 1, ad 2).

And indeed, to say, for example, that theft takes its proper species from this, that for its object it has another's good unjustly taken away, or from this, that it is opposed to the virtue of justice, plainly comes back to the same thing. Yet since the method according to which sins are distinguished through oppositions to virtues is plainer and easier, we shall hold this very one (V, 32; H. Ap., III, 55).

n. ¶324.

PRINCIPLE. The specific distinction of sins is taken from opposition to several diverse virtues, and from diverse or contrary opposition to one and the same virtue. It helps to resolve that principle into several special rules:

RULE 1. Sins which are opposed to virtues specifically diverse are specifically diverse. The reason is because each virtue has a special distinct goodness, or conformity with the divine law; therefore similarly a sin opposed to some virtue contracts a special and proper deformity, or malice, for itself.

Hence you will resolve: 1. Therefore heresy, despair, hatred of God, perjury, fornication, theft, lying, etc., are specifically diverse, because they are opposed to virtues specifically diverse; namely, heresy to faith, despair to hope, hatred of God to charity, perjury to religion, fornication to chastity, theft to justice, lying to veracity.

Therefore in one and the same act several sins specifically diverse can be found, because one and the same act can include opposition to diverse virtues. Thus, in the voluntary killing of a cleric, there is found a double sin specifically diverse, one against justice, and the other against religion; and a fourfold sin in the crime of a man bound by a vow of chastity and sinning with a married blood-relative, since diverse virtues are wounded, namely justice, piety, religion, and chastity.

RULE 2. Sins opposed in a diverse way to the same virtue, or which wound goods specifically diverse of the same virtue, are specifically diverse. For one and the same virtue can have for object various goods which, according to moral estimation, are specifically diverse: for example, the virtue of justice has for object goods of fortune, goods of reputation, goods of life, etc. Whence it includes various rectitudes or honesties, and these specifically diverse. Therefore also the sins which are opposed to these diverse rectitudes or honesties have diverse malices, and are distinguished in species (Konings, n. 212).

Hence you will resolve: 1. Therefore theft, robbery, detraction, contumely, homicide are specifically diverse; for although the aforesaid sins are opposed to the same virtue of justice, nevertheless they wound diverse goods of this virtue: theft, namely, goods of fortune; robbery, the good or inviolability of the person; detraction, the good of reputation; contumely, the good of honor; homicide, the good of life.

Local, real, and personal sacrilege are also specifically diverse, although they are opposed to the same virtue of religion; for a sacred thing, a sacred person, and a sacred place are goods specifically diverse according to moral estimation.
The violation of ecclesiastical fast through the use of flesh meat, and the violation of the same fast through multiple refection, are specifically diverse; because the former violation is opposed to the virtue of temperance insofar as it moderates the quality of food; but the latter, insofar as it moderates the quantity of food.
Sins of commission and omission against the same virtue are, for the most part, specifically diverse; for ordinarily they wound diverse goods or offices of the same virtue; and thus heresy and the omission of a prescribed act of faith differ in species; despair and the omission of an act of hope; hatred of God and the omission of an act of charity.

On the contrary, they do not differ in species if they wound the same good of virtue. But this happens when the affirmative and negative precept are reduced to the same thing; because then to commit is the same as to omit. Hence theft and the omission of restitution are not specifically diverse, because it is the same thing to carry off and to retain another's property.

Note. When the diversity of goods of some virtue is sufficient that by reason of it sins be judged specifically diverse must be sought both from the nature of the several goods and from the common judgment of theologians.

RULE 3. Sins which are opposed to the same virtue in a contrary way, that is, through excess or through defect, are specifically diverse (V, 30). The reason is because movement is specified by the term to which. Now excess and defect are terms specifically diverse; therefore the movements also, or acts of the will, which are terminated at them, are specifically diverse (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 72, a. 8; cf. 1.2, q. 23, a. 2).

Hence you will resolve: despair and presumption are specifically diverse sins, which indeed are opposed to the same virtue of hope, but in a contrary way: despair, namely, through defect; but presumption through excess. Likewise avarice and prodigality, which are opposed to the same virtue of liberality, prodigality through excess, avarice through defect. Similarly flattery and excessive harshness, the former of which recedes by excess, the latter by defect, from the same virtue of affability. Likewise sluggishness in learning due knowledge, which by defect, and excessive curiosity, which by excess, are repugnant to the same virtue of studiousness.

Corollary. Sins which are repugnant to several laws or precepts issued from a diverse formal motive, namely toward the special good of a virtue, include several malices diverse in species.

For in such a case diverse virtues, or honesties of virtue, are wounded, which the various laws intend: as if someone broke a fast prescribed by the Church and promised by himself to God through a vow, he would wound both temperance, from which the Church commands fasting, and religion, from which God commands vows to be observed. On the contrary, if laws have been issued from the same formal motive (or from the same intrinsic end of the work), and are distinguished only on the part of legislators (as is the case in theft, which is prohibited by divine and human law), they do not introduce a specific distinction of sins; because diversity of legislators does not make the precept formally diverse, but only materially (V, 33).

Hence the omission of the sacred rite on a feast day which is at the same time Sunday constitutes one species of malice, because the hearing of Mass is prescribed by each law from the same formal motive of religion, and therefore from one intention of the legislator (Reuter, de Leg., n. 147; de Pecc., n. 345).

n. ¶325.

Questions. QUAER. 1. How can it be discerned whether laws, several in number, have been issued from the same FORMAL MOTIVE, or from a diverse one?

It is noted beforehand. The difficulty can exist only concerning positive laws. For diverse obligations of the natural law are not given except on account of diverse goods of virtue. Hence it is evident that all obligations of the natural law have a distinct formal motive. Thus, for example, the killing of a priest is prohibited from a double formal motive of justice and religion (V, 33; Salmant., tr. 20, c. 12, n. 9-12).

Resp. 1. Positive laws whose matter is morally diverse have a diverse formal motive: for example, the law prohibiting servile works on feast days, and the law prescribing the hearing of the sacred rite on the same days, indeed have the motive of the worship of God, but in a diverse way. Wherefore he who transgresses this double precept commits two sins, and these diverse in species. On the contrary:

Positive laws whose matter is morally the same are judged to have the same formal motive. Thus, for example, the threefold law of fasting, on account of a vigil, on account of Ember Days, and on account of Lent, has one formal motive, the honesty of temperance. Except if from circumstances, from the context of the law, from the penalties joined to it, the contrary is certainly clear: for example, if a confessor, after hearing sins, imposes on a penitent a fast already prescribed by the Church, this fast is rightly judged to be prescribed from a new formal motive, namely from the motive of penance. Wherefore the penitent violating it commits a double sin, one against temperance, and the other against religion.
A positive law which has the same matter with the natural law has regularly been issued from the same formal motive of the natural law, whose execution it is judged to urge. Thus human laws prohibiting homicide, theft, etc., have been issued from the very motive of the natural law.

QUAER. 2. Whether PRECEPTS strictly so called, not otherwise than positive laws, have a diverse formal motive according to diversity of matter?

Resp. Negatively. Precepts strictly so called, or commands of a Superior, are regularly judged to be imposed not from a diverse, but from the same formal motive of obedience; just as vows of themselves are specified from the virtue of religion, although their matters of themselves look to diverse virtues (cf. III, 335; IV, 38).

Hence: 1. If a Superior gives diverse precepts in free matter, that is, in matter which by no law is here and now prescribed, for example, if he prescribes study, prayer, some act of charity; the inferior who transgresses those various precepts does not commit sins distinct in species, but sins only against obedience. Therefore the matter of disobedience is not to be declared in confession, but only the number of transgressions (2.2, q. 104, a. 2, ad 1). 2. But if the Superior absolutely prescribes a thing already prescribed by some law (for example, a father who, in order to conquer the sloth or levity of his son, with his paternal authority interposed, prescribes to him the hearing of Mass on a feast day), the inferior contumaciously refusing commits two sins distinct in species: one indeed against the law of the Church; the other against obedience owed to one legitimately commanding. Yet otherwise it must be said if the Superior does not strictly prescribe, but only admonishes (cf. n. 690 seqq.).

Note. Sometimes a virtue obliges indirectly, namely from the command of another virtue. In this case, the omission of the commanded act is a sin, not against the virtue from which it was to be elicited, but against the commanding virtue. Thus he who, pressed by a vehement temptation against chastity, omits to pray, sins not indeed against religion, but against chastity; and the reason is because the obligation of the means and of the end is the same.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. II, Article II: On Numerical Distinction

n. ¶326.

This is the question: whence sins which are contained within the same species receive numerical distinction or individuation. The difficulty of the matter arises from this, that moralists take an act morally; because, on the one hand, acts physically several and diverse can morally constitute only one sin, and because, on the other hand, an act physically one can be morally multiple and make several sins. To solve this question, authors commonly assign a double source of numerical distinction, or a double root, one on the part of the subject, the other on the part of the object; namely, on the part of the subject, the multiplicity of morally interrupted acts; but on the part of the object, the diversity of total objects.

It is clear that where in one act several sins specifically distinct are given, for example, against justice and charity, these are also multiplied numerically.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. II, Art. II, § 1. On the Multiplicity of Morally Interrupted Acts

n. ¶327.

Things to be noted beforehand. By moral interruption is understood that circumstance of an act by which it comes about that the act in itself, absolutely, is terminated, and so is disjoined from the following act, that in no way can it be considered as constituting morally something one with it.

A twofold INTERRUPTION OF ACTS is distinguished: one voluntary, the other involuntary.

Voluntary interruption (or interruption from the choice of the agent) is that which occurs either through formal retraction, as if someone truly repents of an evil act; or through free cessation from an act, say, if someone from weariness or fatigue, without the purpose of proceeding further, desists from what has been begun, or also turns himself to other things. In these cases, if he returns to the evil will, the new act will be morally diverse from the first, since it does not proceed from the first, and therefore it will be a new sin (V, 38).

But involuntary interruption (or interruption beyond the choice of the agent) is that which occurs through the natural cessation of an act, for example, on account of distraction, on account of sleep, etc.; likewise on account of a notable delay of time, so that, according to the nature of the action, the act of the will is judged by the judgment of prudent men already to have ceased.

To moral interruption is opposed MORAL UNION, by which it comes about that several acts coalesce into one. It is commonly had from a double cause: 1. if the acts proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, or from the same affection of the will; 2. if they are ordered by the agent, by nature, or by human institution to some principal act primarily intended.

n. ¶328.

PRINCIPLE. There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted acts of the will concerning the same object. The reason is because through such interruption acts of the will become complete, and each is constituted in its own proper malice, and therefore through a new act of the will new malice is begotten.

But since, among sinful acts, there are distinguished merely internal acts, that is, sins of heart; internal acts to be consummated externally, that is, efficacious desires, purposes which tend efficaciously to external sins of mouth or work; and finally external acts, diverse rules must be established, so that the application of the aforesaid principle to each category can be made more easily.

RULE 1. MERELY INTERNAL acts, unless they proceed from the same impulse of passion, are interrupted through any natural cessation whatsoever.

St. Alphonsus explains the matter thus (V, 37; H. Ap., III, 58): "If they are sins of heart, which are entirely perfected internally, as hatreds, heresies, morose delectations, base desires, etc., these, as soon as they are multiplied, are interrupted; so that there are as many sins as there are acts of the will consenting to them. The reason is because, with respect to such acts, one does not depend on another, and therefore they cannot be morally continued ... And therefore the penitent indeed ought to explain, if he can, how many times he consented in will; but if he cannot, because the depraved disposition of soul was long-lasting, then it suffices to confess the time in which he persevered with such a disposition, explaining, at least in general, whether those interruptions (besides the ordinary interruptions of sleep, etc.) were notably rare or frequent. But if several acts of this kind proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, they constitute one mortal sin, even if some brief interval intervenes among the acts."

RULE 2. Internal acts TO BE CONSUMMATED EXTERNALLY for the most part are not interrupted by ordinary natural cessation (say, by sleep, common distractions); but they are interrupted by a lengthy interval of time. The reason is because these acts, through a tendency to the external work, are connected, and coalesce into one; but this connection can no longer endure after some interval of time, as is clear.

But what is to be judged a LENGTHY TIME cannot be precisely indicated; for, according to the nature of the thing and the vehemence of the passion, acts of the will endure unequally, so that in some matters they are prolonged little, in others much. But thus St. Alphonsus (V, 38; H. Ap., III, 60): "I think," he says, "that the impulse of one act can with difficulty be prolonged (ordinarily speaking) more than for two, or three days at most. Hence, he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days ought to explain the time; so that thus the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be understood morally."

We said: for the most part; excepted are "acts of the will which proceed from the first depraved purpose and endure in some effect which conduces to perfecting one external sin only; because then, however long a time the depraved will endures, those acts (as ordered to one perverse end) constitute one sin" (V, 40; H. Ap., III, 61).

From this rule it is inferred: 1. "If someone proposes to kill a man, and for this reason prepares arms, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although for many days he has sought him and has repeated the will several times. Thus the Doctors commonly with St. Thomas (2 Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1). 2. If someone resolves not to restore another's thing, and always remains in the same will (even for a year), he commits one sin; because in that retention never retracted the first will virtually remains ... Yet it must be adverted that if a thief is rendered impotent to restore, and then, having become able, with opportunity given, does not restore, he commits a new sin. The reason is because in that case, through that time of impotence, the will of not restoring does not persevere in effect" (V, 40).

RULE 3. EXTERNAL acts: a) are morally interrupted, if they are complete in themselves, or if the agent intends to rest in them; b) on the contrary, they are not interrupted, but coalesce into one, if they are ordered to the consummation of the same sin, or proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, or from the same affection of the will (V, 41; H. Ap., III, 62).

I. These acts therefore ARE INTERRUPTED: 1. When they are complete IN THEMSELVES, that is, consummated in their own species, so that they cannot be ordered to another sin of the same species. Wherefore he commits two sins who twice pollutes himself, twice fornicates with the same woman, twice communicates unworthily, etc., even if he perpetrates these crimes within a brief space of time. They are interrupted 2. when the agent intends to rest in them, that is, if they are not subordinated to some completed principal act: say, if someone has several touches, without intention of copula; or if he strikes several times, without intention of killing; or if he several times steals parts from a heap, without intention of carrying off the whole heap; because then each act has its completed malice. Likewise, if someone having kisses, touches, etc., did not will copula from the beginning, but afterwards, on account of increased lust, perfected copula, it is not enough if he confesses only the copula; for then all the acts ought to be explained as distinct sins, because, since one rests in them, each act has in itself its own consummated malice. Thus commonly the Doctors. And the same must be said of him who had the mind only of wounding an enemy, and then, inflamed by anger, killed him: he commits two sins (V, 43).

II. But external acts ARE UNITED: 1. If they are ordered to the consummation of the same sin. Hence, if someone, for consummating copula, sends before acts, kisses, and speeches, it suffices if he confesses only the obtained copula. And probably the same must be said of touches immediately following, because they are very likely applied as the complement of the obtained copula (V, 41, fin.). Yet there is excepted the case if, even while the physically same purpose remains, so great an interval of time intervenes that, according to common estimation, the acts can no longer be called concatenated, that is, so that the preceding act is no longer the proximate disposition to the following act, or its quasi-beginning, although it tends remotely to it.

From this it is inferred: a) He who, from the intention of stealing a heap of wheat, which he cannot carry off all at one time, by repeated times, on the same night, steals parts of the same heap, commits one sin. But he who, from the same intention, steals parts on several occasions morally interrupted (that is, distant from one another by such an interval that one act cannot be called the continuation of the preceding other), sins as many times as he returns to stealing.¹ b) Similarly, a young man who, from the intention of fornicating, meets a girl with longer spaces interposed, and gradually, through acts less libidinous, induces her to fornication, commits not one, but several sins; because those external acts are no longer morally united, since they were not the proximate disposition to the fornication which afterwards followed, or its quasi-beginning.

If they proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, or from the same affection of the will; say, if someone from the same impulse strikes an enemy several times, dishonestly touches himself several times, blasphemes the same Saint or several holy days several times, several times in the same matter insults someone, or detracts from him (V, 41). But this, as has already been said, does not hold for those sins of work which are complete in themselves: for these cannot coalesce into one.

n. ¶329.

IT IS ASKED. Whether the MEANS employed for sinning must be explained in confession as numerically distinct, if the sin afterwards was not consummated?

Resp. Affirmatively. For then those means are no longer united, and, even if indifferent, they are informed by the internal malice, and therefore must be explained as external sins, or works begun (V, 42; H. Ap., III, 62).

Whence: 1. If these means were indifferent, as to take a road, to carry a ladder for theft, etc., it must be explained in general whether any means of this kind were employed, and how many times with moral interruption. 2. If the means were evil in themselves, as kisses, touches, speeches for seducing a girl, they must be declared in species, at least by reason of scandal, by which both the charity owed to the neighbor is violated, and the virtue which those means induce one to wound.¹

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. II, Art. II, § 2. On the Diversity of Total Objects

It must be noted beforehand. The total or adequate object is called that which morally constitutes something one and integral in itself, so that it is neither part nor complement of another; which so terminates one act that it divides it morally into several. Wherefore it must be observed that some objects, physically distinct, can coalesce into one moral object; others cannot. Thus diverse things estimable by price, as sheep, oxen, houses, etc., of the same owner, coalesce into one good of fortune. On the contrary, the lives of several men, whether of body or of soul, cannot coalesce into one; nor the honors or reputations of several men, or temporal goods, unless perhaps these last are possessed by common ownership (Kon., n. 226). In this matter common estimation has very great force.

n. ¶330.

PRINCIPLE. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are total objects, or objects morally diverse. Thus St. Alphonsus (V, 45; VII, 28; H. Ap., III, 64), with Tournely, Salmant., Croix, D'Annibale (I, n. 286), and others.

This rule is indeed not admitted by some for those cases where those several objects are reached by one external act, for example, if someone by one detraction wounds the reputation of several persons, or by one blow kills several. The reason alleged by them is that a multiple total object multiplies only the malice of the act, and that malices are not to be confessed. But the second opinion, which can be called the more common, teaches that, even in this case, diversity of total objects well constitutes sins diverse in number. The reason: just as one act regarding several objects diverse in species includes several sins diverse in species, to be explained in confession, so an act regarding several objects includes several sins diverse in number. For a sinful act is a movement or tendency of the will into its object as into its term; whence it follows that, if the object is total, the act also is totally terminated or individuated as many times as there are total objects. Besides, there ought to be as many sins as there are morally distinct rights wounded. This is clear by an example admitted by all: "if a married man has copula with a married woman, no one denies that he commits a double injustice: one, because he violates the right of his own wife; the other, because he cooperates so that she violates the right of her husband. Therefore, by the same single act, there can well be several sins diverse in number against the same virtue."²

n. ¶331.

From these things you will resolve: I. He commits several sins:

Who by one shot of a gun kills several men; or by one detraction defames many members of one family; or by one speech is a scandal to several.
Who, by one act, commits theft against several persons: but this is not understood if he steals the goods of a monastery or chapter, because those goods belong to the community, but not to the individuals.
Who, by one act of the will, proposes for several days to omit the Office or fasting; or wishes evil to several persons; or wishes (that is, efficaciously desires) to approach several women, or several times the same woman.

II. He commits one sin:

Who denies several articles of faith; for since there is one formal (and total) object of faith, namely the veracity of God revealing, he who denies one article is just as much an unbeliever as he who denies all.
Likewise, probably he commits one sin who, by the same act, blasphemes against the twelve Apostles; because the college of the Apostles is one total object, and besides, all blasphemies against the Saints take their malice from one relation to God, or from one congregation of Saints.
Similarly, he who desires several evils for an enemy, for example, infamy, death, etc., but apprehends them under one aspect of evil, namely as means to his destruction, probably commits only one sin, which is sufficiently declared by these words: I desired grave evil for my neighbor. But he who efficaciously desired for his enemy diverse evils, specifically and in particular considered, certainly ought to confess all those things distinctly, because they are diverse sins (V, 46, 50; H. Ap., III, 64, 65).

n. ¶332.

Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he commits diverse sins who detracts from someone IN SEVERAL MATTERS, or affects him with diverse contumelies?

Resp. More probably he commits several sins. The reason is because diverse rights to reputation or honor, which belong to the other, are wounded; for by the fact that someone has been defamed in one crime, he is not therefore defamed in another.

"Yet here it must well be adverted that little women and common people, who while quarreling together from the same impulse load each other with diverse contumelies, commit one sin (and this light). The reason: because, according to common estimation, these do not wound reputation and honor, since, on the one hand, insults among persons of this kind are not apprehended as grave; and on the other hand, those hearing give no faith to them, and therefore such quarrelers for the most part are excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary concerning some particular fact" (V, 48).

QUAER. 2. Whether he who detracts from someone BEFORE SEVERAL PERSONS commits several sins?

Resp. Probably he commits only one sin of detraction. "The reason is because to detract before several persons is only an aggravating circumstance, since the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple." Nevertheless easily, in the case, there will be scandal, by reason of which he commits as many sins as there are persons to whom the detraction is a scandal (V, 49).

QUAER. 3. Whether a priest who, in mortal sin, successively absolves SEVERAL persons or ministers the sacred Eucharist to SEVERAL persons commits several sacrileges?

Resp. to the first. Some deny it, because formally he inflicts one irreverence upon God; as he who steals several sacred vessels commits one sacrilege. "But more truly Concina, Croix, and others teach that he commits as many sacrileges as he imparts absolutions, because each absolution is an individual sacrament."

Resp. to the second. A priest who, in mortal sin, ministers the Eucharist successively to several persons more probably commits only one sacrilege, because there is one administration, and therefore one banquet (V, 50, q. 6).

Note. In practice it must be said that per se a penitent ought not to be vexed with questions concerning the total object, because, as the learned D'Annibale says, only the conscience of those sinning numbers sins, and it everywhere ignores subtle and exquisite things. Yet per accidens, for example, for rightly forming the judgment of the confessor, questioning and confession are urgent.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Chapter III: On the Gravity of Sins

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 72, a. 5; q. 88-89; de Malo, VII, a. 1, 2; Contra Gentes, l. 3, c. 143; Lib. Sent., II, D. 42, q. 1, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, n. 1; ed. G., II, n. 705; III, 132: "On the abuse of speaking evil of the dead"; ed. G., II, p. 456; Aertnys, l. 1, n. 228; Lehmkuhl, I, 334; Scheeben, Dogmatik, II, 528 seqq.; Koch, Lehrb. der Moralth., 243; Gopfert, I, 224; controversy with Schell apud Commer; Mausbach, Kath. Mor., p. 214; Manning, Sin and its consequences.

The gravity of sin is the measure of malice, or deformity, which the act has with right reason, or (what is the same) the greater or lesser offense of God contained in sin.

n. ¶333.

PRINCIPLES. I. Not all sins are of the same gravity, but some are graver than others. This is of faith against Jovinian; and is proved: 1. From Scripture, for example, from the words of the Lord to Pilate: He who handed me over to thee has the greater sin (John 19:11). 2. From reason. For sin is a disorder of a human act. But such a disorder can be greater or lesser, as is luminously clear from the things said concerning the morality of human acts. Therefore.

II. Some sins are mortal, others venial. This is of faith against Calvin and Baius. It is proved: 1. From Scripture, which declares some sins worthy of death: Those who do such things are worthy of death (Rom. 1:32). Likewise the classic text 1 Cor. III, 8. Then (Matt. 7:3) some sins are likened to a beam, others to a mote: but a mote is a light thing, a beam something grave. 2. From the decrees of the Church, for example, from the condemnation of the 20th proposition of Baius, asserting: "There is no sin venial from its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment." Likewise from Trent (Sess. XIV, c. 5), which teaches that all mortal sins which occur to memory are to be confessed; not likewise venial sins.

n. ¶334.

Questions. QUAER. 1. Whence must the diverse gravity of sins be taken?

Resp. 1. It must be taken primarily on the part of the object, or from the dignity of the virtues to which sins are opposed. Thus, for example, blasphemy, from its genus, is a greater sin than theft; because it is opposed to a more excellent virtue, namely religion (1.2, q. 73, a. 4).

It must be taken secondarily from the circumstances, for example, from the dignity of the person, from the duration or intensity of the act, from the effects, but especially from the greater or lesser grade of knowledge, advertence, and consent.

Hence, other things being equal: graver are a man's sins committed against God than against himself and neighbor; sins of commission than of omission; sins of mouth and work than of heart; sins of malice than sins of infirmity, and these graver than sins of ignorance; sins of those who excel in knowledge, virtue, dignity, etc. (St. Alph., Selva, P. I, c. 4).

QUAER. 2. Whether a sin lighter from the object can, by reason of a circumstance, exceed the gravity of a sin of a superior species?

Resp. Affirmatively, more probably with St. Thomas and others: "because although, regularly, the graver sin is that which is opposed to the more perfect virtue, nevertheless, since the gravity of a sin of a superior species is finite, therefore, even if physically it cannot be exceeded by the malice of a sin of an inferior species, it can indeed be exceeded morally." Thus, for example, gold is more precious than silver and lead. Yet this does not prevent a great heap, or mountain, of silver from being more precious than a small mass of gold. "And therefore the aforesaid rule of measuring the gravity of sin from opposition to the superior virtue runs only when sins are the greatest against each virtue, but not when the comparison is made of the greatest sin to the least" (V, 34; H. Ap., III, 56).

Hence morally sodomy and bestiality are graver sins than perjury, as St. Thomas teaches with the Salmanticenses. Within the ambit of the same virtue, sins against a prohibiting law are also physically graver. In general, a sin is graver the nobler the person against whom it is directed; whence sacrilegious Communion, according to St. Thomas, is not the gravest sin of all. Moreover, a sin is graver the more important the good which is wounded, for example, in sins against charity owed to the neighbor (Lehmk., I at the end).

In sin also the aspect of malice and the aspect of harm which it brings must be distinguished. From this St. Thomas observes (1.2, q. 73, a. 5): spiritual sins are, according to themselves, greater than carnal sins; but carnal sins are of the greatest adherence. Wherefore, the greatest cautions must always be employed, so that even the very beginnings from which that most dangerous pest can arise may be strongly resisted.

With these things premised, the matter must be discussed: 1. concerning mortal sin; 2. concerning venial.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. III, Article I: On Mortal Sin

n. ¶335.

DEFINITION. Mortal sin is a deliberate transgression of a law gravely obliging, or: an OFFENSE, that is, an injury OF GOD, which, on account of its gravity, dissolves grace and friendship with God, and merits eternal punishment (see n. 339). "It is called mortal, because it removes the principle of spiritual life, namely habitual grace, and brings death to the soul" (V, 51; cf. Inst. Cat., Introd.).

DIVISION. Mortal sin is such either from its whole genus, or from its genus simply, or per accidens.

It is mortal from its whole genus, when by reason of the object it is always grave, because the whole notion of offense is detected both in the least and in the greatest quantity of matter.

Of this kind are hatred of God, formal heresy, perjury, blasphemy, simony by divine right, direct violation of the sacramental seal, or breaking the fast before Communion, venereal acts outside marriage, etc. These never admit smallness of matter: because they always contain grave disorder by reason of the object (V, 56).

It is mortal from its genus (simply or not from the whole), when by reason of the object it can be mortal or venial according to the quantity of matter; but the sin is not mortal unless it reaches a certain quantity of matter.

Of this kind are thefts and other sins against justice; for they admit smallness of matter (V, 54-56; H. Ap., III, 67).

It is mortal per accidens (venial per se), if by reason of the object, or considering the nature of the thing, it is indeed light, but has been made grave

by reason of some special circumstance which intervenes in the act, for example, by reason of error, scandal, etc., as will be explained below (n. 342, q. 3).

n. ¶336.

PRINCIPLE. For mortal sin three things are necessarily required, namely grave matter, full advertence of the intellect, and perfect consent of the will. The reason is because, human frailty being considered, it does not seem to befit divine goodness to punish man with eternal torments on account of a transgression in matter altogether light, or on account of the violation of an obligation not fully and perfectly voluntary (V, 53).

There is required 1. Grave matter, namely matter which is such either according to itself, or by reason of some circumstance, for example, if the end of the legislator is of great moment, to which the law contributes very much, or if grave scandal must be avoided, etc.

Full advertence to the grave obligation, and therefore in the definition of mortal sin there is added deliberate, that is, perfect in the line of act.

For the intellect can advert in a twofold way: either fully, when someone, fully master of himself, perfectly discerns the matter, having the mind free; or half-fully, when he discerns the matter in an imperfect way, as happens in half-wakefulness, in half-drunkenness, in distraction, in most vehement passion. Now, in order that a sin be mortal, full advertence is always required either to the malice of the act, or to the danger of sinning, or to the obligation of averting such a danger; and this either actually, while the action is posited, or in the beginning when the cause was freely posited, from which afterwards the evil act followed (Conf. dir., III). Cf. n. 318.

Perfect consent of the will. Consent is called perfect when the act of the will embracing evil is wholly free and deliberate, or when it follows wholly full advertence of the intellect; but imperfect, if it was sudden, without sufficient deliberation, or if it follows half-full advertence; or finally, if only the inferior part of the soul consents, with tepid resistance of the will (cf. n. 322, q. 1).

Now, for mortal sin, which is full and consummated fault, imperfect consent does not suffice, but full and perfect consent is required, in which there is the whole notion of the voluntary. This is common and certain, says St. Alphonsus (V, 5), among the Doctors even of the more rigid opinion. Nevertheless it can happen that the will, with only indirect consent, commits mortal sin, if, namely, with the effect foreseen, it wills the cause, as was said above (H. Ap., III, 40). Cf. n. 319, 321.

Note. Virtual and confused advertence suffices, provided it is full; nor is it required that it be distinct. It is distinct when someone discerns the quality or quantity of the sin; concerning virtual we spoke n. 317; it will be confused when, by an act of the intellect fully conscious of itself, he doubts or suspects the malice of the action (V, 3). This suffices for perfect consent and for mortal sin, as is clear from the things said n. 36. Therefore neither is it required, as certain neoterics have thought (but afterwards they taught this less openly), that mortal sin must be committed from rebellion against God, from formal insurrection against God, from hatred of God and with a certain pertinacity. See Commer, Herrmann Schell, p. 118.

n. ¶337.

Questions. QUAER. 1. How can the objective gravity of sins, or gravity BY REASON OF MATTER, be known?

Resp. The objective gravity of sins is known:

I. From authority: 1. From Sacred Letters. "Which sins are light, which grave, must be weighed not by human, but by divine judgment," says St. Augustine (Ench., c. 78). Therefore those sins must be considered mortal which in Sacred Letters are said to be worthy of death, or to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, or hateful to God, etc. For words of this kind signify that the deformity of the action is certainly grave. 2. From the definitions of Supreme Pontiffs and decrees of General Councils; if, namely, in them some sin is declared mortal, or is found affected by grave penalties (Diss. proleg. Zacch., P. II, c. 3 and 4). 3. From the doctrine of the holy Fathers, Doctors of the Church, and distinguished theologians. Those things which by them unanimously, or almost unanimously, are held as mortal, must also by us be considered as such. For not to assent to them savors of temerity, since their consensus in a moral matter is an indication of truth (Kon., n. 202).

II. From the very matter of sin or from natural reason. Thus generally GRAVE are judged: all sins which are directly against God or some perfection of his; sins which tend to grave prejudice of the human race, as are the various species of lust; sins by which the neighbor is gravely harmed in goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc.; sins which are gravely repugnant to an end of great moment intended by law, as the omission of fasting, Mass, annual confession, Paschal Communion, etc.

For the rest, the limits between mortal and venial sin often, indeed very often, can in no way be determined, as is clear from innumerable controversies of the Doctors. But where strict doubt perseveres, one must stand for the milder part and the faithful person must prudently be instructed. "For a mortal sin is not to be built up, unless it is certainly clear concerning it" (I, 89; V, 52, Bene hic).¹

QUAER. 2. Whether he sins gravely who knows his action is EVIL, but is ignorant of its GRAVITY, or does not attend to it?

It is noted beforehand. The question has force concerning those things which are not evidently grave, nor evidently light: for concerning evident things it cannot be supposed that the one operating, who adverts that the matter is evil, does not attend, not even confusedly, to gravity or lightness; because, at least implicitly and exercisedly, he sufficiently apprehends one or the other. Likewise the question is not concerning a man who positively doubts concerning the gravity of his action. Let the conclusion given above, n. 36, be read again.

Resp. It is disputed; but to St. Alphonsus sufficiently probable is the opinion of those who say that a man of this kind sins, per se, only venially; because in order to sin mortally, it is required that someone consent directly or indirectly to a mortal sin; but he who in no way thinks of, or suspects, mortal sin cannot by any reason be said to consent to mortal sin (I, 23; cf. Istruz., I, 13).

We said PER SE, that is, supposing: 1. that he does not apprehend, at least confusedly, the danger of sinning gravely or the obligation of investigating the matter; 2. that the agent is not of lax conscience; otherwise, at least indirectly, he must be judged to consent to mortal sin (cf. n. 318, 2).

QUAER. 3. How must one judge IN DOUBT concerning perfect consent?

Resp. One must judge from things commonly happening, as we have already said (n. 50).

If the one doubting is of timorous conscience and is not accustomed deliberately to consent to grave sin, it can reasonably, indeed morally certainly, be believed that he has not consented. For he who habitually adheres to God, and greatly fears lest he be deprived of divine grace, if it sometimes happens that he is turned away from him, must inflict great force upon himself in order that he despise the remorse of conscience and deliberately throw himself into sin: but he cannot do this unless he certainly adverts to the evil which he embraces.

But for presuming that full consent was not present in a pious man, these following CONJECTURES are especially useful: "a) If such a one has had a serious and often repeated purpose of never sinning mortally, and does not know that he has certainly revoked it. b) If, when he adverts the evil, he is terrified and immediately repels the temptation, and at once doubts whether he consented. c) If he remembers that he proceeded timidly (that is, if there was present only torpor, yawning, hesitation of the will). d) If he does not know whether he did or thought something in wakefulness or sleep; for if he had been awake, he would have adverted it and would know it" (VI, 476). e) Finally, if he could easily have proceeded to the external act, and nevertheless did not proceed (Reuter, Neo-conf., 244, 265).

If the one doubting is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins (or is of lax conscience), the opposite must be judged concerning him; "because in doubt he is presumed to have consented. For if he had resisted, he would indeed remember that effort which he inflicted upon himself to repel the temptation."
Whether mortal sins which remain plainly doubtful from this must be declared in confession will be weighed below in the treatise on Penance (n. 1695 seq.).

QUAER. 4. Whether he sins gravely who DELIBERATES concerning furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if finally he does not consent?

Resp. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation. If the deliberation is only a certain hesitation, or omission of resistance, proceeding from torpor, sloth, or negligence, it does not exceed venial sin. But if the deliberation is full and formal, by which, namely, someone weighs whether he wishes to perpetrate a gravely evil thing or not, it is a mortal sin. For thus hesitating, after the manner of Pilate, he values God with the creature; wherefore he commits a sin of the same species and gravity as that concerning which he deliberates (Croix, V, 226-229).

For promoting tranquility of conscience in doubts concerning consent, a simple and serious effort to elicit an act of charity has much force; it helps very much and can by no means harm.

n. ¶338.

Note. By reason of peculiar malice, there are also distinguished:

Sins AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT. Six are numbered: a) presumption, b) despair, c) attack against acknowledged truth, d) envy of fraternal grace, e) obstinacy, f) final impenitence. They are called sins against the Holy Spirit because, through them, that is cast away by which the Holy Spirit is accustomed to remove man from sin: whence they are most grave, and are remitted only with the greatest difficulty (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 14, a. 2).
Sins CRYING TO HEAVEN. There are four, namely: a) homicide, b) sodomy, c) oppression of the poor, d) defrauding the wages of laborers. They are called crying, because they most vehemently provoke divine vengeance and merit most grave punishments (Voit, de Pecc., n. 316-317).
Irremissible sins, concerning which see Matt. XII, 31; Mark III, 28; Luke XII, 10; 2 Pet. II, 20; Heb. VI, 4; X, 26. They are so called not with respect to God, but with respect to man, who rejects the mercy of God.

Scholium

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS · Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, CHAPTER I: ON THE NATURE OF SIN · Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, Ch. II, ESPECIALLY ON MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN · Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, CHAPTER III: ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS · Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON SPECIFIC DISTINCTION · Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: ON THE NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS · Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART SECOND: ON SINS IN SPECIES · Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART SECOND: ON SINS IN SP…, CHAPTER I: ON INTERNAL SINS

On the Effects of Mortal Sin

n. ¶339.

The chief effects are the following:

GRAVE INJURY OF GOD. Any mortal sin is an offense of God, not effectively, because God is incapable of harm, but affectively; and it is a true injury and contempt of the divine Majesty, which is placed after the creature (H. Ap., III, n. 20). For mortal sin is aversion from God and conversion to the creature.

But this offense of God involves so great an evil in itself that it cannot be conceived by any created intellect: for objectively and extrinsically, or on the part of the one offended, it is truly infinite, because "injury is in the one injured as honor is in the one honoring" (St. Thom., III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2).

PRIVATION OF SANCTIFYING GRACE, and with this privation, the loss of all merits, and inability for acquiring new merits.
A MOST FOUL STAIN OF THE SOUL. To the point St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 86, a. 1 and 2): "The soul of man," he says, "has a double brightness: one from the shining of the natural light of reason, by which it is directed in its acts, and another from the divine light of wisdom and grace, by which man is perfected for acting well. But when man sins, he adheres to certain things against the light of reason and of the divine law, and thus he is stained ...; the stain of the soul is so called metaphorically. This stain remains in the soul even when the act of sin passes away, insofar as it imports a defect of brightness from recession from the light of reason and of the divine law ... but after he returns to the light, which is done through grace, then the stain ceases."
GUILT-BOUNDNESS OF FAULT. This prior guilt-boundness, which differs from stain only according to the mode of signifying, properly says a state of culpability, which includes two things; namely: a) privation of the praiseworthy or of praise, which is owed both to the person who operates according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, and to the act which agrees with these rules ...; b) the obligation of repairing the injury inflicted upon God, through deviation from the aforesaid order of reason and of the eternal law, and therefore through contempt of God himself (1.2, q. 21, a. 2).
GUILT-BOUNDNESS OF PUNISHMENT, that is, the obligation or necessity of paying the punishment due to sin. As St. Thomas rightly observes, those things which are contained under some order are in a certain way one, in order to the principle of the order. Wherefore whatever rises against the order ought to be depressed by that order and the prince of the order. Therefore, since sin perverts the THREEFOLD order of reason, of the universe, and of God, hence it incurs guilt-boundness of a threefold punishment, namely remorse of conscience, vengeance of creatures (for example, through fire), and privation of God (1.2, q. 87, a. 1).
PUNISHMENT ITSELF. Punishment is usually defined: the privation of a due good, against the will of him who is deprived, on account of fault. Wherefore two things are to be noted: one concerning its gravity; the other concerning its bitterness.

As to gravity, it depends on the magnitude of the good of which someone is deprived. Whence the gravest of all punishments is the privation of God, who is the highest good. The second place is held by the privation of supernatural goods. From this punishment it easily results that one sin becomes per accidens the punishment of another, insofar as the sinner, despoiled of his supernatural habits and more deprived of actual graces, is drawn on to other sins, as if by the proper weight of his perverse nature. In the third place comes the privation of natural goods. By this punishment also, at least partly, the sinner is chastised; for his nature, wounded by original sin with the fourfold wound of ignorance, malice, infirmity, and concupiscence, is affected by a new wounding. St. Thomas well declares this (1.2, q. 83, a. 3).

But as to the bitterness of punishment, it must be said that it arises from contrariety of the will. And hence it often happens that in this life the greatest punishment is felt least, and the least is felt most; for "the fascination of trifling obscures goods" (Wis. IV, 12). But after death, punishment torments according to its intrinsic gravity. For man, once having entered into the house of his eternity, at last judges rightly concerning those divine goods, to the possession and enjoyment of which he was born. Whence the more excellent the goods are, the more bitterly he grieves concerning their privation. And since God is infinite good, St. Alphonsus does not doubt (Praep. ad mortem, cons. 26, punct. 3) to assert that the punishment of the damned is plainly incomprehensible and in a certain way infinite. Cf. Lessius, de Perfectionibus moribusque divinis, l. XIII, c. 12, 13, 28 seqq.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. III, Article II: On Venial Sin

n. ¶340.

DEFINITION. Venial sin is a light transgression of the divine law, lessening the fervor of charity, and rendering man worthy of temporal punishment (V, 51; H. Ap., III, 23).

It is called venial because it does not take away the principle of pardon, which is grace, and therefore easily obtains pardon; but not as if it were a thing light in itself or to be little esteemed. It is enough to understand, says St. Alphonsus, that it is an offense of God, so that it be avoided more than any other evil whatsoever (Instr. cat., Introd., n. 9).

DIVISION. Venial sins are such either per se, or per accidens.

Venial sins per se, or from their genus, are those which, by reason of the object, are always venial, so that they never become mortal unless they are drawn outside their proper species on account of some supervening circumstance. Thus a lie always remains venial, unless by reason of harm or another circumstance it passes to another species.

Of this kind are, generally, sins committed against one's own good, as useless and vain concupiscence, vain delight of the senses, prodigality, curiosity, superfluity of clothing, excess in food, in drink, in sleep, in laughter, in fear, in sadness, in appetite for money, praise, and several other things which will be enumerated below when we treat of capital sins.

Venial sins per accidens are those which indeed from their genus are mortal, but which, on account of smallness of matter or another circumstance, become light, as will be explained below (n. 342, quaer. 2).

n. ¶341.

PRINCIPLE. For venial sin three things are required: an obligation imposed by some precept, advertence at least half-full to the light malice of the transgression, and some consent, at least imperfect. That these three are required is clear; for, these being removed, either there would be a transgression of no law, or there would be no knowledge and willing of evil, that is, no deformed human act would be present, and consequently no sin properly so called.

From these things, venial sin is clearly discerned from imperfection, in which not all things intervene which are required for constituting formal sin. Namely, IMPERFECTION is usually taken in a twofold sense. 1. In one sense, imperfection, with respect to law, is called an action or omission repugnant not indeed to some positive precept, but to mere counsel; to executing which someone is incited either through the impulse of grace, or through the dictate of reason, or only through the directive will of Superiors. Imperfection, taken in this sense, is not per se sin; for where there is no precept, there is no transgression of a precept. We said per se, because often imperfections of this sort, on account of various circumstances, are not free from fault, for example, on account of vicious love, curiosity, sensuality, sloth, etc. 2. In the other sense, imperfection, by reason of act, is called a transgression of precept wholly indeliberate and involuntary, both in itself and in the cause, such as wholly involuntary distractions during prayer, involuntary excess in laughter, in sadness, in indignation, in joking, in telling stories. In this sense, imperfection is free from all fault.¹

n. ¶342.

Questions. QUAER. 1. Whence must the DIFFERENCE between mortal sin and venial sin be taken?

Resp. The Doctors more commonly teach that it must be taken from the essentially diverse mode by which the will converts itself to the creature in each sin. Namely, by sinning mortally, the will converts itself to the creature totally, as if the creature were its ultimate end, and therefore it averts itself totally from God, and at least implicitly contemns his friendship. But by sinning venially, the will, while preserving its habitual tendency toward its ultimate end, that is, toward God, pursues the creature only by an undue and inordinate love: wherefore it incurs only temporal punishment, which corresponds to the inordinate conversion to the creature.²

And in this sense St. Thomas seems to speak when he says that venial sin is not against, but beside the law; understand that it is not against the end of the law, which is charity, but is against the order of the law to be observed, and consequently is a true transgression of law, as is clear from the definition of sin (cf. V, 11).

QUAER. 2. In how many ways does a sin, mortal from its genus, become VENIAL?

Resp. In three ways: a) from smallness of matter; b) from imperfection of knowledge, that is, either from an invincibly erroneous conscience, by which someone judges that something is venial which of itself is mortal, or from half-full advertence; c) from imperfection of consent (cf. n. 336).

QUAER. 3. From how many causes can a sin, venial from its genus, become MORTAL?

Resp. From six causes, namely:

By reason of error, when someone in reality wills or operates something which of itself is a light sin, but seriously thinks or doubts, from erroneous conscience, that it is a grave sin (cf. n. 22; 337, q. 2).
By reason of an adjoined end, when, namely, to an act per se venially evil there is joined a gravely sinful end: as if someone lies lightly in order to seduce a girl (n. 306, 307).
By reason of excessive affection, when, namely, in a lightly evil thing the ultimate end is constituted, so that the man badly disposed at least by an internal act sets it before God, and knowingly and actually is prepared gravely to offend God rather than renounce his vain delight.
By reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the legislator: thus "it is mortal to do or omit something from contempt of a just human law; likewise, from contempt of God prescribing or even counseling, which for that reason contains a tacit blasphemy, as if God prescribed or counseled useless things, etc." (V, 61, 3). Cf. things said n. 179, 3.
By reason of scandal, when grave scandal of the little ones proceeds from venial fault: as if from venially evil words which parents bring forth, children are gravely scandalized; or if children, through light disobedience, knowingly provoke parents to blasphemies.
By reason of danger, when, from a light fault, there arises a proximate or probable danger of sinning gravely: as if someone talks idly with a woman, having sufficiently learned by experience that from conversations of this kind he has often sinned mortally (I, 22; V, 59-63; H. Ap., III, 68).

n. ¶343.

From the things said you will resolve: 1. Several venial sins cannot constitute one mortal sin by reason of multiplication; because since mortal and venial differ essentially between themselves, the nature of one cannot become the nature of the other. Whence St. Thomas (1.2, q. 88, a. 4): "All the venial sins of the world cannot have so great a guilt-boundness as one mortal sin." And St. Alphonsus: "It is better to permit innumerable venial sins than one mortal sin" (III, 130).

Nevertheless they can reach mortal sin by reason of matter coalescing. "It must be adverted," says St. Alphonsus, "that small matters repeated then constitute grave matter when they coalesce of themselves, or at least morally in themselves; as are small thefts, small omissions in the office, in Mass, or small eatings repeated on the same fast day" (V, 56, 2; H. Ap., III, 67).

Any Christian who wishes to avoid mortal sins alone, without caring anything about omitting venial sins, does not sin mortally, speaking per se; the reason is because a purpose of this kind conduces to mortal sin only remotely. But it is otherwise if contempt is present, or the proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, respect being had to past experience (IV, 12). As to religious, cf. n. 2154.
Someone does not sin gravely by reason of excessive affection from the fact that he is borne very intensively and vehemently into a created thing; but it is required that appreciatively he esteem that object, at least virtually, in such a way that he is actually prepared, on account of it, to transgress a precept obliging under mortal sin. We say actually prepared; because that which he is disposed only habitually to commit is not imputed to him as fault (V, 60).
A confessor does not satisfy his office if he has no care to remove the penitent from frequency of venial sins, especially those which are committed with full advertence. The reason is because he who casts aside all care of avoiding venial sins will little by little fall into mortal sins (cf. n. 344, 5).

…and 50 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 62 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS

We must treat 1° of sins in general, 2° in particular.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, CHAPTER I: ON THE NATURE OF SIN

n. ¶197.

Definition. - Sin is: A free transgression of any law obliging in conscience.

It is said: 1) free, or it ought to be in the power of the will of the agent to posit the act or not to posit it (n. 9).

It is said: 2) of law; for where there is no law, neither is there prevarication.

It is said: 3) obliging in conscience, or one to which nothing is lacking of those things which pertain to the essence of law (n. 100).

n. ¶198.

Division. - It is divided into original, concerning which in speculative theology, and personal. Personal sin is committed by the proper and physical will of the sinner, and

It is subdivided into actual, which is the sinful action itself, for example, blasphemy here and now uttered, and habitual, which is the stain of the soul adhering from actual sin and deforming it until it is deleted by penance; but each is either mortal or venial, according as it dissolves friendship with God or does not dissolve it.

Actual sin is 1° of commission or omission, according as it occurs by the positing of a prohibited act, or by omission of a prescribed act.

2° Against God, neighbor, or oneself, according as it specially and immediately is repugnant to God, or is opposed to duties by which a man can be bound toward any others whatsoever, or is opposed to the obligations which each one has toward himself.

3° Of malice, or ignorance, or infirmity, according as it is committed either from mere malice, or from vincible ignorance, or from mere frailty.

4° Formal, when the law is freely and knowingly violated; material, when the transgression of the law is wholly involuntary.

n. ¶199.

Principles. - I. For formal sin, besides the objective malice of the act, there is required advertence of mind and consent of will. And 1° indeed advertence of mind to the malice is required, because the malice of sin cannot be the object of the will unless it is known in some way by the help of the intellect: for there is no desire for what is unknown; 2° consent is required on the part of the will; for sin is perfected by the will, according to that saying of Matthew:¹ For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, adulteries, etc.

II. For actual sin there is necessarily required either actual advertence, or a neglect of advertence voluntary either directly or indirectly. For it is repugnant that a man sin unless in some way either here and now, or in the cause, at least confusedly, he advert to the sin. For nothing is willed unless it has been foreknown.

But a directly voluntary neglect of advertence is had, for example, in him who, as St. Thomas says,² "studiously wills not to know some things, so that he may sin more freely"; and likewise in him who neglects to advert either altogether or sufficiently, while he adverts, at least confusedly, that he either ought to advert, or ought not to apply that advertence which the matter to be done deserves. - But neglect of advertence will be indirectly voluntary in him who either deliberately wills to follow some passion, or does not retract a depraved habit, or, as the same St. Thomas says,¹ "on account of labor or on account of other occupations neglects to learn that through which he would be withdrawn from sin." Therefore there are imputed to fault in these also either "every depraved effect connected with such a passion," or "evil acts which proceed from an evil habit," or sins caused from that ignorance, although actually they do not advert to these while they follow, provided nevertheless they had foreseen them at least confusedly.² Cf. n. 5. 7.

Resolves. - 1° Vincible ignorance concerning some precept is a sin, and in a grave matter can be grave, if the negligence was notable: the reason is that every law obliges first to knowledge of itself, and therefore the precept is violated not only by an act opposed to it, but also by voluntary ignorance of it.

2° Evil acts have that malice which is apprehended. Hence if a thought occurs concerning such a malice, or one specifically such, this is truly contracted through an act of the will.

3° A sin foreseen in the cause, and then, the act having been morally interrupted, advertently committed, will be numerically twofold, namely 1° voluntary in the cause, 2° in itself.

4° If ignorance culpable in the beginning becomes invincible, the evil act is not a sin in itself, but the reason of sin must be taken from the cause alone. Moreover it will become invincible if no thought any longer occurs concerning past negligence or concerning actual ignorance, because then proximate and expedient power for dispelling the ignorance is lacking. Ignorance also becomes invincible if a doubt arising about it cannot be dispelled.

5° Those blinded and accustomed to sin, although on account of a defect of clearer knowledge then perhaps they sometimes sin less gravely in act than others, nevertheless are not excused, because a state of this kind, where there is no care of amendment, is voluntary and culpable in them.

6° A defect of sufficient advertence is only with difficulty to be admitted in those accustomed to sin and generally in those who operate according to their passions,³ because at least confusedly they advert to the malice of sin.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, Ch. II, ESPECIALLY ON MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN

n. ¶200.

Definitions. - The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice, by which sin is more or less offensive to God, and therefore worthy of greater or lesser punishment.

Mortal sin is a transgression of a law gravely obliging, or a grave offense against God, depriving of divine friendship and sanctifying grace, and rendering the sinner worthy of eternal punishment.

Venial sin is a slight offense against God, which neither deprives of divine friendship, nor of sanctifying grace, nor therefore excludes from eternal beatitude.

Certain sins are mortal from their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it may finally be, always contains grave disorder, as happens in lust, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc. - They are called mortal from their genus (not whole) when their matter, remaining in the same species, can be grave although it can also be light, of which kind are sins against justice. - But sins are called venial from their genus when, considering the matter or nature of the object, they do not admit grave guilt, and therefore so long as they remain within their own species, that is, another species mortal from its genus does not accede, they cannot be mortal.

n. ¶201.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Whence is the greater or lesser gravity of sins to be taken?

Resp. It is to be taken generally 1° from the object, end, and circumstances, according as they are more or less repugnant to rational nature or to law; 2° from the duration of the evil act, or from its intensity; 3° from greater or lesser advertence to the malice of the act, or from the diverse degree of consent furnished to the depraved act; 4° from the excellence of the virtues or precepts to which the sins are opposed; 5° from the various modes in which virtues or laws are violated.

Quaer. 2° What is required for sin to be formally mortal?

Resp. There are required 1) grave matter either in itself, or at least in the apprehension of the intellect; - 2) full advertence to the grave malice of the act; - 3) full consent of the will in the prevarication.

And so 1° grave matter is required; for otherwise mortal sin would not be distinguished from venial by reason of the matter, since light matter of itself cannot dissolve a man from divine friendship.

2° Full advertence and full consent are also required, because, since through mortal sin a man recedes totally from God in order to adhere to creatures, this cannot happen unless the sinner deliberately prefers the object of sin to God, and so constitutes his ultimate end in a creature. Moreover, it is altogether foreign to divine goodness to hand a man over to eternal damnation either because of a light transgression, or because of an act not perfectly free and voluntary. - Thus all.¹

Moreover advertence is judged full and sufficient if an explicit, or at least implicit, thought of mortal malice precedes the consent or sinful act. And this indeed can happen even in a single instant through a simple judgment concerning the malice, without the mind reflecting several times upon itself by a special act; yet true and full deliberation of the mind, and full adhesion to the depraved object, are always required.

Quaer. 3° What is required for venial sin?

Resp. For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect: these indeed are required, because if these are removed there can be no knowledge and volition of evil, and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, these being posited, knowledge and volition of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some way.

n. ¶202.

- Quaer. 4° How can sins be known as mortal by reason of matter?

Resp. A threefold rule is assigned.

First Rule. - Recourse must be had to Sacred Scripture. For what things are grave or what are light are to be weighed not by human but by divine judgment, says St. Augustine.² Moreover those things must be judged mortal which in Sacred Scripture are declared worthy of death, or to exclude from the kingdom of heaven; or which are announced with the particle: woe, which surely denotes truly grave deformity. Thus the Apostle³ says concerning the works of the flesh: Which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury . . . I foretell to you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. - Recall also the long series of mortal sins which the Apostle enumerates.¹

Second Rule. - Recourse must be had to the Church, or to the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs, to the Decrees of General Councils, etc., in which many things are declared mortal, or only venial. For the Church is the pillar of truth, and therefore from her doctrine the rule and measure of morals must be taken.

Third Rule. - Recourse must be had to the Holy Fathers, to the Doctors of the Church, and also to the common doctrine of Theologians. For the Holy Fathers and Doctors were placed by God in the midst of the Church as burning lamps for driving away the darkness of error, and for illuminating the faithful in the way of truth. But Theologians know better than others how to interpret the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers and the Decrees of the Church, and to compare cases not defined with defined cases, things not declared with things declared, and to deduce fitting conclusions from parity or similarity. Therefore those things which are held by them unanimously as mortal must be judged as such; for the consensus of the Doctors is an indication of truth.

n. ¶203.

- When the preceding rules are lacking, it is very difficult to determine when sin is grave or light. But generally the following are judged grave:

1° All sins which are directly against God, or some perfection of his. Likewise all sins which turn to the grave prejudice of the human race, as are the various species of lust.

2° All sins which are gravely repugnant to an end of great moment intended by law, as the omission of fasting, Mass, annual Confession, Paschal Communion, etc.

3° All sins by which one's neighbor is gravely injured in the goods of life, reputation, fortune, etc., as homicide, detraction very harmful to one's neighbor, notable theft, etc.

Moreover the limits between mortal and venial sin can very often in no way be determined, as is established from innumerable controversies of the Doctors on this matter. But mortal sin must not be asserted unless it is certainly established, as St. Alphonsus rightly notes.²

n. ¶204.

- Quaer. 5° How does sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

Resp. 1° Sin mortal from its genus can become venial in four ways, namely by reason 1° of smallness of matter; - 2° of imperfect advertence; - 3° of imperfect consent; - 4° of erroneous conscience. - Thus St. Thomas¹ and St. Alphonsus.²

Resp. 2° But sin venial from its genus can become mortal 1° by reason of erroneous conscience; - 2° by reason of scandal; - 3° by reason of a depraved end gravely evil; - 4° by reason of formal contempt of law, or of the authority commanding; 5° by reason of a depraved affection for a thing otherwise lightly evil, so that someone is prepared even to transgress a gravely obliging precept; - 6° by reason of danger or proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin. - Thus all.

n. ¶205.

- Quaer. 6° Does he sin gravely who PROPOSES to commit all venial sins, and to avoid only mortal sins?

Resp. Negatively, more probably, speaking of itself, because such a proposal of itself conduces only remotely to mortal sin. I said: speaking of itself, or excluding contempt and proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, with account had of past experience.³

Quaer. 7° Is it a grave sin to expose oneself without cause to danger of falling probably into mortal sin?

Resp. Affirmatively, as is plain of itself. See what was said at n. 87. I.

n. ¶206.

- Quaer. 8° Does he sin gravely who without sufficient cause posits an action from which he will suffer base motions?

Resp. He does not sin gravely if 1) the action is not of itself and gravely influencing toward depraved effects; 2) he does not intend them; 3) proximate danger of consenting in depraved delight is absent (n. 8).

Quaer. 9° Does he sin gravely who deliberates about furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if finally he does not consent?

Resp. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation. For if this is imperfect, namely if it is only a certain hesitation, or an omission of resistance from torpor, sloth, or negligence, the sin will not exceed venial. - Lacroix. But if the deliberation is full, it will be mortal sin, because the will shows itself prepared to place God after sin. - Lacroix.⁵

Quaer. 10° Can venial sins multiplied effect a mortal sin?

Resp. Distinguish. Negatively of themselves, or by force of multiplication, because the individual sins remain in an inferior theological species; Affirmatively by reason of the coalescing matter, as, for example, in theft.

n. ¶207.

Resolves. - In formal sins you will discern venial from mortal:

1° From the gravity of matter [n. 201, q. 2°. 1)]; from the degree of advertence; from the nature of the act, insofar as, if full advertence is present, perfect consent is never lacking in sins of commission of work or speech; but it can be lacking in sins of heart or of omission.

2° Where it is not clear that some sin is mortal, the confessor ought not to be hasty in judging that it is in fact grave both objectively and subjectively, because in doubt one must stand for the smallest part, or at least the matter is to be left to divine judgment.¹ Cf. n. 695, R. 2°.

3° In doubt concerning perfect consent you will judge in favor of the penitent, 1) if he is of a timorous conscience and habitually prepared to die rather than offend God; 2) if, adverting more fully to the temptation, he was terrified and immediately repelled it; 3) if he does not know whether, waking or sleeping, whether fully master of himself, he did or willed something evil.² Cf. n. 1363, q. 2°.

The confessor does not satisfy his office if he applies no care to remove the penitent from the frequency of venial sins, especially of those which are committed with full advertence. For he who strives not at all to avoid venial sins usually gradually falls at last into some mortal sin. (A) p. 485.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, CHAPTER III: ON THE DISTINCTION OF SINS

We must treat 1° of specific distinction; 2° of numerical distinction.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON SPECIFIC DISTINCTION

n. ¶208.

Preliminary Note. - Formal sins, of whatever kind they are, all agree in this, that they contain moral malice or repugnance with the eternal law of God. Nevertheless, since the eternal law of God, although one in itself, by order to the rectitudes which it demands and which are specifically distinct, is equivalently diverse and multiple (equivalently, namely, it is one thing insofar as it demands the rectitude of justice, another insofar as it requires the rectitude of charity, religion, etc.); hence also malice, or repugnance with the eternal law, by order to the same specifically distinct rectitudes, becomes wholly diverse and multiple (plainly, for example, the malice of theft will be one thing and the malice of blasphemy another, since theft is repugnant to the eternal law insofar as this demands the rectitude of justice, but blasphemy insofar as it requires the rectitude of religion); and therefore formal sins themselves too can differ altogether among themselves, and in fact do differ, according to the difference or diversity of moral malice contained in them.

From this understand how deservedly in Moral Theology there is treatment of the specific distinction of sins; and this all the more because, from the Council of Trent,¹ there is a strict obligation of divine law to expose, in Sacramental Confession, all mortal sins committed after Baptism according to species and circumstances changing the species.

With this premised, concerning the specific distinction of sins let there be a threefold question. And so:

n. ¶209.

- Quaer. 1° What sins differ among themselves in species?

Resp. Those sins differ in species which from the object, circumstances, or end of the one operating have malice or repugnance with the eternal law specifically diverse.

It is said: 1° which from the object, circumstances, or end of the one operating; because these three constitute the principles of morality, that is, the sources from which human acts take their goodness or malice, and the specific diversity of the same goodness or malice; as will be explained more broadly in the following number.

It is said: 2° specifically diverse repugnance; because repugnance diverse only in this sense, that it is notably greater or lesser, does not render sins distinct in species, as St. Thomas expressly teaches:² "more and less do not diversify species. . . . Hence to take another's thing in great or in small quantity does not diversify the species of sin. . . . Just as that which differs in whiteness according to more and less does not differ according to the species of color." - Indeed, greater repugnance, where it transfers sin from venial to mortal, is said to cause a theological or demeritory species, namely insofar as venial sin does not merit privation of grace and glory, as does mortal sin; but, a theological difference of this kind, which is taken according to guilt, as the Angelic Doctor observes,¹ cannot be a difference constituting diversity of moral species, about which we are treating here; for guilt, or penalty, as an effect follows fault, already constituted in its moral species.

Note. - Therefore, in order to know the specific distinction of sins, it is necessary accurately to know their specific repugnance with the eternal law. But since that repugnance, in so multiple a variety of sins, not rarely lies hidden rather obscurely, hence of itself:

n. ¶210.

- Quaer. 2° Whence can specifically diverse repugnance be discerned, and consequently the specific distinction of sins in particular?

Resp. For the solution of this question we assign four rules, commonly received by Theologians, and to each of them we add certain practical resolutions.

First Rule. - Sins which are repugnant to diverse virtues are distinguished in species; for just as any virtue has special and proper goodness, so also the sin repugnant to it has special and proper malice.

Resolves. - Therefore the following are distinguished in species: heresy, despair, hatred of God, perjury, fornication, theft, lying, etc.; because these sins are repugnant to diverse virtues, namely heresy to faith, despair to hope, hatred of God to charity, perjury to religion, fornication to chastity, theft to justice, lying to veracity.

n. ¶211.

Second Rule. - Sins which are repugnant indeed to the same virtue, but in a contrary mode, namely one by excess and the other by defect, are distinguished in species; for contrariety, as St. Thomas notes from the Philosopher,² "is a difference according to form," and therefore "contraries differ according to species." Nor does it matter that contraries are opposed to the same virtue, which is in the middle between them; for virtue has some likeness to one of the extremes, as between fortitude and daring, between prodigality and liberality; but between the extreme vices there is every kind of unlikeness.

Resolves. - Therefore the following are distinguished in species: despair and presumption, which are indeed repugnant to the same virtue of hope, but in a contrary mode, namely despair by defect, presumption by excess; likewise avarice and prodigality, which are opposed to the same virtue of liberality, but prodigality by excess, avarice by defect; similarly flattery and excessive harshness, of which the first by excess, the other by defect, departs from the same virtue of affability; - likewise sloth in learning due knowledge, which by defect, and excessive curiosity, which by excess, is repugnant to the same virtue of studiousness.

n. ¶212.

Third Rule. - Sins which are repugnant indeed to the same virtue and even in the same mode, for example by defect, but under a diverse respect, that is, according to various specifically distinct goods which are contained under the same virtue, are distinguished in species; for one and the same virtue, respectively to the diverse goods which it contains under itself, can have diverse rectitudes, and so, for example, one and the same virtue of justice obtains a wholly diverse rectitude according as it protects goods of fortune, or goods of reputation, or goods of life, etc.; since these goods themselves are specifically diverse in moral estimation. Therefore sins also, although opposed to the same virtue in the same mode, nevertheless respectively to the diverse rectitudes of this virtue can have diverse malices.

Resolves. - a) Therefore the following are distinguished in species: theft, rapine, detraction, contumely, homicide, all of which indeed in the same mode are repugnant to the same virtue of justice, but under a diverse reason; theft namely insofar as that virtue protects goods of fortune; rapine, insofar as it protects goods or inviolability of the person; detraction, insofar as it protects the good of reputation; contumely, insofar as it protects the good of honor; homicide, insofar as it protects the good of life. - b) Likewise local, real, and personal sacrilege differ in species, although they are opposed to the same virtue of religion in the same mode; for a sacred thing, a sacred person, and a sacred place are goods specifically diverse in moral estimation. - c) Thus also violation of ecclesiastical fasting by the eating of meat is distinguished in species from violation of the same fast by multiple refection; because the former violation is repugnant to the virtue of temperance insofar as it moderates the quality of food; but the latter, insofar as it moderates the quantity of food. - Finally from the third rule it can still be deduced that sins of commission and sins of omission are indeed not always, but for the most part, distinct in species, although they depart from the same virtue in the same mode; for ordinarily they injure diverse goods or offices of the same virtue. And so heresy (a sin of commission) and omission of a prescribed act of faith (a sin of omission) differ in species; despair and omission of an act of hope; hatred of God and omission of an act of charity.

Note. - When the diversity of goods of some virtue is sufficient so that by reason of this sins are judged distinct in species, must be sought both from the nature of the individual goods and from the common judgment of Theologians.

n. ¶213.

Fourth Rule. - Sins which are repugnant to several laws made from a diverse formal motive are distinguished in species; for since laws made from a diverse formal motive have for their end a diverse honesty of virtue, therefore the sins opposed to them have diverse malice in species. - Yet where sins are repugnant indeed to several laws, but laws made from the same formal motive, they are not distinguished in species; for several laws made from the same formal motive, and therefore diverse only from the number of legislators, according to common estimation morally constitute only one law.

Resolves. - a) Therefore one omitting Mass on a feast day which is also Sunday does not for that reason commit two sins distinct in species; because the hearing of Mass is prescribed by each law from the same formal motive of religion. The same must be said of one not fasting on some vigil which falls on a day of the Ember Days of Lent; because that threefold law of fasting was again made from the same formal motive of temperance. Likewise one must establish this concerning him who violates a vow or oath repeated several times; or even concerning him who commits homicide or theft, although each of these is repugnant to several laws, namely to the law of nature, to positive divine law, to ecclesiastical law, and to civil law; for these diverse laws prohibit homicide or theft from the same formal motive of justice, and therefore they are morally judged as one law.

b) On the contrary, he who on Saturday is held to fast from a vow, from the precept of the confessor, and from ecclesiastical law, if he does not fast, commits three sins distinct in species: the first against religion by force of the vow, the second against the virtue of penance by force of the precept of the confessor, and the third against temperance by force of ecclesiastical law; for this threefold precept of the vow, the confessor, and the Church was made from the diverse formal motive of the said virtues.

Note. - To discern rightly whether laws, several in number, were made from the same or from a diverse formal motive, before all else one must inquire what is proximately and immediately intended by the author of the individual laws; for that very thing is the formal motive - the form or soul - of the law. Thus, indeed, laws several in number are only numerically or formally diverse, according as the same or diverse honesty of virtue was proximately and immediately intended by their author. But of itself it is licit to presume (unless something else is established from the context of the law, circumstances, or interpretation) that the legislator proximately and immediately intends that very thing which is called the intrinsic motive of the law, or the end of the work, that is, that very thing to which the matter of the law, with attention to the circumstances, tends of its own nature; just as, for example, a fast imposed by the confessor after sins have been heard, with attention to this circumstance, by its own nature pertains to the virtue of penance; a natural fast before Holy Communion to the virtue of religion; an ecclesiastical fast to the virtue of temperance. . . . Hence the intrinsic motive of the law, or the end of the work, of itself is judged to coincide with the formal motive of the law. And therefore, if some other motive is added to the law which is called extrinsic, or the extrinsic end of the one operating, for example, if the legislator expresses that he was also moved to make the law from the motive of another honesty, to which namely the matter of the law can indeed be referred in some way, but nevertheless does not tend of its own nature; that extrinsic motive is judged secondary and remote only, but not immediate and formal, provided that from the context of the law, etc., the contrary is not established. Let the example here be the law of fasting of Ember Days, and the law of fasting on the vigil of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Each law has the same intrinsic motive (namely the honesty of temperance), and therefore the same formal motive; for although the Church was also moved to make the first law from the extrinsic motive of obtaining worthy Ministers from God, and to make the other from the extrinsic motive of honoring the Blessed Virgin Mary, nevertheless we rightly judge that the same formal motive remains for each law; because those extrinsic motives of themselves are only secondary and remote, nor has the Church anywhere signified that she prescribed the aforesaid fasts immediately and proximately from those motives, or wills them to be observed from them.

Note. - Nevertheless transgressors of such laws can by accident contract a new specific malice by reason of scandal or by reason of a depraved end or affection, for example, if they violate them from contempt of their extrinsic motive, of the priesthood, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, etc., from grave acedia, etc. The same should be observed in the resolutions of the following number.

n. ¶214.

- But as regards precepts strictly so called (cf. n. 97. 98), namely: precepts which parents impose on children, or masters on their domestics; all these are regularly judged to be imposed not from a diverse, but from the same formal motive of obedience, although their matters of themselves regard diverse virtues, for instance: if a parent prescribes for a son attendance at school, prayer, hearing Mass, etc. Hence children, by transgressing the precepts of parents, indeed sin several times against obedience; but of themselves they do not commit sins distinct in species, and therefore of themselves they also are not held in Confession to declare in precisely what matter they were disobedient to parents. - The same ordinarily seems to have to be judged concerning the ordinances of Regular Superiors, who, according to Reuter,¹ are not accustomed to command religious subject to themselves except from the same formal motive of obedience. Likewise you will regularly resolve the same concerning vows, which are as it were particular precepts imposed on oneself by the one vowing from the same formal motive of religion, so that one breaking two vows, for example, one of fasting and the other of praying the rosary, would not commit sins distinct in species, and therefore in Confession would satisfy by saying: "twice I broke a vow in grave matter." Make exception for a vow of observing a law.

n. ¶215.

- Quaer. 3° Can several sins distinct in species be found in one and the same act?

Resp. Since one and the same act physically, both from the object and from circumstances and the end of the one operating, can be repugnant to diverse virtues, or to the same virtue in a contrary mode or under a diverse respect, or even to several formally diverse laws; hence it is manifest of itself that in one and the same act there can be found several sins distinct in species, or several malices specifically diverse. And so, for example, the killing of a cleric in a church is a threefold sin distinct in species: one against justice, and two others against religion, namely according to the two diverse goods of this virtue which are violated: the sacred place and the sacred person. - Likewise he commits four sins distinct in species who, bound by a vow of chastity, sins with a married blood relative; because he violates four diverse virtues, namely justice, piety, religion, and chastity. Let the things handed down before in the Treatise on Human Acts be recalled here as to the individual principles of morality.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, Ch. III, ARTICLE II: ON THE NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS

n. ¶216.

Preliminary Note. - The dissertation now to be undertaken on the numerical distinction of sins claims for itself no less attention than the inquiry of the preceding article on their specific distinction; since, from the Council of Trent,¹ all and each mortal sins committed after Baptism, of which memory is had after diligent examination of conscience, must be declared in Sacramental Confession, not only according to species, but also according to number. - But sins are said to be distinct according to number, or numerically distinct, if they are several in number, for example two homicides, three thefts, etc.; and hence the whole argument of the present article can be reduced to this one general question: When must sins be judged to be several in number? or, what comes to the same thing: whence must their numerical distinction be sought? Yet observe that in this question the discussion concerns only sins diverse in number alone, that is, sins of the same species which are several in number; for if the discussion concerns sins distinct in species, it is of itself clear that they are also distinct in number; for things which differ in species by that very fact are not one, but several, and therefore numerically diverse.

This being noted beforehand, concerning the numerical distinction of sins of the same species let there be three sections.

§ I. Whence The Numerical Distinction Of Sins Of The Same Species Is To Be Sought.

n. ¶217.

- According to the mind of St. Alphonsus,² this distinction is to be taken from a twofold root, namely 1° from the multiplicity of acts of the same species which do not coalesce into one act of sin, and 2° from the multiplicity of objects of the same species which do not coalesce into one object; and therefore, with the same Saint as guide, these two general principles can rightly be established.

Principles. - I. Several acts of the same species, which do not coalesce into one act of sin, constitute as many sins as there are acts.

II. One act, having several objects of the same species which do not coalesce into one object, contains as many sins as there are objects.

That these principles may be better understood and made accommodated to practical use, in the two following sections we shall investigate: 1° with respect to the first principle, when several acts must be judged not to coalesce into one act of sin; 2° with respect to the second principle, when several objects must be judged not to coalesce into one object.

§ II. Which Acts Do Not Coalesce Into One Act.

n. ¶218.

- The following are judged not to coalesce: a) acts which are disparate among themselves, and b) acts between which there intervenes a moral interruption.

Point I. On Disparate Acts.

Those acts are called disparate which do not concur as means, beginnings, or complements toward the same work to be consummated in its own species. Wherefore:

1° Among themselves all acts complete in themselves, that is, consummated in their own species, are disparate.

2° Likewise preliminary acts, that is, not consummated, which are posited without the intention of arriving at the consummated act, are judged to be disparate from the consummated act, if the latter afterwards follows, with the will changed and increased.

3° Similarly acts not consummated, which indeed are posited with the intention of arriving at the consummated act, but by accident do not attain to it, are again rightly held as disparate from this act, intended to be consummated but by accident not consummated.

4° On the contrary, as often as such acts not consummated are posited with the intention of arriving at the same consummated work, and actually attain to this also, so often they are not disparate from the consummated work, but coalesce with it into one act of sin, provided nevertheless that between them there does not intervene a moral interruption, concerning which below in the second Point.

n. ¶219.

Resolves from 1°. - Therefore two fornications, two homicides, etc., are disparate acts, and therefore numerically two sins, because individual fornications, individual homicides, are complete acts. Hence acts of this sort, complete or consummated in their own species, must always be set forth in Sacramental Confession according to their number, even if perhaps they proceed from the same intention or from the same impulse of the will; for instance, if someone from the same impulse of the will successively kills several persons, or from the same heat of lust fornicates several times, etc. Likewise if a priest in the state of mortal sin celebrates three Masses successively on the day of the Nativity of the Lord; for individual Celebrations, in moral estimation, are acts complete in themselves, and therefore disparate among themselves. Likewise, from the truer opinion of St. Alphonsus and one whose opposite must wholly be denied,¹ if a priest, in mortal sin, successively absolves several persons; because individual absolutions are individual Sacraments, and therefore actions disparate among themselves. Yet the same Saint thinks otherwise² concerning a priest who, in the state of mortal sin, in one successive course distributes Holy Communion to several persons. Indeed such a priest, in distributing the Most Holy Eucharist, according to the opinion which Alphonsus defends against Lugo, sins mortally by the sin of sacrilege, but does not commit numerically several sins, because such a distribution, made to several in one course, is judged in moral estimation to be one action, one banquet, although it consists of many guests, and therefore the individual distributions, in the case, will not be actions disparate among themselves.

n. ¶220.

Resolves from 2°. - Therefore obscene words, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person, without the intention of arriving at the consummated act of lust, for instance at fornication, are acts disparate from the fornication itself, if this afterwards follows because lust has been increased; and therefore kisses of this sort, etc., separately from the fornication afterwards following, must be declared in Confession. Likewise grave woundings inflicted on someone, without the will of killing him, are disparate from the killing itself, if afterwards it happens because anger has become more inflamed; and as such they must be explained in Confession. Cf. St. Alphonsus.³

Note. - If you ask here whether those very acts not consummated, as kisses, etc., in the first case, and woundings in the second case, are also disparate among themselves mutually, so that in Confession it is necessary to say how many times they took place? I answer affirmatively; because these acts, as is supposed, are by no means ordered from the intention of the sinner to the consummated act, but are done solely on account of their own delectation; and hence it is the common opinion of the Doctors that in Confession it must be declared how many times. - Nevertheless one exception must be admitted, namely: if these acts proceed from the same impulse, even with a certain brief interval; for then they can morally be estimated as one continued act, and therefore then it will suffice that in confession there be simply set forth what was done, for example: I acted dishonestly with another person by touches and kisses; I injured my neighbor by gravely wounding him. - The same you will rightly judge concerning locutions which, while remaining in the same matter and person, are uttered several times in one course from the same vehemence of affection, and thus morally become as it were one continued locution; for instance, if someone in the same matter, from the same impulse, several times curses the same person, several times blasphemes or perjures himself, etc.

n. ¶221.

Resolves from 3°. - Therefore depraved conversations, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person from the intention of arriving at the consummated act of fornication, are disparate from this very intended fornication, if by accident it is not consummated, and consequently must be opened separately from it in Confession. - Wherefore St. Alphonsus rightly notes altogether¹ that, separately from the intended sin, as sins numerically distinct from it, there must be explained the acts not consummated which were posited as means toward consummating the sin, if afterwards the sin is not consummated, as Viva teaches, asserting that the common opinion so holds. And this not only if the aforesaid acts are evil of themselves, as touches and dishonest conversations are; but also, according to a very probable opinion, if they are indifferent of themselves, as to take the road, prepare arms for homicide, etc.: "because then the sin does not remain merely internal, but is externalized in those actions, which all become evil, since they are informed by the malice of the depraved end."

Note. - If here again you ask whether these acts not consummated, in the supposed case, are also disparate among themselves mutually, and as such must be declared in Confession according to the number of each? I answer negatively; because from the intention of the sinner they are ordered to the same work to be consummated in its own species; and hence for confession it will suffice that, separately from the intended sin, you say: I posited several acts for the purpose of committing this or that sin, which I nevertheless did not consummate. So St. Alphonsus.²

n. ¶222.

Resolves from 4°. - Depraved conversations, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person from the intention of fornicating, and actually also attaining to fornication, are not disparate from the fornication itself, and therefore do not constitute new sins, but morally coalesce into one complete work, one numerically consummated sin; because according to the common course such acts are as a certain introduction, a proximate disposition, a remote inchoation, or complement of the consummated work itself. Wherefore there is no obligation of explaining them separately in Confession; but it will suffice if it is said: I committed fornication with such and such a person; since actions preceding this are understood from common occurrence. So St. Alphonsus³ with the common opinion. - Moreover let it be well noted that actions of this sort preceding, as also complacency concerning fornication consummated, when they are had immediately after the fornication and are by no means intended toward a new fornication, probably are not new sins to be explained in Confession; because then they seem to be employed as a complement of the obtained fornication.

Point II. On Acts Morally Interrupted.

n. ¶223.

- Acts in the same species of evil, and conversant about the same object, are called morally interrupted when between them there intervenes a breaking off of the evil will, so that the subsequent acts proceed from a new decree of the will. - But that it may be determined more accurately in which acts moral interruption actually has place, with attention to the distinction between internal and external acts:

Quaer. 1° When are INTERNAL ACTS morally interrupted?

Resp. They are morally interrupted:

1° If the first will is expressly revoked by a contrary will; for this prevents the posterior act from being able to be called a continuation of the prior, since in reality it proceeds from a new decree of the will. Hence, if you take complacency in an evil delectation, and then elicit an act of displeasure; or if you will to kill your enemy, and then retract that will by putting away the hatred, or also by an act of charity toward the enemy; if afterwards you return to the evil will, you commit a new sin, numerically distinct from the prior one.

2° If the first will is virtually or tacitly revoked, namely by voluntary advertence to matters with which the evil will is incompatible; or even by taking up a state incompatible with the first evil will. Thus St. Alphonsus,¹ after the common opinion, teaches. Hence he who turns his soul to pious thought, for example by attending to a sermon, by reciting prayers, etc., tacitly revokes the preceding evil will, and therefore, if afterwards he resumes that evil will, he sins anew. Likewise he who resolves to steal something, and in the meantime, before the execution of the theft, becomes gravely ill, so that during the time of the infirmity he is incapable of carrying out the theft; if afterwards, after recovering health, he returns to the same purpose, he commits a new sin, because through such impotence the first purpose was morally interrupted.

3° If the first will ceases naturally, that is, through a cessation not freely chosen, but caused by natural distraction, inadvertence, or oblivion, lasting for a more or less notable time according to the nature of the diverse acts. But, concerning this third mode of moral interruption, Theologians greatly disagree. Some think that internal acts are not morally interrupted at all by natural cessation alone, at least ordinary cessation, for instance by common distractions, by sleep, etc. Others on the contrary opine that any internal acts whatever are morally interrupted by any natural cessation whatever, even ordinary. But among these St. Alphonsus held a middle way; his opinion, safe in practice, seems capable of being explained briefly thus:

n. ¶224.

Opinion of St. Alphonsus. - In this controversy concerning the moral interruption of internal acts through natural cessation, first, according to the holy Doctor, a distinction must be made between merely internal sins, that is, those which either are wholly consummated internally in their own species, as hatred, heresy, envy (sins of the heart strictly so called), or at least are committed internally only, without effectively tending to an external sin, as morose delectation and inefficacious desire; - and sins not merely internal, that is, those which effectively tend to an external sin of mouth or deed, as an efficacious desire or purpose of blaspheming or stealing. But after this distinction has been premised, according to the mind of the same holy Doctor one may establish thus:

A. Merely internal sins are morally interrupted by natural cessation, even ordinary cessation, for instance by common distractions, by sleep, etc., so that they are numerically distinct as often as they are repeated after such cessation. - Yet here attention must be given to the vehemence of the affection by which the will is borne into the object; for the given resolution is understood with this limitation: unless several acts of this sort proceed from the same vehemence of affection, or from the same impulse of passion; for then they constitute only one sin, even if a certain brief distraction intervenes between the acts. - From these things it is inferred, for Confession, that he who recalls that he took delight many times in the same object, and especially if this happened on the same day, must say how many times he yielded to this evil will, if he can remember this, at least confusedly; that is, if he is able to estimate how often the evil will, either not interrupted or interrupted and then reassumed, lasted through a notable time. But if he cannot - as ordinarily happens, when the depraved disposition was long-lasting - let him say through how much time he persevered in that disposition and whether the interruptions were notably rare or frequent.¹ Cf. nevertheless n. 1424, Principle III, 1°, c), § Some Doctors.

B. Sins not merely internal, namely efficacious desires or firm evil purposes concerning an external sin of mouth or deed, more probably are not morally interrupted by ordinary natural cessation alone, whether by common distractions or sleep; but only by the intervention of a long time, which long time, ordinarily speaking, is judged by the holy Doctor to be present as often as more than two or at most three days intervene between the purposes, since such force does not seem to be present in one single act of the will that it can efficaciously endure beyond that time. Therefore, if the penitent has persevered beyond two or three days in an evil purpose, in Confession he must explain the time, saying for example: for the whole month or week I remained in the purpose of stealing, which I renewed about so many times before the consummation of the theft; so that thus the number of internal sins concerning external sins may be understood by the confessor.² Yet it must carefully be observed here whether perhaps by force of the evil purpose some external effect has already been produced, conducing to the consummated external sin; for then the first purpose is judged not to be morally interrupted, but to persevere, so long as that external effect lasts; and hence the aforesaid resolution - that an evil purpose is morally interrupted by the intervention of a long time - must be received with this limitation: unless nevertheless the efficacy of the first purpose virtually perseveres in some external effect; for then the evil purposes, through whatever time they last, constitute one sin only. Hence, if someone proposes to kill a man, and therefore prepares arms, takes the road, and finally kills him, he commits one sin in number, although he sought him for many days, and meanwhile also thought about other things, renewed the purpose a hundred times, etc. Similarly, if someone proposes not to restore another's property, and remains in this purpose - even for a year - he commits one sin only; because in the very retention of the other's property the efficacy of the first purpose virtually perseveres. Yet where the thief becomes incapable of restoring, and afterwards again becomes capable and does not restore, he commits a new sin; because during the time of that incapacity there is nothing in which the efficacy of the first purpose virtually persevered.

n. ¶225.

- Quaer. 2° When are EXTERNAL SINS morally interrupted?

Resp. There is no need here for discourse about external sins which are disparate, which of themselves are morally disjoined and therefore numerically distinct, as was explained more broadly in Point I, n. 218 sqq. Hence the question proposed in this sense is to be understood of external sins which, according to themselves, are not disparate, for example kisses or touches which of themselves and from the intention of the agent tend and attain to fornication. But external sins of this sort are morally interrupted in three cases, namely:

1° When between them there intervenes an express or tacit revocation of the evil purpose; concerning which case see the things handed down before at n. 223.

2° When between them there intervenes a simple cessation of the evil purpose beyond two or three days, without some external effect having been produced in which the purpose is judged morally to persevere; concerning which case see the notes above at n. 224, B.

3° They are still morally interrupted, or, to speak more accurately, in a certain broader sense they become disparate and numerically several, when between them, even while the same purpose remains physically, there intervenes such an interval of time that the external acts themselves can no longer be called concatenated, that is, so that the preceding act is no longer the proximate disposition or as it were an inchoation of the subsequent act, although it remotely tends to it. But when such concatenation, because of an interval of time, is actually absent must be judged from the nature and circumstances of the acts themselves, especially with regard to common sense and the natural estimation of men. - Generally I would think it can be said: that it is rather easily lacking in sins of the mouth, especially if they are done from levity or custom, for instance in curses, blasphemies, perjuries, not uttered from the same impulse; - and then that it is lacking in sins of deed when the intervening delay of time is in no way customarily apprehended as brief. But if commonly it is apprehended as brief, sins of deed, notwithstanding such interval of time, still seem to be concatenated and morally united. - Hence I resolve: a) He who, from the intention of stealing a heap of wheat, which he cannot carry off wholly at one time, repeatedly on the same night steals part, commits one sin only; but he who from the same intention on alternate nights does this, seems to commit as many sins as there are acts. L. II. 44 at the beginning. b) Youths sin by several sins who, from the intention of fornicating, at times notably distant according to common sense, approach another person, with libidinous acts, and thus finally arrive at fornication; because those external acts, in the case, are no longer concatenated, since they are not the proximate disposition or a certain quasi-inchoation of the subsequent fornicary intercourse. On the contrary, they would sin by one sin only if, in the same morally continuous approach, some delay intervened between the libidinous acts, for example because of conversation with a third person. c) Similarly, if someone, laboring servilely on Sunday, wishes to rest a little and therefore is occupied by sleep; but then, awakened, begins again to work, he commits one sin only. - Likewise he sins by one sin who interrupts the eating of meat on a fast day for a little while, for example to receive a guest, etc.

§ III. Which Objects Of The Same Species Do Not Coalesce Into One Object.

n. ¶226.

- Several objects in the same species of evil, about which one and the same act is conversant, are judged not to coalesce when one object is not part of another, or, in other words, when those several objects do not constitute, as parts, one total object. Such especially are: the lives of several men, whether of body or of soul; - and the honors, reputations, or temporal goods of several men, unless perhaps they are possessed by common dominion.

Resolves with St. Alphonsus.¹ Therefore he commits sins several in number: 1° Who by one act kills several men; or gives scandal to several; or affects several with contumely. 2° Who in one discourse detracts from several, even of the same family or community; except perhaps, according to Dens, in the case where the reputation were proper to some community precisely as such; as if someone should unjustly say of some monastery that regular discipline is not observed in it. 3° Who by one act imprecates some evil on several; or also steals from several, unless nevertheless the goods carried off by theft are possessed by those several with common dominion, for instance by reason of undivided inheritance, by reason of community, etc. 4° Who by one act desires to commit several fornications, whether with diverse persons or with the same one. - From these things the resolution for other similar cases will easily be clear.

n. ¶227.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he who detracts from someone before several commit as many sins as there are persons among whom the other is defamed?

Resp. Probably he does not commit several sins of detraction; because he does not seem to injure several objects or rights, since the right to reputation, which chiefly consists in the opinion of the multitude, is one and not multiple, both among all and among individuals. Hence by reason of such detraction it will suffice that in confession it be said: I detracted from someone before several.² Nevertheless the same detractor, in the case, commits several sins of scandal; and by reason of this, the number of persons must be set forth.³

Quaer. 2° Does he who in one discourse detracts from another in distinct matters, saying for example that he is unjust, lustful, and a man without religion, commit as many sins as the matters are diverse?

Resp. More probably affirmatively, at least of itself; because such a detractor violates a multiple right to diverse reputations which do not coalesce into one reputation; for he who has been defamed in one crime is not for that reason defamed in another. Yet by accident detraction of this sort not rarely constitutes one sin only, namely: when the circumstances in which those diverse insults are uttered are such that the hearers easily understand them to be uttered from anger, and therefore do not attribute faith to them. Hence women of the lower class and common people who, quarreling together, from the same impulse load one another with diverse contumelies, commit one sin only. Indeed those quarreling in this way, for the most part, are excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary with some particular fact.¹

Quaer. 3° What must be said concerning him who by one continuous act wishes diverse evils to another, as infamy, poverty, etc.?

Resp. According to a sufficiently probable opinion, he commits one sin in species and number, as often as, as more frequently happens, those evils are apprehended under the reason of evil in general. But otherwise, if the will is borne advertently to wishing those diverse evils to him, as they are distinct; and otherwise also a fortiori, if he desires actually to inflict those diverse evils on another.²

Quaer. 4° Of how many sins is he guilty who by one act denies several articles of faith?

Resp. Of one only; because the formal object of faith is not multiple, but one, namely: the veracity of God revealing; and hence he who denies several articles of faith is no more an unbeliever than he who denies one.³

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART SECOND: ON SINS IN SPECIES

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General · Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General, First Part: On Sin Accordi…, Fourth Question: On the Subject of Sin

The discussion must be 1° on internal sins; 2° on capital sins.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART SECOND: ON SINS IN SP…, CHAPTER I: ON INTERNAL SINS

n. ¶228.

- A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1° Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through the imagination as present, without desire.

2° Joy, or deliberate complacency in a past evil thing, or in an evil work performed either by oneself or by another.

3° Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if there is an intention or absolute purpose of executing it; otherwise it is called inefficacious.

But what the malice of these is, and what species, hold in these few things:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and assumes the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1° it is truly a sin. This is established from the precept: Thou shalt not covet, which must be understood generally and indefinitely of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is repugnant to right reason: for it is shameful and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, what it is not licit to execute.

2° It assumes the species of its object. For any desire whatever regards the external act as to be mandated to execution, either absolutely, if the desire is efficacious, or at least hypothetically, if it is inefficacious; necessarily therefore it is borne into that act according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or follow from it of their own accord. This is established also from the words of Christ:² He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood of adultery. Therefore ...

3° It also assumes the species of the circumstances of the object. This is clear from the reason just brought under 2°. Hence in confession, for example, of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, the bond of matrimony, or a vow of chastity, which affect the desired person, must be declared.

n. ¶229.

- II. Joy likewise is a sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is conversant, and similarly assumes the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself.

The reason is because joy, as we said above, is the approval of past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the whole malice of these. - Hence he who takes complacency in the recollection of past sins and approves them must in confession explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting concerning a sin committed, sorrow over evil not performed, and also sadness over good accomplished are to be referred back to joy.

n. ¶230.

- III. Morose delectation 1° is certainly a sin; 2° it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is because it is repugnant to rational nature and to divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant from right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object indicates affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is evil affection, as is clear. Therefore ... Hence Osee:² They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Proverbs:³ Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord.

The reason for the second is because whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in the very degree and species in which the object is evil, in the same entirely will the delectation concerning it be evil. Therefore ... St. Thomas¹ and St. Alphonsus.²

Does it also assume the malice of the circumstances of the object? Negatively, very probably, theoretically speaking. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object besides that which moves delectation. In practice, however, the opposite opinion is very pleasing to St. Alphonsus,³ namely because of the proximate danger of depraved desire. Yet if you foresee that the penitent will be induced with difficulty to open the circumstances of the object thought upon, because of the speculative probability of the former opinion you will prudently abstain from troublesome questions. Thus with Billuart, Scavini, T. I, n. 923.

n. ¶231.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° ON DESIRE. Is it licit to desire evil under a condition, if it would be licit?

Resp. Distinguish. Affirmatively of itself if the appended condition removes the whole malice of the thing; the reason is because such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which through the condition the malice is wholly excluded. But negatively in the other hypothesis; the reason is because such an affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove the malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however appended, cannot remove the malice. For things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and therefore a condition would be appended uselessly, since to choose such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed.⁴

Nevertheless he would probably have to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but would only disclose what he would will in another condition of things. - St. Alphonsus⁵ with others. Besides, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this sort are, even if the appended condition removed the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife; which desires Cajetan rightly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because, although such a desire is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in venereal matters will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditional desires concerning things prohibited by positive law alone must also be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes they can labor under some inordinate affection.

Hence the confessor must prohibit betrothed persons from lingering in the desire of intercourse to be had in future matrimony; for "great" is "the danger of present delectation, which is evil when the condition which gives honorable character to that object is absent." Yet often betrothed persons and widowers are in good faith, not thinking it to be mortal to be delighted concerning a licit object, as intercourse in matrimony is; and therefore the confessor will prudently be silent about mortal sin, unless he should see pollution to follow from that complacency.

…and 22 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 20 passages

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General

n. 410.

Introduction

410. Object of the treatise. - Moral theology treats of human acts by which we come to the end, beatitude. They are those acts which are conformed to the dictate of right conscience and to the eternal law. But there are also human acts which are not conformed to the law of God or to the dictate of right conscience, by which we do not come to the end, and which are called sins. Hence, after the treatises on the end, on human acts, and on their rules, namely, on conscience and on law, the consideration of evil acts or sins rightly follows.

411. The treatise is divided into three parts:

The first part treats of sin according to itself:

of the essence of sin; 2) of the distinction of sins, a) specific, b) numerical; 3) of the comparison and gravity of sins; 4) of the subject of sin, where internal sins are treated.

The second part treats of the causes of sins:

of interior causes: a) of ignorance on the part of reason, b) of passion on the part of the sensitive appetite, c) of malice on the part of the will;

of exterior causes: a) of God permitting, b) of the devil tempting, c) of man cooperating;

of sin which is the cause of another sin, namely, of the mode by which one sin causes another, and of capital sins.

The third part treats of the effects of sin:

of the diminution of the good of nature; 2) of stain or guilt of fault; 3) of guilt of punishment; 4) of mortal and venial sin, which are distinguished according to diverse effects: a) of the distinction of mortal sin from venial, b) of its gravity, c) of the conditions required for it, d) of the division of mortal and venial sins, e) of their conversion, f) of venial sin according to itself.

n. 412.

412. Importance of the treatise. - The treatise is of the greatest importance, because it applies the abstract general principles concerning human acts more determinately and concretely to sins, which above all are to be avoided by each one, and are to be estimated and judged in others by the priest and confessor.

n. 412.

The following can usefully be consulted: St. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo 1, 2, 3, 7; and I-II, q. 71-89 with the commentaries of Cajetan and Billuart; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book V; Reiffenstuel, Theologia Moralis; Ferraris, Prompta Bibliotheca; Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, vol. I; Billot, De peccato personali et originali; Theologia Mechliniensis, Tractatus de Peccatis, edited by St. Carton de Wiart; Lumbreras, De Vitiis et Peccatis; Deman, article "Peche," in Dictionnaire de Theologie; and manuals known to all, such as Van der Velden, Haine, Aertnijs, Marc, Lehmkuhl, Genicot, Noldin, Tanquerey, Prummer, and Vermeersch.

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General, First Part: On Sin Accordi…, Fourth Question: On the Subject of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2 and 3; q. 7, a. 6.

n. 446.

446. The subject of sin is the power which is the principle of the evil act remaining in it. Moreover sin is in various subjects: a) properly and formally it is in the will, for sin is a voluntary act, but a voluntary act most properly is an immanent act of the will (a. 1); b) nevertheless not only acts of the will are voluntary, but also acts which are commanded by the will or are not repressed by it; whence sin also resides in reason and in the inferior faculties insofar as they are moved by the will; c) nevertheless it is not in the exterior members because their actions are transient. Therefore one sin in number can consist of several partial acts which are in diverse subjects: nevertheless these acts, because one says order to another, constitute one thing in the moral order: one sin (a. 2).

447. Sin is usually attributed to the more principal power when it is elicited by several powers. By the Scholastics it is attributed to the power principally operating, because action is attributed more to the principal and first agent than to the secondary or quasi-instrumental. But by moderns today it is usually attributed to the power in which it is consummated. Hence by reason of the subject three internal sins are distinguished:

in the sensitive appetite, insofar as it is moved by reason and will, movements of concupiscence or sins of sensuality, which are perfected by passions of the sensitive appetite;

in reason, morose delight, when deliberate reason does not repress the movement of imagination, of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, but remains about it for delight, by thinking and representing the evil to itself as present: for then the will does not tend into the act and the delight naturally following, but consents to delight alone as thought and represented, and the sin is perfected in reason;

in the will itself, desire or joy, when the will consents not only to the delight thought of but also to the evil work itself, whether to be placed or placed, which intention is perfected in the will itself.

Let it be noted, however, that several of these sins are rather often joined.

From this principle the mode of speaking of St. Thomas in this whole question is to be understood. Hence 1) sin is not usually attributed to the members and exterior senses because, since they obey despotically at the nod of the will and cannot resist it, and consequently do not have their own movements, they are only passive faculties and organs and instruments of the acts of the will (a. 2, ad 3). 2) Sin is attributed to the sensitive appetite (concupiscible and irascible) insofar as it is moved politically by reason and will, because it is not a pure instrument, but is an active faculty which has its own acts to which it can be moved by reason and will or be repressed by them, yet in such a way that it also resists them. Therefore it has a certain principality of operating comparatively to the exterior members; but it is not always principally operating comparatively to reason and will. For a) mortal sin, which requires perfect deliberation of reason and full consent of the will, is attributed only to reason and will, which principally operate and to which it belongs to be converted to the end or to be turned away from it (a. 4; Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate 25, a. 5). But b) inordinate movements of concupiscence which do not occur with full deliberation, but only with some advertence of reason, imperfectly or indirectly voluntary, are attributed to the sensitive appetite as principally operating, because reason and will do not principally but imperfectly operate in them (a. 3, ad 3). They are called sins of sensuality. 3) Every sin is from deliberating reason; moreover it can be in reason in two ways: a) insofar as reason errs in the cognition of something which it can and ought to know, b) insofar as it commands or does not restrain the inordinate movements of other powers (a. 5). When deliberate reason does not repress an inordinate movement of appetite, but remains about it for delight, the sin of morose delight or consent in delight is committed, which is attributed to reason as principally operating, namely, as first moving and directing (a. 6). 4) With reason deliberating, there can be consent not only in the delight of the work but also into the act or the work itself, future or past: then there is present the sin of desire or joy, which can be attributed either to reason as judging and bearing sentence and directing, or to the will which consents and thus completes the sin (a. 7, ad 1).

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P. — 2 passages

Chapter II: Concerning Various Sins Against the Virtues and the Precepts of the Decalogue

n. ¶4463.

Besides the duties proper to particular states, there are others common to all men, to which the theological and moral virtues, and the precepts of the Decalogue, order us. But just as the diverse virtues dispose us so that we may be rightly ordered toward God, toward our neighbor, and toward ourselves, so too there are other sins against God, against neighbor, and against ourselves.

n. ¶4464.

In the present chapter we shall speak concerning certain sins against God and against neighbor; concerning the principal sins against ourselves it comes to be said in the third chapter, where capital sins are treated.

Coppens, Medical Practice

Charles Coppens, S.J. — 36 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Coppens, Medical Practice, Lecture V. Venereal Excesses

In the opening lecture of this course, I remarked to you, gentlemen, that the scope of Medical Jurisprudence is much wider than that of Medical Law. It embraces many subjects of which human laws take no cognizance, and in particular such vicious actions as do not violate the rights of others, but are injurious to those only who practise them. They undermine the health and shorten the lives of the guilty parties, and bring in their train diseases the most destructive and often the most incurable. It is the physician’s beneficent task to lessen the weaknesses and sufferings of the body, and to prolong human life in well-preserved vigor to a green old age. It is not the least important part of his valuable services to provide for the sound and vigorous propagation of the human race to future generations. Of this propagation of our race, of the laws which govern it, and of the criminal abuses by which these laws are violated, I am to treat in this present lecture. My subject is “Venereal Excesses.”

I. If a physician’s purpose were only to make money, his task would then be to multiply diseases and infirmities; he would then be as great a curse to mankind as he is really intended to be a blessing; and an immense blessing he will be to his fellow-men if he studies to remove even the remote causes of diseases and untimely deaths. He can do so in a variety of ways and not the least by providing against sexual excesses and abuses. These are a copious fountain of ill to humanity. A host of diseases, such as tuberculosis, diabetes, cardial and nervous affections, epilepsy, hysteria, general debility, weaknesses of sight, languor and general worthlessness, hypochondria, weakness and total loss of reason, and, in married life, impotence and sterility are some of the effects of venereal excesses. Any excitement of the sexual passion before the body has received its full development is more or less injurious to its welfare; and all excesses or unnatural indulgence of it at any period of life is pregnant with deplorable consequences. Now, such evil practices are too much overlooked by many physicians; yet it is certain that thousands of patients might, by timely warning on these matters, be saved from unspeakable mental and physical sufferings. To give sensible and intelligible directions on a subject as delicate as it is important in medical practice, it will be necessary to enter into some scientific details.

The passion which prompts to sexual intercourse is altogether natural in itself, and, as such, intended by the Creator to be indulged in at the right time and in the proper manner. It is the stimulus which He has provided for the propagation of the human race. If the stimulus is strong at times, this too is a special effect of His wisdom; because without a powerful prompting of this kind, most men would shirk the burden of married life, just as very many would not care to toil if they had no hunger and thirst and other bodily wants to satisfy.

But though all these cravings are useful and even indispensable to mankind, all of them need the regulation of reason. When they are indulged immoderately or in unnatural ways, they become most copious sources of bodily diseases, of mental disorders, and moral degradation. Every one knows how the passion of drink, when abused, proves the ruination of millions; excessive eating, too, injures the systems of countless people. But no animal passion is more liable to become disorderly, none needs more firm control and habitual watchfulness, than the passion of lust. Reason dictates that it should be indulged for no other purpose than that for which the Creator has made it, namely, marital intercourse. I say marital and not merely sexual intercourse; for outside of married life all nations have always condemned its indulgence.

Besides, it is only in the married state that the children, which are the fruit of such intercourse, can be properly educated. To generate a race of young barbarians is certainly not the purpose of the sexual relations. Children must not be begotten unless they can be properly raised, in a manner worthy of their noble destiny. Now, it is only in the married state, in the family or domestic society, that they can be thus educated. They need the tender hand of a mother to supply their material wants; they need the manly care of a devoted father to provide the necessaries of life, his firm hand to break their wanton wills, and his wise direction to set them well on the road to temporal and eternal happiness. Therefore, no one has the right to beget or to bear children except in marital life. Now, the sexual passion is to be exercised only in connection with its proper object, the procreation of children and the fostering of such mutual love between husband and wife as is conducive to domestic happiness. Therefore this passion is to be kept under careful and rational constraint. This the law of morality requires; all nations have ever exacted that this passion shall be subject to established rules; no free-love has ever been tolerated where there was the least pretence to civilization, and I do not know that it was ever permitted even among barbarians.

Even the distant approach that Mormonism made towards free-love has been absolutely condemned and repressed by the common-sense of the American people, as incompatible with civilization. In fact, all history testifies that the true civilization of any race or country rises or falls with the restraints imposed on the passion of lust; no polygamous nation has ever been more than half-civilized. The greatness of Rome and Greece decayed when the laws of social purity declined; and in our own day the immorality of what is called “the social evil” is the darkest stain on modern civilization.

And what we say of civilization or social soundness, the soundness of the body politic, applies in a great measure to individual soundness, the health of every person’s mind and body. Personal purity promotes health and vigor, it lends beauty to form, gives a keen edge to the intellect, adds energy and brings success to manhood, and prepares for enduring and honored old age. Venereal excesses, on the contrary, undermine the vigor of the constitution, bring on a host of bodily infirmities, exhaust the system before the proper time, debauch and degrade the mind and will, and prepare their victims for an early grave or a decrepit old age.

II. But how can a passion so ardent be properly restrained? In particular, what can a physician do to prevent the manifold injuries which, if not properly controlled, it will bring to his patients? These are practical questions directly to our purpose.

The first requisite for all effective action is to have correct knowledge and strong convictions on a subject. No one will check a passion with firmness if he have a lingering doubt as to whether, after all, he is strictly bound to restrain it. As a man’s mind matures, at least if his mind be upright and not distorted by the strain of a ruling passion, he understands more and more thoroughly that his perfection consists and his highest interests lie in obeying at all times the law of reason, in maintaining his specific dignity of a rational being, and not allowing himself to be controlled by passion, the ruling power of brute animals. Besides, he becomes aware in various ways of the evil results of immoral practices, and he sees many reasons to keep his passions in check. But young people have neither such experience nor such information, and they are not always wise enough to understand the imperative dictates of self-restraint. And yet it is often in early years, while body and mind are in the period of development, that the most serious injury is done to the constitution and to the character by the indulgence of carnal pleasures. Habits are then engendered which become a real slavery; so that later in life when there arises a sincere desire to stop such disgraceful practices, there is a feeling of impotence to resist temptations which by one’s own fault have become a second nature.

What then can be done with the young? They must early and authoritatively be told of the wrong, the sin of base self-indulgence, and of every practice that leads to it. If a beginning of immorality is discovered in a child, it must be plainly told and emphatically warned of the serious consequences involved. The child’s mother is, as a rule, the best guide and director in infancy. Later on, the Doctor has frequent chances to do so; it comes from him with better grace than from others; and his warning is likely to be minded, because it is clear that he knows and ought to know what he is talking about with regard to bodily consequences. Yet it is always a matter of delicacy; and great care should be taken lest, while pointing out the evil, there be also a stimulus added to a prurient curiosity.

Much good sense is required in any given case to decide whether more good or more evil is likely to result from the warning; in doubt of success, it is better to leave the matter alone.

“Where ignorance is bliss

’Tis folly to be wise.”

The safest way of repressing the passion of lust is the provision that an all-wise Providence supplies in Religion, in which God authoritatively forbids all immoral action and even all immoral coveting or desire. Positive dogmatic teaching on this subject is required, especially with the young. You cannot argue with them on this matter as you can with grown people. That is one reason why religious teaching should permeate early education. The Decalogue should be the back-bone of a child’s training: and it should be proposed on the authority of God, and explained so as to check not only sinful acts, but also covetings, prurient curiosity, improper reading, immodest looks and thoughts, in a word, whatever paves the way to the walks of sin. The greatest of teachers has Himself laid down the law in this matter: it must be proposed as coming from His divine lips, as it did: “I say to you that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart” (St. Matt. v. 28). The lesson is enforced by these words of the^† great Apostle: “Neither fornicators, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate ... shall possess the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10).

True, the child will not realize the full import of such lessons; but he will understand it in due time; and already in early years he will be warned against indulging his nascent passions. It is well that the conscience should be early awakened in this matter; for the more this passion is indulged, the more it craves for further indulgence till it becomes almost uncontrollable.

III. No possible evil to any individual man or woman can result from the firm control that one may acquire over the passion of lust. On the contrary, if it should be controlled all through life, this would only add to a man’s strength of mind, firmness of will, soundness of body, and length of life. For in the school of morality, in which every Physician should be educated, the leading principle is: “Contraries are cured by contraries,” “Contraria contrariis curantur.” On this principle, lust is most efficiently controlled by aiming, at least in youth, at total abstinence from its indulgence. You know that, in the Catholic Church, priests and religious lead a single life, and pledge themselves for life to practise the most perfect control of the sexual passion. What do you think is the result of their total abstinence on this point with regard to their length of days? As a rule their life is much longer, in normal circumstances, than that of the other learned professions. Here are a few proofs. In France, during the twenty years from 1823 to 1843, 750 priests died in the diocese of Paris. Of these only 200 were under sixty years old; there were 554 between sixty and seventy years old, 448 over seventy, and 177 over eighty. Again, of 202 Carmelite nuns who died in a large convent of Paris, Dr. Descuret, the attending physician, states that 82 had lived over seventy years, 23 over eighty years. Most Trappists and Carthusians die of scarcely any other sickness than old age. All young people who aspire to the clerical or religious profession learn from their early years the holiness and the loveliness of purity. Our Church effects this result by placing before their youthful imaginations the most perfect of patterns of virtue, the infant Saviour, the virgin Mother, the boy saints Aloysius and Stanislaus, the maidens Agatha and Cecilia, and a whole phalanx of Christian heroes and heroines.

I dwell the more willingly on this subject, gentlemen, because, besides protecting modesty in your young patients generally, it may fall to the lot of some of you, in the course of your professional careers, to be attending physicians to religious houses; and you will then appreciate the delicacy of the flowers of virtue that bloom beneath the shadow of the sanctuary. Certainly even there you may happen to find isolated cases of infidelity to duty; for human nature is not angelic nature; but in such abodes it comes near to it, at least for the vast majority.

IV. On the other hand, what sad havoc does not the sexual passion play where it is precociously developed and wantonly indulged. Dr. H. Fournier, one of the most eminent physicians of Paris, says: “There is not a vice more fatal to the conservation of man than masturbation.” This unfortunate habit is sometimes acquired by very little boys and girls. Foolish or vicious nurses may bring it on by handling young children most indelicately. This is one of the many reasons why none but virtuous servants and nurses should be employed by wise parents and physicians. In later years, children often learn this degrading and most injurious vice from their depraved companions, some of whom seem even to regard the practice of it as a manly accomplishment. When habitually indulged in, it produces on the health and the strength of the constitution effects the most deplorable. Even the intellect is liable to become thereby enfeebled, a want of virility is exhibited both in the body and in the mind of its victims; then follows a loss of ambition and self-control. “When this morbid passion gets control of a person,” writes an experienced practitioner in medicine, “it is as though an unclean spirit had entered, subdued the will, weakened the moral forces, enfeebled the intellectual faculties, lessened the power to resist temptation, and overcome every obstacle opposed to its gratification. Even while the intellect is still clear, and the sense of wrong keen, the individual is a slave to this morbid impulse.” Though the baneful effects may not always affect the physical health of the victim, the unfortunate practice very often engenders in boys and girls tendencies which in later years lead to all the miseries conspicuous in houses of debauch and infamy. But I need not dwell on consequences that belong to pathology rather than to Jurisprudence.

V. Confining myself to my sphere of what is morally right or wrong, I must be permitted to point out some gross violations of duty in some members of your honored profession. There are physicians so reckless of consequences and of principles alike as to advise at times the practice of illicit sexual intercourse. Let them beware; they are doing a very unwise and guilty act. Even if an immoral practice should save a human life, it may not be indulged, on the principle which must be by this time very familiar to your ears, that the end does not justify the means. And besides no good result can be expected from what is contrary to the law of nature and of nature’s God. It was to punish sins of the flesh that the Deluge was sent, which destroyed nearly the whole human race. “All flesh had corrupted its way,” says the sacred historian. It was to punish unlawful indulgence of lust that Sodom and Gomorrha were destroyed by fire from heaven; and the memory of these guilty cities is preserved in the very name of Sodomy. Onan, as the same sacred volume relates (Gen. xxxviii), performed the marriage act in a manner to frustrate it of its legitimate purpose, the generation of children, and the Lord slew him; and his sin is to this very day branded with his name and called Onanism. And yet in Christian lands physicians are found who will at times dare to recommend such practices to their patients.

On the occasions mentioned, God punished the guilty miraculously; but that is not His usual way. He has so contrived our natures that sins committed against His laws in our bodies ordinarily bring a part of their punishment in their train, not the less certain because slower in its operation than a miracle would be. All the venereal diseases are there to act as earthy ministers of Heaven’s justice, anticipating, and often mercifully averting, the punishments of the future world.

VI. Besides private and secret tortures of body and mind, a public and most deplorable calamity has descended of late on our own vigorous young nation, as well as on some older lands, threatening in the not distant future the extinction of many of its most esteemed families and of what was, not long ago, a vigorous stock. The following article by Dr. Walter Lindley, Professor of Gynecology in the University of Southern California, will explain the matter better than my words could do. It was read in Los Angeles at a meeting of the Southern Californian Medical Society in June, 1895, and is printed in the “N. Y. Medical Journal” of August 17 of the same year (pp. 211 and following). It is headed “American Sterility;” I will quote freely from it:

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On the Nature of Sin · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On the Specific and Numeri…, The various divisions of sin · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On the Subject of Sin

“The obstetrician finds his vocation disappearing among the American women from the face of the earth.

n. ¶21.

“It is a fact that the American family with more than one or two children is the exception. From the records of six generations of families in some New England towns, it was found that the families comprising the first generation had on an average between eight and ten children; the next three generations averaged about seven to each family; the fifth generation less than three to each family. The generation now on the stage is not doing so well as that. In Massachusetts the average family numbers less than three persons. In 1885 the census of Massachusetts disclosed that 71.28 per cent of the women of that State were childless. The census of 1885 in the State of New York shows that twenty-five per cent of the women of that State are childless, fifty per cent average less than one child, and seventy-five per cent average only a trifle over one child.

n. ¶22.

“Southern California has fully as dark a record as New England—that is, in the family where the man and wife are American-born. It goes without saying that the medical profession in this country is composed to a great extent of typical progressive Americans, and I ask you to make mental statistics of the children in the families of the physicians in Southern California, and you will find very few of them containing more than two.

n. ¶23.

“Had the Rev. T. R. Malthus lived in the United States to-day, he would never have argued about the danger of over-population, as he did in his interesting volume on ‘The Principles of Population.’”

n. ¶24.

After quoting the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Lycurgus, Dr. Lindley continues: “In Southern California there are, it is true, many children, but the average American family is very small.

n. ¶25.

“As I sat writing this an evening or two ago, I jotted down the names of twenty-five families of my acquaintance in Los Angeles, taking them as fast as I thought of them. The list was composed entirely of professional and business men ranging in age from thirty-five to fifty. All had been married quite a number of years. The result of my memorandum was that in these twenty-five families there were but eighteen children. These families were wholly unselected, and are about the average Protestant American families outside the rank of laborers.

n. ¶26.

“What are the causes of this small proportion of children? Disease, preventives of conception, and abortion form the trinity of responsibility in this grave condition. It is true that the first cause (disease) results in many women being barren, but I believe that you will agree with me that the last two causes, preventives of conception and abortion, are the two chief causes.

n. ¶27.

“The A. P. A. might find food for thought by investigating the infrequency of criminal abortion in Catholic families in the United States. It is the Protestant or agnostic American who too often uses one of the preventives of conception.” (Here the Doctor refers to a foot-note in which he says: “I write this opinion as a Protestant, and should be glad to learn that it is not well founded.”) He continues: “If, through inadvertence, pregnancy should occur, then an abortion is in order. Disease and poverty and war and accident all work together to keep down the population, but we are overcoming these. Plagues and pestilences are rare. The number who die of starvation in California is very small, while war has played but a small part. Through the diffusion of the laws of sanitation, improved dietary, and advanced therapeutics, the longevity of man is increasing, but the American woman’s aversion to child-bearing is blighting our civilization, and can be well named the twentieth-century curse. In this aversion the woman frequently echoes the wish of the husband.

n. ¶28.

“A large proportion of the American young women who marry do so with the determination that they will have no children. They are abetted in this notion by many elderly women. The cure for this terrible sentiment is education. The home, the press, the schoolroom, and the pulpit should be centres for reviving the ancient idea of the nobility of motherhood. The physician should not underestimate his influence.

n. ¶29.

“By constantly bearing in mind the danger of the present tendencies, he can do much to change the current. Let us hope that we shall again see the day when thoughtful motherhood shall be considered the highest function of womanhood, and to shirk this natural duty will be deemed a disgrace.”

n. ¶30.

Gentlemen, it would be easy to prove that this testimony of Dr. Lindley is not that of an exceptional witness, or a piece of special pleading; but it is the acknowledged conviction of the medical profession generally, confirmed by the last United States Census, and in fact not questioned, to my knowledge, by any weighty authority. As early as 1857, Dr. H. B. Storer, an eminent physician of Boston, startled the community by publishing two books on this subject, entitled: “Criminal Abortion. Why not?—A Book for Every Woman”; “Is it I?—A Book for Every Man.” Soon after, Rev. John Todd, a Protestant minister of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, published a work styled “Serpents in the Dove’s Nest,” all which works and a multitude of others tell the same tale of woe regarding the increase of child-destroying crimes in New England, chiefly among the old stock peculiarly called Americans. Dr. Nathan Allen, of Lowell, Massachusetts, in his treatises, “Changes in the New England Population” and “The New England Family,” gives overwhelming testimony. “Harper’s Magazine” (quoted by the “Catholic World” for April, 1869) remarks: “We are shocked at the destruction of human life on the banks of the Ganges, but here in the heart of Christendom fœticide and infanticide are extensively practised under the most aggravating circumstances.” We Catholics are not personally interested in this matter; but the good of our fellow-men and chiefly our fellow-countrymen calls for the earnest exertion of us all to stop this dreadful evil. All the works I have referred to exempt Catholics from the blame pronounced; the “Harper’s Magazine” article referred to expressly says: “It should be stated that believers in the Roman Catholic faith never resort to any such practices; the strictly Americans are almost alone guilty of such crimes.” This matter is fully explained in a recent work called “Catholic and Protestant Countries Compared,” by Rev. Alfred Young, C.P., ch. xxxii.

n. ¶31.

VII. Now, gentlemen, I am very much afraid that while physicians as a body abhor all such murders and openly condemn them, many do not show much repugnance to allow, and even sometimes to suggest, such onanistic intercourse among married people as shall prevent the possibility of conception. For instance, if it happens that a young mother suffers much in her first confinement, at once the suggestion is made that a second parturition may prove fatal. From that moment regular intercourse is dreaded. Either onanism is habitually practised, or the husband becomes a frequent visitor to dens of infamy, where to where to save his wife’s health, he encourages a traffic that leads multitudes of wretched girls to a premature and miserable death. Every one despises those outcasts of society; but are not the men who patronize them just as guilty? Probably enough, if the imprudent suggestion about dangers of a second child-bearing had not been made by the Doctor, the young wife might have become the happy mother of a numerous family of healthy children. For we must trust in Divine Providence. If a husband and wife do their conscientious duty, there is a God that provides for them and their family more liberally than for the birds of the air and the lilies of the field. And if He should so dispose that the worst should befall, well, such temporal clangers and sufferings as attend child-bearing are the lot of woman-kind, just as the dangers and hardships of the battlefield, the mine, the factory, the forest, and the prairie are the lot of the men.

n. ¶32.

The man who shirks his duty to family or country is a coward; women, as a rule, are brave enough in their own line of duty, and patiently submit to God’s sentence pronounced in Paradise, “I will multiply thy sorrows and thy conceptions, in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children” (Gen. iii. 16), just as they have to submit to the words immediately following: “Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power, and he shall have dominion over thee.”

n. ¶33.

Certainly, the husband of a delicate woman ought to spare her strength and restrain his passion, but not at the sacrifice of morality; and Doctors ought to be very careful not to cause false or exaggerated alarms, and thus make themselves to some extent responsible for untold moral evils. They should remember that, as a rule, the raising of a family is the principal purpose of a married life. The happiness and virtue of the parties concerned depend chiefly on the faithful performance of this duty. How sad is the lot of those—and they are many—who undertook in early years of married life to prescribe a narrow limit to the number of their children; they had one or two, and they would have no more, and for this purpose criminally thwarted the purposes of nature. Then comes death and snatches away their solitary consolation: and they spend their old age childless and loveless, in mutual upbraidings and unavailing regrets.

n. ¶34.

How different is the lot of those aged couples—and they were many of yore, and are yet in various nations—who are like patriarchs amid their crowds of children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren, dwelling in mutual love and as if in a moral paradise where all domestic virtues bloom!

n. ¶35.

VIII. True, such families are usually the outcome of moderately early marriages; and many Doctors nowadays disapprove of such unions as an evil. A moral evil they certainly are not; and the physical evils sometimes attending them must, I think, be traceable to a variety of causes; for such evils are certainly not inseparable from early marriages. As to their moral advantages, Mr. Wm. E. H. Lecky, in his “History of European Morals,” writes of the Irish people in particular: “The nearly universal custom of early marriages among the Irish peasantry has alone rendered possible that high standard of female chastity, that intense and jealous sensitiveness respecting female honor, for which, among many failings and some vices, the Irish race have long been pre-eminent in Europe” (v. i. p. 146). And that he does not confine his statement to female chastity is evident from what he adds farther on: “There is no fact in Irish history more singular than the complete and, I believe, unparalleled absence among the Irish priesthood of those moral scandals which in every Continental country occasionally prove the danger of vows of celibacy. The unsuspected purity of the Irish priesthood in this respect is the more remarkable, because, the government of the country being Protestant, there is no special inquisitorial legislation to insure it, because of the almost unbounded influence of the clergy over their parishioners, and also because, if any just cause of suspicion existed, in the fierce sectarianism of Irish public opinion it would assuredly be magnified. Considerations of climate are quite inadequate to explain this fact; but the chief cause is, I think, sufficiently obvious. The habit of marrying at the first development of the passions has produced among the Irish peasantry, from whom the priests for the most part spring, an extremely strong feeling of the iniquity of irregular sexual indulgence, which retains its power even over those who are bound to perpetual celibacy” (p. 147). No one will say, I believe, that the custom of early marriages in Ireland has any injurious effects on the health of either parents or children. Nor need it necessarily have such effects on those of our American young men and women who lead regular lives and are not enfeebled by unnatural vices or demoralized by dainty food and luxurious manners.

n. ¶36.

A wise physician has many proper ways of providing for the health and strength of both parents and children without advocating practices which are a snare for innocence. Let him insist with all his patients on the cultivation of healthful habits for the family and the individual; wholesome and not over-delicate food; moderation in eating and drinking; regular and manly exercise, especially in the open air; early hours for retiring and rising. But, above all—and this is directly to our present purpose—let him show the greatest regard for the laws of morality, the main support of individual and social happiness. His views upon such matters, manifested alike in his conduct and his conversation, but especially in his management of cases involving the application of moral principles, will go far to influence the community in which he moves. His task is to be a blessing to his fellow-men, a source of happiness and security to individuals and to society.

Billuart, Summa Summae

Charles-René Billuart, O.P. — 11 passages

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On the Nature of Sin

D. Thomas, IIa IIae, from q. 71 to q. 89.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On the Specific and Numeri…, The various divisions of sin

Sin taken most generally is divided into original sin, which is derived from Adam to posterity through seminal propagation, and personal sin, which is committed by one's own will. Personal sin is subdivided into actual and habitual. Actual sin is an act or omission disconformable to the rules of morals; habitual sin is the stain left in the soul from actual sin. Of original and habitual sin specially below. Now of actual sin.

Actual sin is divided: 1° into mortal and venial ¹. Mortal is said of that which inflicts death upon the soul, depriving it of sanctifying grace, which is the life of the soul in the supernatural order, and turning it simply away from the last end; whence it is, by its very nature, irreparable, and it induces the guilt of eternal punishment. Venial is said of that which, since it does not deprive one of grace and charity, but only diminishes their fervor, nor turns one simply away from the last end, but only retards its attainment, leaves the principle of life and grace; whence it is not irreparable by its nature, nor does it induce the guilt of eternal punishment, but of temporal punishment only. Of both also we shall treat specially below. ¹ Here q. 72, a. 5, c.

2º Actual sin is divided into sin of commission and omission ¹, of which we have already spoken. Sin of commission is an act disconformable to the rules of morals; it fights against a negative precept. Sin of omission is the privation of an act owed; it fights against an affirmative precept. ¹ Ibid. a. 6, c.

3º Actual sin is divided into sin of heart, of mouth, and of deed ². Yet this division is not always into diverse sins, but sometimes into diverse degrees of the same sin. ² Ibid., a. 7, c.

4° It is divided into sin of weakness, which arises from vehement passion; sin of ignorance, which arises from vincible ignorance; and sin of malice, which is committed with full liberty and as it were deliberately, without passion or ignorance.

5° Actual sin is one thing simply such, another against the Holy Spirit, which is sin from malice, whereby the special gifts of grace are repelled or assailed, which are effects of divine love, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Six are counted, namely: despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, impugning of the truth known, and envy of fraternal grace.

6° Others are capital sins, others arise from them. The capital sins are counted seven, from St. Greg., book XXXI Moral., chapter 31, namely vainglory (some place pride), envy, avarice, anger, lust, gluttony, and sloth.

7° Finally sin is one thing material, another formal, and this in a twofold sense: 1º Material sin is the evil act itself in itself and considered entitatively; formal, the very malice or deformity of that act or omission. 2º Formal sin is said to be the free transgression of the law imputable to the will; material, a transgression of the law not free, and therefore not imputable to the will, such as are transgressions of the law from invincible ignorance.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On the Subject of Sin

is caused. But sin is caused from a defect or inordination of some circumstance. Essential gravity is sought from circumstances that change the species, because they pass into the nature of the object; accidental gravity from circumstances that do not change the species.

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Chapter I. On the Nature of Sin · Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Chapter II. On the Gravity of Sin · Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Article I. On Specific Distinction · Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Article II. On Numerical Distinction · Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. II, Chapter I. On Internal Sins · Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. II, Chapter II. On Capital Sins

I say 4° : Carnal sins of themselves and other things being equal are less than spiritual sins¹; because the more grievous the impulse to sin, the less is the sin. Now carnal sins have a more vehement impulse, namely the concupiscence of the flesh innate in us. They are nevertheless of greater infamy, because they are concerned with pleasures common to us and to brutes, and of greater adherence, because they have more of conversion to a changeable good, or to the creature. ¹ Ibid., a. 5, o.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 40 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Chapter I. On the Nature of Sin

n. 124.

Sin is commonly said to be the free transgression of any law obliging in conscience, or, from St. Thomas after St. Augustine, a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law of God. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 71, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, n. 1.

Sin is distinguished in many ways: for it is 1st. actual or habitual, according as it is an act or omission not conformed to law, or the state of sin not yet blotted out; 2nd. mortal or venial, according as it dissolves divine friendship, or does not dissolve it and is only a slight offense of God, which can easily merit pardon; 3rd. of commission or omission, according as it is done by the placing of a prohibited act, or by the omission of a commanded act; 4th. against God, neighbor, or oneself, according as the sinner violates duties owed to God, to neighbor, or to himself; 5th. of malice, ignorance, or infirmity, according as it is committed from mere malice, from vincible ignorance, or from mere frailty; 6th. formal or material, according as some law obliging in conscience is violated knowingly and freely, or altogether involuntarily. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, qq. 72 and 88.

n. 125.

Principle

For any formal sin there is essentially required advertence of the mind and consent of the will. For formal sin, as is gathered from its very definition, must necessarily be a human act: but it is repugnant that any human act be given without advertence of the mind and consent of the will. Therefore. - Besides, according to that saying of Matt. xv, 19: "From the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies," sin is completed by the heart, namely, by the will; but since the will is a blind faculty, it cannot seek the malice of sin unless it is enlightened by the aid of the intellect. Therefore for formal sin there is essentially required advertence of the mind and consent of the will. - Cf. St. Thom. 1 p. q. 19, art. 1; and 1-2, q. 74, art. 1 and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 5.

n. 126.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Evil acts have that malice which is apprehended; wherefore, if cognition occurs concerning such malice, or malice so specified, this is truly contracted through the act of the will, whatever finally may be the objective malice considered in itself.

2nd. If ignorance which is vincible, and consequently culpable in the beginning, afterward becomes invincible, the evil act which is placed by force of this ignorance is not sin in itself, but the whole account of sin is to be repeated from the cause alone, namely from the degree of culpability of that ignorance together with foresight of future acts. Moreover ignorance is to be called invincible if no thought any longer occurs concerning past negligence, or concerning actual ignorance.

3rd. If some sin has been foreseen in its cause, and then is placed with advertence, by an act formally distinct from the prior act, there will be had a twofold sin, namely 1st. in the voluntary cause, 2nd. in itself.

4th. The blinded and those accustomed to sin, although, because of defect of clearer cognition, perhaps sometimes they sin less gravely in act than others, nevertheless are not excused. Yet if sometimes they perpetrate evil acts from custom altogether inadvertently, although these acts cannot be called sins in themselves, for here and now they are not voluntary, nevertheless, since they are voluntary in their cause, they are imputed to them: indeed the strict obligation of correcting an evil custom always presses.

5th. The same thing must be said of other sins which are voluntary merely in their cause; namely, then guilt is formally contracted when the cause is placed, and since the whole guilt resides formally in the cause, it will be present in the same way whether acts of this kind follow or not, and whether these same acts are repeated in fewer or greater number: but when they actually follow, each of them constitutes one evil act with the cause. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 4. - Baller., note (a), p. 125; and note (a) and (b), p. 126.

6th. However much the soul is struck by the stimuli of evil tinder or of evil concupiscence, and however clear the cognition of these stimuli may be, there will never be any stain of sin unless the will in some way consents to them. The reason is that sin, in its whole extent, is completed by the will, but not by imagination or by the stimuli of the flesh. Wherefore the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5, says: "This holy Synod confesses and judges that concupiscence or tinder remains in the baptized: and since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those not consenting, and those manfully resisting by the grace of Christ Jesus."

7th. But these stimuli or motions of concupiscence, after advertence of reason, must be resisted at least in some way, nor is it sufficient then to bear oneself negatively or neutrally. The reason is both because these motions always bring with them some danger of consent, and because they contain some disordering of nature. But if you ask what sort of sin it is so to bear oneself negatively or neutrally, the answer is, according to the truer opinion, that it is only venial, with always excluded the case in which the danger of consent is grave, or at least is apprehended as grave.

8th. But if all motions must be resisted, this must especially be said of the motions of concupiscence in a venereal matter, which must not be retained even under the pretext of struggle and exercise of virtue. Nevertheless there is no obligation to resist them directly, since such resistance sometimes stirs them up more; much less is material resistance necessary.

9th. Not only as regards carnal motions, but also as regards motions against faith and charity, merely indirect resistance through distraction of the mind is to be advised, rather than any direct resistance or assault.

10th. Nor likewise are we bound to direct resistance against every temptation which is prolonged for a long time; for this would be too troublesome and liable to innumerable scruples. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 6 and seq.

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Chapter II. On the Gravity of Sin

n. 127.

The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice by which sin is more or less offensive to God: it is called mortal if, because of the violation of a law gravely obliging, it dissolves divine friendship and renders man guilty of eternal damnation; otherwise it will be venial. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1.

It must be noted here that some sins are said to be mortal from their whole genus, and others simply mortal from their genus (not whole). The former are those whose matter, of itself, setting aside erroneous conscience, semi-full advertence, or imperfect consent, always contains grave disorder within its whole genus, as happens in lust, blasphemy, heresy, etc. But the others are those whose matter, within its genus, is now grave, now slight, of which sort are sins against justice. - But sins are said to be venial from their genus which, considered according to the matter or nature of the object, do not admit grave guilt within their genus, and therefore, until they are transferred into another genus by a new mortal deformity accruing from elsewhere, they cannot be mortal. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51. - Lacroix, n. 199.

I say 1st. Not all sins are equal, but some are graver than others. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture: Jerem. vii, 26: "And they have done worse than their fathers." St. John xix, 11: "He who handed me over to you has the greater sin." Proof 2nd. from reason. What is said, with due proportion, of the injuries of men against God must be said of the injuries of sons against parents, or of subjects against Princes; but these certainly differ among themselves by reason of gravity: therefore those also. Besides, sins are opposition to virtues and precepts; but some virtues are more excellent than others, and some precepts are graver than others; therefore opposition to these will be graver or less grave. From another side also the evil intention of the delinquent can admit various degrees of malice, as is clear. Therefore.

I say 2nd. There are mortal sins. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture. I Cor. vi, 9, 10: "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor those serving idols, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor those who lie with males, nor thieves, nor the avaricious, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor the rapacious will possess the kingdom of God." Rom. i, 32: "Those who do such things are worthy of death." I St. John iii, 14: "He who does not love remains in death." Add innumerable other testimonies of Sacred Scripture, from which it is very clearly established that many men, because of their sins, are to be rejected by God and tormented with eternal penalties. Proof 2nd. from the authority of the Church: for the Church teaches that there are mortal sins. Thus Trent, sess. 6, can. 27: If anyone shall have said that there is no mortal sin except that of infidelity, or that grace once received is lost by no other sin, however grave and enormous, except the sin of infidelity, let him be anathema. Likewise sess. 14, c. 5 says: It is necessary that all mortal sins be recounted by penitents in confession.

I say 3rd. There are merely venial sins. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture: Prov. xxiv, 16: "The just man will fall seven times." Therefore he who falls or sins while he is just does not sin mortally, since he is not deprived of justice: therefore only venially. Therefore. Likewise St. James iii, 2: In many things we all offend; but we do not all sin mortally, since many are just before God, as is clear from many places of the Old and New Testament, for example, as is said of Zachariah and Elizabeth, Luke i, 6; of St. Joseph, Matt. i, 19, etc. Therefore there are just persons not immune from sin; therefore there are venial sins. Proof 2nd. from the definition of the Church; in Trent, in the place cited above, it is said: "Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God, and into which we fall more frequently, can be expiated by many other remedies (besides the Sacrament of Penance)." It is clear also from proposition 20 of Baius, condemned by Pius V and other Supreme Pontiffs, which sounds thus: "There is no sin venial by its own nature, but every sin merits eternal penalty." Proof 3rd. from reason: for among friends there are slight offenses which do not dissolve friendship; therefore similarly such offenses ought to be given toward God. Therefore.

n. 128.

Questions

Question 1. What things are required for mortal sin?

Response. Three things are necessarily required, namely grave matter either in itself or because of circumstances; full advertence to the grave malice of the act; full consent of the will into the transgression. Therefore:

There is required 1st. grave matter, otherwise a law obliging under grave sin could not be had.

There is required 2nd. full advertence of mind, otherwise there will not be full deliberation.

There is required 3rd. full consent of the will, because unless the sinner, with full consent and full deliberation, prefers the object of sin to God, and thus establishes his ultimate end in the creature, he cannot be said to withdraw totally from God. Besides, it is altogether alien to the divine goodness to consign man to eternal damnation either because of a slight transgression or because of an act not perfectly free and voluntary. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 5, 6, and 53.

n. 128, Q. 2.

Question 2. What things are required for venial sin?

Response. For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect: they are required indeed because, when these have been removed, there can be no cognition and volition of evil, and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, when these have been posited, cognition and volition of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some way.

n. 128, Q. 3.

Question 3. In what way can sins be recognized as mortal by reason of matter?

Response. A threefold rule is assigned.

Rule I. Recourse must be had to Sacred Scripture, and those sins must be judged mortal which in Sacred Scripture are declared worthy of death, or exclude from the kingdom of heaven, or which are expressed with the particle woe, which indeed denotes truly grave deformity. Thus the Apostle says concerning the works of the flesh, Galat. v, 19: "Which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury ... I foretell to you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God." - Recall also the long series of mortal sins which the Apostle enumerates, I Cor. vi, 9 and 10.

Rule II. Recourse must be had to the Church, or to the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs, to the Decrees of general Councils, etc., in which many things are declared mortal, or only venial. For the Church is the pillar of truth, and therefore from her doctrine the rule and measure of morals is to be taken.

Rule III. Recourse must be had to the Holy Fathers, to the Doctors of the Church, and also to the common doctrine of theologians. For the Holy Fathers and Doctors were placed by God in the midst of the Church as burning lamps for driving away the darkness of error, and for illuminating the faithful in the way of truth. But theologians know better than others how to interpret the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, and the Decrees of the Church, and how to compare cases not defined with defined ones, cases not declared with declared ones, and from parity or similitude to draw opportune conclusions. Therefore those things which by them unanimously or almost unanimously are held as mortal are to be judged as such; for the consent of Doctors is an indication of truth.

But when the preceding rules are lacking, it is very difficult to determine when a sin is grave or slight. Generally there are judged grave 1st. all sins which are directly against God or some perfection of his: likewise all sins which tend to the grave prejudice of the human race, as are the species of lust; 2nd. all sins which gravely repugn the end of great moment intended by the law, such as the omission of fast, Mass, annual confession, paschal communion, etc.; 3rd. all sins by which the neighbor is gravely injured in the goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc., such as homicide, detraction very harmful to the neighbor, notable theft, etc.

For the rest, the limits between mortal and venial sin very often can in no way be determined, as is clear from the innumerable controversies of the Doctors concerning this matter. But a mortal sin is not to be asserted unless it is certainly established concerning it, as St. Alphonsus rightly notes. Cf. Systema Mor.; and de Sacram. Poenit., nn. 604 and 605.

n. 128, Q. 4.

128. Question 4. In what way does a sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

Response. A sin mortal from its genus can become venial in a fourfold way, namely by reason of: 1st. smallness of matter; 2nd. imperfect advertence; 3rd. imperfect consent; 4th. erroneous conscience. But a sin venial from its genus can become mortal: 1st. by reason of erroneous conscience; 2nd. by reason of scandal; 3rd. by reason of an end gravely evil; 4th. by reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the authority commanding; 5th. by reason of an evil affection toward a thing otherwise slightly evil, so that one is prepared to transgress even a precept obliging gravely; 6th. by reason of danger or of a proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin; 7th. finally by reason of any circumstance which contains mortal malice in itself and accedes to the act, as St. Thomas well observes, in such a way that it changes its species. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1, 2, and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 54.

n. 128, Q. 5.

Question 5. Would he sin gravely who wished to avoid only mortal sins, and cared not at all about committing venial sins?

Response. Negatively, more probably, according to a sufficiently common opinion of theologians, even if this were done from purpose, and not from mere carelessness, provided contempt or peculiar frailty is excluded. The reason is that a soul so disposed does not of itself and necessarily introduce a proximate danger of sinning gravely. But in practice the matter is slippery, since facility in sinning venially is the cause why the soul is gradually weakened, and more easily at length is overcome by grave temptations, according to that saying of Ecclus. xix, 1: "He who despises little things will fall little by little." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Praeceptis partic., n. 12.

n. 128, Q. 6.

Question 6. Does he sin gravely who deliberates about furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if at last he does not consent?

Response. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation; for if this is imperfect, namely if it is nothing but a certain hesitation, or an omission of resistance arising from torpor, sluggishness, or negligence, the sin will not exceed venial. - But if the deliberation is full, the sin will certainly be mortal, because the will then implicitly places some created good before God; for by the very fact that it seriously deliberates, weighing on either side the advantages and temporal evils arising from sin, it shows itself prepared to violate the law if it shall have perceived some utility in this violation. - Cf. Lacroix, nn. 226 and seq. - Sanchez, in Decalog., lib. 1, cap. 1, n. 16.

n. 128, Q. 7.

Question 7. Does he sin gravely who, without sufficient cause, places an action from which he is going to suffer base motions?

Response. 1st. Affirmatively, when a man stirs up these evil motions deliberately. For such a one consents to evil delectation to such a degree that he expressly seeks it.

2nd. Negatively, when, no cause being given on the part of the one suffering, these motions arise naturally and spontaneously, and the danger of consent is absent, as the matter is evident.

3rd. Affirmatively, when he places an action which of itself gravely influences these evil motions, and which itself is a grave sin in the genus of lust. Thus St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 482: "If the cause of pollution gravely influences it and the man does not abstain from placing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided that it was foreseen at least in a confused way. Causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes certainly are mortal. And then (note this) that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature." And again in the same place, n. 484: "The common and more probable opinion teaches that it is not mortal unless it arises from a cause mortal of itself in the genus of lust. The reason why the cause ought to be mortal is that, since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil. The reason why the cause ought, besides, to be evil in the same genus of lust is that, since the cause concurs only slightly toward pollution, there is not a grave obligation of avoiding it on account of pollution, which happens beyond intention."

Therefore if there is present a just reason for placing a licit action, for example, to study, to heal, to hear confessions, no guilt is contracted from these effects: likewise no guilt, if a cause outside the genus of lust in no way influences of itself the evil effects, but these follow only by accident: there will be only slight guilt if a cause outside the genus of lust only slightly influences the effects. If the action is within the genus of lust, an indirectly voluntary gravely evil effect will be imputed only when the action itself gravely and proximately influences this effect and is a mortal sin against the sixth.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Where it is not clear that some sin is grave, the confessor ought not to be hasty in judging that it is actually grave, both objectively and subjectively, because in doubt one must stand for the minimum, or at least the matter is to be left to divine judgment. - St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

2nd. In doubt concerning perfect consent you will judge in favor of the penitent: 1st. if he is of a timorous conscience and habitually prepared rather to die than to offend God; 2nd. if, becoming more fully advertent to the temptation, he was terrified and at once repelled it; 3rd. if he does not know whether, awake or sleeping, whether fully master of himself, he did or willed anything evil. Elbel, n. 578. - St. Alphonsus, lib. 6, n. 476.

3rd. A confessor does not satisfy his office if he applies no care by which he removes the penitent from frequency of venial sins, especially of those which are admitted with full advertence. For one who strives in no way at all to avoid venial sins is accustomed little by little at length to slip into mortal sin. - See Cases, n. 144 and seq. - Roncaglia, c. 1.

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Article I. On Specific Distinction

n. 129.

The specific distinction of sin arises from a special malice, or from the diverse deformity by which one sin differs essentially from another.

Various rules are assigned by theologians for knowing this specifically diverse deformity. The first of all, and the more fundamental, they take from the diversity of objects; for as all human acts, so also sins are distinguished primarily and of themselves in species according to their objects. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 72, art. 1. But precisely because this rule is fundamental and remote, the Doctors establish two others, which are proximate, easier, and more accommodated to practice.

Rule I. The specific distinction of sins is taken from opposition to diverse virtues, or from opposition indeed to the same virtue but according to the diverse offices which it prescribes to be observed, or finally from opposition to the same virtue according to its extremes. The reason for the first is clear, because individual virtues have their own special and altogether distinct goodness; therefore sins opposed to them also necessarily contract a special turpitude. Thus denial of revealed truth, despair, and hatred of God differ among themselves in species, because they are opposed to three diverse virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity. - The reason for the second is that a virtue which demands that diverse offices be observed is virtually multiple, and to violate it according to these imports a diverse repugnance to the moral order. Thus homicide, theft, and detraction differ among themselves in species, although they are opposed to the same virtue, namely justice, because they are opposed to diverse offices of the same virtue, which commands that no one be injured whether in the goods of life, or in the goods of fortune, or in the goods of reputation. The reason for the third is that extremes are contraries, and contraries, according to St. Thom. 1-2, q. 72, art. 8, differ according to species; thus presumption and despair differ among themselves in species, because one through excess, the other through defect, is opposed to the same virtue of hope. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 31.

Rule II. The specific distinction of sins is taken also from violation of precepts morally diverse. For sin is transgression of law or of a precept; therefore where precepts differ among themselves in moral species, the sins opposed to them also ought to differ in species. Thus omission of Mass on a feast day, omission of the commanded fast, omission of annual confession or paschal communion, differ among themselves in species. But precepts are called morally diverse as often as they have a diverse object, such as fast, hearing of Mass, abstinence from meats; or as often as the intrinsic motive of the precept is diverse, although the object is the same. Thus he who in Lent omits the fast to which from another source he is bound by reason of sacramental penance commits a twofold sin diverse in species. On the contrary, theft is one sin, although it is prohibited by divine and human law, because the reason of the prohibition is the same. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 33.

But if someone rightly attends, he will perceive that this second rule either is reduced to the first, or at least cannot in any way be brought into use without the first. For the objects of various precepts are diverse in the genus of morals only because they pertain to diverse virtues, or to diverse offices of the same virtue; but the intrinsic motive of each precept is the very virtue or office of virtue to which the precept is referred.

n. 130.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He commits four diverse sins who, bound by a vow of chastity, sins with a married blood-relative, because he violates four diverse virtues, namely chastity, religion, piety, and justice.

2nd. He sins in a threefold way who kills a priest or religious in a church; because he violates justice by killing, and religion in two specifically diverse ways, namely by violating a sacred person and a sacred place.

3rd. He does not commit sins diverse in species who omits Mass on a Sunday on which another feast of precept falls, for example, the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, nor he who violates the fast of a vigil or of Ember Days falling in Lent, because those precepts are not formally diverse, since the intrinsic and primary motive is the same.

4th. On the contrary, he perpetrates three sins diverse in species by one act who omits a fast to which on the same day he is obliged from a precept of the Church, from a vow, and from sacramental penance; for this reason in confession the violation of this threefold obligation must be disclosed.

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Ch. III, Article II. On Numerical Distinction

n. 131.

It is certain that sins which are distinguished specifically are much more still distinguished in number; wherefore here it is asked only in what way the numerical distinction of sins within the same species is known.

Rule I. The numerical distinction of sins is taken from the diversity of total objects, or objects morally diverse. The reason is that the object, as St. Thomas teaches, is in some way the form of the act; and therefore it necessarily brings it about that the act is such as the object itself is. Therefore where there are several objects in number in the genus of morals, there are several acts in number in the same genus; where there is one object, the act is reputed to be one. Therefore there are as many sins as there are total objects. Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 18, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 36. - But in the present matter we call that object total which either by its own nature so effects one moral thing that it is neither a part of another, nor is referred to another which completes it; or, if it can be referred to another as a part or complement, is not so intended by the one acting. Thus one total object is had in completed copulation, one likewise in a wound inflicted with the intention only of wounding; and therefore one and the same object, when by its nature it is not total, can be or not be total according to the varied manner in which it is intended.

Rule II. The numerical distinction of sins is also taken from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, the individual acts become complete in themselves, nor can the following act be called a continuation of the preceding. Thus he who, on several occasions morally interrupted, strikes another or steals, commits as many sins as there are strikes or thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 36.

But acts of the will are interrupted in a threefold way, namely: 1st. By retraction or express revocation of the will, because this prevents the later act from being joined with the former, for example, if someone retracts an evil will of acting badly, and afterward resumes it. 2nd. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to a diverse object, for example, if someone freely ceases from an evil purpose, and then returns to it. 3rd. By a sufficiently notable involuntary cessation, regard being had to the nature of the act, according to the judgment of prudent persons, for example, through sleep, distraction, occupation, etc.

n. 132.

But in order that these principles may be applied more easily, the following things must be kept before the eyes.

1st. Merely internal acts, which have no order to an exterior effect, for the most part are morally completed as soon as they are physically interrupted, and therefore of themselves are multiplied as many times as they are physically interrupted. The reason is that such acts, because of their simplicity both on the part of the object and on the part of the will itself, and because of the lack of any exterior effect in which they agree, speaking of themselves, are not morally continued, nor do they coalesce into one, since they have nothing, neither in themselves nor in another, by which they may be united with each other. Hence the penitent ought in confession to express, if he can, how many times he adhered to an internal temptation; but if he cannot, let him say approximately; or at least whether he gave consent very frequently during the course of the day. - I said of itself or for the most part that the matter is so, because if sometimes several acts of this kind proceed from the same impulse of passion, they will constitute one mortal sin, although some brief interval may have intervened between the acts. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 37.

2nd. Internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action are multiplied as many times as the evil purpose is formally renewed, that is, as many times as through retraction or voluntary cessation it ceases to be, and afterward is assumed anew: for then the later act cannot be judged morally a continuation of the prior, and a new act of the will formally distinct intervenes. But if it ceases through involuntary cessation, it is judged to persevere virtually for some time, but not always and indefinitely, and therefore, when it is again assumed, it is not held as morally interrupted, provided that too long an interval of time has not intervened. But what such an interval ought to be can be defined only by the judgment of wise persons. For the same purpose endures for a greater or lesser time according to the varying intensity, and also according to the varying circumstances of persons, age, sex, disposition, etc. St. Alphonsus thinks that the impulse of one act, ordinarily speaking, can with difficulty be prolonged for more than two or three days. Hence, he says, one who so perseveres virtually in an evil will beyond two or three days ought in confession to explain the time, so that thus the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be understood morally. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 138.

3rd. External acts, or acts externally consummated, are multiplied as many times as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even when a notable interval of time has been interposed, when they are as it were parts of a more principal act, or when they tend to one end. The reason is that then they effect one moral thing, which is not completed unless the principally intended act has been consummated. Thus he who has determined to perpetrate theft commits one sin, although through several days he has thought about it, has renewed the evil purpose more often, has undertaken a way to this, has sought an opportune time, etc.; for the prior act of the will is judged to persevere virtually in that very effect or external work. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 40.

n. 133.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He commits one sin who, intending fornication, touches a woman basely, kisses her, entices her by base conversations, and at last fornicates; for all those previous acts are ordered to consummating the act. But if from the beginning he had willed only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed copulation, there will be a twofold sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses only the copulation. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43.

2nd. A priest who wills to omit the whole Office on one day makes one sin, because the individual Hours on one side bespeak an order to completing one Office, and on the other their omissions are intended after the manner of one thing. But he would make two sins who first had willed only to omit Matins, and afterward refused to recite the remaining Hours, because there would be a twofold act of evil will plainly distinct.

3rd. He perpetrates one sin who, from the same impulse of passion, repeats an evil act many times, for example, several times basely touches himself or another, even with some interruption; several times strikes an enemy, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; for there is one evil affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 50.

4th. He makes one sin who denies several articles of faith at the same time, because the motive of faith is one; therefore he is equally an unbeliever who denies one article and he who denies all. - Likewise probably he makes one sin who by the same act blasphemes the twelve Apostles; because all blasphemies against the Saints take their malice from one relation to God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 47.

5th. He makes one sin who, intending to steal some determined sum of money, takes it away on several occasions lest he be detected, because there is one evil act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft. On the contrary, he perpetrates several sins who on several occasions steals from the same mass of money, without having determined from the beginning to carry off the whole, because the individual thefts effect an object total in itself. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 141.

6th. He makes several sins who fornicates several times with the same woman; for each fornication is terminated in itself, or constitutes a total object by its own nature. - The same must be said concerning diverse pollutions. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46.

n. 134.

Questions

Question 1. Whether one sin or several sins are committed by one who by one act detracts from an entire religious community, or by one blow kills several men, or snatches a purse belonging to several associates?

Response. It is greatly controverted: according to St. Alphonsus and many others, several sins are committed in these cases, both because the rights of several are violated, and because detraction, a blow, or theft of this kind is virtually multiple in the judgment of prudent persons. - But many others, and theologians of great note, probably hold that only one sin is committed, because there is one act of the will, one account by which that multiple object is apprehended, and one external manifestation of the malice of the will. But to the reason taken from the violation of the rights of several, they respond that when someone does not obey different superiors commanding the same thing, he certainly commits one sin, although he violates the rights of several. - A fortiori the same Doctors teach that one sin is committed when, by one act of the will, one tends ineffectively to several objects apprehended after the manner of one thing, for example, if someone by one act should desire several women by simple affection or complacency. But in the case of an efficacious purpose of perpetrating something which would have to be reached by diverse external acts, there would be several sins; and therefore he would sin several times who efficaciously willed to omit several fasts, to approach several women, or the same woman several times. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 45. - Lacroix, n. 149. - Baller., note (b), p. 141.

n. 134, Q. 2.

Question 2. Does he make several sins who detracts before several persons?

Response. Probably he makes only one sin, because to detract before several persons is only an aggravating circumstance: for the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple. Wherefore, practically speaking, there is no obligation of explaining in confession the number of persons before whom someone has detracted, but it suffices to say: I detracted before several persons. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 49.

n. 134, Q. 3.

Question 3. Must the means employed for sinning be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated?

Response. Some affirm this, even if those means were not evil in themselves, as to undertake the journey, to carry a ladder for theft, etc., and their reason is that the sin then does not remain only internal, but becomes external by those means. For those actions, although they are indifferent in themselves, nevertheless become evil from the evil end.

But others probably deny it, unless those means are evil in themselves; in which case they ought to be indicated, and indeed all of them if they are diverse in species, as touches or obscene words employed for soliciting. Indeed others say that the means are not necessarily to be explained even when they are evil in themselves and diverse in species; but that it suffices if the sinner accuses himself thus, for example, I willed to commit fornication, but although I employed certain means, I could not. - Cf. D'Annibale, 1, n. 287, n. 15. - De Lugo, De Poenit., n. 566. - Varceno, vol. 1, p. 259. - Baller., note (b), p. 143.

n. 134, Q. 4.

Question 4. Does he commit several sins who wishes several diverse evils upon an enemy?

Response. Affirmatively, of itself, if the intention of the one imprecating is borne determinately to evils of diverse species, for example, infamy and death; because desire takes its species from the desired object, as will be said below. But by accident there would be one sin, namely when these diverse evils are apprehended almost under the general account of evil, as means to ruin; which is accustomed to happen when imprecations proceed from an impulse of anger. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 50; and Hom. Ap., n. 65.

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. II, Chapter I. On Internal Sins

n. 135.

A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1st. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through imagination as present, without desire.

2nd. Joy, or deliberate approval of an evil work performed either by oneself or by another, by which the will holds the perpetrated evil as pleasing and acceptable.

3rd. Desire, or an act of the will seeking an evil thing as to be obtained, and therefore to be carried out by work. It is called efficacious if there is present an absolute purpose of carrying it out; inefficacious if there is present only conditioned consent, for example, if someone says: I would steal if I could; or I would fornicate with this woman unless I feared infamy, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Therefore morose delectation is concerned with the object, not as it is in itself, but as here and now it is presented to the imagination; joy, on the contrary, and desire are concerned with the object as it once was or will be in itself.

n. 136.

I Say 1st. Desire of an evil thing, even inefficacious, is truly sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances. The reason for the first is that it is base and dishonorable to desire absolutely or conditionally what it is not lawful to carry out. The reason for the second is that every desire, even inefficacious, tends toward its object, and therefore is a willing of the special malice of that object, and so contracts it. The reason for the third is the same; for desire, since it tends toward the object as to be carried out by work, reaches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. - Hence in confession, for example, of a desire of fornicating, there must be declared the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the desired person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 12.

I say 2nd. Joy likewise is sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action with which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of past evil, which necessarily embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, clothed namely with its circumstances. Hence one who, in the recollection of past sins, takes complacency in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned again in act.

To joy are to be reduced boasting concerning a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed.

I say 3rd. Morose delectation is certainly sin, and certainly also takes on the gravity and species of the objects exhibited to the mind. The reason for the first is that it is repugnant to rational nature and divine law for the will to hold as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Besides, deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear of itself. Therefore ... Hence in Osee ix, 10, it is said: "They became abominable like those things which they loved." But the reason for the second is that whoever takes delight in an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection; and therefore the malice of that delectation will plainly be evil with the same gravity and species by which the object is evil. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 74, art. 8. - St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

n. 137.

Questions

Question 1. Does morose delectation take on also the specific malice of the circumstances of the object, as desire and joy do?

Response. Negatively, probably, according to many theologians; and the reason is that simple delectation does not tend toward the object as it really exists, but rests in it as it is represented by phantasy. Moreover this, neither from the nature of the thing nor in fact, is accustomed to represent all circumstances, but only that one which moves the delectation more. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 148.

n. 137, Q. 2.

Question 2. Is it lawful to desire an evil under the condition, if it were licit?

Response. Affirmatively, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the thing, because such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object from which by the condition malice is altogether excluded. But the response would be negative in another hypothesis, because such an affection tends toward an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object even as represented, as would be blasphemy, perjury, etc. Nevertheless he would probably be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly did not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but only showed his propensity toward that object. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27; and Hom. Ap., n. 50.

For the rest, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition added would remove the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural right, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Bertha if I did not have a wife. Cajetan deservedly calls these desires foolish and diabolical temptations. Indeed also other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive right are to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection. - Cf. Cajet., under the title Sins of Thought.

n. 137, Q. 3.

Question 3. Is it lawful to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left aside from forgetfulness?

Response. Although it is never lawful to rejoice or take delight either concerning an evil omission or concerning an evil work, even when inculpably admitted, according as they were evil in themselves; yet it is lawful, of itself, that is, with the danger of consent to delectation concerning the evil cause excluded, to rejoice or take delight concerning the good and honorable effect which arose from them.

But whether it is also lawful to rejoice or take delight concerning the evil cause itself, not according as it is evil, but according as it was the cause of a good effect, many affirm with Lessius, Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, and others; but St. Alphonsus, with several others, denies it, alleging proposition 15, condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance." - But it must be said that it is not clear whether by this proposition absolutely every joy concerning an inculpable evil work was condemned; or rather only the joy was reprobated by which the son, against the right order of charity, places the good of a much inferior order, namely the riches obtained from it, before the death of his parent. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Lessius, de just. et jure, lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 105. - Suarez, disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 15. - Lugo, de poenit., disp. 16, n. 389. - Viva, in the cited proposition, n. 12. - Baller., note (a), p. 152; and note (c), p. 186.

n. 138.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is not lawful to be delighted concerning nocturnal pollution according to itself and on account of its pleasure, but it is certainly lawful to be delighted concerning it according as it is an exoneration or alleviation of nature. For the defect of free consent through sleep, although it cannot make licit a delectation inherent in an evil work which thereafter is freely taken, nevertheless can very well excuse the exterior work from fault. And this is the true doctrine of St. Thomas, who also refers a base dream to the natural cause of pollution, to which can be reduced also the touches or motions following that same dream. "For when," he says, "seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of the humor has been made, ... the one sleeping dreams those things which pertain to the expulsion of such abundant or resolved humor; just as also happens when nature is burdened from some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination." - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 154, art. 5; and in 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Baller., note (b), p. 149.

2nd. The confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice concerning an advantage coming to them from their own sin or another's, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor. The same is to be feared concerning one who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but one which arises from his misfortune, for example, from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For sometimes joy concerning the evil of the neighbor can creep in rather than concerning the good effect arising from it, especially if he previously bore enmity against him; therefore the confessor, if the matter seems to demand it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent.

Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

3rd. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, and another to be delighted concerning the manner, for example, an ingenious one, by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed can of itself be free from fault), nevertheless the confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who gladly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except for manifesting the ingenious manner by which they were done, especially when a habit of consenting to evil delectation confirms this suspicion.

4th. It is not mortal to be sad concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is only troublesome, or in the divided sense of the law, for example, concerning the trouble of fasting.

5th. If the penitent accuses himself of some evil thought, he is to be asked whether he knew it to be sin; and if he responds that he detested it as soon as he knew it to be base, he is to be judged altogether immune from sin. - If he responds that for some time he had some confused cognition of malice and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial sin. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it is to be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a timorous conscience.

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. II, Chapter II. On Capital Sins

n. 139.

Capital sins are so called because they are as it were the heads or fountains of other sins. Hence they should be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in general.

Seven are enumerated, namely: 1st. Pride; 2nd. Avarice; 3rd. Lust; 4th. Envy; 5th. Anger; 6th. Sloth; 7th. Gluttony. But how fittingly all sins are reduced to seven heads St. Thomas explains excellently, 1-2, q. 84, art. 4.

We shall say very few things here about the individual capital sins, but we shall carefully indicate the places of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus to which recourse must be had for a fuller exposition of the doctrine.

n. 140.

I. - On Pride

Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence, and is distinguished into perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect. It is called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is pleased with himself that he is in the disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of superiors. But this, by that very fact, always includes mortal sin in itself. In other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it is accustomed to introduce only venial sin. From pride proceed ambition, vain glory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 162; and QQ. DD. De Malo, qq. 8 and 9.

n. 141.

II. - On Avarice

Avarice is the disordered appetite of temporal goods. It is opposed to justice or to liberality. If the former, it will easily issue into mortal sin, namely as often as it impels one to grave injustice toward the neighbor. - If the latter, of itself it will produce only venial sins. For the rest, excessive affection toward earthly things can impel, and indeed is accustomed to impel, into other even grave sins. From avarice also proceed hardness of heart toward the miserable, disquiet of soul, perfidy, deceit, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 118; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 13.

n. 142.

III. - On Lust

Lust is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing. Lust is a grave sin from its whole genus; but this is to be understood if venereal delectation is deliberate in itself and directly willed. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it sometimes admits smallness of matter, as will be said more fully below where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is treated.

Blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, hatred of God, languor of faith, indeed even loss of faith, are effects of lust. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, qq. 153 and 154; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 15.

IV. - On Envy

Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is judged as one's own evil, or at least as one's lesser good. To it is reduced joy concerning the evil of another, which is judged an increase of one's own good. Envy is directly against charity, and from its genus, although not from its whole genus, imports grave sin. From envy proceed detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 36; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 10.

V. - On Anger

Anger is the kindling of the soul, and a disordered motion against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is the habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial, if it is only a disordered motion of the soul. - Anger generates indignation, rancor, shouting, insults, blasphemies, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 158; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 12. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 80 and seq.

Tr. I, Disputation II: On Unbelief, Question I: What unbelief is, and what kind of sin it is · Tr. I, Disputation II: On Unbelief, Question II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins · Tr. I, Disputation XI: On Hatred, Question II: What sin hatred is, and what kind · Tr. I, Disputation XII: On Sloth, Sole Question: What sloth is, and what its object is

VI. - On Sloth

Sloth in general sounds the same as laziness; but more strictly it is torpor of mind and weakness of will, from which distaste for spiritual things flows because of the labor and trouble attached to them. - If it is so great that grave obligations are omitted from it, it must be held grave; if otherwise, it is to be judged slight. Torpor, wandering of the mind, nausea in prayer, etc., are the fruits of sloth. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 35; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 11. - St. Alphonsus, n. 84.

n. 146.

VII. - On Gluttony

Gluttony is the disordered appetite of food or drink, and from its genus it is nothing but venial sin. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone unfit for duties. - From gluttony come drunkenness, about which more fully presently, dullness of mind, buffoonery, much speaking, and uncleanness of every kind. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 148 and 150; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 14. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 74 and seq.

Note. - It would perhaps be very fitting to consult St. Thomas concerning sobriety. Sobriety is especially concerned with drink having the power of making drunk. For sobriety preserves measure: "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor, 2-2, q. 149, a. 1, "it especially assigns to itself that matter in which it is especially praiseworthy to preserve measure. But of this kind is drink capable of making drunk, because its measured use contributes much and a moderate excess harms much, because it impedes the use of reason more than excess of food." And ibid. ad 3: "although measure is required in all things, nevertheless sobriety is not properly said in all things, but in those things in which measure is especially necessary." Now then, "it pertains to moral virtue to preserve the good of reason against those things by which it can be impeded. And therefore," he says ibid. a. 2, "where a special impediment of reason is found, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue for removing it. But intoxicating drink has a special account of impeding the use of reason, insofar as namely it disturbs the brain by its fumes. And therefore ... a special virtue is required, which is sobriety." And although "food and drink commonly can impede the good of reason, by absorbing it through immoderation of delectation, ... drink capable of making drunk impedes according to a special account." Would that also the following words of the Angelic Doctor were noted by some: "in all drinks capable of making drunk there is one and the same account of impeding the use of reason. And thus that diversity of drinks is related accidentally to virtue." Ibid. ad 3. No food or drink, speaking according to itself, is illicit. Yet drink can be rendered illicit by accident, either "because by wine [a man] is easily harmed, or because by a special vow he is obliged not to drink wine," or "from the manner of drinking, because namely he exceeds measure in drinking," or "on the part of others who are scandalized by this." Ibid. art. 3. To the objection that the use of wine is totally illicit, because it impedes wisdom without which someone cannot be in the state of salvation, the Angelic Doctor responds: "Wisdom can be had in two ways. In one way according to the common mode, insofar as it suffices for salvation. And thus it is not required for having wisdom that someone altogether abstain from wine, but that he abstain from the immoderate use of wine. In another way according to a certain degree of perfection. And thus it is required in some persons, for perceiving wisdom perfectly, that they altogether abstain from wine, according to the conditions of certain persons and places." ad 1. But for women and young people, if we regard proneness to pursuing bodily pleasures, "for old men in whom reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others, and for Bishops or any ministers of the Church who with devout mind ought to insist upon spiritual offices, and for kings who by wisdom ought to govern the subject people, sobriety is specially enjoined." Ibid. a. 4. - Cf. the places to be cited at n. 148 from St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; 2-2, q. 150, a. 2.

n. 147.

On Drunkenness

Drunkenness is a voluntary excess in drink unto disturbance of reason, whether this is done from or with pleasure, or without pleasure. But it is divided into perfect and imperfect. The first is had when the use of reason is altogether taken away, so that the drunk man is incapable of acting morally; but the other is that by which the mind is indeed disturbed, yet still has the power to discern between good and evil.

But many others, following St. Thomas, define the vice of drunkenness as: superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone unto deprivation of the use of reason.

n. 148.

Principle

Perfect drunkenness is always a mortal sin, but imperfect drunkenness of itself is only venial. The reason for the first is gathered both from the consent of theologians and the estimation of God-fearing men, and because to deprive oneself of the use of reason in a violent and unnatural way, and indeed in such a way that it cannot immediately be recovered, gravely repugns rational nature; and finally because in the Scriptures, for example, I Cor. vi, 10, drunkards are excluded from the kingdom of God. But the reason for the second is both because there is no grave disordering as long as one can act morally, and because the consent of theologians so holds. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 75. But St. Thomas speaks thus, 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its own account it has this, that it is a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself unable to use reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue. But that it is venial sin happens on account of a certain ignorance or infirmity, for instance when a man does not know the strength of wine or his own weakness, whence he does not think that he will be made drunk: for then drunkenness is not imputed to him as sin, but only overabundance of drink. But when he is frequently made drunk, he cannot be excused through this ignorance, without his will seeming to choose rather to suffer drunkenness than to abstain from superfluous wine, whence the sin returns to its own nature." Therefore the drunk man is guilty of a twofold disordering according to St. Thomas: by drinking wine from pleasure alone; and by drinking from excess unto the loss of the use of reason without any motive which would justify even the account of excessive drink. Cf. Baller., tr. 4, n. 381, seq. - Azor., l. 7, c. 33, q. 5. - Lessius, lib. 4, c. 3, d. 3, n. 13. - Dicastillo, lib. 1, disp. 3, d. 11, n. 104.

n. 149.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is lawful to use any liquors whatever, as medicine for driving away diseases, for example, typhus, even if drunkenness is foreseen as going to follow, provided nevertheless that it is not directly intended, and the salvation of the soul is not placed in danger. It is required namely 1st. that drunkenness follow only indirectly, and 2nd. that no danger be present that the sick man die without reception of the sacraments. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, a. 2, ad 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 76. St. Thomas speaks thus: "When someone drinks much according to the counsel of medicine ... the drink is not reputed superfluous." l. c.

2nd. The same seems able to be said of those of our country who take a great quantity of liquor in order to expel or restrain the poison which they have drawn from the bites of serpents; for drunkenness, if any follows in such a case, would be said to have followed only indirectly. In this case it is not taken from the pleasure of wine alone nor without necessity.

3rd. It can never be lawful to assume drunkenness as a means for obtaining some effect, however good, because evils are not to be done that goods may come. But if a great quantity of liquor were taken, not indeed for violent deprivation of the use of reason, but for relaxing and thus soothing the nerves, so that from this some surgical operation may be done more easily, it does not appear why this would be illicit, since it is said to be lawful to use opium or ether for performing similar operations.

4th. Those mothers or nurses are altogether to be condemned who, for quieting the tears of children, use alcoholic or opiated drinks, and thus from the first age introduce an evil custom into them.

5th. A fortiori doctors are to be condemned who recur to the same remedy in order to provoke the sick to gladness or to lessen pains of the body; for those acting thus, although perhaps they can be excused from the sin of drunkenness, because they procure it only indirectly, nevertheless certainly introduce an evil custom into the sick if they recover; or, if they die, expose them to the danger of eternal damnation.

6th. Certainly they sin gravely who by command, counsel, or provocation induce others to drunkenness, or induce them to drink with foresight of future drunkenness: something which here and there is done under the vain pretext of friendship or civility.

7th. Likewise he who drinks to excess in order to free himself from the death which another threatens against him does not drink from the pleasure of wine alone or without cause; hence it is not sin.

n. 150.

Questions

Question 1. What must be said concerning the promise not to drink (the pledge) as it is accustomed to be made among us?

Response. Although a promise of this kind is good in itself, and, as daily experience establishes, offers an excellent remedy for amending the life of many, nevertheless the practice of receiving it is not without difficulties. For if it is said openly, what theologically speaking is certainly true, namely that violation of that promise is no sin or only venial sin, it will scarcely not happen that the whole efficacy of the remedy vanishes. But from the other side, if nothing is said, many and grave sins will be perpetrated from an ill-formed conscience; since there are many who judge violations of that promise to be graver sins than perfect drunkenness. Therefore much prudence and discretion is needed in receiving promises of this kind. - Wherefore, if there are those who doubt concerning the quantity of that obligation and inquire about it, or if they are not so untaught that they can easily grasp an explanation, or are not drawn to liquors by an utterly mad and ruined love, it will be useful, indeed necessary, to explain to them what the nature of that promise is; for since this is not a vow, but only a purpose manifested to a priest, it cannot of itself oblige under grave sin. But in the other hypothesis perhaps it would be better to say nothing, and to bear oneself permissively concerning those grave sins which would follow; for the lessening of drunkenness will be a sufficient reason for permitting them. - Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, May 1883, pp. 338 and seq.

n. 150, Q. 2.

Question 2. What must be said concerning those sodalities recently instituted for extirpating the vice of drunkenness?

Response. That they are very good and are preferred by many apostolic laborers to the other remedy which consists in the promise not to drink. The reason is that these more recent remedies, while from one side they foster piety more, which is the beginning of every true conversion, from the other side offer no occasion of new sins. The Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore indeed alluded to these remedies in the following words: "Since monstrous scandals arise from excessive drinking, we exhort pastors, and beseech them by the bowels of Jesus Christ, that they put every zeal into eliminating the vice of drunkenness. To this end, we judge worthy of praise the zeal of those faithful who abstain from every ardent liquor in order to decline more safely the danger of excesses. But those who spontaneously enter a society among themselves, so that by mutual examples of virtues they may help and strengthen one another, ought first of all to employ those aids which Christ the Lord left in the Church, by which human vices are amended and infirmity is sustained; and by prayer, frequent reception of the sacraments, and other exercises of piety, to obtain heavenly aid for themselves, and to trust not in themselves, nor in their purposes, but in God, without whom human effort profits nothing." But the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, speaking more explicitly, say: "The societies which come under the name of 'Catholic Union for promoting Total Abstinence' and 'Sacred Thirst,' we acknowledge as worthy of great praise; for they are governed by a truly Catholic spirit, and seek the necessary strength not so much in firmness of their own will as in the power of prayers and of the sacraments. Moreover it is known that the Head of the whole Church and Vicar of Christ on earth has more than once enriched them with his apostolic blessing and with the indulgences of the Church. Therefore we also exhibit to the same the signs of our benevolence, and that they may flourish the more, we commend them to the paternal care of all our priests, that they may not only add courage to them but also always show them the Catholic path." Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 470 and seq.; and Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 260 and seq.

Very recently special spiritual graces in favor of the faithful enrolled in societies of Temperance or Abstinence from intoxicating drink were conceded by the Supreme Pontiff Pius X on 21 May 1914 - namely: indulgences both plenary and partial, and also an altogether singular favor by virtue of which all Masses which are applied by any priest whatsoever for the soul of some deceased member can assist that soul as if they had been celebrated at a privileged altar. These graces were granted by the Supreme Pontiff wishing to show his more favorable will toward the aforesaid Societies and to find their Members more eager in advancing so salutary a purpose. - Acta Apost. Sed., v. VI, p. 309.

n. 150, Q. 3.

Question 3. Is it lawful to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

Response. Affirmatively, if drunkenness is only material to him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc. But they more commonly deny it if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done that goods may come: nevertheless St. Alphonsus, n. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others, "because it is lawful to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater." For when someone can be deterred from perpetrating a greater evil by no other means, to persuade the lesser evil has the account of good. See below n. 185. Q. 5th.

Note. - 1st. Habitual excessive drink produces enormous harms for the individual, the family, and society. It harms the health, fortune, and morals of individuals: domestic peace departs from the family, horrible crimes are committed, reason itself day by day becomes degenerate and more vicious.

Personal remedies: for all to avoid the occasions of this sin and those persons and assemblies by whom temperance is violated; to acquire strength by exercise of this virtue and of Christian mortification, and by consideration of motives both natural and supernatural by which men may become stronger against the vice of drunkenness, finally by petition of divine aid. - Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath., under the word Gourmandise.

2nd. The use of morphine, chloroform, and other medicines bringing exile of reason must be ruled by these general principles. The use of morphine, etc., for calming grave pains by soothing the senses is permitted in surgical operations, in more difficult births, and in general when there is a just cause. The use of morphine, etc., taken habitually induces an unquenchable thirst, to which follows unfitness for performing grave duties, and servitude under the medicine itself: such use is gravely prohibited; indeed doctors sin gravely who so frequently prescribe these things to the sick that there is proximate danger of inducing this habit or desire for morphine. The use of morphine which does not bring with it this danger but only a lessening of pains is not illicit of itself. The use of morphine, etc., inducing the loss of the exercise of reason for a long time without cause is certainly a grave sin.

The use of morphine, etc., employed with the dying without their consent so that they may remain in a state of semi-wakefulness is a grave sin and against natural right: such use in those circumstances, that is, with one dying, is gravely illicit when he is not prepared by the sacraments for dying, nor is it lawful for him to consent to it. If he is prepared and there is no danger of falling into grave sin, doctors are to be deterred from employing these means. But what if the pains are most bitter and extraordinary, for example, if someone is burned by slow fire in a conflagration, and cannot be removed from the flames themselves, because, say, he is held by the beams of the house? Is it lawful in this case, when there is no danger of falling into a state of sin, without the consent of the dying man so to soothe his senses that he will remain in fainting until death? It is not lawful: because he has a right to acquire enormous merits. What if he himself wishes it, or if there is danger of falling into grave sin? In those most difficult circumstances let the priest assist him with every help and exhortation so that he may suffer the pains bravely. If at last the sacred minister himself fears, let him be silent; indeed it does not seem altogether certainly prohibited so to soothe the senses, because in the case, morally speaking, he is a prepared sick man: to this indeed he is bound, but it is not clear that he is bound to acquire greater merits. It is his right: but whether a grave obligation rests upon him, this is not evident. Cf. Villada, Cas., v. 3, p. 309. Lehmkuhl speaks more severely, n. 892, ed. 11a.

3rd. Nor does artificial sleep seem illicit, by which, induced by medicinal injections, a woman giving birth does not fully perceive the pains of birth. During this state, so it is reported, she is not deprived of the use of the senses; afterward, however, she is said not to remember those things which then happened, and the sleep is called twilight. Moreover we affirm that if the woman in that state is duly protected, if the doctor is prudent, if care is applied so that nothing harmful happens either to the woman or to the fetus, the matter is done licitly. But another thing would have to be said if these conditions were not verified.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 87 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Tr. I, Disputation II: On Unbelief, Question I: What unbelief is, and what kind of sin it is

It is TO BE NOTED, from St. Bonaventura on those words Lucas 19. Non relinquent in te lapidem super lapidem: eo quod non cognoveris tempus visitationis tuae — There shall not be left in thee a stone upon a stone: because thou hast not known the time of thy visitation — that Infidelity is the ruin of the spiritual edifice; just as faith, on the contrary, is the foundation of that edifice. But this is Infidelity, not that which is opposed to Fidelity, which is a moral virtue inclining toward faith, or a promise to be kept, of which Eccles. 5. Displicet Deo infidelis promissio — An unfaithful promise displeaseth God — as the holy Doctor warns on that passage; but it is the infidelity that is opposed to the Theological virtue, as I said, disp. 1. quaest. 1., with St. Bonau. That Infidelity is a sin, I showed in disput. 1. quaest. 14. and the following, where the obligation to believe the articles of faith, and other matters, were treated of; and therefore it can be sinned against by grave omission, in not learning the things of faith that have been sufficiently proposed.

But Infidelity can be sinned against in TWO WAYS: either positively, by attacking and refusing the truth of faith once acknowledged, and this is called infidelity of contrariety; Or privatively, by lacking the due knowledge. Some add another negative lack, which is through invincible ignorance, but this the majority do not admit, with St. Bonavent. 3. dist. 21. art. 1. quaest. 3., of which I treated in Prima secundae, tract. de peccato, disp. 1. quaest 1.

Infidelity is DIVIDED, moreover, into Heresy, Judaism, and Paganism, by St. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 5. and St. Bonau. p. 1. Gentil. sect. 26. There the holy Doctor proves that infidelity is the greatest sin among sins, viz. Ioan. 16. Arguet mundum de peccato, etc. quia non crediderunt in me — He will argue the world of sin, etc. because they believed not in me. He calls this Sin antonomastically. And Ioan. 3. Qui non credit, iam iudicatus est: quia non credidit in nomine Unigeniti filii Dei — He that doth not believe is already judged: because he hath not believed in the name of the Only-begotten Son of God. And of Mark, at the end: Qui vero non crediderit, condemnabitur — But he that believeth not shall be condemned — as if the supreme punishment were prepared for the unfaithful. I said, with St. Bonau., that infidelity is the greatest sin among sins, because no one on the way hates God expressly, but only interpretatively, as St. Bonau. teaches on those words Ioan. 15. Et oderunt me, et Patrem meum — And they hated me, and my Father. Interpretatively indeed they hate, insofar as they are turned away from Him through sins, or would not be punished; but formal hatred is the proper possession of the damned.

St. THOMAS compares infidelity with the hatred of God, and says that this is worse, because it is opposed to Charity, which is greater, 1 Corinth. 13. But that Infidelity is greater, he says, than Despair, as I shall say in disp. 6. quaest. un., although the latter is more perilous. See also Tannerus T. 1. quaest. 8. dub. 1.

Furthermore, the holy Doctor places infidelity in the intellect, in 3. dist. 5. quaest. 5. ad 4.; for it is opposed to faith, which is in the intellect and the will, or in free choice, as I said, disp. 1. quaest. 18. Of this treat Suarez disp. 16. sect. 3., Hurtado disp. 67., Lugo disp. 18. sect. 1. They ask especially: whether the sin of infidelity is always consummated in the intellect; whether sometimes in the Will alone.

Suarez loc. cit., Coninch. disp. 18. dub. 3., Tannerus 2. 2. disp. 1. quaest. 8. dubio secundo, Fuliens. lib. 3. cap 6. DENY it.

Valentia disp. 1. quaest. 10. p. 1., Hurtado disp. 68. sect. 2. ASSERT it, which opinion, understood Metaphysically, pleases Lugo, num. 9, although, speaking commonly, he adheres to the former. Fuliens., however, says that the objective malice is in the intellect, which fails from faith; but the formal [malice] in the will, from which the perverse act of the intellect freely goes forth.

Tr. I, Disputation II: On Unbelief, Question II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

The sectaries of this time clamor that all the works of infidels are sins. So Luther, art. 36. among those condemned by Leo X; Melanchthon in Apol. confess. Augustana; Bucerus lib. de concordia communi; Calvin lib. 2. Instit. cap. 3.; Kemnitius in examine sess. 6. can. 7.

But the opinion of Gregory of Rimini was, 2. sent. dist. 41. quaest. un. art. 2., that every action of that infidel is evil who is wholly ignorant of God; but not the actions of heretics, who at least acknowledge God. Capreolus, however, in 2. dist. 41. quaest. un. art. 3., thinks that at least every commanded action, done by an infidel at the time it is commanded, is evil, because it ought to be referred to the true God, which infidels do not do, since they do not know the true God: and in this he favors Gregory.

Yet it is most true that some works of infidels are good.

It is proved first from St. Bonaventure, 3. dist. 38. dub. 2. ex 7 primo Exodi, where the midwives of Egypt are praised, because against the king's command they kept alive the Hebrew infants, to which they were bound by both Divine and natural law. Now those midwives were infidels. And of them it is said: Quia timuerunt Deum, aedificavit eis domos — Because they feared God, he built them houses. There St. Jerome says: AEdificavit eis domos spirituales: Ergo aliquam spiritualem rem adeptae sunt — He built them spiritual houses: therefore they attained some spiritual thing.

It is proved second from the Saintly Doctor, from what is said in prima secundae, tract. 5. qui de Gratia, disp. 1. quaest. 10., where it is shown that by the powers of nature one can perform a good moral work.

It is proved third from the Saintly Doctor here, because neither faith nor sanctifying grace is required for a good moral work, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 6. cap. 7., where under anathema they condemn those who say that every action of man before justification is sin.

The same is proved from the Fathers: Ambrose lib. 1. de Abraham, cap. 2.; Jerome in fine lib. 2. com. in epistolam ad Galat.; Augustine lib. de spiritu, et litt. cap. 27. et 28.; Chrysostom homil. 67. ad popul. See Tanner disp. 1. q. 8. dub. 4.

They object certain passages of Scripture, Matth. 7. Non potest arbor mala bonos fructus facere — A bad tree cannot bring forth good fruit.

n. 9.

The Saintly Doctor answers here, from St. Augustine lib. 1. cont. Iulianum, cap. 3. et in Enchir. cap. 15., that the bad tree is said to be the will, insofar as it wills something badly, or insofar as the will of that infidel is not perfectly good. So also Tanner and others.

n. 10.

Second they object that word of Ioan. 15. Sine me nihil potestis facere — Without me you can do nothing.

n. 11.

The Saintly Doctor answers on that passage, and in 2. dist. 28. art. 2. quaest. 3., that He speaks of meritorious works, and of those which are a disposition to salvation de congruo. Then it suffices that the help of God be present, so that one may act on account of God known as the author of nature, even if faith is absent.

n. 12.

They object third, Rom. 14. Omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est — All that is not of faith is sin.

n. 13.

The Saintly Doctor answers, in 3. dist. 23. dub. 2. et in 4. dist. 39. q. 3., that he there speaks of conscience in the manner of a work, so that a deed done against conscience is evil. Thus it is expounded by St. Chrysostom, homil. 26. in epistolam ad Romanos, and by others. So also Tanner loco citato.

n. 14.

They object fourth that word of Titus 1: Coinquinatis, et infidelibus nihil est mundum — To the defiled and unbelieving nothing is clean.

n. 15.

It is answered from St. Bonaventure here, and St. Chrysostom homil. 3. ibi, that all things are unclean to infidels when they superstitiously perform their actions; for an infidel can judge one thing unclean, for instance a little wine, as well as a sow. See the rest in Valencia quaest. 10. p. 2.; Tanner loco citato.

Tr. I, Disputation XI: On Hatred, Question II: What sin hatred is, and what kind

To no one is it doubtful that hatred is a sin against Charity, as the S. Doct. shows at length on 15. Ioannis. Therefore he rebukes there the haters of God: They have hated me, and my Father. And the haters of the neighbor: But because you are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you. Levit. 19. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. Prima Ioan. 3. He who hateth his brother, is a murderer. Therefore the haters of the neighbor are rebuked, Amos 5. Proverb. 9. as S. Bonaventure reports there on 15. Ioan. Whence D. August. tract. 5. in primam Ioan.: He has not moved his hand to kill a man, and already he is held a murderer by the Lord. That one shall live; and this one is already judged an assassin. I said, however, that hatred whose material object is God, or man, is a sin; for if hatred be borne toward the sinner, as such, it is not evil, as D. Bonaventure notes on 15. Ioan., which that Psalm 138 proves: With perfect hatred I hated them, where D. Gregory in the Pastorali, p. 3. cap. 1. admon. 23.: Perfect hatred, whereby vice is hated and nature loved.

Or, if even our dear ones stand in the way of the divine service, they are to be hated, Lucae 14. If anyone come to me, and hate not Father, and Mother, as S. Bonaventure observes on that passage. But hatred against God, who is Light, Truth, and the Highest Good, is most grave and monstrous, as the S. Doct. expounds at length on 15. Ioan., ruminating those words: If I had not done among them the works which no other hath done, they would not have sin. But now both they have seen, and have hated me, and my father.

I assert first, that hatred of God is the gravest sin.

It is proved by D. Bonav. loc. cit. first with the reasoning of D. August. tract. 92. in Ioan. and Chrysost. homil. 72. in Ioan., taken from that cited Ioan. 15.: They have hated me without cause. For where is the highest good, outside of which there is no good, and in which nothing evil is to be found, it would necessarily, as to specification, be to be loved; and it is most monstrous to hate it. It is confirmed from Aristotle 8. Eth. cap. 10.: That is worst which is contrary to the best. But hatred of God is contrary to Charity, which is the highest virtue, since it is borne toward the Highest Good insofar as it is the Highest Good: Therefore.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonav. in the Incendio amoris, and Stimulo amoris, because, as it is the greatest duty to love the Highest Goodness, from which there come to us Being, Life, and all good things; so it is the greatest abomination and iniquity, to be carried in hatred against that goodness, and to will its destruction.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonav. in the places cited, and elsewhere everywhere, with the reasoning which D. Thom. also uses, art. 2.: because as Charity is best, because the whole adheres wholly to God, as God is; so hatred of him is worst, because it turns the whole away from God, and in every way. With these and similar arguments all the works of the Seraphic Doctor are filled.

S. Bonaventure notes, however, that wayfaring men ordinarily do not hate God explicitly, but only implicitly, insofar as they are turned away from him, that they may be converted to a changeable good; and therefore all sins virtually contain hatred of God, as Valentia also notes, disp. 3. quaest. 11. puncto 2.

I assert secondly, that to hate the neighbor is a most grave sin.

n. 9.

It is proved by the S. Doct. ad cap. 15. Ioan. and collat. 70. homi. de enim., where those are called haters of the neighbor, as I said. There he brings forward many Fathers asserting hatred to be detestable: Gregory homil. 27. in Evang. and D. August. saying: To hold hatred against a brother is to stop up the fountain of Charity.

n. 10.

Hence the S. Doct. lib. 1. de profectu religiosi, cap. 29., among the remedies of hatred, puts first to consider seriously that God does not spare him who does not spare, as is said Matth. 18. Whence he who wishes to be saved must lay aside hatred, and it is better to do this with certainty; now it is always of its genus a mortal sin; but per accidens it can be venial, first from imperfection of deliberation. Secondly, when he wishes the neighbor the greatest evil. So Suarez de Charitate, tract. 3. disp. 6. sect. 1. Azorius Tom. 3. lib. 2. cap. 20. Sylvester v. odium. Fagundez in 10. praecept. Decalogi, lib. 10. cap. 2. num. 22.

n. 11.

Nay, of its genus it is the greatest sin, among those things which are done against the neighbor. So D. Thom. quaest. 34. art. 4. and Suarez. For although the harms inflicted on the neighbor aggravate other sins above hatred; yet this is worse by the disordination of the will, because it turns one altogether from the Neighbor, the object of Charity, by the natural and Divine law of loving.

n. 12.

It is not placed, however, among the capital vices, because other sins do not proceed first from it, but it is rather the dregs of other sins — Envy, Anger, etc. — from which dregs others then crawl. So D. Thom. art. 5. Fagundez num. 24.

n. 13.

From what has been said you have that hatreds against God and against the neighbor are diverse in species, because the objects are diverse; nor have they of themselves that one should be for the sake of the other, as we said in Charity with D. Bonavent. 3. dist. 27. quaest. 2.

n. 14.

Nay, each hatred seems to be doubled, insofar as they turn away from the natural and supernatural Divine good; likewise also that of the neighbor, as Bannes said, art. 6.; but Valentia puncto 2. assents to the opposite.

Tr. I, Disputation XII: On Sloth, Sole Question: What sloth is, and what its object is

ACEDIA is a Greek word, ἀκηδία, which signifies carelessness, or negligence. Then also a certain sadness that aggravates and oppresses the soul, so that it brings forth that carelessness. Now that sadness can be either of sense, or of the will. Here it is taken for the sadness of the will, bringing forth carelessness in the good work.

Now this can be described, from D. Thom. art. 1. and D. Bonavent. p. 1. Centil. sect. 21. and in Diaeta, tit. 2. cap. 7. and in the Declaratione terminorum Theologiae, where Latius also describes its daughters in the speculo animae, cap. 3.: Acedia is the sadness of the will concerning a good, in some measure divine and ours, esteemed as an evil of one's own, on account of the difficulty joined to obtaining it, bringing forth in consequence carelessness and torpor in salutary works.

From these you have, first, that Acedia is a sin, since it is sadness about good. Hence you will find this tepidity rebuked in Scripture, Proverb 8. How long, sluggard, wilt thou sleep? Then: The sluggard wills, and wills not. Ecclesiast. 6. Subject thy shoulder, and bear it, that is, spiritual discipline, and be not grieved with its bands. Matth. 3. Every tree that doth not bring forth good fruit shall be cut down, etc. Therefore at Matth. 25. and Lucae 19. the servant is gravely punished, because he hid the talent dug in the earth, as the S. Doct. shows in the speculo animae, cap. 3., where he also observes that that lukewarm one is to be vomited forth, Apoc. 3.; and on 8. Lucae, him who puts the lamp under a bushel. See many Fathers in D. Bonavent. lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 10.

Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 1. The Elements of Sin · Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 2. Curiosity Sinful · Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 3. A Vocation Lost · Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 4. An Ambitious Lawyer

You HAVE secondly, that this sin is opposed to the virtue of Charity: for it is contrary to its joy, as S. Bonav. teaches, p. 1 Centiloq. loc. cit.

…and 47 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 1 passage (filed under the subtopics)

Diss. I, Chapter X — The conditions of the purpose necessary for Confession

n. XVII.

XVII. QUESTION VII. What is a near occasion, and ought a penitent to have a purpose of avoiding it? ANSWER. That is called a near occasion which, the whole complex of circumstances being regarded, gravely allures to fault, so that without great difficulty and caution men are not wont to abstain from fault. These occasions, which by very many are called near, are more often occasions proximate relatively.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 90 passages

Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 1. The Elements of Sin

Thomas, recently placed in charge of a certain mission by the bishop, is of such a disposition of mind that he fears everything, perceiving difficulties and even sin everywhere. As often as he sits in the sacred tribunal to hear confessions, he is assailed by indecent thoughts and motions; when he applies himself to the study of moral theology, the same thing always happens to him. Several times during the day he repeats the resolution to die rather than consent; nevertheless, the temptations return and cling more tenaciously. He fears, moreover, that at least sometimes, although he had a firm will to expel temptations of this kind, he resisted negligently at the beginning. Finally, for recreation he read through a certain book treating profane love, although he foresaw most grave temptations and actually suffered them; nevertheless, he remained doubtful whether he consented or not. Hence it is asked:

What is deliberately entertained pleasure, what is joy, and what is desire?

By what stages does one arrive at sinful pleasure, and how is sin committed?

How is the species of sins of this kind discerned?

Just as the object of joy and desire must be disclosed in confession, must the object of deliberately entertained pleasure also be disclosed?

What judgment is to be made concerning Thomas’s case?

Solution

For the answer to this question see “Manual of Moral Theology,” p. 149 and following.

By what degrees is sinful pleasure arrived at, and how is the sin committed?

The first stage on the road to sin is the apprehension of a sinful object by the intellect. We here suppose that this simple apprehension is not voluntary. The sinful object thus present in the mind naturally attracts the appetite and an indeliberate motion of the will toward the object is the consequence. Then the intellect notices what is going on and reflects that it would be wrong to consent to the inordinate motion. If consent be given after advertence to the wrongfulness of the object, sin is committed. So that there is no sin in the apprehension of a sinful object by the intellect, nor in the natural and indeliberate movement of the will toward that object which follows. Sin is committed by freely choosing something which is sinful, and this can not be done without previous advertence by the intellect to the sinfulness of the object.

How are the species of this sort of sin known and distinguished?

Sins are human acts, and acts are specifically distinguished by their object, so that the species of a sin is known by its object. The object in sinful desire is something wrong in the concrete, invested with certain circumstances without which the object can not exist in the concrete. Sinful desire, then, will contract the malice of the object, and that of any evil circumstances with which the object may be invested. The same is true of joy about a sin committed in the past. Morose delectation in a sinful act as represented in the mind can prescind from certain circumstances which would invest the object in the concrete, and if it does so prescind from them, they do not form part of the object of the sinful delectation, and so they do not affect its malice.

Has the object of morose delectation to be made known in confession as the object of evil joy and desire has?

Yes, in itself; for otherwise the sin will not be confessed in its kind. Thus morose delectation in a thought of fornication is quite a different sin from morose delectation in a thought of revenge. Some theologians, however, admit an exception to this rule in the case of morose delectations of impurity. They point out that ordinarily in such sins it is not so much the object which attracts as the immodest pleasure which such thoughts ordinarily cause. This immodest pleasure gives unity to the sins of thought, even though their objects are different. This opinion relieves confessors of the irksome duty of asking for details about such sins in the confessional beyond the number and the kind in general. Detailed questions about the objects of such sins frequently could not be put without danger both to the penitent and to the confessor.¹

1 Génicot, vol. i, no. 175.

The case. Thomas, a priest who has lately been put in charge of a mission, is of a timid disposition, and fears difficulties and sin everywhere. He is tempted by bad thoughts and feelings whenever he hears confessions, as he was when he studied moral theology. These temptations are not sins, for he does not consent to them. They probably come from his being afraid of them, and they will cease if he does not bother about them, and commits himself to God. Sometimes he is afraid that at least he was negligent in repelling them at once. We understand by repelling thoughts of this kind the turning away of the mind from them as far as possible. Thomas may have committed fault in this way, as it is difficult always to be prompt in rejecting such thoughts, but the negligence would not be more than a venial sin. In reading a novel for recreation, though he foresaw that serious temptations would be the result, he did not commit a sin unless he foresaw proximate danger of consenting to evil. This we must not presume in a man like Thomas. Afterward he doubts whether he gave consent to evil; as the presumption is in his favor he need not confess this. However, it will be better if Thomas will for the future seek his recreation where he is not likely to be troubled by thoughts and feelings which are always objectionable and dangerous.

Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 2. Curiosity Sinful

To Titius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, knowledge seems to be good, and therefore the desire for it seems unable to be bad. Theologians, however, seem to teach otherwise when they hand down that curiosity is sinful. Thus, according to them, the reading of an indecent book, inquiry by young people about sexual matters, and an indecent look are sins, at least venial, if they proceed from curiosity; but to inquire of the dead about truth out of curiosity is mortal. In order that he may resolve these difficulties, Titius asks:

What is curiosity, and in what does its malice consist?

Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

Let satisfaction be given to Titius and his difficulties.

Solution

What is curiosity and in what does its malice consist ?

Curiosity, in the sense in which the word is used by theologians, is an inordinate desire of knowledge. As St. Thomas teaches (II-II, question 167, article 1), knowledge is good in itself, but it may be bad incidentally, as when it is the cause of pride. And although knowledge is good, yet the desire of knowledge may be inordinate and vicious. The desire of knowledge becomes vicious if the end for which it is sought is bad, as if one studies medicine in order to poison an enemy. Moreover, all knowledge is not equally important, and so a desire of knowing what is less useful is inordinate if it stands in the way of acquiring knowledge which is necessary. A law student who requires all his time to qualify for his examinations would do wrong if he spent two hours daily in learning Chinese. If the means taken to acquire knowledge are bad, the desire becomes inordinate. Thus, as St. Thomas says, it is unlawful to seek to know the future from demons. Fourthly, a desire of knowledge is inordinate if it leads one to try to learn what surpasses his powers.

Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

No; in order that an action may be good, not only the object, but the end and all the circumstances must be good — good arises from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever. The answer, too, is clear from what was said above.

The case. Titius, a theological student, thinks that as knowledge is good the desire of it can not be evil. This difficulty has been met already. It is clear that the desire of knowledge can be inordinate, and if it is inordinate, it is sinful. Theologians are right when they teach that curiosity is at least a venial sin and that it may be mortal. Thus the reading of an improper book out of curiosity, where there is not proximate danger of consenting to evil, is a venial sin; if the book is indecent and there is proximate danger of consenting to evil, it is mortal. Before the proper time youths should not think or talk about sexual matters, as thought and talk about such matters before the time leads to impurity. Hence to indulge curiosity about them in talk, look, or reading, is at least a venial sin, and it becomes mortal if the danger of consent be proximate. To seek to know occult matters by calling up the dead is specially forbidden in Holy Scripture, and is mortally sinful.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 218; Lessius, De Justitia, lib. iv, c. 4, n. 84.

Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 3. A Vocation Lost

Mary, a nun professed in a religious institute of simple vows, then learned for the first time that sexual pleasure in marriage is lawful; if she had known this before emitting her vows, she would never have vowed. She often conceives a desire to marry if it were lawful. At length, when her aging parents, having fallen into poverty, manifest by letter their will to enjoy her presence and assistance, Mary rejoices that an occasion has been offered to request a dispensation from her vows, which she accordingly requested from her confessor. When these things have been disclosed, the latter asks:

What kind of error invalidates vows?

Is the desire for a bad thing under the condition “if it were lawful” a sin, and of what kind?

Is it lawful to rejoice at another’s misfortune?

What can or ought to be done by the confessor in the case?

Solution

What sort of mistake makes vows invalid?

Substantial mistake about the substance of the vow makes it invalid just as such a mistake makes other contracts invalid, for a vow is a promise made to God. Private vows are also rendered invalid if they were taken under a mistake about some accidental circumstance of great importance which was a principal motive for taking the vows, and probably even by a mistake about some accidental circumstance of less moment, if the mistake was such that the vows would not have been taken if the truth had been known. However, this probable opinion can not be applied to vows taken in an approved Religious Order, for such vows place the person who takes them in a fixed and permanent state of life, and only substantial mistake makes them invalid. Much in the same way marriage is a permanent state of life, and only substantial mistake can be admitted as a diriment impediment of marriage.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book iii, no. 198.

Is a desire of evil under the condition “if it were lawful” a sin, and of what sort ?

If the condition takes away the whole malice of the desire and it is not dangerous to entertain it, a conditional desire of evil is not sinful. Thus if on a Sunday I say, “I should like to stay at home to-day if the Church did not bid me go to Mass,” I do not commit a sin. This doctrine holds in matters of mere positive law. In matters which belong to natural law, where a voluntary inclination toward a wrongful act is sinful and remains sinful even under the condition “If it were allowed,” such conditional desires are wrong, and belong to the same species of sin as does the corresponding external act. Thus the conditional desire, “I should like to kill my enemy if it were lawful,” is a sin of the same malice as homicide; it is the expression of a movement of hatred for one’s neighbor which goes the length of desiring to take his life; the added condition “if it were lawful” does not annul this movement of hatred nor take away its malice.

Is it lawful to rejoice at the misfortune of another?

No; as it is uncharitable to wish evil to another, so it is uncharitable to rejoice at his misfortune. But it is not uncharitable to be glad that a misfortune has befallen my neighbor because thereby greater good accrued to him or to the public. In this case the object of joy is the good, not the misfortune, of one’s neighbor.

The case. Mary, a nun, learned after profession of simple vows that venereal pleasure is lawful in marriage, and if she had known it before she would not have become a nun. We must suppose that Mary knew what chastity is when she took her vow. Her ignorance with regard to marital rights was not substantial mistake about her vow, nor did it render the vow invalid.

She often forms a conditional desire of marrying if it were lawful. In this Mary does wrong, for although such a desire is not wrong in itself, yet one in Mary’s position can not foster such desires without exposing herself to temptations against her vow or against her vocation. How seriously Mary sinned in this would depend on the degree of danger to which she exposed herself.

Her parents become old and poor, and write to Mary that they desire her presence and help. If Mary can be of any real help to her parents, she has good reason for asking for a dispensation from her vows. If the necessity of her parents were extreme, she would be bound to go and help them; if it is grave, the question whether she is bound to go is disputed. At any rate if she can help them and relieve their necessity, she may ask for a dispensation from her vows, nor does she commit a sin in being glad of the opportunity. The confessor, however, can not grant her a dispensation; it will be his duty to consider her character and circumstances so as to be able to give her good advice. It might be that she would be useless to her parents, and would have no chance of marrying if she left her convent, in which case her confessor would advise her to stay in religion, and give what help she could to her parents with the permission of her superiors. But it might also be that, all things considered, it would be better if Mary returned to the world, and in that case the confessor would advise her how to ask for a dispensation from her vows.

Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 4. An Ambitious Lawyer

Titius, a layman of outstanding ability, was studying civil law; and, since he knew that he easily surpassed others, he hoped that he would acquire the highest honors and dignities, from which he could leave a great name to posterity. By a certain misfortune he failed in a case of great importance. Thereupon, ambition having been cast aside and reputation among others despised, he indulged in drunkenness and, if not an excuse for his vices, found at least some consolation in the sayings of ascetical writers about the vanity of the world and contempt for glory. Paul, a friend of Titius, indeed knows that Titius erred, but he finds it by no means easy to say, practically and theoretically, where virtue stands. Hence it is asked:

What is pride, and in what precisely does its malice consist?

What is ambition, and what kind of sin is it?

…and 50 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Slater, Cases II

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 10 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 11. Full and Specific Confession

Titius, a confessor, notices that some penitents do not sufficiently distinguish the different species of sins when they confess fornication although they ought to say adultery. Hence, when he hears the confessions of adults who confess fornication, he is accustomed to ask whether they are joined in marriage; nevertheless, he remains uncertain whether or not he ought to ask whether they are betrothed, for if betrothed persons sin with someone other than the betrothed, they violate the fidelity of betrothal, which obliges from justice. Titius is likewise uncertain whether he ought to ask those confessing incest about the degree of consanguinity or affinity. To furnish Titius with some light, it is asked:

Whence is the specific distinction of sins derived?

What circumstances must necessarily be expressed in confession?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

Whence is the specific distinction of sins derived?

Sins are specifically distinct when their formal objects are specifically different, or when they are opposed to specifically distinct virtues, or when they are transgressions of formally distinct laws.¹

What circumstances must necessarily be mentioned in confession?

Those circumstances which change the moral or theological species of the sin must be mentioned in confession. There is a controversy among divines as to whether circumstances which notably increase or diminish the malice of a sin, but which do not change its nature, should be mentioned in confession. The negative opinion is probable and safe.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 165.

The case. If Titius has learned by experience that in a certain place penitents do not sufficiently distinguish between adultery and fornication, he does well in general to ask those who confess fornication whether they are married. He will not be obliged to put this question in every case of such a sin being confessed; without doubt the confessions of some penitents will be so minute and descend to particulars in such a way that he will be able to rely on the theological accuracy of the terms which they use. There is no necessity for Titius to ask those penitents who confess fornication and deny that they are married whether they are betrothed. Some theologians, it is true, teach that the circumstance of betrothal changes the species of a sin of fornication committed with another woman, but others deny it, on the ground that betrothal is only a promise to give marital rights; it does not actually give them.

Titius should not ask questions about the degree or kind of relationship when incest is confessed, for it is probable that incest committed with any relation is of the same species, unless it is committed with a relation of the first degree of consanguinity in the direct line, and as this sin is very rare and asking about it might give scandal to the penitent, the confessor should not ask about it, unless in a particular case he has good reason to suspect that in fact such a sin was committed.

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 13 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Pt. II, Ch. VI, Section II. How Good becomes bounden Duty, and Evil is advanced to Sin

The great problem of Moral Philosophy is the explanation of the idea, I ought, (c. i., n. 6). We are now come close up to the solution of that problem. The word ought denotes the necessary bearing of means upon end. To every ought there is a pendent if. The means ought to be taken, if the end is to be secured. Thus we say: "You ought to start betimes, if you are to catch your train." "You ought to study harder, if you are to pass your examination." The person spoken to might reply: "But what if I do miss my train, and fail in my examination?" He might be met with another ought: "You ought not to miss the one, if you are to keep your appointment: or to fail in the other, if you are to get into a profession." Thus the train of oughts and ifs extends, until we come finally to a concatenation like the following: "You ought not to break your word, or to give needless pain to your parents, if you don't want to do violence to that nature which is yours as a reasonable being," or "to thwart your own moral development,"—and so on in a variety of phrases descriptive of the argument of the last section. Here it seems the chain is made fast to a staple in the wall. If a person goes on to ask, "Well, what if I do contradict my rational self?" we can only tell him that he is a fool for his question. The oughts, such as those wherewith our illustration commenced, Kant calls the hypothetical imperative, the form being, "You must, unless:" but the ought wherein it terminated, he calls the categorical imperative, the alternative being such as no rational man can accept, and therefore no alternative at all.

This doctrine of the Categorical Imperative is correct and valuable so far as it goes. But then it does not go far enough. The full notion of what a man ought, is what he must do under pain of sin. Sin is more than folly, more than a breach of reason. It is mild reproach to a great criminal to tell him that he is a very foolish person, a walking unreasonableness. If he chooses to contradict his rational self, is not that his own affair? Is he not his own master, and may he not play the fool if he likes? The answer is, "No, he is not his own master; he is under law, and his folly and self-abuse becomes criminal and sinful, by being in contravention of the law that forbids him to throw himself away thus wantonly."

Kant readily takes up this idea, shaping it after his own fashion. He contends,—and herein his doctrine is not merely deficient, but positively in error,—that the Categorical Imperative, uttered by a man's own reason, has the force of a law, made by that same reason; so that the legislative authority is within the breast of the doer, who owes it obedience. This he calls the autonomy of reason. It is also called Independent Morality, inasmuch as it establishes right and wrong without regard to external authority, or to the consequences of actions, or to rewards and punishments. The doctrine is erroneous, inasmuch as it undertakes to settle the matter of right and wrong without reference to external authority; and inasmuch as it makes the reason within a man, not the promulgator of the law to him, but his own legislator. For a law is a precept, a command: now no one issues precepts, or gives commands, to himself. To command is an act of jurisdiction; and jurisdiction, like justice (see c. v., s. ix., n. 1, p. 102) requires a distinction of persons, one ruler, and another subject. But the reason in a man is not a distinct subject from the will, appetites, or other faculties within him, to which reason dictates: they are all one nature, one person, one man; consequently, no one of them can strictly be said to command the rest; and the dictate of reason, as emanating from within oneself, is not a law. But without a law, there is no strict obligation. Therefore the whole theory of obligation is not locked up in the Categorical Imperative, as Kant formulated it.

The above argumentation evinces that God is not under any law; for there is no other God above Him to command Him. As for the ideas of what is meet and just in the Divine intelligence, though the Divine will, being a perfect will, is not liable to act against them, yet are those ideas improperly called a law to the Divine will, because intellect and will are identified in one God. Kant's doctrine makes us all gods. It is a deification of the human intellect, and identification of that intellect with the supreme and universal Reason; and at the same time a release of the human will from all authority extraneous to the individual. This amounts to a putting off of all authority properly so called, and makes each man as sovereign and unaccountable as his Maker. "Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God, and sit in the chair of God: and hast set thy heart as if it were the heart of God: whereas thou art a man and not God." (Ezech. xxviii. 2.) Kant is thus the father of the pantheistic school of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

But it has been contended that this phrase about a man who does wrong breaking a law, is only a metaphor and figure of speech, unless it be used with reference to the enactment of some civil community. Thus John Austin says that a natural law is a law which is not, but which he who uses the expression thinks ought to be made. At this rate sin is not a transgression of any law, except so far as it happens to be, in the lawyer's sense of the word, a crime, or something punishable in a human court of justice. There will then be no law but man's law. How then am I obliged to obey man's law? Dr. Bain answers: "Because, if you disobey, you will be punished." But that punishment will be either just or unjust: if unjust, it originates no obligation: if just, it presupposes an obligation, as it presupposes a crime and sin, that is, an obligation violated. There seems to be nothing left for John Austin but to fall back upon Kant and his Categorical Imperative, and say that whoever rebels against the duly constituted authority of the State in which he lives, is a rebel against the reason that dwells within his own breast, and which requires him to behave like a citizen. So that ultimately it is not the State, but his own reason that he has offended; and the State has no authority over him except what his own reason gives.

If this were true, there would be no sin anywhere except what is called philosophical sin, that is, a breach of the dignity of man's rational nature; and the hardest thing that could be said in reprobation of a wrongdoer, would be that he had gone against himself, and against his fellow-men, by outraging reason, the common attribute of the race.

Far worse than that has the sinner done. He has offended against his own reason, and thereby against a higher Reason, substantially distinct from his, standing to it in the relation of Archetype to type, a Living Reason, [Greek: hepsychos logos] (cf. Ar., Eth., V., iv., 7), purely and supremely rational. The Archetype is outraged by the violation of the type. Moreover, as the two are substantially distinct, the one being God, the other a faculty of man, there is room for a command, for law. A man may transgress and sin, in more than the philosophical sense of the word: he may be properly a law-breaker, by offending against this supreme Reason, higher and other than his own.

Here we must pause and meditate a parable.—There was a certain monastery where the monks lived in continual violation of monastic observance. Their Abbot was a holy man, a model of what a monk ought to be. But though perfectly cognisant of the delinquencies of his community, he was content to display to his subjects the edifying example of his own life, and to let it appear that he was aware of their doings and pained at them. He would croon softly as he went about the house old Hell's words: "Not so, my sons, not so: why do ye these kind of things, very wicked things?" But the monks took no notice of him. It happened in course of time that the Abbot went away for about ten days. What he did in that time, never transpired: though there was some whisper of certain "spiritual exercises," which he was said to have been engaged in. Certain it is, that he returned to his monastery, as he left it, a monk devout and regular: the monk was the same, but the Abbot was mightily altered. The morning after his arrival, a Chapter was held; the Abbot had the Rule read from cover to cover, and announced his intention of enforcing the same. And he was as good as his word. Transgressions of course abounded: but the monks discovered that to transgress was quite a different thing now from what it had been. Seeing the law proclaimed, and the Abbot in earnest to enforce it, they too reformed themselves: the few who would not reform had to leave. The subsequent holy lives of those monks do not enter into this history.

n. 9.

Now, we might fancy God our Lord like the Abbot of that monastery in the early years of his rule. We might fancy the Supreme Reason, displeased indeed, as Reason must be, at the excesses and follies of mankind, but not otherwise commanding men to avoid those evil courses. Were God to be thus quiescent, what we have called (n. 6) philosophical sin, would indeed carry this additional malice, beyond what was there set down, of being an offence against God, but it would not be a grievous offence: for it would not be a sin in the proper sense of the term, not being a transgression of the law of God, inasmuch as God, by the supposition, would have given no law. But the supposition itself is absurd. God could not so withhold His command. He is free indeed not to command, but that only by not creating. If He wills to have creatures, He must likewise will to bind them to certain lines of action: which will to bind in God is a law to the creature.

n. 10.

This assertion, that God cannot but will to bind His creatures to certain lines of action, must be proved, though in the ascent we have to mount to high regions, and breathe those subtle airs that are wafted round the throne of the Eternal. As God is the one source of all reality and of all power, not only can there be no being which He has not created and does not still preserve, but no action either can take place without His concurrence. God must go with His every creature in its every act: otherwise, on the creature's part, nothing could be done. Now, God cannot be indifferent what manner of act He shall concur unto. A servant or a subject may be indifferent what command he receives: he may will simply to obey,—to go here or there, as he is bid, or to be left without orders where he is. That is because he leaves the entire direction and management of the household to his master. But for God to be thus indifferent what action He should lend His concurrence to, would be to forego all design and purpose of His own as to the use and destiny of the creatures which He has made and continually preserves. This God cannot do, for He cannot act aimlessly. It would be renouncing the direction of His own work, and making the creature His superior. God is incapable of such renunciation and subservience. He must, then, will the cooperation which He lends, and the concurrent action of the creature, to take a certain course, regulated and prescribed by Himself: which is our proposition, that God cannot but will to bind His creatures to certain lines of action. If His free creatures choose to stray from these lines, God indeed still cooperates, and to His cooperation is to be ascribed the physical goodness of the action, not its moral inordinateness and inopportuneness. Still, as the action is morally inordinate, God may be said to cooperate, in a manner, where He would not: whence we gather some conception of the enormity of sin. (See c. vii., nn. 5, 6, pp. 130, 131.)

n. 11.

The lines of action laid down and prescribed by God are not arbitrary and irrespective of the subject of the command. They are determined in each case by the nature of the subject. The Author of Nature is not apt to subvert that order which proceeds from Himself. He bids every creature act up to that nature wherein He has created it. His commands follow the line of natural exigency. What this natural exigency amounts to in man in regard to his human acts, we have already seen, (c. vi., s. i., p. 109.)

n. 12.

The difference between a necessary and a free agent is, that the former is determined by its nature to act in a certain way, and cannot act otherwise: the latter may act in more ways than one. Still, as we have seen, the nature even of a free agent is not indifferent to all manner of action. It requires, though it does not constrain, the agent to act in certain definite ways, the ways of moral goodness. Acting otherwise, as he may do, the free agent gainsays his own nature, taken as a whole, a thing that a necessary agent can nowise do. God therefore who, as we have shown, wills and commands all creatures whatsoever to act on the lines of their nature, has especial reason to give this command to His rational creatures, with whom alone rests the momentous freedom to disobey.

n. 13.

We are now abreast of the question, of such burning interest in these days, as to the connection of Ethics with Theology, or of Morality with Religion. I will not enquire whether the dogmatic atheist is logically consistent in maintaining any distinction between right and wrong: happily, dogmatic atheists do not abound. But there are many who hold that, whether there be a God or no, the fact ought not to be imported into Moral Science: that a Professor of Ethics, as such, has no business with the name of the Almighty on his lips, any more than a lecturer on Chemistry or Fortification. This statement must be at once qualified by an important proviso. If we have any duties of worship and praise towards our Maker: if there is such a virtue as religion, and such a sin as blasphemy: surely a Professor of Morals must point that out. He cannot in that case suppress all reference to God, for the same reason that he cannot help going into the duties of a man to his wife, or of an individual to the State, if marriage and civil government are natural institutions. If there is a God to be worshipped, any book on Moral Science is incomplete without a chapter on Religion. But the question remains, whether the name of God should enter into the other chapters, and His being and authority into the very foundations of the science. I do not mean the metaphysical foundations; for Metaphysics are like a two-edged sword, that cleaves down to the very marrow of things, and must therefore reveal and discover God. But Morality, like Mathematics, takes certain metaphysical foundations for granted, without enquiring into them. On these foundations we rear the walls, so to speak, of the science of Ethics without reference to God, but we cannot put the roof and crown upon the erection, unless we speak of Him and of His law. Moral distinctions, as we saw (c. vi., s. i. n. 7, p. 113), are antecedent to the Divine command to observe them: and though they rest ultimately on the Divine nature, that ultimate ground belongs to Metaphysics, not to Ethics. Ethics begins with human nature, pointing out that there are certain human acts that do become a man, and others that do not. (c. vi., s. i., p. 109.) To see this, it is not necessary to look up above man. Thus we shall prove lying, suicide, and murder to be wrong, and good fellowship a duty, without needing to mention the Divine Being, though by considering Him the proof gains in cogency. Or rather, apart from God we shall prove certain acts wrong, and other acts obligatory as duties, philosophically speaking, with an initial and fundamental wrongness and obligation. In the present section we have proved once for all, that what is wrong philosophically, or is philosophically a duty, is the same also theologically. Thus the initial and fundamental obligation is transformed into an obligation formal and complete. Therefore, hereafter we shall be content to have established the philosophical obligation, knowing that the theological side is invariably conjoined therewith. As St. Thomas says (1a 2æ, q. 71, art. 6, ad 5): "By theologians sin is considered principally as it is an offence against God: but by the moral philosopher, inasmuch as it is contrary to reason." But what is contrary to reason offends God, and is forbidden by Divine law, and thus becomes a sin. No God, no sin. Away from God, there is indecency and impropriety, unreasonableness, abomination, and brutality, all this in view of outraged humanity: there is likewise crime against the State: but the formal element of sin is wanting. With sin, of course, disappears also the punishment of sin as such. Thus to leave God wholly out of Ethics and Natural Law, is to rob moral evil of half its terrors, and of that very half which is more easily "understanded of the people." A consideration for school-managers.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a, q. 22, art. 2, in corp. (against Lucretius, ii. 646-651); Suarez, De Legibus, II., vi., nn. 3, 5-9, 13, 14, 17, 20-24.

The Casuist

Various; ed. S. Woywod, O.F.M., and J. A. McHugh, O.P. — 42 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Case LXVIII: The Near Occasion with Relation to Company-Keeping

Titius, a young single lad, has intimate relations with Ursula, a young unmarried person. He has repeatedly at night visited and sinned with her. There is no prospect of marriage. He has promised his confessor time and again to cease this sinful attachment. Coming to Confession again he tells Father Lucas, his confessor, that he has not sinned with Ursula since his last Confession, although he has several times visited her in her room at night. He gives positive assurance that no further impropriety will take place and asks may he not associate with the person as with a sister?

^* By I. J. Braun.

Father Lucas inquires: "Did you not have temptations during those nocturnal visits?" Titius: "I did have very strong temptation, but I would not consent!" Father Lucas: "Is there no possibility of your marrying one another?" Titius replies in the negative, and mentions he does at any rate not care to marry. Father Lucas then directs him to give up the acquaintance with that person, it being the near occasion of sin for Titius as well as for Ursula.

Titius after some argument finally agrees to give up the person, but insists that he must visit her just once more at night in order to take leave of her, and also because he has many things to tell her, and that she has articles belonging to him which he wants to recover. Father Lucas asks: "What good reason is there to visit her only at night-time? Why not by day?" Titius: "It would not do by day, because we should get a bad reputation if seen together. Then, too, I can not arrange matters within the few minutes that I could be with her in day-time." Father Lucas then allows this last visit provided Titius gives his word of honor that this shall be the last visit, that he will make it as brief as possible, and that he will take utmost care not to let anything improper happen. Titius promises all this faithfully and parts with the absolution.

Quaeritur. 1. Was Father Lucas obliged to demand that Titius give up his relations with this person?

What is to be held in general of courtships and company-keeping? When are they allowed, when forbidden?

Was Father Lucas correct to allow to Titius the taking leave of Ursula in her room alone and at night?

Answer, 1. Father Lucas was strictly bound in conscience to forbid to Titius his nocturnal visiting with the person; for what good purpose can there be in a courtship with no prospect of marriage? Even if Titius for a brief period, since his last Confession, has not had improper relations with the person, it is obvious that due to his passionate and sinful affection for the person, he will fall again into sin, and that then the last state will be worse than the first. No one may expose himself voluntarily to the near occasion without necessity or important reasons. The visits at night to the person were in themselves grievously sinful because without necessity and reason.

Courtship and company-keeping can not be condemned at random; young people must have an opportunity to become acquainted before they become linked together for life.

Courtship and company-keeping is, however, permissible only where there is the intention and the possibility of ultimate marriage. Where one or both of these is lacking, such relation must not be tolerated. In other words the one starting or indulging in a courtship must have the will and the ability to marry the courted person.

The so-called company-keeping (amores, procationes) between persons of opposite sex is in itself not immoral, provided that there exists between such amantes a proper and sincere intention, and a not too remote prospect of marrying, and provided further the relation, the vicaria relatio, appears to be free of impropriety, tam peccata carnis, quam occasionem proximam talium peccatorum excludens.

In fact, in case of contemplated marriage, a previous consociation is judicious, and even necessary, because the young people should get knowledge of each other so as to convince themselves that they can respect and love each other. Gopfert in his Moral Theology writes:

"What is to be thought in general of acquaintanceships, continued association, visits, etc., between young persons of opposite sex? It can not be said that they are in themselves grievously sinful, but as a rule they are hardly anything else but the near occasion of grievous sin. Three conditions may be named under which they may be permitted, namely, that they should be begun for a good purpose, that the intercourse must take place within proper bounds, and that the necessary precautions be employed.

They must be begun with a good purpose, in other words, with the intention to contract marriage soon, i. e., within a relatively short time, to be determined by reasonable judgment and according to the usage of conscientious persons. Owing to the danger of mixed marriages, inquiries should be made as to whether the other party is of the Catholic faith, and if not the person should be seriously warned against further intercourse and against a marriage promise.

Intercourse shall take place only within proper bounds, i. e., not too frequent and not too long visits. A greater frequency may be allowed if the wedding is to take place in a short while, say in a month or two; a lesser, the farther off the wedding seems to be. A greater frequency may be tolerated if the young girl is never left alone with the young man, but always under vigilant care; a lesser, when the young people are usually left alone, or when the girl is not under the care of parents or relatives who watch over her.

At these visits the necessary precautions must be taken: The young people must not be in each other's company without the parents' knowledge, and not without their silent or expressed approval; as far as possible not be left alone, and they must fortify themselves against temptation by spiritual means.

Where these three conditions obtain, such relations and courtships are not unlawful, even if a grave danger were present, because they are morally necessary conditions, for to demand that one should marry a comparatively unknown person would be unreasonable, and if one would not admit this reason the confessor would accomplish nothing else than that the young couple would now ex mala fide surely sin. For these reasons such visits may not be forbidden even if the parties fall into sin on account of them. The confessor will in such cases accomplish more, if he seeks by appropriate means to make the occasion a remote one; if he, for instance, advises that they never be left alone, that some one be always present, even if only a little boy or girl; in their presence grievous exterior sins could not (easily) take place; excessive marks of affection will not easily occur; he will counsel them to restrict demonstrations of affection in their frequency, duration and manner. If he does not improve matters then these people may be considered as in occasione proxima moraliter necessaria absente, and relapsing continually into this same sin. It is to be considered which is more promising, to demand that the couple employ other and more effective means or that they omit entirely their visits, marks of affection, etc., and this is to be imposed upon them in Confession.''

Gopfert has gathered in these directions nearly everything of moment that is to be found in the various standard authors about the lawfulness of courtships, etc. Difficult, yet incalculably important for the priest, is the question: When are courtships prohibited:

Let us quote here, first of all, from the writings of Blessed Leonard of Port Maurice, who teaches on this subject: "It seems that much less severity and more indulgence is indicated in the occasions that are not in esse, as: visits to gambling-houses and places of amusement, of gatherings and inns, love affairs, etc., for according to the instructions of St. Charles, if the penitent promises to give them up, and if this promise comes from the heart, one may give absolution at least twice or three times, but only in the supposition that the confessor perceives such promise proceeds from a sincere and contrite heart. If the penitent has often before promised reform and has not amended his conduct then the saintly archbishop instructs that absolution be refused until the near occasion has been avoided.

Among those occasions that are not in esse, there should be placed in the front ranks, in my opinion, the amorous alliances, which in our days are a stumbling-block for the young. Some are unwilling that there should be such an outcry against this unholy love, because they fear to disseminate wickedness where there is none, or that one might represent as a sin that which in reality is not a sin. They claim that the soul is given thus a false conscience and a false shame, and that it will plunge from sin to sin, at last unavoidably into sacrilege. But alas! the delusion of those perhaps unaware of the true license and wickedness of our days.