Human Acts

Man must tend to the ultimate supernatural end by his acts: for eternal beatitude is repaid to us as wages and reward of labor. Now, in order that our acts may be apt for meriting the ultimate supernatural end, they must be human, morally good, supernatural, and meritorious: for the end cannot be obtained except by acts which are proportioned to the end; but only these acts are proportioned to the ultimate supernatural end. Therefore we must treat in order of human acts, of moral, supernatural, and meritorious acts.

45. What they are. The principles of human acts are called those things which must concur for producing a human act in the individual. Now three things must concur for effecting a human act: the object, the intellect, and the will.

1. The object of a human act, which is some particular good, as a final cause allures and moves the will to acting and by its influence gives it a certain and determinate tendency, or affection. Therefore acts of the will have from the object that they are acts of such a species, that is, the object specifies the acts of the will.

2. On the part of the intellect there must be present: a. advertence to the act itself. For a human act must be in the power of the one operating, to such a degree that he can place it or not place it. But this is impossible unless, adverting to the act itself, he knows that he is going to place the act.

For this reason thoughts, imaginations, or appetitions which immediately upon the proposal of the object arise in the intellect, in the imagination, in the will, or in the sensitive appetite without any advertence of the mind cannot be human acts, and therefore neither good nor evil.

b. Advertence to the object and its qualities. Since the object of a human act must be freely willed and therefore previously known, the act is human insofar as its object is known.

In order that the act of one who, killing his father, commits parricide, be a human act, he must know that he is killing his father; it would be homicide if he thought he was killing a man; it would not even be homicide if he thought he was killing a beast.

c. Deliberation, by which we inquire whether some object represented by the intellect is to be embraced or rejected by the will.

Those are not human acts which are not determinate in the concrete and surrounded by various circumstances. Therefore the intellect, having considered all the circumstances, must judge whether the action is to be embraced or rejected. Moreover, the object which we desire rarely exhibits itself to us as a mere good or as a mere evil, but frequently as a good joined with a defect or evil, whether true or apparent. In this case deliberation is needed as to whether that is good or evil, lawful or unlawful, and therefore to be embraced or rejected by the will.

d. The dictate or practical judgment, by which we decide that something is good or evil, to be embraced or to be rejected.

a. The will cannot elicit a human act, whether of pursuit or aversion, unless a judgment has preceded concerning the suitability or unsuitability of the object, with which the act is concerned, with the nature of the agent; and specifically it cannot elicit a morally good act unless a judgment has preceded concerning the moral goodness or lawfulness of the object and act. But this judgment is called the practical dictate or judgment.

b. Frequently by a simple glance it is known that the thing proposed by the intellect is good and therefore to be embraced, or evil and therefore to be rejected; in which case deliberation and practical judgment are contained in a single act.

3. On the part of the will there is required: a. the exercise of liberty, in that the will determines itself to acting or to acting in this way.

Since a human act by its nature is a free act, it is clear that a human act cannot be done without the exercise and use of this perfection, namely liberty.

b. A free tendency into the object, insofar as it is proposed by the intellect.

After the will has determined itself to acting, it elicits in itself an act which by its nature is a vital and affective tendency by which it embraces the object and adheres to it, or is a vital aversion which rejects the proposed object.

46. On advertence. a. Advertence is defined as the act by which the mind attends to something. It is divided:

a. By reason of the act itself into full advertence, if nothing impedes the mind so that the act of adverting is perfect, as when someone perfectly awake, self-possessed, and not distracted adverts to things; and into half-full advertence, if something impedes the mind so that the act of adverting is not perfect, as when someone thinks about a matter while not yet fully awake, or not fully self-possessed, or distracted by other things.

b. By reason of the thing to which the mind adverts into distinct advertence, if the thing is apprehended clearly or certainly, and confused advertence, if the thing is apprehended obscurely or doubtfully. Thus one who steals a sacred thing, thinking that the theft of a sacred thing is sacrilege, distinctly adverts to sacrilege; one who steals a sacred thing, knowing only that the theft of a sacred thing is graver than simple theft, adverts confusedly to sacrilege. Likewise one who throws a tile from a roof into the street with the plan of killing an enemy passing by, adverts distinctly to the death of the enemy; and one who does the same suspecting indeed that a man perhaps passing by could be killed, but not knowing whether in fact someone is passing by and is killed, adverts confusedly to the death of a man.

b. According to the diverse advertence of the mind to an act, whether of the will or of other powers, threefold diverse acts, or as they are usually called, movements, are distinguished. There are: a. first-first acts or movements, which precede every advertence of the mind, for example movements of aversion, anger, revenge in the sensitive appetite or in the will; b. second-first acts or movements, which precede full and perfect advertence of the mind; c. second acts or movements, which are elicited with full and perfect advertence and knowledge.

47. Since it depends upon the exercise of liberty that an act be human, it is necessary to know what things impede the exercise of liberty and therefore a perfectly human act. The impediments of human acts are of two kinds: some are actual, which actually and transiently lessen or remove the human, voluntary, and free act; others are habitual, which habitually and permanently lessen or remove the human, voluntary, and free act.

I. Actual Impediments

There are four things which actually and transiently impede the human act: ignorance, concupiscence, fear, and force. Because a human act must proceed from previous knowledge, ignorance impedes it; because it must proceed from the will as from an internal principle, violence impedes it; because it must proceed from a principle indifferent to acting and not acting, concupiscence and fear impede it.

1. On Ignorance

48. Notion. Ignorance is the lack of knowledge of some thing. Therefore ignorance denotes a habitual state of the mind.

a. Ignorance differs: a. from error, for error signifies an erroneous judgment or an assent not conformable to truth; therefore besides the lack of knowledge of some truth it involves a judgment contrary to truth, as if someone not only did not know that Christ is God and man, but judged Him to be a mere man; b. from inadvertence, which consists in this, that the mind does not attend to a matter, even though habitual knowledge of that matter is present.

b. Ignorance, which denotes a habitual state of the mind, is taken here insofar as it actually influences our action, namely for actual ignorance, to which inadvertence also pertains.

49. Division of ignorance. 1. By reason of the object, ignorance is divided into ignorance of law and ignorance of fact. The first is ignorance of the law, as if someone does not know that fasting must be observed on the vigil of Pentecost, or does not know that the reading of a heretical book is prohibited. The other is ignorance of a thing, either as to substance or as to some circumstance, as if someone does not know that today is the vigil of Pentecost, or that the book which he reads is heretical.

Some reduce ignorance of the penalty to ignorance of law, namely of the law decreeing the penalty for the offense; others to ignorance of fact, namely of the connection of the penalty with such an offense; finally others list it as a third species of ignorance.

2. By reason of the subject, or of the man ignorant, ignorance is divided into invincible and vincible. The first is that which cannot be put away, and is called physically invincible if it cannot be put away in any way, as if someone does not think at all about the matter or law, or about the obligation of investigating; and morally invincible if, with moral diligence applied, it cannot be put away. The other is that which can be put away by applying moral diligence, but is not put away.

a. That diligence is considered moral which prudent persons are accustomed to apply in matters of this sort. Moral diligence must be diverse according to the quality of the matter, person, and circumstances: for greater diligence is usually applied in a matter of grave moment, lesser in a matter of slight moment; likewise, other things being equal, a person to whom many means of finding the truth are available applies greater diligence, and a person to whom only few means are available applies lesser. How much diligence must be applied so that it can be called moral must be measured from the way prudent persons act in these diverse circumstances. Therefore moral diligence is not the greatest diligence which can be applied, but is that diligence which anyone, from prudent judgment here and now, in this matter and in these circumstances, can and must apply for dispelling ignorance. But no one is bound to greater than moral diligence, even if he could apply greater.

b. Invincible ignorance is involuntary and therefore inculpable. Vincible ignorance is voluntary at least in the cause, and is culpable if it concerns those things which must be known, but inculpable if it concerns those things which can lawfully be unknown.

c. In order that ignorance be vincible and culpable, it is required both that a thought, or at least suspicion, of ignorance and of the obligation of putting it away enter the mind, and that the occasion of inquiring be voluntarily passed over or not sufficiently used.

3. Vincible ignorance, according to the diverse way in which it is willed, is divided into affected and not affected. The former is had when someone deliberately wills ignorance, for example so that he may sin more freely, as if someone doubting whether today is a fast does not ask, although he could easily ask, lest perhaps he be bound to fast. The latter is had when someone omits due inquiry, not because he wills to be ignorant of the matter, but for another reason, for example because of negligence, shame, and so forth.

The former is willed in itself; the latter is willed not in itself but in the cause, that is, in the omission of due inquiry.

4. Ignorance not affected is subdivided into crass or supine, when no diligence or almost no diligence is applied to putting it away; and into simply vincible, when some diligence indeed is applied, but not sufficient.

5. Invincible ignorance is divided into antecedent and concomitant. It is called antecedent if the one operating is actually so disposed that he would not place the action if he knew what he is ignorant of. Thus the ignorance of a hunter who kills a friend whom he thinks to be a beast is antecedent, because he would not have done it if he had known it was his friend. It is called concomitant if the one operating is actually so disposed that he would place the action even if he knew what he here and now is ignorant of. Thus the ignorance of a hunter who kills an enemy sought for death, whom he thinks to be a beast, is concomitant, because he would have killed him even if he had known him to be his enemy.

The former precedes the consent of the will and is usually called the cause of the action, because the action would not be done if the ignorance were absent. The latter accompanies the consent of the will and is usually named a non-cause, because the action would be done even if the ignorance were absent. In the former case the action is done from ignorance; in the latter, with ignorance.

6. Ignorance in general is divided into antecedent and consequent. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes voluntary negligence in investigating an obligation, as is ignorance of the fast in one who has not even thought about the fast. Consequent ignorance is that which follows voluntary negligence in investigating an obligation, as is ignorance of the fast in one who, thinking about the fast, does not put away the ignorance.

All antecedent ignorance is invincible and therefore involuntary and inculpable. But all consequent ignorance is vincible and therefore voluntary and culpable, either in itself or in the cause.

Note. Ignorance of those things which must always be known is called habitual ignorance. A physician, judge, advocate, confessor, or pastor labors under habitual ignorance when he does not know those things which he must know from his office. Those who labor under ignorance of this sort are said to be in a habitual state of sin. This is not to be understood as though they sin at every moment for as long as they labor under this ignorance, but as meaning that they sin as often as an occasion offers itself of learning those things whose knowledge is necessary to them, if they advertently neglect the opportune occasion.

50. The influence of ignorance on human acts. 1. Invincible ignorance, whether antecedent or concomitant, removes the voluntary: for what is done ignorantly is not voluntary in itself, because it is unknown, nor is it voluntary in the cause, because the ignorance is supposed invincible. And since both antecedent and concomitant ignorance are invincible, the latter removes the voluntary by equal reason.

a. Invincible ignorance, just as it removes the voluntary, also removes fault. Hence one who on Friday eats meat while invincibly ignorant that it is Friday, or that what he eats is meat, does not commit sin. One who strikes a man while invincibly ignorant that he is a priest is guilty of injustice, but not of sacrilege. Children and the uneducated who do shameful things whose malice they do not know do not sin.¹

b. That disposition of soul by which one operating with concomitant ignorance would place the action even if he knew the matter cannot bring it about that the action is voluntary, but only brings it about that after the truth is known the action is pleasing. Therefore, in the example given above, the actual will of killing the enemy indeed brings it about that the hunter sins by internal affection, but not that he is guilty of actual homicide.

2. Vincible ignorance does not remove but lessens the voluntary, at least if it is not affected.

a. The reason for the first is that vincible ignorance is voluntary; therefore voluntary also is the action or omission which proceeds from this ignorance, and the effect which follows from the action or omission.

Because vincible ignorance does not remove the voluntary, neither does it remove fault: one who shoots at a beast while suspecting that it could be a man is guilty of homicide if in fact he kills a man.

b. The reason for the second is that something is less voluntary the less knowledge there is of it; but manifestly there is less knowledge in one who is ignorant of a thing, even vincibly, than in one who knows it.

a. Therefore vincible ignorance also lessens fault: for something is imputed as fault insofar as it is voluntary. And since this ignorance has diverse grades of voluntariness, namely according as it is simply vincible, crass, or affected, so also the action which follows from this ignorance has diverse grades of fault.

b. The quantity of fault which is present in a sin committed from vincible ignorance is not taken from the action or omission which followed because of the ignorance, but from the negligence which was committed in dispelling the ignorance: for the action or omission is voluntary insofar as the cause of that ignorance is voluntary. Hence it can happen that great defects committed from ignorance by confessors in absolving penitents, by pastors in arranging marriages, or by physicians in treating the sick, are only light sins, when the negligence in fulfilling the obligation or in removing the ignorance was slight.

c. Ignorance is usually called crass when the negligence of investigating the truth is very great; and it is usually called simple or simply vincible when that negligence is not so great. Therefore crass ignorance is usually assessed as grave sin, while simple ignorance is assessed as light sin. There are authors, however, who say that not every simply vincible ignorance is a light sin, but that even simply vincible ignorance is either light or grave sin according to the greater or lesser negligence. Ignorance that is lightly culpable in a moral matter is usually equated with invincible ignorance.

Note. Because affected ignorance ordinarily arises from a great inclination to sin, it seems rather to increase than to lessen the voluntary. But an action which proceeds from affected ignorance is voluntary only in the cause; and what is voluntary in the cause is never as perfectly voluntary as that which is voluntary in itself and directly, because knowledge of the former is not as perfect as knowledge of the voluntary in itself.

2. On Concupiscence

¹ Therefore this proposition (2) was condemned by Alexander VII on December 7, 1690: "Although invincible ignorance of the law of nature may be granted, this in the state of fallen nature does not excuse the one operating from formal sin from it."

51. Notion. Concupiscence in the broader sense, as it is taken here, is otherwise also called passion, and designates any act or movement of the sensitive appetite toward sensible good or evil apprehended through the imagination.

a. Concupiscence taken in the stricter sense is one of the passions, of which six are numbered in the concupiscible appetite: love, desire or concupiscence, joy, hatred, horror, and sadness; and five in the irascible appetite: hope, daring, despair, fear, and anger. Therefore concupiscence taken in the broader sense signifies the acts of all the passions, but taken in the stricter sense signifies the act of one passion only, namely desire.

b. Sometimes concupiscence in an altogether different sense signifies a depraved inclination of the appetite, lower and higher, arising from original sin, by which man is borne toward those things which are opposed to right reason.¹ Therefore this concupiscence differs in two ways from that concerning which we treat here: a. this one signifies a movement or act, but that one only an inclination or disposition; b. this one is concerned with sensible good or evil, but that one only with evil, yet both sensible and rational evil.

¹ Cf. Gal. 5:17; Rom. 7:23.

52. It is divided into antecedent and consequent. Antecedent concupiscence is that which precedes every consent of the will, yet draws and allures the will to consent. Consequent concupiscence is that which follows the consent of the will.

a. It can happen in three ways that concupiscence follows the consent of the will: either it is admitted after having arisen spontaneously, as if in one who meets an enemy, hatred spontaneously aroused is fostered by deliberate consent of the will; or it is deliberately stirred up, as if someone recalls in his mind injuries inflicted upon him by an enemy in order that he may be stirred to revenge; or it overflows from a vehement free act of the will, as if affections of hatred or love freely admitted overflow into the sensitive appetite.

b. Therefore antecedent acts of the sensitive appetite are not voluntary and hence in themselves neither good nor evil. But consequent acts of the sensitive appetite are voluntary and therefore either good or evil; and those indeed which are deliberately stirred up or, once stirred up, are admitted, are voluntary in themselves, while those which overflow from the will into the sensitive appetite are voluntary in the cause.

53. The influence of concupiscence on human acts. 1. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntary and sometimes entirely removes it.

a. The reason for the first: for the voluntary is less, the more reason is impeded in its deliberation and the more the will is inclined by an external influence toward one side. But movements of the sensitive appetite impede the deliberation of reason: for they turn it away from considering the proper motives of reason and weaken their force and efficacy; moreover, they allure the will to consent.

b. The reason for the second: sometimes passion is so vehement that it entirely disturbs the mind and wholly removes the use of reason, to such a degree that the moral malice of the object is no longer perceived. Now, if no deliberation of reason is present, there is likewise no voluntary, as is clear in those who because of love or anger are plainly insane. But if passion does not wholly remove the use of reason, it does not entirely remove liberty.

a. Passion which lessens the voluntary also lessens sin, and passion which removes the voluntary excuses altogether from sin. Yet passion which does not wholly remove the use of reason does not remove the voluntary, and therefore neither excuses from sin. Hence it happens that actions which proceed from sudden anger or from vehement sadness, according to the degree of advertence, are either altogether involuntary or at least cannot be imputed as perfectly human acts; and if evil, they are frequently either no sin or only a light sin. A determinate judgment in the concrete concerning the imputability of such an action must be committed to God.

b. Whether the consent of the will which adheres to movements of concupiscence is a perfectly or imperfectly human act does not depend upon the movement of concupiscence, that is, upon its greater or lesser vehemence, but upon the influence which it exercises upon the use of reason. For a movement of concupiscence cannot act directly upon the will and absolutely draw it to consent; on the contrary, the will can resist even more vehement movements of concupiscence and deny consent. But passions usually impede the use of reason more or less.

2. Consequent concupiscence which overflows from an act of the will neither increases nor lessens the voluntary, but is a sign of its intensity.

a. The reason for the first is that the act of the will is already perfect when the movement of the sensitive appetite arises.

b. The reason for the second is that only from an intense act of the will does a movement overflow into the sensitive appetite.

Consequent concupiscence which is deliberately stirred up by the will serves this purpose, that human operations may be performed with greater alacrity and with greater vigor and fervor; and since it itself is voluntary, it can add merit to good actions and demerit to sins.

3. On Fear

54. Notion. Fear is defined as a trembling of the mind on account of a future evil. Therefore it is an act of the appetite by which we flee from an imminent evil which we think we can conquer either in no way or only with difficulty.

a. Fear arises in the appetite from the representation of evil; and although the one fearing remains altogether self-possessed, nevertheless fear often moves him to willing something which otherwise he would not have willed. And thus fear must be considered in this place, namely insofar as it moves the will to choose something for avoiding a greater evil, which otherwise it would not have chosen, as if someone chooses amputation of a leg in order to avoid death.

b. The evil which causes fear can threaten either the one himself who fears, or those joined to him; for the evil which happens to those joined either by blood or by friendship is considered one's own.

c. He is said to operate from fear for whom fear is the cause of the operation; he is said to operate with fear for whom not fear but another thing is the cause of the operation. A sailor throws goods into the sea from fear; a martyr undergoes death with fear, which he naturally fears. In the former case fear is antecedently related to the operation; in the latter, only concomitantly. Here the discussion concerns operations which are done from fear.

55. Fear is divided: a. By reason of quantity into grave and light, according as the evil from which fear arises is grave or light.

In order that fear be called grave, two things are required: a. that a grave evil threaten, such as death, mutilation, long imprisonment, grave infamy, great loss of goods, and the like; b. that the evil can be averted only with difficulty. If a light evil threatens, or indeed a grave evil but one which can easily be averted, fear is called light.

Grave fear is either absolutely grave, if an evil truly grave in itself is feared; or relatively grave, if the evil is indeed light in itself but grave with respect to a determinate person who is fearful, such as children, the elderly, and women.

a. Relatively grave fear in moral matters is equated with absolutely grave fear, because it induces the same trembling of the mind and therefore exercises the same influence on the action.

b. Fear which falls upon a constant man signifies absolutely grave fear: for it arises from an evil which even a constant, strong, and courageous person deservedly dreads.

b. By reason of origin it is divided into fear inflicted from without and from within, according as it comes from an external or internal cause; thus fear of death from shipwreck is from without, fear of death from disease is from within.¹

Fear from without is again divided into fear inflicted by a necessary cause, as by shipwreck, fire, or attack of wild beasts, or by a free cause, namely by man.

Fear inflicted by a free cause is again inflicted either justly or unjustly, according as the person causing the fear has the right of causing fear, as a prince or father who threatens punishment, or unjustly causes fear, as a robber threatening death unless money is given.

c. Reverential fear must be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have those offended and indignant whom he ought to revere, such as parents and any superiors whatever, princes, prelates, bishops, and the like. It is referred to fear justly or unjustly inflicted, according as its cause is just or unjust.

Can reverential fear be grave? Fear arises from evil which someone thinks is threatening him. Therefore if grave evil can threaten from the offense of parents or superiors, reverential fear can be grave. But reverential fear is taken in two ways: a. in itself, insofar as it signifies the confusion and distress which an inferior suffers because of the offense and indignation of the superior alone; b. insofar as it also signifies other evils besides, such as long reproof, harsher treatment, deprivation of goods, and the like. Now if reverential fear is taken in this latter sense, without doubt it can be grave; but if it is taken in the former sense, it is considered light. Once this distinction has been made, authors can be reconciled, some of whom hold reverential fear to be grave, while others hold it light.

¹ Others, for example D'Annibale (I, n. 138), call fear from without if it is inflicted by another for extorting consent, and fear from within if the imminent evil itself brings fear, whether it comes from an internal cause, such as infirmity, or from an external cause, such as contagious disease, storm, shipwreck, the punishments of hell, and so forth. According to this distinction, fear indeed inflicted by another, but not for extorting consent, must be referred to fear from within.

56. The influence of fear on human acts. 1. Fear which is so vehement that it disturbs the use of reason entirely removes the voluntary: for where deliberation of reason is lacking, there is perfect involuntary. Yet this happens in fear rarely and only accidentally: for ordinarily and of itself even grave fear does not remove deliberation of reason, which is required for a perfectly human act. Therefore with regard to fear, the following principle must especially be attended to.

2. An act placed from fear, however grave, of itself is voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense. For fear of itself brings it about that the will deliberately chooses the action as a means for avoiding evil, but with some repugnance, as if someone from fear of shipwreck throws goods overboard. But an act of this sort is voluntary simply with an admixture of the involuntary.

a. Since fear ordinarily does not remove the voluntary, it does not excuse from sin, nor remove the merit of a good action, as if someone assists at Mass from fear of punishment. Yet because involuntary is mixed with the voluntary which proceeds from fear, fear lessens fault and merit, and indeed the more, the greater is the repugnance in placing the action. But in particular: a. if the matter is intrinsically evil, no fear excuses from sin, nor does it lessen fault so much that mortal sin becomes venial because of fear; b. if the matter is prohibited by positive law alone, grave fear can completely excuse from sin, unless fear is inflicted in hatred of the Church or of religion.

b. Because an act which is done from fear is voluntary simply and therefore simply human, of itself fear does not excuse from obligations contracted because of it unless a law or special reason stands in the way. For the voluntary which suffices for committing grave sin also suffices for contracting obligations. Therefore, of itself, a vow emitted from fear of death in the midst of shipwreck or in grave illness is valid.

3. Light fear is not attended to in the external forum: for it is supposed not to have had influence on the action. But in the internal forum it lessens the voluntary and therefore the gravity of sin according to the quantity of influence upon the will.

4. On Violence

57. Notion and division. 1. Violence, coercion, or force, considered passively, is defined as motion caused by an external principle while the will resists; considered actively, it is the force itself which is applied for causing motion in another.

Therefore two things are required for an act to be called violent or coerced: a. that it proceed from an external principle; b. that it be against the will resisting with all its powers. Therefore one who truly and perfectly suffers force, so that outwardly he cannot do otherwise, not only inwardly does not consent, nor merely dissents, but also outwardly resists as much as he can by persuasion, prayers, threats, shouting, force, and so forth, and tries to repel the force brought against him.

2. It is clear that violence cannot fall upon elicited acts of the will, since it is a contradiction in terms for the will to be coerced to an act, that is, that in the will there be an inclination toward an object while the same will declines from the same object by resisting. Therefore not even God can coerce the will. But violence can fall upon acts which can be commanded by the will: for not only members of the body, but also internal powers, especially imagination and intellect, can be moved to acts by external force, for example through the influence of a good or evil angel, while the will resists.

3. Violence is divided into absolute violence and violence in a qualified sense. The former is had when he to whom it is brought resists as much as he can and therefore suffers altogether unwillingly. The latter is taken in a twofold sense: a. according to some, it is had when the one suffering can repel the force brought against him or at least diminish it, but does not; b. according to others, it is had when the one suffering cannot repel the force brought against him, but does not suffer it altogether unwillingly.

58. The influence of violence on human acts. 1. Absolute violence removes every voluntary: for an act caused by absolute violence is done with the will altogether resisting, and if it consented even minimally or omitted due resistance, the absolutely violent would already fail. Therefore violence removes sin, since there cannot be sin which is not voluntary.

One does not sin who, violently shut in, is forced to omit Mass on a feast day; who is forced to bend the knees or burn incense before idols; the virgin who is oppressed by force and resists according to her powers; one who suffers depraved suggestions.

2. Violence in a qualified sense does not remove but lessens the voluntary. For either resistance which could and ought to be applied is omitted, and then the violent action is indirectly voluntary in the omission of resistance, as if a woman who is oppressed does not repel an attacker whom she could repel; or the will does not entirely oppose, and then there is some consent of the will, as if a woman who is oppressed and cannot repel the attacker consents to depraved pleasure.

The resistance which must be opposed to violence, lest a violent or coerced action can be imputed as sin, is sometimes required of itself, namely when the violence is of such a kind that it can be overcome. Thus if someone suffers immodest touches, in order that they be violent and involuntary in the full sense, it is required not only that the will oppose, but also that the touches be repelled as far as possible; otherwise the one who suffers force is considered at least in some way to consent. Sometimes resistance is required accidentally, even if it is useless, namely when it is required for preventing scandal; thus martyrs who were compelled to offer incense to idols were bound to resist insofar as it was necessary to show that they suffered unwillingly. Or resistance is required when it is necessary for forestalling consent, which happens where force is brought against chastity; thus a woman oppressed is bound of itself to resist, even by shouting and by the powers of the body, as much as she can. But if this positive resistance is useless or too difficult, indeed dangerous, she is excused from applying it, provided she can avoid consent.

II. Habitual Impediments

Habitual impediments are of two kinds: habits, both good and evil, inhering in the will; and illnesses of the soul, which impede man from being able fully to use his spiritual faculties.

1. On Habits

59. Notions. A habit is defined as a constant inclination, added to a faculty, for producing similar acts. To the power in which it exists, a habit confers that the power can operate easily and promptly.

a. Here the discussion concerns moral habits, and these acquired, which exist in the will and incline it to moral acts, whether good, virtues, or evil, vices.

b. Man by nature is not endowed with habits, neither good nor evil, but only with certain dispositions to habits, which are called inchoate habits and come from natural temperament or by heredity from parents. Habits themselves are acquired by repetition of similar acts: for any act leaves in the power from which it proceeds a certain determination or inclination toward producing similar acts; then, through the repetition of the same acts, a habit is generated in the power. Ordinarily several acts are required for generating a habit, unless they are very intense.

c. After he has acquired the use of reason, man begins to acquire habits for himself. For if he resists the passions which draw toward sensible things, by this very fact the forces of the will against the passions are gradually increased; there is formed in the will a certain disposition of eliciting similar acts against the passions, which inclines the will to the good, lessens the appetite of passion, and subjects it to the will; indeed, as experience testifies, the very organs of the body take on a disposition consonant with virtue. If on the contrary he indulges the passions, the forces of the will for overcoming the passions are lessened, inclination into the object of the passion is increased, and the very organs of the body take on a disposition consonant with vice, to such a degree that man is finally subjected to the vice. Nevertheless there remains in the will the power of freely determining itself against the impulses of passion, however much increased by the habits of vices, provided that sufficient use of reason has remained.

d. The more frequently similar acts are repeated, the greater in the power becomes the inclination and facility toward similar acts. An intense habit and one already long rooted in the power is called custom, which sometimes impels to similar acts with such force that it can scarcely be commanded: custom is a second nature. This especially holds concerning depraved custom.

e. Depraved customs are of two kinds: some which do not affect the organic powers, imagination and the sensitive appetite, nor impede the spiritual powers in their functions, such as the custom of blaspheming, lying, stealing; others which alter the organic powers, and sometimes indeed so vehemently that the activities of the spiritual powers are impeded thereby, such as the custom of lust and drunkenness.

f. By reason of origin there is distinguished natural or involuntary custom, which is contracted without advertence to its moral effects; and moral or voluntary custom, which is contracted and retained with knowledge of the moral effect.

60. The influence of habits on human acts. 1. A habit, whether good or evil, in the acts upon which it influences, increases the character of the voluntary and of merit or demerit; but it lessens the character of the free.

The reason for the first is that the act proceeds from a will which is more fixed in the object and more inclined to the object than a will lacking the habit. The reason for the second is that the free, or the indifference of the will, is less the more the intellect considers one side and the will is inclined into the same; but habit brings it about that the part which is consonant with the habit is exhibited more vividly to the intellect and that the will inclines more toward the same.

2. On custom. a. Depraved custom which does not infect the activity of the mind and will indeed lessens liberty, but does not exclude a perfectly human act and grave fault. Sometimes it exercises such force upon the will that it can be overcome only with difficulty; nevertheless it is not such that the will, at least aided by the help of grace, cannot command it.

It must altogether be held that any depraved custom whatever can, by applying apt remedies, be corrected over time, unless the spiritual faculties are thereby disturbed in their activities.

b. Depraved custom which impedes the functions of the mind and will lessens liberty in such a way that man is incapable of a perfect act and grave fault, and indeed the more so, the more the activity of intellect and will is disturbed.

In order that the imputability of offenses which are committed from depraved custom, especially against chastity, can be judged, it must be noted that sinful acts, the more frequently they are committed, increase the appetite the more, to such a degree that a most vehement impulse drives one to sin; that the same acts weaken the energy of the will; and that the intellect, recalling sensible goods, is impeded from sufficiently weighing the motives which would draw it back from sin. These impediments of liberty are greater in those who have contracted the depraved habit almost from infancy, and greater still in those to whom an evil disposition has been transmitted by heredity from parents. Therefore, although they sin more or less deliberately, nevertheless they can be excused not indeed from all sin, but from so great a sin.

2. On Illnesses Of The Soul

61. Notions. 1. The recent medical discipline which is called psychiatry or psychopathology has illnesses of the soul as its object. From this discipline moral theology chiefly gathers that there are diverse affections of soul which exercise a more or less determining influence upon the moral life and lessen liberty, and which therefore deserve to be attended to in assessing the imputability of offenses.

a. In times past, an examination concerning the state of mind of those who had perpetrated a crime was rarely instituted, since full use of reason, and therefore perfect imputability of the crime, was not called into doubt unless the accused were found to be plainly insane. But in our time a diligent examination is instituted concerning the state of mind of those who are guilty of crime. And rightly indeed, since a crime cannot be imputed to an agent who is not fully self-possessed. Although it cannot be denied that in our time, since men suffer much more frequently from nerves, there are more evildoers than before who lack the perfect use of the spiritual faculties, nevertheless several physicians, in making a judgment from theories of psychiatry concerning the full deliberation of evildoers, exceed the measure. For they teach that from disease there is present in the will an internal necessity by which it is impelled with inescapable vehemence to perpetrating evils, or that the will at least labors under perfect abulia (Willenslosigkeit), to such a degree that, the movements of concupiscence having been rejected, it plainly cannot choose the good. They attribute this sick will to those who labor under neurasthenia, melancholia, hysteria, or moral dementia.

b. From inclination to evil and from abulia there must be distinguished weakness of the will in relation to good (Willensschwache, sittliche Schwache), which is naturally present in it in the state of fallen nature. There is indeed present in the will, even after the fall, a natural inclination to good, to which nevertheless the sensitive appetite, concupiscence, the tinder of sin, is opposed; this by its nature is borne also toward sensible goods which are opposed to uprightness. Now concupiscence, insofar as it is borne toward shameful sensible goods, renders the choice of the moral good difficult and constitutes the natural weakness of the will in the moral order; this weakness can be greatly increased by depraved habits.

2. Illness of the soul, psychopathy or Seelenkrankheit, is said to be present when the activities of mind and will are habitually badly affected. From psychological principles it cannot happen that the intellect and will in themselves labor under some disease, since they are merely spiritual powers, incapable of disease. In particular, the will cannot have any other sickness in itself than depraved habits, which indeed lessen free determination but do not remove it. Nevertheless, since the spiritual powers in their acts externally depend upon the senses, especially upon imagination, upon the sensitive appetite, and upon that part of the brain which serves the functions of these powers, if the sensitive powers are badly affected, then by overflow the intellect and will also are disturbed in their functions.

Since the will in its acts depends directly only upon knowledge, with the required knowledge shining beforehand, the will itself is always unimpeded and free. Hence it cannot happen that one lacks moral liberty who sufficiently apprehends the moral goodness and malice of his action.

62. The influence of illness of the soul on human acts. One must distinguish between men who labor under illness of soul and those who are indeed not truly sick, but nevertheless are affected by dispositions which, when certain circumstances are added, can degenerate into a perfect illness of soul.

1. For those sick in mind, as lacking the use of liberty, it is manifest that moral actions cannot be imputed. They are driven by an inescapable force and inclination to committing depraved actions, thefts, arsons, homicides, lust, in which, on account of illness of mind and defect of liberty, they are immune from sin.

If such persons come before a confessor: a. he should not openly signify to them that in those acts they are plainly immune from sin, both because this cannot be established with certainty in a particular case and lest they yield to the depraved inclination without any resistance at all and thus increase it; b. he should gently exhort them to resist depraved inclinations, for serious resistance can at least diminish the natural inclination.¹

2. Those who are not truly sick do not fully lack the use of liberty, and therefore cannot be immune from the obligation of rendering an account of their moral acts. For although imputability is lessened according to the measure of impeded liberty, nevertheless offenses committed must be imputed to them as fault, and sometimes even as grave fault.

a. For making an equitable judgment concerning some offense committed, attention must be given to the actual and habitual disposition of the delinquent. The more perfect the advertence to the malice of the action is, and the more unimpeded the deliberation concerning the obligation of omitting the action and concerning the consequences which arise from the offense, the greater is the imputability of the offense. The more knowledge and deliberation are impeded and disturbed by an actual affection and impulse or by a habitual disposition, the less is the imputability of the offense. But to those whose advertence and deliberation are not impeded, evil actions are fully imputed, even if they committed the offense under the influence of some passion or impulse.

b. Therefore the opinion must be rejected both of those who teach that offenses are to be imputed to all in the same degree, and of those who, with recent psychiatry, affirm that offenses cannot be imputed to any of those who have an affected disposition of soul. The true opinion neither removes their imputability nor equates it with that of the healthy; since it is impossible to determine its grade in a particular case, it must be committed to the judgment of God.²

Note 1. Pastors of souls and confessors must know what illnesses of the soul are, by what signs they are recognized, whether moral actions are to be imputed to sick persons of this kind, and how the sick themselves are to be treated in the care of souls. Pastoral theology treats of these things. Cf. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der speziellen Seelenfuhrung (Freiburg: Herder, 1904), p. 166 ff. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit (Munster: Schoningh, 1904), p. 210 ff. Bessmer, Storungen im Seelenleben (Freiburg: Herder, 1907). The same, Grundlagen der Seelenstorungen (Freiburg: Herder, 1906). Familler, Pastoralpsychiatrie (Freiburg: Herder, 1898). Romer, Psychiatrie und Seelsorge (Berlin: Reuther, 1849). Schloss, Propadeutik der Psychiatrie (Vienna: Kirsch, 1908).

Note 2. Although sins of the flesh are often the cause of illnesses of the soul, nevertheless it must also be noted that from illnesses of the soul, or of the brain and nerves, sins of the flesh, especially sexual perversities, not rarely arise. In this way it is explained why sometimes men who until now had lived piously and chastely suddenly give themselves to sins of the flesh and foul perversities. Their moral defects are to be attributed not to fault, but rather to a disease contracted through misfortune.

¹ Cf. Genicot, Casus conscientiae I, p. 6 f.

² Cf. Bessmer, Grundlagen, p. 181 ff.

63. Which acts are moral. 1. Moral is said first and properly of an action, and that a human one. Whatever besides this is called moral (moral order, moral law, moral virtue, etc.) is so called secondarily and improperly.

For moral is said from mos, custom; but mos properly signifies the same mode of acting often repeated in free agents. Therefore moral first and properly pertains to free actions; improperly, whatever is referred in some way to a moral action is called moral.

2. Those acts are called moral which are performed freely with knowledge of the morality of the object. Therefore a twofold condition is required in order that an act can be called moral:

a. That it be free: for a necessary act can be called neither moral nor properly human.

"The genus of morals," says St. Thomas, "begins where dominion of the will is first found."¹ And indeed a moral act by the consent of all makes a man worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment; but only that which is done with liberty makes a man worthy of praise and reward or of blame and punishment.

b. That the moral quality of the object be apprehended and intended: for liberty alone does not suffice to constitute the morality of an act, but it is further required that the will tend toward an object which is apprehended by the intellect and represented to the will under a moral aspect; for there cannot be a moral act except from a tendency of the will toward a moral object, just as an act cannot be good or evil except from a good or evil object.

a. We distinguish the physical order, or order of nature, and the moral order, or order of reason. To the physical order belongs everything which conduces to developing, preserving, and perfecting nature, whether sensitive or spiritual, and which therefore brings delight or at least utility to the agent. But to the order of reason, or the moral order, belongs that which befits rational nature, which is fitting to its dignity. If one operating in some action apprehends and intends nothing other than the delight or advantage of nature, he does not exercise a moral action, even if the action should pertain to the spiritual order. For example, one who in the study of mathematics or music knows nothing except that it pleases or perfects a man, and intends only this delight or utility, does not exercise a moral action. In order that an action be moral, he must apprehend and will the moral quality of the object.

b. The object of a moral act can be a thing whose nature is so constituted that it befits a rational being to exercise an act either of love or of aversion concerning it, as God, who is to be loved by man; or it can be an action which by its nature is of such a kind that it befits a rational being to place it or avoid it; thus it befits a rational being to speak the truth and to flee perjury.

c. Therefore not every human act is at the same time moral; but there are human acts which are not moral. And indeed not only do children act deliberately without their acts being moral, because they do not yet apprehend the notion of moral good and evil; but adults also sometimes deliberately exercise acts without any attention at all to their moral character, especially when they look at indifferent things, read, write, etc.² Moral authors are of different opinions in this matter. Some say that all human acts are moral, just as all moral acts are human.³ Others, on the contrary, hold that there are human acts which, because of defect of advertence to the moral order, are not moral. The patrons of the former opinion must affirm that man, as often as he acts deliberately, also adverts at least confusedly to the moral order; but this seems contrary to experience.

¹ St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 21, q. 3, a. 2.

² Cf. Struggl, Theologia moralis, tract. 1, q. 1, n. 28. E. Muller, Theologia moralis, 3rd ed. (Vienna: Mayer, 1894), I, l. 1, § 97, n. 1.

³ Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 3. Lehmkuhl I, n. 28.

79. The nature of imputability. a. The imputability of moral acts necessarily follows from their nature. For imputability is that property of a moral act by force of which it can and must be attributed to man as to its proper author and master; but moral acts, since they proceed from a deliberate will, belong to man as to author and master.

Ordinarily, however, imputability is predicated of the man himself as author of moral actions, and signifies that condition of man by which he himself can and must be considered as author of his actions.

b. Imputation is the judgment by which acts and their effects are attributed to man as to their proper author and master.

c. The foundation and root of imputability is the free will, through which man is constituted author and master of his acts. And therefore the grade of imputability depends upon the greater or lesser influence of the free will in producing moral acts.

Since moral acts are either good or evil, and their goodness or malice is attributed to man as author, they are imputed to him, insofar as they are good, unto praise and merit; but insofar as they are evil, unto blame or fault and punishment. Therefore moral acts, by reason of imputability, are either praiseworthy and meritorious or culpable and worthy of punishment.

80. Conditions of imputability in general. 1. In order that a moral act can be imputed fully to man (especially as grave sin), there is required: a. perfect knowledge on the part of the act; b. knowledge, at least confused, of the morality of the act; for if he does not apprehend the morality of the act, the physical action, but not the moral action, is to be imputed to the agent.

a. Knowledge of the intellect is perfect if no impediment stands in the way of its natural activity, such as is present in one who has full use of reason or is fully self-possessed. The more the intellect is impeded in its activity, the more the imputability of the action is lessened.

b. With regard to the morality of the act, knowledge can be concerned: a. with the morality of the act in general (good or evil); b. with the morality of the act in species (theft or sacrilegious theft); c. with the gravity of the evil act (grave or light sin).

c. For the full imputation of an act, confused knowledge of its morality suffices.

2. In order that a moral act can be imputed fully to man, perfect consent of the will is required, so that the act is perfectly human.

The perfection of consent depends not so much upon adhesion of the will as upon knowledge of the intellect, so that consent is perfect if knowledge is perfect, and imperfect if knowledge is imperfect. Therefore acts placed from fear are indeed less voluntary, insofar as they contain repugnance and therefore a lesser adhesion of the will; nevertheless they are perfectly human acts, placed with perfect consent of the will, provided that knowledge of the intellect has not been impeded because of fear.

81. On the imputability of an act morally good and evil. In order that a good act can be imputed to the agent, the moral goodness itself must be sought and intended; in order that an evil act can be imputed to the agent, it is not necessary that the moral malice be intended.

a. Both good and evil can be voluntary in itself or voluntary in the cause; concerning both, that is, concerning good and evil voluntary in itself, and concerning good and evil voluntary in the cause, the principle holds: To one giving alms, the moral goodness of the action is not imputed unless he intends it; to one striking an enemy, the moral malice of the action is imputed even if he does not intend it. To one writing a good book for the sake of making profit, the good effects from it, even if foreseen, are not imputed unless he intends them; but to one writing a depraved book for the sake of making profit, the foreseen evil effects are imputed even if he does not intend them.

b. The reason for the first is that the will must intend the good; for the will cannot be and be called good except from the goodness of the object which it intends. The reason for the second is that the will must not intend but avoid evil: for since the object of the will cannot be evil, the will is and is called evil from the malice which is joined with the object that is intended and which we must avoid.

82. On the imputability of an evil effect voluntary in the cause. Here there is question only of an evil effect, not likewise of the imputability of a good effect, because good, in order to be imputed to us, must be intended in itself, and therefore good voluntary only in the cause is never imputed. But evil voluntary only in the cause can be imputed to us (n. 80). Therefore it is asked whether every evil effect is imputed to us already for this reason, that it follows from a cause freely placed by us, or whether other conditions are further required for this.

1. In order that an evil effect which alone follows from an action (indifferent in itself) be imputed, it suffices that it was foreseen confusedly. For since the effect is contained in the cause, the will which wills the cause necessarily wills also the effect which alone is contained in it.

Although this principle is implicitly contained in the following one, nevertheless it is better to state it explicitly. Example: drunkenness, which alone follows from drinking, must be imputed to the drinker, provided that he knew the drink as intoxicating.

2. In order that an evil effect which follows together with a good one from a good or indifferent action be imputed to the agent, the three following conditions must be present simultaneously:

a. That the agent foresaw the effect at least confusedly: for what has in no way been foreknown is not voluntary; what is in no way voluntary cannot be imputed to the agent.

Therefore drunkenness following from moderate drinking of wine, whose intoxicating force was unknown, is not imputable as sin, because it was not foreseen. Nevertheless brawls, blasphemies, obscene words, and things of this kind which are committed in drunkenness must be imputed as sin to him who is accustomed to commit these things in drunkenness, because on account of the custom of doing things of this kind in this state they have been sufficiently foreseen. But to him who was not accustomed to commit these things in drunkenness, they are not imputed if they happen by chance, because they have not been foreseen.

b. That he could have impeded the effect, that is, that the agent could have either not placed the cause or removed it once placed; for what does not depend upon his will cannot be imputed to the agent, since the foundation of imputation, liberty, is lacking.

a. The agent is rightly judged able to impede an evil effect which follows together with a good one from the same cause if there exists another means for obtaining the good effect with which the evil effect is not joined.

b. Hence a priest is not guilty of sacrilege who gives Holy Communion to a sinner, which he cannot deny because of the sacramental seal; nor is the omission of Mass imputable to him who must care for the sick.

c. That he ought to have impeded the effect, that is, that the agent is held either not to place the cause or to remove it once placed, lest the evil effect follow. For if he is not held to abstain from the cause, the agent uses his own right and, with regard to the evil effect, has himself only permissively.

To him who, in attacking a city, fires an instrument of war in such a way that besides the fighting enemies several innocent persons are killed at the same time, the death of the innocent is not imputed. To a physician are not imputed the depraved movements which he suffers in carrying out care of the sick.

83. When the cause of an evil effect is licit. Now it is asked when we are no longer held to abstain from an action, although it is foreseen that an evil effect will follow from it. The conditions under which it is licit to place a cause from which an evil effect follows are contained in this principle:

It is licit to place a cause from which a twofold effect follows, one good and the other evil, if the cause itself is in itself good or at least indifferent, if the good effect follows at least as immediately as the evil, if a proportionately grave reason is present, and if the end of the agent is honorable. Therefore four conditions are required in order that it be licit to place a cause from which an evil effect is known to be going to follow:

a. That the cause which is placed be good or at least indifferent: for if it were evil, the placing of the cause itself would already in itself, independently of every effect, have to be imputed as sin, for example in one who makes himself drunk while foreseeing that homicide will arise from it.

If, however, the cause were evil not precisely because of that effect about to follow, the malice of the cause would be imputed, but not the malice of the effect. Thus to one who harms his health while foreseeing that it will happen that he cannot fast, the omission of the fast is not imputed, because he is not held to preserve his health for the reason that he may be able to fast.

b. That the good effect follow from the cause at least as immediately as the evil, and not by means of the evil effect: for if from the cause there immediately follows an evil effect and from this only then a good one, evil would be done so that good may follow, which is never licit: for evils are not to be done that goods may come.¹

a. If two effects follow from a cause, it can happen that they proceed from the cause equally immediately, because the cause by its nature is determined to produce both, as if a surgeon, by amputating an arm, causes health and pain for the sick man; or it can happen that the effects do not proceed from the cause equally immediately, because the cause is not determined by nature to produce both, as if someone paints an image for the sake of making profit, by the sight of which another is incited to sin. In each case the agent can intend one without intending the other.

b. Hence a girl pregnant from a crime sins gravely if she procures an abortion in order to avoid infamy; for she employs an evil means to obtain a good end. A physician licitly gives medicine to heal a pregnant woman, even if he foresees that an abortion will follow; but he acts illicitly if the remedy directly and immediately tends to expelling the fetus and only then, from this expulsion, to healing the disease.

c. That the evil effect which is foreseen to follow be not intended nor approved, but merely permitted: for even an action honest in itself becomes evil if the agent, in performing it, intends a depraved end.

Therefore two things from this side must be guarded against when a cause is placed from which an evil effect is foreseen to follow: first, lest the effect be intended when the cause is placed; and then, lest it be approved or pleasing when it actually follows. For example, if someone, using his own right, digs a pit into which he foresees his neighbor will fall, he sins both if he intends the neighbor's evil and if he rejoices in it once it has followed.

d. That there be present a proportionately grave reason for placing the cause and permitting the evil effect: for when a sufficient cause is added, the law ceases by force of which the evil effect was to be avoided; but when this law ceases, the evil effect can licitly be permitted, as if someone kills an attacker in order to preserve himself.

¹ Cf. Rom. 3:8.

84. A proportionately grave reason. Therefore, in order to obtain a good effect, it is sometimes licit to permit evil, if there is present a proportionately grave excusing reason. The proportion must be present between the good effect, or between the cause on account of which the action is placed, and the evil effect.

In order that it can be judged whether there is present a proportionately grave excusing reason, attention must be given to these circumstances:

a. The greater the evil which is foreseen to follow from the cause placed, the greater the excusing reason must be.

Thus it is not licit to kill an aggressor in order to preserve goods of lesser value, but it is licit in order to preserve goods of greater moment or life itself.

b. A greater excusing reason is required if, by omitting the action, the agent can impede the evil effect, than if the evil is nevertheless going to follow from elsewhere.

Thus a greater reason is required so that an innkeeper can provide meats to guests on a fast day if no one else will be found who will give them, than if another is present who will give them when he refuses.

c. The closer the cause concurs toward effecting the evil, the greater reason is required.

A proximate cause is distinguished, which produces the effect in such a way that between it and the effect no other middle cause intervenes; and a remote cause, which does not produce the effect unless several other middle causes intervene. A cause is called nearer or more remote according as fewer or more other causes intervene. Therefore a greater excusing reason is required in one who concurs proximately, a lesser in one who concurs remotely, toward another's sin, for example drunkenness. From this reason it can happen that a good lesser in itself compensates a greater evil, namely when the good follows proximately, but the evil only remotely, from the same action.

d. The more certainly the evil effect is foreseen to follow, the greater excusing reason is required; therefore a lesser reason suffices if the evil will follow only more or less probably.

e. A greater reason is required in those who are held from office to impede evil than in those who are held by no office to impede it.

Thus a greater reason is required so that an innkeeper can provide meats to his son on a fast day than so that he may licitly do this toward strangers, because from the office of piety he is held to impede the sins of his son. Those are said chiefly to be held from office to impeding sin who by force of contract, and therefore from justice, must impede it, such as guards and pastors.

85. When an evil effect voluntary in the cause is imputed. 1. One who knowingly places or does not remove the cause of an evil effect (the same must be said of omission of a commanded action) does not commit sin when the evil effect follows, but when he voluntarily places or does not remove the cause: for sin consists not in the existence of the evil effect, but only in the internal act of the will. Therefore, although the evil effect does not in fact follow, nevertheless the sin has already been committed.

a. Hence one who, while drinking, adverts that he will become drunk by further drink, and besides this knows by experience that in drunkenness he is accustomed to quarrel and to blaspheme, at the very instant at which, foreseeing the evil effects, he decides to drink, commits the sin of drunkenness, quarrel, and blasphemy willed in the cause. One who on a feast day in the morning gives himself to sleep, foreseeing altogether that Mass will be omitted from this, then sins against the precept of the Church when, foreseeing the omission, he gives himself to sleep. One who has decided not to hear Mass sins by this purpose, even if afterward, his will changed, he hears it. The same must be said of one who gives poison to another; namely, he does not sin when the death of the other follows, but when he places the cause of death.

b. Therefore the gravity of a sin voluntary in the cause is not to be taken from the gravity of the effect or from the gravity of the precept violated, but from the malice of the internal act of the will. But if the act of the will which seeks the cause with foresight of the evil effect is a venial sin, even the violation of a grave precept will be only venial.

2. An evil effect voluntary in the cause, which completes an internal sin externally, has the character of sin from the malice of the internal sin. Hence if he who placed the cause has retracted his will before the evil effect followed, this effect does not have the character of sin, but only has the character of an effect of sin.

To him who, foreseeing that he will commit homicide in drunkenness, makes himself drunk and kills a man, death is imputed as sin. But if before the death of the other he retracted his depraved will, the death is not imputed to him as sin, but only as an effect of sin. The same must be said of one who gives poison to another but before that one dies has confessed the sin; namely, after death has later followed, he is not held to confess again the sin of homicide; nevertheless he must repair the damage inflicted by the homicide.

86. On the imputability of sin committed from a depraved habit. If someone has contracted a custom, for example of swearing, the individual acts committed from this custom are imputable as sin if the one swearing adverts to the act and its malice. But if he swears inadvertently, one must distinguish: as long as the custom is voluntary, the acts are imputed as sin; if the custom is involuntary, the acts are not imputed as sin. For the contracted custom is the cause of the individual acts; therefore if it is voluntary, the individual acts are voluntary in the cause. But custom is voluntary both if the one swearing, adverting to the custom to be contracted by repeated acts, nevertheless does not amend himself, and if, adverting to a custom already contracted, he tries by no remedy to put it away. It is involuntary if, whether contracted advertently or inadvertently, he retracts it by penance and proposes to put it away.

a. Therefore one who from a depraved custom which he is studying to amend swears or blasphemes inadvertently does not sin, because the individual acts are voluntary neither in themselves nor in the cause. But one who from a depraved custom which he neglects to root out swears or blasphemes inadvertently commits sin, because the individual acts are voluntary, not indeed in themselves, but in the cause. Nevertheless he does not commit as many sins as the oaths or blasphemies he says, but one, and that he commits when, adverting to the contracted custom and to the obligation of rooting it out, he neglects amendment. Therefore if someone does not advert to the individual sins which are committed from a depraved custom, there is no reason for the confessor to be solicitous about their number, since the sin consists only in the neglected amendment of the depraved custom.

b. From these things is gathered what sort of sin is negligence in taking away a depraved custom of this kind, which is the cause of sins. Namely, if the sins committed from custom are grave, the negligence is grave, because the obligation of rooting it out is grave; but if the sins are light, the negligence is light, because the obligation of taking it away is light; but finally, if some care is applied for amending the custom, yet not serious and sufficient care, light negligence likewise is committed.

87. Which they are. In order that a human act be morally good, a twofold condition is required:

1. That it be explicitly sought as good: for an act of the will cannot be morally good except from the moral goodness of the object, which is explicitly sought by the will as such.

2. That it be referred to God at least objectively: for since God is the first principle and ultimate end of all things, reason demands that all our works be referred to God.

a. Besides the threefold subjective intention, actual, virtual, and habitual (n. 42, 6), there is another relation of actions to God, which is called objective or natural. An action is referred to God objectively, naturally, or implicitly, by the fact that the action is referred to God, not by some intention elicited by the one operating, but by its very nature. For every good work by its own nature is fitting to the moral order; but since God is the author and end of the moral order and has willed that it be observed, one who deliberately acts according to this order implicitly regards God and places an action ordered to God and conformable to the divine will. Now it is asked how an act must be referred to God in order that it be good. Concerning this matter there are diverse opinions of theologians.²

b. There are some who teach that all acts which are not concerned with God Himself, the ultimate end, must be referred to God through the virtual intention of the one operating in order that they be good.

Their argument is this: by a positive precept we are obliged to refer all our actions to God, for the Apostle says: Whether you eat, or drink, or do anything else, do all things for the glory of God.³

a. St. Alphonsus seems to be of this opinion, who (l. 5, n. 44) teaches that indeed an actual relation of all works to God is not required, but nevertheless a virtual one is. "Hence," he says, "it is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer all one's acts to God, so that the precept of the Apostle may thus be fulfilled, at least by a virtual intention of doing all things for the glory of God."

b. Besides the Jansenists, the theologians who are called Augustinians (Noris, Berti, and others) thought that every act good from its object, in order that it be truly good, must be referred explicitly to God from the motive of charity. They came to this opinion from several testimonies of St. Augustine wrongly understood, and they thought it was confirmed from Sacred Scripture (by the texts just cited). They said that the omission of this relation was a venial sin.

It cannot be understood why, from the nature of the thing, another relation of the same action to the ultimate end would be required for honesty than the implicit and natural relation. And indeed, since God is the absolutely ultimate end, every moral action must tend toward God the ultimate end; but a moral action, by the very fact that it is morally good, tends toward God, and the one operating exercises an action tending by its nature toward God. Therefore, if another and more perfect relation were required, this would be necessary from the positive will of God. Therefore, in fact, the patrons of this opinion appeal to the precept of God promulgated through the Apostle. But no divine precept exists by which we are obliged to refer our actions to God by a positive intention. For the words of the Apostle related above are explained by some, with St. Bonaventure and his school, not of a precept but of a counsel; but if nevertheless, as St. Thomas with his followers thinks, they contain a precept, they do not oblige to anything else except that all works be referred to God implicitly and objectively. And indeed those words cannot contain a universal precept which affects absolutely all men; for if all actions, in order to be morally good, had to be referred to the ultimate end by the intention of the one operating, it would follow that all works of unbelievers are sins from defect of due relation, which is false.⁴

Nor do those words contain a particular precept which obliges only the faithful; for besides the fact that an intolerable yoke would be imposed upon the faithful by a precept of this kind, this doctrine is contrary to the sense and practice of the faithful. For all the faithful, even the pious and timorous, judge that they do a good work if from mercy they give alms to a poor man, even if they do not think about a further end.⁵

Finally, if these words contained a precept of explicitly referring all things to God, we would not be held only to refer all works to God in whatever way, but we would be held to this from the motive of charity. For to seek the glory of God by one's acts pertains to charity; indeed it is even the most perfect intention which man can elicit, since it is the intention which God Himself pursues in His works ad extra, and the intention according to which Christ the Lord offered His life here on earth to God the Father. But it is false that all works are to be referred to God from the motive of charity; for it would follow that every action which is not done from the motive of charity is a sin, which no sane person affirms.

In fact, by these words the Apostle concludes a discourse expounding the precept that in no way by our operation should we scandalize our neighbors, but rather edify them; and therefore from the context the words objected contain the precept that our external operations, especially indifferent ones (to eat, to drink, and things of this kind), should edify the neighbor and in this way redound to the glory of God. Concerning the motive from which those operations are done, since it is internal and hidden from others, there is no discussion in these words.⁶

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 103 ff. Walsch, l.c., n. 675 ff. Frins II, n. 290 ff. Ernst, Uber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung (Freiburg: Herder, 1905).

² Since the relation of works to God is made through a good intention, here is solved the question whether a good intention is required, and what kind, in order that our works be good.

³ 1 Cor. 10:31. Cf. also 1 Cor. 16:14; Col. 3:17; 1 Pet. 4:10-11.

⁴ Cf. Baian proposition 25: "All works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices"; likewise propositions 36 and 37.

⁵ Cf. proposition 9 of Alexander VIII: "He truly sins who has hatred for sin merely because of its turpitude and unfittingness with nature, without any respect to God offended." Therefore he neither sins nor performs an evil act who, from the motive of natural honesty without a further relation to God, elicits an act of sorrow for his sins.

⁶ Cornely, Commentarius in s. Pauli ep. 1. ad Cor. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1890).

88. If there is question of acts indifferent in themselves, it is required that they be moderated at least according to the prescriptions of reason and that they be apprehended and sought as such, even if the will explicitly intends not the honorable good but delight or advantage.

a. One who plays in order to recreate himself and understands this action, all its adjuncts considered (of person, place, time, duration, etc.), to agree with the prescriptions of reason, and intends it as such, acts well. Theologians of every school hold this opinion, especially St. Thomas and his genuine disciples, who think that the acts which most Scotists call indifferent are morally good. Today this opinion has become almost common among theologians.¹

b. Ordinarily men judge some action to be exact according to reason by the fact that they apprehend it as not illicit.

a. Others teach that all actions, especially indifferent ones, in order that they be morally good, must be referred positively to an honorable end, that is, the reason which moves and determines the will to acting must be a positively honorable good or the motive of some virtue; nor does it suffice that it be either delight or advantage of nature.

In order that actions by which a man consults his own health or preserves life through food be morally good, the will must seek them because, for example, God thus commands, or because they sustain life. The bestowal of alms by which someone intends to relieve the need of the poor is a morally good work because it is done from a positively honorable motive, namely from the motive of the virtue of mercy.

Of this opinion, besides the Augustinians, are many theologians of every school, not only Thomists, but especially Scotists, who, admitting acts indifferent in the individual, require this for acts to be morally good: that they be explicitly ordered to an honorable end.

b. Their argument is this: man always and in all things is held to operate as man, or as a rational being. For God cannot permit that man, acting deliberately or as a rational being, should operate in a mode which does not befit the dignity of rational nature. But an operation which is not positively referred to an honorable end is not worthy of man; for the end proper to rational nature is a positively honorable end. Therefore one who by his actions seeks advantage or delight, and does not positively intend a further end, acts after the manner of brutes and does not place a morally good action.

c. Refutation. But neither does this opinion seem to be admitted. For although the end proper to rational nature is called the honorable good, nevertheless it can be shown by no argument that man is held always and in all things to intend that end positively in order that he act well. For it suffices that he intend it negatively, that is, that he apprehend himself to do nothing which is contrary to the honorable end; by this very fact he also implicitly intends the positively honorable end. Besides this, this opinion also seems to be contrary to the sense and practice of the faithful, as will soon be explained.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 112-129; VI, n. 239. Genicot I, n. 39. Pesch III, 673. Lest anyone think this doctrine foreign to the mind of the ancient theologians, let him compare these testimonies. "The act of political virtue (to speak to someone from a certain civil friendship - an indifferent act from an indifferent end) is not an indifferent act, but is good in itself, and if it is informed by grace, it will be meritorious." St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5. "In two ways man can operate for relieving a necessity of nature or even for an advantage of the body: first, by considering human nature only as animal; in another way, by considering it also as rational, which happens when, for operating on account of an advantage of nature, man applies the rule of reason and judges that advantage to be fitting to himself also as regulated by reason. Therefore the former mode does not suffice for the honesty of the action. But if he operates in the second mode, this is enough for the honesty of the action." Suarez, in I-II, tr. 33, disp. 9, sect. 3, n. 9. "We are accustomed to call recreation honest, games honest, etc., insofar as in their delightfulness, which is the reason of willing and the formal object of such acts, the measure prescribed by reason is preserved, and on account of this measure preserved they are named honest." Mastrius, l. 1, disp. 5, q. 4, a. 4, n. 196.

89. Arguments for the proposed opinion. a. An action is morally good which is good from object, end, and circumstances; but an action which is ordered according to reason is of this sort. Certainly an object which, considered abstractly, is indifferent, but in the concrete, all circumstances considered, is ordered according to reason, must be called morally good. Likewise an end which, considered abstractly, is indifferent (delight), but in the concrete, with account taken of the circumstances, is ordered according to reason, must be called morally good, because it is conformable to reason. It is always indeed required that man in his deliberate actions operate as man and as befits rational nature; but one who in some action intends delight or advantage of nature, yet one tempered according to the norm of reason, does not act after the manner of brutes, but as a rational being, namely deliberately and according to the prescription of reason.

b. An act by which moral virtue is exercised is a morally good act: "the honorable," says St. Thomas, "is properly referred to the same thing as virtue."¹ But there are acts whose object and end are indifferent in themselves, and which are constituted acts of virtues by this alone, that the use of things, which is undertaken for advantage and delight, is in every respect tempered according to the norm of reason; of this kind is the virtue of temperance.²

c. This opinion agrees with the mind and practice of the faithful, even the timorous. For no one, however pious he may be, judges that he has committed sin if he moderately uses the advantages and delights of nature according to the prescription of reason, and is not solicitous about a further honorable end. Therefore the faithful nowhere accuse themselves of actions of this kind as though they had performed an evil action; and this practice of the faithful agrees very well with the mind of the holy Fathers.³

Note. Nevertheless all concede that this moral goodness of actions is the lowest, and that it can be increased and perfected through an intention by which actions are explicitly ordered to a higher honorable end and therefore to the ultimate end. For the goodness of actions grows so much the more, the higher and nobler is the end which is positively intended by the agent, and the more this intention is explicit and actual.

¹ Summa II-II, q. 145, a. 1.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 6. Cf. also I-II, q. 64, a. 1.

³ Cf. St. Augustine, In Ps. 34, serm. 2, n. 16; In Ps. 164, n. 2.

90. Difficulties. Against this doctrine a twofold difficulty arises. One is from Sacred Scripture, by which idle words, and by equal reason idle actions, are reproved;¹ but idle words are said to be those which do not have an honorable end. The other difficulty arises from propositions 8 and 9 condemned by Innocent XI, from which it is clear that to use delights for pleasure alone is sin;² but one who in delightful actions does not intend a further end acts for pleasure alone.

a. An idle word is called not indeed a shameful or lying word, but neither is it a word which is not directed by the intention of the speaker to a higher honorable end. Rather an idle word is a word which, without reason of necessity or utility, is uttered from mere buffoonery or talkativeness; but a word of this kind, as uttered against the prescription of reason, is evil.³

b. He is said to act for pleasure alone, not who in the use of delights does not intend a further honorable end, but who seeks delightful actions as long as they bring pleasure, without respect to the prescriptions of reason dictating and requiring mode and measure, lest the use of delights impede goods of a higher order. Therefore one who acts for pleasure alone not only does not intend a higher end, but also implicitly excludes and impedes it (n. 74).

Therefore to act for pleasure alone in such a way that a further honorable end, and therefore the ultimate end, is impeded, is sin. But to act for pleasure alone in such a way that delight moves one to acting and is intended, without being directed to a further honorable end, is not sin, provided that the delightful action is known truly to serve nature and that in its use the mode prescribed by reason is observed.

¹ Matt. 12:36.

² Proposition 8: "To eat and drink unto satiety for pleasure alone is not sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts." Proposition 9: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without fault and venial defect." These propositions are false under multiple heads.

³ Cf. Knabenbauer, Commentarius in evangelium s. Matthaei (Paris: Lethielleux, 1892), I, p. 496 f.

91. On the use of delights.¹ a. Delightful goods (Genussmittel, Genussguter) are called those whose use brings delight. Delight is the rest or complacency of the appetite in a present or possessed good. Since there is a twofold appetite, there are also two genera of delightful goods: spiritual and sensible. Although delight is perceived also from the use of spiritual things, nevertheless the discussion here is chiefly of the delights of the lower appetite from the use of sensible things.

b. Sensible delightful goods are of two kinds: necessary, which are required for conserving life or the species and to which delight is annexed, as food and drink; and non-necessary, which serve only for bringing delight, as liquors, odors, spices, tobacco, etc. These are either taken alone or sprinkled upon things necessary for life in order to increase their delight. Concerning delightful things a twofold question is instituted: a. whether their use is licit; b. whether delight itself can licitly be sought.

1. Each person can licitly procure for himself delights which are not harmful, provided that their use is directed by the law of reason so as to be honorable and morally good; nevertheless abstinence from them is to be commended as an exercise of virtue.

a. All created things are good and were created by the author of nature for this reason, that we might use them to obtain our honorable ends. This especially holds concerning things which serve for conserving life and the species: "For all things are yours";² therefore their use is not only not prohibited but entirely licit.

b. After the fall the appetite is borne toward delights independently of the norm of honesty, namely even toward those which are illicit and inordinately toward those which are licit. Therefore in their use it must be ruled by reason, so that its acts may be morally good.

c. For a twofold reason abstinence from delightful things, even licit ones, is to be commended: to strengthen the will, so that it may abstain from them so much the more certainly and easily when their use is illicit; and to exercise virtue according to the example of Christ the Lord, who, though He was rich, for our sake became poor,³ and completely renounced non-necessary delights.

2. The act of the will by which delight itself or a delightful thing is sought on account of delight is licit and morally good, provided that the object is licit and the appetite for delight is moderated according to the rules of right reason. Therefore one who uses the delights of nature, such as conversing, eating, drinking, playing, recreating himself, etc., because they please, is far from acting badly; rather, he acts well, if in these things he observes the mode and measure prescribed by reason.

a. There are theologians (for example Billuart with other Thomists) who contend that acts which are done from delight, of whatever sort this may be, are all morally evil: for since to act on account of delight is not fitting to a rational being, they think every deliberately sought delight is morally evil. Others (as Viva)⁴, distinguishing between animal delights, such as delights of touch and taste, and superior delights, though sensible, such as delights of sight and hearing, teach that the former can never under any condition be licitly sought for their own sake, because they are not of themselves worthy of rational man; but that the latter can licitly be sought for their own sake, provided they are sought with moderation, because they serve intellectual knowledge and do not so depress man to the condition of brutes.

b. To actions which contribute to conserving and perfecting nature, the author of nature has for this reason given advantage and delightfulness, that men might be drawn from this to exercising them. Therefore man can will advantage and delights. Now if in those actions he perceived and sought nothing other than advantage of nature and pleasure, the action would indeed be fitting to animal nature, but would not be worthy of rational nature. But by the fact that he prescribes in every respect, to the advantages and delights which he seeks, the mode and measure which right reason demands (with regard to adjuncts of time, place, duration, etc.), he acts as a rational being. Nor can it be understood what would be lacking to actions of this kind so that they cannot be called right and worthy of man. For the nature of man, since he is a rational animal, is not rational only, but animal and rational; therefore he can positively seek and pursue those things which are fitting to his animal nature. But by the fact that these are exercised under the guidance and dominion of reason, they also sufficiently befit rational nature.

¹ Cf. I. B. Becker, "Die moralische Beurteilung des Handelns aus Lust," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie (1902), pp. 448, 673. Frins II, n. 198 ff.

² 1 Cor. 3:22.

³ 2 Cor. 8:9.

⁴ Damnatae theses, on propositions 8 and 9 condemned by Innocent XI, nn. 6, 9, 13.

92. On omissions. It is asked whether omissions of a good work not commanded are sins. An omission of a good work cannot take place without the pursuit of some good; now, according as this good is honorable or dishonorable, the omission will be sinful or not sinful.

In order that this may be explained better, it must be noted that omissions of a good work can occur in a twofold way: either in place of a more perfect work a less perfect work is chosen, or the good work is simply omitted.

a. If in place of a more perfect action another less perfect action is chosen which itself is honorable, the omission is far from a sin; rather, it is a good act, although of lesser perfection than the omitted action. If, for example, to a young man there offers itself an occasion of hearing Mass (not commanded) and at the same time of taking a walk, and, the more perfect work omitted, he chooses the less perfect walk, by the omission of Mass he in no way sins.

b. If the good work is simply omitted, or excluded by an act of nilling, without another work being chosen in its place, it depends upon the motive on account of which the more perfect work is omitted whether the omission is sin or not. For since no one can will against the good insofar as it is good, one who omits a good work omits it for this reason, that he perceives in it some evil which he intends to flee; but we flee evil from love of the opposite good. Now if the love of the opposite good is honorable, the omission will be a morally good act; if it is dishonorable, the omission will be sin. If, for example, when an occasion of hearing Mass is offered, a young man apprehends that indeed no impediment is present for going to church, but also that no obligation urges, and omits it, he decides to omit Mass for this reason, that he apprehends in it an evil, for example inconvenience, which he intends to flee. Now if the motive on account of which he tries to avoid the inconvenience is reasonable, the omission is not sin; but if the motive is, for example, spiritual sloth or disdain of the good, the omission is sin.¹

¹ Cf. Pesch III, n. 675. Lehmkuhl I, n. 40.

96. Declarations. 1. Moral acts by which we arrive at the supernatural end of eternal life must be supernatural, and this by the internal supernaturality of the act itself, by which it is elevated above nature in its very being and as to substance. For the way must be proportioned to the terminus, and the work to the reward; but the end of eternal life is strictly supernatural and essentially diverse from a natural ultimate end. Therefore also the acts by which we tend toward that end must be supernatural as to essence.

2. The conditions which are required in order that a human act truly be supernatural are assigned variously by authors. All indeed require: a. that the act be morally good, for a human act indifferent in itself morally cannot be supernatural. Certainly a supernatural act has God as principal author through grace exciting and assisting; but God does not excite by His grace to indifferent acts. Then they require: b. that the act proceed from a supernatural principle, namely from a power elevated by actual grace; for in order that an act be supernatural, this certainly is required: that it be elicited not by the powers of nature, but by the supernatural powers of grace. But others further require: c. that its formal object or motive also be supernatural.

What this condition means they explain in diverse ways; nevertheless most wish the formal object to be apprehended through faith, that is, that the agent be moved to acting by some revealed truth which he knows not by the mere light of reason but by faith (the intellect furnished with the light of faith). For example, one who gives alms to a poor man because to aid the poor is honorable acts from a natural motive; but one who bestows alms because the poor man has been redeemed by Christ, because he is the brother of Christ, because Christ commands this, because it contributes to eternal life, acts from a supernatural motive apprehended through faith, provided that he is furnished with the habit of faith. For faith must influence the supernatural act; but it influences through a motive known from faith.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14. Schmid, "Die Ubernaturlichkeit der menschlichen Heilswerke," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie (1888), pp. 263, 419. Mullendorff, "Die Verdienstlichkeit u. das ubernaturliche Motiv," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie (1893), pp. 42, 496. Schiffini, De gratia divina (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), n. 371 ff.

97. Twofold opinion. 1. Theologians of great name require for a supernatural act, besides a supernatural principle, also a supernatural object or motive: Suarez,¹ Lacroix,² St. Alphonsus,³ Mazzella,⁴ Lehmkuhl.⁵

These authors bring forward two kinds of arguments:

a. From the nature of the thing: acts are specified by the (formal) object; but a natural act differs in species from a supernatural act; therefore the (formal) object of each act must be diverse in species or essentially. But the essential diversity of each (formal) object consists in this, that one is apprehended through reason, but the other through faith.

b. From the sources of revelation. Some patrons of this opinion concede that from the nature of the thing there is not an efficacious argument by which it is demonstrated that a natural and a supernatural act cannot be concerned with the same object. But they affirm that from the positive will of God all supernatural acts must proceed from faith, or must have a supernatural motive; since both Sacred Scripture and tradition teach that faith is the root from which supernatural life sprouts. Therefore without the influence of faith through a motive known from faith, supernatural acts cannot be exercised. And indeed:

a. These testimonies: "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe";⁶ "the just lives from faith,"⁷ must be understood not only of first justification, for which man must dispose himself through an act of faith, but of absolutely all supernatural acts, which cannot be supernatural unless faith influences them through their supernatural motive.

b. The Council of Trent, wishing to declare the doctrine of St. Paul expressed by these testimonies, adds: "For this reason we are said to be justified through faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification";⁸ from which we have that not only first justification, but also the increase of sanctifying grace through supernatural and meritorious acts, must proceed from the root of faith. But, they say, acts proceed from the root of faith only in this way, that faith influences them through a supernatural object and concurs in their production.

2. Nevertheless it can be affirmed: in order that a human act be supernatural, no other condition is required except that it be ethically good and proceed from grace or from a supernatural principle; but it is not necessary that the object of the supernatural act be supernatural. Therefore the supernaturality of the act does not depend upon the object, but upon the eliciting principle, so that it is supernatural even if it is concerned with a natural object, provided that it is elicited by the powers of grace.

a. By these things it is not denied that an act which proceeds from faith, and therefore is elicited from the supernatural motive of faith, is of greater dignity and worth. Therefore, although the supernatural good intention, as it is called, is not proved necessary from this head, nevertheless the faithful are to be admonished and exhorted that they accustom themselves to exercise their actions from the supernatural motives of faith; for their works will in this way be of greater merit. But for the very supernaturality of the act this is not necessarily required.

b. For the rest, that which Cardenas teaches specifically concerning alms can be extended to most morally good actions of a Christian man: "He who in the school of faith has learned that alms are a holy operation and pleasing to God, because God has thus revealed, although when the occasion of alms is offered he is actually unmindful of divine revelation, nevertheless operates led by the doctrine which he learned in the school of divine faith; and thus that operation proceeds virtually from an act of faith, because he operates from the dictate which he acquired in the school of faith."⁹

¹ De gratia, l. 2, c. 4, 5; l. 12, c. 7, 33, n. 10.

² Theologia moralis, l. 2, n. 21 ff.

³ Theologia moralis, l. 6, n. 439.

⁴ De gratia Christi, n. 54 ff.

⁵ Theologia moralis I, n. 258. Passauer Monatsschrift (1895), p. 14 ff.

⁶ Heb. 11:6.

⁷ Heb. 10:38; Rom. 1:17; Gal. 3:11.

⁸ Sess. 6, c. 8.

⁹ Cardenas, Crisis theologica, pr. 4, disert. 16, c. 6, n. 54.

98. Arguments for this opinion. 1. Acts which proceed from a principle supernatural through grace are without doubt supernatural: for if the root and principle is supernatural, the fruit or effect must also be supernatural. And indeed actual grace brings it about that human acts are supernatural. For grace is granted for this reason, that acts may become supernatural through grace; and for this reason grace is necessary for every salutary work both of the just and of the sinner, both of the faithful and of the unbeliever, because grace itself must bring it about that the work is supernatural.

a. Therefore if for supernatural acts a supernatural object or motive were required, this would be for this reason: because in this order of providence God would grant the help of grace (especially for indifferent acts) only under this condition, that man act from a supernatural motive. But it can be demonstrated by no argument that God in this order made the supernatural concurrence of grace dependent upon the supernatural motive of the agent. On the contrary, it seems able to be demonstrated that faith is the condition on which the supernatural help of grace depends in this order, so that God grants supernatural grace to those who have already received faith, by which their works are elevated to the dignity of a truly supernatural act. Namely, for man constituted on the way to the terminus, as often as he acts well, God is present with the supernatural help of grace. For God has destined man to a supernatural end; by this very fact He has also imposed upon him the obligation of tending by his acts toward the end established for him. But since without the help of grace he cannot tend toward his end, God must succor him through grace, so that man can satisfy his obligation. Therefore as often as man by his acts tends toward the end established for him, God grants him supernatural grace. But man tends toward his end as soon as he embraces faith or disposes himself to having it: for through faith he apprehends his end and orders himself to it. To bring forward at least one testimony of Scripture from many, Christ the Lord says: "He who hears My word and believes Him who sent Me has eternal life,"¹ that is, he has that by which he can perform the works of eternal life, because he has the condition by which, once posited, supernatural graces are supplied by God. From tradition, moreover, it is established that in the Church there flourishes the persuasion which St. Augustine expresses in these words: "that anyone cannot operate well unless through faith he has received grace. But man begins to receive grace from the time when he begins to believe God, moved to faith by internal or external admonition."²

b. From the preceding argument it follows that actual grace is always available to all the faithful, whether just or sinners, by which their morally good actions become supernatural. But with greater certitude it can be affirmed that all morally good works of the just are always exercised with the help of divine grace and therefore are supernatural. For the Council of Trent has this: "For since that same Christ Jesus, as head into the members and as vine into the branches, continually pours virtue into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works."³

2. If for supernatural acts the influence of faith through a supernatural motive were required, there would be no supernatural act without the influence of faith; but there are supernatural acts without the influence of faith. It is certain that in unbelievers before faith and independently of the influence of faith there are found acts which proceed from grace: for the proposition affirming that faith is the first grace has been proscribed;⁴ since before faith truly supernatural graces are granted, by which the unbeliever may dispose himself to embracing the true faith. But acts which are elicited by the powers of grace are supernatural. Therefore there are supernatural acts which are not founded on faith in this sense, that faith influences them.

¹ John 5:24.

² Ad Simplicianum, l. 1, q. 2, n. 2. Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie XVIII (1894), p. 593; XX (1896), p. 22 ff.

³ Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16.

⁴ Cf. proposition 27 of Quesnel and 5 condemned by Alexander VIII.

99. To the arguments of the opposing opinion. a. Acts without doubt are specified by the object: for an object diverse in species brings it about that the acts also are essentially diverse. Nevertheless the object is not the only reason from which the essential distinction existing between acts must be sought, since this can also be derived from an essentially diverse power, even if the object of the acts is the same. Now the distinction between a natural and a supernatural act must chiefly be taken from the side of the essentially diverse principle.

b. It cannot be affirmed that all supernatural acts are so founded in faith that they spring forth from faith as from a root. For it is established that there are truly supernatural acts in unbelievers, namely those acts which precede faith itself and its influence.

c. The words of the Apostle in Heb. 11:6 must proximately be understood of first justification, so that the sense is: the good pleasure with which God follows the just cannot be obtained without faith; and in like manner, one who comes to God through justification itself must have faith. Therefore proximately those words signify the absolute necessity of faith for justification. Then, if the words of the Apostle are taken more broadly, so that faith is said to be necessary for any good pleasure with which God follows even supernatural works, and for any approach by which even through supernatural works we come to God, this is true in this sense: not indeed that the motive of faith, but that the existence of faith in the one operating, is the condition without which grace necessary for supernatural acts is not granted.

d. The words "the just lives from faith" signify: a. the just man has through faith and on account of faith that by which he can live the supernatural life, because faith is the foundation and condition by which, once posited, he receives supernatural graces from God. b. The just man, at least for the most part, takes from faith the motives of willing and acting; from the same faith he takes motives of living well and piously and of exactly observing the precepts of the Christian religion, and in this way he lives, that is, preserves and perfects the supernatural life.

e. Faith is called the foundation and root of all justification not because of the motive of faith from which works supernaturally good must be done, but: a. because supernatural life begins with faith and depends upon faith as upon a condition of actual graces; b. because faith moves one to exercising good works and in this way concurs toward preserving and increasing justification.

THE Christian faith teaches that the end of human life is to know, love, and serve God. If a man fulfils this obligation faithfully till death, it further gives him the assured hope of eternal happiness with God in heaven. All our actions should be directed towards the end for which the whole man exists; if an action is such that it conduces to that end, it is a good, moral action; if, on the contrary, it does not conduce to that end, it is a bad, immoral action.

Not all man’s actions, however, are capable of being invested with this moral quality. There are many actions of man which have no more moral quality than the growth of a tree in the garden or the running of a dog in the street. Good or bad digestion is an operation to a great extent removed from man’s control; he is in general no more responsible for it than for the condition in which he was born. Or, if some immoral picture is suddenly thrust under his eyes, he cannot help seeing it. Such acts are neither moral nor immoral; they are neither capable of conducing to the end of moral human action, nor of diverting the agent from it: they merit neither praise nor blame.

A man is a good man morally if he performs well the good actions over which he has control; he is a bad man if he wilfully performs bad actions. So that the actions over which a man has control, the actions which he freely performs, are alone capable of making him a good or a bad man; they are the only actions of man which have a moral quality; they alone are treated of in moral theology. It is the task of moral theology to frame rules for human conduct according to the teaching of the Catholic Church, to decide what actions are good and what bad according to the principles of the Christian faith.

The actions over which a man has control are in a special sense called human if acts, because they are due to his free choice. That man has the power of free choice or free will, is clearly taught in Holy Scripture, and is a dogma of faith.¹ It is also a truth of sound philosophy,” vouched for by the consciousness of each individual and by the common sense of mankind. It does not belong to our province to prove the doctrine. We suppose that, at any rate in many of his daily actions, when all the conditions requisite for action are present, a man is free to act or not, to perform this action rather than that other. A man must indeed have a motive for action, but that motive does not constrain him to act; if he has the use and control of his reason, he may as long as he is in life perform or abstain from the action proposed to him. Man has the wonderful power, unique in all the visible creation, of directing his mental and bodily activity in this way or that according to his good pleasure; and it is this wonderful power which makes him a moral agent, and makes it worth while to discuss and formulate rules of human conduct. Man himself is the cause of his human acts; he freely directs them to the end of human existence, or to some perverse end of his own choice.

¹ Ecclus. xxxi 10; Trent, sess. 6, can. 5, 6.

This power of free choice is a property of the rational will, and is the natural complement of the deliberative reason with which man is also endowed. For among the various objects offered to the will’s acceptance, the reason can propose motives for the selection of one object rather than of another, and, at any rate in many actions, until the deliberation is finished, the will need not decide between them. If an object capable of satisfying all our desires were presented to us, there would indeed be no room for deliberation; as Dante expresses it: Such one becomes, admiring that blest Ray, That, whatsoever else allure the sight, Impossible it is to turn away; Because the one sole wished-for Good is there, A.d everything defective elsewhere found, In it is perfected beyond compare. Paradiso, xxxiii 100. Wright’s translation. In the presence of such an object, the whole man, with all the vehemence of his will made for good, would rush into the embrace of his God. For God alone is capable of wholly satisfying all man’s desires. Or again, if some object of ardent natural desire were suddenly thrust upon us, leaving no time for deliberation, overwhelming us with the idea of its power¹ to satisfy our appetite, it might be that no room was left for free choice, that we should be necessitated to action. There would be at least some indeliberate motion towards the object, a movement of the will which divines call motus primo-primus. If in such a case the power of deliberation is not altogether smothered, but is exercised, though imperfectly, the movement of the will which follows is called secundo-primus. If the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi-deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin.²

These principles are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect.

It follows from what has been said that previous knowledge of, and deliberation about, the object proposed by the intellect to the will, is necessary to free and moral action, which is defined by divines to be action which proceeds from man’s deliberative will.³

¹ M. Maher, Psychology, 5th ed., p. 394.

² St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7.

³ St Thomas, 1-2, q. I, a. 1.

Human acts are by theologians divided into various classes:

(a) Internal acts are performed by the internal powers of the soul; external, by the bodily organs.

(b) Elicited acts are such as proceed immediately from the will and are performed by it alone. They are usually said to be six in number; three having reference to the end, and three others to the means for the attaining of the end. A wish is a simple inclination of the will or an ineffectual desire of an object; an intention is a firm resolve to attain an object by the use of the appropriate means; fruition is a peaceful delight in the possession, real or imagined, of a loved object. The act of selection between various means to an end is called choice; if no alternative is offered by the intellect, acceptance of the means by the will is called consent, though this term is more commonly used of every act of acceptance by the will of an object proposed to it; use or execution is said of the act of the will which applies the means chosen to the obtaining of the end proposed.

Commanded acts are executed by other faculties than the will by which they are commanded.

(c) Natural acts are performed by man’s faculties unaided by divine grace; supernatural, by the help of God’s grace.

(d) Good actions are conformed to the rules of morality; bad actions are contrary to them; those that are indifferent may be good or bad according to circumstances.

(e) Valid acts are such as have all the conditions requisite, and so produce their effect; invalid acts are destitute of some condition necessary to produce their effect.

Human acts, the subject-matter of moral theology, are also called voluntary acts to distinguish them from such actions as are produced under external compulsion. For voluntary acts are the effect of an internal principle, the will (voluntas). The term, however, is ordinarily used not of all actions which are produced by an internal principle, for some of these are specially denominated spontaneous or reflex actions. These latter are the immediate result of sense excitation without the intervention of consciousness. Thus the eyelid closes to protect the threatened organ, and the hand rises involuntarily to drive off a troublesome fly. Voluntary in the strict sense is used only of actions produced by the will with rational knowledge of, and inclination towards, the object. Voluntary actions are produced with consciousness and deliberation. Thus, practically and in the concrete, voluntary actions are identical with human acts, though their connotation is different. For human acts connote freedom, as we have seen, while an act may be voluntary and yet not free. The beatific vision by which the blessed see God face to face, and are thereby thrilled with ineffable delight, is a voluntary act; it proceeds from the will with full and clear knowledge of God, but it is not free; the blessed cannot avert their gaze from the Infinite Beauty which enraptures every fibre of their being. However, all voluntary acts of man are in this life free, and so, for the purposes of moral theology, human acts and voluntary acts are interchangeable terms.

An act may be voluntary in various ways:

(a) An act is perfectly voluntary if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; if the knowledge and deliberation are not full, the act is imperfectly voluntary.

(b) Simply or absolutely voluntary is distinguished from voluntary under a certain respect, or secundum quid. More commonly an action which under the circumstances is willed, but which would not be willed if the circumstances were different, is said to be simply or absolutely voluntary; while inasmuch as the same action would not be willed if the circumstances were different, it may also be said to be only voluntary under a certain respect. Thus, to take the well-worn example, when the merchant is willing in a storm that his goods should be thrown overboard to save the ship, the action is simply voluntary; he would not will it unless the ship were in danger, so that it is also voluntary only under a certain respect.

(c) An action is said to be voluntary in itself when it is in itself and by itself the object of the will; if it is merely the effect of something else which is willed, it is then called voluntary in something else, or voluntary in the cause.

Frequently directly and indirectly voluntary are used in the same sense as voluntary in itself and voluntary in the cause.

All voluntary action is imputed to the agent for praise or blame, merit or demerit; for the action is free, as we have seen, and proceeds from a positive inclination of the will. This inclination of the will is an important element in voluntary actions; the absence of it prevents the sin of man being imputed to God as voluntary, and the same principle sometimes justifies us in performing an action which is right in itself, though some of its effects are evil. But this is an important point and requires fuller treatment.

First of all then, let us see what is required before an evil effect of my action can justly be imputed to me and make me morally guilty.

(a) The evil effect must in some measure be foreseen, otherwise it will be involuntary and not imputable. And so no moral blame attaches to a man who, thinking that he is drinking water, swallows poison. (b) The agent must be able to prevent the evil effect, for we are only responsible for what is under our control. The engine-driver of an express train is not responsible for the death of a person who suddenly throws himself under the wheels of the engine.

(c) There must be an obligation not to perform the action by reason of the evil effect which would follow from it. If the evil effect follows merely by accident, it does not render an otherwise lawful action unlawful, and I am not bound to abstain from it on account of the mere possibility of the evil effect following from it. Thus, if a hundred people indulge in hunting or motoring for a considerable time, some one of them is morally certain to meet with an accident endangering lite or limb. But this does not make hunting or motoring morally wrong. Though I am conscious that the accident may happen to me, I may nevertheless hunt or use the motorcar as usual. If I kill myself or someone else, it will be merely by accident, for it is presumed that I use reasonable care to avoid mishap.

On the other hand, a superior, whose commands I am bound to obey, may have used his authority to forbid an action on account of the possible evil effect which may follow therefrom. In that case I must abstain from the action by reason of the command of my superior, though otherwise I should be free. And so if a father, for special reasons, forbids his son to go to the theatre, the son should obey, as long as he is subject to parental authority. Again, even though there may be no positive command of a superior, in cases where no good would come from the action, and where the only effects would be evil, I am bound to abstain from the action, which in that case itself becomes evil. Similarly, where the evil effects are largely in excess of the good, right reason tells me that I must abstain from the action. But there are many actions which are forbidden by no lawful authority, which have both good and evil effects, while it is not clear that the latter largely outweigh the former. Am I bound to abstain from such actions, or when am I bound to abstain from them ?

In order to provide a general rule of conduct in such circumstances, divines have formulated what is known as the principle of a double effect. That principle may be enunciated as follows: It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad, provided that (1) the action, viewed in itself, is good, or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good; (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of— the bad; and (4) there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect.

This rule will furnish us with a guide in case of doubt whether we are bound to abstain from any given action because of some evil effect which will follow from it. We shall be at liberty to perform the action in question provided that four conditions are realized. In the first place, the action itself, apart from the evil effect, must not be bad. If it is bad in itself, there can be no question about its lawfulness. Further, the agent must not intend the evil effect, though he foresees that it will follow. If he intends it, the evil effect becomes voluntary in itself and imputable to the agent. Then, the good effect must not be the result of the bad, for we must not do evil that good may come; the end does not justify the means.1 Lastly, there must be such a proportion between the good and bad effects that right reason tells me that I am not forbidden to forego the good effect of the action on account of the bad being inextricably bound up with it.

The question as to whether a general is justified in ordering his army to take a stronghold by assault in war will serve to illustrate the principle and its use. In the first place, the assault must be justified by itself, apart from the cost in human life. The assault will be justified in itself if the war is just and the stronghold belongs to the enemy; it will not be justified if the war is one of unjust aggression, or if the general has been expressly ordered by his Government not to take the place. Moreover, the general must not directly intend the necessary loss of life among the innocent non-belligerents.

He foresees and deplores it; he is said in the technical language of theology to permit the evil effect, not to intend it. The slaughter of innocent non-belligerents must not be the means chosen to capture the stronghold; evil may not be done that good may come. Finally, the capture of the place must be a matter of sufficient importance in the war to warrant the shedding of innocent blood in the bombardment, and the other evils necessarily entailed in an assault. The question as to when the good result is sufficient to outweigh the evil is largely a matter of sound judgement after a careful examination of all the circumstances. If the successful storming of the place would only add to the personal reputation of the general without bringing the end of the war any the nearer, the assault would be a crime; if it would compel the enemy to sue for peace, it would usually be justified. This principle is of great importance in Moral Theology; it has in its support the common consent of divines, and is expressly used by St Thomas.”

If I am not justified, according to the foregoing principle, in performing an action which causes some evil effect, that evil effect is imputable to me though I did not intend it in itself; it is not indeed voluntary in itself, but it is voluntary in its cause, and I am bound to avoid evil even though only voluntary in its cause.

When, however, evil is not voluntary in itself, but only voluntary in its cause, a question arises concerning the degree of moral guilt which is contracted when such a cause of evil is posited unwarrantably. The case arises especially when grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide.

But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour’s crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case¹ Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence² ‘The answer must be ‘“‘ No.”’ For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

¹ Rom. iii 8.

² Summa, 2-2, q. 64, a. 7.

'Theologians dispute about the question whether such a sin of omission as is committed by not closing the gate after me, with resulting loss to my neighbour, can be committed without a special act, by simply neglecting to put the act which was of obligation.

The question is not a very practical one; it will be sufficient to say in reply that physically a man who adverts to the obligation of doing something may hold himself neutral, and so sin by omission without doing anything; practically, however, in such cases, a positive determination is formed not to perform the duty, or at least to perform something else which is foreseen to be an obstacle to the performance of the duty.¹

¹ Suarez, tract. 5, d. 3, sec. 2, n. 6.

The question sometimes arises at what time a sin of omission or a sin which is voluntary only in the cause is committed. When a man gets drunk on the Saturday evening and foresees that in consequence he will not be able to attend Mass on the following day, is the sin of omitting to hear Mass committed on the Saturday night, when he voluntarily posits the cause of his not hearing Mass on the following day, or on the Sunday, when Mass is not heard as is of obligation? Inasmuch as a formal sin is a human act, it would seem that we must say with St Alphonsus¹ that the sin is committed when the cause of the omission or of the evil is voluntarily posited, otherwise we should have to say that a man may commit sin without knowing it, or while he is asleep. ‘10.

¹ Theol. Mor. lib. 5,

WE have seen that we are responsible only for those actions which are performed with knowledge or advertence and freedom of choice. Whatever tends to prevent or lessen advertence, or to restrict liberty, will tend to diminish our responsibility. Ignorance affects advertence, fear and violence influence freedom of choice, and concupiscence influences both. Something must now be said on each of these causes which affect the voluntariness and imputability of our actions.

Ignorance is the absence of knowledge which the person who is ignorant should have. It is thus distinguished from nescience, which is merely the absence of knowledge, without the implication that the knowledge should be possessed.

Ignorance must also be carefully distinguished from error or mistake, which is a false judgement concerning something. Thus, if I simply do not know the person to whom I am speaking, I am in ignorance of his identity; if I mistake him for someone else, I am in error.

(a) With reference to the subject who is ignorant, ignorance is either invincible or vincible.

Invincible ignorance cannot be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. This may arise in my mind either because no thought of my want of knowledge occurs to me, and so the idea of making inquiries never enters into my head, or because I have failed to acquire knowledge on the point, though I made all reasonable efforts to do so. What efforts should be made in any given case depends on the character and circumstances of the person and the matter on which he is ignorant. If the matter is of great importance, if it affects the salvation of souls or the spiritual and temporal welfare of large numbers, great efforts must be made to dissipate ignorance; the efforts which would be sufficient in the case of one poorly instructed, or very much occupied with other weighty affairs, would not be It sufficient in other cases where these suppositions are not verified. In general, where knowledge is of obligation those efforts must be made to acquire it which ordinarily prudent and good men would exert in the circumstances.

Vincible ignorance is such as can be removed by the use of the requisite diligence. Various degrees are distinguished by divines according as some, or little, or no diligence is exercised to dispel it or means are used to foster it. If means are used to foster it, the ignorance is called affected; if little or no diligence is used to dispel it, it is called crass or supine; if some diligence is used, but not what is required in the case, it is called simply vincible ignorance.

(b) With reference to the object of ignorance, we must distinguish ignorance of law, fact, and penalty. 'There is ignorance of law, if the law’s existence is not known, as when a Catholic does not know that the Church forbids marriage within the third degree of kindred. There would be ignorance of fact, if it were not known that A. B. is related to C. D. within the third degree. Ignorance of the penalty is distinguished from ignorance of law when some special sanction is not known, though the law itself is known.

(c) With reference to the action of the subject, we distinguish antecedent, consequent, and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is not voluntary, it is not willed by the subject; consequent ignorance is voluntary; concomitant is not expressly willed, but the action which is done with concomitant ignorance would ex hypothesi be done, even if the ignorance did not exist.

Invincible ignorance, as defined above, excuses from fault, so that, however bad an action done in invincible ignorance may be, it cannot be a formal sin. The reason is obvious; there is no knowledge in the agent of the malice of the action, and so the bad action is involuntary, and not imputable.

Vincible ignorance of the malice of the act, however, cannot excuse one who does wrong. He does not indeed will the evil in itself, but he wills its cause, and so it is voluntary in its cause and imputable. A person who sins in simply vincible ignorance, or even in crass ignorance, is indeed less blameworthy than one who sins with full knowledge of the malice of his act; the sin is only imperfectly voluntary, and less imputable than if perfectly voluntary. There is an apparent difference of opinion among theologians as to whether affected ignorance increases or lessens the malice of a wrong Prop. 2 damn. ab Alex. viii; 68 inter Baianas, can. 2202. action. With many modern authors it seems best to distinguish the motive with which in each case ignorance is fostered. If the state of ignorance is fostered through fear of being compelled by knowledge to abstain from the sinful act, such affected ignorance would seem to lessen the malice of the sin; the wrongdoer would not in this case venture to sin if he had full knowledge, and so he fosters his ignorance; his will is less malicious than if he sinned with full deliberation and consent. If, on the contrary, he merely fosters his ignorance to be able to plead it in excuse, and he is so bent on sinning that he would do the act in the same way even if he had full knowledge of its malice, then it does not seem to diminish the sin; it is rather a sign of an absolute determination to commit the sin.¹

We saw in a former chapter that the degree of malice which attaches to a sin committed in more or less culpable ignorance is measured rather by the sinfulness of the neglect to put away the ignorance, than by the sinfulness of the act in itself.

¹ Bucceroni, 1, n. 51, can. 2229.

Ignorance itself of what we are bound to know, as of the obligations of our state of life, of the truths of faith which are necessary to salvation, is sinful if consequent and vincible; antecedent and invincible ignorance is of course not sinful.

Ignorance does not render an act invalid which has all other requisites for its validity; and so baptism conferred by one who knows nothing about its effects will be valid, if the - matter and form are correctly applied with the intention of doing what the Church does. Substantial error or mistake about the person with whom marriage is contracted will invalidate the contract, while ignorance of who the person is will not, if there be the will to marry.

In theology concupiscence is used in two distinct senses. It frequently signifies the inclination to evil, which in human nature is a result of the fall of our first parents. In this sense it is called sin by the Apostle.¹ Without any moral or immoral implication the word is used here to denote any passion or any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object. It comprehends, therefore, any movement of love, desire, or hatred, sorrow, anger, or delight.

Concupiscence is antecedent or consequent. The former precedes any action of the will, and so is involuntary. The latter is voluntary, either because it is deliberately and directly excited by the will, or at any rate willed in its cause.

¹ Trent, sess. 5, de pec. orig.

Antecedent concupiscence lessens the malice of an evil action which is done under its impulse. For concupiscence troubles the intellect, so that it cannot dispassionately weigh the moral quality of the object proposed to the will and the motives for rejecting it; moreover, concupiscence paints the object in more than naturally attractive colours, so that it exerts an undue influence on the will. Concupiscence thus disturbs the indifference of the will and renders the act which follows less voluntary and free. It is accordingly less imputable to the agent.

It sometimes happens that antecedent concupiscence renders the subsequent action involuntary, and so in no wise imputable, however wrong it may be. This will be the case when some sudden onslaught of passion deprives the agent of the use of reason and blindly impels him to evil. Strong passions, such as love or anger, especially in impressionable natures, sometimes produce this result, and even when murder or suicide is committed in such circumstances juries are warranted in bringing in a merciful verdict of murder or suicide while temporarily insane. If, however, the passion was not altogether antecedent, but in the early stages of its onslaught there was room for deliberation, the consequent evil will not be altogether involuntary; it will to some extent be voluntary in its cause at least.+

It used to bea matter of dispute among theologians whether a man could be insane and not responsible for his actions in some one category, while he retained his self-control in others. In our days it will hardly be disputed that monomania exists, and if it exists, as, for example, in the matter of intoxicating drink, the monomaniac will not be directly responsible for his actions done under the influence of his madness, although he may be responsible for them in their cause.” ¹ Similarly, those who suffer from illusions may be so demented on the particular point as not to be responsible for actions which they perform under the influence of their illusion. It is a question of fact when this is the case, a fact which it is difficult even for experts to determine.

Natural propensities to evil arising from hereditary taint or from temperament lessen the voluntariness of the action just as passion does, but they are not as a rule so strong as to make what in itself is mortally sinful only venial.

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7, can. 2206.

Consequent concupiscence increases the malice of a bad action if it is wilfully excited, because the tendency of the will to evil is voluntarily made more intense. If the passion is voluntary only in its cause, it is rather a sign of the great intensity of the perverse will from which it flows, but which it does not cause.

The evil motions of anger, impurity, rash judgement which precede all advertence and deliberation of the mind, cannot of course be sinful, as they are not voluntary. They become sinful when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice. The question is discussed among theologians, whether it be sinful, and in what degree, to remain neutral under an evil motion of concupiscence, neither giving consent to it nor positively resisting it. If the question is raised concerning a vehement temptation to impurity, it may reasonably be denied that it is ordinarily possible to remain neutral; the danger of consenting would be too great. In such a case there will usually be a grave obligation to resist positively for fear of being drawn into giving consent. Positive resistance does not mean direct and physical effort, which would be worse than useless; but it means that we must, under temptation, avert our minds from the evil suggestion and occupy them with other thoughts. If, however, the question be put, whether sin is committed by remaining neutral under temptation to evil, not deliberating about committing it, but simply neither consenting to it nor rejecting it, the correct answer would seem to be that a venial but not a mortal sin is thereby mortally sinful only venial. The struggle against vice is more difficult for those who are subject to such propensities, but as long as they are in their right senses with the help of God’s grace they can resist, if only they take the necessary means. The same must be said of those who have strengthened their passions and weakened their will by long indulgence in a habit of sin. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 1, n. 236. ‘“‘ ' There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane.” C. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 1905, p. 174.

However, on p. 203 the same author writes: ‘‘ The majority of insane persons are sane in a considerable proportion of their conduct; and when in this part of their conduct they commit offences they are rightly punishable.” Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in a sentence which immediately follows the last. It is this: “‘ Since the limits between the sane and the insane areas of conduct of insane persons are ill defined, no insane person should be punished with the same severity that would be awarded to a sane person for the same offence.” committed. There is some sin, because we are commanded to rule the lower appetites and keep them in subjection to reason, which is not done in the case supposed. But the sin cannot be mortal, for there is no consent of the will, by which alone mortal sin can be committed. This is the teaching of St Thomas and of St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor. 5, n. 6.

Fear is defined to be a perturbation of the mind on account of some present or future danger.

It is grave or slight in proportion as the danger is serious or not serious. Absolutely grave fear is such as will seriously affect an ordinarily constant man, as the fear of death, of perpetual imprisonment, or of loss of goods; relatively grave is such as will seriously affect anyone of timid disposition.

Reverential fear is that which a subject feels lest he should offend his superior. Ordinarily, divines rank it as slight fear, but it may become grave if, for example, a very austere father threaten his daughter with loss of home or with his perpetual displeasure.

Fear from without is the result of some external danger, which may arise either from a necessary cause, as, e.g., from the danger of shipwreck; or it may be threatening from a free agent. Fear from within is from an internal cause, as the fear of death from a disease which has been contracted.

The actions which are done out of fear are simply voluntary, but they are usually also involuntary under a certain respect.

There is no question here of actions which are done in fear or with fear, as when I walk with fear and trembling along a lonely road by night. We are concerned with the effect which fear has on human actions done in consequence of fear; and unless it deprives the agent of the use of reason, which in rare cases may happen, the action remains voluntary, because it is done freely and deliberately to avoid the threatened danger. In such circumstances, as we saw above, the action is said to be simply voluntary; but it is also involuntary under a certain respect, for, unless the danger threatened, the action would not be done. An exception must be made with regard to attrition elicited from fear of hell, which, if it is to be efficacious, must be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary,¹ for otherwise it would not help to justify the sinner in the sacrament of Penance.² We can easily see how this is possible with regard to sin. For other actions done through fear have some evil or loss annexed to them, on which account they are involuntary under some respect; while aversion from sin is wholly good and reasonable, and so there is no reason why repentance for sin from fear of hell should not be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary.”

¹ St.Alphonsus, 6, n. 442.

² Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

Inasmuch as bad actions done through fear are simply voluntary, it would follow that they are imputable to the agent, so that fear does not excuse him from sin. And this is true of such actions as are intrinsically bad and against the natural law. The Church has always considered those to be apostates who through fear of death or persecution deny their faith, though less culpable than those who renounce it without excuse (Can. 2205).

However, with regard to positive precepts, grave fear ordinarily excuses transgressors of them from sin. The reason is, because the legislator is not presumed to desire that his laws should bind when their observance would entail such grave consequences to his subjects. Divines, relying on what we read in Holy Scripture, teach this doctrine concerning the positive law of God, and it will be all the more true of positive human legislation.¹ But if non-observance of a law or a command of a superior would cause great damage to the common good, then the law or command must be obeyed, even with loss of life; for private advantage must yield to the requirements of the common weal. And so a soldier must stick to his post in war, even at the risk of life.

¹ St Thomas, 3, q. 40, a. 4, ad 3; 1-2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 4; Suarez, De Leg. 3, c. 30, n. 6; Can. 2205, sec. 2.

Violence or coercion is the using of greater force than can be resisted to compel another to perform some action against his will. In certain connections the person who suffers violence is said in English law to be under duress.

It follows from the definition that violence is from something external to the agent; no one can offer violence to himself; and that the subject resists to the utmost of his power.

If the resistance is only partial, there is violence only under a certain respect (secundum quid).

The elicited acts of the will cannot be forced by violence, for in that case the agent would will and not will at the same time.

The other internal faculties, and much more the external faculties of man, may be subject to violence. If the violence is absolute, the resulting action is involuntary and not imputable to him who suffers violence; if the resistance is only partial, the action will be voluntary to a certain extent, and in the same degree it will be imputable to the agent (Can. 2205, 52215, Sec, 2).

By performing good actions a man becomes a good man morally, and he is a bad man morally if he performs bad actions. Actions are called good or bad morally with reference to the norm or rule of human conduct. So that the morality of an action is its relation to the rule of human conduct. It will be a morally good action if it be conformed to the rule of conduct; otherwise it will be a morally bad action. As men have differed, and do differ, widely in their views as to the meaning of human life and as to man’s destiny, they naturally have differed, and do differ, widely in deciding what is the rule of human conduct. The rule in different systems will be progress, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or pleasure, or the categorical imperative of the individual reason. Even among Catholic philosophers and divines there is some difference of opinion as to what constitutes the fundamental norm of morality. Practically the different opinions come to much the same, especially as there is greater agreement among Catholics as to what are the formal and proximate rules of morality. The teaching of St Thomas and many others seems to be that the fundamental norm of morality is rational human nature as such. Good in general is that which is conformable to the being whose good it is; and so morally good actions will be such as are conformable to the rational nature of man considered in itself and in all its relations.. Man’s intellect can know man himself, the existence of God and our relation to him, our relations to other human beings, and to the world round about us; knowing these things, our reason can tell us what actions are becoming and what unbecoming to such a nature. Moreover, reason tells us that although we have the physical liberty to do wrong, we are nevertheless under a moral obligation to abstain from it. Our most wise, and good, and provident Creator, who has given us our nature and placed us in the position which we hold, cannot be indifferent as to the manner in which we conduct ourselves. The still, small voice of conscience is there to tell us what is right, in the name of God whose herald it is, to approve of what we do well, to condemn what we do ill. The fundamental norm of right conduct, then, is man’s moral nature, morally right conduct is conduct in conformity with man’s nature in itself and in all its relations. This constitutes right order in the moral world, which God the Creator and provident Ruler of the universe cannot but will us to observe, and this divine Will or Reason bidding us to observe right order and prohibiting its violation is the eternal law of God, the formal objective rule of morality. Human reason, applied to conduct, or conscience, is the formal subjective rule which makes known to us and applies the objective rule¹

¹ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 65. 2, n. 65.

The morality of a human act belongs to it inasmuch as it issues freely from the will with knowledge of its moral quality. Because it is the free product of the human will, a human or a moral act makes a man culpable or praiseworthy. Now the will alone is free, and so morality belongs properly to the internal act of the will. In a perfect human action, indeed, the external act must follow, if it is in the agent’s power, in order to the completeness and perfection of the internal act; otherwise there will be no perfect and efficacious will, But the external act, which is called free only with reference to the will from which it proceeds, cannot have any separate morality of its own, nor of itself can it add to the morality of the internal act. In a complete human act, therefore, consisting of an internal and external action, morality is formally in the internal act alone. Accidentally, on account of longer duration, or repetition, or greater intensity which the external act causes, it may add something to the goodness or malice of the internal act, but not in and by itself. A man is good or bad as his will is good or bad.

From this it must not be concluded that an external sin is the same as an internal sin; that if a man has committed fornication, it is sufficient to confess the desire and intention to do so; the malice of the internal and external acts are the same substantially, but an internal act is different from an external act; and so the sins also differ, for sin is a bad human act.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether, besides the division into good and bad actions, we must also admit a third class, neither good nor bad, but indifferent. In the abstract, indifferent actions certainly exist; to take a walk, for example, in itself and in the abstract, is neither a good nor a bad action. But in the concrete, a man’s intention, and the circumstances in which the action is performed, necessarily give it a moral quality. The intention must be honest or not, the circumstances must be such as to make the action conformableto right reason or not, and so in the concrete any particular action must be either right or wrong; it must be either good or bad, it cannot be indifferent. An action may of course be morally good, and yet not supernaturally meritorious, and so indifferent from a supernatural point of view; and this perhaps is the meaning of some of those divines who contradict the above teaching of St Thomas and the common opinion of the schools.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 9.

An action which in itself is not conformable to right reason and order is against the law of nature and intrinsically bad. An action which in itself is not bad, but only bad because forbidden for good reasons by a lawful authority, as eating flesh meat on a day of abstinence, is said to be bad because forbidden; while intrinsically bad actions are forbidden by God because they are bad and inordinate. However, not all these intrinsically bad actions are bad in the same degree. Some are necessarily and always so, because in all circumstances they remain inordinate, as hatred of God, our first beginning and last end. Others in certain circumstances may become lawful, as taking what belongs to another, which in certain circumstances may be done without sin. The State for good reason may grant leave to take another’s land for a new railway; and a fortiori almighty God, the supreme Lord of all created things, may, without doing an injury, take the life, rights, or property of his creatures. Many divines explain the spoliation of the Egyptians, and the divine toleration of polygamy in the Old Law, by the aid of this principle.

Finally, some actions, as obscene touches and looks, are commonly inordinate and sinful; but if there is good reason for them, and due caution be exercised, they become lawful.¹

¹ Gury, I, n. 26.

We saw in the preceding section that there are various rules by which we know whether a human action is good or bad. It will be a good action if it be conformable to right order, otherwise it will be a bad action. It remains for us to cor- sider what elements in an action make it conformable or not with right order. What have we to attend to in order to know whether an action is according to right reason or not ?

There are three such elements, of which sometimes one, sometimes another, sometimes all together, contribute to make the actions in right order or, on the contrary, inordinate. They are the-object, the end, and the circumstances of the action.

By the object is here meant that to which the will primarily and directly tends; that which it determines to do looked at in itself, apart from the circumstances with which the action when done will be clothed; or it is the action considered in the abstract.

It is obvious that some objects, in the sense above defined, have an objective morality of their own, and this causes the will which tends towards them to be either good or bad as the object is good or bad. To blaspheme God is an action which no creature of his can will without the greatest inordinateness. The will to commit murder, or to steal another’s property, is essentially an evil will, because it tends to an evil object. On the contrary, to love God, to relieve human misery, to show love, honour, and reverence to one’s parents, are good actions, because these objects are good, and the will that tends to them is good.

Human actions, then, derive their specific morality from the object, whenever that object is of itself conformable to rational human nature or, on the contrary, not conformable to it. If the object is indifferent, without any objective moral quality, as walking, the action will derive its morality from the circumstances in which the action is performed.

By the end is here understood the reason or motive which induces the agent to act.

The end of all human life is called the last end; other motives for action are intermediate ends. An end is primary if it holds the first place among several, and would be sufficient by itself to induce action; otherwise it is secondary.

It is obvious that the end or motive which induces the agent to act holds a very prominent place among the sources of the morality of an action.

For it is the object to which the will tends, the prospect of gaining which moves the agent to act; but, as we saw in the last point, the motion of the will takes its moral quality from the object; a will, then, which tends to a good end will so far be good; a will which tends to a bad end will be bad. But the morality of an action resides chiefly in the will, so that a good or bad will, derived from the motive of an action, must necessarily contribute to the goodness or badness of that action. It is the end or motive which sets the will in motion and gives its own moral quality to the action which follows. One, then, who steals money in order to be able to commit adultery commits a sin against justice, induced thereto by a desire to sin against chastity, and as St Thomas, following Aristotle, says, he is more of an adulterer than a thief.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 6.

After the final end of man has been set forth, we must speak of motion in order to the final end, or of the human act considered according to its moral being. But so that the things which must be said about it may become clearer, we shall first deal with the human act considered according to its physical being.

(St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1; qq. 6-21; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book V, I-XXXIII; Homo Apostolicus, tract 3, nn. 1-18.)¹

We shall first present the summary doctrine of the human act considered physically; then we shall consider its individual elements separately.

¹ Cf. John of St. Thomas, on I-II, t. I; Cajetan, on I-II, qq. 6-17; qq. 22-48; Billuart, I-II, De actibus humanis; Gonet, Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, part 2, tract I, De actibus humanis; Suarez, on I-II, De voluntario et involuntario in genere deque actibus voluntariis in speciali; Pegues, literal French commentary on the Summa Theologica, vols. VI and VII; Bouquillon, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, tract 4, section 1, De actu libero; Frins, De actibus humanis; Walsh, Tractatus de actibus humanis; Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, vol. III, tract II, De Deo fine ultimo, section II, De actibus humanis in se consideratis; Lehu, Philosophia moralis et socialis; Walter McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science; Potters, Compendium Ethicae generalis; Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis.

I. Notion of a human act. A human act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man. For "those actions alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man. Now man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be a faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, I).

Other acts, which do indeed proceed from man, but not from the will, or not from deliberate will, are called acts of man. Such are, for example, the first thought of the intellect, the desire for beatitude, and the beatific love of the saints (St. Alphonsus, V, II).

II. Intrinsic principles of the human act. As follows from the definition handed down, the intrinsic principles of the human act are intellect and free will, or, as others prefer, intellect, will, and liberty: the intellect deliberates; the will, once deliberation has been placed, freely chooses.

III. Division of human acts. Human acts are distinguished:

1. Into elicited and commanded acts. Elicited acts are those elicited by the will itself, such as the act of loving. Commanded acts are those elicited by another faculty from the command of the will, such as the act of walking; likewise acts elicited by the will, but from the command of a preceding act of the will. Acts of this kind can be called both elicited and commanded, as when someone detests sin from charity toward God.

2. Into internal and external acts, according as they are completed by the internal powers alone, as thought is, or proceed to the external powers, as the act of speaking does.

3. Into commanded, forbidden, and free acts. Of free acts, some are simply permitted, some are advised, and some are dissuaded.

4. Into good and bad acts, according as they agree with the divine law or differ from it (n. 60). Good acts are distinguished into natural and supernatural acts, according as they are elicited by the powers of nature alone or with the help of grace.

5. Into valid and invalid acts, according as they produce or do not produce the effect for which they are destined. Then, of valid acts, some are irrescindable or firm, while others are rescindable or infirm (St. Alphonsus, V, III and IV).

For an act to be human, two things are required: namely, that it be voluntary and free. Hence:

We shall speak first of liberty considered in itself, then of those things which influence liberty, and finally of the consequence of liberty, or imputability.

Of those things which influence liberty, some impede it, such as physical violence, or force brought upon the faculties which must execute the commands of the will, and ignorance, by which the root of liberty, that is, reason, is impeded in the exercise of its activity. Others concur, proximately or remotely, toward the impediment or diminution of liberty, or at least can concur, insofar, namely, as they proximately or remotely conduce, or at least can conduce, to obscuring the light of reason. Of this sort especially are the passions, habit, temperament, disposition, character, and psychic abnormalities. We shall speak of each.

¹ It seems practical to add these things, although logically the things to be said would rather be referred to another place.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 6-17.)

Human acts are a means to man’s Last End, inasmuch as they are meritorious—i.e., labors that deserve a recompense (I Cor., iii. 8), struggles that deserve a crown (II Tim., ii. 5). But works are not meritorious unless they are one’s own (human) and good (moral); and, since the reward is supernatural, they must also be the fruit of grace. Hence, we shall speak of acts in the following order: (a) acts as human and free (Art. 2); (b) acts as morally good (Art. 3); (c) acts as supernaturally meritorious (Art. 4).

Definition.—Those acts are called human of which a man is the master, and he is master of his actions in virtue of his reason and his will, which faculties make him superior to non-human agents that act without reason and freedom. Hence, the following kinds of acts done by a human being are not called human: (a) those that are not under the control of the mind, because one is permanently or temporarily without the use of reason or without knowledge (e.g., the acts done by the insane; by those who are unconscious or delirious, under the influence of hypnotism or drugs, distracted or carried away by vehement fear, anger, etc.; by infants and uninstructed persons); (b) those that are not under the control of the will, even though they are known (e.g., automatic acts, such as the acts of the vegetative powers, growth, circulation of the blood; pathological acts, such as convulsions; acts done under external violence).

Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.—An act is human, or voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand what he is saying.

The condition of a person without knowledge is ignorance, which is defined as the absence of knowledge in one who is capable of knowing. Ignorance is of various kinds. From the viewpoint of that which is not known (i.e., of the object of the ignorance), there is ignorance of the substance of an act and ignorance of the quality of an act. For example, Titus driving rapidly in the dark runs over and kills a pet animal of his neighbor, but knows nothing of this happening (ignorance of the substance of the act); Balbus, a child, fires a pistol at his playmate, not knowing that this causes death (ignorance of the physical quality of an act), and that it is the sin of murder (ignorance of the moral quality of an act).

With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three kinds of ignorance may be distinguished.

(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally while shooting at an animal.

(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before firing.

(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a man whom he mistook for a deer.

With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant, there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus, a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant. (b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance: first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised, but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person deliberately aims to continue in ignorance.

Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of Acts.—(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality, makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may say: “Ignorance excuses.”

(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one’s own self, the presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable. Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence: “Ignorance does not excuse” (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).

Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.—(a) Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be actually desired.

(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act entirely involuntary.

Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.—(a) Invincible ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence, no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice involved.

(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though he had knowledge.

Vincible ignorance makes an act less voluntary and less sinful: (a) when the ignorance is not affected, for the voluntariness is measured by the knowledge, and knowledge here is lacking; (b) when the ignorance, though affected, was fostered only through fear that knowledge might compel a stricter way of life; for such a state of mind seems to show that one would not act the same way if one had knowledge.

Like to ignorance are the following: (a) error, which is a judgment not in agreement with the facts (e.g., Balbus, a young child, thinks stealing is lawful, because older persons are represented as stealing in the moving pictures); (b) forgetfulness, which is ignorance of what was once known (e.g., Titus made a study of his duties as a Catholic when he was young, but at present what he does not know about those duties is not inconsiderable); (c) inadvertence, which is a lack of attention to what is being done (e.g., Caius, who is absent-minded, sometimes gets his hair cut and goes away without paying, or takes money that does not belong to him).

The principles and conclusions given above with regard to ignorance will apply also to error, forgetfulness and inadvertence; for in all these cases the lack of actual knowledge at the moment an act is done, is either willed or not willed, and accordingly the act itself is either voluntary or not voluntary. In the examples mentioned above, Balbus does not will the guilt of theft, since he does not know it; but his elders do will that guilt, because they should know it. Titus is responsible for neglecting his duties, if he has forgotten them through his own neglect of them or other fault; otherwise, he is not responsible. Caius’ inattention is involuntary, if due to mental concentration or distraction, and if it is not desired by him; it is voluntary, if he is aware of it and cultivates it, or if he does not try to be more attentive to his duties.

Consent Requisite for a Human Act.—To be human, an act must proceed not only from knowledge, but also from inclination; that is, it must be voluntary. Three things are necessary in order that an act be voluntary: (a) it must be agreeable to an internal principle, i.e., in most moral matters to the will. Hence, an act that is done against one’s will on account of external violence is not voluntary; (b) it must be caused by the will. Hence, a shower of rain is said to be agreeable to the gardener, but not voluntary since his will is not its cause; (c) it must be performed with a conscious purpose. Hence, natural acts (such as sleeping) and spontaneous acts (such as stroking one’s beard absent-mindedly) are not voluntary acts.

Kinds of Voluntary Acts.-(a) A voluntary act is free or necessary, according as one can or cannot abstain from it. The vision of God in heaven is voluntary to the blessed, since they look at Him knowingly and gladly; but it is not free, since they cannot avert their gaze from that which makes them blessed. The love of God on earth is voluntary, since chosen; but it is also free, since man is able to turn away from God.

(b) An act is perfectly or imperfectly voluntary, according as the deliberation and consent that precede it are full or only partial.

(c) An act is said to be simply—that is, absolutely—voluntary, when it is wished under circumstances that exist here and now, although in itself, apart from those circumstances, it is not wished. It is said to be voluntary under a certain aspect, when it is desired for itself, but not under existing conditions. Thus, if an arm needs to be amputated to save life, the amputation is absolutely voluntary, while the preservation of the arm is voluntary only in a certain respect. Hence, an act is voluntary simply or absolutely when one chooses it, all things considered; it remains involuntary under a certain respect, inasmuch as the choice is made with reluctance.

(d) An act is voluntary in itself or directly, when it is desired in itself for its own sake (i.e., as an end), or for the sake of something else (i.e., as a means). It is voluntary in its cause or indirectly, when it is not desired in itself, either as a means or an end, but is foreseen as the result of something else that is intended. Examples: Titus quarrels with his neighbors, at times because he likes to quarrel, and at other times because he wishes to make them fear him; hence, his quarrels are directly voluntary. Caius is a peaceful man who dislikes quarreling; but he likes to drink too much occasionally, although he knows that he always quarrels when he is under the influence of liquor. Thus, his quarrels are indirectly voluntary.

An act is voluntary in its cause in two ways: (a) approvingly (physically and morally voluntary in cause), when one is able and obliged not to perform the act that is its cause (e.g., the quarrels of Caius mentioned above are approved implicitly by him, since he could and should prevent the intoxication which is their cause); (b) permissively (physically voluntary in cause), when one is not able or not obliged to omit the act that is its cause (see 94 sqq.). Examples: Balbus, in order to make a living, has to associate with persons of quarrelsome character, and as a result often hears shocking disputes. Titus, a military commander, orders an enemy fortification to be bombarded, although he knows that this will involve the destruction of other property and the unavoidable killing of some non-combatants or neutrals. Caius writes a book whose purpose and natural result is edification, but he foresees that evil-minded persons will misunderstand it and take scandal.

Omissions, as well as acts, may be voluntary. (a) Thus, they are directly voluntary, when they are willed as an end or as a means to an end. Example: Titus fails to reprove the disorders of those in his charge because he likes disorder, or because it illustrates his theory that everyone should go through an evolution from roughness to refinement. (b) They are indirectly voluntary, when their cause is willed with approval or permitted with disapproval. Example: Balbus does not like to miss Mass, but he fails to rise from bed when he hears the church bell ringing, and as a result does not get to church. If his failure to get up was due to laziness, the omission of Mass was approved by Balbus; if it was due to illness, the omission was only permitted.

The effect that follows upon an omission may also be voluntary. (a) Thus, it is directly voluntary, if the omission is chosen as a means to the effect. Example: Caius hears Titus say that he is going to make a certain business deal, and he knows that Titus will suffer a great loss thereby; but he wishes Titus to lose his money, and therefore says nothing about the danger. (b) It is indirectly voluntary, if one foresees the effect, and approves or permits it. Examples: Balbus sees Titus attacked by a hoodlum and realizes that, unless assisted, Titus will be badly beaten up; but he is such an admirer of pugilism that, in spite of his sorrow for Titus, he decides not to stop the fight. Caius sees his friend Sempronius drowning, and fails to go to his assistance, because to his regret he is not an expert swimmer.

The effect of an omission is indirectly voluntary and approved by the will when one is able and bound to do what one omits. Example: Balbus receives some confidential documents with the understanding that he will guard them sacredly; but fearing to lose the good graces of Titus, who is curious and loquacious, he omits to put the papers away as promised, with the result that Titus finds them and reads them.

Obstacles to Consent.—The obstacles to consent are all those factors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus, the actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to ignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and fear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The habitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states.

The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.

(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant—i.e., when it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but apart from or in spite of their fears.

(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the punishment of hell.

The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on the voluntariness of acts are as follows.

(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger. Examples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or not, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement.

(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus’ surrender of his purse and Claudius’ act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as best suited to the circumstances.

(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary. Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell; hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect involuntary.

Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite towards its object through love, desire, hope, or its repose therein through delight. It tends towards good, as fear tends away from evil (see 117 sqq.). Passion is an obstacle to consent in the following ways: (a) it takes away voluntariness (i.e., the quality of proceeding from an internal principle with knowledge of the end of the act), whenever it is so intense as to prevent knowledge; (b) it diminishes liberty (i.e., the quality of being perfectly voluntary, or indifferent as between many acts), even when it does not prevent knowledge.

Antecedent passion makes an act more voluntary, since it makes the will tend with greater inclination to its object; but it likewise makes an act less free, since it impedes deliberation and disturbs the power of choice. Example: A man who takes extreme delight in sports, plays voluntarily, but is less free than if he were not so immoderately inclined that way.

Consequent passion which results naturally from an intense act of the will does not increase the voluntariness of the act, since it is not its cause; but it does show that the act of the will is intense, for it is only that which is willed vehemently that overflows from the will and affects the emotions.

Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.—Having discussed human or voluntary acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are of this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.

Acts Elicited by the Will.—The first class of acts under the control of the will are those that are performed by the will itself—i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.

Acts Commanded by the Will.—The second class of acts that are under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.

Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the passions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).

The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b) sensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 18-20.)

In order that an act be a means by which man may tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient that it be human (proceeding from knowledge and will); it must also be morally good.

Definition.—Morality is the agreement or disagreement, of a human act with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man’s Last End. The act which is in agreement with those norms is morally good; the act which is in disagreement with them is morally bad. An act that neither agrees nor disagrees with the norms of morality, is called morally indifferent.

The constitutive norm of morality is that which gives an act its moral quality. (a) Proximately, this is the relation of agreement or disagreement of the act to the rational nature of man considered in its entirety and with reference to its true happiness; (b) remotely, this norm is the relation of the act to God, the Last End of man.

Hence, that which makes an act morally good is its agreement with the nature of man as a rational being destined for heaven, and its promotion of the glory of God, which is the purpose of all creation.

The manifestative norm of morality is that through which the moral quality of acts is known. (a) Proximately, this is right reason, which is the superior faculty and guide of the will; (b) remotely, it is the divine intellect, from which reason receives its light.

The preceptive norm of morality is that which points out duty with respect to good and evil. (a) Proximately, it is conscience; (b) remotely, it is the law of God.

The species of morality are three: (a) an act is morally good when it is in harmony with the norms of morality mentioned above (e.g., prayer, works of charity); (b) an act is morally bad when it is out of harmony with those norms (e.g., blasphemy, injustice); (c) an act is morally indifferent when, if considered in the abstract, it neither agrees nor disagrees with moral norms (e.g., walking, riding, etc.).

The Sources of Morality.—The sources from which the morality of an act is derived are its own tendencies and modes, in so far as they have a relation of agreement or disagreement to the standards of morals. These sources are: (a) the object of the act, from which it derives its essence (e.g., God is the object of charity); (b) the circumstances of the act, by which it is modified accidentally (e.g., fervor is a circumstance of the act of charity); (c) the purpose or end of the agent, which is the chief circumstance (e.g., to please God, as the purpose of a work of charity).

The object of an action is that to which it primarily and naturally tends as to its term and end, and from which it is named. Thus, an alms is directed immediately and of its own nature to the relief of the poor (end of the act); it is only secondarily and from the direction given it by the agent that it tends to generosity and edification, since the agent may give stingily, or from a bad motive (end of the agent).

What are human acts? - An act in created things is the determination of some potency or faculty. Hence human acts are acts of human faculties. But human acts are considered in moral theology in the genus of morals, or insofar as they are moral acts. Hence here "moral acts and human acts are the same." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. But "the genus of morals begins where dominion of the will is first found." S. Th. 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2. Therefore human acts are, in general, acts of man by which man himself orders himself to an end suitable to him. Therefore human acts can be considered either in relation to the man who is ordered to the end by them, or in relation to the end to which he is ordered by their help. We shall speak step by step of human acts considered in both respects. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 4.

What is the division of the treatment of human acts in relation to man? - Human acts, considered in relation to man, can be inspected in two ways: 1. Insofar as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature. For an act in general, in created things, as was just said, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from being able to be to being. And therefore they are called acts, not actions. For an act is so called by reason of its intrinsic principle; an action, when it comes forth outwardly, from which also the effect differs if it follows, for the action is the object of the act. 2. Insofar as they fall short of this proper nature of theirs because of impediments, which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly.

We shall speak first of the intrinsic nature of the human act; then of its impediments. E. M.

What is the intrinsic nature of the human act? - Usage has obtained that a distinction be made between an act of man and a human act. An act of man is called one which proceeds from man without advertence and deliberation, or without deliberation only. But human acts are called those which proceed, not in any way whatever, but with advertence and deliberation. Nor indeed was that distinction made without reason. For "of the actions which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man" (namely adequately, both as to the substance of the work and as to the mode of operating). "But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts.... But man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1.

Moreover, a human act can be elicited or commanded, according as it is performed by the will alone, or also by another potency; merely internal or external, or mixed, according as it is performed by a power of the soul alone, or also by another faculty of the body; natural or supernatural, according as it is brought about by the powers of nature alone, or also by the powers of grace; good, bad, indifferent, and meritorious or demeritorious from its relation and order to the rule of morality, to reward or punishment; valid or invalid, according as it has all the things required for its effect, or not.

Now, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, and therefore voluntary and free, so that we may know its nature more deeply, it is necessary briefly to explain 1. the nature of the voluntary, 2. the nature of the free, 3. finally, in how many ways any act can proceed from a deliberate will. And this is done in the following questions. E. M. n. 6, 69, 71, 72, 74, 89.

What is the voluntary; how many acceptions of the voluntary are there? - R. To the first: The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds from or is caused by the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. Therefore the voluntary differs from the willed, which designates only the object of the act of the will. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, it agrees with any natural motion, but differs from the violent; for the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle.

R. To the second: The voluntary can be taken in three ways: 1. more broadly, for the spontaneous; 2. more strictly, for the voluntary precisely as such, namely insofar as it differs from the spontaneous and from the free, or at least abstracts from the free; 3. most strictly, for the free. The spontaneous is that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object toward which the appetite tends. "The reason is that, just as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the elicited appetite follows from the apprehended form, the act representing the object." Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 4. Therefore the spontaneous belongs both to men and to brute animals.

The voluntary properly is that which proceeds from the spiritual appetite, or will, with prior rational cognition of the object or end. Finally, the free is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to an act, with the power of eliciting that very act, or not eliciting it, or of eliciting another. Therefore the free essentially includes the notion of the voluntary; and the voluntary also essentially includes the notion of the free, if indeed the voluntary is taken according to the proper meaning of the word, but adequately, both as to the substance of the act and as to the mode of operation proper to the will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1, 2; q. 8. a. 1; q. 26. a. 1; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 1, 3, 6; L. 1. 5. n. 6.

You will resolve: The voluntary cannot be had without prior cognition. Nothing is willed unless first known. Nevertheless a clear and distinct knowledge of the thing is not always necessary; for obscure and confused knowledge is sufficient. And thus an adult is validly baptized, even though he does not yet have all Christian obligations fully examined. Moreover, the voluntary cannot exist except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only to the good; but the good has the notion of an end. "Since the good is what all things seek, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that the good imports the notion of an end." S. Th. 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is nothing except something certain and determinate. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either one of two women does not contract; and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, l. 1, d. 26, s. 1; Rubr. Miss. de Defect., title 7, n. 1; L. 1. 3. n. 203, 224.

Finally, the voluntary cannot exist concerning an impossible thing. For "the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and suitable." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. Yet it is by no means required that the voluntary be only concerning a true and real good. "For the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good; and on account of this the Philosopher says: the end is a good, or an apparent good." S. Th. 1. c.

Can the voluntary at least exist concerning a thing impossible, not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot exist, as is clear from what was said in n. 9, if one uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand the empty space outside the world.

Concerning a thing impossible only as to law, there is a question: for example, contracting marriage with one who has a diriment impediment, consecrating water, baptizing with wine, etc. But it seems that this must be affirmed; since the will is borne into the fact itself, and it is not necessarily borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown to him, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, as far as he is concerned, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without a renewed consent, and validates the marriage. And indeed C. Ex sponsalibus, sole chapter, de Spons. et Matr. in the Sixth, says: "From pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason whatever, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of public honesty of justice." Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed. Cf. vol. 2, n. 1033; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 2, d. 33.

What is the free, and how many kinds are there? - The free adds to the voluntary only a relation to the potency eliciting the voluntary act and having the power to suspend it, or to elicit another act, different only in species, or even opposed. In the first case it is called liberty of exercise or of contradiction. In the second case, liberty of specification. In the third case, liberty of contrariety.

Therefore the free certainly requires in the potency or faculty an intrinsic dominion of the act, and accordingly immunity not only from extrinsic coercion, but also from intrinsic necessity; but it by no means requires immunity also from weakness, namely from concupiscence and the other miseries of human life, which, as extrinsic, and neither coercing nor necessitating, cannot change the intrinsic manner of acting of the human will. "The free is that which is the cause of itself." S. Th. C. G. l. 2, c. 48. And this liberty is altogether necessary for meriting or demeriting.

This liberty of which we are speaking is physical liberty. But moral liberty involves in its concept the absence not only of physical necessity of acting, but also of moral obligation by force of a law commanding or prohibiting. S. Th. 1. p. q. 83; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

There is indeed no doubt that various interior dispositions of the soul and body of man, and also exterior conditions of man, can influence human acts. Hence moral statistics collects the moral facts of men, in various conditions of persons, in order to investigate their causes, whether internal or external. And it especially dwells upon enumerating criminal facts. But criminal anthropology insists upon investigating the causes of crimes, some of which are internal, various diseases, neurasthenia, epilepsy, etc., others external, education, the company of associates, the reading of books and newspapers, etc. Psychopathology or Psychiatry considers the influence of various diseases upon various crimes. But from all these exterior and interior causes, although the voluntary and the free can be diminished, as will later be seen in the impediments of human acts, nevertheless liberty is by no means taken away, unless madness entirely perverts the use of reason. For from these there can indeed be inadvertence, inconsideration, ignorance, the excitation of concupiscence and of the passions, a contracted habit, and imaginations clinging to the mind, and certain fixed judgments; by all of these an inclination to acting can indeed be had, greater or lesser, but in no way an intrinsic necessity of acting. If the intellective faculty is not injured, through whatever bodily disturbance, the liberty of the will always remains.

In human acts is the free truly found not only from coercion, but also from necessity? - R. Affirmatively. It is a truth of faith, which is most openly clear from Scripture and Tradition; notably from Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6. The reason is that "if some good is proposed to the will which has the complete notion of good, as the ultimate end, on account of which all things are sought, it cannot not will to be happy, or will to be miserable. But in those things which are ordered to the ultimate end, nothing is found so evil that it does not have some good mixed in, nor anything so good that it suffices in all respects; hence, however much the good or the evil is shown, it can always adhere and flee into the contrary by reason of the other thing which is in it; from which it is taken, if it is evil simply, as an apparent good; and if it is good simply, as an apparent evil; and hence it is that in all things which fall under election the will remains free, having determination in this alone, that it naturally seeks happiness, and not determinately in this or in that." S. Th. 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 2.

Hence, as is clear, that power toward opposites, by which the act of the will is placed by the will itself, presupposes in its exercise the objective indifference of the judgment of the intellect, which consists in this: that the intellect proposes to the will in the object various notions of suitability or unsuitability, of good or evil. Therefore liberty is concerned with particular goods to be sought. But as regards the seeking of happiness in general, the human will is not free as to the specification of the act, because it cannot will the opposite; but it is free as to the exercise of the act, because someone can not wish then to think about beatitude. S. Th. de Malo, q. 6, sole article.

From the liberty by which human acts are performed, they are said to be imputable to the agent, namely the honesty or baseness of the act redounds to the agent himself, as to its author. Eccl. 15:11 ff.; Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6; St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 105; S. Th. 1. 2, Prologue, q. 10. a. 2; q. 13. a. 6; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 2; Wurzburg, de Act. hum., c. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

"It follows that, when a grave temptation has arisen, and after the sensitive appetite, concupiscible, venereal, or irascible, is vehemently excited by phantasy or from elsewhere, then, I say, acts of a threefold kind can be given in the will. 1. Those which precede the use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant or time in which the intellect does not yet propose to the will motives deterring it, but only motives enticing it toward that object into which the appetite is borne. And these acts of the will are called first-first motions. 2. Those which follow upon some use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant in which the intellect proposes the deterring motives only obscurely, but the enticing motives toward illicit love or toward hatred so vividly that the will is moved only weakly and imperfectly by the deterring motives.

And these acts of the will are called second-first motions. 3. Finally, those which follow upon the perfect use of reason, and are elicited by the will in that instant in which the intellect has proposed to the will, sufficiently clearly and intensely, deterring motives or the unsuitability and moral malice, by which the will could freely be deterred if it seriously wished. And these acts of the will are called deliberate acts. "Acts of the first kind are not free, and consequently they are not formally sinful. But acts of the second kind are imperfectly free, and only venially sinful. But acts of the third kind are perfectly free, and consequently, if there is gravity of matter, they are mortally sinful." Struggl, Theol. Mor., tr. 1, q. 1, a. 1, v. 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3.

In how many ways does the voluntary proceed from the will? Since the voluntary presupposes the apprehension of the intellect, includes an act of the will and the exercise of liberty, and extends itself also to some extrinsic act, or extrinsic action, hence the voluntary is from the will in many ways, and from this arise various divisions of the voluntary, which we shall now explain.

What is the voluntary elicitedly and commandingly? - The first is had when the whole act is performed by the will and in the will, without the aid of another faculty, whether interior and spiritual, or exterior and bodily; such are volitions and nolitions.

The second is had when the act indeed depends upon the very command of the will, but nevertheless is performed by another faculty of the agent; whether interior, as are the intellect, phantasy, memory; or exterior, as are the members of the body and the organs of the senses, as to walk or to speak. But an act can be at the same time elicited and commanded; for the will can command itself in its own acts. And in this way one virtue, for example charity, commands the acts of other virtues, when the will from the motive of one virtue elicits the act of another virtue, for example, from love of God it has mercy on the poor. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1 ad 2; q. 17. a. 5; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 10, s. 1, 2.

What is the division of acts elicited by the will? - The division is twofold, according as these acts consist in the pursuit of good, or in flight from evil; and according as they are concerned with the end or with the means.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What are the acts of the will which are concerned with the end and with the means? "Every action of the will is concerned either with the end, or with the means, which can happen in two ways, either by appetizing or by executing. From this arises a twofold order of acts of the will and of the practical intellect, which governs the will in morals. The first contains all those acts which are necessary up to the final election of the means, which are will, intention, counsel, consent, election. The first two are concerned with the end; the latter with the means, in the order in which they have been numbered. But once the election has been established, the will proceeds to free execution, and thus there is the second order, in which only two acts are numbered: command and use. To these acts fruition is added, which is not an operation ordered to seeking or attaining the end; but, rather, once the end has been obtained, it follows upon it." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, at the beginning.

What is will? - Will, or simple volition, is the first act of the will, which is as it were the first inclination of the will toward the proposed object, as toward something lovable of itself, without any order to another. From this it is clear that this act is concerned with the end; for only the end is lovable of itself. But it does not include a tendency into the end, standing only in love and complacency for that good, and therefore it is simple volition, or love and complacency, still inefficacious. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 1; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1, 2.

What is intention? - Intention is a free or perfectly voluntary tendency into a good, so that we may attain it. Therefore intention is a tendency of the will into some end to be obtained through due means. It is a purpose and desire toward the thing loved, and of itself is an efficacious desire. For purpose is had when someone determines with himself to do something. But desire, in its general signification, signifies any appetition whatever of obtaining a good which someone lacks; and it extends not only to the appetition of an efficacious will, but also to imperfect volitions, or velleities, even of impossible things. Intention, either virtually or expressly, is also an appetition of the means in common. The reason is that intention is the efficacious will of obtaining the end. But to will the end, absolutely as something to be attained as such, is virtually to will to execute all the means necessary to the end. Moreover someone can explicitly elicit this act: I will to employ all the means necessary for the end; this act is intention, because it precedes every consultation about the means and every election, and is the principle of counsel and election. In common, not in particular; for by this reason it is distinguished from election. Suarez, tr. 2, s. 2; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 2; q. 12.

Can someone intend several things at the same time; and if several incompatible things are intended, which intention prevails? - R. To the first: Affirmatively. For either those things are ordered to one another, or they are not. "If indeed they have been ordered to one another, it is manifest that man can intend many things at the same time. For there is intention not only of the ultimate end, but also of an intermediate end: but someone simultaneously intends both the proximate and the ultimate end, as the making of medicine and health. But if two things not ordered to one another are taken, thus also man can intend several things at the same time, which is clear from the fact that man chooses one thing before another, because it is better than the other. But among the other conditions by which something is better than another, one is that it is useful for several things. Hence something can be chosen before another from the fact that it is useful for several things, and thus manifestly man intends several things at the same time." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 12. a. 3.

R. To the second: If those wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen if the impossibility were known. If neither is more powerful, neither prevails, and accordingly neither is valid. If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later prevails over the former; for it is predominant in the order of time and actuality. Except if the former is more powerful, or has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the former will, provided it is not expressly revoked, is certainly predominant. Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 121, 123; L. 1. 6. n. 24.

You will resolve: If one person asked you for a Mass in thanksgiving, another for someone gravely sick, it must be held to have been applied for the latter, whether he asked for it first or later.

If you have established with yourself: Whatever vow I may emit hereafter without the permission of my confessor, I do not wish it to be valid; and afterward you have vowed something without consulting your confessor, it is not valid, provided that will is not retracted expressly or virtually, namely if, mindful of the first vow, you were to emit the second, for example in shipwreck, in fire, etc.

If someone contracted marriage, intending it to be soluble, with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract, the marriage is null; for indissolubility is an essential property of Christian marriage. But he would contract validly if merely through error he thought marriage to be soluble, because private error does not take away from him the intention of contracting in the way in which he ought. L. 1. 3. n. 179, 210, 700; l. 6. n. 24; Elbel 130.

What is election? - Election is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as a means, or as a useful good; namely, it is the efficacious volition of some particular thing which is loved on account of another.

Therefore election proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is the useful good as such and possible for us; and it contains at least virtually the volition of the end itself.

Likewise election retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to take place among several things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of election remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is the only means or whether it is compared with others. Election is after the manner of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing.

Moreover election is the purpose of the will; since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he will do something. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, d. 8, s. 1, 2.

What is consent? - Consent can be attributed to any free act of the will conforming itself, or consenting, to the judgment of the intellect, that is, accepting the good proposed by the intellect; in this way sin is said to be perfected by consent, and thus it is not a special act, and is concerned not only with the means, but also with the end. But insofar as it is a special act, it is concerned with the means, and is not an act specifically distinct from election, but only by reason, from diverse respects. "For insofar as the will wills what the intellect judges to be useful, it is called consent; but insofar as it prefers that either to other useful means, or certainly to other useless things not conducing to the end, it is called election." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 2. But also in reality consent can be distinguished from election, namely when consent is inefficacious. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 15.

What is counsel? - Counsel properly is an act of the intellect including two things: the inquiry and discovery of the means, and the discerning judgment concerning the means more apt for attaining the end. Therefore counsel involves not one act of the intellect, but several. For that inquiry does not take place without discourse and consideration of several things. But counsel sometimes signifies only inquiry, sometimes only judgment, even though it does not proceed from discourse, and sometimes it embraces both. Counsel in this last sense indeed frequently precedes election, but not always. For when election takes place among many things, which happens more often, all those things must be found, proposed, discussed, and judged by the intellect. But where there is question of very small matters, or of things determined of themselves, or known of themselves, then there is no formal counsel. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 14; q. 9. a. 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 5.

What is use? - Use is one thing active, another passive. The first is an act elicited by the will, by which the will moves the other powers to operating. The second is the act of the executing power proceeding from active use.

Use properly concerns the means, for use signifies a certain movement of the will toward really obtaining the thing willed, or the end. Use is really distinguished from election, since counsel and election concerning the means according to itself first take place before there is treatment of execution. But it is by no means really distinguished from election when the intellect suddenly determines the means and all the circumstances, and the will in the same instant in which it chooses the means also chooses the circumstance of actual execution; for from the force of such election there follows the action of the executing power. Therefore use is the will executing the chosen means for attaining the end. Use and election are not acts specifically distinct from one another, because they tend into the object under the same notion of good, namely as it is useful for attaining the end. But election of itself is concerned with the means in the order of intention, as future and as an effect of the end. Active use is concerned with the same means in the order of execution, as present and as the efficient cause of the end had in reality. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16; Suarez, d. 9, s. 1, 2.

What is command? - The command which is treated here is the command by which someone commands himself, not that by which he commands others, and it is the absolute will intimated to oneself for doing or omitting something. Man can command himself in two ways: 1. as it were in the exercised act, while he moves himself to doing something; 2. in the signified act, by expressly eliciting the act of command: do this. Command of this kind is partly an act of the will, and partly an act of the intellect; because to command is to move to acting, but "the first mover among the powers of the soul to the exercise of an act is the will." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. But to command is not to move in any way whatever, but to move as if by imposing a law; and it is the intellect that imposes law on the will, since it judges concerning things to be done. Now here it is asked, what is this act of intellect and will which adequately constitutes command?

As regards the act of the intellect, note: 1. Before will and intention there precedes a practical judgment of the intellect, by which someone judges not only that the thing is good in itself, but also that it is suitable for him, and that it is expedient to love it. This judgment contains some notion of command. "For one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1.

2. Before election and consent there likewise precedes a practical judgment, whether it is by way of formal counsel or not, proposing the means apt for the end as something electable; and a judgment of this kind contains the notion of command more, since it moves more by announcing and intimating.

3. After that election which in time precedes active use, another judgment precedes, more practical, distinct in this from the judgment which precedes election, that it more immediately touches the work and all the determinate circumstances necessary for the execution of the work. The reason is that before every act of the will there must precede a judgment of the intellect consonant with it, by which it is directed and illuminated; but active use is an act of the will, which adds something to the election already made. Therefore. This judgment still more participates in the notion of command; for it moves the will more vehemently by announcing and intimating, not so much by its own power as by the power of the election already made. For it is altogether ordered to the execution of the work and inclines more to overcoming the difficulty of the work, which at the time of execution always appears greater than in consultation and abstract election.

4. Besides these practical judgments, there is found in us another judgment, which we experience when it speaks thus internally with us: do this; and it explicitly expresses the efficacious act of the will to be elicited for executing the work. This judgment is that which explicitly constitutes command. This judgment is not of itself necessary for the work; nevertheless it is a useful act, so that the will itself and the whole man may be moved more, or so that he may more quickly undertake the execution, or so that he may persevere more constantly in it; because while man thus commands himself, he as it were reflects above himself and becomes superior to himself; and because, as external speech with regard to others has the power of moving and inciting the mind, so internal speech has this power with regard to oneself.

As regards the act of the will, it must be noted: 1. that this command, if it is efficacious and true, supposes an absolute will; for if it takes place without any will, it is fictitious and not true; but if the will which precedes is inefficacious, the command itself also will be inefficacious. And the reason is that the whole efficacy of moving is from the will. Therefore a will of this kind completes the notion of that command.

2. The act of the will preceding the act of reason, which is command, is election, by virtue of which reason moves. Therefore command is the practical judgment itself, whether direct or reflex, which, from election already made, by announcing and intimating what is to be done, moves to execution; and then the will begins to use by executing the command of reason. Hence it is manifest that command is prior to use.

3. Nevertheless active use itself of the will has some notion of command, and is often called command. For the will commands the other potencies, even the intellect. Indeed, the will commands even itself. For the will commands all voluntary acts, and one act of the will is commanded by another act of the same will. And the reason is that to command belongs to one having dominion; but it is the will which, as it were, has dominion over all human actions.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17; q. 71. a. 6 ad 2; 2. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2; Quodl. 9. a. 12; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 9, s. 3.

What is fruition? - Fruition, as regards the name, is to take fruit from a thing. As regards the thing itself, it is a certain repose of the will, sweetness, joy, delight, once the presence of the desired object and its possession have been posited.

Joy is said more of a rational good, delight of a sensitive good, fruition of both; and it is rather restricted to one's own good, while joy is also said of another's good, as of a friend. Moral theologians commonly distinguish joy from delight by time, teaching that joy is of a past thing, delight of a present thing. Therefore the object of fruition properly is the good under the notion of a delightable good. But both the end and the means can be an object of joy, although the reason for rejoicing, or the formal object, is always the end. The first reason is that joy arises from the attainment of a delightable good. But the means itself is a certain delightable good. And thus we experience that we are delighted when we obtain suitable means. The second reason is that every loved good is an end or by reason of the end. Therefore every good which delights is an end or by reason of the end. Moreover a twofold joy or fruition is distinguished, perfect and imperfect. "For since it concerns an attained end, if the end has been perfectly obtained, fruition is perfect; if it has been obtained in a certain hope, from this some fruition can arise, but imperfect, because that is already some kind of attainment; and this seems to be that fruition of which Paul speaks: rejoicing in hope." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 7, s. 2. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 11, 31; 2. 2. q. 28.

What is the perfect and imperfect voluntary; the absolute voluntary and velleity; the voluntary simply and according to a certain respect? - These various divisions can be taken and explained in various senses, according as there is considered in the voluntary either precisely the notion of the voluntary, or the notion of the free, or the various object to which it is referred, according to its various state. We shall briefly explain them in the following paragraphs, according to the various acceptions which they have.

By reason of the voluntary, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply, or perfect; another is such according to a certain respect, or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will with the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance. In this way the most perfect voluntary is the love of God toward Himself and the love of the Blessed toward God, which proceed from the most perfect cognition of the object.

The second is that which proceeds indeed from the consenting will, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed volition actually, but mixed with a conditioned nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw away the merchandise, which nevertheless he would also, by deliberate will, wish to preserve if shipwreck were not imminent; hence, not without the deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious repugnance, he absolutely consents to throw them away. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6 ad 3; a. 7 ad 2; Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; L. 1. 5. n. 21.

By reason of the free, according to the varying degree of deliberation, one voluntary is perfect, and it is that which proceeds from the will with perfect cognition and full deliberation; another is imperfect, and that is what proceeds from the will with imperfect cognition and half-full deliberation. Such are the actions of a man half-drunk, half-asleep. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 3, 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. The voluntary that is perfect in this way can well be imperfect in the preceding way, as is clear from the example given of throwing merchandise into the sea in shipwreck.

By reason of deliberation, simply, one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is according to a certain respect, which is also called velleity. And thus, when the temptation of sin stands in the will, yet someone deliberately resists the sin, the will as nature, or according to a certain respect, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Aptly S. Th. 3. p. q. 21. a. 4, where he also gives the reason for this division: "The will simply of man is the will of reason. For we will absolutely what we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the movement of sensuality, or even according to the movement of simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, namely if nothing else stands in the way, which is found by the deliberation of reason. Hence such a will should rather be called velleity than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this if something else did not stand in the way."

By reason of the object, likewise one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is velleity and according to a certain respect, according as the object to which the will tends is considered absolutely, as it really is, according to all its circumstances, or only as it is in itself, with abstraction made from the circumstances.

To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6 ad 1: "Each thing, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, as it is considered with something added, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself contrariwise. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or living to the danger of the multitude, then it is good for him to be killed, and evil for him to live. Hence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain ones to be damned, according to the demand of His justice. And nevertheless that which we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Hence we will something simply according as we will it with all particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Hence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but according to a certain respect he would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Hence it can rather be called velleity than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God wills simply, happens; although that which He wills antecedently does not happen."

And thus also that throwing away of merchandise of which above in n. 30, under various respects, is voluntary according to a certain respect, and at the same time voluntary simply. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 142. a. 3; 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6.

By reason of its perfection, finally, one voluntary is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete; another is the voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete. The first is that which extends itself all the way to the attainment of the thing, by efficaciously willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed all the way to the attainment of the thing, but stops in simple complacency for it. When there is a twofold contrary will concerning the same object, that one is absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other, because one is absolute, the other as if conditioned; for example, someone truly wills to contract marriage, but nevertheless would not wish to receive the sacrament; he truly contracts marriage and receives the sacrament. De Lugo, de Sacr. in genere, d. 8, s. 8, n. 120 ff.

Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason for this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1: "It must be said that the will is intermediate between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the movement of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the will is not complete except concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will it if it were possible."

A sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will; for he has an absolute and efficacious will of health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to employ the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, of health, since he does not at the same time will the means inducing health. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken as if incomplete will were an undeliberated willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberated willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from His kingdom, if he could, and similar things, where it is clear that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompletion of the will is to be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the movement of the will toward the thing. Hence from the fact that the movement of the will is toward the thing to be attained, disposed, etc., by means of exterior operation, it is not perfect, with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of movement of the will, unless it is terminated at a good that can be done, although it is perfect as regards consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God, and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will.

The Angelic Doctor, q. 20. 2. a. 4, says: "If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has according to the matter and due circumstances, then it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected in this, that it attains the end or reaches the term. Hence the will is not perfect unless it is such that, when opportunity is given, it acts. But if possibility is lacking, while the will exists perfected so that it would act if it could, the defect of perfection which is from the exterior act is simply involuntary."

Therefore the will can be called and can be complete in two ways. In one way, according to that relation by which the willed thing is in the will. In another way, according to that by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first way, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that it wills perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that it has perfectly, or attains and possesses the thing willed. Hence the will prepared to act if it could is a perfect will, because it wills perfectly, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really has, attains, and possesses that which it wills, and which it is apt by nature to have. For every movement falling short of the term is imperfect by privation, which consists in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account from the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as the imperfect to the perfect, it follows that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, alone it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater love no one has than that someone lay down his life for his friends; He said lay down, not wish to lay down. Cajetan, on 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5; q. 20, a. 4.

What is the direct and indirect voluntary; voluntary in itself and in the cause; positive and negative? - The voluntary, by reason of the act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one thing direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting, namely which ought and can prohibit. For "not always is that which follows upon a defect of action reduced, as into a cause, into the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or the governance of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, since the will, by willing and acting, can impede this which is not to will and not to act, and sometimes ought to, this which is not to will and not to act is imputed to it as existing from it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; 2. 2. q. 69. a. 7; 3. p. q. 47. a. 1. Namely, it must be what one ought and can prohibit, so that one is in fault. And thus no one would say that every good which you do not do is voluntary to you, even indirectly, and consequently imputable, although absolutely you can do it, but are not bound to do it; and much less every evil which you are not bound in any way to impede.

If nevertheless someone knowingly posits an act incompatible with another act, which is omitted, for performing which there is no obligation, since that omission is free, it is indirectly voluntary, although not imputable to fault; for example, if you wish to study without wishing not to go to visit a church, when there is no obligation; and, on the contrary, it is imputable to merit, as if you wish to pray and therefore omit recreation, without saying, I wish to omit it. Cf. Commentary de Act. hum., Fourth, n. 9. Cf. here the following paragraph and n. 35.

The voluntary, by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing voluntary in itself, another voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; the second, when someone wills the cause from which some effect is going to follow, even if he foresees this effect; for then he does not will it in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. Foresees, that is, merely foresees; for if besides this he wills it, that effect will already be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not merely in the cause. From this it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect, with respect to the will, will have the notion of an end, and the cause the notion of a means. For that which someone wills on account of itself has the notion of an end; what someone wills on account of another has the notion of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, then that effect is outside the intention, and in no way can it be voluntary, not even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to impede it if it is evil, the effect is imputed to it; consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3; q. 71. a. 5.

And thus evil works committed against one's neighbor in drunkenness are voluntary in the cause for him who was voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. If someone writing a bad book foresees many spiritual evils from it, although he does not intend them, they are imputed to him, and they are voluntary to him not in themselves, but in the cause. But if the effect is good, and someone who posits the cause foresees it, he is already judged implicitly to will it, and he does not lack his merit, since the good is the object of the will, not evil. If you give your goods to a monastery, foreseeing the spiritual goods thence to come, you certainly do not lack merit. Therefore there is a distinction between good and evil; for good, at least in some way, we ought to intend; evil, on the contrary, cannot be intended, but ought to be avoided. Suarez, d. 1, s. 4.

Several theologians altogether distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says, "The voluntary in itself is sufficiently clear; for then something is said to be voluntary in itself when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately concerned with it, either by a proper act, if it is voluntary direct, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirectly voluntary." D. 1, s. 4. Likewise S. Th. q. 77. a. 7: "Two things seem to have to be considered. First, that something can be voluntary either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it, or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause and not into the effect; as is clear in him who voluntarily becomes drunk. For from this, what he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly, it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed is that into which the will is borne; but indirect is that which the will could have prohibited, but does not prohibit."

But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause the direct and indirect voluntary, and express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. Gury, Ballerini, n. 5. Now, with a comparison established between both divisions, the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary includes under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause. For the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be "that which proceeds from the will as from an agent," q. 6. a. 3 ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing.

But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be "that which is from the will as from a non-agent," l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the acting and willing will. Therefore the indirectly voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Nevertheless it can be reduced to both; for the indirectly voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since externally not acting is as it were the external object completing that not willing, just as the former is in some way voluntary in itself, so also is the latter, since one complete non-act is as it were constituted from both the lack of an interior and exterior act; for example, not willing to hear Mass, and not hearing Mass in fact, just as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass.

Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so from the omission of an act another act can follow, which, although it is not properly the effect of that omission, just as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect. And thus it can be called voluntary in the cause; for example, the death of those sailing, indirectly voluntary, is, in the sense stated, voluntary in the cause for the pilot of the ship who desists from steering.

What is required so that an evil effect which follows, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will as fault? - The following conditions are required: 1. That he who posits or omits the cause advert, at least confusedly, that such an effect will follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless in some way it is known beforehand.

2. That the agent be able to impede such a cause; because there is no obligation to impossibilities.

3. That the agent be bound, by reason of that effect, to remove or omit that cause; because the effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in reality does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. L. 1. 5. n. 15; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; q. 21. a. 2; C. I. 1151 f.; C. G. 1182 f.; C. H. 1092 ff.

When is someone bound to remove the cause, by reason of an evil effect that will follow? - 1. He is bound when it of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect. For then the cause is evil in itself. It is said, of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect, because one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause if the evil effect followed merely accidentally; for then the cause would not therefore be evil in itself. Nor would he be bound if the cause of itself, directly and primarily, produces a good effect, and only through this as a medium an evil effect follows; for a cause according to moral estimation is judged from its effect of itself, directly, and primarily, and accordingly it is then simply honorable in itself. Therefore then one would not will the evil, but would will the good, and would only permit the evil. Likewise one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause because it equally, directly and primarily, as if in a parallel manner, influences a good and an evil effect. For then the cause in itself, according to moral estimation, is indifferent, and honorable, insofar as it is subject to the honorable intention of the agent; for the evil effect is not intended, but permitted. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 5; q. 73. a. 8; 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

2. Someone is likewise bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless someone is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept that presses to be fulfilled; for example, if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. "For he who is bound to the law must necessarily be bound to procure the ordinary means, and the means proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing, for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things." Ithur., case 32, n. 4. Hence "the reason can be given, that by reason of the precept that cause and the effects following from it, although physically they are connected only accidentally, and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless morally are judged to have the notion of one unsuitable object, or one to be avoided by the will, and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 9.

3. Finally, someone is bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness on the part of the agent. For then an honorable end of the one operating is lacking; for evil is to be avoided, and it can be permitted when there is a rational and just cause. Besides, to will such a cause then often shows an evil affection directly toward that evil effect that will follow; or at least there is often a proximate danger of such evil affection. But a greater or lesser reason is required for positing the cause according as it is a cause of itself, or from its own nature influencing such an effect, or an accidental cause, namely one which does not influence such an effect from its intrinsic nature, but from some extrinsic condition of things. Likewise the greater reason is required for acting in such a case, the more proximately the cause touches the evil effect, the more probable the evil effect is, the less right one has to the action considered in itself, and the graver the effect itself is, if one is bound by office to impede the evil. For if a proportionately grave reason is not had, natural honesty itself obliges us to omit that cause. L. 1. 1. n. 152; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

Is the effect which follows, gravely evil, voluntary only indirectly or in the cause, always imputable as grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if he illicitly posits the cause without any sufficient reason? - R. 1. Affirmatively, if that cause of itself, or from its intrinsic nature, gravely influences the effect. The reason is that if the cause of itself gravely influences the effect, the grave malice from the effect redounds into the cause. Therefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect itself by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, one who wills the cause, of itself gravely influencing an effect gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in reality directly wills the grave malice of that effect, and does not merely permit it; since the cause and effect are inseparably connected with one another, so far as concerns the very nature of the thing, and no other honorable reason is present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed.

R. 2. Negatively, if that cause of itself influences that effect only lightly. The reason is that, since the cause of itself has only a light influence upon that gravely evil effect, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and accordingly, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with one another. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. Accordingly he does not contract the grave malice proper to the effect. But since the malice of the effect redounds into the cause by reason of the influence which the latter has upon the effect, where the influence is light there is only light malice; and consequently, with the direct intention of the gravely evil effect always excluded, someone willing a cause that influences such an effect only lightly, although he will not sin gravely, nevertheless will sin lightly. And this is the proper reason why, although there is no smallness of matter in venereal matters, nevertheless there is such in those acts of mere sensuality, as are looks, from a cause of mere curiosity, at less honorable things, with the intention of the venereal thing itself again excluded, as the very common opinion of theologians holds.

R. 3. Again negatively, if the cause in no way of itself influences that evil effect, but the effect follows merely accidentally, or from extrinsic circumstances. The reason is that since the effect follows only accidentally, there is no connection, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause of itself, but merely accidentally, someone willing the cause, with every intention of the evil effect excluded, contracts none of its malice, neither grave nor light, although perhaps otherwise he also sins gravely. And thus, if someone foresees pollution from some excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly, or perhaps even gravely, by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of lust. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing only accidentally into some evil effect, by reason only of that evil effect itself. For in actions only this one thing must be attended to: whether they are the cause of this effect, or not. For if they do not have the force of a cause, it is ridiculous that they must be avoided on account of an effect of this kind. And in no way is someone bound to abstain from positing such a cause, if a reasonable motive is present for positing a cause of this kind.

Cf. 40. 1, 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, 5; Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 14 ff.; L. 1. 3. n. 484; Salm., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5; 3. p. q. 30. a. 7; d'Annibale, 4th ed., p. 1, n. 157, note 15.

When is an effect willed in the cause imputed? - It is imputed, speaking of itself, first when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. "The reason is that the free volition, or non-impeding, of an evil effect is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and accordingly formal sin is committed when there is such a perverse volition or nolition.... Thus therefore, he who, for example, has offered poison to another ... does not sin when the death of the other follows ... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect." Struggl, q. 1, a. 3, n. 32. Speaking of itself; for if someone can impede an effect of this kind right up to its execution, and does not impede it, or is pleased in its futurition or existence, he continues in his mind the sin whose cause he previously posited freely and culpably. Consequently someone must then confess the effect as if it were the external act and object, the complement of the sin. But it would be otherwise if, after the cause had been posited, before the effect follows, he retracts the will, or confesses the sin committed. L. 1. 5. n. 10; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 3.

Note: Since the cause, as such, participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a different malice, it suffices in confession to accuse only the malice of the effect; or if the cause has in itself another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if because of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if because of theft you likewise omitted Mass, you can then accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. L. 1. 5. n. 9; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 15, n. 479.

You will resolve: 1. "If the cause of pollution is one gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was at least confusedly foreseen. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust, namely touches or sights of the shameful parts of another's or one's own body with base and deliberate delight; the sight of human intercourse; and morose thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes are certainly mortal. Thus S. Th. a. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, de Matr., l. 9, c. 45, n. 23, and all agree." L. 1. 3. n. 482. A special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in delight excited from a base object. Gravely influencing; therefore, if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow, since then it follows outside the intention and accidentally. Of themselves are grave faults: "the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause of itself mortal in the genus of lust.... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil." L. 1. 3. n. 484. In the genus of lust, whence "it is inferred that the pollution which happens outside the intention from causes illicit even mortally in another genus than lust is not mortal, as from drunkenness, or from eating too immoderately or on a forbidden day." L. 1. 3. n. 484, 477; Salm., Theol. Schol., tr. 13, d. 10, n. 274; Theol. Mor., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41.

2. "If someone, about to do some necessary or lawful and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends, then, provided the danger of consent to the delight is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action; because the effect following accidentally and outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his right. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is lawful to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace according to the custom of the country, if otherwise one would have to be regarded as uncivil." L. 1. 3. n. 481. "It is lawful for someone who suffers a great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows." L. 1. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either of themselves influence only lightly, or although they of themselves gravely influence, nevertheless, since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and delight, but from an honorable, necessary, useful, suitable cause, they no longer have the same force and influence upon the effect, which is gravely increased by that evil propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished by the will turned elsewhere and resisting as far as it can. Hence the evil effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to natural constitution, or to weakness of nature, than to the aforesaid acts as cause. Besides, with the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the evil effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, by behaving permissively toward the evil. Therefore that evil effect, in the case, truly follows accidentally and outside the intention. L. 1. 3. n. 483; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

3. "It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not prolonged conversation with a girl, or from a slight glance, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as has been said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them." L. 1. 3. n. 484. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing. L. 1. 5. n. 29. A just cause is "any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness." L. 1. 3. n. 484; l. 5. n. 29.

4. A fortiori grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and accidentally, since they are outside the genus of lust. Therefore, although pollution or an evil commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is lawful to ride horseback, not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for recreation; to recline in some position in order to rest more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drink; to lead honorable dances, etc. L. 1. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent; for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the effect going to follow, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, "because, as they say, the pollution arises rather from the weakness of nature than from that cause, which concurs to pollution only accidentally and remotely. But Sanchez, Lessius, and others more probably affirm it..., because without a rational cause to permit pollution always seems something unbecoming and disordered." L. 1. 3. n. 484; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 45; Sporer, de Matr., n. 644 ff.; Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, d. 14, n. 97-103.

What is the actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative voluntary? - The voluntary, by reason of the very act of the will and its efficacy, is one thing actual or formal, another virtual, another habitual, another interpretative. Actual voluntary is given when someone actually wills something, with actual attention on the part of the intellect, whether he wills explicitly, that is, clearly and in particular, or implicitly, that is, confusedly, by a universal or quasi-universal will, which extends also to this object.

The virtual voluntary is threefold. First, the virtual voluntary is that which perseveres in some power of itself, and it is given when the explicit and clear will itself, or intention of the end, no longer exists, but only volitions of the means explicitly and clearly exist, which volitions of the end itself, in a more remiss degree, with more remiss attention, accompany. Thus when a priest wills to celebrate Mass and then puts on the sacred vestments, approaches the altar, and performs the other customary things, without any longer having that clear actual will to consecrate, the consecration will be virtually voluntary if, while he performs all things voluntarily, there is always present to him, confusedly and weakly, some attention and will to consecrate. Or at least then acts of the cogitative or estimative power remain, which are first generated when the mind proposes its object to the will, and which acts then go on to influence all subsequent acts. When the mind apprehends that object, its apprehension is at the same time generated in the cogitative or estimative power, which pertains to sensitive cognition, and moves the sensitive appetite and the exterior members to motion.

The virtual voluntary, secondly, is that which perseveres in the exterior work itself, commanded by a prior act of the will, or in the voluntary execution of the means, which someone voluntarily employs by the force or virtue and impulse of the prior intention of the end, even though as regards the end not even remiss attention and volition any longer exists. Thus the pilgrimage undertaken by a traveler to the sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin will be virtually voluntary, even though on the journey he no longer attends to it, indeed thinks of entirely different things.

The virtual voluntary, thirdly, is that which perseveres in some moral effect of its own; thus, for example, a contract entered into by a procurator will be virtually voluntary to the principal agent, who gave him the faculty of acting in his name. In a moral effect, so that a merely physical effect may be excluded, into which perhaps that prior act of the will influenced as it is a physical act; for example, if, having had the will to consecrate, afterward while sleeping you consecrate in a dream, the consecration is null. For that prior act of the will does not influence this effect as it is a human or moral act, but merely as it is a certain physical action. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Lugo, de Sacr. in gen., d. 8, s. 5, n. 87; de Fid., d. 1, n. 98; de Poenit., d. 24, s. 4; Laymann, l. 1, c. 2, c. 3, n. 4.

The habitual voluntary is that which was, but is neither in itself, not even weakly, with no attention to it persevering on the part of the intellect, nor in an exterior commanded work, or in the execution of the means, nor in any positive moral effect, but is, morally speaking, in a merely negative effect, insofar as the prior will has not been retracted. Hence a will of this kind suffices for certain moral effects. Thus, if an adult invalidly baptized were rebaptized while he sleeps, the baptism is valid. Thus also "for contracting," says St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 769, "an interpretative or conditional will does not suffice, cf. below n. 773, but an actual or virtual will is required, or at least one had and not retracted, according to what is to be said, l. 6, n. 324." Habitual voluntary is sometimes called virtual voluntary, which in truth is a certain habitual voluntary, insofar as it is distinguished from actual. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Laymann, l. c.

Interpretative voluntary is an act of the will which neither is, nor was, because cognition of the object is not present and was not present, but would be if cognition of this kind were had. Just as actual and virtual voluntary is a true cause of the act which is posited by the force of an actual or past volition, so habitual and interpretative voluntary is not a cause of the act. Habitual makes it that the act is positively according to the will, for example, the reception of a sacrament by a dying person deprived of his senses, who while healthy had resolved to receive the sacrament in danger of death. Interpretative makes it that the act at least is not judged to be against the will. Its foundation is the disposition and inclination of the soul, on account of the suitability of the thing. And these concern the voluntary considered in itself. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 4.

1. Human acts are, generally, acts of man, by which the same man orders himself to an end consonant with himself. For every agent acts on account of an end. But this is the distinction between rational nature and irrational nature: that the former, by its own acts, orders itself unto an end, while the latter is ordered unto an end by another. Aptly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2: “It must be considered that something tends to an end by its action or motion in two ways. In one way, as moving itself to the end, as man does; in another way, as moved to the end by another, as an arrow tends to a determinate end from the fact that it is moved by the archer, who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts through free choice, which is the faculty of will and reason. But those things which lack reason tend to the end through natural inclination, as moved by another, and not by themselves, since they do not know the notion of the end. And therefore they cannot order anything unto an end, but are only ordered unto an end by another. For the whole irrational nature is compared to God as an instrument to the principal agent... And therefore it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as acting itself, or leading itself to the end; but it is proper to irrational nature as acted upon and led by another, whether to an apprehended end, as brute animals are, or to an end not apprehended, as those things are which entirely lack cognition.”

2. Wherefore human acts, concerning which these Commentaries treat, and concerning which St. Thomas treats in 1. 2., are acts of man as wayfarer, by which man tends toward Beatitude, so that, with divine grace assisting, he may merit it for himself and at last obtain it. Hence the Angelic Doctor first treats in 1. 2. of the ultimate end of man and of Beatitude, then of human acts. Hence human acts can be considered either relatively to the man who by them is ordered to the end, or relatively to the end to which man is ordered by their aid. We shall speak in an orderly way of human acts according to each consideration, in distinct Commentaries.

1. Arnulfus, an upright man, but of a petulant disposition, when, first, he had met his enemy, and had been provoked and attacked by him not only with words but also with blows, burns with the desire of killing him, and, having seized a dagger, rushes upon him. But, the impulse of anger having been restrained, he flees from the enemy. Afterwards, however, having become master of himself, he fears lest he has committed a mortal fault, and therefore, no delay having intervened, he throws himself at the feet of the confessor, about to accuse the sin.

2. The same man, although he had made serious efforts to destroy the evil habit of blaspheming, in a quarrel had with a certain adversary breaks out into blasphemies, and therefore again seeks a confessor to wash away this stain of conscience.

3. On another occasion, knowing that he was accustomed to quarrel in drunkenness, he carefully attends lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety. But behold, urged by his companions to drink beyond custom, he is overtaken by drunkenness before he has adverted to its danger, and, being furious, mixes in quarrels with others. But having returned to himself he strives to do penance, and again has recourse to the confessor.

Q. 1. What is the voluntary? 2. Has Arnulfus sinned in that threefold case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 6-8. To the second, Arnulfus does not seem to have sinned, at least gravely, in any of the three proposed cases. For the perfectly voluntary was lacking. Not in the first, for he is said, and appears, truly to be an upright man, and an upright man does not so easily resolve deliberately to kill a man. He is said, moreover, to be prone to anger, and that his enemy met him; whence, from his presence, he could at once be moved to anger. Likewise it is said that he was provoked and attacked with words and blows, and so he could be much moved to anger, so that he lacked at least full and perfect knowledge of the malice and deliberation of mind. Finally it is said that, the impulse of anger having been restrained, having become master of himself, he feared lest perhaps he had sinned, and at once went to the confessor to expiate the guilt of soul, if perhaps he had incurred it; and this indeed shows that Arnulfus acted at least without full deliberation of mind.

Not in the second; for, if he had sinned gravely, in the case this would have been only on account of the neglected habit of blaspheming. But he had made serious efforts to root it out. For since he is prone to anger, he is easily to be judged to have acted from a first-first movement.

Not in the third, since he carefully attended lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety, and then, not adverting to the danger of drunkenness, he was seized by drunkenness. - G. 1.

2. Elpidius, habitually given to drinking and of a quarrelsome disposition, furious in drunkenness, after having had a dispute with Titius, resolved to seek vengeance from him; yet he put off the purpose to another time. Afterwards he went to a nearby tavern, that he might calm his anger in wine; but behold, when at night he was leaving the tavern perfectly drunk, by an unfortunate chance he came upon Titius himself, and beat him so gravely that for many weeks he was forced to abstain from his accustomed work and suffered great damage.

Q. 1. What is the free? 2. Are the damages inflicted by Titius in drunkenness imputable to him, and therefore is he held to repair them?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 10-12. To the second: "Affirmatively. The reason is that the damages are truly voluntary and sufficiently foreseen in the cause itself, at least confusedly. For Elpidius willed to inflict damage on Titius, and drank with the danger of drunkenness, since he was habitually given to drinking. Moreover he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages; since he could not be ignorant that in wine he became furious and could harm someone. Therefore Elpidius is excused neither from grave sin against justice, nor from the obligation of repairing the damages." Thus G. 3.

But that resolution is not without difficulty. For Elpidius entered the nearby tavern, not in order then to carry out his evil purpose, but, on the contrary, to calm his anger; and so it does not appear that even confusedly Elpidius then foresaw damage to be inflicted on Titius. Nor is it valid to say that he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages. For if in fact, in the case, he did not foresee it, this general presumption must yield to the truth. And the presumption in the case is rather the contrary; since, stirred by anger, he entered the tavern to calm his anger; whence Elpidius rather seems, for that time, to have willed to abstain from every vengeance and from inflicting damage. But when Elpidius gravely beat Titius, Elpidius was already perfectly drunk, and so then the voluntary, the free, and sin were entirely lacking. - I. M. 288.

1. Blasius, wishing to harm Caius his enemy, intended to pierce his ass with lead. But alas! a double misfortune befell him. For the ass is not struck by the bullet, but leaps and springs away unharmed, while the cow of Titius his friend, which after a dense hedge was lying quietly, and could not be seen by him, is unhappily killed.

Q. 1. What is the not-voluntary and the involuntary? 2. Is Blasius held to restitution for the ass not harmed, or for the cow killed?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 8, 18. To the second, negatively to both. He is certainly not held to restitution for the ass, since it escaped unharmed. For to sin the mere will of causing damage suffices; but for restitution from damage caused, the mere damaging will does not suffice. There is also required a truly damaging action, and damage truly inflicted.

Nor is he held to restitution for the cow, since he neither intended that damage nor could foresee it, and so it was not voluntary; indeed it was altogether involuntary to him. For, for restitution from damage caused, an action actually damaging and damage actually inflicted do not suffice; it is required also that damage of this sort proceed from the will and be voluntary, so that it may be imputed to him and an obligation of reparation arise for him. Therefore in the forum of conscience, or before the sentence of a judge, he cannot be urged to any reparation of the damage. But what if the ass and the cow had belonged to the same Caius? In the rigor of principles, not even then would Blasius be held for the damage. For although it would not then have been involuntary, nevertheless it would still have been not-voluntary, because that damage would always have been unforeseen. For he had not seen the cow. - G. 3; I. M. 1358, 1370.

2. Faustinus, wishing to affect Nicolinus his enemy with injury, resolved to kill a pair of horses, which Nicolinus held very dear to himself. But amid the darkness of night, not discerning well, he kills another pair, namely asses of the same Nicolinus, which Nicolinus also held very dear to himself.

Q. Is Faustinus held to restitution; and, if affirmatively, what ought he to restore?

R. Faustinus is held to restitution from unjust damaging. For in the case there was a culpable, efficacious, and unjust cause of damage. Therefore no necessary condition for restitution is lacking. And indeed, knowingly and willingly, Faustinus killed the pair of asses, although he thought it was a pair of horses. Whence it cannot here be said that that killing was not-voluntary to him. The difficulty can only be in the estimation of the damage, because this cannot be taken from the horses, which he did not kill, nor from the asses, which he did not wish to kill. But certainly it cannot be taken from the horses, because their damage does not exist; and, on the contrary, it must be taken from the asses, because their damage does exist. In the present matter, error of person excuses from restitution, because then there is no injury of the person; but error of thing, since it does not remove injury of the person, does not excuse from restitution; for this always remains, whether by damage of horses or of asses; for in that damaging, the injury of the person, not of the horses nor of the asses, is considered. Therefore the damage unjustly inflicted must be repaired: the damage inflicted, by no means that which was not inflicted. If Caius, in order to inflict injury on Sempronius, were to snatch from him a golden necklace, judging it silver, and throw it into the sea, would he not certainly be held for the estimated value of a silver necklace? And if the necklace were silver, and he judged it golden, would he not again be held for the real value of the silver necklace? - Cf. 5. 1.

1. Titius, a priest, determines to celebrate Mass on the following day for Sempronius, who asked that it be celebrated according to his intention, an alms having been given, but with no determined time. But on the following day Titius is asked in the sacristy by Caius that he be willing soon to celebrate Mass, and to sing it for his father, who died that very night. Forgetful of the prior intention, Titius celebrates and sings the Mass for Caius's father. Still forgetful of the Mass to be celebrated for Sempronius, he celebrates on the third day for himself, since he thinks he has no other obligation which he must satisfy. But behold, after some days the same Sempronius asked several other Masses from Titius, and then Titius remembered that prior Mass to be celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius.

Q. 1. What is intention; and can several things be intended? 2. Which intention of Titius prevailed in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17-19. To the second: the Mass which Titius celebrated and sang on the following day was celebrated for Caius's deceased father. For this was the predominant intention, which prevails over the other, which was incompatible with it. This can be confirmed even from that circumstance, that he sang the Mass.

The Mass which Titius celebrated on the third day was celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius. For this intention, although habitual, was evidently predominant over the intention of celebrating for himself, although this latter was actual. For the predominant intention is that which would actually be chosen, once its incompatibility with the other were known. But, once each intention was known, the intention which would have been chosen by Titius would have been the intention of celebrating for Sempronius, because he celebrated for himself only insofar as he was persuaded that he had no obligation which he had to satisfy. Therefore. And this must be asserted a fortiori if Titius had had no intention specially on that day. "If it is applied to no one, or to one incapable, the fruit remains in the treasury of the Church, or yields to the priest himself, or to those for whom he is specially held to offer, since he is thus judged implicitly to have intended." St. Alph. l. 6, n. 336. Cf. n. 335, q. 1. Moreover, in practice, when a doubt stands, it would be safer to celebrate the Mass another time for the one for whom the application did not avail. - G. 5, 6; v. 2, 335; Elbel 403.

2. Franciscus, administering the sacrament of baptism, is distracted by a sudden noise made in the church, and pronounces the form of baptism without attending to it in any way. A little later, he hears confession, and, finding the penitent little disposed, resolves not to absolve him. But again he is distracted, thinking of the cause of that noise, and, distracted, pronounces the form of absolution.

Q. 1. What is actual and virtual intention? 2. Do baptism and absolution avail in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17, 18, 41, 42. To the second: Franciscus administers baptism validly and licitly. Validly, because, although there is no actual intention and voluntary; nevertheless there is virtual intention and voluntary, which suffices in the administration of the sacraments. Licitly, because that distraction, since it was voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, can be attributed to Franciscus as no fault. S. Th. 3 p., q. 64, a. 8, ad 3.

The absolution given by Franciscus was invalid, nor in giving it did Franciscus sin in any way. It was invalid because, of two intentions simultaneously incompatible, the predominant intention always prevails, and this in the case is the intention of not absolving. Indeed, it was the only one, since he absolved while distracted. But Franciscus sinned in no way, because that wandering of mind was altogether natural and involuntary. - G. 5.

1. Ricardus, an innkeeper, lest his tavern be deprived of the great concourse of guests, supplies abundant wine to drunkards asking for it, although he foresees that many of them will become drunk and quarrel. He is moved by reason of customary profit, and sometimes by reason of preventing blasphemies; nor does he think that he offends in this. He also easily admits into his inn men uttering impious or obscene conversations, nor does he rebuke them, because, he says, he is not held by reason of his office to be solicitous about their manner of acting.

2. Nemesius on a certain day offers 20 asses by way of payment to Caius, a porter carrying a certain bundle to his inn. The porter asks 25 asses. Nemesius denies that he will give him anything more, although that man, furious, breaks out into imprecations and blasphemies.

Q. 1. What is the indirectly voluntary? 2. Does Ricardus sin gravely by serving wine to those who will become drunk, for the sole reason of customary profit? 3. Does he sin gravely by doing this to prevent the blasphemies of the drunkards? 4. Does he sin gravely by not preventing the impious and obscene conversations of the guests? 5. In the second case, ought Nemesius to have given the aforesaid five asses, although not owed, in order to prevent the blasphemies of the porter?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 32, 33, 34. To the second, negatively, generally and speaking in itself. The reason is that the innkeeper is not held to prevent, with grave damage to himself, the sins of drunkenness and quarrels which guests are accustomed to admit; for charity does not urge with so great an inconvenience. But hardly any tavern is found in which some guests are not accustomed to become drunk, and afterwards to mix in some quarrels. Therefore, if the innkeeper denies wine, the guests will go to other drinking shops, in which abundant drink is served to them; and therefore he himself will undergo great damage, and uselessly. Generally and in itself: for if it is not a question of sins of this sort foreseen confusedly, but is a question of some particular case, namely of a certain drinker already near drunkenness, who asks for more drink, it cannot here be served. The reason is that in a particular, determined, and certain case, only slight damage would have to be undergone by him in order actually to prevent a determined and certain sin. Except if, from other extrinsic circumstances, grave damage would still have to be undergone by him, or graver sins would follow. Elbel 17; L. 1, 2, n. 69.

To the third, negatively. The reason is that, of two evils, the greater must be prevented when both cannot be prevented.

To the fourth, affirmatively, if there is grave scandal of others and he could easily prevent it. The reason is that he is held only by the general reason of charity, which does not oblige with grave damage. But a grave inconvenience in practice is not lacking, as was just said in the response to the first for the case of the drunkenness of guests.

To the fifth, negatively, if he has paid the customary and just price. The reason is that, since similar cases often occur, an occasion would be given to wicked men to blaspheme more and more, and grave damage would have to be undergone by pious men. G. 7, 8, 9; I. M. 35, 36, 337, 434.

1. Adalbertus confesses thus: 1. wishing to kill Titius, my enemy, I killed Caius, my friend. 2. By shooting a bullet at a deer, I at the same time pierced my enemy, sought on another occasion for death, standing hidden in a thicket. 3. Ignorant that it was a vigil, I ate meat; but out of laziness on Sunday I had not been present at Mass, in which the obligations occurring in the week are customarily announced.

Q. 1. Does ignorance cause the involuntary? 2. What is to be judged concerning Adalbertus?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 48. To the second: in the first case Adalbertus is not excused from the sin of homicide, since knowingly and willingly he killed a man. But if he used due diligence to guard against the homicide of another besides Titius the enemy, since his external act is not formally injurious to Caius, whom he killed altogether involuntarily, he is not to be bound to any restitution toward his heirs. But otherwise, if he omitted due diligence, or foresaw confusedly the danger of killing Caius. - I. M. 1370, 1372, 1373.

In the second case, either he used due diligence to guard against the damage of another, or he did not. If the former, the act is not voluntary, and consequently not a sin. If the latter, he is guilty of homicide. But since the enemy was standing hidden in a thicket, and Adalbertus thought he was killing nothing except a deer, he seems to be excused from homicide. - Elbel 46.

In the third case, either a thought occurred to him about an obligation perhaps to happen within the week, or no thought occurred. If the former, the ignorance was vincible, and he sinned against the precept of the Church by neglecting to inquire. If the latter, although he sinned by omitting Mass, nevertheless he did not sin by the omission of fasting. I. M. 8, 207, 288. - G. 12, 13, 14, 646 seqq.

2. Abundius, a priest approved for receiving the confessions of the faithful, experiences that his knowledge is slight and insufficient for duly carrying out that office; nevertheless he continues to hear confessions, because he has authentic testimony of the bishop concerning his suitability. Hence, through defect of knowledge and study, he commits various errors concerning the species of sins to be inquired into, and especially concerning the obligation of restoring. Having been rebuked by a confessor and bound to make restitution on behalf of the penitents, he had resolved seriously to apply himself to the studies of Moral Theology, and meanwhile to interrupt the sacred ministry, when behold, suddenly he is called to Titius, who is dying, and, as report has it, liable to various restitutions. He goes on uncertain, absolves the poor man while doubtful, not being able to discern the entangled conscience, and returns sad, muttering that he would again be liable to restitution on behalf of the penitent.

Q. 1. Is there sin in the case from ignorance, or are the aforesaid errors imputable to Abundius? 2. Did he sin gravely in each instance? 3. Is he liable to restitution?

"1. A man must annihilate his powers, and this is eternal life. - 2. To will to act actively is to offend God, who wills to be the sole agent; and therefore it is necessary to abandon oneself wholly and totally to God, and afterward to remain like a lifeless body. - 4. Natural activity is the enemy of grace, and impedes the operations of God and true perfection; because God wills to operate in us without us. - 5. By doing nothing, the soul annihilates itself, and returns to the very principle and to its origin, which is the essence of God, in which it remains transformed and divinized; and God then remains in Himself, because there are then no longer two things united, but only one, and in this way God lives and reigns in us, and the soul annihilates itself in operative being. - 6. The interior way is that in which neither light, nor love, nor resignation is known; and it is not necessary to know God, and in this manner one proceeds rightly. - 13. Free will having been resigned to God, the thought and care of everything that concerns us must be left to the same God, and one must allow Him to accomplish His divine will in us." - Condemned propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI, Const. Caelestis Pastor, 20 Nov. 1687.

"16. The immediate division of human works is that they are either virtuous or vicious; because if a man is vicious and does anything, he then acts viciously, and if he is virtuous and does anything, he then acts virtuously; because just as vice, which is called a crime or mortal sin, universally infects the acts of a vicious man, so virtue vivifies all the acts of a virtuous man." Proposition of John Hus, condemned by the Council of Constance and by Martin V, Bull Inter cunctas, Bull In eminenti, 8 Kalends of March 1418.

"7. Every deliberate human action is love of God or of the world: if of God, it is the charity of the Father; if of the world, it is the concupiscence of the flesh, that is, evil." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"34. That distinction of a twofold love, namely, natural love, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous love, by which God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious, and was devised to make sport of the sacred Scriptures and very many testimonies of the ancients. - 37. He agrees with Pelagius who acknowledges any natural good, that is, any good which takes its origin from the powers of nature alone. - 62. That distinction also, by which a work is said to be good in two ways, either because it is right and good from its object and all its circumstances (which they are accustomed to call morally good), or because it is meritorious of the eternal kingdom, because it is performed by a living member of Christ through the Spirit of Charity, is to be rejected. - 63. But that distinction of a twofold justice is likewise rejected: one which is effected through the indwelling Spirit of Charity; the other which is effected indeed from an inspiration of the Holy Spirit stirring the heart to penance, but not yet dwelling in the heart and pouring forth charity in it, by which the justification of the divine law may be fulfilled." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V, Bull Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1 Oct. 1567. Cf. nn. 69, 75, 89.

"23. The doctrine of the Synod concerning a twofold love (of dominant cupidity and of dominant charity), declaring that man without grace is under the servitude of sin, and that in that state, through the general influence of dominant cupidity, he infects and corrupts all his actions; insofar as it insinuates that, in man while he is under servitude or in the state of sin, destitute of that grace by which he is freed from the servitude of sin and constituted a son of God, cupidity so dominates that, through the general influence of this cupidity, all his actions are in themselves infected and corrupted; or that all works which are done before justification, in whatever manner they are done, are sins, as though in all his acts the sinner serves dominant cupidity: false, pernicious, inducing into an error condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent, and condemned again in Baius, art. 40. - 24. But insofar as between dominant cupidity and dominant charity there are placed no intermediate affections implanted by nature itself and praiseworthy by their own nature, which, together with the love of beatitude and a natural inclination toward good, remained as the last lineaments and relics of the image of God; from St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 28; just as though between divine love, which leads us to the kingdom, and illicit human love, which is condemned, there were no licit human love which is not reprehended; from St. Augustine, sermon 349, On Charity, Maurist edition: false, previously condemned." Condemned propositions of the Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI, Const. Auctorem Fidei, 28 Aug. 1794.

"39. That which is done voluntarily, even if it is done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely. - 41. That mode of liberty which is freedom from necessity is not found in the Scriptures under the name of liberty, but only the name of liberty from sin."

"66. Violence alone is repugnant to the natural liberty of man." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"3. For meriting or demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices." Proposition of Cornelius Jansen, condemned by Innocent X as heretical; Const. Vineam Domini, 16 July 1705.

"27. Free will, without the assistance of the grace of God, avails only for sinning. - 28. It is a Pelagian error to say that free will avails for avoiding any sin." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"2. Although invincible ignorance of the natural law be granted, in the state of fallen nature this ignorance does not excuse one who acts from it from formal sin." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"10. That they did not sin who, not knowing Christ, crucified Him, and that whatever is done through ignorance is not to be ascribed to guilt." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II in the year 1140.

"But this holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence, or the fomes, remains in the baptized; and since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent, but who resist manfully through the grace of Christ Jesus; indeed, he who shall have contended lawfully shall be crowned. This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it is from sin and inclines toward sin. But if anyone shall think the contrary, let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 5, Decree on Original Sin, penultimate paragraph.

"74. Concupiscence in the regenerate who have relapsed into mortal sin, in whom it now dominates, is sin, just as are other vicious habits. - 75. The evil movements of concupiscence are, for the state of corrupted man, prohibited by the precept: Thou shalt not covet; whence a man who feels them and does not consent transgresses the precept Thou shalt not covet, although the transgression is not imputed as sin. - 76. As long as anything of carnal concupiscence is in one who loves, he does not fulfill the precept: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"19. That neither the work, nor the will, nor concupiscence, nor pleasure, when it moves the soul, is sin, nor ought we to will to extinguish it." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II.

"17. Free will having been handed over to God, and the care and thought of our soul having been left to Him, no further account is to be taken of temptations; nor must any resistance be made to them other than a negative one, with no industry employed; and if nature is moved, it is necessary to allow it to be moved, because it is nature. - 37. On occasions of even furious temptations, the soul must not elicit explicit acts of the opposite virtues, but must remain in the aforesaid love and resignation." Condemned propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI.

"41. God permits and wills, in order to humble us and lead us to true transformation, that in some perfect souls, even those not possessed, the demon inflict violence upon their bodies and cause them to commit carnal acts, even while awake and without obscuration of mind, by physically moving their hands and other members against their will. And the same is said as regards other acts sinful in themselves; in which case they are not sins, because consent is not present in them. - 47. When violences of this kind occur, it is necessary to allow Satan to operate, employing no industry and no effort of one's own, but a man must remain in his nothingness; and even if pollutions and obscene acts with one's own hands, and even worse things, should follow, it is not necessary to disquiet oneself, but scruples, doubts, and fears must be cast out; because the soul becomes more illuminated, more strengthened, and more pure, and holy liberty is acquired. And above all, it is not necessary to confess these things, and it is most holy not to confess them; because by this means the demon is overcome and the treasure of peace is acquired." Condemned propositions of Michael de Molinos, condemned by Innocent XI.

"38. Every love of a rational creature is either vicious cupidity, by which the world is loved, which is prohibited by John, or that praiseworthy charity, poured forth in the heart through the Holy Spirit, by which God is loved." Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V.

"40. Without grace we can love nothing except unto our condemnation. - 44. There are only two loves from which all our volitions and actions arise: the love of God, which does all things for the sake of God and which God rewards; and the love by which we love ourselves and the world, which does not refer to God that which is to be referred to God, and for this very reason becomes evil. - 45. Since the love of God no longer reigns in the heart of sinners, it is necessary that carnal cupidity reign in it and corrupt all their actions. - 46. Cupidity or charity makes the use of the senses good or evil." Condemned propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI, Const. Unigenitus, 8 Sept. 1713.

"15. God does not command an external act. - 16. An external act is not properly good, nor does God properly perform it. - 17. Let us bring forth the fruit, not of external acts, which do not make us good, but of interior acts, which the Father dwelling in us makes and performs. - 18. God loves souls, not the external work." Condemned propositions of Eckhart, condemned by John XXII in the year 1329.

"13. That because of works a man becomes neither better nor worse." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II.

"40. The Blessed Virgin never performed any external work, and nevertheless she was holier than all the Saints. Therefore one can arrive at holiness without an external work." Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

"Moreover, it teaches (the holy Synod) that the largess of divine munificence is so great that we are able to make satisfaction before God the Father through Christ Jesus not only by punishments voluntarily undertaken by us for punishing sin, or imposed at the judgment of a priest according to the measure of the offense, but also - which is the greatest proof of love - by temporal scourges inflicted by God and patiently borne by us." Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 9. Cf. also ibid., ch. 13, and sess. 6, ch. 14.

"If anyone shall say that nothing is commanded in the Gospel besides faith; that other things are indifferent, neither commanded nor prohibited, but free; or that the Ten Commandments in no way pertain to Christians: let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 19.

"61. That distinction of the doctors, that the mandates of the divine law are fulfilled in two ways - in one way only as regards the substance of the works commanded, and in the other as regards a certain mode, namely, that according to which they can lead the one acting to the eternal kingdom, that is, according to the meritorious mode - is fictitious and to be rejected." Proposition of Michael Baius condemned by St. Pius V. Cf. nn. 6, 89.

"9. He truly sins who hates sin merely because of its turpitude and incongruity with nature, without any regard for God offended. - 10. The intention by which someone detests evil and pursues good merely in order to obtain heavenly glory is not right or pleasing to God. - 11. Everything that is not from supernatural Christian faith, which works through love, is sin. - 13. Whoever also serves God with a view to eternal reward, if he should lack charity, is not free from fault whenever he acts, even with a view to beatitude. - 14. Fear of hell is not supernatural. - 15. Attrition, which is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments, without the love of benevolence for God on account of Himself, is not a good and supernatural movement." Propositions condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"60. If fear of punishment alone animates penance, the more violent this penance is, the more it leads to despair. - 61. Fear restrains only the hand; but the heart is devoted to sin as long as it is not led by the love of justice. - 62. He who abstains from evil only through fear of punishment commits it in his heart and is also guilty before God." Condemned propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI.

"8. To eat and drink unto satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided that it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts. - 9. The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone is wholly free from all fault and venial defect." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, Decree of 2 March 1679.

"2. Just as an evil work by its nature is meritorious of eternal death, so a good work by its nature is meritorious of eternal life. - 4. Eternal life was promised to man in his integrity and to the angel in view of good works, and good works by the law of nature suffice of themselves for attaining it. - 15. The reason of merit does not consist in this, that those who act well have grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but in this alone, that they obey the divine law." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

"1. If anyone shall say that man can be justified before God by his works, whether done through human nature or through the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ: let him be anathema. - 2. If anyone shall say that divine grace through Christ Jesus is given only for this, that man may more easily live justly and merit eternal life, as though through free will without grace he could do both, though with hardship and difficulty: let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 6, canons.

38. Moreover, Moral Theology inquires what good and evil there is in human acts, what licit and illicit is found in them. For its material object is not contained in human acts insofar as they are beings of nature, but insofar as they are moral being. Hence the Angelic Doctor, I-II, q. 7, a. 2, says: "First, the theologian considers human acts according as through them man is ordered to beatitude.... Second, the theologian considers human acts according as in them there is found good and evil, better and worse.... Third, the theologian considers human acts according as they are meritorious or demeritorious." And in the same place, ad 3: "The theologian has considerations concerning virtuous and vicious acts... and considers acts according as they merit punishment or reward."

Since the whole of Moral Theology is occupied with directing human acts, we shall take the beginning of our treatment, as the order of things and common custom require, from human acts themselves. Therefore we must treat here 1. of the notion, 2. of the principles, 3. of the morality of human acts.

1. • DEFINITION. An act in general is the determination of a potency, or it is the faculty of acting placed in exercise, or also it is the exercise of the faculty of acting. The potency itself is customarily called first act, and its determination second act.

But a human act is that which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or it is an act proceeding from a free will with advertence to the goodness or malice of the act.

For that alone can be called a human act which proceeds from man insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures ¹. Now man acts then only, as such, when in acting he uses the faculties essential to himself, namely of knowing, willing, and freely determining himself; therefore there is not given an act properly human unless it proceeds from the deliberate or free will of man. Hence a human act at length is the same as a moral act. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, art. 1.

¹ From this manner of speaking certain moderns, after Alasia, ineptly conclude that also any acts of the intellect, such as thought, perception, judgment, reasoning, and likewise acts of the will even not free, are altogether human acts, because, they say, they are perfected by those powers by which man essentially differs from brutes. They did not understand, namely, that the distinction of man from brutes is employed here by the Doctors not only as to the substance of the faculties, but especially as to the mode of operating (see Suarez, on I-II, Treatise 1, Disputation 2, Section 2, from no. 7). And indeed this abuse of innovating can bring only this fruit: both that men do not understand one another and move controversies which arise merely from the opinions of another not being perceived, and that in reading the books of the Doctors, indeed also ecclesiastical monuments and decrees, they undergo the gravest danger of erring.

Hence it differs from an act of man ², which is done in man, or by man, without any deliberation, such as indeliberate acts, first-first motions, or acts of a man wholly distracted, sleeping, delirious, insane, drunk, or deprived in any way whatsoever of the use of reason ³.

² A certain modern, having rejected the customary distinction of the ancients into acts of man and human acts, introduced a new one of natural or animal acts and personal acts; for, as he says, the faculties of intellect and will, as the highest active principle, constitute personality. But from this an easy path lies open to grave errors; for if personality is constituted in the highest or supreme active principle, then God, for one nature or active principle, will have one person, but Christ, for a twofold nature, will have two.

³ It has pleased some to distinguish manifold acts in man according as St. Gregory the Great (Homily 29 on the Gospel) said that man has something from every creature, so that consequently 1. some acts are called natural, as to live, vegetate, grow, etc.; 2. others animal, common also to brutes, as to eat, walk, etc.; 3. others of man, as to speak, laugh, understand, etc.; and 4. finally human, which proceed from a deliberate will; in these the intellect holds itself as condition, but the free will as cause.

2. • DIVISION. A human act is distinguished in many ways.

1. Elicited, or commanded. That is called elicited which is consummated in the will itself, as an act of love, hatred, desire. But commanded is that which, with the will commanding, is perfected by another potency, whether internal, as an act of thinking, or external, as an act of walking, writing.

2. Internal, or external. An internal act is that which is perfected only in the internal powers of the soul, such as an act of thinking, loving. But an external act, or mixed act, is that which the will perfects through the organs of the body. An internal act is called more specially an act, and an external act is rather named an action ⁴.

⁴ The consideration of an internal or external act now especially regards whether the internal act, for example the consent of the will, in any way comes forth exteriorly or is manifested; so that thence it may be gathered whether it is subjected to a law, or censure, or reservation, etc.

3. Good, evil, indifferent. A good act is called that which is conformable to right reason; evil, that which is not agreeable to it; indifferent, that which neither is conformable to the norm of reason nor is repugnant to it. - A good or indifferent act is also called licit ⁵; but an evil act, illicit.

⁵ Those who do not admit indifferent acts in the individual by that very fact hold any licit act also as morally good. See what is to be said below, Chapter III, Article 1.

4. Natural, or supernatural. The former is that which is produced by the powers of nature alone; but the latter, that which is perfected by the help of divine grace ⁶.

⁶ A supernatural act is called meritorious either de condigno or de congruo, according as some retribution is repaid to it either from justice, or from the mere fittingness and benignity of God.

5. Valid, or invalid. A valid act is that which enjoys all the essentials required for producing its proper effect. But invalid is that which lacks even one of the essentials. Thus a contract is valid in which the things required for its validity, whether by natural law or by positive law, are found. Otherwise it must be held invalid.

66. State of the question. Among the acts which are performed by man, some are voluntary, others involuntary. The former are performed by the will with a previous cognition of the intellect. But the latter are done without previous cognition or will. Of this kind are the acts of one fully dreaming, drunk, or delirious, who are incapable of conscious cognition;¹ likewise the acts of vegetative life, such as the digestion of foods or the circulation of the blood, which are not subject to the will; and also the acts of a fully distracted man who, although he is capable of attention, in fact does not notice those things which he does, because his attention is turned aside to other things. - The former acts, namely voluntary acts, can be called human acts, because they proceed from man insofar as he is rational man; but the latter are called acts of man, because they indeed proceed from man, but not insofar as he is rational, since they are done without advertence and will.²

¹ Thus voluntary acts are distinguished from spontaneous acts, which are done with merely sensitive cognition, such as the acts of infants or the mentally unsound.

² Sometimes, however, only those acts are called human which are truly free, and therefore proceed from the deliberate will, according to those things which are set forth below. To the point St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1: "Of the actions which are done by man, those alone are called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his own acts. Whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his own acts through reason and will... therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will."

Here we treat concerning voluntary acts; nor will there be discussion of the others, except that they may be distinguished from the former. Among voluntary acts, some are necessary, but others free or deliberate. The former indeed proceed from the will with previous cognition, but in such a way that the will cannot abstain from them; thus we necessarily will good in common;¹ for we do not embrace evil except under the species of good, or insofar as in some way it appears to us to be good. On the contrary, free acts so proceed from the will that the will according to its own pleasure can posit the act or not posit it. Thus the voluntary is, as it were, a genus which contains under itself two species: the necessary voluntary and the free or deliberate voluntary; but, since the former is occupied only with good in common, often voluntary and free are taken promiscuously. - We shall declare this more fully by setting forth: 1. the notion and species of a free act; 2. the principles which concur toward its production; 3. the causes which influence a free act.

¹ Certain ones, however, think that man is free even concerning good in common, because, they say, he tends toward it naturally indeed, but not from necessity; thus Piat, La Liberte, t. II, Le Probleme, p. 262-269. - Nevertheless it is established psychologically that there is some distinction between the desiring of beatitude, which all elicit at least implicitly, and the willing of the means which lead to it: for since these are diverse, and consequently limited goods, they do not solicit our assent necessarily. - For the rest, in practice, it matters little, provided it is admitted that we are truly free concerning the choice of means for obtaining beatitude.

67. 1. Definition. An act is called free which is immune from coercion and necessity.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 8-17; Suarez, Tr. de voluntario et involuntario, disp. I, II, VI-X; Salmanticenses, De principiis moralitatis, cap. I, n. 9-21; Billuart, De actibus humanis, diss. I-III; Bouquillon, n. 318-330; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 1-34.

(a) Liberty or immunity from necessity, which is also called liberty of exercise, or free will, is the faculty of choosing one thing before another, so that the agent is not intrinsically determined to one thing. For liberty it is by no means required that the will be in a state of indifference; but it suffices that, notwithstanding various causes, whether external or internal, which influence it, it ultimately be able to choose either part. - It is threefold: liberty of contradiction, which is exercised concerning contradictories, for example, when we can choose between loving and not loving; liberty of contrariety, which chooses between contraries, for example, between loving and hating, good and evil; liberty of specification, to which belongs choosing between objects diverse in species, such as eating and walking. Now for the essence of liberty the sole faculty of choosing between contradictories suffices, or between acting and not acting.

(b) Liberty from coercion, or liberty of execution, is the unimpeded faculty of acting according to one's pleasure, so that the agent is not forced to act by external violence, nor impeded from acting. Necessity therefore affects the very internal faculty of choosing, while coercion only binds the external power of executing.

68. 2. Existence. (A) The existence of liberty today is denied by determinists,¹ who contend that all actions of man depend on antecedent or concomitant circumstances in such a way that they are truly determined by them, but are not freely chosen by the will. It is not our purpose to vindicate against them the existence of free will; Philosophers do this.

¹ Thus, among others, A. Fouillée, La liberté et le déterminisme, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1895. Yet he himself confesses that we become free little by little: for we have the concept of liberty; but every concept tends to burst forth at some time into act and to become real. For the rest, most determinists confess that there is in us some power of changing circumstances, and so of indirectly attaining what we will.

69. Let it suffice to recall their principal arguments to memory:

(a) Psychological.² From the inward testimony of conscience it is established that we, at least in many acts, are truly free. For notwithstanding the various motives which impel us to acting in this or that way, we can, according to our own judgment, consider these motives attentively or not, and make a practical judgment about them; we are conscious that we can choose between delightful good and honorable good; at the very instant in which we choose good, pleasure often allures us to evil, and therefore the fulfillment of duty requires an effort, that is, an act of the will contrary to pleasure; if we do good, we impute the action to ourselves as to true authors, as worthy of praise; if we have acted badly, conscience reproves us as worthy of blame. At length sometimes we perceive the distinction between acts arisen from an invincible propensity and those which are performed freely. Therefore unless conscience manifestly deceives us, we are truly free at least in many things.

² Piat, Le problème de la liberté, p. 37-127; Mercier, Psychologie, t. II, n. 203-206; Meyer, op. cit., n. 109-114; Fonsegrive, Essai sur le libre arbitre, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 434-452, where he joins the psychological and the metaphysical argument together.

This is confirmed from the concept of duty to be fulfilled, which is present in all, as was shown above. For by duty we are not forced nor determined, but solicited to acting; hence sometimes we resist the command of duty, while conscience resists; sometimes we give consent to it, while concupiscence resists; in the former case, we repent that we have violated the order of nature; in the latter, we rejoice concerning good freely chosen.

(b) Metaphysical. The proper and adequate object of the will is universal good; wherefore, if some object is proposed to the will which is, and evidently appears to be, universally good, according to every consideration, of necessity the will will tend toward it, if it wills anything; for it will not be able to will the opposite. But if some object is proposed which is not, and does not appear, good according to every consideration, the will is not of necessity borne toward it. Now any particular goods, insofar as they are not the universal good, but are deficient from some good, can be taken as not good; and according to this consideration, they can be rejected or approved by the will.¹

¹ Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2.

Therefore the subject of liberty is properly the will, to which belongs choosing between acting and not acting, doing this or that. But the root of liberty is reason, which can have diverse conceptions of good:² it conceives the highest good and proposes it to the will as something necessary; but particular goods it conceives and proposes as desirable insofar as they are more or less connected with beatitude.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 2 ad 2; I, q. 83, a. 1.

70. (B) Theologians likewise, against Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists, prove that the human will, even in the state of fallen nature and under the influence of grace, remains free from necessity.³ (a) This surely is established from the general manner of speaking of Scripture; for precepts are given to man; rewards are promised to those doing good, but punishments are inflicted on the evil; sinners are called to penance, the just are warned lest, trusting too much in themselves, they fall into sin; there are in us two kinds of propensities mutually opposed to one another, by which we are allured to good and to evil;⁴ but, if without God's help we can do nothing from ourselves, we can do all things in Him who strengthens us.⁵

³ Which we proved in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 94-98.

⁴ Rom., VII, 15-25.

⁵ Philip., IV, 13. - Fonsegrive sets forth the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers concerning liberty, op. cit., p. 79-124.

(b) Therefore the Council of Trent deservedly declares that by Adam's prevarication the free will of man, although weakened and inclined in its powers, was by no means extinguished, and that it can dissent from the grace of God, if it wills.¹ Likewise, as heretical, the third proposition of Jansenius was reproved: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 1 and can. 4-5 (Denzing., nn. 675, 696, 697).

71. The primary distinction of free acts is taken from the principle from which they proceed: some indeed are elicited and others commanded. Elicited or immanent acts proceed immediately from the will and are perfected and consummated in it,² such as volition, intention, election, etc.; commanded acts are those which do not proceed immediately from the will, but, from its command, from another power, whether internal or external, such as thinking, walking, etc. A few things must be said concerning these, so that the nature of the free act may be better understood.

² In a general way those acts are called elicited which are performed by that faculty which is the proper subject of those acts; thus an act of faith is elicited by the intellect and commanded by the will. But in moral matters, an elicited act is so called in relation to the will, to which it belongs to act morally.

72. 1. Concerning elicited acts. Six elicited acts of the will are generally distinguished, when we act not precipitately, but prudently and maturely: simple volition, intention, consent, election, use, fruition.

(a) When the intellect apprehends something as good, the will is borne toward it as lovable in itself, and that inclination is called simple volition, or complacency, or love.

(b) But this volition moves the intellect to weighing whether that good is fitting and possible for the subject; and if the intellect truly judges that the matter is so, intention is born, by which the will tends toward the end as attainable.

(c) By force of this intention, the intellect inquires concerning means suited to obtaining the end, and the will gives consent, or desires the means useful for attaining the thing.

(d) By force of this consent, the intellect is applied to discerning what are the more apt means for attaining the object, and on the part of the will there is election, by which it approves one means before others.

(e) When the means has now been chosen, the will, with the intellect directing, commands the execution of this means, and consequently applies the executive powers to the act; this indeed is called active use, or the command of the will for acting.

(f) Finally, when the will has attained the good, it rests in it and enjoys it, and from this is born fruition, or joyful rest in the possessed end.

73. 2. Concerning commanded acts. For judging rightly concerning the liberty, and consequently concerning the morality, of these acts, it is of the greatest importance that it be defined over which faculties the will can command, and by what kind of command. For a twofold command is distinguished: one absolute, or despotic, which cannot be resisted; and another non-absolute (which was called political by the Scholastics), which we can resist.

(a) Now the will exercises no command over those apprehensions of the intellect which precede every volition; for example, it cannot prevent reason from perceiving the truth proposed to it; directly it does not influence the judgment which is made concerning a thing evidently true or false, but indirectly, insofar as affections of soul incline the judgment in some way toward that part which is more pleasing. - The intellect is subject to the free will as to application, insofar as it can be applied to this or that object, but not absolutely, as is clear from the wanderings of mind to which we are subject; and in some way as to adherence, when the truth is not evidently clear, for example, in the mysteries of faith; for then the will is able to command an assent firmer than the weight of the reasons which are brought forward deserves.¹

¹ It is clear from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition: "The will cannot effect that the assent of faith in itself be firmer than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves." (Denzing., n. 1036.)

74. (b) The will cannot exercise command over the first representations of imagination or recollections of memory, which moreover were not willed, nor over the first movements of the sensitive appetite (or of the passions); for all these things anticipate its act. But as to the other acts of these faculties, it is able to exercise some command; for it can excite phantasms, recollections, or passions, and on the contrary in some way restrain the movements of concupiscence, by commanding these faculties that they turn themselves aside to other objects. Often, however, phantasms, recollections, or movements of the passions return even against the command of the will: "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, which is in my members."¹

¹ Rom., VII, 23.

(c) Almost the same must be said concerning the external senses: they depend on the will as to application, or turning away from objects, but not as to sensation, or impression: for the senses are so disposed that sensation is produced whenever a sensible object strikes the organs; but from that sensation there necessarily follows some pleasure or sadness. Nevertheless, often the will, when there is place for deliberation, can indirectly prevent sensations and the movements following from them, by commanding the senses to turn themselves away from certain objects. But when pleasure or sadness has arisen, the will can freely consent or dissent.

75. (d) But the motive power of the external members of the body is subject to the command of the will almost absolutely, provided only that it is not impeded by some defect, such as paralysis, or by some extraordinary state, such as hypnotic sleep or diabolical obsession.

(e) Certain functions of vegetative life, such as nutrition, depend on the will only indirectly, insofar as, for example, it can command that this or that food be eaten; certain functions, however, such as respiration, are directed by the will; all are remotely subject to some command of the will, insofar as dispositions of soul, such as joy or sadness and other passions, influence not a little the exercise of these faculties.

All these things indeed must be kept before the eyes for judging rightly concerning the liberty and morality of acts which are more or less commanded by the will.

76. By reason of manifestation, human acts are merely internal, when they are performed by the powers of the soul without any exterior sign, such as thought, imagination, volition; external, when they are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as walking, inclination of the head, etc.; mixed, which are exercised by external and internal powers together, such as pious recitation of the rosary, devout genuflection, etc. - There are other divisions, concerning which we shall speak below in their own place.

77. When it is a question of a merely natural act, the internal principles which concur toward its production are the various faculties which are described in Psychology; if it is a question of a supernatural and meritorious act, there are required besides certain supernatural gifts, by which the faculties are completed and elevated; these are declared more fully in the treatise concerning Grace. Here it is sufficient to recall to memory those things which are more useful for the understanding of a free and meritorious act.

Although all the faculties of man concur in some way toward the production of a free act, nevertheless there are two which proximately produce it, namely the intellect and the will: the former knows the object, judges concerning its moral goodness or malice, and proposes it to the will: nothing is willed unless previously known; the latter pursues the good proposed by the intellect. - The other faculties indeed concur toward a free act, but only insofar as they are directed by the will, from what was said above, n. 73-75.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 9-15; Suarez, op. cit., disp. VI, VIII; Billuart, diss. III. Confer the Philosophers, where they discuss Psychology.

78. That an act may be truly and in all respects free, cognition or advertence of mind ought to precede the election of the will; and the agent ought to advert to two things: the act itself as moral, and the various elements which can affect its morality: and the more perfect the cognition, the freer the act is, because the will elicits the act more freely the more lucidly the motives of acting are proposed to it.

1. The agent ought to be conscious of the action itself which he elicits, that this may be free; for since a free act is in the power of the one operating, the agent ought to be so disposed that he can posit or not posit the act, continue or interrupt it; but he cannot do this unless he is conscious that he is acting and performing such an act. Nor does it suffice that he advert to the material act itself, but it is required that he perceive its morality.

79. (a) By reason of the subject itself, advertence is full or semi-full: full, when nothing on the part of the intellect impedes the eliciting of the act of adverting, with that perfection which prudent persons are accustomed to employ in matters of some moment, for example, when someone, awake, in possession of himself, neither disturbed nor distracted, attends to a matter; - semi-full, or rather non-full, when something impedes the mind so that the act of adverting is not perfect, for example, when someone thinks about some matter while not yet fully aroused from sleep, or not fully in possession of himself, or distracted by other matters.

According to diverse advertence of mind, three kinds of acts are usually distinguished: first-first movements, or indeliberate ones, which precede all advertence, for example, the natural movement of aversion, anger, revenge when they are excited before they are adverted to; second-first movements, or semi-deliberate ones, of which we are conscious only imperfectly, because we are not fully awake, or are distracted in some way; second movements, or deliberate ones, which are elicited with full advertence, namely by one who is altogether in possession of himself and fully attends to the matter.

80. (b) By reason of the object, advertence is distinct, when the morality of the object is clearly perceived; confused, when it is apprehended only obscurely. Thus one who throws a stone from a window, foreseeing that from it a passing enemy will be wounded, distinctly adverts to the malice of this action; but if he does this, indeed suspecting that perhaps someone passing by can be wounded, but not knowing whether someone in fact is passing, he adverts only confusedly to the wounding of the neighbor. - This distinction indeed is of the greatest moment, since an effect only confusedly foreseen is much less imputable to the agent than one which is clearly perceived.¹

¹ Which Vieux Moraliste lucidly sets forth, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-30.

81. 2. That the agent may freely will all the circumstances of the act, he ought to advert to them; for since nothing is willed unless previously known, if in some object there are several moral elements which the agent does not perceive, he does not freely will the same. Thus if someone kills his father, thinking him to be a man hostile to himself, he is indeed guilty of homicide, but not of parricide, because, on account of darkness or another cause, he did not advert that this man was his father; if he kills him while hunting, thinking that what he saw was a wild animal, he is guilty neither of parricide nor of homicide.

Since a free act is directly elicited by the will, it remains to speak concerning volition itself, so that it may be better discerned when it is truly free.

82. 1. By reason of deliberation and adherence, volition, like cognition itself, is called perfect or imperfect, according as it is done with full or semi-full advertence, and at the same time with full or semi-full consent. Therefore in the voluntary, or free, there can be several degrees, according as cognition or volition is more or less perfect. Certain ones think that the perfection of volition depends on cognition alone; but others, whom we follow, judge that there are degrees in consent itself. For sometimes no consent is given, although advertence is full, as in the case of abulia, below, n. 128. Sometimes consent is semi-full, although advertence is full, as in the case of a habit already retracted, n. 125. At other times the will consents only reluctantly, under the influence of fear: thus a Christian who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith; or an official who, in order to preserve an office, reluctantly acts against conscience. In this case, if advertence is full, volition does not cease to be free, and indeed sufficiently full for committing mortal sin: for then the agent deliberately prefers a temporal and transitory good to a spiritual and eternal good, which is commanded under grave obligation. This is illustrated by a comparison: a merchant who, when a storm has arisen, throws his merchandise into the sea to save his life, does this indeed reluctantly, but nevertheless freely and efficaciously, because he places life before riches; thus one who consents to sin from fear acts freely, although reluctantly. - But at other times consent is given with the whole soul, with the whole heart. Therefore there are various degrees in consent itself.

83. 2. By reason of manifestation, volition is express, when it is distinctly declared externally by words or other signs; tacit, when consent is indeed elicited, but is not distinctly manifested, and is gathered to be present only from some fact or omission of fact: thus, if a superior, knowing that something is being done against the law, does not prohibit it when he easily can, he seems to consent. - From this was born the axiom: he who is silent seems to consent; it must be noted, however, that silence alone of itself does not signify consent, but that its sense is to be defined from the adjuncts, according to the rules which will be handed down in the whole course of the work.

From the voluntary or tacit consent there must carefully be distinguished the presumed voluntary, which someone in fact did not elicit, but would have elicited, if the matter had been proposed to him; for example, if in a particular case a positive law cannot be observed without grave inconvenience, the dispensation of the legislator can be presumed.

84. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is expressed, volition is positive, when it is terminated to some act; negative, when it consists in some omission; for example, a father who adverts that his son is stealing another's good, and does not impede it, negatively wills to cooperate in this theft. But this omission is truly free and imputable when someone can and is bound to act.

Here it can be noted that a voluntary omission can happen in manifold ways. If it is a question, for example, of hearing Mass: (a) someone can expressly say: I do not wish to hear Mass; (b) or choose an action incompatible with hearing Mass, for example, hunting; (c) or positively determine himself to elicit no act, whether of volition or nolition; (d) or behave altogether passively, as happens to those who are found in a state of indifference or abulia, as they say. In the first three ways, the omission is free; in the fourth, it is controverted: for abulia is a psychological disease, which often was voluntary in the cause, but greatly diminishes and sometimes removes liberty.

Other divisions of the voluntary or free, direct and indirect; actual, virtual, and habitual, will more opportunely be declared below.

85. Natural faculties, aided by divine concurrence, indeed suffice for eliciting an act naturally good, provided it is not too arduous;¹ but, since in fact we have been ordered to a supernatural end, it is useful to say certain things in passing concerning those principles which are superadded to our nature for making a meritorious act.

¹ What fallen man can and cannot do, without grace, as to ethically good works, was declared in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 33-48. - In the same treatise all those things which concur toward a meritorious act are set forth more fully.

1. The Christian, by receiving baptism, is constituted an adoptive son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom, and receives a certain participation of the divine nature, namely habitual grace, by force of which human nature is elevated to the supernatural state, and radically becomes capable of acting meritoriously; at the same time virtues are infused into the powers of the soul, which perfect them and render them proximately apt for eliciting supernatural acts; to these are added the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for performing more perfect and more arduous works by a certain divine instinct. Finally, that our faculties, already adorned with supernatural virtues and gifts, may break forth into act and in fact elicit supernatural works, undeserved helps are provided to them, which are called actual graces. Thus in Christians nature is perfected by grace; faculties are completed by infused virtues and gifts; the concurrence by which God cooperates with our acts is supernatural; thus we are able to act not only honorably, but also supernaturally and meritoriously.

But when habitual grace and charity are lost by mortal sin, faith and hope remain in the soul, provided someone has not sinned gravely against these virtues; nor are actual graces denied to him, by whose aid he is able to elicit supernatural acts¹ of fear of God, hope, penance, and love, and to recover sanctifying grace.

¹ These acts of the sinner are indeed supernatural, but not meritorious de condigno, as is declared in the treatise concerning Grace.

86. 2. But infidels, who have not been justified by baptismal regeneration, receive at the opportune time undeserved helps, by whose aid they can fulfill the natural law. When for some time they have observed this law, God, according to the common opinion, kindly bestows on them, not from justice, but from mercy, certain actual graces of illumination; if they consent to these, they will be led step by step to faith, hope, charity, and justification; but once justified, they are equated with Christians, and can truly merit. - All these things indeed are set forth at length in the treatise concerning Grace.²

² Since in the present Treatise we are able to touch these things only in passing, the professor, according to various circumstances, will explain the same things more or less to his students.

87. After those things which we have set forth concerning the principles which produce a free act, it remains to inquire concerning the causes which influence the same, for increasing its liberty, or diminishing it, or wholly taking it away. Generally theologians treat only concerning the impediments of a free act, four of which are enumerated by St. Thomas: ignorance, concupiscence, violence, and fear. Yet elsewhere others are listed, concerning which it is useful to say a few things here, so that the confessor may be more equitable in judging the works of penitents. But we consider it more opportune here to treat not only concerning the impediments of liberty, but concerning the principal causes which influence it for diminishing or increasing it. Now certain causes influence the voluntary more proximately: 1. indeed directly in the intellect, and indirectly in the will, such as error and ignorance; 2. directly and principally in the will, such as the passions; 3. directly in the execution of volition, and indirectly in the intellect and will, such as violence. - But other causes influence the intellect and will more remotely, such as heredity and temperament, education, habit, and also certain morbid states affecting body or soul. Concerning these we must speak separately.

Since a free act depends on intellect and will, everything which affects either faculty by that very fact can benefit or harm liberty.

88. There are certain dispositions of mind and body in which man is not in possession of himself, and concerning which nothing special occurs to be said here, namely: the defect of reason in infants; but in adults, insanity whether total or partial (monomania), sleep whether full or semi-full, drunkenness, hallucination, diabolical obsession. In all these, if the use of reason is wholly lacking, liberty will be lacking; if some advertence remains, the act will be more or less free according to the very degree of cognition. - But since ignorance and error much more frequently influence human acts, these must be treated especially.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76; Suarez, disp. IV; Salmanticenses, op. cit., cap. XIV; St. Alphonsus, De act. hum., n. 26-29; Billuart, diss. I, art. 9; Bouquillon, n. 332-334; Ballerini P., n. 35-58; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du clerge, XX, 1898, p. 1153-1161; Didiot, Morale surnaturelle Fondamentale, n. 383-432.

89. (A) Notion. Ignorance in general is the lack of some knowledge in a subject otherwise capable; it is called negative, or simple nescience, when it is the lack of knowledge which we are not bound to acquire, for example, ignorance of medicine in a rustic; it is called privative if it is the lack of due knowledge, as is ignorance of theology in a priest; concerning the latter we treat here.

Ignorance differs from error, which, beyond the lack of knowledge, involves a judgment contrary to truth, as if someone thinks hatred of enemies to be something honorable. It differs also from inadvertence, which consists in this, that the mind does not actually attend to a matter, although it habitually knows it, as occurs in distractions: consequently inadvertence is the lack of actual attention, while ignorance denotes a habitual state. - But, in moral matters, the principles which we shall hand down concerning ignorance can be applied to error, forgetfulness, and inadvertence, with this distinction however, that inadvertence is more easily excused because of the weakness of the human mind.

90. (B) Division. (a) By reason of the object, ignorance is twofold: ignorance of law, when the law itself is unknown, for example if someone does not know that on the vigil of the Assumption fasting must be observed; and ignorance of fact, when someone does not know that the law, otherwise known, must be applied in the case, because, for example, he does not advert that this day is the vigil of the Assumption.¹

¹ Certain ones besides admit ignorance of the penalty attached to the delict, for example, if someone does not know that the reading of a book defending heresy is punished by excommunication: but this can be referred to ignorance of law.

91. (b) By reason of the subject, ignorance is: 1) vincible, and therefore culpable, when with moral diligence applied it can and ought to be driven away. The moral diligence of which there is question is not the highest diligence, but that which prudent persons are accustomed to apply in matters of this kind: for this ought to be diverse according to the various circumstances of person, thing, place, etc., nor can it be defined mathematically, but morally from the manner of acting of prudent persons in the same adjuncts. - Moreover, ignorance is not morally called vincible unless when the agent notices or at least suspects the obligation of putting it away, and voluntarily lets go the occasion of inquiring: for of what is unknown there is no desire.

Therefore there can be degrees in vincible ignorance; if someone deliberately wills ignorance, so that he may more freely violate the law, if perhaps it exists, this is called affected ignorance; for example, if someone doubting whether today one must fast does not wish to ask, although he easily can, lest perhaps he become conscious of the obligation of fasting. - But when someone omits due inquiry, not because he wishes to be ignorant of the matter, but from negligence, shame, lightness of soul, or another similar cause, the ignorance is called simply vincible; if no diligence or almost none has been applied, it is called crass or supine.

92. 2. Ignorance is called invincible, and therefore inculpable, when, with moral diligence applied, it cannot be expelled, and a fortiori that which is so rooted that not even a suspicion of inquiring arises. If knowledge could in no way have been acquired, the ignorance is absolutely invincible (concerning which, however, there is scarcely question in moral matters); if it could be put away only with difficulty and with extraordinary diligence, it is morally invincible. - Now that today there are many who labor under this ignorance in religious and moral matters, not only among rustics, but also among men otherwise learned in profane matters, those who have given labor to the sacred ministry for some time know very well. And this ignorance indeed is occupied not only with merely positive laws, ecclesiastical or divine, but also with the secondary principles of natural right.

93. (C) Another division, although of lesser moment, is found among theologians, namely into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent ignorance; this, however, is not opposed in its members, but is taken in a diverse way.

1. By reason of the work concerning which it is occupied, ignorance is antecedent when it is truly the cause of the work, so that the agent would not posit the action if he knew the truth; thus the hunter who kills a friend whom he thinks to be a wild animal, and certainly would not have killed him if he had known him to be a friend; - concomitant, when it is not the cause of the work, because the one operating is so disposed that he would posit the action even if he knew the matter: such is the hunter who kills an enemy whom he thinks to be a wild animal, but otherwise would have killed him if he had known.

2. By reason of the will, ignorance is antecedent when it precedes every act of the will, and therefore is altogether invincible, as is ignorance of fasting in him who by no means thinks of fasting; consequent, which is in some way willed, and consequently vincible, as it exists in him who, thinking about fasting, neglects to inquire concerning it, when he easily can.

94. (A) Ignorance morally invincible, whether actually or in the cause, removes the free, and therefore imputability, concerning that which is unknown. For, by force of the principle that nothing is willed unless previously known, we do not freely will that which we do not know; but that which is invincibly unknown is not known in itself, as is clear, nor even in the cause, since the ignorance is supposed to be invincible, and consequently cannot morally be dispelled.¹

¹ What is voluntary in itself and in the cause, and also imputability (responsabilite), will be set forth more fully where the morality of human acts is treated.

It is said concerning that which is unknown; for it can happen that the one operating perceives some morality of the act, although not the whole: thus one who kills an innocent person whom he does not know to be a priest is not indeed guilty of sacrilege, but of homicide, because he knowingly killed a man unjustly.

On this head, often children and the rude, who do dishonorable things, whose malice they do not well understand, are excused more or less from grave sin according to the degree of ignorance.

95. (B) Ignorance actually vincible does not remove the free, but diminishes it, at least if it is not affected. - It is said actually vincible, that it may be distinguished from ignorance which formerly was vincible, although here and now it is invincible.

(a) The reason for the former is that vincible ignorance, as is clear from the notion itself, supposes at least some cognition or thought concerning the obligation of inquiring; now he who neglects to inquire, when he is bound to do so, by that very fact freely intends, at least confusedly, the effects which are foreseen to follow from his action. Thus, if a hunter discharges a gun at some object, not knowing whether it is a wild animal or a man, he rather freely consents to homicide; if he thinks it is a wild animal, while suspecting it to be a man, he consents less freely, but nevertheless in some degree.

96. (b) The reason for the latter is that something is less free the less knowledge there is of it; but, in our case, there is only confused or probable knowledge, or even mere suspicion; therefore the free and the fault are diminished, and indeed the more so the less the cognition is.

It has been said at least if it is not affected; for more commonly theologians, after St. Thomas,¹ hold that affected ignorance does not diminish, but increases sin, since the agent intends to sin more freely. Yet some deny this with Lugo,² because, they say, it is worse to violate a known precept than not to wish to know it in order that it may be violated without remorse: for something of reverence and fear is shown in the second case. - In practice, the matter depends on the intention of the agent at that instant when he does not wish to inquire: if in reality he intends nothing except to sin more freely and boldly, his culpability is not diminished; but if he neglects to inquire from a certain reverence toward the law, which he fears to violate, the fault is diminished.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76, a. 4.

² Lugo, De Paenitentia, disp. XVI, n. 183.

97. (C) Ignorance here and now invincible, which nevertheless formerly was vincible, indeed removes the actual free and the free in itself, but leaves the voluntary in the cause.

For it can happen that ignorance was formerly vincible and culpable, without nevertheless being adverted to here and now; suppose, if a confessor has not sufficiently cultivated theology, or has for a long time and culpably interrupted the study of it, he can hand down an erroneous decision to a penitent, without being conscious of this error. In this case he is not free, nor does he incur sin at that instant in which he inadvertently deceives the penitent; but if, while he was studying theology, he was conscious of omitted diligence and foresaw, at least in a confused way, the evil effects that would follow from negligence, by that very fact he willed those effects, more or less freely and culpably according to the degree of cognition; and thus those effects are not actually and in themselves free, but only in the cause.

Hence, if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance formerly committed, by suitable penance and due diligence, he can be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.¹ Nevertheless, if even after penance he is ignorant of those things which are necessary for undertaking his office,² he ought to abstain from exercising it until he has acquired the necessary knowledge; for by freely exercising an office without competent knowledge, he would commit a new sin.

¹ Gury-Ballerini, t. I, note to n. 37; Bouquillon, nn. 277, 333.

² Here it is a question of competent knowledge, not of eminent knowledge, which is found in the most learned; the confessor, judge, physician, etc., who possess the former and use proportionate diligence, can exercise the office without fault, even if sometimes they err.

98. Corollary. Since the will is freer the more perfect cognition is, it is of the greatest interest to acquire true knowledge, especially of those things which are useful for living honorably and religiously. But because knowledge influences the will the more as it occurs more vividly to the agent, frequent reconsideration or meditation of noble things serves not a little for living rightly; for since the will is blind and is illuminated only by the intellect, he who thinks rightly is inclined to acting rightly; and by frequent meditation of honorable things the custom of living honorably is gradually formed.³ It is likewise very expedient to think seriously concerning the morality of the act in itself and in its effects before we act, so that, with all things carefully weighed, we may choose what is better.

³ Not only mystics, but also rationalists and positivists have recognized this utility of meditation, such as J. Payot, Education de la volonte, Paris, 1904, p. 92-134, and Fouillee, in the cited work, Les idees-forces.

The internal causes which principally move the will are the passions: they indeed influence the intellect, by disturbing the judgment more or less, but besides and especially they add to or diminish the powers of the will, by vehemently impelling it toward good or evil.

⁴ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 22-48; q. 6, a. 6-8; Suarez, disp. III; Senault, De l'usage des Passions, Paris, 1664; Billuart, Tr. de Passionibus, diss. I; idem, De Actibus hum., diss. I, art. 7-8; Meyer, I, n. 119-129; Bouquillon, n. 335-343; Alibert, Physiologie des Passions, Paris, 1827; Letourneau, Physiologie des Passions, Paris, 1868; Belouino, Des Passions, Paris, 1883; A. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, rendered into French by P. Le Monnier, Les Emotions et la volonte, Paris, 1885; Mercier, Psychologie, 6th ed., Louvain, 1904, n. 134-137; Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments, Paris, Alcan.

99. 1. Notion and division of the passions. (A) In a broad sense, passions are called any affections whatsoever of the soul, even merely internal ones. Among the common people, passion denotes any inordinate or excessive propensity of the will: in which sense avarice is called a passion.¹ Philosophically, passions commonly are called affections of the soul which arise from the sensitive appetite with some organic commotion of the body; thus love, hatred, anger, etc., move not only the sensitive appetite, but also the body; for example, the heart is dilated by joy, contracted by sadness.

¹ Certain modern philosophers make this notion their own, such as Rabier, Psychologie, 6th ed., Paris, 1898, p. 516.

100. Concerning the division of the passions, which by many moderns are also called emotions, philosophers do not agree.

The more common division is that which St. Thomas hands down, after Aristotle. Eleven are distinguished, six of which look to the concupiscible appetite and pursue delight: love and hatred, desire (or concupiscence) and horror or flight, joy and sadness; but five are referred to the irascible appetite, which tend toward arduous good and toward battle against obstacles: hope and despair, daring and fear (or dread), and also anger, to which there is no contrary.

The reason of the division is this: in man, as in animals, there are two kinds of inclinations, by which we are moved toward sensible good, according as it is simply delightful or arduous. By the concupiscible appetite we tend toward good insofar as it is delightful; namely by love we are inclined toward good, abstracting from whether it is present or absent; by desire we pursue good insofar as absent, and by joy we are delighted in present good; on the contrary, by hatred we absolutely turn away from evil, by horror we flee absent evil, and by sadness we grieve over present evil. But when it is a question of sensible arduous good, which we are able to attain only with strenuous effort, by the irascible appetite we pursue it: if the good, although arduous, is possible to obtain, hope arises; if it appears impossible, despair is born; if it is a question of future evil easily to be fled, daring arises; but if it appears difficult to repel, fear creeps in; finally if a present evil pressing for vengeance is present, anger blazes forth.

Bossuet shows brilliantly how all passions proceed from love and are caused from love;¹ St. Thomas and St. Augustine had already gone before him; for the latter says:² "Love longing to have what is loved is cupidity; but having this and enjoying it is gladness; fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and feeling it if it should happen is sadness."

¹ Bossuet, Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme, ch. I, n. 6.

² St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, lib. XIV, c. 7, apud Migne, P.L. XLI, 410.

101. Other divisions have been proposed by moderns, without nevertheless explaining the matter more clearly. Thus Descartes³ lists six original passions: admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and gladness. According to Hume,⁴ there are two species of passions: some direct: desire, aversion, sadness, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security; others indirect: pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, commiseration, malice, generosity. According to Ribot,⁵ there are five original ones, namely fear, anger, sensitive love (tendresse), love of oneself, sexual love: from which others are derived by a certain evolution.⁶

³ Descartes, Les passions de l'ame, 2nd part.

⁴ Hume, Tr. on human nature, B. II, p. I, sect. I.

⁵ Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments, Introduction.

⁶ Other divisions are set forth apud A. Bain, op. cit., pp. 68-75 and 568-581.

The subject of morality is man as a rational creature, able to know the moral law and conscious of being responsible for his acts and omissions.

Man's chief ethical faculty is free-will, i. e., the power to determine his own actions or to choose for himself between right and wrong (liberum arbitrium, vis electiva). By virtue of this faculty man is truly and properly the master of his own actions (dominus actuum suorum).

Only those acts are properly called human (actus humani, in opposition to actus hominis) of which man is master, i. e., which he performs with consciousness and free-will (actus morales). ¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 83, art. 3: "Choice is proper to free judgment. We are said to possess free judgment because we can accept one thing while refusing another, which is to choose; and therefore the nature of free judgment must be considered from choice." —Ibid., 1a 2ae, qu. 1, art. 1: "Man differs from other irrational creatures in this: that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are called properly human of which he is master. Man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be a faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are called properly human which proceed from a deliberate will. If any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of a man, but not properly human actions, since they do not belong to man insofar as he is man."

The liberty of the human will, which we take as an axiom from philosophy and Dogmatic Theology, ² is not merely a Catholic dogma,³ but a fundamental truth of revealed religion,⁴ and the pivot of all morality.⁵ Without free-will man could perform no ethical acts, either good or bad; there would be no moral responsibility, no imputability, no virtues or vices, neither guilt nor merit, and no redemption.⁶ To deny the freedom of the will, therefore, is to deny Christianity itself.

² See Readings at the end of this chapter.

³ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 5: "If anyone says that man's free will was lost and extinguished after Adam's sin, or that it is a thing only in name—indeed, a name without a reality—and finally a fiction introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be anathema."

⁴ Cfr. Gen. IV, 7; Deut. XXX, 19-20; Ecclus. XV, 14-18; Matth. XXIII, 37.—St. Augustine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, II, n. 2, says: "He has revealed to us through His Holy Scriptures that there is free choice of the will in man. ... The divine precepts themselves would not profit man unless he had free choice of the will, by which, in doing them, he might attain the promised rewards."—Ibid., n. 4: "What of the fact that in so many places God commands all His commandments to be kept and done? How does He command this if there is no free will?" (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 882 sq.)—Cfr. E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. II, Paris 1904, pp. 51 sqq.

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Comment, in Sent., II, dist. 24, qu. 3, art. 2: "The will is the principle of moral things, and therefore the moral order begins where dominion of the will is first found."

⁶ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, c. 1, n. 3: "Both punishment and reward would be unjust if man did not have a free will."—IDEM, De Vera Religione, c. 14, n. 27: "If we do evil not by the will, no one at all should be rebuked or admonished; and if these are removed, the Christian law and every discipline of religion must be taken away. Therefore sin is committed by the will. And since there is no doubt that sin is committed, I see that there should likewise be no doubt that souls possess free choice of the will." —IDEM, Enarrat. in Ps., CI, serm. 1, n. 11: "If You had not given me free choice and by this reason made me better than beasts, just condemnation would not follow me when I sinned." —IDEM, Retract., I, c. 9, n. 4. (See Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1241; XXXIV, 133; XXXVII, 1302; XXXII, 596).—Cfr. St. Jerome, Adv. Iovin., II, c. 3: "God created us with free choice, and we are drawn by necessity neither to virtues nor to vices. Otherwise, where there is necessity, there is no crown." (Cfr. ibid., XXIII, 286). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 83, art. 1: "Man possesses free choice; otherwise counsels, exhortations, precepts, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain."

Free-will is capable of development and cultivation, and hence is not the beginning but the end of moral endeavor. Man, by "going from virtue to virtue," and by ''growing unto salvation," ⁷ is called to attain "moral liberty," to develop into "a perfect man unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ," and thereby to reach that blessed freedom which is "the glory of the children of God." 8 Moreover, free-will is not absolute but relative and limited in various ways:—metaphysically, by man's dependence upon the will of His Creator, and ethically, by certain natural, individual, personal, and social factors which constitute as many intrinsic determinants of liberty.

⁷ Ps. LXXXIII, 8; Phil. III, 13; 1 Pet. II, 2.—Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 11.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. ⁸ sqq., 13, 83. —C. Gutberlet, Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner, Fulda 1893, pp. 26 sqq. —M. Maher, S.J., Psychology; Empirical and Rational, 4th ed., London 1900, pp. 394 sqq. —IDEM, in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 259 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, New York 1902, pp. 249 sqq. —IDEM, Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill), London 1906. —W. von Rohland, Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner, Leipsic 1905. —A. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. I, Paris 1904. —H. Gründer, S.J., Free Will, the Greatest of the Seven World-Riddles, St. Louis 1911. —E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 329 sqq. —W. McDonald, Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1910, Ch. VIII. —J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, New York 1919, pp. 21 sqq.

⁸ 2 Cor. III, 17; Eph. IV, 13; Rom. VIII, 21.

I. Man was created for both time and eternity. Here on earth, where he is to prepare himself for the life beyond, he is subject to the same laws as other terrestrial creatures. However, since he holds first rank among, and was made to rule over these creatures,¹ he is empowered to use them as means to achieve his own particular ends.²

¹ Gen. I, 26 sqq.; II, 19 sq.; IX, 2.—Cfr. St. Augustine, Tract, in loa., 33, c. 6; Vergil, Aeneis, VI, 727; Sophocles, Antigone, 332 sqq.; A. Jakob, Der Mensch, die Krone der irdischen Schöpfung, Freiburg 1890.

² 1 Cor. III, 22.

But man is not created for this world alone. He has an immortal soul,³ and is bound so to employ his earthly sojourn that he may attain eternal beatitude. This is the express will of God, which man cannot change, and to that extent his freedom is limited by his supernatural end. However, this limitation by no means abrogates free-will, but rather elevates it to a higher plane of perfection.⁴

³ Rom. XIV, 7 sq.; Acts XVII, 28; Job XIV, 5 sqq.

⁴ Job I, 21; Prov. XXVII, 1; Luke XII, 20; 1 Tim. VI, 7; Jas. IV, 13 sqq.—St. Polycarp, Ep. ad Phil, IV, 1 (ed. Funk, Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 301). —Tertullian, Ad Uxorem, I, c. 7: "Beyond these things, I advise you to reflect that no one is taken from this world except by God's will, if not even a leaf falls from a tree without God's will. The same One who brings us into the world must also lead us out." (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 68).—Horace, Carm., I, 4, 13; 28, 15.

II. Though he is the lord of the physical universe, man is in several respects subject to nature.

1. His moral life is influenced by natural causes. Certain physical disturbances are regularly followed by definite phenomena in the ethical domain. Statistics show how greatly men are dependent on climate, the weather, seasonal changes, and other physical agencies. They are compelled to battle with nature for their existence and well-being, and this struggle involves a constant expenditure of physical as well as intellectual energy.

2. Man's control of his own actions is limited by the life of the body.⁵ His intellectual knowledge depends upon the senses. Through the organs of the body man receives impressions by the aid of which he forms mental images, concepts or ideas. Moreover, the intellectual and moral life of man is influenced by various bodily conditions, e. g., the need of food and sleep, the sexual instinct, disease. Man has to devote considerable thought and attention to the care of his body and is frequently compelled to combat its impulses. The body has been compared to a dead weight or a prison impeding the intellect in its movements. But this comparison is one-sided. The body is an essential constituent of the compound, man. It is the organ of the soul, subject to its elevating influence. Animated and, as it were, spiritualized by the soul, the body becomes the source of sentiments conducive to moral improvement. ⁶ The life of the body, moreover, furnishes the soul with many occasions for practicing virtue and acts as a strong counterpoise to pride and self-conceit.

⁵ Wisd. IX, 15.—Cfr. J. B. Hirscher, Die christliche Moral, Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 174 sqq.

⁶ St. John Chrysostom, Orat. de Angusta Porta, i, says that the body is the harp of the soul; the spirit moves the strings, and if this is done in the right way, the instrument gives forth the beautiful melody of virtue. (Migne, P. G., LI, 41).

Whereas the Old Testament emphasizes man's mastery over the earth, the New insists that the body be kept holy because it is a temple of the Holy Ghost.⁷

⁷ 1 Cor. I, 19; III, 16; Rom. VIII, 11; VI, 16-22.

READINGS. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit. 2nd ed., Münster 1908.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 169 sqq. —Ellsworth Huntington, World Power and Evolution, Yale University Press, 1919. —J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, New York 1919, pp. 30 sqq.

Man as an individual is constituted by a material body and a spiritual soul,¹ and endowed with impulses and inclinations which give rise to definite temptations, virtues, and vices. The individual determinants of free-will are chiefly three: 1. AGE. —Age exercises a notable influence on the human organism and offers to the will a special field in which to exert itself. Though the individual continues the same, and his personality is essentially unaffected by age, the differences wrought by the latter are so far-reaching that moral science must take account of them.

¹ See Scholastic Psychology and Pohle-Preuss, The Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 124 sqq.

Each age has its peculiar ethical tasks and problems. ² In infancy man is almost completely ruled by egoism, but the egoism of the child has a redeeming feature in his ready submission to God (faith) and parents (filial love, pietas).³ In early childhood the operation of the will, so far as it acts independently, is negative rather than positive, characterized by a tendency to obstinacy, destructiveness, and cruelty.

² 1 Cor. XIII, 11; Tit. II, 1-6; John II, 12-14.

³ Cfr. Matth. XVIII, 1-6; XIX, 13-15; Mark X, 13-16; Matth. XI, 25. —St. Jerome, Ep., 52 (al. 2), n.

³ (Migne, P. L., XXII, 528); W. Preyer and K. L. Schafer, Die Seele des Kindes, 8th ed., Leipsic 1908; R. Gaupp, Die Psychologie des Kindes, Leipsic 1908.

The period of adolescence is marked by a struggle between liberty and control. Though very receptive at first, the boy soon begins to assert himself against his elders. He is inclined to follow the bent of his sensual nature, to enjoy himself, to substitute knowledge for faith, to criticize and doubt, to engage in airy speculations, to waver to and fro between optimism and pessimism, hope and despair. Over against these tendencies are the faculty and inclination to labor, to cultivate tender sentiments, and to seek noble ideals. Unless these faculties are properly trained, the young man is liable to become an egoist, a dreamer, and a sentimentalist.⁴

⁴ Cfr. Sophocles, Antigone, 705 sqq.; Horace, Ep., II, 3, 156 sqq. (De Arts Poetica)', I, 2, 67 sq.; Homer, Ilias, III, 108; IV, 320.

Manhood, the age of maturity, is marked by full control of the vital energies, by a certain fixity of both the bodily and the intellectual type, and by a preponderance of the active over the receptive faculties. The peculiar dangers that beset middle life are pride, vainglory, isolation, heartlessness and obtuseness of mind resulting from untoward experiences. These perils can be avoided by cultivating a strong sense of duty and devoting oneself to the service of God and one's fellowmen and to the contemplation of nature. ⁵ Thus each succeeding period of life has its peculiar ethical stamp; each its special dangers and pitfalls; each its own capacity for virtue. This truth is exemplified in the lives of the saints, who belong to every age, clime, and condition.

⁵ Cfr. Job XII, 12-13; Prov. XVI, 31; Ecclus. XXV, 6-8; Wisd. IV, 8-9.—J. Ehring, Des Priesters Greisenalter, Münster 1896, pp. 3 sqq., 59 sqq.

2. TEMPERAMENT. —By temperament we understand the peculiar physical and mental character of an individual. The ancients enumerated four types —the sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric (or bilious), and melancholic. None of these temperaments is found unmixed in any one individual. Nevertheless, as the temperaments contain the germs of definite inclinations and tendencies, a study of them is of great importance for the formation of character. The temperaments undoubtedly influence the will, though by no means irresistibly. Besides, every man is more or less responsible for the faults peculiar to his temperament. Hence arises the duty of acquiring control over one's temperament and its idiosyncrasies. In this matter the Apostles furnish splendid models.⁶

⁶ Cfr. A. Fouillee, Temperament et Caractere selon les Individus, les Sexes et les Races, Paris 1895; P. Michel, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Vol. I, pp. 445 sqq.

3. NATURAL TALENT. —Talent is a special aptitude or faculty for effective action along certain lines. Talents differ and are differently distributed. Some men are more talented than others. Some are highly gifted in more than one respect, while others scarcely show any trace of talent at all. The presence or absence of special aptitudes necessarily influences man's intellectual and moral development, and hence is an ethical factor of considerable importance. A man's choice of vocation and his social standing are largely conditioned by his talents, and experience teaches that, as a general rule at least, the moral sense develops in proportion to the growth of intelligence.

However, while talent has a place among the individual determinants of free-will, its influence is by no means compelling. Whether endowed with many talents or few, great or small, man remains master of his actions. There is no hard and fast relation between morality and intellectual culture. Intellectually inferior men sometimes attain to great moral perfection. Moreover, man's ethical development depends upon other factors besides natural aptitudes. Even infidel savants admit that the low mental and moral state of many primitive races is the result, not of natural inferiority, but of a process of depravation.⁷ For some reason or other their natural faculties and aptitudes were not properly developed. The Catholic Church teaches that every normal human being is able to distinguish good from evil and to observe the more general or absolutely necessary precepts of the Gospel. It is this conviction that inspires Catholic missionary activity among the heathen. History testifies that nations which have attained to some degree of culture are more easily converted than those completely immersed in savagery.

⁷ Cfr. W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker, Vol. I, Paderborn 1885, pp. 3 sqq.; C. Gutberlet, Der Mensch, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1903, pp. 474 sqq.

READINGS. —J. B. Hirscher, Die christliche Moral, Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 251 sqq.; Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 268 sqq., 418 sqq. —C. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, Freiburg 1904, pp. 99 sqq., 131 sqq. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, 2nd ed., Münster 1908, pp. 132 sqq. —M. Maher, S.J., Psychology, 4th ed., London 1900, p. 393. —T. Pesch, S.J., Instit. Psychologicae, § 1078 sq. —O. Brüssau, Die Temperamente und das christliche Leben, Hamburg 1906. —M. Maher, S.J., in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. II, p. 585.—A. C. O'Neil, ibid., XIV, 8. —A. Waldron, O.P., ibid., XV, 474. —F. Muszinski, Die Temperamente, Paderborn 1907. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 65 sqq. —Fr. a Barbens, O. M. Cap., Introductio Pathologica ad Studium Theologiae Moralis, Tarracona 1917.

Man is not merely an individual, he is also a social being, and as such his liberty of choice is influenced by several other factors in addition to those already enumerated. They are: 1. SEX. —Sex is the sum-total of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish the male from the female organism. Its influence is not limited to the body, but extends to the intellect and the will, and consequently affects the moral character.¹

¹ See Readings at the end of this Section.

The male sex, generally speaking, possesses greater spontaneity, energy, and strength than the female. These advantages are counterbalanced by certain defects, e. g., lack of delicacy and sentiment. The female sex, on the other hand, enjoys greater receptivity, a more delicate sense of modesty, a more intense religious sentiment² and greater patience, but is less strong in resisting evil,³ and more prone to fall.⁴

² The liturgical phrase, "devotus femineus sexus," be it remarked in passing, is merely a synonym for "virgines Deo devotae," i. e. the members of female religious orders.

³ Cfr. 1 Pet. III, 7, and the hymn for Matins in the Commune Virginum of the Roman Breviary.

⁴ Cfr. R. Stade, Aus der Gefängnisseelsorge, Leipsic 1901, pp. 56 sqq., 105 sqq.; IDEM, Frauentypen aus dem Gefängnisleben (1903), pp. 40 sqq., 57 sqq., 67 sqq.; H. F. Beneke, Gefängnisstudien, Hamburg 1903, pp. 13 sq., 76 sqq.

But though sex is a determinant of morality, it does not neutralize free-will. For in the first place the human soul or spirit is non-sexual ⁵ and the same law binds both male and female. "There is one law for men and women." as the Schoolmen put it. The assumption of a so-called double standard of morals is unchristian.⁶ Secondly, all virtues are attainable by both sexes, and neither enjoys any intellectual or moral privilege that is denied the other.⁷ Third, the sexual relations of men and women, unlike those of irrational brutes, are not governed by physical necessity, but controlled by the will,⁸ which can ennoble and spiritualize them.⁹

⁵ Cfr. St. Ambrose, Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., II, n. 28: "The soul, which has no sex." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1562); St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 93, art. 6, ad 2: "The image of God is common to both sexes, since it is according to the mind, in which there is no distinction of sexes."

⁶ Cfr. 1 Cor. VII, 3-4: "Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and the wife also in like manner to the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife." —Cfr. the Shepherd of Hermas, Mand. IV, 8: "This is the course of action for wife and husband." Ibid., 10: "For this reason it was enjoined on you to live by yourselves, whether husband or wife." (Ed. Funk, Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 476, 8 and 13; Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers, Vol. II, London 1913, p. 81). —The Corpus Iuris Canonici quotes the following from St. Ambrose (C. 4, C. XXXII, qu. 4): "A man is not permitted what a woman is not permitted. The same chastity is required of the husband as of the wife." And this from Innocent I (c. 23, C. XXXII, qu. 5): "The Christian religion condemns adultery on equal grounds in both sexes." St. Jerome in speaking on the same subject centuries before the days of Gratian insists on the striking contrast between the pagan double code of morality for men and women, and the single or equal code of Christian teaching. (Ad Oceanum, Ep. LXXVII). "The laws of the Caesars are one thing," he writes, "those of Christ another: Papinian commands one thing, our Paul another." And after describing the larger licence the Roman laws allowed to men and husbands, he sets against this the Christian code of equality: "Among us, what is not permitted to women is equally not permitted to men; and the same servitude is assessed on equal terms." Such is the contrast presented, in the judgment of St. Jerome, at the close of the fourth century, between the Christian and Pagan ideas on this question. And yet, after the lapse of fifteen hundred years, a candid historian of morals is fain to confess that the pagan idea still predominates in modern Europe.

⁷ Cfr. Gal. III, 28; Matth. XXVIII, 10; Acts XVII, 12, 34; XVIII, 2. —St. Ambrose, Expos. Evang. sec. Lucam, IV, n. 57: "The Lord came to heal both sexes, and he who 'was created first' had to be healed first; nor was she who had sinned more through fickleness of mind than through depravity to be passed over." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1629).—St. Augustine, Serm., 12 (al. 16 de Diversis), n. 12: "Wishing to bring both sexes to the hope of renewal and restoration, He chose the male sex, in which He would be born, and the female, through which He would be born." —IDEM, Serm., 190 (al. 61 de Diversis), n. 2: "Since He Himself assuredly created both sexes, that is, male and female, He therefore also wished by being born to honor both sexes, which He had come to liberate. ... The Lord, coming to seek what had been lost, wished to commend both by honoring them, because both had been lost. Therefore in neither sex ought we to do injury to Christ: the Lord's Nativity commended both to the hope of salvation. The honor of the male sex is in the flesh of Christ; the honor of the female is in the mother of Christ. The grace of Jesus Christ conquered the serpent's cunning." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 106, 1008).—St. Leo the Great, Serm., 74 (al. 72), c. 3: "For this faith throughout the whole world not only men but also women, and not only immature boys but also tender virgins, contended even to the shedding of their blood." (Migne, P. L., LIV, 398).—In the benediction of the baptismal font in the Roman Missal we read: "And may mother grace bring forth into one infancy all those whom either sex distinguishes in body or age distinguishes in time."

⁸ Cfr. Matth. XIX, 11-12: "All men take not this word, but they to whom it is given. For there are eunuchs, who were born so from their mother's womb: and there are eunuchs, who were made so by men: and there are eunuchs, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He that can take, let him take it." —Rom. VIII, 12-14: "Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh. For if you live according to the flesh, you shall die: but if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." —Cfr. 1 Cor. VII, 25 sqq.

⁹ Matth. XXII, 30: "For in the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married; but shall be as the angels of God in heaven." — Cfr. Tertullian, Ad Uxorem, I, c. 1 (ed. P. Leopold, II, 62 sq.) —St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XXII, c. 17 (Migne, P. L., XLI, 778 sq.); IDEM, Serm., 243 (al. 6 de Divers.), n. 6 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 1146). —St. Jerome, Adv. Iovin., I, c. 36 (P. L., XXIII, 261).

2. EDUCATION. —Education signifies the process of imparting and drawing out (e-ducere) knowledge, skill or discipline of character. As society is at present constituted, education is imparted partly in the home and partly at school. The early training a child receives at home is of supreme importance for his future welfare because it leaves upon the mind deep traces of good or evil.¹⁰ Whether a man will be virtuous or vicious, whether his life will redound to the advantage or detriment of his fellowmen, depends largely upon the character of the domestic circle in which he spends his youth. No other factor, agency, or institution can fully supplant a good Christian home.

¹⁰ Cfr. Plato, Politia, II, 17: For it is then especially that a character is molded and takes on the impression which anyone may wish to stamp upon each one. —Cfr. Horace, Carm., IV, 4, 29, 32 sqq.: "The brave are born of the brave and good; ... but instruction advances the inborn power, and right cultivation strengthens the heart: whenever either is lacking, faults disgrace what was well-born."

In spite of all this, however, home-life does not give a necessary predetermination for either good or evil. The will remains free, and even the most excellent training sometimes fails to bend it in the right direction. It happens that good parents have bad children,¹¹ whereas, on the other hand, a naturally good child will often preserve its innocence in spite of a bad example.

¹¹ " Filii heroum nequam."

The school supplements and completes the training received at home, and its influence on the formation of character is second only to that of the family.¹² Its chief defect is that it cannot give to each child the individual care required, and hence the influence of the school upon the moral character is less pronounced than that of the home.

¹² Cfr. the Greek proverb: Πολλοὶ μαθηταὶ κρείσσονες τῶν διδασκάλων. —Many pupils are better than their masters.

3. SOCIETY. —Human society is the sum-total of living men, considered as an aggregate, of which each individual is a member. Every man is more or less a child of his time, nation, and country, —not merely in a physical sense, i. e., by the external characteristics due to soil, climate and national type; but also intellectually and ethically, in regard to his views of right and wrong, his likes and dislikes, etc.¹³

¹³ Cfr. Ps. XVII, 26-27: "Withthe holy, thou wilt be holy; and with the innocent man thou wilt be innocent; and with the elect thou wilt be elect: and with the perverse thou wilt be perverted." —Pope Hadrian VI composed this epitaph for his tombstone: "Alas, how much it matters into what times the virtue of even the best man may fall!"

The relation existing between man's free acts and the social environment in which he lives (milieu) has been carefully investigated in recent times. It was found that certain crimes and misdemeanors recur more or less regularly under certain conditions. This observation led Lombroso and others to conclude that the law of physical causation applies to ethics and that human conduct is governed by necessity.¹⁴ With this conclusion we cannot agree, for three reasons:

¹⁴ Cesare Lombroso's writings in particular, some of which have been translated into English, have exercised a malign influence on contemporary thought. Cfr. Krauss, Der Kampf gegen die Verbrechensursachen, pp. 17 sqq.; R. Frank, Die Lehre Lombrosos, Tübingen 1908. — Enrico Ferri, another popular author, contends that crime is "a biologico-social abnormality," which has "its origin in an anti-social biological constitution, cosmic or physical," and is "the resultant of anthropological, cosmic, and social factors." (Cfr. Criminal Sociology by Enrico Ferri, tr. by J. I. Kelly, Boston 1917)- Ferri too often makes words serve in place of ideas. Put to the logical test, his system fails completely. Cfr. Charles Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Study, London 1920.

a) That men think, feel, calculate, and act alike under similar conditions is no proof that they lack liberty of choice. b) At all times there have been many who, under identically the same circumstances, have attained a degree of moral perfection that raised them far above their fellows. c) Statistics are limited to external acts, whereas the individual inclinations and dispositions as well as the intentions and motives from which individual actions spring, and which therefore constitute the true essence of morality, elude observation and inquiry. All that science can demonstrate is to what extent men observe the law or, rather, in what degree they are given to immoral practices. Even those acts which are common to a large number of men and can therefore be statistically tabulated, remain rational and ethically free—actus humani—regardless of social and economic environment. ¹⁵ The science of what is called moral (or, more correctly, criminal) statistics devotes its attention entirely to vice and crime. Virtue, as a rule, makes no noise. An ancient Chinese proverb says: "If you do a good deed, your neighbor will never find it out; but if you commit a crime, everybody for a hundred miles around will talk about it." To regard only the evil that men do will never lead to an adequate knowledge of human nature.

¹⁵ Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Willensfreiheit, pp. 40 sqq.

READINGS. —Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 163; XV, 687. —A. Rosier, C.SS.R., Die Frauenfrage vom Standpunkt der Natur, der Geschichte und der Offenbarung, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1907, pp. 18 sqq., 26 sqq. —H. Marion, Psychologie de la Femme, Paris 1900.—Ch. Turgeon, Le Féminisme Français, Vol. II, Paris 1902, pp. 152 sqq. —C. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, pp. 138 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 69 sqq.

L. Desers, L'Education Morale et ses Conditions, Paris 1909. —W. Toischer, Die Macht der Schule, Prague 1897.—F. W. Foerster, Schule und Charakter, 7th ed., Zurich 1909.

Not all human actions are ethically free. There are various degrees of self-determination corresponding to the measure of knowledge with which a man acts.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 59, art. 3: "Some things do not act from any judgment, but as if acted upon and moved by others, just as an arrow is moved toward its end by the archer. Other things act by a certain judgment, but not a free one, as do irrational animals. For a sheep flees a wolf by a certain judgment by which it considers the wolf harmful to itself; but this judgment is not free in the sheep, but implanted by nature. Only that which has intellect can act by free judgment, insofar as it knows the universal character of the good, from which it can judge this or that to be good. Hence wherever there is intellect, there is free choice."

A spontaneous or reflex action is one produced by the will without due knowledge. A spontaneous act, as such, is not ethical. "Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum." To the category of spontaneous actions belong the primary perceptions of the external and internal senses, the first stirrings of the imagination and the memory, as well as all acts performed in the state of sleep or disease, under external compulsion or in ignorance.

2. VOLUNTARY AND FREE ACTS. —An act is voluntary and free (voluntarium et liberum) if it is performed by the will with knowledge and deliberation. ² For an act to be voluntary and free, therefore, two conditions must cooperate: a) The act itself must be produced by an internal principle, i. e., the will; b) The person acting must have some knowledge of the end towards which his act tends.

² "Actus procedens a principio intrinseco seu a voluntate cum cognitione finis." —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 1.

Acts performed under external compulsion, therefore, or without knowledge of their purpose, cannot be called free.

In order that an act be entirely free, it must, moreover, be perceived by the agent in all its I parts and circumstances. When even one circumstance is unknown to the agent, the act is not free with regard to this circumstance. For instance, if a man appropriates to himself an object, not knowing that it belongs to another, he is not a thief; or if he knowingly possesses himself of the property of another without being aware of the fact that it is devoted to a sacred purpose, he is not guilty of sacrilege.

There are different degrees of voluntariness, according to the measure of reflection accompanying an act. (1) An act is positively voluntary (voluntarium positivum) if it is directly intended; negatively (voluntarium negativum) if it involves an inexcusable or culpable omission.³

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 71, art. 5, ad 2: "Not willing itself can be called voluntary, insofar as it is within man's power to will and not to will."

(2) An act is perfectly voluntary (voluntarium perfectum) if it proceeds from the will with full knowledge and deliberation; it is imperfectly voluntary (voluntarium imperfectum) if the knowledge and deliberation are not full.

(3) An act is immediately voluntary (voluntarium elicitum) if it is produced directly by the will; it is mediately voluntary (voluntarium imperatum) if it is dictated by the will and performed by some other faculty of mind or body.

Usefulness. By accurate notions the distinct knowledge of things is prepared for the intellect. Especially to be attended to are the notions of the commanded act and the elicited act, and of moral liberty.

The notion of a human act. An act is called human insofar as it is voluntary, that is, insofar as it proceeds from the will, with advertence of reason, toward human finality.

For it belongs to the specific dignity of the rational animal that he act by conscious reason and will. The acts by which we seem to operate in a way similar to the other living beings have customarily been called acts of man. Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 1, art. 1.

Therefore a fully human act is a fully voluntary act.

In our present life, an act is at the same time human and free. For in heaven the most fully voluntary act of adhering to God, our beatific end, cannot be psychologically free.

For we know from philosophy that a psychologically free agent is one who, all things required for acting being posited, can do or omit the action (liberty of contradiction), and can choose this action or a different one (liberty of specification).

Whether an act can be free without some attention to finality, or to the order of reason; or whether, when only temporal utilities are adverted to, then we necessarily embrace the greater utility: this is disputed. Those who think that this attention is not required admit human acts which are not moral. We, as is evident from our very definition of a human act, rather hold the contrary side with St. Thomas, l.c.; cf. Suarez, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum, d. 1, s. 1, n. 9, 10.

¹ Recently Victor Frins, S.J., treats the matter fully and learnedly in De actibus humanis, 3 vols., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1897-1904.

The notion of a moral act. An act is called moral insofar as it pertains to morals, or to the manner and custom of human life. Therefore acts are formally moral insofar as they give quality and value to life in rational estimation ¹.

According to St. Thomas, the genus of morals begins where dominion of the will is first found. Wherefore all human acts are at the same time moral. Cf. 1, 2, q. 18, art. 5, 9; and q. 19, art. 1, ad 3.

Therefore there will also be a twofold division of human acts: one psychological, by which they are considered in their physical constitution, or as acts; the other moral, by which they are considered in their rational estimation, or as human. A third division, from efficacy, is not common to all acts.

¹ In explaining the notion of morality, theologians labor rather considerably. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 93.

I. Psychological division of human acts. 1. Human acts are internal or external. The former are completed by internal powers, and do not appear outwardly in any way: to think, to imagine. The latter either are manifested by some sensible sign, or proceed to external powers: words by which interior affections are expressed; genuflection for adoring.

Strictly speaking, the act which is called external ought to be called mixed: for unless the will had a part in it, it would not be human.

2. Acts are natural or supernatural. The former are done by the natural powers alone, with the ordinary concurrence of the First Cause; supernatural acts are done with the aid of grace transferring the act to the supernatural order.

Moreover, graces are granted which are called medicinal, insofar as they confer strength for avoiding sins. Yet are they purely medicinal, so that, when they are given to unbelievers, acts consonant with these graces do not transcend the natural order? Many, perhaps most, admit such graces as purely medicinal; we rather incline to the negative side.

3. Human acts are elicited or commanded.

To command is to move someone toward doing something, by intimating or announcing (proposing) to him the thing to be done, as if you were to say: Do this. We can command ourselves and others. Yet others only if they are inferior to us; and then the external manifestation of our will is necessary.

Now acts are elicited or commanded in a twofold way.

a) With attention to their efficient causality, elicited acts are acts which, commanded by no other act, are consummated in the will itself which determined itself to acting: such can be an act of love of God. Commanded acts, on the contrary, are those which, from the command of the will, are effected by other powers, whether internal or external, indeed even by the will itself. Think of the various acts of divine worship which the will exercises through mind and body: prayer, psalmody, inclinations of the head.

b) With attention to final causality, or motive, acts are called elicited with respect to the proximate motive; commanded, with respect to another motive by which the agent is moved to perform the act under its proximate motive: as if from fear you were to make an act of charity.

Since the question concerns final causality, not efficient causality, a nobler action can be commanded by an inferior one. But it is clear that, for the command to be efficacious, the powers for making the nobler act must be at hand, or, in the example alleged, grace for making an act of charity.

An act can be done under its own proper motive, and also simply under a nobler motive. Thus, a poor man asks alms of me. I can bestow alms upon him from mere charitable benevolence; and the same charity can command in me an affection of mercy or compassion, under which, with charity commanding, I bestow the alms. In the latter case the act is strictly commanded; in the former, only broadly, because not mercy itself, but charity alone, is exercised in it.

Moral division. As moral, human acts can be right or depraved, according as they are done according to the order of reason, or apart from or against that order.

They are licit or illicit, according as they are consonant with a law that commands or even counsels, or are repugnant to a law that commands.

They are good or evil, with attention to the proportion which they have to the agent, to whom they can be fitting or unfitting.

We do not add indifferent acts, because, as they are received in the subject, they cannot affect him except well or badly. Yet those acts are called indifferent which, with attention to their object or genus, cannot yet be denominated good or evil.

Insofar as they are referred to another, the same acts are imputable unto praise or blame, unto reward or punishment, and consequently meritorious or demeritorious.

Moral liberty. Just as psychological liberty coheres with the psychological account of a human act, so moral liberty is connected with the moral account of the same act.

This, however, is understood in two ways.

1. In the more frequent use, moral liberty denies an obligation of the will: I have moral liberty of praying, studying, walking.

2. In the less frequent use, it denies an impediment of the will, when, as much as the will itself wishes, so much can it unfold itself. Therefore it denies those several servitudes, more or less full, of concupiscences or of bodily weight, which we have to undergo with groaning, as when we complain that the mind was lacking to us for rising at the appointed hour.

This moral liberty has been wounded by original sin, yet not destroyed. Therefore the proposition was condemned that, in the present state, man, left to himself, would have power only for sinning. Cf. propositions 25, 27 and 65 of Baius, among the propositions condemned by St. Pius V, respectively as "heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous, and offensive to pious ears." 1 Oct. 1567. Prop. 25: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." Prop. 65: "Only by Pelagian error can some use of free will be admitted as good or not evil; and he who so thinks and teaches does injury to the grace of Christ." Prop. 27: "Free will, without the aid of the grace of God, has power only for sinning." (Denz., n. 1025, 1917, and 1065.)

Wherefore the love of charity, in heaven, will be at the same time psychologically necessary and morally supremely free: by loving God there, the will perfectly effects what it wills to effect.

Division of certain acts from efficacy. Not all acts, but not a few, are done less for their own sake than for a further efficacy: thus the buyer and the seller make a contract of sale in order to have the thing or the money. These acts are distinguished as valid or invalid. The former have what is essentially required for that efficacy; the latter lack an essential element. Valid acts themselves are, some, rescindable by human authority: for example, several contracts, on account of injury to the other party; others cannot be rescinded; and this either absolutely, as a consummated marriage, or less absolutely, as a ratified marriage, which, by power divinely conferred, can be destroyed by the Supreme Pontiff for a just cause.

Concerning not a few acts, questions of no small importance arise in law and in moral theology: whether they are invalid ipso facto and from the beginning, and by what law, divine or human; or whether they can be weakened only by the sentence of a judge or by the authority of a legitimate superior.

Not every valid act is licit: for instance, a marriage made against a legitimate prohibition; nor is every invalid act illicit: for instance, a testament lacking form. Yet in ecclesiastical law an invalid act must be said to be per se prohibited.

Various things to be noted. 1. The will, both by acting and by omitting an act, can observe or violate the order of reason. Wherefore, under the name of human act comes also a conscious and free omission, which can be good and meritorious, evil and deserving of punishments.

2. Although we refer human acts to the will, the intellect also has its own parts in these acts. No understanding is mere understanding, no willing mere willing; but each faculty, in various degree, conspires in every action.

3. Nor do acts exist separated as we consider them; but they are prepared in a certain continuous series of actions, and are completed by various consequences. None is without antecedent roots, none without subsequent effects. But no less than physical science, moral science must estimate continuous motion as an infinite series of disjoined or momentary motions, so that in some imperfect way it can know and explore them.

Arrangement of the treatise. The human act is essentially voluntary. In our present condition it is at the same time free, moral, and imputable. Yet per se it is not repugnant to its essence that it be psychologically necessary; and we have adduced the example of the beatific vision. Likewise the observance of precepts was psychologically necessary to Christ. For this reason liberty, morality, and imputability unto merit or punishment ought rather to be called properties of the human act as it is done by a wayfarer. Nevertheless liberty is joined more closely with voluntariety, so that a separate exposition of liberty and voluntariety would be without usefulness and not without inconvenience. Therefore this will be the arrangement of the treatise, that we treat: 1. Of the human act as voluntary and free; 2. Of the impediments of the human act; 3. Of the human act as moral; 4. Of the human act as imputable.

I. A human act, under which name also omission comes, is an act which proceeds from the will with advertence of reason. In this life this act is psychologically free; according to the estimation of reason, it qualifies our life, whence it is called moral; and, according as it is referred to another, it is meritorious or demeritorious.

II. Psychologically it is distinguished, with attention to the executing power, as internal or external; with attention to the subjective principle, as natural or supernatural. With attention to its consummation in the will or in a power moved by the will, or also with attention to the proximate or remote motive under which it is done, it is called elicited or commanded.

III. As moral, an act can be, with attention to the order of reason, right or depraved; with attention to law, licit or illicit; with attention to proportion to the agent, good or evil (in the subject, none is indifferent); with attention to relation to another, meritorious or demeritorious.

With this notion is connected liberty, which is called moral, insofar as it signifies either licitness or human possibility.

IV. With attention to further efficacy, some acts are valid, others invalid. Valid acts can be rescindable or not. An invalid act is not necessarily illicit, nor is a licit act always valid.

V. The intellect does not act without the will, and vice versa; nor do acts exist separately from the continuous actuation of human energy; and none fails to flow into the following disposition.

VI. The reason for the order to be followed is established.

Usefulness. In moral theology one must frequently recur to the divisions of the voluntary, especially in questions on imputation, on sins, on chastity and the opposed vices, on laws, and on the sacraments. It is of the greatest importance to possess a distinct notion of intention, election, and permission; and accurately to separate the virtual, habitual, and interpretative voluntary, or that presumed for the future. The conditions of liberty must be known, so that the impediments of the human act may be better understood.

I. The notion of the voluntary. The voluntary is "that whose principle is in the agent himself, he knowing the particulars in which the action is" ¹; or, as St. Thomas says more briefly (2), "that whose principle is within, with the addition of knowledge."

Moreover this voluntary is divided: from the object, from the mode by which it attains the object, from its figure or subjective account of being, from its manifestation, and finally from its objective perfection.

¹ Aristotle, Ethic., 3, c. 3. - (2) 1, 2, q. 6, art. 1.

II. Divisions. 1. From the object. Since the will is a rational appetite, it follows the formal presentation of end and means, so that an act has some acts concerning the end, others concerning the means.

a) Concerning the end there can be: simple willing, or complacency in an object which is apprehended as fitting to the subject, or lovable in itself (St. Th., 1, 2, q. 8).

Then intention, in some way prosecutive of the thing. For an end is "that for the sake of which something is done."

Then fruition, that is, rest in the end obtained or the good possessed ¹. In its fruition, the will approves, and holds as ratified, the pursuit of the end (or the efforts made) and its attainment.

b) Concerning a means or means there can be: consent, by which one adheres to a judgment proposing what has seemed useful for attaining the end (1, 2, q. 15);

or election, by which, from several means, one is preferred (1, 2, q. 13);

and active use, by which powers are applied to acting.

Therefore we have voluntary complacency, intention, fruition, consent, election, execution.

And so not only acts of the will can be voluntary, but also acts of other powers, or effects; yet formally only acts of the will are voluntary; the rest are voluntary denominatively.

Moreover these things are to be observed about those acts. Use pertains to the order of execution; all the rest to the order of intention ². If use has been lacking, there will not be a voluntary external deed, for example the death of an enemy. Yet this death can be the object of complacency, fruition, and thus terminate the will. If it has thus terminated it, formerly more than today, that death was called willed, although not voluntary ³.

Intention is distinguished as perfect or efficacious, and inefficacious. The efficacious is of itself connected with the existence of the object, because the means are in the power of the will and the will admits or chooses all the necessary things. If, on the contrary, it neglects to admit the necessary means, it is called velleity.

¹ 1, 2, q. 11.

² Therefore let us not confuse the order of intention, which comprises intention, election, and consent, with intention strictly so called.

³ Thus in Italian volita is said of rain desired by farmers.

2. From the mode by which the object is attained. a) The will, as it is appetite, has, without organic transmutation, prosecutive and aversive acts, by which the eleven passions of the sensitive appetite are denominated: love and hatred, desire and flight, hope and despair, fear and daring, anger, delight and sadness ¹. Therefore, insofar as these proceed knowingly from the will, all these can be voluntary.

b) The object can be attained in itself or in another object. In itself is attained that toward which the will is immediately affected. In another the will attains what it wills only as connected with the object which it wills in itself. Moreover it can be connected as a part: as the obligation of support is part of conjugal life; as an accessory: as the vow of chastity is added to the subdiaconate; as an effect (strictly or broadly so called) foreseen together with the thing toward which the will is affected: as quarrels and blasphemies which are foreseen as going to follow from drunkenness.

If the question concerns an effect which is foreseen as going to follow but which is not loved, the voluntary is more strictly said to be in the cause only, and the effect is called merely permitted. Therefore, what must be well held, the will neither intends nor chooses what it merely permits; but permission means mere foresight without affection. Permission is active when it flows from an action on account of the concurrence of another cause which cannot be impeded; it is passive when the effect is merely not impeded.

¹ St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 22, art. 3, ad 3; and q. 23, art. 2, c.

3. From the subjective account of being, or the figure of the voluntary, there is distinguished:

a) The voluntary on account of action, or the positive voluntary, and the voluntary on account of omission, or the negative voluntary, as when someone omits to impede what he ought to impede: for example, damage through an animal possessed by him ¹.

And while we act, our act itself can be called positively voluntary; while we do not wish to act, our non-acting will be negatively voluntary.

N.B. Concerning the signification and use of several words, not all agree: this must be attended to when reading writers. Thus some call direct voluntary what is from the will positively operating; indirect, what is from the will insofar as it passes over an obligation of acting. While others call direct the voluntary in itself, but indirect the voluntary in another.

b) The explicit voluntary, which in itself is present before the mind, and the implicit, which is contained in the former. Thus the will of sorrow for sin contains the purpose of not sinning; the will of loving all contains the will of loving enemies. Thus the will of the legislator implicitly wills the law according to the true sense. This division is sufficiently akin to the distinction of the voluntary in itself and in another; but here there is more regard to attention than to intention.

¹ That which follows an omission will be called voluntary when it follows per se; permitted, when it follows per accidens.

4. From manifestation, you have the voluntary that is expressed, tacit, presumed (for the present). Expressed is what is manifested by speech or another sign ordered to this; tacit, what is gathered from an expressed concession or from some deed or omission of a deed. A superior, permitting a journey, tacitly consents that in the customary manner you seek money for yourself; an owner, who can easily dissent, tacitly consents to someone, observed by him, using his thing. Presumed for the present is what, from an inclination or disposition of the mind, is conjectured to be truly present now. A friend of the bishop from whom by letter he asked jurisdiction to be sent to him at once, after the letters have been received, conjectures that the jurisdiction has been sent.

Presumed for the future is the same as interpretative, concerning which see n. 46, c.

On the adage "He who is silent seems to consent". (R.I., 43 in 6°). In doubt, provided no reason suggests the opposite, "he who is silent seems to consent" ¹: a) in a matter which benefits the silent person without a burden; b) when some necessity of contradicting is joined with a ready faculty of contradicting. Here belongs the saying: "Knowledge and sufferance are held for expressed consent" ². This at least is valid in matters of slight prejudice. - c) Where several come together to deliberate about a common opinion. Those who are silent will be judged, per se, to add their assent to those consenting.

¹ The Rule of Law (142 Dig. L, 17) has this: "He who is silent certainly does not confess; but nevertheless it is true that he does not deny."

² Marginal note to the Gloss on § Caius, law 25, De legatis (D. 31, 1).

5. Division of the voluntary from its objective perfection.

a) The voluntary can be perfectly and imperfectly deliberated. The former, which is also called perfect, requires full knowledge and deliberation. Knowledge is called full insofar as, morally, all the notes of the thing are known and the mind is not subjectively impeded. The imperfectly deliberated is had in sudden movements, in a great heat of passion, in partial wakefulness.

b) The voluntary simply and according to something. The former is estimated from the object as it exists; the latter from a peculiar note which is in it. Marriage, besides the common life of spouses, is wont to bring association with parents. This can be pleasing or displeasing. If it has been appetible, marriage will be voluntary simply and according to something (that is, according to that note); if displeasing, it will be voluntary simply, but not according to something.

Quite often they call something voluntary according to something when consent to the thing is denied, although some note of it is pleasing: as if you should be unwilling to possess a thing which you would acquire as precious, because it belongs to another; but this use seems to us less correct. For since nothing proceeds from the will, nothing voluntary is had except complacency concerning that note.

c) Formal and interpretative voluntary. The former is present when the will truly adheres to a thing proposed by the intellect. The latter is present when, indeed, no consent either was or is, but from the inclination of the mind, from the fittingness of the thing with the rational appetite now perceived, it is conjectured that consent would have been future if the object had been proposed. The interpretative will is sometimes called presumed for the future. Since this is not and was not at all in act, it can effect nothing. Wherefore a dispensation, which must loose the bond of law, can never be presumed in this way; but a permission can be presumed, with which an act, valid in other respects, obtains the due mode of subordination to the will of the superior.

d) Actual, virtual, habitual voluntary. Actual denotes assent which is now deliberately present; virtual shows itself in the effect of a prior actual will; habitual denotes a past and not retracted will, although it perseveres in no effect.

Thus, from the will of going on foot to St. Peter's, someone who knows the way well, without a conscious choice of roads, turning over many things in his mind, converses with a companion, and makes the journey: he virtually wills to visit the basilica. He who formally asked for extreme unction and then is deprived of the senses has the habitual will of the sacrament.

The virtual will possesses the same efficacy as the actual. The habitual can suffice for certain juridical or spiritual effects which do not require action.

Lugo ¹ (De Sacr. in genere, d. 8, 15; De Paenit., d. 7, n. 40) thought that the virtual will was present, but confused and scarcely perceptible, or, as we would say, subconscious. But another explanation seems preferable. The association of ideas and images brings us this facility, that by one act of command we can determine a whole series of partial actions which we have done often enough. Under a given command, every series which has been foreseen and has been effected by that command is voluntary in a manner similar to that in which the explosion will be called voluntary which is determined in a deep cavern by one who, placed outside the cavern, causes an electric contact. This alone differs: that it remains in our power consciously to break off the commanded series. Therefore, although actual willings are easily mixed in the series to be executed, nevertheless the series is virtually voluntary, insofar as it derives from the first command; and, according to the law of human action, this voluntariety is entirely sufficient.

¹ Frins still adheres to him, De actibus humanis, I, 53.

On the involuntary. At the same time we know what the involuntary is, and how it is divided. We shall observe this one thing: strictly, that is called involuntary which is done against the will; non-voluntary, that which is done apart from the will, insofar as the thing does not depend on the will, although it can be pleasing to it. In the broader signification, both are called involuntary.

I. The conjunction of the voluntary and of liberty. In the present condition of man as wayfarer, a voluntary act is at the same time psychologically free. Only the appetite for beatitude is necessary for him "as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can be unwilling then to think about beatitude, because even the acts themselves of intellect and will are particular" ¹.

Nor in Aristotle does a word occur by which the free is distinguished from the voluntary. Whence, in this article, we consider the voluntary act merely under another respect, and we can proceed from this principle: as much as the voluntary is deficient, so much liberty is deficient; and every defect of liberty declares an act imperfectly voluntary.

We must treat of the conditions and impediments of liberty.

¹ St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 6, art. un.; cf. in 1, 2, d. 25, q. 1, art. 2.

II. Conditions of liberty. The use of free choice requires:

1. That reason, habitually and actually, have the ability of judging concerning the good formally taken, and concerning the proportion by which a particular good fits the subject and his inclination or appetite. Otherwise, the object cannot be proposed as indifferent, that is, as such a thing as is at the same time appetible and incapable of satisfying the appetite. Now in that indifference of judgment the first root of liberty consists.

2. That reason be unimpeded for following the direction of the will, under whose direction things are considered under various aspects and diverse practical judgments are effected. For since the will is a rational appetite, man wills or prefers nothing which at the same time he does not judge to be to-be-willed or to-be-preferred: wherefore between our willing and our final practical judging there is a necessary concord. And so, unless the judgment itself is in the power of the will, neither will the proper act of willing be in its power.

3. That reflex knowledge of the object and of the acts be had. For without conscious possession, the use of dominion cannot be had.

To say the same thing more briefly: free choice requires an intellect developed and unimpeded for representing, docile for obeying, and reflex consciousness. And so:

a) whatever conquers the intellect;

b) whatever carries away the will, impedes the use of free choice;

c) nor can that be free which does not proceed from our will.

Those impediments and limits of free choice are now to be considered by us, first in the healthy man, then in the sick or badly affected man.

I. The voluntary, or "that whose principle is within with the addition of knowledge," is divided under various respects.

II. According as end and means are objectively proposed to the will, the will can love the end by simple complacency, intend the same, and, when it is obtained, enjoy it; but the means it either, by consenting, merely accepts as they are proposed, or by consulting among several chooses the better; finally it uses the powers for applying the means.

III. According to the mode of attaining objects: already, without bodily mutation, it has the eleven prosecutive or aversive movements of the sensitive appetite; moreover, as rational appetite, it wills certain things in themselves, or directly, certain things in another, or indirectly. And an effect foreseen with an action or omission and yet not loved is called permitted (actively or passively).

IV. From external species, the voluntary is distinguished positively, by action, and negatively, by omission: which some call the indirect voluntary.

Then there is the explicit voluntary, and the implicit, which is contained in the former.

V. From its manifestation, the voluntary can be formally expressed, or tacitly signified in some deed or omission, or be presumed for the present, that is, conjectured from an inclination of the mind.

From this is gathered the prudent use of the adage: He who is silent seems to consent.

VI. According to its varied perfection, there is distinguished the perfect voluntary, to which neither knowledge nor deliberation is lacking, and the imperfectly deliberated voluntary; then the voluntary simply, which embraces the object as it is in the concrete, and according to something, which embraces the same under a definite note to which attention is given. There is also the formal or true voluntary, and the interpretative voluntary, which is not, but would be if the object were proposed: it is called presumed for the future. Finally there is the actual voluntary, in present act; the virtual, in a series efficaciously commanded; and the habitual, which once was and has not been retracted: this voluntary can have force for no physical effect, but indeed for juridical effects.

VII. From the voluntary we know what, and of how many kinds, the involuntary is.

VIII. Psychological liberty, which is now had in every human act, requires as conditions an intellect developed and unimpeded for representing, docile for obeying, and reflex consciousness.

Usefulness. It is of no small moment, and often of no small difficulty, that a moral theologian, for example in the sacrament of penance, be able prudently to discern guilt, and to judge concerning the value of promises and of obligations undertaken. To this end the present title has been written.

Account and division of impediments. 1. Although we speak of impediments of the intellect and will, nevertheless the spiritual faculties cannot properly either fall sick or be affected by an intrinsic impediment. Therefore all impediments cohere with our present necessity of using the body and material powers even for the noblest acts. And so by the same bonds by which the senses, whether interior or exterior, are bound, the intellect itself is externally bound. Now we distinguish the impediments and limits of free choice in a healthy man, and the impediments which must be ascribed to a morbid state. The former are either common to all, insofar as all men per se experience those states in which the higher faculty, impeded in its act, can make no free act, at least not perfectly; and accidental impediments, such as ignorance, which bring it about that, not indeed per se but per accidens, a faculty, even when unimpeded for its own acts, nevertheless does certain things involuntarily.

Distribution of the argument. Both by age, sleep, and the state of drunkenness, even the free choice of a healthy man is commonly impeded. Moreover various movements of appetite anticipate deliberation, beyond which psychological liberty cannot extend itself.

Hence:

I. Common impediments. 1. A child is not free. For, the development of the brain being deficient, he lacks conscious possession of universal notions.

2. One sleeping is not free. For, according to the varied perfection of sleep, the senses are impeded more fully or less fully. Nor is liberty restored by any dream. For in a dream phantasms are joined in the fatal order in which either they were already previously connected, or by some accidental fact, as for instance by hearing a sound or by contact with a heavy or cold thing; one thing succeeds another ¹; and, the normal communication between the higher centers and external perceptions being broken, consciousness cannot judge concerning the objective state; finally every conscious direction is taken away from the will. If sometimes we seem to ourselves to deliberate and to act freely, we rather dream the use of free choice than truly have it. If we resist an evil suggestion, it is an indication of virtue which, confirmed by long exercise, has phantasms of its own acts sufficiently strong that they are presented together with the phantasms of the passions and of lower propensions. Yet men are accustomed to be led through dreams more by instinct than by acquired virtue. Nor are the commands of dreams completed by execution.

3. One perfectly drunk is not free in act, although the drunkenness could have been voluntary.

4. One imperfectly awake does not yet enjoy an unimpeded use of the exterior senses and of the interior sense. And by those impediments of the senses the higher powers are prohibited from procuring for themselves the supplements of strength which would be necessary for overcoming the temptation or suggestion ². Therefore the efficacy of command is deficient, and a perfect consciousness of things and of self is not yet present. Wherefore, if the respect of moral goodness or malice was not present before the mind, then there will be no liberty; but if thought about a good action or about moral obligation has entered the mind, the will which with diminished strength overcomes the temptation can greatly merit; but if it has yielded to the temptation, it cannot be gravely blamed. For as long as man is prohibited by his subjective state from estimating and intending the ultimate end according to its dignity and with fitting efficacy, he cannot by his own proper act determine concerning that end, so that his disorder is only venial.

¹ Often two recent memories are mingled. A friend occurs; then, with another, a question was raised about a meal: we dream that we dine with the friend.

² Helps are sought by diverting the mind to other things, by renewing purposes or vows.

On non-deliberated movements. 1. In the sense itself, various concupiscences ¹ spontaneously follow sensible apprehension. These are not from the will. Wherefore only the act by which those concupiscences thereafter either are admitted or fostered, or are repelled, can be free. With what obligation of repelling: this will be said in the proper place.

2. The will itself, as it is the appetite of man, experiences in itself spontaneous affections toward all things which also by lower reason are proposed in some way as goods of man. (We call lower reason that which proposes motives drawn from the present goods of this life and of the world; which goods, moreover, with the aid of sense, are represented more vividly.) Those movements of the will, since they precede comparison with the motives of higher reason, or considerations of the honorable good, are not from the will as it is rational appetite. Wherefore those movements, which are called first-first, are outside the limits of liberty and are not governed by moral law.

3. Moreover the will has, even in the state of wakefulness, on account of distraction of mind or the force of involuntary concupiscence, imperfectly deliberated acts, concerning which one must pronounce as concerning the acts of a half-sleeping man. Wherefore those movements, second-first, if good, will be very praiseworthy; if they tend toward evil, they cannot induce grave guilt.

¹ We are not treating here of concupiscence insofar as, according to its force, it makes the use of free choice more impeded, but of spontaneous concupiscences which can even aid honorable appetite: for example, the movement of love toward offspring.

Ignorance is the privation of knowledge in some way owed; and thus it differs from nescience, which is the simple negation of knowledge. But error is a false judgment. A layman is nescient; a confessor is ignorant of moral theology. Both err when they hold fornication to be a venial sin. Inadvertence, finally, is actual inconsideration or oblivion of habitual knowledge.

Ignorance is divided with respect to the ignorant subject and his circumstances; with respect to the object ignored; and with respect to the act of the will to which it is referred or which it affects.

1. With respect to the subject, ignorance is invincible which could not be dispelled by any diligence whatever, or at least not by moral diligence. Moral diligence does not require that all means be employed, but denotes a human mode of diligence, accommodated to our condition, which, varying according to the varied gravity of the matter, prudent persons are accustomed to employ in their own affairs and to require from others. Therefore not only perfect ignorance, which excludes suspicion of the truth, can be invincible, but also imperfect ignorance, which is compatible with a doubt that has been judged contemptible.

Ignorance is vincible which could have been removed by moral diligence. Again this ignorance is of negligence, when someone is turned away from the study of knowing by various other reasons; it is affected when someone directly wishes to be ignorant. And the name affected ignorance has customarily been reserved for ignorance which is blameworthy. Yet a certain will of being ignorant can also be praiseworthy. For although knowledge per se is good and advantageous, in the present condition of our infirmity certain things are happily unknown, for example, for the greater guardianship of chastity, for the easier exercise of charity toward one's neighbor.

According to the degree of negligence, ignorance is crass or supine, which has not seized even an easy occasion of knowing; it is simply vincible, which has omitted only sufficient application. The theologian who in no way applies himself to acquiring the science is crassly ignorant of it; he who is not sufficiently diligent is simply ignorant of it. He is deceived by crass ignorance who, needing to know whether midnight has passed or not, does not even consult the clock which lies near him; he labors under simply vincible ignorance who neglects to rise from bed and take a few steps to consult the clock.

2. With respect to the object, law, fact, and penalty can be ignored.

Ignorance of law is had in two ways: more strictly, when that which is contained in the law is unknown; less strictly, yet properly, when the very existence of the law is not known. This law can be natural, positive divine, or positive human: either ecclesiastical or civil.

Ignorance is of fact when the conditions required for the application of the law are unknown to be present.

Ignorance of penalty is that ignorance of law by which it comes about that you do not know that a special penalty has been annexed to some delict.

He labors under ignorance of law who does not know that postulants can and ought to be received within the enclosure of nuns (c. 540, § 3), or that a law of pontifical enclosure exists for nuns; under ignorance of fact, he who does not know that such a religious house is a monastery of nuns; under ignorance of penalty, he who does not know that violation of that enclosure has been sanctioned with excommunication.

3. With respect to the act of the will, ignorance can antecede or follow the act of the will, according as it has a voluntary cause or not; it can be a cause [removing the prohibiting thing ¹] of an act which without ignorance would not have been done, or exercise no account of causality, or merely accompany an act which, with attention to the disposition of the will, would not be prohibited by knowledge of the law or fact.

Therefore there is a twofold respect: in the former, the origin of ignorance is considered; in the other, its effect; whence we would have a twice two-membered division. Yet by received usage one three-membered division is substituted for the two two-membered divisions in this way: antecedent is said of ignorance which is invincible or involuntary and at the same time a cause of willing; concomitant, that which is not a cause of willing; consequent, that which is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time is a cause of willing.

¹ Since ignorance is a non-being, it effects nothing positive, but removes the obstacle which knowledge would oppose. Therefore it is called removing the prohibiting thing.

That positive laws can be invincibly unknown is outside controversy and is clear per se. That there are remote conclusions of natural law which can be invincibly unknown is no less manifest. For there are many questions, for example, concerning the obligation of restoring in this or that case; concerning the origin of such an impediment of marriage (for example, consanguinity in the first degree of the collateral line), about which learned men themselves have disputed with one another for centuries and do not agree. On the contrary, that certain first principles and almost immediate conclusions, for example, that good must be done, that evil must be fled; that homicide and adultery generally are not lawful ¹, are known by all men of sound mind, is also not doubted. There then remain several principles or corollaries not so proximate and not so remote, whose ignorance is judged more severely by some than by others. And today we rather incline to the more benign side. Thus almost no one now doubts that the malice of pollution can be unknown for a long time by an adolescent or young man. Nor are there lacking those who think that certain onanistic abuses between spouses, at least in certain circumstances, can be excused in good faith.

¹ Indeed adultery is never permitted by natural law; but some can now be ignorant of that absolute universality of the prohibition: wherefore we have excluded invincible ignorance only from its general prohibition.

What habit effects. A habit for the most part does not remove sufficient knowledge of a good or evil act ². Nevertheless "it can happen that someone having a vicious habit sometimes acts not from habit, but from a passion rising up or even from ignorance." (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 78, art. 2.) This happens more easily to those who wish to correct the habit and yet, impatient or distracted, pour out certain blasphemous or even scurrilous words, or perform brief touches on themselves. Concerning this matter, this too seems to be observed: the knowledge which is enough for a good act remains more easily with a good act than, with an evil habit, is preserved the knowledge which is necessary for an act at least gravely evil: both because an upright man wishes more formally to use his habit, so that he would be said by St. Thomas, l.c., to "operate from the habit itself"; and because less perfect deliberation is required for a good act than for an act gravely evil.

"Some obvious circumstance of malice, which the agent habitually knows, can scarcely ever be handed over to oblivion or inadvertence in such a way that there is not sufficient knowledge for contracting malice. Thus, for example, who would not laugh at a priest or religious who, after sinning against chastity, said that he had in no way attended to the vow or to the sacred state?" (Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., I, 77, 3.)

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, De actibus humanis, XIV; Theol. mor., l. 8, n. 127; l. 6, n. 4, § tertio.

1. The gravity of that guilt must be judged from the conscious degree of negligence. Moreover, that negligence can be the omission of actual consideration, whose necessity, nevertheless, someone notices, whether this flows from habitual and conscious inconsideration or not; and it can be habitual ignorance of things which, whether by a common obligation or by a special obligation of state, one must know according to every time. (St. Thomas, De malo, q. 3, art. 8.)

Therefore he can be blameworthy who is accustomed to act precipitately and does not apply himself to his own amendment, and he who, through his own sloth, does not acquire the knowledge required by his office.

How many sins there are in number, in the latter case, is not so easily defined. For as often as someone wished to be ignorant, or formally or virtually neglected an occasion of learning, so often will he sin on account of ignorance.

Moreover, as often as an ignorant person has committed himself to a probable danger of inflicting harm, for example by exercising an office, so often also will he sin unless he is excused by necessity. Wherefore he ought to abstain from exercising the office until he can exercise it without probable danger. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. th., I, Tr. 1, c. 3, n. 55.

As to the species of the sin, either there is had a special precept of knowing, and then from the nature of that precept its violation has its species. Wherefore blameworthy ignorance of the articles of faith will be opposed to faith itself, although the ignorant person does not sin by formal heresy, unless he is so disposed in act that he would not adhere even to a known definition of the Church ¹.

Or that precept does not exist; and then the sin of ignorance receives its species from the transgressions which are foreseen in confused fashion as going to follow. For every law which commands or forbids a work, implicitly, in order to that work, imposes knowledge of itself. Cf. Bucceroni, Institutiones theol. mor., I, 52.

¹ Cf. Lugo, De fide, d. 20, n. 182, 191.

Effect of ignorance on the voluntary. 1. Antecedent ignorance causes the good or evil act which has been produced by the ignorant person to be involuntary simply. For it is not voluntary in itself, and it denotes such a disposition of the agent that, had he known, he would have acted otherwise.

2. Concomitant ignorance, as such, renders the act non-voluntary, although not involuntary ². For involuntary, strictly, is what is repugnant to the will. But what is done with concomitant ignorance would be done even knowingly.

3. Consequent ignorance, as such, makes the act voluntary in the cause, yet in itself involuntary, since, with knowledge present, it would be omitted.

But what if it is affected, or directly voluntary in itself? That ignorance, if it concerns the morality of the thing, is in itself a sin which, according to the thing in question, can be grave or light. That it renders the act more voluntary than simply vincible ignorance is manifest per se. Moreover, it is a sign of great propensity to that thing for the sake of which someone wishes to be ignorant: for example, to reading a book about which he wishes not to know whether it is prohibited; and in this respect it is said, rather improperly, to increase the voluntary. But with respect to the very violation of the prohibiting law to which the ignorant person exposes himself, it betrays a greater or lesser affection than if he sinned knowingly, according to the motive by which he is led. If from contempt of authority as such, it will be a sign of worse affection; if, on the contrary, he wishes to be ignorant lest, being conscious of the matter, he should in some way be delayed from sin, the affection can be less than that of one sinning knowingly. Cf. Ball.-Palm., I, tr. 1, n. 51; Lehmkuhl, I, 76.

Even in good acts directly voluntary ignorance demonstrates a great affection for a praiseworthy action. Thus he betrays a very beneficent mind who wishes to be ignorant of the habits of a beggar lest, perhaps some malice of his being detected, he should give alms less promptly.

Finally, by a universal account, an act done with ignorance is less voluntary than one which is done knowingly. Yet except ignorance directly chosen for this reason, that the note unknown is utterly disregarded. For he wills a good action more, for example, who refuses to consider its danger because he intends to assist the sick or devote himself for his country with every danger; he wills more to transgress a precept who, from contempt of the precept, affects ignorance of it.

² St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 6, art. 8.

Effect of ignorance on merit and sin. Because the condition of merit and sin is voluntariety, ignorance, other things being equal, removes, diminishes, or increases merit or sin by precisely the same account by which it removes, diminishes, or increases the voluntary. Wherefore invincible ignorance, whether of law or fact, whether antecedent or concomitant, necessarily removes sin.

Whence Augustine: "So far is sin a voluntary evil, that in no way is it sin if it is not voluntary. And this indeed is so manifest that no fewness of the learned, no multitude of the unlearned, dissents from it" ¹. Yet Baius denied this concerning infidelity, prop. 67: "Purely negative infidelity in those among whom Christ has not been preached is a sin"; which St. Pius V, by the Bull Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1 Oct. 1567, condemned among those proscribed as "heretical, offensive to pious ears." (Denz., n. 1068.) But the Baians and Jansenists denied the same thing concerning all natural law, prop. 2, from the 31 which were proscribed by Alexander VIII, decree of 7 Dec. 1690, "as rash... and heretical," and it sounded thus: "Although invincible ignorance of natural law be granted, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse one operating from it from formal sin" (Denz., n. 1292).

Yet do not for this reason think that the unknown law of nature is violated without detriment. For not only is the ignorant person deprived of the merit and also of the connatural influence of a good action, but also, since every act materially but intrinsically evil is unnatural or contrary to nature, through a certain trace which every action leaves in man, it is opposed to the good and happiness of the agent. Therefore they err who rejoice over a sin committed ignorantly, or who grieve that they do not live among less cultivated nations, where they could do several things ignorantly against the law of nature. Ignorance of the natural law can never be apprehended as good.

And in a similar way an act materially good is not useless to the ignorant person, although unknown goodness does not produce merit.

But simply vincible ignorance diminishes merit or sin. That is, he who proposes to do something which he suspects to be good or which he fears may be evil, by this intention either merits or sins, yet less than if he had perceived the goodness or malice; nor does it pertain to merit or sin whether the act is in truth materially good or evil. For the true object of the will is the act as it is apprehended by the intellect.

Finally, directly voluntary ignorance for the most part diminishes, sometimes increases, merit or sin, as was explained above concerning the voluntary.

¹ De vera religione, c. 14, n. 27 (P.L. 34, 133).

Effect of ignorance on the penalties of the external forum. Modern civil laws are not accustomed to establish any mitigation of penalty on account of ignorance of the law or of the penalty.

Among them ignorance of law is said to harm. From this, however, in pronouncing a penalty, the judge is not prohibited from admitting some excuse of ignorance; also in fiscal matters, friendly settlements are admitted on account of ignorance of an illicit act.

But in the canonical forum, far greater account is had of ignorance, at least if this can be sufficiently proved, for "ignorance or error concerning the law or the penalty is generally not presumed" (c. 16, § 2).

Moreover these principles are laid down. C. 2199: "All causes which increase, diminish, or remove fraud or fault, by that very fact increase, diminish, or remove the imputability of the delict."

C. 2201, § 1: "The violation of an unknown law is not imputed at all, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself."

C. 2218, § 2: "Not only those things which excuse from all imputability, but also those which excuse from grave imputability, likewise excuse from any penalty, whether latae or ferendae sententiae, even in the external forum, if the excuse is proved for the external forum."

Concerning penalties latae sententiae, moreover, these things are established: 1. Affected ignorance, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from none. 2. "If the law has the words: he shall have presumed, he shall have dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, with deliberation he shall have acted, or other similar words which require full knowledge and deliberation, any lessening of imputability, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae." 3. If it does not have those words: crass or supine ignorance exempts from none; ignorance not crass or supine, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative ones. Cf. c. 2229.

What those penalties are will be said later. Let us only observe that excommunication is always a medicinal penalty.

Effect of ignorance on the value of certain acts.

Insofar as voluntariety is required for value, so far, and neither more nor less, ignorance will be able to obstruct the value of an act. Thus he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who hears Mass, not knowing that it is Sunday: because the intention of fulfilling the precept is not itself prescribed; he validly baptizes who does not know that baptism is a sacrament, provided that, by performing the essential rite, he wills to do what the Church does: because nothing more ought to be voluntary; baptized persons marrying validly confer upon themselves the sacrament who do not know that matrimony is a sacrament, because they will the contract which is the sacrament; but those contract matrimony invalidly who have been ignorant that matrimony is a permanent society between a man and a woman for procreating children (c. 1082, § 1), because the substance of the contract must have been admitted voluntarily; one half-asleep makes a vow invalidly, because perfect deliberation is required for a vow.

Whatever we have said about habitual ignorance is valid for inadvertence; indeed, ignorance has no effects except insofar as it begets inadvertence.

In order we shall speak about concupiscence, then about the added force of habit; then about certain supplementary observations.

422. - 1. In the higher or rational psychic life, right philosophy, departing from Cartesian tenets, recognizes only a twofold faculty: intellect and will, or rational cognition and appetite; but the third, which was called the affective faculty or affection (le sentiment), some judge to pertain to the intellect and others to the will.

Moreover, in the lower psychic life, three things occur which are observed distinctly: sensations or sensitive apprehensions; affections, agreeable or disagreeable, resulting therefrom; and appetite, or tendencies of pursuit or aversion. Modern authors also reduce these three to two. But, inquiring more into what appears simple or irreducible and what composite, they are accustomed to exhibit both of the former things as simple: sensations and affections, while they contend that appetite can be resolved into each of the two preceding elements. Classical philosophy, however, looking more to active faculties, instead refers all things to apprehension and appetite. In pleasure or the contrary affection there intervene: a) conjunction with good or evil, as the proximate cause of an agreeable or disagreeable affection; b) perception of this conjunction; c) the consequent complacency or displeasure. But whether pleasure or the contrary affection is formally in apprehen- sion or in appetite: concerning this matter the Scholastics dispute, and St. Thomas himself seems to have varied. Cf. De veritate, question 26, article 4, reply to objection 4; In tertium Sententiarum, distinction 15, question 2, article 3, solution 2; Summa theologica, I-II, question 35, article 1. Concerning this matter cf. Froebes, Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie, vol. 1, pp. 24, 197, 198; vol. 2, p. 425, no. 2.

2. In order that we may say a few things concerning the individual elements: sensations are distinguished into three genera, according to physiologists: external sensations, so called from their object or cause by which they are determined, for example by contact; kinesthetic sensations, that is, those by which we are chiefly informed concerning the position and movement either of the body itself or of the members in their mutual relation (cf. Froebes, in the cited work, vol. 1, p. 145); organic sensations, which are excited by a change in the internal organs and teach us the state of the organism, but especially warn us concerning disturbed functions of vegetative life, as concerning poorly digested foods, visceral obstruction, hunger, thirst, and fatigue.

3. Affection or affective state designates the state and condition of the subject within himself, or the manner in which he experiences himself to be, whence we say: I am - or, I feel - well or ill.

Affection is accustomed to be joined with sensations, whether it accompanies them or results from them: thus a healthy man experiences the sense of agreeable satiety if, within the limits of temperance, he consumes good and pleasant foods. Nevertheless, it can sometimes subsist independently of sensations. Thus, with the will commanding, or with a cause of great joy dominating, someone in the midst of sensible pain can judge himself to be well or well affected, just as, on the contrary, moral sorrows can impede the efficacy of agreeable sensations. Therefore, between affection and sensations there prevail laws of association and mutual influence.

Most authors today, at least when there is discussion of lower psychology, distinguish only two specifically diverse affections: that of pleasantness or that of discomfort (jouissance, bien-être, ou malaise, indisposition). Nevertheless, not a few, with Wundt, recognize several pairs of affections: of excitation and quiet; of tension and relaxation.

The more vehement affections produce physiological changes of the internal organs, which changes in turn produce sensations and partial affections connected with them. Thus sadness of soul removes hunger and brings indigestion of the stomach, which itself also changes our affection.

Several partial affections - according to not a few physiologists, even if they are contrary - are accustomed to flow together into a resultant sum which is called the total affection. But the total affection arising from the cooperation of all organic sensations, or the affection of our body taken as a whole, is called the general or common affection.

4. Appetite is the act by which the subject is borne toward an apprehended good, whether present or absent. In the lower appetite the tendency is spontaneous; upon it, from instinct, there follows, likewise spontaneously, an exterior pursuit or flight: instinctive directions are less defined in man.

428. - 1. Sexual instinct is also present in man, but is less defined. For a twofold instinct can be distinguished: one, strictly so called, which is borne immediately toward carnal pleasure to be obtained through copulation: it moves body toward body in order to obtain venereal pleasure. The other moves person toward person, or seeks a person of the other sex because of secondary sexual characters, that is, because of the psychic and somatic qualities of the other sex, whose company is thereby rendered agreeable. But this interest in the person remotely disposes one toward venereal pleasure. Together with the person, the body is near; familiar association soon excites the carnal appetite itself. All these things have been wisely ordered so that matrimony among men would truly be not a mere conjunction of bodies, but would dispose and lead toward bodily enjoyment through a more universal union.

429. - On sexual instinct strictly so called. The stimuli of sexual instinct strictly so called are distinguished into normal or customary stimuli common to men, and abnormal stimuli which are proper to certain persons. They are further specific if they have almost no other use than to actualize sexual instinct; while those are called common which also possess some other utility.

Normal and specific stimuli are psychic or nonpsychic, that is, merely material. The latter affect the nerve centers by a chemical influence and operate independently of every consciousness of the subject: thus aphrodisiac drugs, and especially the "hormones" secreted internally, to whose influence nocturnal pollution seems chiefly to be ascribed. Some add the very pressure (la pression) of a gland which abounds in elements to be excreted.

A psychic stimulus does not move unless it is known. In order that it exert its power, besides an object suitable for exciting the appetite, or savory, and that object known, there is required in the subject an aptitude for undergoing that incitation, and then for acting upon the object, or for being acted upon, which we can call sensibility: it is called "receptivity and reactivity."

These subjective aptitudes vary considerably. There are some who are affected in no way by a whole particular class of stimuli, while for others the stimulus must be furnished with certain peculiar notes: some are excited by nudity, others by colors; some, besides nudity, require definite forms of the body from which others shrink. Stimuli, therefore, are relative, yet not to such a degree that there are none to which a common excitatory power can be assigned, which, before experience, is to be presumed capable of being effective. Such are, when perceived by external sensation or represented internally, the sexual functions, the sexual parts, a certain nudity of the body, and the acts preliminary to copulation.

2. Once the stimuli have been received, there follows a certain affective state, sufficiently complex, composed of the agreeable elements of sexual sensations and of the disagreeable elements of the excited and distended organ and of the unsatisfied venereal appetite: the excited and distended organ physiologically, and the unsatisfied appetite psychologically, induce an affective state in which discomfort and unpleasantness prevail.

3. Hence there arises an appetite for full satiety, which will be obtained when the agreeable affections are completed and the others removed. To this end, through instinct they appear to the phantasy, and through experience to reason, as manipulations to be performed about the sexual organs, especially those of the other sex; the subject is vehemently impelled to perform them (the appetite of manipulation). Excitation then increases with the addition of new stimuli, and the akme, or apex of excitation, is reached. Then the greatest pleasure of the lower order is obtained, and at the same time, with the outpouring of semen or quasi-semen, the orgasm is resolved, by which name is meant the whole process of the greatest carnal commotion, consisting of sensations, affections, and physiological changes. But the natural impulse to remove the tension of the organs is called the appetite of detumescence: it is satisfied in the orgasm itself.

430. - 4. You should therefore observe that, as such, venereal instinct is borne not toward procreating offspring but toward experiencing one's own pleasure.

But the nexus between stimuli, sensations, affections, appetite, and the impulse toward execution or exterior acts is not from human choice but from a natural connection and the instinct's innate associations.

5. Venereal instinct in man is variously subject to the command of the rational faculties. Led by intellect and will, which, because of the unity of the human composite, are also inclined toward seeking these things, man can deliberately seek sexual stimuli, retain them, increase them even artificially, preserve them longer, and excite himself in unusual ways for which there is no desire in brute animals. For man, unlike a brute animal, at the same time senses how unequal even complete carnal satisfaction is to procuring happiness. Therefore, the stimulus to perceive the sensation is received in him with the desire of increasing satiety itself. And he can also deny assent to the stimuli and to the affections themselves, call the mind away to higher things, diminish the efficacy of the stimuli by antecedent thought, and deliberately flee occasions of excitation.

431. - On sexual instinct broadly so called. Persons of different sex can also be bound together by a noble friendship: thus the strictly sexual consideration is ordinarily very far removed from the affection of children toward both parents and of parents toward offspring. But when the other sex is formally sought, then love founded upon sexual characters is necessarily, at least in part, sensual. (And even into a noble affection toward a person of the other sex who is not closely related by blood, something sensual easily enters.)

Sexual instinct broadly so called also becomes active with the aid of stimuli which are chiefly psychic (which do not act unless known).

These stimuli induce an affective state similar to that which exists in venereal instinct. There is agreeableness if the person toward whom the subject is borne is present and place is given to the desired association. If either one is missed, an affection of tension and discomfort will prevail, with an inclination toward seeking full satisfaction. A more vehement affection brings about physiological changes, sensations with connected affections; not, however, in the genital organs, at least of itself. But if it begins to pass into carnal appetite, changes will at once be present in these organs. Yet you should observe that this carnal propensity can be involuntary and repudiated.

The appetite tends, as we have said, toward obtaining a common and total affection of agreeableness; toward retaining and completing it, if it is present. It therefore impels toward interior and exterior acts by which union with the beloved person is perceived. But the more the proximity of persons becomes a proximity of bodies, the more attention is directed toward typical bodily qualities (the secondary criteria of sex), and the more the union between persons manifests itself by bodily signs such as kisses, prolonged embraces, caresses, etc. Conversely, the more one withdraws from carnal instinct, the more attention is given to psychic qualities, and bodily signs of familiarity are more or less neglected.

These things prepare the way for not a few prudent counsels.

Nothing special need be added concerning the action of the higher faculties. When the matter advises it, these can prudently prevent the propensity from becoming carnal; prevent carnal movements which may happen to arise from being accepted; lead persons to renounce every satisfaction of the senses; and prudently break off the association itself when it is not very useful.

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 6-48; Billuart, Sum. S. Thom., treatise on human acts; G. Walsh, Tract. de actibus hum. 2nd ed. (Dublin 1891); V. Frins, De actibus hum. (Freiburg 1897 sqq., Herder); Noldin, De principiis n. 40-105.

Preliminary note. The supernatural end is not obtained by an adult man except as a reward owed to his good acts, as was said above. Hence, after the treatise on the last end, there is conveniently a discussion on human acts. But our intention, writing on practical Moral Theology, is not to discuss all the subtleties which the scholastics devised concerning human acts, but rather to hand down those things which are more useful and accommodated to practice, following the doctrine and method of St. Thomas in his Summa theologica I-II, q. 6-21. We divide the whole treatise on human acts into four chapters, namely: 1. on the nature and divisions of the human act; 2. on its principles; 3. on its morality; 4. on its merit. From the second article onward subdivisions will have to be made, as will appear below.

26. Definition. A human act can be defined: an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or: which proceeds from reason knowing and will moving; or: of which man is master.

The Angelic Doctor writes very well to the point:¹ "Actions which are done by man are properly called human only when they are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts; whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will. Whence free choice is also said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." - Acts of man are commonly called those acts which indeed proceed from man as man, but without the intervention of reason or will, as the acts indicated below under nn. 2, 3, and 4.

From the given definition it is plain that the following acts are not properly human acts:

1. All natural acts and all acts of the vegetative power in man, for example, nutrition, digestion of foods, motion of the heart, bodily excitations coming from an influx of humors or from extrinsic causes not freely admitted by the will. But because of the intimate conjunction between soul and body, the will can exercise some influence upon those acts; for example, the will can vividly excite the imagination and, by means of the imagination so excited, is able to produce palpitations of the heart or motions of sensuality. In these cases acts of sensuality of this kind are certainly human and moral acts, but not if they arise without the intervention of the will.

2. All acts elicited by the perfectly insane, by those sleeping, by infants lacking the use of reason, by persons put to sleep by hypnotism, by the drunk (if, however, the hypnosis or drunkenness is perfect and the acts committed could not have been foreseen before the hypnosis or in the state of sobriety). The reason is that acts of this kind proceed without the use of reason and therefore are not produced by man as a rational animal.

3. All acts so-called "first-first,"² which are indeed produced by a man having the use of reason, but occur so suddenly that they precede every use of reason and will, for example, instantaneous and unforeseen motions of anger from an unexpected grave offense. Such acts are neither human nor moral, but amoral. But the motions so-called "second-first," which occur with half-full deliberation and advertence, are human acts, and therefore moral, although imperfect.

4. All coerced acts, that is, those which occur under the influence of force or violence. Hence violent rape is not for the virgin an act either human or moral, but merely physical. For the virgin is not mistress of this act, which is altogether against her will.

¹ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

² Concerning the controversy whether the first motions of sensuality are venial sin, see Billuart, De peccatis diss. IV, a. 2, § 1. The negative opinion seems to be far truer.

27. Scholion. On the love of felicity and beatific love. Authors dispute whether the love of felicity on this earth and beatific love in heaven is a human act or not. Suarez, Sylvius, Billuart, Haine, and others stand for the negative side. Wiggers³ and Vermeersch^3a are for the affirmative side. It seems to be a dispute about words. The love of felicity on this earth, just like beatific love, is psychologically necessary, but it is not an act, but a habit (either innate or infused). But the individual acts which from this habit are indeed elicited necessarily, but not coercively,^3b are altogether according to and in no way against the will; moreover they are proper to man insofar as he is man, and for this reason nothing prevents them from being called human acts.^3c Whence Wiggers⁴ deservedly says: "It seems very absurd to despoil the most perfect operations of man, and those for which he was chiefly created, of the name and dignity of human action." Therefore some theologians do not call the act of beatific love human, but superhuman. But there is no disputing about words.

³ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

^3a Theol. mor. I, n. 38.

^3b St. Thomas (De malo q. 6, a. unic.) says: To desire beatitude is necessary to man "as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can then not wish to think about beatitude, since even the particular acts themselves of intellect and will are."

^3c If an act otherwise necessary could not be a human act, then Christ on this earth would not have elicited human acts in observing the divine precepts, because He could not transgress those precepts.

⁴ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

28. Note. St. Thomas⁵ says: "Moral acts and human acts are the same." Nevertheless the account of each is not the same; for an act is called human because it proceeds from reason and will, but it is called moral insofar as it is conformed to or deformed from right reason and divine law (cf. below, on the notion of morality, n. 99).

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3. This opinion of the Angelic Doctor is much truer than the opposite opinion defended by some, for example by Noldin, De princip. n. 63 at the end.

29. Divisions. Of human acts one is:

1. An elicited act and a commanded act. This division occurs very often in Moral Theology, but it is not explained by all in the same way. We call an act elicited which is produced immediately and formally by some power or habit; but a commanded act is one which is elicited by one power or by one habit, but from the command of another power or habit. Elicited acts of the will are, for example, to love, to hold in hatred, to consent, etc. An elicited act of the habit of faith is to believe; an elicited act of the virtue of justice is to render to each one what is his.⁶ A commanded act is a fast performed from the motive of penance; for it is elicited by the virtue of temperance, but commanded by the virtue of penance. Every act indeed is elicited, but not every act is commanded.

Even the highest powers of man not rarely act under the command of another. Thus the will itself can elicit commanded acts, as the Angelic Doctor expressly teaches: "An act of the will can be commanded."⁷ Only the first act of the will is to be excepted, namely, the simple volition of the end, which is not from the command of reason, but from the instinct of nature or of a higher cause.⁸ Experience testifying, inordinate passions in some men altogether command both the will and reason. - By the way, it is already permitted here to observe that, in a case in which one and the same act is elicited by one habit and commanded by another, that act derives its morality rather from the commanding habit than from the eliciting habit; for example, the virtue of mercy elicits an act of succoring the poor man, but this act of mercy is done from the motive or command of the love of God. In this case the act thus perfected pertains rather to the virtue of charity toward God. More broadly on this below, where there is discussion of the morality of acts from the end (n. 99 sqq.).

⁶ Many authors, such as the old Scholastics and Noldin, Tanquerey, Aertnys-Damen, take an elicited act as that which is immanent in the will, by which it is perfected and consummated, such as volition, choice, etc. But they call commanded acts those which are produced by other powers from the command of the will, for example, to think, to walk.

⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 17, a. 5.

⁸ Cf. ibid. ad 3.

30. 2. An internal act, an external act. Again, authors do not use this division in the same way. According to some, internal acts are only acts elicited by the will, such as to love; for they are and remain in the will. But external acts are all acts commanded by the will, since they are outside the will and are elicited by internal powers (an interior act, for example, to understand) or external powers (an exterior act, for example, to walk). According to others, in the more common and clearer sense, those acts are called internal which are manifested by no external sign, for example, acts of faith, meditations, morose delectations, of evil joy, of evil desire, etc.; but those acts are external which are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as to steal, to fornicate, to genuflect, to sing psalmody, etc.

Note. a) An act outwardly perceptible remains external, although accidentally it is perceived by no one; and this indeed must be well attended to in the matter of censures. For a censure is not incurred unless, besides the other requisites, an external act has been committed. Hence if someone has denied the faith interiorly, he is not excommunicated; but if he has committed his denial to writing or uttered it, although no one else knows this, he incurs the censure.

b) There are authors who, besides external and internal acts, also distinguish mixed acts, namely, those which are exercised by external and internal powers at the same time; but this distinction is superfluous, not to say erroneous, since every external human act must at the same time proceed from an internal act, otherwise it is no longer a human act. Yet we concede that several interior acts can be joined to some external act; for example, mental prayer, study, etc., can be joined to walking.

31. 3. A good act, an evil act, an indifferent act, according as it is either conformed to right reason as the norm of morality, or deformed from it, or indifferent to right reason. For example, a good act is prayer to God, an evil act is a lie, an indifferent act is walking (considered objectively). Below (n. 129 sqq.) we shall prove that indifferent acts are not given except when taken in the abstract, but that in the concrete every act is either good or evil because of the end or the adjoining circumstances. A good or indifferent act is called a licit act insofar as it is prohibited by no law; but an evil act is the same as an illicit act.

32. 4. A natural act and a supernatural act, according as it is elicited by natural powers alone (for example, to think, to speak) or is produced by the help of supernatural grace (for example, to elicit an act of contrition, of faith, etc.). An act is not supernatural from the fact that it turns upon a supernatural object, but from the fact that it is elicited by a supernatural principle. Hence if someone considers the mystery of the Trinity by the light of natural reason alone, he does not elicit a supernatural act; on the contrary, if someone by the help of grace resists a carnal temptation, he performs a supernatural act. - All supernatural acts elicited in this life are meritorious⁹ (either de condigno or at least de congruo, properly or broadly so called).

⁹ Cf. below, on merit, n. 139.

33. 5. A valid act and an invalid act, according as it either has or lacks the necessary conditions prescribed by positive law for producing some certain effect. This distinction often comes into use in sacraments and contracts. Thus, for example, the act of baptizing is valid if all things pertaining to the essence of baptism are observed; otherwise it is invalid. An invalid act is not to be confused with a rescindible act, since the latter is valid in itself, but can be annulled by competent authority.

34. Scholion. On the genesis of the human act. Here it is permitted briefly to add the series of acts both of the intellect and of the will which, according to St. Thomas,¹⁰ must concur for any external moral work. They are twelve, namely, six on the part of the will, five on the part of the intellect, and one on the part of the executive powers. Therefore, first there are six acts elicited by the will, of which three turn upon the end and three upon the means to the end. Concerning the end: simple volition, intention, and fruition. Concerning the means to the end: consent, choice, and active use. To these six acts of the will correspond five acts on the part of the intellect, and on the part of the executive powers only one act. On the part of the intellect there are two concerning the end, namely, simple apprehension and judgment; three concerning the means, namely, counsel, discretive judgment, and command. That act which is elicited by the executive powers is called by the scholastics passive use. Now the order of all these acts is the following: The first act is on the part of the intellect, namely, cognition or simple apprehension of the end to be obtained, for example, health of body to be recovered. This act of the intellect is followed in the will by simple volition, which is the bare complacency or love of the good to be had. This act in itself is ineffective, for it is only a wish; yet it disposes the intellect to considering whether the loved good can be had. Therefore a third act approaches, and indeed on the part of the intellect, namely, judgment that the loved end can be obtained, for example, that lost health is truly recoverable. After this act of the intellect there follows in the will an efficacious intention of actually obtaining the proposed and possible end through means.¹¹ These four acts having been posited concerning the end itself, the intellect attentively inquires about suitable means to be employed for obtaining the end; this act indeed is called counsel or consultation about means. In the example brought forward this counsel would be the deliberation of the sick man or of the physician, by what means health is to be obtained. Such counsel having been had, there follows on the part of the will an act which is called consent, by which it approves and appetitively seeks the usefulness of the means. By force of this consent the intellect is applied to discerning in particular what means are to be employed; this discernment indeed is called discretive judgment. This having been had, the will truly chooses or appetitively seeks the means thus proposed in particular by the intellect; this act is called choice or the appetite of what has been pre-counseled.¹² For example, all things having been weighed, the sick man chooses a surgical operation for recovering health. Once the particular choice has been completed, the intellect commands the execution of the means chosen; this act is called command. To this command on the part of the will there corresponds the application of the executive powers to the work, which act is called active use. The executive powers obey this application of the will and truly execute the external work, which act is called passive use; for example, the sick man goes to the hospital and prepares all things for the surgical operation. Finally, all these acts having been premised, the intended end is obtained and the will rejoices and rests in it; this act indeed is called fruition in the possessed end; for example, the surgical operation having been happily performed, health is recovered, and the man, who previously was sick, now rejoices in perfect health. - All these things are explained more broadly by the Angelic Doctor in the cited place. We have made mention of them, not indeed because of immediate practical utility, since that twelvefold number of acts is wont to be performed so quickly that the agent does not become conscious of all of them, but to show how accurately and wisely the scholastics made an analysis of human acts.

¹⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 8-17.

¹¹ Intention is distinguished from simple volition in this, that simple volition has as its object the good as such; but intention has the good as attainable through the means necessarily to be employed (cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 12, a. 1 ad 4). Whence, properly speaking, God indeed wills His goodness, but He does not intend it, since He does not need means for having it.

¹² S. theol. I-II, q. 14, a. 1. Concerning the relation between consent and choice, see ibid. q. 15, a. 3.

The intrinsic principles of the human act are called those intrinsic causes which produce the act. But from the definition already given of a human act, its intrinsic principles appear, namely, intellect and will. For there is no human act unless it has proceeded from deliberate will, that is, with cognition premised and will acting. But cognition must necessarily precede an act of the will according to the axiom: "Nothing is willed unless it is foreknown." Hence the present chapter is conveniently subdivided into two articles, namely: 1. on the cognition required for a human act, and 2. on the voluntary which is required for a human act.

35. Cognition is the first foundation of a human act, so that without sufficient cognition a truly human act is altogether impossible. But cognition can turn chiefly upon a twofold object, namely: 1. upon the act itself, and 2. upon the morality of the act. As to the first, the agent must be conscious to himself of the action itself which he elicits, or he must have sufficient advertence to the action itself.¹ If this advertence is present, the elicited act is truly human. But besides this it is required that the agent attend to the morality of the action. Thus, for example, a man eating meat on Friday adverts to the act of eating; but he can totally forget the morality of this action, because he does not advert that it is Friday. - Inadvertence differs from ignorance in this, that it is the privation of actual cognition, while ignorance is commonly taken for the privation of habitual cognition. Hence wherever there is ignorance, there is also inadvertence, but not contrariwise. For one who knows something habitually can, from actual distraction, not attend to it. For the sake of clarity one must speak separately: 1. of advertence, 2. of ignorance, 3. of the influence of ignorance or inadvertence on human acts.

¹ Modern philosophers call this apperception.

9. I. On the ultimate end of man. It belongs to dogmatic theology to institute the question concerning the ultimate end of man; and in truth, among the authors versed in that science, it is possible to find arguments on this matter at once splendid and profound. We wish to note the following for remembrance.

1. The end of God the Creator is His intrinsic glory, that is, His perfection. For the Lord has wrought all things for Himself (Prov. 16:4). In other words, God created all things, not that from this He might obtain usefulness, but that He might manifest His perfection, His goodness, through goods communicated to creatures. So the Vatican Council (Sess. 3, c. 1).

2. The ultimate end of man is primarily the extrinsic glory of God; secondarily, however, perfect beatitude in God. The reason is clear: for that must be the primary ultimate end of man which God Himself intends in creating him and all other things. But on account of His extrinsic glory (that is, that He may be known, praised, loved), God has wrought all things, as Sacred Scripture often testifies. But in procuring this extrinsic glory, man finds perfect beatitude. For the attempts of man are vain when he seeks beatitude among created things, which are not of themselves desirable, nor stable, nor open to all. Man attains true beatitude when especially those faculties which are proper to him are perfected, namely intellect and will. But since intellect and will are capable of universal truth and good, it follows that man will attain perfect beatitude only in the knowledge and love of God. So all theologians. Cf. Palmieri, Mazzella, Satolli, Van Noort, Herrmann, in the Treatise On God the Creator, article on the end of creation. This is the ultimate end of man. It is the noble office of moral theology to indicate both the means apt for the end, and the dangers and snares by which man is surrounded, and which attempt to turn him away from attaining the end.

II. Means to the end; order of things to be said. The means to the end are human acts, by which the knowledge and love of God, in which beatitude consists, are exercised or prepared. Concerning these in the body of the work.

The first principles of moral theology regard the morality of these human acts in general. Since this morality is the relation of a human act to its rule, it is expedient that in this general part each term of the relation be weighed separately: namely the rule, and the thing ruled.

And first, as regards the RULE, it is necessarily twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate rule is the law of God subjectively taken, that is, conscience, which immediately and universally directs the act of any man whatever. But the remote rule is the divine law considered objectively, or in itself; and this is what must direct conscience itself. For conscience, that it may be a right and perfect rule of human acts, must itself also be directed according to the norm of the various laws which God prescribes to the human will, whether directly or indirectly.

Then as regards the THING RULED, that is, human acts, we shall consider these under a twofold aspect: 1. insofar as they are human, that is, insofar as they proceed deliberately from the will of man and are imputable to him; 2. insofar as they are good or evil, that is, conformable to the rule or discrepant from it.

10. With St. Alphonsus and most of the older theologians, we shall assign the first place to the treatise on Conscience, which is the subjective norm of acting; there will follow the treatise on Laws, or on the objective norm which must inform conscience itself. In the third place we shall speak of the matter to be ruled, or of Human Acts; to this treatise we shall subject the treatise on Sins, because the one is intimately connected with the other, and the former is, as it were, an introduction to the latter.

Finally we shall assign the last place, as though to an appendix, to the treatise on Virtues in general; this treatise is useful, indeed in a certain way necessary, that the matter of human acts and of the laws of the Decalogue may be known more deeply.

Surely logical order seems to demand this for itself: that the treatise on Virtues be placed before the treatise on Vices and Sins, since logically good is prior to evil; but since those things are chiefly to be considered by the moral theologian which are opposed to the ultimate end, namely sins, there is sufficient reason why the aforesaid order should be inverted. Besides, it is fitting that the two treatises on Human Acts and on Sins not be separated, and that the generic notions concerning virtues immediately precede the treatment of the Decalogue, which is wholly concerned with virtues and with the offices of virtues prescribed by the law of God.

Therefore the general treatises will follow in this order:

Treatise I. On Conscience.

Treatise II. On Laws.

Treatise III. On Human Acts.

Treatise IV. On Sins.

Treatise V. On Virtues in General.

St. Thomas, Eth., VI, 1, 2; 3 D. 33, q. 1; 1.2, q. 19, a. 5; q. 57, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., 1; H. Ap., 1; John of St. Thomas (ed. Vives), VI, q. 31, disp. 22; Sylvius-Maurus, in Eth., VI; Suarez, in 1.2, tr. 3, disp. 12, sect. 1, 2, 4; the moral works of more recent writers: Lehmkuhl, Aertnys, Noldin, Tanquerey, Gopfert, etc.; Beaudouin-Gardeil, de Consc.; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. (ed. 3).

11. Definition. Conscience is a practical judgment or dictate of reason, by which we judge what here and now is to be done as good, or avoided as evil (I, 2).

It is called: a practical judgment, namely one which directs the one operating in acting; by which we judge, that is, by which without any fluctuation of mind we affirm; what here and now, that is, in the individual case, and with all circumstances considered; is to be done, that is, ought or can be done; as good, or avoided as evil; by these words is expressed the formal respect under which the agent exercises his judgment concerning acts to be placed. For he does not judge concerning the utility or facility of an action or omission, but concerning its relation to the moral law, namely whether it is according to it, against it, or beside it (1.2, q. 19, a. 5).

12. Division. 1. Conscience, by reason of the acts to which it is referred, is either antecedent or consequent. Antecedent conscience is that which precedes human acts, so as to compose them according to the norm of right. Consequent conscience is a judgment concerning past acts; it approves or disapproves, praises or condemns with remorse; it is not conscience properly so called.

All the more, that habit by which the one who is endowed with it promptly obeys the dictate of conscience, and is called a conscientious man, is not conscience properly so called.

Antecedent conscience obtains various names according to its various office. When it judges what is to be avoided as evil, it is called prohibiting conscience; when it judges what is to be done as a good of precept, it is called prescribing conscience; finally, when it judges that something has been left to free choice, it is called permitting conscience; and it is also named counseling conscience, when it declares a thing to be better and of counsel.

2. By reason of the object, conscience is true or erroneous; by reason of the subject, it is certain or doubtful. These will soon be explained more fully. Conscience, whether true or certain, is prohibiting, or prescribing, or permitting or counseling, as was said above.

13. That the nature of conscience may be better known, it is pleasing to note the following.

I. Conscience is an act of the practical intellect.

1. It is an act, not a power or a habit; for conscience is said as though knowledge with another, because it is the application of knowledge or notice to a particular action: but the application of knowledge to something is made by some act. Besides, conscience can be put aside and is easily changed, which cannot be said of a power (St. Thomas, P. I, q. 79, a. 13).

2. It is an act of the intellect, not of the will; for it goes before the will, and signifies to it what in a particular case is good or evil, which evidently pertains to the cognitive faculty.

3. It is an act of the practical intellect. For according to the twofold respect under which the intellect is considered, it is called either speculative or practical. The speculative or theoretical intellect is that which rests in the contemplation of its object, whether the matter concerns fact (that is, the existence, nature, properties, or effects of a thing), or right (that is, law, or its disposition, extension, or interpretation). The practical intellect is that which extends or applies knowledge to work (ibid., a. 11). Cf. Cajetan, 1.2, q. 57, a. 5; Beaudouin, work cited; John of St. Thomas, Logica, P. II, q. 1, a. IV.

From these things it is understood what, in things operable, is a speculative judgment and what is a practical judgment. A speculative judgment, when operations are in question, is that by which the intellect declares that the thing objected to it, in itself, is objectively good or evil, for example, this war is just or unjust. A practical judgment is that by which the intellect decrees that the same thing, the present circumstances considered, here and now, subjectively, can or ought actually to be chosen or rejected, for example, it is lawful for me to fight in this war.

II. Although synderesis, moral science, and prudence concur in forming conscience, nevertheless conscience differs from them.

It differs from synderesis. Synderesis is not an act but a habit naturally instilled, by which we know the first principles of things to be done, for example: good is to be done, evil is to be fled; God is to be worshiped; what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another (St. Thomas, place cited, a. 12).

It differs from moral science. This also is a habit of the speculative intellect, but acquired, and is concerned with general conclusions deduced from first principles in this or a similar way: synderesis brings forth the first principle: evil is to be fled; science subsumes: theft is evil, and concludes: therefore it is not lawful to steal. Therefore moral science is concerned with the objective and material morality of an act; but conscience with the subjective and formal morality of the same.

It differs also from prudence. Prudence is a habit of the practical intellect, and has a broader scope than conscience. For prudence, besides those parts which it obtains in forming the dictate of conscience, especially in weighing the peculiar circumstances of the fact, also inquires into the means suitable for attaining the end. Thus, for example, when a superior must correct some guilty person, conscience indeed declares the obligation of correcting; but prudence suggests how one must proceed, that the end, namely amendment, may be obtained (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. 5, a. 1).

III. Conscience is a judgment concluding from two premises, whether the syllogism is made implicitly or explicitly. Synderesis or science furnishes the major premise, which declares the disposition of the law; the particular fact to which the application of the law must be made supplies the minor; prudence watches lest either be asserted rashly; the conclusion is the practical judgment which is called conscience. For example: A superior legitimately commanding must be obeyed. But this superior commands legitimately. Therefore he must be obeyed (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 2).

14. Order of things to be said. Conscience, as we intimated above, must, on the part of the object, be conformable to truth; but on the part of the subject, it must rest upon moral certitude. Whence there must be treated: 1. true conscience, and erroneous conscience opposed to it; 2. certain conscience, and doubtful conscience opposed to it. But since the question of solving doubts arising from the occurrence of probable opinions is of particular importance, it must be treated specifically. Hence: 3. probable conscience.

15. Definition. True conscience is that which dictates the truth of the thing. It rightly concludes from true principles that something is lawful or unlawful, which in reality is such. Erroneous conscience is that which dictates the false as true, whether it assumes for itself a false principle, or deduces false conclusions from a true principle (I, 3).

True conscience, strictly speaking, is not the same as right conscience, although it is sometimes used promiscuously; for true is said according to what is, but right according to what is apprehended. Namely, TRUE is that which in reality is such in itself; RIGHT is that which is done according to the rules of prudence, in other words, that which truly and really is conformed to right appetite, as St. Thomas says (Eth., VI, 1. 2). Hence right conscience can be predicated, although per accidens, even of him who labors under invincibly erroneous conscience, as will be said below. Cf. Beaudouin, q. 1, § 1.

16. Division. Erroneous conscience is either invincibly or vincibly erroneous.

1. Invincibly erroneous conscience is that whose error morally cannot be overcome or laid aside; because, a) either the thought or doubt of error in no way, not even confusedly, comes into the mind of the one acting, while he places the action or its cause; or because, b) although doubt of error has come into the mind, nevertheless, with moral diligence applied for attaining the truth, the error cannot be driven away.

2. Vincibly erroneous conscience is called that whose error man does not lay aside through neglect. Therefore he operates with vincibly erroneous conscience who a) either already notices the error in some way, or b) at least

doubts about the error, and at the same time notices the obligation of overcoming it, and nevertheless does not inquire into the truth.

But diligence in inquiring into the truth is not required to be the greatest; ordinary and common diligence suffices, such as prudent men of the same condition are accustomed to apply in like circumstances.

Note. Those things which later in the various treatises, on Laws, on Sins, on Censures, etc., will come to be said concerning ignorance will explain the present matter more perfectly. See n. 22.

17. Principles. I. We are always bound to obey a true conscience, whether prescribing or prohibiting. This is clear from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 14:23): But all that is not from faith (that is, from the dictate of conscience) is sin. And from Innocent III (c. Litteras, de restit. spol.): "Whatever is done against conscience builds toward gehenna." The reason is that true conscience is the right application of the law, and a manifestation of the divine will, to which it is always unlawful to resist.

St. Bonaventure very beautifully expresses this office of conscience, saying: "Conscience is like the herald of God and His messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as though from God, as a herald when he publishes the edict of the king" (L. 2 Sentent., dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3).

18. II. We can obey a true conscience permitting or counseling, but we are not bound. For 1. it belongs to a permitting conscience truly and absolutely to dictate that some action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, therefore; 2. but it belongs to a counseling conscience to declare that something is better and of counsel. But this is the nature of counsel, that it indeed brings in the merit of reward in the one carrying it out, but no guilt of fault and penalty in the one omitting it. Hence that saying: "He who passes over counsel does not sin, provided contempt is absent" (St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3 and 4).

19. Nevertheless it must be noted that what the law in general only counsels or permits can in the particular case be prescribed or prohibited by conscience, namely when there are peculiar circumstances which, in a special case and for a determined person, clearly manifest the obliging will of God; as will be clear from the things to be said concerning vocation to the clerical or religious state (cf. n. 1916, q. 3 and n. 2141).

20. The principal means by which the treasure of a true and right conscience is acquired are these: 1. knowledge of the law of the Lord, in which each one can progress by continual study, by reading good books, by consulting the doctors of the Church, and especially by questioning and humbly listening to the Church herself, who is the supreme mistress of consciences. 2. Mortification of vices. This mortification is absolutely necessary, because the practical judgment of reason, on account of the evil inclination of the will, often turns away from the truth. 3. Prayer, or assiduous conversation with the Divine Teacher, who speaks within without the noise of words, and raises up to Himself a docile mind in a point of time so that it grasps more reasons of eternal truth than if it had studied in the schools for ten years (Imit. Chr., l. 3, c. 43).

21. III. It is right to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience permitting; one must follow it when it prescribes or prohibits. The reason for both is that "a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, toward which the will is borne of itself, and not according to the material object of the act" (St. Thomas, quodl. 3, a. 27; St. Alphonsus, I, 5).

The first is also clear: 1. From the words of the Lord (John 15:22): If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin. 2. From the saying of St. Augustine (de Lib. arb., l. 3, c. 19, n. 53): "That which you unwillingly do not know is not imputed to you as fault." 3. From the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although there be invincible ignorance of the natural law, this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin." So Baius and Jansenius (cf. Viva, on this proposition).

The second is proved: 1. From the doctrine of the Apostle (Rom. 14:22), saying that one who eats meats which he judges it unlawful to eat, as having been sacrificed to idols, truly sins, because he acts against faith, that is, conscience.

2. From reason: the will is borne toward the object not according as it is in itself, but according as it is proposed by reason. Hence St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 19, a. 5): "When erring reason proposes something as a precept of God, then it is the same thing to contemn the dictate of reason and the precept of God."¹ Hence he who acts against an invincibly erroneous conscience (if it obliges) commits sin of the same species as if he acted against a true conscience.

It is useful to note that one acting with invincibly erroneous conscience not only does not sin, but also more probably acquires merit for himself. "The reason is that, in order to call some act good, at least inadequately, it suffices that it be directed by the dictate of reason and prudence. Therefore, since the one acting acts prudently, without doubt he ought to merit on account of the good end by which he is led in acting, namely the end of the glory of God or of charity toward neighbor, etc.; just as, on the contrary, he would demerit who does a good work, but apprehended as evil, on account of the evil end by which he carries out that work" (I, 6). So the doctors very commonly with St. Bernard, "who teaches that a subject obeying a prelate from a right intention acts meritoriously, although materially he errs against the law" (de Praec. et disp., c. 14, n. 21). Cf. I, 7 and 173, 174.

22. IV. No one can follow a vincibly erroneous conscience permitting, nor contemn one prescribing or prohibiting; but each one is bound to lay it aside. For 1. By operating according to a permitting conscience of this kind, a man sins, because he does what in reality is evil in itself; nor does ignorance excuse him from fault, since, as vincible, it makes his act voluntary in its cause (cf. n. 288). Thus a judge who already notices that he does not sufficiently know a case debated in court cannot cast his vote for either side; but he is bound to acquire for himself a more perfect knowledge of the matter, so that he may thus be able to render a just sentence; otherwise he would rashly commit himself to the danger of erring, and accordingly would stain himself with sin. 2. By operating against an obliging conscience of this kind, he likewise sins, because he chooses what he judges to be evil. Thus, he who erroneously judges that he must lie or steal in order to help his neighbor, and at the same time notices the obligation of further inquiring into the truth, cannot follow such a conscience, nor act against it (I, 4).

Yet in order that one sin by acting against erroneous conscience, his action must be free. Hence the ignorant man does not sin, even if he believes himself to sin, when, being unable, he omits to hear Mass on a feast day; when he suffers involuntary distractions in prayer, or nocturnal pollutions in sleep.

Note. That the confessor may more easily judge whether the conscience of a penitent was vincibly or invincibly erroneous, let him ask him: a) whether he truly doubted concerning the lawfulness of the act, b) whether he attended to the obligation of searching into the matter further? If he answers affirmatively, we have one laboring under a vincibly erroneous conscience. Nevertheless the responses of a scrupulous person must be weighed according to the things soon to be said. Cf. n. 319, 337.

23. To vincibly erroneous conscience can be reduced: 1. lax conscience, which loosens obligations too much; 2. scrupulous conscience, which increases them too much; 3. perplexed conscience, which apprehends sin in both terms of a contradiction.

We shall treat of each only briefly here, because practical rules will be set forth at length below in the treatise on Penance.

24. Notion. A lax conscience is that which, from light and contemptible reasons, judges that what in reality is evil is not evil, or thinks that a grave evil is light, although either can easily be detected (H. Ap., tr. ult. 31). How great a danger threatens from this sort of conscience the Savior Himself declares, crying out: Broad is the way that leads to perdition (Matt. 7:13).

Lax conscience can be distinguished in three ways:

1. Simply lax conscience, which tends to extending liberty beyond what is fair, for example if it rests upon a slightly probable or improbable opinion.

2. Cauterized conscience, when, from a long-standing habit of sinning, it counts grave or even most grave sins as nothing, calling evil good and good evil (Isa. 5:20), and drinking iniquity as though water (Job 15:16).

3. Pharisaical conscience, when it makes great things small and conversely small things great; of which sort were the Pharisees straining out a gnat but swallowing a camel (Matt. 23:24).

25. The principles to be adapted to a lax conscience are these:

I. He gravely sins who, knowingly obeying a lax conscience, transgresses some law in a grave matter.² The reason is that he could easily overcome ignorance of this kind, as being voluntary, and therefore cannot, under the pretext of ignorance, be excused from lethal sin.

II. Indeed, he can gravely sin in a light matter, if his temerity drives him to acting after any dictate whatever has been passed over and contemned.

III. He who labors under a lax conscience ought, far more strictly than others, to apply effort to laying it aside, if a doubt about the honesty of an action arises.

26. The causes of lax conscience are: 1. a soft life, which enervates; 2. neglect of prayer, which wholly casts us down; 3. excessive solicitude for temporal things, which makes us earthly; 4. the custom of sinning, which removes the horror of sin; 5. familiarity with vicious men, to whom we become accustomed; 6. luxury, which prevents the Christian from inclining and tending toward spiritual things.

The effects are: 1. blind tranquillity of soul after sin; 2. insensibility to pious warnings; 3. mockery of pious exercises; 4. an impenitent heart treasuring up wrath for itself on the day of wrath (Rom. 2:5).

The remedies of such a conscience are: 1. spiritual retreat for several days; 2. frequent and humble prayer with meditation on the last things; 3. daily examination of conscience; 4. frequent reading of pious books; 5. diligent confession; 6. flight from the wicked and conversation with the good (Haine, Elem. Theol. mor., n. 44).

27. Notion. A scrupulous conscience, or one agitated by scruples, is that which, from a slight motive, doubts concerning the honesty of some action, and therefore often fears that there is sin where there is none (H. Ap., I, 8).

Scruple is said from scrupus, which is a rough little stone entering the shoe of one walking, whence the foot is injured and the step impeded. Therefore a scruple is a vain apprehension, or an empty specter of sin, by which the eyes of the mind are struck, as infants are terrified by apparitions. But it belongs to the malignant spirit to inject a greater anxiety of sinning than is proper, so that the soul, rushing into the abyss of despair, may no longer truly fear any sin.

Three things concur for a scruple: 1. a futile reason, whose solution does not appear; 2. a vain fear of sinning arising thence; 3. disturbance of soul (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. 5, a. 5).

You will infer: 1. Scrupulous conscience, as such, is not conscience, but only a shadow and likeness of conscience; for it is not the dictate of reason, but of imagination. Yet if someone were to judge firmly that sin is present where it is not, he would have a conscience formed by scruples and therefore erroneous, but properly so called. 2. It differs entirely from a tender and timorous conscience, which indeed solicitously, but wisely, according to the rules of Christian prudence, avoids every sin, even the slightest.

28. Since the present matter is to be treated elsewhere (n. 1835 seqq.) in order to practice, it suffices here to note two things:

I. To act against scruples is always licit, and often obligatory. 1. It is licit, because a scruple is not a dictate of reason, but an empty fear, as lacking a prudent and reasonable foundation. Therefore that fear does not prevent the one acting from forming for himself a practically certain conscience from extrinsic principles, especially from the authority of the confessor. Hence, to act against a scruple is not to act against conscience.

2. It is obligatory, because excessive anxiety greatly harms spiritual progress, and brings grave detriment to body and soul at once (I, 19).

II. The principal and almost sole remedy against scruples is to acquiesce in the judgment of a superior or confessor. - Thus very commonly the Doctors, and the reason is clear. For since the scrupulous, while they are agitated by scruples, cannot form for themselves a true dictate of conscience, nothing else remains except that they hand themselves over to be ruled by the counsel of others, and use extrinsic reasons rather than intrinsic ones (I, 12).

29. Notion. A perplexed conscience is that by which someone, placed between two precepts, believes that he sins whichever part he chooses. He labors under this conscience who, for example, assisting a sick person, thinks that he will sin equally, whether, on a feast day, he omits Mass, or whether he departs from the infirm person.

Rules to be observed by the perplexed (I, 10; H. Ap., I, 7):

I. If the perplexed person can defer the action without grave harm, he is held to defer it until he has consulted the wise (for example a confessor); because each one must avoid that by which he thinks God is offended.

II. If (as usually happens) he cannot defer the action, he is held to choose that which seems to him the lesser evil, avoiding rather the transgression of natural law than of human or positive divine law; for the law of an inferior order must yield to the law of a superior order.

III. If he cannot discern the lesser evil, whichever part he chooses, he does not sin; because there is lacking in him the liberty necessary for formal sin, and because he himself is in invincible ignorance (cf. n. 216).

St. Thomas, de Verit., q. XIV; 2.2, q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 1; q. 70, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 20-39; ed. G., I, p. 11 ff.; Mazzotta, tr. I, disp. 1, q. 3, c. 1-5; Bardi, Discept. de consc., discept. 1, c. 9; disc. V and VI; Reuter, P. I, tr. 2, c. 2, n. 75; Panzuti, Theol. mor., I, tr. 1, 3 and 4; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2), n. 125; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 119.

We shall speak: 1. of the necessity of certain conscience for acting rightly; 2. of the manner in which doubtful conscience is laid aside.

For the sake of clarity it is useful to premise the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the threefold state in which, with respect to a proposed truth, our mind can be placed: namely concerning the state of certitude, doubt, and opinion.

30. "Our intellect," says the Angelic Doctor, "with respect to the parts of a contradiction, is disposed in diverse ways. For sometimes it is not inclined more to one than to the other, either because of a defect of things moving it, as in those problems concerning which we do not have reasons, or because of the apparent equality of those things which move toward either part: and this is the disposition of one doubting, who fluctuates between the two parts of a contradiction. But sometimes the intellect is inclined more to one than to the other, yet that which inclines it does not sufficiently move the intellect so as to determine it totally to one of the parts; whence indeed it accepts one part, yet always doubts concerning the opposite: and this is the disposition of one opining, who accepts one part of a contradiction with fear of the other. But sometimes the intellect is determined to this, that it totally adhere to one part: ... and this is the disposition of one understanding principles... of one knowing... and of one believing" (de Verit., q. 14, a. 1).

Elsewhere (3 D. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1) he has these things: "When the reason which moves toward one part neither suffices for terminating the intellect, because it does not resolve conclusions into principles known of themselves, nor suffices for terminating the will, so that it seems good to it to adhere to that part, then a man opines that to which he adheres and the intellect is not terminated to one thing, because there always remains a movement toward the contrary: for he accepts one part with fear of the other; and therefore one opining does not assent. But when a man does not have reason toward one part more than toward the other, either because he has reason toward neither, which belongs to one not knowing, or because he has reason toward each, but equal reason, which belongs to one doubting: then he in no way assents, since his judgment is in no way determined, but he is disposed equally toward diverse things." In what sense one opining does not assent, he explains there immediately afterward: "One opining has thought without perfect assent, but he has something of assent, insofar as he adheres to one more than to another." Likewise in the Summa Theologiae (2.2, q. 2, a. 1): "Some acts pertaining to the intellect have firm assent without such thought; ... but some acts of the intellect indeed have unformed thought without firm assent, whether they decline to neither part, as happens to one doubting, or decline more to one part, but are held by some slight sign, as happens to one suspecting, or adhere to one part, yet with fear of the other, which happens to one opining."

These things having been noted beforehand, without difficulty the diverse notions concerning the state of certitude, doubt, and opinion are established.

31. On the state of certitude.

Notion. CERTITUDE can be defined: the firm adherence of the mind to some proposition, without fear of erring; or also with St. Thomas: "The determination of the intellect to one thing" (3 D. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 3); and in other words: "The firmness of adherence of the cognitive power to its knowable object" (ibid., D. 26, q. 2, a. 47).

Division. 1. By reason of acquisition, certitude is divided into direct or indirect certitude.

Direct certitude is that which arises from proper and intrinsic principles affecting the thing itself. Thus it is directly and perfectly certain that children owe love to parents; for the certitude of this thing is sought from the very relation of cause which parents have toward children.

Indirect or reflex certitude is that which is obtained from principles extrinsic to the thing. Thus, for example, a son invincibly doubting whether a thing commanded by his father is lawful in itself or not, can arrive at a certain dictate with respect to lawfulness if he has recourse (or reflects) to the general principle: In doubt, one must stand for the superior. See n. 38, where there are more things.

2. By reason of firmness of assent, it is divided into absolute and moral certitude.¹

Absolute certitude is the assent of the mind on account of an infallible motive. On account of this sort of motive, such firmness is present in the mind that it excludes not only every fear of erring, but even the power of deliberately fearing. The following propositions, and propositions similar to them, introduce this certitude: the whole is greater than its part; bodies are heavy; the Roman Empire once existed.

Moral certitude (such as is understood here) is the assent of the mind on account of authority or grave reasons; so that there is no founded reason for doubting or fearing concerning the truth of the object. Such certitude arises, for example, from the testimony of two men who are worthy of faith. It does not indeed remove the possibility of doubting, but it actually excludes prudent fear of error.

Broad moral certitude. From this perfect moral certitude, or moral certitude properly and strictly so called, there plainly differs imperfect moral certitude, or certitude improperly and broadly taken, by which one indeed adheres to one part, but with a certain prudent fear of error. Therefore in this state there is indeed an assent of the mind, and thus it differs from the state of strict doubt (n. 32); but that assent is not firm, but fearful; and thus it differs essentially from moral certitude properly so called, and agrees with the state of one opining (n. 33). In other words: broad moral certitude excludes prudent and strictly so-called doubt, but admits prudent fear or hesitation.

This notion of imperfect moral certitude, or broadly so called - which is of the greatest moment in this matter - plainly agrees with the doctrine of St. Thomas and of the other principal doctors.

By the Angelic Doctor this sort of certitude is called "probable certitude, which," he says, "attains the truth in the greater number of cases, although in the fewer number it falls short of the truth"² (2.2, q. 70, a. 2); likewise "certitude of prudence" (2.2, q. 47, a. 9), or "certitude of opinion" (3 D. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 3, ad 1). Blessed Albert the Great agrees (In Topic., l. 1, tr. I, c. 2). St. Antoninus agrees, who calls the same "certitude of probable conjecture," and says that it arises "from gross and figurative probable conjectures disposed more toward one part than toward another" (Summa Theol., P. I, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10). Likewise Gerson, who has these things: "In morals, Aristotle says that certitude is to be taken grossly and figuratively; this certitude does not remove every probability or opinion of the other part, although it inclines more to this or to that, which suffices" (de Contr., P. 2, prop. 13).

Lugo also rightly says (de Fide, I, n. 316): "We can distinguish two grades of moral certitude. The first is of certitude which we have described, namely that which excludes every prudent fear of erring, and this is proper moral certitude. The second is of less proper certitude, which does not exclude prudent fear, but only prudent doubt concerning that object, or a prudent judgment concerning the contrary object."

Finally St. Alphonsus teaches: "For forming the moral certitude of some opinion, it is not required that the authors holding the opposite still lack every reason, even a light one; but it suffices if that opinion, with all things weighed, appears so true that scarcely any appearance of truth remains for the contrary, or that the contrary does not seem sufficiently probable" (Diss. 1755, n. 52). In the Moral Work (I, 81; ed. G., I, p. 60) it is possible to read: "A most probable opinion, which is also called morally certain, speaking broadly however, does not exclude every prudent fear lest it be false; unlike an opinion or opinion strictly certain, which excludes every prudent fear" (I, 81; ed. G., I, p. 60). St. Alphonsus also understands this imperfect moral certitude, or broadly so called, whenever he says that an opinion certainly or notably more probable is "morally or quasi-morally certain," or "sufficiently certain." Therefore several authors are mistaken who teach that broad certitude also excludes prudent and reasonable fear of error, and consequently begets firm assent.

32. On the state of doubt.

Notion. Doubt in general, insofar as it is opposed to strict certitude, is the suspension of judgment or of firm assent.

Division. Doubt is distinguished in many ways:

1. By reason of assent or adherence, it is divided into strict doubt and broad doubt. Strict doubt is the suspension of all assent, or the fluctuation of the mind, on account of equal motives for either part of a contradiction. This alone is true, genuine, properly so-called, and prudently formed doubt, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas (cf. above n. 31) and of all philosophers.³ Broad and improperly so-called doubt consists in a certain prudent fear of the intellect imperfectly assenting to one part of a contradiction. This fear, which by St. Thomas is also called "doubting," namely in a broad sense, or "some doubt" (quodl. VIII, a. 13), arises either from this, that the motive existing for only one part is not plainly firm but only probable, or from this, that the motives for one part are certainly or notably graver, although for the opposite part there are also motives grave in themselves. Therefore this broad doubt accompanies the state of broad and imperfect certitude (n. 31), or the state of one opining (n. 33).

Note. Suspicion is reduced to strict doubt; it stands midway between doubt and opinion, insofar as the mind, led by a slight sign, inclines toward one part only, but by no means assents to it. So St. Thomas (above n. 31), with whom St. Alphonsus wholly agrees (H. Ap., I, 77).

2. By reason of the motive or foundation on which it rests, doubt is negative or positive. It is negative when no probable reasons occur on either side, but either none or only light ones. It is positive when for each side (doubt positive on both sides), or at least for one side (doubt positive on one side), there is present a grave motive sufficient for forming a probable conscience, although with fear concerning the opposite.⁴

3. By reason of the object, there is doubt of fact and doubt of law. Doubt of fact is concerned with the essence or existence of a thing. For it asks what is: whether, for example, such a pact has been added to a contract or not; whether such a decree has been duly promulgated; whether it has been abrogated; whether the present thing is the object or matter of the law or not: for example, whether this food placed before me is meat or not; whether I have satisfied the law, vow, penance, obligation of contract, etc. Doubt of law is concerned immediately and of itself with the law or the obligation of the law, and consequently with the honesty of the action; for it asks (although only theoretically and in general): what is to be done; whether it is lawful to confer a sacrament with such matter, to enter into a contract with such a pact, etc. (I, 41, 53; H. Ap., XVI, 142; XVIII, 35; XIX, 79; cf. VII, 67, where there are examples).

It must be noted here that doubt of law arises from some doubt of fact; for right arises either from the essence of the thing (for example, from the very nature of man), or from some positive act, for example, from a contract, from the decree of a legislator, etc.; and similarly it is removed by a fact, for example, by payment of a debt, by dispensation from a law, etc. But doubts of fact are more commonly concerned with matter falling under a law, since in these it is generally asked: whether a man is placed in such circumstances as demand the application of the law.

4. By reason of the mode in which the object is considered, doubt is speculative or practical. It is speculative when one doubts concerning the truth of a thing or proposition, concerning the objective honesty of an action: for example, whether that war is just or not; whether painting is servile work; whether Baptism conferred with distilled water is valid, and like things. It is practical when one doubts concerning the subjective honesty of placing an action, that is, when someone doubts whether in practice, and with all the circumstances in which he is here and now placed having been weighed, he can or ought to act; for example, whether it is lawful for me to serve as a soldier in such a doubtfully just war; whether on this feast day to paint; whether to baptize this boy with distilled water (I, 21, 25; Istr., I, 13; Conf. dir., I, 9).

As can be seen, speculative doubt is a doubt of science, which proximately and of itself is concerned with the true, although consequently and remotely, when a moral matter is in question, it also regards the lawful. Practical doubt is a doubt of conscience, by which it directly and immediately regards the lawful. But it arises from speculative doubt, whether of law or of fact, and always supposes it: for no one, unless he is scrupulous, can doubt whether it is lawful for him, for example, to paint on a feast day, unless he has already doubted whether painting is servile work prohibited by God. Therefore speculative doubt is about the premises, practical doubt about the conclusion (Diss. 1757, n. 54).

33. On the state of opinion.

Notion. Opinion is a weak assent by which the intellect is borne toward one part of a contradiction, esteemed as true, with fear concerning the opposite.

It is said: 1. It is assent, and thus it differs from strict doubt and suspicion.

2. Weak, and thus it differs from strict certitude.

3. Esteemed as true; for "one opining," says St. Thomas (in VI Eth., lect. 8), "says that what he opines is true," and indeed he says this with fear. Accordingly, opinion also involves positive knowledge, although imperfect.

4. With fear, that is, prudent and reasonable fear; for imprudent and irrational fear is not always absent even from the certitude of faith.

And so the state of one opining, into which someone comes after mature consideration, includes broad doubt (n. 32), and coincides with broad and imperfect moral certitude (n. 31).

34. Note. The word opinion, as is clear, is taken here for the subjective state of the mind, but not for some opinion or objective proposition, in which sense we speak of an opinion, that is, a true, false, probable, lax, safe, etc., opinion or proposition.

These things having been noted beforehand, let us approach the argument of the present article.

35. Definitions. Certain conscience is that by which one firmly and without fear of erring judges that something is lawful or unlawful for him.

It differs from true conscience as certitude differs from truth. Truth regards the object, which is apprehended as it is in itself; therefore it excludes error. Certitude regards the subject judging that something is true without fear of falsity; therefore it excludes fear of error, which nevertheless can be present in the subject per accidens invincibly. Hence it is clear that conscience can be certain without being true. Yet of itself certain conscience is always right conscience; whence the question is always made only concerning certain conscience (Beaudouin, q. 2, a. 1).

Doubtful conscience is that which suspends assent for either part of the doubt, and remains uncertain and hesitating (I, 20).

It is clear that conscience of this kind, on account of the defect of judgment, is not conscience in the true sense of the name, but is called by this name improperly, and only from the usage of the schools.

36. Principles. I. For acting licitly there is required moral certitude concerning the honesty of the action. In other words, certain conscience alone is the rule of morals, and it is never lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience (I, 55; H. Ap., I, 31). It is proved, 1. From the words of St. Paul (Rom. 14:23): Everything that is not from faith is sin. "It is said from faith, namely from the certain dictate of conscience, so that a man has persuaded himself in his conscience that by acting he acts rightly, as St. Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, and others with St. Thomas explain that phrase FROM FAITH." 2. From reason: he who acts with a conscience not certain voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of sinning, and by this very fact sins. And indeed, he who, uncertain about the honesty of an action, nevertheless acts, implicitly and interpretatively says: I wish to do this, whether it is lawful or unlawful: which is a virtual contempt of the divine law, and consequently sin (cf. St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 17, a. 3).

But if it is asked what sin one thus doubting and acting commits, St. Alphonsus answers (I, 22): "He sins, and indeed with a sin of the same species and gravity concerning which he doubts; because he who exposes himself to the danger of sinning already sins, according to that: He who loves danger shall perish in it (Ecclus. 3:27). Wherefore if he doubts whether that is mortal, he sins mortally." Cf. however n. 337, q. 2, where there are other useful things.

37. II. For acting licitly, ordinarily strict moral certitude is not required, but broad moral certitude suffices. This is the very common opinion among the authors. Cf. Dissertation de Usu moder., 1757, n. 31.

We say ordinarily, for sometimes prudence does not permit even the slightest danger of error to be undergone: for example, when the life of a man is in question, or the validity of Baptism to be conferred, etc.; in these cases certitude entirely strict is required, as we shall say more accurately in its place (cf. n. 81 ff.).

The reason is that, since God does not command impossibilities, those dictates in the matter of morals must suffice which we can practically form. But although we have strict certitude regarding first principles and their proximate conclusions, nevertheless ordinarily only dictates of broad moral certitude are at hand for us relative to remote conclusions.¹ Whence St. Thomas (2.2, q. 47, a. 9, ad 2): Certitude is not to be sought in the same way in all things, but in each matter according to its proper mode. But because the matter of prudence is singular contingents... the certitude of prudence cannot be so great that all solicitude is removed. And in another place: Moral matter is such that perfect certitude is not fitting (1.2, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3). To the matter also St. Antoninus (Summa, P. I, tit. 3, c. 10): It belongs to the disciplined man to seek certitude in each thing according to the exigency of the matter. Recall what we said above (n. 31). Cf. Suarez, de Lege, l. 8, c. 3, n. 19; de Relig., tr. 6, l. 4, c. 5, n. 5; Valensise (super syst. Theol. mor. disquisitio), where he treats the mind of St. Thomas concerning the sufficiency of probable certitude in moral judgments.

Note. Arguments of this kind, which establish the sufficiency of broad moral certitude, can be called concomitant principles. For they accompany, at least implicitly and in exercise, the direct arguments from which firm security cannot be had, so that they may render it plainly firm and perfect.

Nor is there an obstacle in the fact that in broad moral certitude there is still a certain prudent and founded fear of error (n. 31), for this remains only in the speculative order; but practically the fear of sinning is excluded by those same concomitant principles, which for this reason are also called by others indirect and reflex principles. Cf. Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 125; Beaudouin, p. 44.

38. III. For acting licitly, reflex certitude sometimes suffices.

It is said: sometimes, namely if, while an invincible speculative doubt remains, direct certitude cannot be had. For before all things direct certitude is to be sought; that is, before all things diligent inquiry into the truth is required, because, as the doctors say: "The law of acting imports the law of knowing." But if, after sufficient inquiry, direct certitude cannot be obtained, indirect or reflex certitude suffices (I, 25).

It is proved, 1. From authority. "It is certain and commonly explored among all the doctors," says St. Alphonsus (I, 64), "that the moral certitude of some opinion, if it is not proved from some certain direct principle, is nevertheless proved from another reflex principle, likewise certain, as is proved from can. 4: Quid culpatur, caus. 23, q. 1, where St. Augustine writes: A just man, if perhaps he serves as a soldier even under a sacrilegious king, can rightly wage war when that king commands, if, preserving the order of civil peace, either he is certain that what is commanded him is not against the precept of God, or he is not certain whether it is." Therefore, although a subject is doubtful concerning the justice of a war, nevertheless he can licitly serve as a soldier at the command of his prince - and by what reason? relying on the reflex principle that the prince has a certain right, so that always, and so long as the injustice is not established, he be obeyed.²

2. From reason. Because he who acts thus prudently judges that in these circumstances he acts lawfully and honestly: since the judgment concerning the honesty of his act rests no longer on weak reasons of probability, but on a most firm supervening, that is, reflex principle. Cf. n. 44 and 57 ff.

S. Th. I-II, q. 1 and q. 21.

47. Notion of a Human Act. - After the treatise on the ultimate end, human acts must be considered, by which we must arrive at that end.

According to St. Thomas, who first of all wrote a distinct treatise on human acts:

1. Cf. our article: Le traite des Actions humaines dans la Morale thomiste, in Revue des Sc. phil. et theol. 1926.

1. Those actions alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man, or which proceed from a man acting insofar as he differs from irrational creatures, not only as to substance but also as to the mode of operating.

But he differs in the mode of operating from irrational creatures insofar as he acts freely, and thus is master of his acts.

2. Hence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master.

But he is master of his acts through deliberation of reason and election of will.

3. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. Other actions, however, which are done by man, are called acts of man; and although some are human as to substance, for example necessary actions of intellect and will, nevertheless they are not human as to the mode of operating, nor properly human, since they are not of man acting as man (q. 1, a. 1).

Therefore a human act can be defined as an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man (q. 1, a. 1), or as an act which, proceeding from reason, is voluntary (De Malo 2, a. 6).

1. St. Thomas sometimes asserts that acts are human insofar as they are from reason (e.g., Q. D. De Malo 2, a. 4 and 6; I-II, q. 88, a. 6; q. 63, a. 2; q. 19, a. 1, ad 3; q. 18, a. 5 and 9; q. 58, a. 2; III, q. 19, a. 2), sometimes insofar as they are from deliberate will (De Malo 2, a. 5; a. 4, ad 10; a. 7, a. 3; I-II, q. 18, a. 5 and 6; q. 19, a. 1; Q. D. De Veritate 5, a. 10; II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 2; d. 41, q. 2, a. 1; C. Gent. II, 23; III, 9-10). But there is no contradiction. They are from deliberate will as from the immediate and formal principle and proximate foundation; from reason as from the first, radical principle, and therefore the higher regulating principle: for reason, as the first principle, is their measure, and it also is the very thing which can order to the end, which is the principle in things to be done. Hence all acts which proceed from rational powers are human, whether through essence, or through participation, as is the concupiscible and irascible appetite. Cf. II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 3.

Hence:

1. The following are not human:

a) acts (of vegetative or sensitive life) which man has in common with beasts both as to substance and as to mode of operating, such as eating, seeing, walking, sensing without deliberation;

b) acts of one who is incapable of deliberating: an infant, one fully sleeping, one delirious, drunk, or mad, one perfectly dependent upon the influence of hypnotism;

c) acts of one who can deliberate but which are placed without any deliberation, e.g., by a man fully distracted: these are called first-first movements.

2. Acts proper to man as to substance, such as understanding, willing, laughing, weeping, wondering, speaking, nevertheless are not human unless they are done from deliberation; on the contrary, acts common with beasts, such as eating, drinking, rubbing the beard, walking, are human if they are done from deliberation.

3. Beatific love, although it is an act proper to man as to substance, nevertheless is not such as to the mode of operating, because it is not free; whence it is not a human act.

2. It can nevertheless be called eminently human: for the necessary voluntary in the love of the highest good with full universality is the root of freedom, and therefore contains the free virtually and eminently, and so such an act is human eminently but not formally. Cf. Billuart and Gredt in o. c.

48. Properties of a Human Act.

Human acts, so called insofar as they are posited according to the mode of acting proper to men, are also called free insofar as they proceed from a free will; moral insofar as they are conformed or deformed with the rules of morals, inclination to the ultimate end, right reason, law, and therefore have the character of rectitude or sin; imputable insofar as they can be attributed to man as author and master, who must render an account of them, and thus are worthy of praise or blame, praiseworthy or culpable; meritorious insofar as they are referred to another into whose profit or harm they yield, whether an individual person, or a community, or God, the ruler of the universe and ultimate end.

3. Imputability and responsibility differ. Imputation is the attribution of a moral act, or the judgment by which a moral act is attributed to the author as master of the act itself; whence imputability is the property of a human act by reason of which it is attributed to the author as master of the act itself. - The concept of responsibility is related; but imputability is on the part of the act, responsibility on the part of the agent: the act is imputable, man is responsible in his act. Responsibility is the property by force of which man is obliged to answer for his acts. It is twofold: moral and juridical, according as someone must answer in the forum of conscience or in the external forum before a judge. Thus Lehu, Philosophia Moralis et Socialis, c. 4, a. 2.

All these acts are really the same, although they are distinguished by reason insofar as they are considered under a diverse respect (q. 21).

1. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 21, a. 1: "A human act is constituted in the being of good or evil as if from a formal cause, and upon this is founded that from order to the end it has the notion of right or sin, from order to the efficient cause, of praiseworthy or culpable, from order to another, of meritorious or demeritorious." Conformably to St. Thomas: "Thus therefore it is clear that a good or evil act has the notion of praiseworthy or culpable according as it is in the power of the will; but the notion of rectitude and sin according to order to the end; but the notion of merit and demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another" q. 21, a. 3.

49. Division of the Treatise. - The treatise is divided into three parts:

The first treats of human acts according to material or physical and psychological being:

A. Concerning the condition of human acts: 1) concerning the subjective element of the human act: a) concerning the voluntary, both according to itself, and positive and negative, direct and indirect, and in itself and in cause; b) concerning the impediments of the voluntary, that is, violence, fear, concupiscence, ignorance; c) concerning the free; d) concerning the impediments of the free, namely, passion, habit, and more remote impediments; 2) concerning the objective element of the human act: a) the object, b) circumstances.

B. Concerning the division of human acts: a) elicited acts; b) commanded acts.

The second part treats of human acts according to formal or moral being:

A. Concerning the morality of human acts in general: 1) concerning the essence and species of morality; 2) concerning the foundations of morality: a) concerning the intrinsic distinction between good and evil; b) concerning the subjective criterion or norm of morality; c) concerning the objective criterion and ultimate foundation of morality; d) concerning errors to be noted in this matter; e) concerning the cognitive faculty of morality; 3) concerning the principles or sources of morality in general; 4) concerning the specific distinction between a good and an evil act; 5) concerning the specific distinction between various good or evil acts a) from the object, b) from circumstances, c) from the end.

B. Concerning the morality of human acts in species: 1) concerning the goodness and malice of the interior act; 2) concerning the goodness and malice of the exterior act; 3) concerning the goodness and malice of the external effect; 4) concerning the goodness and malice of the passions; 5) concerning the goodness and malice of other circumstances.

The third part treats of human acts according to supernatural and meritorious being: 1) concerning supernatural merit; 2) concerning the conditions of merit.

50. The Treatise Is at Once Theological and Philosophical.

In the established division, the first part is rather philosophical, providing notions necessary for the understanding of the remaining parts; the third is wholly theological, as treating of the supernatural element; the second is at once theological and philosophical, because it is taken not only from reason but also from revelation. For revelation, by divine oral tradition and partly by the sacred Scriptures, also and more certainly teaches us the most universal moral principles and their immediate and more general conclusions, from which the whole moral science is deduced. Whence to declare, confirm, explain, and apply these belongs to theology as to philosophy.

51. Importance of the Treatise.

The treatise is the most principal of all, because it is:

1. More universal, since it hands down the most general notions and principles of the whole moral science, to be applied in all parts; and therefore

2. More fundamental, because upon it the edifice of the whole moral science is built. For moral science treats of nothing except human acts, and all other things, whether ends, means, rules or counsels, virtues or vices, it considers only insofar as they pertain to human acts. Whence the treatise is entitled concerning human acts in themselves. Hence

3. It is more necessary: for it is impossible to acquire for oneself a knowledge, not common or merely historical, of moral things, but scientific, founded in reasonings, unless the doctrine concerning human acts is well understood and rightly applied.

Since the whole of Moral Theology is concerned with directing human acts, the beginning of our treatment, as the order of things and common custom requires, must be taken from human acts themselves. Therefore we must here treat 1° of the notion, 2° of the principles, 3° of the morality of human acts.

1. Definition. - An act, in general, is the potency of a being placed in exercise. But potency (faculty, power, virtue) is defined by St. Thomas:¹ The proximate principle of the operations of the soul; proximate, I say, or immediate; for the mediate and remote principle is the very essence of the soul, which, by means of the potencies, is the principle of actions, in the same way in which the root of a tree brings forth fruit only by means of branches.²

As many as are the genera of potencies³ in the soul, so many are the genera of acts proceeding from those potencies. But man has some potencies common with irrational creatures, and others proper to himself. Wherefore "of the actions which are done by man, those alone are called human which are proper to man, insofar as he is man. But man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his own acts. Now man is master of his own acts through reason and will.... Therefore" (behold the definition) "actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of man," such as are all acts of man destitute of the use of reason in whatever manner at last, "but not properly human, since they are not of man insofar as he is man."⁴

2. Division. - A human act is distinguished in manifold ways:

1° Elicited, namely that which is perfected and consummated in the will itself, without the aid of another faculty, such as purely internal volitions and nolitions; or commanded, which, the will commanding, is perfected by another potency subject to the will, and that either internal, as the act of thinking about some particular thing, or external, as the act of walking, writing. Therefore each proceeds from the will (for otherwise it would not be a human act), yet not in the same manner.¹

2° Internal, which is made manifest by no sensible sign, such as an act of thinking, of loving; or external, which is outwardly manifest, for example walking about. All elicited acts are internal; but commanded acts can be either internal or external.

3° Good, which is conformed to right reason; or evil, which is not consonant with it. Good is also called licit; evil, illicit.

4° Valid, which enjoys all the requisites essential for producing its proper effect, for example the transfer of ownership in an act of sale; or invalid, which lacks even some one of the essentials, as, for example, because in an act of sale the thing is not the seller's own, and is as if it had by no means been placed.

3. - Three principles of human acts are numbered: 1° cognition, 2° will, 3° liberty. For these are constitutive of them, and therefore are required for any properly human act, as is clear from the definition of a human act and from the very nature of the thing. For will necessarily supposes prior cognition; for nothing can be the object of the will unless it has first been apprehended by the help of the intellect. Hence the axiom: Nothing is willed unless first known. But liberty supposes each of these; for liberty is the faculty of choosing, or of determining oneself to some act; but choice cannot be made unless the will moves itself toward this or that part which has first been known.

Cognition here is the same as conscience, concerning which in the following treatise. Here, therefore, we shall speak only of will and of liberty, or of the voluntary and of the free, and also of the impediments of each.

4. Definition. - The voluntary, properly so called, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end, or of the object willed: from an intrinsic principle, which is common to every act proceeding from any potency of the soul whatever, for example from the vegetative potency, and is not proper to the voluntary alone; with cognition of the end, which belongs to the voluntary alone. Therefore an act is voluntary insofar as it is done with cognition of the end. Hence if some circumstance of the action is altogether unknown by the agent, the action in relation to that circumstance will not be voluntary, by that very fact that it is unknown. Thus, if someone strikes a man while ignorant that he is a priest, he will indeed be guilty of injustice, but not of sacrilege, since he was ignorant of that sacred quality of priest in the man struck.

From this definition it is clear that the voluntary differs from the coerced, from the spontaneous, from the willed, from the free, and from a human act: 1° from the coerced or violent, because that proceeds only from an extrinsic principle; 2° from the spontaneous, because although it proceeds from an intrinsic principle, nevertheless it does not proceed from that principle with cognition of the end. For a spontaneous act is of those who apprehend only the end (object), but not the reason of the end and its proportion to the act. Thus a dog, seeing bread, begins to move toward it, and an infant smiles upon its mother caressing it;¹ 3° from the willed; for willed is not said of an act of the will, but of the object into which the will tends, and this can happen although the object does not depend on the will as an effect from its own cause. Thus rain poured out upon dry land, with respect to the farmer, is called willed, but not voluntary. 4° from the free, because that proceeds from the will determining itself to acting, with the power of not acting. Therefore everything free is voluntary, but not conversely. Thus the Blessed in heaven love God voluntarily indeed, but not freely; say the same of man as wayfarer, who voluntarily indeed, yet necessarily,

pursues happiness. Nevertheless in the schools voluntary is regularly taken for free, since in the acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end they are in fact not distinguished. The reason is from St. Thomas,¹ because the will "has determination in this alone," "that it naturally desires happiness, but not determinately in this or that"; 5° from a human act, which, although it agrees with the voluntary insofar as it proceeds from the same principle, namely from deliberate will, nevertheless differs from it, both because a human act, since it is an act, comprises only action or omission, while the voluntary also extends to their effects (n. 6); and because a human act, since it is human, is effected by man alone, but the voluntary by any being endowed with intellect and will; and because the human act (of the 2nd and 3rd kind, p. 1, note 1 at the bottom of the page), which is considered by Moralists, is free, while there is also necessary voluntary (n. 4 under 4°).²

5. Division. - The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1° Necessary or free, of which the one differs from the other as voluntary and free (n. 4 under 4°).

2° Perfect, which supposes that full cognition of the intellect by which the character of good and evil becomes known, and the full consent of the will, such as is in him who perfectly knowing and willing eats flesh on a forbidden day; or imperfect, or semi-voluntary, which proceeds from the will with that imperfect cognition by which the character of good and evil becomes known only somewhat obscurely, and in which there can be a manifold degree. But an imperfect or semi-voluntary act, even in the violation of a grave precept, does not exceed venial sin, as happens in those half-asleep or distracted by other things.

3° Voluntary simply, which proceeds from the full inclination of the will without any repugnance, as, for example, in a youth who, for the comfort of his mind, wishes a game, when he could choose for himself another kind of recreation, for example walking; or voluntary according to something, which indeed comes from the consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or with some inclination of the will toward the opposite. Therefore, if someone, induced by human fear or by threats of companions, violates a precept which obliges gravely and notwithstanding fear of any evil whatever, he places an act truly voluntary (unless the fear is of such a kind that it wholly disturbs reason), and indeed gravely sinful; for he acts with full determination of the will, although he acts reluctantly and would prefer not to act. Yet an act of this kind is also involuntary according to something, and therefore becomes less culpable.

4° Actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative. It is called actual if the will here and now, and immediately and directly, is borne toward the thing willed. Thus actually voluntary to me is, for example, this my response to the question proposed, or contrition while here and now I elicit an act of penance. Virtual is an act of the will physically indeed now past, but which morally perseveres in some thing which is done in a human manner, as in its effect, and therefore is its cause. Thus, for example, in a traveler who "desires to reach the wished-for goal of his course," the individual steps which he places toward it are themselves virtually voluntary, although he does not attend to the individual steps, indeed, while making the journey, he thinks about things altogether diverse. The reason is that those steps proceed from the act of the will by which the traveler at the beginning wished to undertake the journey to that goal. Resolve the same concerning absolution imparted by a distracted confessor. Habitual is an act of the will not retracted, but not persevering either in itself or in its effect, as the application of the fruit of a Mass to be celebrated long afterward, not revoked. Interpretative is that which has been had neither physically nor morally, but which can prudently be presumed would be had, if thought were taken of it, or could be taken. Thus the consent of an absent Superior, reasonably presumed by a religious, is interpretatively voluntary. Sometimes it gives honesty to an act, when there is question of lawfulness alone, as in the proposed example; often it does not give honesty, especially when there is question of the validity of an act, because then it is required that another's will either truly exist, or have existed and not been revoked. Thus you cannot absolve someone sacramentally if you trust that the Superior would consent to the jurisdiction if you asked, because jurisdiction actually had is required (Haine, Th. Mor. Elem., p. 4, q. 7).

The interpretative voluntary is sometimes taken in the sense of the indirect voluntary, and by St. Alphonsus (L. I. 170) is called virtual or interpretative advertence; improperly, however, as is clear from the Holy Doctor himself, L. V, 177, § Ratio 2 and § Dictum est; L. VI, 14; L. III, 313.

By the ancient scholastics under the name of the habitual voluntary there is sometimes understood that voluntary which is now called virtual; for example, by St. Thomas, p. 3, q. 64, a. 8 ad 3.

5° Express, which is manifested externally (by words or signs), for example if a Bishop, asked to grant jurisdiction to someone for hearing confessions, responds: I grant it, or assents by a nod of the head; or tacit, which is not declared externally, but is sufficiently gathered to be present from some fact, or from the omission of some fact. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a superior if he omits to oppose himself to them when otherwise he can and ought to do this. Hence rule of law 43 in the Sixth: "He who is silent is seen to consent." Tacit is also called presumed, namely concerning the present.

6° Explicit or implicit, according as something is intended in terms, or in a proper and distinct concept - as if one about to baptize should say: I wish to baptize - or in a confused concept, or in some general thing willed, as if one about to baptize should say: I wish to do what Christ instituted or what the Church here does or intends.¹

7° Absolute or efficacious, and relative or inefficacious. This division supposes two volitions which cannot stand together. From this twofold contrary volition, that is called absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other; but that which is thus explicitly or implicitly revoked is called relative or inefficacious.² See n. 1219, Note, under 2°; n. 1319, q. 2°, and St. Alph., L. IV, 210; L. VI, 24.

8° Direct and indirect, concerning which in the following §.

9° Some add the voluntary by one's own will, which proceeds from the operator's own will, and the voluntary by another's will, which indeed proceeds from the will of another, yet is imputed to us on account of subordination or subjection, or the pact of a legitimate Superior or of the parties among themselves. Thus the sin of Adam was voluntary for us; thus, at least in the external forum, the will of the father is sometimes judged the will of the son who is under puberty, or even of a minor. See, for example, n. 1525, It is said, 3°.

Since no special difficulty occurs in the other species of the voluntary, we shall speak only:

6. The direct and indirect voluntary comes among theologians in a twofold sense. In one sense, indeed, according as something proceeds from the will directly, as from one acting (as to sink a ship by a war-cannon), or indirectly, as from one not acting, as the sinking of a ship from the helmsman, insofar as he ceases from steering.¹ The direct voluntary taken in this sense others call positive; the indirect, negative, according as acting denotes something positive, not acting something negative. Yet from this do not conclude that the voluntary consists in negation; for, as St. Thomas says,² "something is called voluntary not only because it falls under the act of the will, but because it falls under the power of the will. For thus even not willing itself is called voluntary, because to will and not to will are in the power of the will, and similarly to do and not to do."

But in another and more common sense, the direct voluntary (or, as others say, express³) is called that "which is willed in itself" (therefore it is also called voluntary in itself) "and immediately, as when someone steals something, because he has in himself the will of stealing";⁴ indirect is that "which is willed not in itself, but in another thing which is apprehended, at least confusedly,⁵ as the cause"

"of some effect." Hence it is also called voluntary in cause.¹ By others, for the same reason, it is also called implicit or virtual voluntary.²

Hence you will gather: a) An effect not only foreseen, but also intended, is directly voluntary.

b) What is intended in itself is directly voluntary, even in the case in which it is intended not for its own sake, or as an end, but only as a means; and therefore the killing of a fetus is directly voluntary, although it is intended only as a means of saving the life or reputation of the mother. "For voluntary is not only what we will for its own sake, as an end, but also what we will for another thing, as for an end."³

c) Sins voluntary in cause are imputed at that time at which their cause is voluntarily placed. Yet from this do not conclude that the evil effect itself, when in fact it follows (for example pollution in sleep arising from a voluntary cause), is not sinful, and therefore that it is sufficient to disclose in Confession the guilt of the cause itself. For, as the exterior act is the substantial complement of the interior act and each is morally one and the same act (n. 25), so, in the case, the effect is the substantial complement of the cause, and with it morally one and the same act. Wherefore, just as it is not sufficient to confess the interior act, so neither is it sufficient to confess the placing of the cause. Thus, as the truer opinion, St. Alph., L. V, n. 149, against others.

d) For the imputation of a sinful effect foreseen from a voluntary cause, it makes no difference whether the effect in fact follows or not; for, as was said under c), the effect is imputed when its cause is placed.

That the things to be said concerning the voluntary in cause may be rightly understood, it is useful to premise these things concerning cause. - The efficient cause, concerning which there is speech here, is that by which something is done. But this is:

1° Physical or moral. The former is that which, by acting physically, produces the effect, as fire produces a conflagration, the sun light. The latter is that which effectively moves another free cause to acting. Thus one commanding homicide is the moral cause of the killing.

2° Immediate or mediate. The former is that which produces the effect, no other cause intervening, for example, if someone pierces the breast of another, he will be the immediate cause of his death. The latter is that which does not produce the effect except another cause being interposed. Hence a moral cause is always a mediate cause.

3° Proximate or remote (in moral matters). A proximate cause has a necessary or ordinary connection with the effect; but a remote cause, although it is able to produce the effect, nevertheless does not have great force upon it, nor does it notably influence it; or it is that from which the effect does not frequently arise. Thus the drinking of wine for a drunkard will be a proximate cause, for a sober man a remote cause, of drunkenness.

4° A cause per se or per accidens. The former is that which from its own nature tends, or is ordered, to producing the effect. Thus excessive drink is a cause per se of drunkenness. But the latter is that which, although from its own nature it is not ordered to some effect, nevertheless sometimes, some circumstance being added, can produce it. Thus homicide can follow from drunkenness. For the most part this last division falls back into the preceding one.

7. - An evil effect following from the indirect voluntary, that is, from the direct volition of a cause, is imputed to the agent for fault, if he could and ought to have avoided the cause on account of such an effect. Hence these things flow:

Corollaries. - I. A threefold condition is required that an effect can be imputed to the agent, or to the one placing the cause, namely:

1° That the agent foresaw the effect, at least confusedly. The reason is that an effect in no way foreseen can in no way be voluntary; for nothing is willed unless it has first been known. Hence drunkenness is not voluntary, nor to be imputed to him who becomes drunk from a little wine, whose force he did not know. Therefore, as some have contended, it is not sufficient for fault that the evil effect could have been foreseen or ought to have been foreseen; for the supposition must be denied, namely that an effect can be foreseen if in fact it is not foreseen, at least confusedly; for the first idea of some thing is not in man's power. Hence also, not even indirectly, is the omission of acts voluntary concerning which a man in no way thinks, as, for example, the omission of Vespers in him who, wholly immersed in studies, does not notice the twelfth hour of the night approaching, before which he had determined to finish them. Nevertheless, voluntary in cause and imputable to sin are the blasphemies, impurities, quarrels, which are wont to be done by someone in drunkenness. For such things are sufficiently foreseen from the custom of doing such things in this state.

2° That the agent could have not placed the cause; for otherwise, liberty being lacking, the voluntary would necessarily be lacking. Besides, an obligation cannot be given when it cannot be fulfilled. Hence the axiom: No one is held to the impossible. Thus a priest who gives Communion to a hidden sinner publicly asking for it is not guilty of sacrilege; for he could not, in those circumstances, not place the cause of the sacrilege which this man will commit.

3° That there be present a law by force of which the agent is held not to place the cause, or to remove it once placed; for where there is no law, neither is there transgression. But no one is held not to place the cause, or to remove it once placed, if he has a right of placing it, founded in necessity, utility, or honesty; for from the rule of law: to one pursuing his own right an effect following beyond intention is not imputed. Hence inordinate motions are not voluntary, nor therefore imputable, to a physician or surgeon in the exercise of his art, or to a theologian in the study of Moral Theology, provided, namely, that the proximate danger of consent is absent or remote; because the former are not held to omit their art, nor the latter his study, in order to forestall this effect, but on the contrary they have a just reason for giving work to them. Thus also evil desires of the curious are in no way imputed to a woman honestly adorning herself.

8. II. - It is lawful to place a good or indifferent cause from which there immediately follows a twofold effect, one good, the other evil, if there is present a proportionately grave reason and the end of the agent is honest, namely if he does not intend the depraved effect.¹

The reason of this principle is that, if this were not lawful, the agent would sin either from the intention of the depraved effect, or from the placing of the cause, or from the foresight of the evil effect. But none of these can be said. Not the first; for the end is supposed honest. Not the second; for the cause is supposed good, or at least indifferent. Finally not the third; for in the hypothesis the depraved effect is not intended, but merely not avoided; and there is present a proportionately grave and just reason for not avoiding it.

Moreover, five conditions which are directly or indirectly enunciated in this principle are altogether required, namely: 1° that the end of the agent be honest, that is, not disordered; 2° that the cause which is placed, or once placed is not removed, be good or at least indifferent; 3° that the good effect be immediate; 4° that there be present a grave reason for placing the cause, or not removing it once placed, nor is the agent held by justice, or by office, or by charity to omit it, or to remove it once placed; and 5° that practically there be no prudent judgment that the agent will consent to the illicit effect.

Therefore, 1° a good end is required; that is, one placing the cause or not removing it once placed must not intend the evil effect,² because otherwise he would intend something disordered, and therefore would sin. Thus in the example just adduced of the physician, surgeon, student of theology, woman honestly adorning herself, it would be a sin if besides the honest end a dishonest one were sought by them. 2° It is required that the cause which is placed, or once placed is not removed, be good or at least indifferent; namely that the act not be opposed to some law from which here and now he is excused by no legitimate cause. The reason is evident. For if the cause were not of this kind, it would induce guilt per se. Hence a girl gravely sins who, pregnant from a crime, procures abortion in order to avoid infamy; for the cause is not indifferent, and besides the 3rd and 4th condition fail. 3° It is required that the good effect follow equally immediately from the cause. The reason is that, if the cause directly and immediately has a depraved effect, and only by means of that depraved effect the good effect exists, then good is sought from evil; but it is never lawful to perpetrate evil, however slight, for procuring any good whatever; for according to the commonly known axiom, drawn from the Apostle,³ evils are never to be done that goods may come. Thus it is not lawful for you to lie, even for saving the life of a man. 4° It is required that there be present a proportionately grave reason for placing the cause, nor is the agent held from another obligation to omit it; because the natural law obliges us to avoid evils and to forestall harms to the neighbor, when we can do this without proportionately grave harm.

When a reason is proportionately grave will be explained in n. 307, 308. 5° It is required that practically there be no prudent judgment that the agent will consent to the illicit effect when it is produced. For consent into sin is never not to be avoided. Suppose, for example, that from riding there is wont to follow pollution for someone, and that the one riding does not intend this (the evil effect), but honest recreation (the good effect). Nevertheless he knows by experience that, notwithstanding the purpose of not consenting and of employing the means for forestalling consent, frequently, because the means have not in fact been employed, or have not been employed seriously enough, he consents; on this man certainly the obligation rests of abstaining from riding.¹

Note. - a) That it may rightly be decided whether the cause of permissively bearing oneself toward an evil effect is proportioned, the advantages and disadvantages which will follow from the action are to be compared with one another; but not only those which will arise in this or that particular case, but also those which would exist for society considered universally, or for the human race, if either it were necessary to abstain from the action, or it were lawful to place it. Wherefore, if I offer a just wage to a worker, and he demands more than the just amount, I am by no means held to consent to it, although I foresee that he will therefore blaspheme; for from this there would exist for society, or for timorous men, this grave harm: that whatever they asked would have to be furnished to those scoundrels, in order to forestall their blasphemies, which otherwise would not only not be forestalled, but to which a more frequent occasion would also thereby be given. On the contrary fornication will never be lawful, because permission for it, if it were given in any event, would yield to the harm of the human race (n. 493, I, under 2°).²

b) If the effect is lightly evil, it can never be imputed unto grave fault; but if it is gravely evil, it will not therefore always be imputed unto grave fault. For, as I said in n. 7 under 3°, in order that an effect can be imputed to one placing a cause, it is required that there be present a law by force of which the agent is held to avoid the cause on account of such an effect, or insofar as it is the cause of such an effect. But the obligation of this law, and likewise the degree or quantity of the obligation, depends both on the causality which intervenes between the action and the effect - namely whether the action influences the effect per se, or only per accidens, and, if per se, whether proximately or remotely - and on the reason which one has for placing the cause of such an effect. - Therefore under grave fault a gravely sinful effect will be imputed if it follows per se and proximately from the action (pollution from an immodest touch); but the killing of an unjust aggressor will in no way be imputed to you if this is necessary for the defense of your life, since you have a just reason for placing a cause producing even per se and proximately the death of the aggressor. - Under grave fault also will be imputed an evil effect which tends to grave harm of the neighbor if either no reason for placing the cause is present (no good effect follows for you from the cause), or a reason is indeed present, but not proportioned to the harmful effect (the good effect to follow from the placing of the cause is so little that, considering the gravity of the harm that will occur to the neighbor, it is to be esteemed as nothing). A case, for example, would be if, by not placing some action from the placing of which you can abstain without any inconvenience, or at least without proportioned inconvenience, you would avoid a cause, although only remote, of so grave a harm (suppose the killing of a neighbor), that you are held under grave fault by charity to avoid that harm, even with this inconvenience. Besides this case, there is not given a grave obligation of avoiding an effect, although gravely evil, if that effect follows from an act as from a cause per se, but only remote. Wherefore, by force precisely of this principle, inordinate motions following from honest conversation (a remote cause), although useless, are excused from grave fault; but if the conversation is truly useful, those motions by themselves are free from every fault. Notice, however, that a cause remote of itself can, for someone, considering his special disposition, be proximate. Examples are had in n. 502, I, under 2°.

9. Definition. - Free is said of that which proceeds from the will determining itself with the power of not acting. But liberty is the faculty of acting or not acting, or the faculty of choosing one thing before another. Hence everything free is voluntary, but not conversely. See above n. 4 under 4°.

Division. - Manifold species of liberty are distinguished.

1° Liberty from necessity, or liberty

of indifference, or of election, which is immunity from every antecedent intrinsic necessity; and this is liberty properly and strictly so called.

2° Liberty from coercion, or liberty of spontaneity, which is immunity from every extrinsic violence brought upon one.

3° Liberty of contradiction, which is the faculty of bearing oneself toward contradictories, for example of studying or not studying.

4° Liberty of contrariety, by which someone can choose one thing, or the contrary of this, for example to love or to hate.

5° Liberty of specification, which is the faculty of bearing oneself toward diverse things, for example to walk, to play, etc.

Four things are opposed, namely ignorance, concupiscence, fear, and force or violence.

10. Definition. - Ignorance, taken generally, is the lack of knowledge.

Division. - Ignorance is distinguished:

1° On the part of the subject, into positive (or privative) and negative (or nescience), according as it is the lack of knowledge owed, or of knowledge not owed, for example ignorance of canon law in a countryman. Each differs from error; for the latter denotes a discrepancy between that which the mind judges and the thing concerning which it judges. Thus, with respect to a usurious contract, he labors under ignorance who does not know it to be usurious (lack of cognition); but he labors under error who, although he knows it to be usurious, nevertheless judges it lawful. Therefore every error is ignorance, but not conversely. How error differs from fraud, see n. 882. 3°.

2° On the part of the object, into ignorance of law and of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or of a particular fact.

3° On the part of the cause, or of the will from which it proceeds, into vincible and invincible, according as, with diligence applied, it can be overcome or not. - But invincible ignorance is physically such, if in no way it can be overcome; morally such, if, after moral diligence has been applied, it cannot be removed.¹

But that diligence is judged moral which prudent persons, according to the gravity of the matter and according to their own capacity, in such circumstances, are wont to employ.¹

4° On the part of the action which is done from ignorance, one kind is antecedent, which is in no way willed and is the cause of the work, so that, if the ignorance itself were not present, the work would not be done; as if someone pierces a man whom he invincibly thinks to be a wild beast, and would not have killed him unless he had been ignorant that he was a man. Another kind is concomitant, which neither is voluntary, nor is the cause of the work, so that, although it were absent, the work would equally be done; as if someone, invincibly thinking that he is killing a wild beast, kills a man long sought for death, whom he would also have killed if he had known him. Another kind is consequent, which in some way follows an act of the will unwilling or negligent to inquire, and is directly or indirectly willed; and therefore it is otherwise called vincible ignorance. Haine, ib. p. 11. q. 27.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished in three ways, namely: 1° simply such, when some diligence, yet not sufficient diligence, is applied to dispel it; 2° crass or supine, when no, or scarcely any, zeal is put into investigating the truth; 3° affected, when someone voluntarily shuns the means of laying aside ignorance, lest he be drawn back from his own purpose.

To invincible ignorance perfect forgetfulness and full inadvertence must be referred. But these, if they are not perfect, or if they proceed from culpable negligence, belong to vincible ignorance.

11. Principles. - I. Invincible ignorance entirely takes away the voluntary, both because it itself is not voluntary, and because nothing can be voluntary where there is no cognition. Therefore no act proceeding from invincible ignorance can be imputed to the agent. Thus likewise one must determine concerning perfect forgetfulness and inadvertence, since the same reason obtains. - Antecedent ignorance precisely causes the involuntary, and indeed positively, because, if knowledge were present, the act would not be placed.

II. Vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary. For ignorance of this sort, whether directly or indirectly, is truly voluntary. Nevertheless it diminishes the voluntary, because it is the cause of willing that which, if it were absent, one is supposed never to have willed. The same also, by parity of reason, say concerning imperfect forgetfulness and inadvertence, and also concerning consequent ignorance.

III. Crass ignorance and affected ignorance diminish the voluntary much less, and consequently sin. The reason is that the former arises from grave negligence, while the latter is retained deliberately for sinning more freely, and therefore is an indication of a very intense voluntary, under which respect it also increases the sin. S. Th., De malo, q. 3. a. 7.

IV. Concomitant ignorance causes the involuntary, but only negatively, or the non-voluntary, not positively, because it is not against the inclination of the will; for the agent rejoices when he notices it. Hence it does not wholly excuse from sin, because it does not take away every habitual or actual conditioned will of sinning; nor again does it wholly cause sin, because it is involuntary and invincible. Hence he who from such ignorance kills, as if it were a wild beast, a cleric who is his enemy, remains guilty of internal homicide because of the evil will of killing his enemy, if he had known him; nevertheless he is excused from external homicide, nor does he incur excommunication, irregularity, or restitutions; because an external act not voluntarily placed does not induce these penalties, and an internal act does not induce them. Haine, ib. p. 13. q. 29.

Resolutions. - 1° Children who have done things illicit in themselves without any pang of conscience or suspicion of malice did not formally sin in reality, even if they had already attained the use of reason; and therefore afterwards they are not bound to confess them, when they understand those things to be illicit, since material sins are not matter for confession.

2° If a confessor or judge notices that he lacks sufficient knowledge to discharge his office as is fitting, and neglects to acquire knowledge, or before he has acquired it continues to exercise his office, he will be held for the errors which he foresaw at least in some way, because they are voluntary to him, at least in their cause.

3° Those who through their own fault are not accustomed to hear Mass on Sundays and are little solicitous about the feasts and fasts to be observed, as such persons have become accustomed, are not excused from sin if they do not observe the feasts and fasts, on the ground that they are ignorant of them; for the ignorance is vincible, since they voluntarily neglect to apply the means by which they could know them. But if only once or twice they have omitted Mass, whether with or without their own fault, and have not even suspected that a feast day or day of fasting was occurring during the week, they are excused from sin, since their ignorance is invincible; for he cannot be called voluntarily negligent in applying the means of dispelling ignorance who does not even think about applying them. - Likewise they sin who, dwelling in the country, far from a church, have neglected to inquire from books, or, if they do not know how to read, from others, for example Catholic neighbors, concerning feasts and fasts. But those are excused who, unskilled in reading and living among non-Catholics, have no one to admonish them concerning these things. The reason for both is the same as that which was brought forward just now.

4° If negligence in laying aside ignorance is culpable only venially, the deed following from it will be imputable only to venial fault. The reason is that acts of this sort are voluntary and therefore culpable only in their cause; therefore, since the cause, namely ignorance, does not reach grave fault, the effect cannot exceed light fault.

5° Vincible ignorance of a thing knowledge of which is prescribed by reason of itself (for example, of the mysteries of Faith, n. 257 sqq.) is a sin specifically distinct from that which is done from ignorance of this sort; because one sinning in this way acts against two diverse precepts issued for a diverse motive (n. 213). But if cognition is prescribed only by accident, by reason of the work to be done, it is not a special sin, but only one sin against that virtue

to which belongs the observance of the precept that is vincibly ignored. For by the same precept by which I am bound, for example, to fast, I am also bound to inquire. Hence, if through negligence in inquiring I do not fast, it is enough if I confess: I violated the fast. Haine, ib. p. 14. q. 31.

See many other things concerning ignorance elsewhere passim, especially in the treatise on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, and on Contracts in general, where error is treated.

12. Definition. - Concupiscence is commonly defined: a motion of the sensitive appetite, or a motion which operates not only in the soul, but also in some sensible part of the body, at least in the heart, namely moving it more intensely toward a real or apparent good, or drawing it back more intensely from that which is represented as evil. In order that this may be understood more fully, it must be known that often we suffer in our body certain commotions, which vehemently impel and excite us toward something; these, moreover, are called passions, which are far from being evil in themselves. For they are from the author of nature, and can be incentives of virtues: thus, for example, a soldier inflamed with desire of true glory fights more bravely. Yet because in the present state of corrupted nature the passions snatch man beyond the limits within which virtue stands, therefore in ordinary usage the passions themselves, just as also concupiscence, are regarded as evil movements; and therefore concupiscence, insofar as it is opposed to the voluntary and to the free, is defined: an inordinate motion of the sensitive appetite, by which the will is borne toward sensible good.

13. Division. - A twofold concupiscence is distinguished: one antecedent, another consequent. The former is that which, in the order of causality, precedes any deliberation or consent of the will, yet allures and draws it to consent; thus, for example, when an enemy has been seen, at once the appetite of vengeance is aroused. But the latter is that which, in the order of causality, follows an act of the will: either because a vehement motion of the will overflows into the inferior appetite, as is wont to happen in those who have a habit of some sin, for example of lust; or because the will directly and deliberately excites this very thing, as, for example, when someone reads obscene books in order to excite lust, - or deliberately thinks about an enemy or about injuries received, in order to kindle hatred in himself or increase the desire for vengeance, - or, when about to rebuke those whom he loves with tender affection, he in some way excites himself to applying himself seriously to the rebuke.

14. Principles. - I. Antecedent concupiscence, and therefore non-voluntary concupiscence, the greater and more vehement it is, the more it diminishes sin; indeed it can excuse entirely from sin. The reason is that the motion of the sensitive appetite disturbs, diminishes, or even impedes the judgment of reason; but causes which diminish the judgment of reason also diminish the voluntary. Since therefore an act is sin insofar as it is voluntary, by that very fact concupiscence, while it diminishes the voluntary, diminishes also the sin; and therefore where concupiscence is more intense and stronger, there the sin is less. Indeed the notion of sin will entirely cease if the motion of concupiscence totally impedes the use of reason (first-first acts).¹

II. Consequent concupiscence, and therefore voluntary concupiscence, does not diminish sin, but rather increases it; or rather it is a sign of its greatness, insofar as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act of sin.²

The former part is proved, because although physically, nevertheless not morally, it diminishes the voluntary, since the very diminution of the judgment of reason proceeds from the will of the agent himself; for he who wills the cause, by that very fact also wills the effect. Haine, ib. p. 15. q. 33.

The latter part is proved, because, as St. Thomas has it:³ "When from a strong movement of the will the lower appetite is stirred to passion, ... passion adds to merit or demerit, because the passion is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who does alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who commits sin with greater lust sins more, because this is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger."

15. Definition. - Fear is a trepidation of mind on account of some danger present or future to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself.

Division. - Fear is commonly divided as follows, namely:

1° By reason of itself, into grave and light, according as a grave evil is feared (hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, great loss of goods), certain or probable, inevitable; - or an evil either light, or improbable, or avoidable. Thus, if you take fear objectively. - Subjectively it is most grave, grave, or light according as it disturbs reason entirely, notably, or lightly.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when, although light in itself, nevertheless it is grave with respect to certain persons. Thus boys, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2° Fear, by reason of the cause, is from within or from without, according as the thing itself produces fear, as disease, shipwreck, etc., or an extrinsic cause, namely a man bringing fear upon someone.

3° Fear, by reason of the manner in which it is struck in, is struck in justly or unjustly, according as it is inflicted from a cause either just, for example deserved penalties, or unjust; and this fear is unjust as to substance. It is called unjust as to manner when it is inflicted indeed from a just cause, but without the order of law being observed. See n. 1599. II.

4° By reason of the end, fear from without can be struck in either for extorting some act, or for another end.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other Superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave if there is prudent fear lest those who strike in the fear be held offended for a long time and gravely.

16. Principles. - I. An act placed from fear, however grave, is simply and absolutely voluntary and free. The reason is that through fear neither is cognition taken away on the part of the intellect, unless the mind is entirely disturbed, - nor election on the part of the will, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those have always been regarded as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the Faith.

II. Those things which are done from fear, although simply voluntary, nevertheless regularly are also involuntary in a qualified respect; whence also the gravity of fault is diminished. The reason is that, by hypothesis, when someone is impelled to acting by fear alone, he acts in such a way that, with fear absent, he would recoil from acting; and therefore a work done from fear alone has joined with it a certain sadness and repugnance of the will, although inefficacious. It is said regularly, because sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance excludes every true notion of the involuntary, or every deliberate affection toward sin. Understand this of fear or attrition that is simply servile, not of servilely servile fear; for the latter does not exclude the will of sinning absolutely, as the former does. Namely, just as in a merchant who casts his wares into the sea from fear of shipwreck there remains an affection simply voluntary toward the wares, so in a sinner detesting his sins from servilely servile fear there remains an affection simply voluntary toward sins; and neither this detestation nor that casting overboard is involuntary except in a qualified respect.

III. If fear takes away the use of reason, the act, as is clear, can in no way be voluntary. But if it does not indeed take away the use of reason, but notably impedes it, the act will be imperfectly voluntary because of imperfect cognition of the thing.

17. Note. - 1° What has been said holds concerning those things which are done from fear, not concerning those things which are done only with fear; for the latter can in no way be called involuntary, and are wont to belong to a man acting manfully or overcoming fear, for instance to a soldier fighting bravely. Bouq. n. 59.

2° It happens that together with fear other causes impel one to acting, and then the action can be pleasing rather than troublesome. For example, someone eats meat on a forbidden day from fear indeed of the mockery of companions, but at the same time from affection for meat. In this case it is not always evident what the act has from fear and what from elsewhere, nor therefore in what degree it is involuntary in a qualified respect. Ib. n. 61.

3° Theologians treat of fear under a threefold respect: 1. as an impediment of the voluntary; 2. as a cause excusing from law; 3. as a cause of invalidity of acts. Here we have spoken of it under the first respect.

18. Definition. - Force or violence is coercion which is brought upon someone by an extrinsic and free cause, while his will is resisting.

Division. - A twofold violence is distinguished, namely absolute and in a qualified respect, according as coercion is brought upon someone resisting in every way, or only in some measure. Moreover it happens in two ways that someone resists only in some measure, namely: 1° when the force is not of such a kind that it cannot be broken or weakened by stubborn resistance; or 2° when someone does not unwillingly suffer the force brought upon him, whatever finally it may be.

Observe that, in a moral matter, absolute violence is that to which, on the part of the one who suffers it, that resistance is opposed which can be opposed to it according to one's power. I say: according to one's power; this intimates two things: one, that the resistance to be applied must be not only internal, but also external; for internal resistance cannot be sincere and efficacious unless there is also external resistance which can be applied. The other, that that external resistance must be as great as, according to the circumstances, can and ought to be applied. See the examples in n. 20 under 2° and 3°.

19. Principles. - I. Elicited acts of the will can in no way be coerced, because force cannot be brought upon the will. Therefore St. Anselm:¹ "No one can will unwillingly," he says, "because no one can will while not willing."

II. Other acts, placed from absolute violence, are in no way voluntary or free, and therefore are not sinful or demeritorious; but external acts which are placed from violence only in a qualified respect are more or less free according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection by which someone suffers the force.² Moreover, not only the exterior members of the body, but also the interior faculties, such as phantasy, the sensitive appetite, etc., can be moved to some acts by some extrinsic force, for example of an angel, whether good or bad, or of another natural cause, while the will resists in vain; for instance, to distractions, to obscene imaginations, etc.

20. Resolutions. - 1° A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her sins in no way, even if she suffers violation; for no one sins wholly unwillingly.

2° Women suffering force sin gravely if, through pusillanimity or vain fear, for example of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even with the danger of consent set aside; because although they do not consent to sensual delight, nevertheless, while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves and cooperate in the crime of another. - Whether a woman oppressed by force sins if, on account of fear of death, she omits to cry out, is disputed. - It seems probably to be denied, with danger of consent set aside. Indeed, very probably, with the aforesaid danger set aside, the woman is not bound to cry out when there stands a danger of any notable harm, whether of infamy or of excessive shame; for if otherwise she already resists as much as she can, she is not bound to repel force with so great an inconvenience. Thus expressly St. Alphonsus.¹ In practice, however, the opposite manner of acting is to be advised, because of the danger of consent.²

3° Sometimes resistance altogether absolute and continuous to the coercion brought upon one is not required, namely when, on the one hand, it would be useless, and, on the other hand, the matter at issue is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of the pagans were not sinning, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting danger of scandal or injury to Religion.

Note. - From what has been said it is clear that force and fear, although in Law they are sometimes used promiscuously, differ very much from each other. "For 1° force is an impulse brought upon one from without, and does not act upon the mind; but fear is an affection of the mind arising from the apprehension of an evil, whether to be brought on by force, or to happen in any other way; 2° force does not act except insofar as it is brought upon one as actually present; fear arises from the apprehension of an evil either present or to happen afterwards; 3° the things which are done under one compelling are altogether involuntary; the things which are done from fear are more often voluntary." Walsh, n. 348.

It is said: 1° Of the essence of morality; 2° of the sources of the same.

21. - As was said above in n. 1, for theologians a human act is the same as a moral or imputable act. Yet theoretically each must be distinguished; for a twofold being is found in any human act, namely physical and moral. A human act considered according to physical being, or in the genus of nature, is an act which proceeds from the free will of man. But a human act according to its moral being, or in the genus of morals, is that same act insofar as it agrees with or is opposed to the rule of morals; and therefore the morality of human acts in general is their agreement with the rule of morals, or their discrepancy from the same. With certain more obscure formulas of speaking from the schools being set aside, the essence of morality can be said to consist in the bearing or relation of a human act to the rule of morals.

22. - But the one rule of morals is right reason; if the human act has been conformed to it, it will be called morally good; but if deformed from it, morally evil. Now since right reason is distinguished as twofold, one uncreated, which exists in the divine mind and is called the eternal law; the other created, which is the light impressed by God upon the rational creature, by which the eternal law itself is known; therefore:

I. The essence of morality consists primarily in the bearing or relation of a human act to the eternal law, which is the divine reason, or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed. The reason is that the eternal law alone can be the primary rule of morals. And indeed a rule of this sort must be infallible, indefectible, and capable of obliging in conscience; but such is the eternal law alone, from which alone other laws receive the force of obliging; therefore. Thus from St. Thomas.²

II. The essence of morality consists secondarily in the bearing of a human act to right reason. The reason is that right reason alone can manifest to man the eternal law, or the primary rule of morals. Therefore it belongs to right reason to direct the act of the will to God as to the ultimate end. Therefore right reason is the subjective rule manifesting the primary rule. Therefore the essence of morality consists secondarily in the conformity or deformity of the human act with right reason.¹

23. Resolutions. - 1° Therefore a moral being is all and only that which lies under the rule of morals, or under the law of God commanding, forbidding, or permitting. For through this alone we are ordered to our ultimate end, or disordered from it. Therefore, that our acts may be good, they must be in some way conformed to the divine will, since this is the supreme and primary rule of morals.

2° Liberty is pre-required for the foundation of morality; otherwise the act would not be human, and therefore all sins and merits would be removed from the midst.

3° It is false that the essence of morality must be placed in liberty alone. For the morality of a human act embraces its imputability to praise or blame, to reward or punishment; but an act is not worthy of praise or blame only because it is free, but also, and most of all, because it is conformed to or deformed from the rule of morals, or the divine will.

4° It is false, a fortiori, that morality consists in the voluntary alone. For the voluntary can be necessary, as, for example, in the natural appetite for happiness in general (n. 4 under 4°).

5° Moral goodness or malice is twofold, namely objective or material, and subjective or formal. The former is the very conformity or discrepancy of the action with the rules of morals considered in itself and in the object itself, independently of the will of the agent; but the latter is the same conformity or discrepancy, insofar as it is freely willed by the agent.

24. Questions. - It is asked 1° whether there are acts properly indifferent, or lacking morality, whether in species or in the individual.

Resp. 1° It is certain that there are acts indifferent in species, or acts which in their own species are without morality. For there are acts which, considered in themselves, abstracting from end and circumstances, have no agreement or repugnance with law or right reason, and therefore are to be judged neither good nor evil. Thus to walk, to write, and innumerable similar things are acts indifferent in themselves.

Resp. 2° But there is controversy with respect to acts in the individual, or as considered in the agent. The more common and more probable sentence with St. Thomas denies this, and St. Alphonsus proves it in these words: "It cannot happen that some singular act proceeding from deliberate will is done without circumstances: therefore either those circumstances are consonant with reason; namely, so that the act is done when, where, how, and on account of what it ought to be done, and thus it is good; or they are not consonant with right reason, at least not all of them, but some one is lacking, and thus it is evil: therefore no act in the individual, and considered according to all circumstances, can be indifferent."¹

25. - It is asked 2° whether the external act (actually to assist or harm one's neighbor) adds morality to the internal act (to will to assist or harm one's neighbor).

Resp. 1° In itself the external act adds no morality to the internal act, and therefore neither increases nor diminishes the substantial merit or demerit of the internal act. Thus with St. Thomas,² St. Alphonsus³ against certain others. - The reason is that, since the internal act of the will is the cause of the external act, and the effect (the external act) is wholly in the cause (in the internal act), the whole goodness or malice of the former must be placed in the goodness or malice of the latter.⁴

This is also clear from Sacred Scripture, which often regards the will as the deed itself. Thus, with respect to goodness and merit, it is clear from Gen. 22. vv. 16, 17, where God said to Abraham, who only willed to immolate his son: "Because thou hast done this thing, and hast not spared thy son ... I will bless thee." And, with respect to malice, from Matth. 5, 28, where Christ says: "He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." - Nor is the obligation of declaring the external act in Confession an obstacle; for it must be declared because from the internal act of the will and the exterior work there arises one and the same moral act.⁵ Nor again is an aureola an obstacle, which is attributed to martyrs, doctors, and virgins, and is not granted to those who are inwardly prepared to suffer and do the same things which the former have done and suffered; for an aureola is a certain accidental reward or joy corresponding to a special difficulty joined with an exterior act. Nor, moreover, is it an obstacle that the real reception of a Sacrament confers greater effects than the will alone of receiving it; for in the question the matter is not of an equal effect of the internal and external act, but of the equal morality and imputability of them. Add that the real effect of the reception of a Sacrament comes from the privilege of Christ, who willed that it have power ex opere operato, and not by reason of a greater goodness in the recipient. Finally, the matter is also of effect, not of morality, when we say that by an internal act an indulgence is not acquired which the Church has granted to an external act; that a censure or irregularity is not incurred by the mere will of placing the work to which by law they are annexed; and that the burden of restitution does not exist from affective injustice alone.

It must also be noted, if the matter is concerning goodness, that the internal act is supposed to proceed from a will so disposed that, given the opportunity, it would operate, and besides that the case of an internal act is excluded which by its nature would be necessarily inefficacious in order to the execution of the action which it would even sincerely will. Thus an elicited act by which I would will only to please and obey God as much as Christ did could not reach that goodness which the actions of Christ had; for however much I should will this, I would will it inefficaciously, since I am not capable of a theandric action.¹

Resp. 2° Per accidens, the external act generally increases morality, because very often it is the occasion by which the goodness or malice of the internal act is increased, for example so that it is prolonged or multiplied, etc. For the internal act is increased because of the arduousness of the good external work, or because of delight in evil, or because of the longer delay of time necessary in completing the external work. Besides, often in the external work there is scandal or harm to one's neighbor, or, on the contrary,

his edification; from these also the morality of the internal act is increased. Thus commonly the theologians.

The sources or principles of morality are those things from which it comes about that a human act is good or evil, better or worse.

Three sources of morality are numbered, namely: 1° the object; 2° its circumstances; 3° the end of the agent. These three are altogether required for a good act; if even one is evil, the act will become evil. Hence the commonly known axiom: Good is from an integral cause; evil, from any defect whatsoever.

I say: are required. Yet, in order that goodness be imputed, it is required besides that it be directly willed; for "for the will to be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good."¹ Wherefore it is imputed to no one for praise that, for example, he visited the sick only for the sake of conversation. Yet it is not required that it be intended explicitly and reflexively, or in a signate act, for example that you say or think: I will to fast because it is honorable; but it suffices that it be sought implicitly and equivalently, or in an exercised act, that is, that the act be apprehended as becoming, praiseworthy, worthy of reward, commended by pious men, or especially as a work, for example, of mercy, etc., and thus be done with a good intention. Cf. n. 31. Corol. 2. - On the contrary, in order that the malice of an act be imputed, it suffices that it be indirectly willed. Hence it is not necessary that the agent tend into the act as evil, because in that way scarcely anyone would sin; but it suffices that he intend an act to which malice is known to be annexed, although this malice in itself does not please him, or that he not avoid the act or the effect of the act which here and now he can and is bound to avoid; because by this very fact he virtually contemns the law and indirectly wills the malice. The reason for the difference is that good must be sought; but evil not only cannot be sought, but must be avoided; and it is not avoided by him who freely places an action to which evil is annexed. Hence he who voluntarily makes himself drunk, although he does not directly will the malice itself of drunkenness, but intends only the delight from drinking, nevertheless acts shamefully and sins. Haine, ib. p. 17. q. 42.

26. - The object is everything (thing or person) about which some action is morally¹ concerned. Hence in theft the object is another's thing which has been unjustly taken away; in an act of justice, another's thing which has been restored; in detestation of sin, an evil action which has been perpetrated. - Now this object can be something either good, as to venerate parents; or evil, as to steal another's goods; or indifferent, as to walk, to speak, to sleep. Again something can be either evil from its own nature, as drunkenness; or evil only because it is prohibited, as to eat meat on Friday without permission. But things evil from their own nature, or intrinsically evil, are of a threefold class, namely:

1° Certain things are such absolutely, or independently of every circumstance, because of themselves they involve repugnance with an absolutely necessary right order, as is hatred of God, blasphemy, etc.

2° Other things are intrinsically evil, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of some adjunct or condition which depends on the dominative power of God or man; such are the taking away of another's thing, the injuring of body or reputation, and similar things, which sometimes become lawful.

3° Finally, other things are evil only by reason of the danger which is ordinarily joined to them, as the sight of a base object, the reading of a wicked book, etc. ... These, when a just cause has been given and the proximate danger of sinning removed, can become lawful.²

That a human act derives its distinct morality from the object is clear from this, that from the object it has that it is such a moral action and not another, that is, good or evil; justice or religion; lust or blasphemy. And indeed from the object the act derives its first and essential morality. First, because it belongs to the act before any other morality (arising from circumstances or end); essential, because it cannot be absent from the act, although others (arising from circumstances

or end) were absent. Thus theft of a sacred thing in order to make oneself drunk is primarily conceived as evil by reason of the object, insofar as it is the unjust taking away of another's thing; and this injustice cannot be absent from theft, even when the end, which is drunkenness, and the circumstance of the sacred thing, are absent. Haine, ib. p. 19. q. 44.

27. - Circumstances, so called as if standing around the act, can be defined: "Accidental determinations, or certain accidents of an act, without which this act could indeed exist as to substance, but which nevertheless add to it a morality in some way different from that which that act already participates from the object and the end." Therefore, in order that a circumstance confer some morality upon an act, it is required that, for example, the circumstance of the sacred place in which it is perpetrated confer the malice of sacrilege upon an act of lust; but that the fact that a theft was committed with the right or left hand confers nothing of morality upon the theft.

Circumstances, as also the end, as such, attribute to the act a secondary and accidental morality. Cf. the things said at the end of n. 26. I said: as such; because sometimes they attribute to the act a first and essential morality, as if either a work objectively indifferent becomes evil from the end for which it is placed (to sing for vain glory) or good (to sing so that the profit coming from it may fall to pious causes), or if an evil circumstance is the whole reason why a good work is chosen (to sing divine praises in church merely so that you may be praised by men). But then circumstances, as being intended in themselves, induce the notion of object in the genus of morals. Haine, ib. p. 19. q. 46.

I say: A human act derives true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances determine the act as moral, namely as having a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order; indeed, as I have said, sometimes circumstances alone induce agreement or disagreement into an act, as happens in the acts about which we spoke above. Hence some circumstances leave the object in the same moral species, as the quantity of money stolen by theft or given in alms; for the species of malice in theft, or of goodness in alms, is not changed by the quantity of money stolen or given. But others change the species itself, or add a new one over it; thus the circumstance that the thing taken away is sacred adds over the malice of theft a new species, namely sacrilege.

From the former circumstances, some aggravate malice, but others diminish it, and that gravely or lightly. Thus the greater or lesser quantity of money taken away by theft, or given in alms, renders either the malice of theft or the goodness of alms greater or lesser, and that gravely or lightly lesser, according as the quantity of money is notably or not notably greater or lesser.

But if circumstances transfer a sin from venial into mortal, or conversely, then they are said to change not the objective species, which they only increase or diminish, but the theological or demeritorious species. Thus the theft of one cent does not differ as to the virtue to which it is opposed from the theft of a gold coin; nevertheless it differs as to fault, namely theologically, because the theft of one cent, as being a light sin, does not deserve the privation of grace and glory, as does the theft of a sum that is grave, as being mortal.

Number of circumstances. - Seven circumstances of human acts are commonly enumerated, and they are comprehended in that common little verse:

"Who, What, Where, By what helps, Why, How, When."

See the reason for precisely this number, if you wish, in St. Thomas.¹ Bouquillon² and Haine³ explain them clearly in the following practical way.

Who, or the one acting, is considered not by reason of himself, for thus he belongs to the substance of the human act, but by reason of his accidental quality or condition, which morally attributes to the act in moral estimation either a diverse value (changing the species), or a greater or lesser value (aggravating or diminishing in the same species). It changes the species, for example, in a sin of lust, if it is committed by a religious; it aggravates in theft, if it is perpetrated by a priest, insofar as, other things being equal, any sin whatever is graver in a priest than in a layman. I say: other things being equal, that is, supposing that in each the act is voluntary in the same degree, and thus in a holy man the same venial sin, committed from frailty or subreption, is wont to be lighter than in one not holy, because the holy commonly neglect less to guard against sins of this sort.¹ Similarly it also increases goodness, if, for example, an eminent man humbles himself, or a poor man gives alms.

What, that is, not the object itself into which the will is borne first and of itself, for a circumstance comes to the object; but the quantity or accidental quality joined to the object. In theft, for example, it is aggravating insofar as it signifies quantity, and thus the theft of 1000 coins is worse than of 100; but it can change the species insofar as it signifies quality, as if the thing stolen is sacred.

Where, or the circumstance of place, namely sacred, profane; public, private. If it operates anything morally, it ordinarily changes the species. Thus the holiness of the place adds the species of sacrilege to a homicide perpetrated in a church; publicity adds the species of scandal to a sin which is committed in a public place. But if you cling to base thoughts in church, it is only aggravating. But if an act, lawful in itself, is prohibited in reverence for a place, for example the extraction of a thief from an immune place, the quality of the place passes into the substance and gives the first species.

By what helps, or by what means which is not necessarily joined to the act; for, as I again admonish, circumstances are accidents of a human act. It changes the species if, for example, by the help of a demon or magician you have brought evil upon your neighbor, or have put on sacred vestments in order to deceive another; it aggravates if, for example, someone steals the ladder of one person in order that he may take away the money of another.

Why, or the end of the one acting, about which presently.

How, or by what accidental manner an act of virtue or of sin is placed; intensely or remissly; from malice or from vincible ignorance; with force brought upon someone or without it, etc. It changes the species, for example, in violation and in robbery; it aggravates, for example, if you sin from malice; it diminishes if you sin from vincible ignorance, from grave fear, from strong temptation, etc.; it changes the theological species if with semi-full advertence.

When, or the accidental quantity (for a long or short time) or quality of time, namely sacred or not sacred. The quality of time ordinarily does not notably aggravate the malice of an act; but, according to Lugo,¹ to a sin which is perpetrated on a feast day it can add a malice diverse in species (namely sacrilege), and that grave, if from the circumstance of sacred time notable irreverence were inflicted upon divine worship; as if someone should exhibit public games, etc., on the Parasceve of the Lord.² I would add: in places where that day is publicly or at least commonly distinguished from other days. - If an act not evil in itself is prohibited at that time, for example the eating of meat, the time passes into the object.

28. - The end is that for the sake of which something either is of itself, namely independently of the will of the one acting (the end of the work; proper; intrinsic), or is made at pleasure by the agent (the end of the one acting; extrinsic). Thus the relief of the poor person is the end of the work in almsgiving; but in the one giving it, either that very relief or vain glory will be able to be the end of the one acting. Concerning this alone, as being the only thing properly called end (motive), we must speak.

But this is: 1° either primary, which flows into the act as an efficient cause, so that without it the act would not be done; or secondary, which only allures to acting, without nevertheless being the efficient cause of the action. Thus a priest in celebrating Mass primarily intends the worship of God, secondarily the stipend.

For others, the primary end is that on account of which the act is chiefly placed; the secondary is that which moves the agent less than the primary, yet so that nothing prevents the agent, if that (secondary end) were lacking, from not acting. Primary in the former sense (which is ours) is equivalently the only or total end, and thus it is understood by St. Alphonsus (H. A. XVI. 136), when he explains who are to be judged to pass otherwise into fraud of reservation. Secondary, in the latter signification, is employed by the same holy Doctor, L. IV. n. 206, § Nota igitur, and is called by him the secondarily motive, without which the act (he is treating of a vow) would not be done. The Vindiciae give an example (Ed. 2. T. I. p. 307 (1); Ed. 1. p. 919. 1) in one who resolves to enter Religion in order to work out his eternal salvation; but since he is borne inordinately toward the eating of fish, he wishes to enter none but that of the Carthusians.

2° The end is intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it. Again the ultimate end is either a) positively or negatively ultimate, according as it is intended, or is not intended, with the exclusion of another end; or b) explicitly or implicitly intended, according as the agent is moved by an end of this sort expressly or only virtually. Thus the dealings by which a miser strives to increase riches, in which he places his beatitude or ultimate end, can be called so many intermediate ends. But if in riches the will rests in such a way that it excludes God, these will constitute an end positively ultimate; otherwise negatively ultimate. Again, if it expressly excludes God, those dealings will be an ultimate end explicitly intended; if not expressly, but he acts in such a way that he must be said by his deed to exclude Him, as if for increasing riches he commits mortal thefts, those dealings will be an ultimate end implicitly intended; for through mortal sin he renounces God. - A means is that which is intended insofar as it is useful for the end, without the will taking pleasure in it, as, for example, the lack of food which the miser unwillingly tolerates in order to increase his riches. Hence the intermediate end participates in the nature of a means insofar as it is referred to a further end; but in the nature of an end insofar as the will takes pleasure in it.

I say: 1° A human act derives true morality from the end, as being consonant with or dissenting from reason. Thus it is conformed to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give them for the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say: 2° He sins who acts for delight alone. The reason is that he acts inordinately, perverting the order of things instituted by the author of nature. For according to the order instituted by the author of nature, delight exists on account of operation, and not conversely; namely delight, for example in eating or drinking, is as a certain salt and seasoning, which serves for enticing one to actions necessary or useful for life. Therefore delight is only a means for carrying out those actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but is not the ultimate end of the action. For thus St. Thomas says: The divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, has appointed delights on account of operation.¹ Confirmation from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV). - Yet this disorder of itself is not grave, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; because ordinarily the ultimate end is not excluded, not even implicitly, unless the matter is of those "whose," as the Apostle says, "God is the belly."

29. Resolutions. - 1° Every choice of an evil means is evil, but, conversely, not every choice of a good means is good. Thus no one is praised from the fact that he abstains from drink from avarice; but he is to be held guilty who steals money for making alms.

2° He who chooses an honorable means for an honorable end places an act of twofold honorableness, if each honorableness is intended. Likewise he is guilty of twofold malice who chooses an evil means for an evil end, for instance if someone steals money in order to make himself drunk.

3° He who employs an evil means for a good end contracts only the malice of the means, for example if someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger. Likewise, conversely, he who employs an honorable means for an evil end contracts only the malice of the end.

4° He who employs an indifferent means for a good or evil end contracts only the goodness or malice of the end. Thus, for example, if you take up a journey in order to show a traveler the way, you have only the merit of the end; likewise if you sing in order to cause annoyance to another, you contract only the guilt of the end.

30. Questions. - It is asked 1° whether any evil end corrupts the whole goodness of the act.

Resp. 1° A gravely evil end always wholly infects the act, however good the object may be in itself. For an act by which someone, by sinning mortally, totally withdraws from God, can in no part be approved by God. Thus if someone gives alms to a needy girl in order to entice her to sin, although also in order to relieve her poverty, the act is wholly infected by the evil end.

Resp. 2° A lightly evil end also corrupts the whole act if it is the total end, or at least the primary end of the agent. For the total end (i.e. the end intended solely), since it embraces the whole object, infects the whole, because the agent wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil.²

This is also clear from the words of Christ:¹ "If ... thy eye be evil, thy whole body will be dark." But if there is a twofold end, and the evil one is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because in such a case there is not indeed physically, but morally, one act of the will, since the secondary end is subordinated to the primary end² (in the sense declared above in n. 28 in the former place); as if someone gives alms from mercy and from vain glory, and would not give unless he expected the praises of men.

Resp. 3° But if the end, lightly evil, is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, which is partly good and partly evil. The reason is that in this case two acts of the will are present, even morally, of which one is not subordinated to the other, and of which one is good, the other evil. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. - You have an example in one who from a sincere affection of mercy wishes to give alms to a poor person, but because the poor person asks publicly, there also enters the stimulus of vain glory, which is not repelled. - Let the same be the judgment concerning a lightly evil circumstance sometimes accompanying an act good from the object, as when someone, rebuking another from charity, incidentally consents to a movement of anger. For a movement of this sort is an act standing of itself. Wherefore properly it does not deprave the act which it accompanies, but mixes evil with it.²

31. - It is asked 2° whether all our actions must be referred to God, according to the words of the Apostle:³ Whether therefore you eat, ... do all things unto the glory of God?

Resp. More commonly, with St. Thomas, Doctors teach⁴ that in the words of the Apostle a precept is truly contained.

It is asked 3° what is required so that one not sin against this precept.

Resp. "This relation" of all works "unto the glory of God is understood either in act, or in aptitude of being referred, which is not only in good things, but also in indifferent things."⁵ With these things set down, I say:

1° On the part of the work, it is required that it be referable to God; such is also a work indifferent from the object. Therefore it suffices that it be neither mortally nor venially evil.

2° On the part of the agent, some positive relation of works to God is certainly required. But what kind?

Resp. a) An actual relation is required as often as the precept of eliciting an act of charity urges; for "under the precept of charity it is contained that God be loved from the whole heart; and therefore a man cannot fulfill the precept of charity unless all things also are referred to God."¹

b) When the precept of eliciting an act of charity is not urging, a virtual relation is required and suffices. It is required, "so that an actual relation to God be joined to every action of ours, not indeed in act but in virtue, according as the virtue of the first ordering," i.e. of the actual ordering previously had, "remains in all following actions, just as the virtue of the ultimate end also remains in all ends ordered to it."²

c) In neither case is an explicit relation required, but an implicit one suffices. It suffices in the former case, namely when the precept of eliciting an act of charity urges, "because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all the things which are ordered to him."³ It likewise suffices in the latter case; for "it is not necessary," nor possible, "that someone always think of the ultimate end whenever he desires or does something."⁴

d) It is not required that we refer our works to God from the motive of charity; for the mode of charity does not fall under the precept of the divine law, except when from precept an act of charity is to be elicited.⁵ St. Alphonsus agrees,⁶ requiring nothing other and nothing more, except that works be referred "to any honorable good."

e) Nor is it required that all things be done from a supernatural motive. "And therefore when some unbeliever, from the dictate of reason, does some good thing, not referring it to evil, he does not sin."⁷ This is confirmed from proposition 8 among those condemned by Alexander VIII (p. XXII).

Corollaries. - 1. Those are to be said to observe this precept, insofar as it demands an actual relation, who elicit an act of charity when the precept of eliciting it urges.

2. Likewise those who, when this precept does not urge, deliberately place a work honorable in itself, "not referring it to evil";¹ - who study to preserve the mean of virtue in jokes, games, recreations, adornment, etc.;² - who collectively order all their works to God. For those who deliberately place a work honorable in itself, by this very fact that they do not refer it to evil, are to be judged to intend, at least implicitly, the honorableness of the work. But those who study to preserve the mean of virtue in jokes, etc., by this very zeal of theirs show themselves to seek the good of virtue. Finally, the collective relation of all works to God implicitly contains the relation of each one.

3. "Although someone approaching the table does not think of the conservation of life, but only of the delight of food, ... he does not on that account sin, because he wills such delight," at least virtually (as is supposed), "on account of the conservation of life, and thus he does not inordinately seek it."³

4. "That the intention may remain more in virtue in our daily actions,"⁴ and that the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled in a more perfect and more salutary manner, "one ought more often in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer all one's acts to God."⁵

It is asked 4° in what way the human will, that it may be good, ought to be conformed to the divine will.

Resp. 1° In all things it ought to be conformed at least negatively, i.e. it is never permitted to disapprove that which God wills, or to murmur against it; for He disposes all things wisely.

Resp. 2° Positively our will can be conformed to the divine will in two ways, namely in the thing willed materially and in the thing willed formally. The thing willed materially is the thing itself or object which we will; the thing willed formally is the reason or end on account of which we will that thing. Again, the thing willed formally is of two kinds: one proximate or particular, i.e. the particular reason on account of which we will that thing; the other universal or ultimate, and it is the glory of God. Thus, while I will my father to live, whom God wills to die, the thing willed materially is the life of the father; the thing willed formally and proximately is the reason of piety toward one's father, the good of the family, etc. But if I should will this ultimately on account of the glory of God, my will is conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately; because just as the ultimate reason on account of which God wills my father to die is the glory of God, so the ultimate reason on account of which I will my father to live is also the glory of God. With these things set down:

I say: a) Our will ought positively to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately, but not always in the thing willed formally and proximately. - I say: "it ought positively to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately"; for the motive of the divine will is ultimately referred to the glory of God, to which the human will, that it may be right, ought to refer all its actions, at least virtually, as was said above.

I added: "but not always in the thing willed formally and proximately"; because, although it is unlawful to will something opposed to the divine will under the same reason under which God wills it, nevertheless it is not always unlawful to will it under a diverse reason, namely one which is not dishonorable. Thus it can happen that a son, on account of reasons of particular good, lawfully wills his father to live; but God wills him to die on account of other reasons, for example on account of sins, or because the course of nature demands it.

I say: b) Our will ought to be positively conformed to the divine will also in the thing willed materially, where the matter concerns a sufficiently known precept or prohibition; for the will of God commanding or prohibiting, when sufficiently known, always has annexed the will of obliging man to willing and doing what He commands, or to not willing and not doing what He forbids. I said: "where the matter concerns a precept or prohibition." - Wherefore 1. of itself I am not bound to will to follow the evangelical counsels. Yet I am bound, as is clear from the things said under Resp. 1°, to be conformed negatively to the divine will with respect to them, insofar as it is not permitted to disapprove them, since they are good and salutary. - Nor 2.

am I bound to will all things harmful to me which, God willing, happen to me, hunger, sickness, the death of parents, etc., in such a way that it is lawful for me, as much as I can, to flee them or strive against them. But after and insofar as these things have already happened, it is not permitted with an absolute and consequent will to oppose them, because again this would be the same as not being conformed to the divine will even negatively. But with an antecedent or conditioned will I am not bound in these things to be conformed to the divine will; and in this way it is lawful for a son to will his father, who is already dead, to live, namely while he wills this under another reason than that under which God willed the opposite. For the antecedent or conditioned will considers the life of the father under the reason of a particular good, abstractly from the circumstance of the divine will. - Haine,¹ Dens.² Cf. S. Th.³ and St. Alphonsus.⁴

The subject of the present lecture, gentlemen, is “Insanity.”

I. This subject belongs to a course of Medical Jurisprudence, because a physician who treats patients for insanity is liable, from time to time, to be cited before a court of law either as a witness or as an expert. His conduct in such cases is to be guided by the principles of natural and legal justice.

Various important cases at law turn upon the question of a person’s soundness of mind; and frequently the medical expert has it in his power to furnish the court with more reliable information in this matter than any one else. At one time, the validity of a last will may be contested, and the possession of a fortune by one party or another may hinge on the question whether the testator at the time of making his will was in sufficient possession of his mental powers to perform an act of so much consequence.

At another time, interested parties may plead for or against the validity of a sale or other bargain made by a person of doubtful competency of mind; or a life-insurance company may be interested in ascertaining the mental condition of an applicant for membership; or it may be questioned whether the payment of an insurance policy is due to the family of a suicide, the doubt depending for solution on the sound or unsound condition of his mind at the moment of the fatal act. Again, there may be a real or pretended doubt whether a certain property-owner is so far demented as to be unfit to manage his estate; or whether he needs a guardian to take care of his person; or it may even seem necessary to confine him in a lunatic asylum. There may be objections raised to the mental soundness of a witness in a civil or a criminal suit; or, finally, a criminal prosecution will depend mainly on the sanity or insanity of the culprit at the moment when the crime was committed; as was the case with a Prendergast and a Guiteau.

You see, then, gentlemen, that important interests are dependent on the thorough and correct understanding of this matter; and therefore much responsibility rests upon the experts consulted in such cases: property, honor, liberty, nay, even life itself may be at stake.

That cases involving an insane condition of mind must be of frequent occurrence, both in the medical and in the legal professions, is apparent from the large and rapidly increasing amount of lunacy in our modern civilization. Wharton and Stillé’s “Medical Jurisprudence” states (sec. 770, note) that in 1850 there was in Great Britain one lunatic to about one thousand persons; only thirty years later the Lunacy Commission of Great Britain reported one lunatic to 357 persons in England and Wales, that is, nearly three times as many. In New York there is one to 384 persons. It appears certain that its increase of late is out of all proportion to the increase of population; and even though I see reasons to distrust somewhat the figures quoted for England, enough is known to create serious alarm regarding the fruits of modern manners and customs on the minds of thousands. This fact makes the matter of insanity very important for the medical and the legal student.

II. Still it must be noted that the responsibility of deciding cases of lunacy does not rest chiefly with the medical expert. In cases of doubtful insanity the decision is to be given not by the Doctor but by the court of justice. Except on very special occasions, as when a physician is appointed on a committee or commission of inquiry, he appears before a court either as an ordinary witness, stating what facts have fallen under his personal observation; or as an expert, explaining the received opinion of medical men with regard to cases of a certain class. Even though he feels convinced that the culprit or the patient is as mad as a March hare, the physician cannot expect that his statement to that effect will be received as decisive. It is for the judge to instruct the jury what kind or degree of insanity will excuse a culprit from legal punishment, or will disqualify a person from testifying as a witness, or from being a party to a civil contract in certain cases; and it is for the jury to decide whether, in the case in hand, the fact of such insanity exists or not. In criminal cases, the jury pronounces on the double question, whether the accused did the act charged to him, and whether he has been juridically proved to have been accountable for the act under the laws as expounded by the judge.

1. To come to a decision on this double question, the jury might need to hear the facts stated which the physician has personally observed, and of which he is summoned to be a sworn witness. In such a situation all that is required of the Doctor is that he shall give a most faithful and intelligent account of the facts.

It would disgrace his standing in society if any fault could be found with his testimony; and, as a sworn witness, he is bound in conscience, like any other witness, to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This is always the case when the purpose of the inquiry is the discovery of the sane or insane condition of a person’s mind. But if the inquiry concerns the performance of the guilty act, the commission of the crime, many States of the Union, as explained before, consider the Doctor’s professional secrets as privileged, just like those of the lawyer and the clergyman; i.e., the Doctor must not use against his patient any knowledge he has become possessed of while acting as his medical adviser.

2. When the physician appears before a court or commission as an expert, he is expected to give the views of the medical profession upon hypothetical cases resembling the one under examination, and the scientific reasons and authorities on which those views are advanced.

3. But here a considerable difficulty presents itself; it is so serious that, owing to it, the weight of the medical expert’s testimony with judge and jury is often much less than could reasonably be desired. The difficulty is to ascertain what really are the views of the medical profession on any given subject. Of course no individual Doctors can put themselves up as representing the convictions of the medical profession, nor can they always appeal to the unanimous agreement of their leading men. Leading physicians, unfortunately, are far from entertaining concordant views on many most vital questions. It is this want of agreement that has made the testimony of experts so powerless to sway the minds of judge and jury.

The medical profession has no organization through which it can pronounce judgment. In fact, many of its most conspicuous members have adopted principles at variance with the deepest convictions of mankind generally; such, for instance, are the followers of Darwin, Huxley, Maudsley, and similar agnostic and materialistic leaders of modern thought.

4. What still further diminishes the credit of medical experts is the fact that, both in civil and criminal trials, they are summoned either by the defence or by the prosecution, and are thus naturally selected, not on account of their thorough knowledge, but on account of their peculiar views known beforehand to the parties citing them. Thus their testimony is likely to be partial to either side, and is distrusted; at least it fails to command perfect confidence. The only way in which the prejudices thus created against the physician can be overcome is by his acquiring thorough knowledge of his specialty, and showing himself on all occasions to be as honorable and faithful as he is evidently experienced and intelligent.

5. The medical profession could be brought to be much more useful to society for the discovery of insanity if we could have here something like what exists in some parts of Germany. “The practice obtains there of requiring the medical faculty of each judicial district to appoint a special committee, to which questions of this kind are referred. This committee is examined directly by the court, and gives testimony somewhat in the same way, and with the same effect, as would a common-law court when reporting its judgment in a feigned issue from chancery, or as would assessors called upon under the canon law to state, in proceedings under the law, what is the secular law of the land on the pending question” (Wharton and Stillé, sec. 274).

The matter of introducing some such practice into this country has been agitated of late, and may by and by lead to beneficial results. Dr. Shrady has taken steps to promote this object by striving to have a law enacted by the New York legislature providing for the regulation of expert medical testimony in jury trials. According to his plan, once such a commission has been established, the court is to send the medical issue to these experts, just as it sends other issues to special juries to be decided. The regular petit jury will then decide only upon the facts constituting the crime.

This would do away with special pleas of insanity before a jury that knows little or nothing about the nature of the disease, and whose sympathies may readily be worked upon by shrewd lawyers to render a verdict of acquittal.

As things are now, the medical expert, summoned to testify in a case of contested sanity or insanity of mind, ought to rise above minor considerations, and promote the cause of justice, by giving all the valuable information that his profession enables him to acquire on the very difficult subject of mental unsoundness.

6. For this purpose, he must be skilled in three departments of science.

(a) In law—sufficiently to understand what are considered by the courts as characteristic marks of an insane mind, and what amount of sanity the courts require to hold a culprit responsible for his crime or a contract valid in its effects.

(b) In psychology—to such an extent that the expert witness can speak analytically and correctly as to the properties and actions of the human mind.

(c) In medicine—so far as concerns the treatment of the insane, and the understanding of their peculiarities, so as to reason from them by induction to the real condition of the client’s or patient’s mind.

But the main requisite for an expert witness is to understand clearly in what insanity properly consists, and how far it ought to excuse an insane man from bearing the consequences of his acts.

III. This two-fold knowledge is obtained by the psychological study of insanity, on which study we are now to enter, and it is the principal point in this whole matter.

Insanity means a want of soundness; he is insane whose mind is not sound, but is deranged, and therefore, like a machine out of order, it cannot properly perform its specific task, namely, to know the truth of things. An insane man cannot judge rightly.

1. Insanity takes various forms, which may be reduced to two kinds, with the doubtful addition of a third kind, namely, moral insanity, of which we shall speak in our next lecture.

The first kind consists in the total want or gross torpor of mental activity. When there is a total, or nearly total, eclipse of the intellect, the disease is called idiocy, the state of an idiot. When there is an abnormally low grade of the reasoning power, it is styled imbecility. The failure or decay of reason in old age is called dotage.

The second kind of insanity is called illusional or delusional. In it the intellect is not impotent; on the contrary, it is often unusually active; but its action is abnormal, its conclusions are false. Not that it reasons illogically or draws conclusions which are not contained in the premises. Very keen logicians may be demented. Their unsoundness arises from the fact that they reason from false premises; and they get their false premises from their diseased imaginations, whose vagaries they take for realities.

2. Here a difficulty presents itself, which we must explain at once, namely, how can there be unsoundness of mind at all? Is not the intellect of man a simple power, and his soul a simple being? How can a simple being become deranged? Can that which has no parts become disarranged, disorganized? I answer, the soul is a simple being, its intellect is a spiritual faculty; and therefore we never say that the soul is insane, nor should we say that the intellect is insane or diseased; but we say that the mind is deranged or insane; the mind comprises more than the intellect; it designates the intellect together with those lower powers that supply the materials for our thought, the chief of which is the imagination. Now the imagination is an organic faculty: it works in and by a bodily organism, which is the brain. Therefore, when the brain is not in a normal condition, the action of the imagination may be disordered. And the intellect or understanding of the spiritual soul is so closely united in its action and its very being with the organic body that the two ever act conjointly, like the two wheels of a vehicle. If one wheel breaks down, the other is thrown out of gear. Thus it is readily understood that mental unsoundness is an affection of the brain, a bodily disease, which may often be relieved and even cured by bodily remedies, by the use of drugs or wholesome food, healthy exercise, fresh air, and all that benefits the nervous system.

Pathologically considered, the nerves may be too excited or too sluggish and torpid; and we have as the result two subdivisions of mental insanity—mania and melancholia. The differences between these two are very striking; as they proceed from opposite causes they produce opposite effects, and, therefore, they betray themselves by very different manifestations; but in one point the two agree, and with this point precisely we are concerned, because in it lies the essence of mental insanity, namely, that both produce a disordered action of the imagination.

3. The manner in which the imagination co-operates in mental action is this. It presents to the intellect the materials from which that power forms its ideas. When we see, feel, hear, taste, or smell anything by our bodily senses, our imagination takes note of the object perceived by forming a brain-picture of it which is called a phantasm. I do not mean to say that it forms a photographic picture of the object; for there can be no photographing taste or smell or feeling; but it forms an image of some kind which it presents to the intellect. This power at once proceeds to form, not a brain-picture, but an intellectual or abstract image of the object presented. For instance, you see this book, and at once you, in some mysterious way which has never yet been explained, impress some image of it on your brain. That you do so is clear from the fact that the image remains when the book is withdrawn. That material image or brain-picture is the phantasm. It is not an idea, though it is often improperly so called. But your intellect forms to itself an idea of a book; that is, you know what is meant by a book. You distinguish between the mere form of a book and the book itself. Your idea of a book is a universal idea, which stands for any book, no matter of what shape or size. Every phantasm, or brain-picture, is a representation which presents its object as having a definite shape or size, while your idea of a book ignores any shape or size. And yet, when your intellect conceives a book, your imagination will picture some particular form of book. If your brain became so affected by disease as to be unfit for the formation and retention of the proper phantasms, then your intellect either would not work at all or it would work abnormally; your mind would then be insane.

4. Now, in an infant the brain is still too soft and imperfect to form the proper phantasms from which the intellect is to elaborate its ideas. A false school of psychology would say that the infant’s brain cannot yet ideate; but that is incorrect language. No brain can ideate or form ideas; an idea is an intellectual or mind image, not a brain image; it is an abstract and universal image, and matter cannot represent but what is concrete and individual. Only a simple and spiritual being, the rational soul, can form ideas. Nevertheless our soul, in its present state of substantial union with our body, is extrinsically dependent on the body; to form ideas it needs to have the sensible object presented to it by a phantasm or brain-picture. Now, a child born blind and deaf, and thus having its mind, as it were, cut off from communication with the outer world, could scarcely form the necessary phantasms, because the clogged senses could not supply proper materials for them; such a child would, therefore, be apt to remain idiotic. And even in children whose outer senses are sound the brain or the nervous system may be too imperfect to allow of its forming proper phantasms. In this torpor of the mind then consists the first kind of mental unsoundness, that of idiocy, or its milder form imbecility. In old age, and in peculiar diseases, the worn-out system may return to a second childhood, then called dementia or dotage. The existence of such species of insanity is not difficult to discover.

5. The second and more common form of insanity, and that which it is often difficult to discover and pronounce upon with certainty, is that which I have called delusional or illusional. Its characteristic trait, its very essence, lies in this, that the insane man mistakes what he imagines for what is real; and he cannot be made to distinguish between imagination and reality, though the difference is obvious to an intellect in its normal state.

In this connection, it is well to point out a distinction, not always observed, but useful to explain the workings of an insane mind, between illusions, hallucinations, and delusions.

(a) An illusion is properly a deception arising from a mistake in sense-perception; as when a half-drunken man sees two posts where there is only one. He has a picture of the post in each eye, and his brain is too much disturbed to refer the two pictures to the same object. In this case the cause of the mistake is subjective. A mirage offers another instance of a sense-illusion; but in it the cause is objective.

(b) A hallucination is a creation of the fancy mistaken for a reality. The deception may be but momentary, as when Macbeth is stealing on tiptoe to the chamber of his guest to murder him. His mind is disturbed by the imagination of the horrid deed he is about to perpetrate. He thinks he sees a dagger in the air, and he says: “Is this a dagger that I see before me, its handle towards my hand? Come, let me clutch thee. I hold thee not, and yet I see thee still; and on thy dudgeon gouts of blood, which was not so before.” But Macbeth, upon a moment’s reflection, sees it is all imagination. “There’s no such thing,” he exclaims. He is not insane, though deceived for a while.

(c) A delusion, on the contrary, is a permanent deception, whether it results from an illusion or a hallucination, it matters not; as a fact, it almost always originates in hallucinations. The deluded man clings to his imaginings; you cannot talk them out of his head. Such is the case of an inebriate who suffers from mania a potu, or “the horrors;” he sees snakes and demons, he thinks, and persists in his error. Such also is a fixed idea not arrived at by faulty reasoning, but come unbidden and proof against all reasoning and evidence. Thus an insane man may be convinced, solely by his imagination, that he is poisoned or pursued or conspired against.

6. This delusion constitutes the essence of mental insanity, which therefore is often called delusional insanity. It may be chronic, i.e., of long continuance, or it may be temporary, acute. For the time being, the effects are the same. Perhaps any man may, at times, be for a moment thrown off his guard, and mistake a fancy for a reality; this does not constitute lunacy. But when the error is so firmly held in the mind’s grasp that nothing can dislodge it thence, then the mind is deranged in its special sphere of action, which consists in knowing the real from the unreal; the mind is then insane.

You notice, gentlemen, that I speak of the mind as grasping the error, and I suppose it to do so independently of the free will’s command. But when the error is voluntary; when a man clings to it simply because he loves it; when he hugs a delusion to his heart, this shows not mental but moral obliquity; it is not insanity but self-deception, and it is by no means of rare occurrence. In a well-reasoned article on “The Metaphysics of Insanity,” written by Mr. James M. Wilcox and printed in the “American Catholic Quarterly Review” for January, 1878, some very severe and no less true strictures are made upon the readiness of a vast multitude of people to practise this wilful self-deception. “Self,” he writes (p. 54), “is the prolific origin of such errors; and so indulgent are we to its faults that we try secretly to hide them even from our own eyes, mostly with success; and where success is not perfect, we make a second effort to hide the imperfection. Repeated efforts of this kind, from which we but half turn away, are crowned in the end, and we soon forget what successful hypocrites we have been. Our numerous passions, the complexities of our desires, the tenacity of their grasp, and the pleasant gentleness of its touch explain an infinity of temptations followed by wilful successes in blindness, all of which are nothing less than guilty acts of self-deception.”

7. It oftens[**] happens in real insanity that mental derangement manifests itself upon one error or one group of errors only, while for all the rest the patient appears to be quite rational. Such a man is called a monomaniac. But he is truly an insane man; for the essence of insanity is in him. It is usually found that a monomaniac will, sooner or later, exhibit signs of mental unsoundness on other matters as well; and even while he has given no such signs, it still remains true that a mind cannot be trusted, but has something radically unsound about it, if it is really unhinged at any point at all.

But then you must be very careful not to confound monomania with eccentricity. The distinction is as important as it is real. Eccentricity is a conscious aberration from the common course of life; it consists in peculiarities in reasoning, words, and actions, which are wilfully indulged, in defiance of popular sentiment. The eccentric man knows that he is eccentric; he is willing to be so, and to take the consequences; but he is not insane.

VIII. Lust voluntary in its cause, from which it is foreseen to follow, is sin to the extent that the cause, insofar as it influences it, is sin. Hence it is a sin grave by its genus, which admits lightness of matter.

It is proved: in venereal pleasure willed in the cause, the consent of the will is borne only toward the cause which provokes the pleasure; therefore it is evil only to the extent that the cause itself is evil. Hence the malice is to be determined from the influence on venereal pleasure; and besides this it must be seen whether perhaps there is a just and proportionate reason for placing the cause on account of a good effect and permitting the evil effect.

Now there are actions which cause a base motion per se, others per accidens, according as they are apt to cause it, or on the contrary are not apt to cause it although nevertheless they can cause it. Actions which by their nature are apt to excite venereal pleasure, and thus are ordered to generation, cause it per se, for example a base look, touch, or imagination. Moreover, of these actions some influence that effect proximately and notably, namely those from which the base effect always or almost always follows, for example a repeated touch on the obscene parts of another person;²³ others influence the base motion only remotely and lightly, from which therefore the evil effect rarely arises, for example a touch made in passing on the immodest parts of one's own body.²⁴ Their influence must also be considered relatively, because by its nature it depends somewhat on the varying inclination and disposition of the subject, as in childhood, youth, or old age, in affection or habit of mind, in a warm or cold bodily constitution; hence certain causes are more vehement with respect to one such person, which are light with respect to another, for example a continued look at a naked person of the same sex, or a continued touch of one's own body.

²³ Actions gravely exciting, according to Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 864, are: "a more vivid practical thought concerning venereal matters; touch exercised on the obscene parts of another person, unless perhaps it is done entirely in passing in a person of the same sex without depraved affection; a voluntarily continued look at a completely naked person of the other sex; indeed also the look of a man at the naked chest of a woman, or the look at an obscene picture, at least if it is continued after commotion has already arisen."

²⁴ Actions lightly exciting, according to Lehmkuhl, ibidem, are: "touch or look on the immodest parts of one's own body made in passing; a non-immodest and light touch of a woman made in passing; taking her hand; a light kiss from an honorable cause; vain conversation with a woman; a non-fixed look at the chest; a fortiori other lighter looks."

Actions which of themselves pertain in no way to generation and are outside the genus of immodesty cause a base motion per accidens, for example to eat or drink immoderately, to use a bath, to ride, to sit or lie in a certain position, to exercise sight or touch on honorable parts on account of merely sensible pleasure. Indeed there are persons who, from actions which in no way relate to the venereal matter, are vehemently excited by a hidden force. Among causes per accidens are counted those actions which remotely and lightly influence the base effect, even if sometimes they influence it gravely, because this proceeds not from their nature but from the intervention of another cause, for example from the subject's infirmity, custom, obsession, weakness, heredity, and so forth.²⁵

²⁵ From the preceding things those opinions can be reconciled which at first sight seem opposed, while some deny that the influence of the cause is to be determined from the disposition of the agent, while others on the contrary affirm it, or assert that it depends principally on the nature of the cause, secondarily on the disposition of the agent. Noldin says, for example, cited work, n. 35: "He who, on account of peculiar disposition and infirmity, suffers frequent pollutions from actions licit in themselves, which by their nature influence them only lightly, is not bound to abstain from those actions, provided consent to the pleasure is excluded: for in placing them he uses his own right." Namely, this is valid concerning causes per accidens, not concerning causes per se. On the contrary, Genicot, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 377: "For determining which causes influence gravely and which lightly, attention must principally be paid to the nature of the cause; secondarily to the disposition of the agent. Whether a cause by its nature influences gravely or lightly often appears easily enough to each one. But in many cases the matter is not so clear: in these especially one must attend to the condition from the disposition of the agent. For the influence of the same causes is very much diminished or increased according to age, constitution, force of imagination, education, degree of virtue, custom of hearing, seeing, handling base things, and so forth." Indeed Aertnijs, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 260, conformably to the doctrine of Saint Alphonsus: "He who, from inclination toward venereal things, has experienced frequent pollution from causes not indeed gravely immodest by their nature, nor on the other hand altogether light, but which in him more vehemently arouse pollution, is bound, when no reason is given for placing them, to abstain from them, and indeed under grave obligation: because with respect to such a person, on account of his inclination, causes of this sort excite not lightly but gravely." Namely, these things are valid concerning causes per se, not concerning causes per accidens.

With these things posited we say:

a. It is a mortal sin without sufficient reason to place a cause which per se proximately or gravely influences carnal motions or venereal pleasure, even if these by accident do not follow; for example very obscene reading, or a prolonged touch or look at an immodest part. One case is excepted: when someone from his own experience knows certainly that he is not gravely moved by an action of this sort.

Practically, however, for mortal sin two things are often required: first, that the cause influence grave motions, that is, vehement ones, or those sufficiently proximately disposing to pollution, or causing great pleasure; for since light and transitory motions are most frequent, to avoid the causes of all of these would be very troublesome, indeed morally impossible, and therefore not to be urged under grave obligation, because often there is present a reason excusing in some measure, not from the whole, namely, but from so much; secondly, moreover, that the cause influence those grave motions proximately or gravely. Therefore Saint Alphonsus rightly notes²⁶ that even pollution itself is not mortal unless it proceeds from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust or immodesty. It must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil to that degree to which the cause itself is evil, that is, to which the cause is evil insofar as it is a cause or insofar as it influences; but every and only a cause which of itself gravely influences motions prohibited under grave obligation, unless there is present a reason excusing from a good effect which compensates the evil, is mortal insofar as it is a cause. It must be in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, for example drunkenness or immoderate eating of meat.

²⁶ Theologia Moralis, book III, treatise IV, n. 484.

b. It is a venial sin without a just cause to place an action influencing lightly or remotely or per accidens into even vehement motions and complete venereal pleasure, provided those things do not please and no proximate danger of consent is present. For a light influence on a grave thing is a light thing.²⁷ Such things are a conversation not prolonged with a girl, a look, a touch, reading that is not very base. A sufficient reason is any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

²⁷ And so an act which would influence only lightly into grave commotion, indeed into pollution, would for this reason be only venially evil. And in this there is a great difference from lust voluntary in itself: for direct intention toward venereal pleasure, even a small one, manifests a disposition of soul very different from that which is found in him who does not seek, indeed does not will, that pleasure. The first per se incurs proximate danger of consenting to further pleasure on account of his own propensity; not so necessarily the other.

c. It is no sin to place from a just cause an action from which inordinate motions are foreseen to follow, even pollution, provided the proximate danger of consent is always absent. A just cause is, for a priest, to hear confessions and to study base matters; for a surgeon, to look at and touch immodest parts; likewise for one serving the infirm or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself from necessity, to ride for the sake of recreation or utility, to perform gymnastic exercises, to lie down in a more comfortable position, while sitting to put leg over leg according to custom, and to take warm foods and drinks moderately.²⁸

²⁸ You will find the whole doctrine concerning lust voluntary in its cause expounded in Billuart, diss. 6, a. 12. P. Vermeersch proposes the matter otherwise and speaks of disguised lust, cited work, n. 374 and 388, in place of lust voluntary in its cause. Yet our mode seems clearer and more open, more conformable to principles and older. Moreover, although at first sight the distinguished theologian may seem to dissent, nevertheless in fact he teaches the same. "For observe," he says, "that the sin of imperfect lust is committed directly, not only when it is sought by express intention, but also when, without another immediate cause, acts are exercised which directly excite the flesh: for then you are judged to effect the venereal motion" (n. 374). Behold the principle; if now you want an example: "Kisses too frequently repeated, especially on the mouth or lips, too prolonged embraces, because they gravely move the flesh and have no cause among unmarried persons, are argued to be grave unless the carnal motion is positively repressed and, if pollution more strongly threatens, one ceases from these" (n. 401). Genicot-Salsmans has the right doctrine concerning lust voluntary in its cause as regards pollution voluntary in this way (Theologia Moralis, I, n. 401), but not as regards venereal motions, which are not proved to be grave, since in them, he says, there is no evident affection toward complete pleasure (n. 403). But this reason is null, for he who seeks incomplete pleasure by that very fact implicitly seeks complete pleasure, and he who wills the cause of pleasure implicitly wills the effect. Moreover this doctrine is new and is not found in the first editions made under the care of P. Genicot himself; it is not founded in tradition: the traditional doctrine holds that to place a cause per se gravely influencing grave motions is of itself a grave sin; nor is it sustained according to principles: for if something is in itself gravely evil, as venereal motions outside marriage are, it is also gravely evil perfectly to cause it, in the case at hand to place a cause per se gravely influencing such motions. Others state more practically: if the motions are grave and excited without just cause, there is great danger, and the sin is grave; on the contrary, if the motions are light, the danger is small and the sin light. But this is said according to presumptions, according to that which often or ordinarily occurs. For if the motions are grave, danger is not always and for all persons grave, nor is it grave to place a cause lightly influencing such motions. On the contrary, if the motions are only light, nevertheless sometimes grave danger can be present. And so it must be said in principle: to place a cause per se gravely influencing venereal motions is of itself a grave sin; to place a cause influencing lightly or per accidens is of itself a light sin.

II. From the doctrine concerning human acts we know that it is licit to place a cause which produces at the same time a good effect and an evil effect, if four conditions are present:

1. if the action in itself, that is, circumstances set aside, is not evil, but honorable or at least indifferent;

2. if the good effect follows from the cause at least as immediately as the evil one, or does not follow by means of the evil; otherwise it would be to work or effect good through evil, and therefore to will evil in some way as a means to good, although evils are not to be done that goods may come about;

3. if the evil effect is not intended, but only the good one; otherwise the evil effect would be voluntary in itself, or at least willed;

4. if there is a reason for placing the cause, and indeed a proportionately grave one, that is, so that the good procured exceeds or equals, and thus compensates for, the evil.

On the contrary, it is illicit if the action is evil in itself or has only an immediate evil effect, even if further from it there is procured, and intended by the agent, a much greater good effect. For although in judging the morality of the interior act of the will, it is necessary above all to regard the intention, nevertheless in judging the morality of the exterior act, one must consider not so much where it is ultimately terminated or what is intended by the agent, but first of all what is immediately done; and if that is evil, or if it immediately produces only an evil effect, even if further it tends or is ordered to some greatest good, it will always remain intrinsically evil.

I. Various pathological states. - Causes of nervous agitation, not rarely occurring in present times, which more or less impede human liberty and moral life, are pathological states or diseases of the mind, which are so called not because the soul or spiritual faculties can be sick in themselves, but because, on account of badly affected organs of the body, specifically centers of the brain and sensitive faculties, they are impeded in action, either transitorily or permanently. Now those who labor under such a morbid state are commonly called abnormal. These are distinguished according to diverse genera, according to their diverse illnesses, the principal of which are numbered here:¹

¹ Theologians are accustomed to treat of these in the doctrine concerning human acts. We have taken the principal things from Vermeersch, Prummer, and Tanquerey; Salsmans also has excellent things in the work Geneeskundige plichtenleer and in the article Abnormalen in den biechtstoel, in Pastor Bonus, Aug. 1927. Besides, the following can be compared: P. Janet, Les Obsessions et la Psychasthenie, Les Nevroses, Nevroses et idees fixes; Dr. Raymond, Nevroses et Psychasthenie; Rauh and Revault, Psychologie appliquee a la morale; Ribot, Les maladies de la volonte; Grasset, Demifous et demiresponsables, Psychisme inferieur, La responsabilite des criminels; Axenfeld and Huchard, Traite des Nevroses; Pitres and Regis, Les Obsessions et les Impulsions; Van Velsen, Hypnotisme, suggestion, psychotherapie; Francotte, La raison et la folie (Rev. des Q. scient., d. 27); Vigouroux, Traite de medecine, t. III; Dubois, Les psychonevroses et leur traitement moral; Pere Raymond, Le guide des nerveux et des scrupuleux; Eymieu, Le gouvernement de soi-meme (vol. 2); Surbled, La morale dans ses rapports avec la medecine et l'hygiene, t. III; Boule, Questions de responsabilite (N. R. Theol. 1910); D'Agnel and d'Espiney, Direction de conscience et Psychotherapie des troubles nerveux; Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoralmedezin (Latin and French versions); Familler, Pastoral-Psychiatrie; Bessmer, Storungen im Seelenleben, Die Grundlagen der Seelenstorungen, Seelische Hilfe bei Nervenleiden, Die Krankhaften Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit (in Stimmen); Schloss, Propadeutik der Psychiatrie (French version); Huber, Die Hemmnisse des Willensfreiheit; Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der speziellen Seelensorge; Romer, Psychiatrie und Seelesorge (an excellent work although the author is Protestant); Weber, Zwangsgedanken und Zwangszustande in pastoral-psychiatrischer Beurteilung; Tummers, De nieuwere richting in de strafwetenschap; Van der Hoeven, Psychiatrie (where sometimes there are positivist conceptions); Roels, De Psychologie van den wil; Schimm Van der Loeff and Barnhoorn, Zielsziekten en hunne verpleging; Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis; Gemelli, De scrupulis, psycho-pathologiae specimen, etc., etc.

1. Phrenesis, in which the sick put forth false judgments that are radically incurable, because they are deceived by perpetual or temporary hallucinations, or have disturbed associations of imagination, so that their psychic life can be equated with the life of those dreaming. Hence in delirium (even if it is monomania, or hallucination circumscribed to one topic) they are not free; during intervals of delirium nothing of itself impedes liberty.

2. Obsession so occupies the mind that the obsessed person is bound to think or do certain things. It disturbs practical judgment sufficiently, so that more often room is left only for light fault, and mortal sin can scarcely be given in them. But, besides perpetual obsessions, there are others which are generated only in certain circumstances; whence outside the state of obsession, the sick are held by the precept of fleeing occasions of morbid excitation toward committing dishonorable things, and if they freely violate this, they are guilty.

To obsession are reduced phobias, fixed ideas, and more intense scruples.²

² Concerning remedies and education against obsession and phobias, cf. Prummer, Th. M., I, n. 95; and Vermeersch, Th. M., I, n. 85.

3. Blind impulses or invincible propensities can exist in a morbid state, whether they immediately obtain an act that is not deliberate, or overcome fruitless resistance, so that the act is nevertheless elicited. Hence some are merely mechanical or motor, which often are without affection, as, for example, in an idiot; others are psycho-mechanical or even merely psychic, which occur with more distinct perception and stronger affection, and often leave partial liberty.

All suppose a suggestible person, for his passive docility depends on the intensity of a certain phantasm which rather easily generates an insuperable motion. Thus some are known to be prone to lies, others to internal blasphemies, others to suicide or homicide, others to thefts, drunkennesses, or fires, according as they labor under kleptomania, dipsomania, pyromania. Yet with these must not be confused those who from habit are thieves, drunkards, liars, etc.; for these certainly are not abnormal, but sinners from malice.

It is not easily discerned whether the impulses are truly irresistible, but it must be judged from all circumstances whether liberty is only diminished or taken away. The latter can easily be supposed a) if the action cannot be explained by natural concupiscence, b) if after the evil action the soul has remained quiet and content, c) if something is done which one otherwise altogether abhors; yet liberty is not always taken away. Hence those things can be applied which are handed down in the Treatise on Human Acts concerning violence, fear, and concupiscence.

4. Abulia renders the will powerless to will efficaciously that which is desired, whether it remains idle, or, as if unwillingly, is compelled to seek or flee certain things against its practical judgments. In the first case, the sick person is often excused from certain positive duties, because liberty is at least sufficiently diminished; in the second case, what has been said concerning impulses holds.

Abulia, however, is sometimes not universal, but limited to certain acts or certain times. Besides, it can be voluntary and free in the cause, when someone knowingly and freely has induced this state, e.g., by constantly abdicating the will without sufficient reason.

5. Neurasthenia is a pathological state consisting in habitual fatigue of the nervous system from an organic or psychic cause, in which the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although master of himself, labors under the greatest inconstancy and is greatly depressed physically and morally. Wherefore liberty is diminished, though not taken away. Hence the sick can rather easily be excused when, yielding to weariness, they neglect certain positive precepts, especially merely ecclesiastical ones, as an excessive burden. Nevertheless, of themselves they are to be judged to sin if, because of sadness, they seek shameful delights to which the illness itself does not impel.

6. Hysteria, although its cause is disputed, also carries with itself disorder and disturbance of the nervous system, but much graver than neurasthenia. It consists in an immense morbid suggestibility, from which sensibility is diminished or for a time extinguished in certain parts of the body (anesthesia), while in others it is rendered much more intense (hyperesthesia); there also arise motions of the body more or less disordered, and also vivid hallucinations or vehement passions which are very unstable and greatly impede the free exercise of the will, as also right judgment and moral sense. Hence in practice, only from all circumstances, and from the declaration of hysterical persons themselves, can it be known how much liberty remains in them. Yet hysterical agitation (crise, acces de grande hysterie) cannot be combined with grave guilt.

7. Still graver is larvate or hidden epilepsy, which impels one to perpetrate various strange, shameful, atrocious things: to inflict injury, blasphemies, shameful conversations, striking, homicide, etc.; not indeed constantly, but with longer intervals interposed, without the sick person retaining memory of all these things. Epileptic agitation or crisis certainly cannot be combined with grave guilt. But outside times of frenzy the mind is sane and perfectly free; unless sometimes a transitory psychic disturbance comes upon it.³

³ Speech is not instituted concerning hypnotism, because it is not an illness, but a phenomenon induced by an extrinsic cause.

All the aforesaid disturbances, even if they affect affection or the will, seem to draw their origin from an obscuring or diminution of intellectual cognition.

II. Conjectural signs of invincible inclination, by which it can more or less be discerned whether someone has yielded to an ineluctable inclination, are taken from various circumstances, especially taken together:

1. if on several occasions, and as if instinctively and swiftly after the manner of a mere instrument, he has placed some action, without any proper advantage, sensible delight, or satiation of a base instinct;

2. if he acted from a certain nervous anxiety or unrest which, when the action has been performed, immediately falls and becomes quiet; while on the contrary in a tranquil and quiet state he never acts thus;

3. if sincerely, and without any dissimulation, he wonders at his own operation, and spontaneously affirms himself conscious that he acted under the impulse of a certain violence;

4. finally, if he seems infected by hereditary blemish, by which, namely, his parents or blood-relatives also seem to labor under the same pathology.

Especially, in the matter of chastity and lust, there is sometimes given an abnormal propensity, as if invincible, toward sexual delight, namely sexual hyperesthesia or erotism, which according to the different sex is called satyriasis or nymphomania. Different species of this are numbered:⁴

⁴ Concerning these, our Questions concerning Chastity and Lust, pp. 99-102, can be compared.

a) a most vehement propensity to procuring self-abuse, especially among certain young persons of either sex;

b) exhibitionism, or an inclination to display in public the sexual parts or operations, every shame having been left behind;

c) homosexuality or uranism, that is, a perverse inclination toward the same sex, and as it were insensibility toward the other sex;

d) sexual perversion, by which venereal delight is procured from those things which are not by nature fitted to procure it. This is manifested in sadism, by which they inflict violence and torments on others to procure sexual delight for themselves; in masochism, by which, on the contrary, with a view to the same delight, they wish to undergo violence and torments; in fetishism, by which lust is excited by the sight or imagination of indifferent things (hair, shoes, cloths, etc.) which the mind conceives as associated with sexual things. In healing this, it is necessary to break apart that association and, as far as possible, erase it from memory.

III. As regards imputability and responsibility, the Determinists and Criminalists are not to be heard, who hold almost all malefactors as irresponsible sick persons, nor many physicians or cultivators of Psychiatry, who too easily deny the liberty and imputability of actions. But on the contrary, the better among them affirm not only that liberty generally is not extinguished, but also that the greatest influence is exercised by the soul upon the body, notwithstanding the latter's native propensity; and therefore in curing mental illnesses they are accustomed to use suggestion or moral persuasion, and indeed acknowledge the beneficial influence of the priest. Besides, for the greater part men are healthy, not abnormal; the latter constitute an exception.

Hence for practice let it be noted:

A human act is called only that act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man. The reason from St. Thomas is that only that act can be called truly human by which man acts insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures; but he differs from them precisely from this, that through free will he is master of his own acts. Therefore.

Nor say, 1st, that man differs essentially from brutes through the act of understanding; for it is answered that this difference must be considered here not only as to the substance of the work, but also as to the mode of operating; wherefore the act of understanding can be called the proper act of man, but not a human act taken strictly.

Nor say, 2nd, that the act by which we seek our beatitude in general is a human act properly so called, since it is perfectly voluntary and proceeds from perfect knowledge; for it is answered that here we consider man as he is a moral being, and his actions as they are worthy of praise or blame; but such they are not except insofar as they proceed from free will, which is the foundation of imputability. Hence although a necessary act of the will, if it is regarded according to its physical entity, can be called human, nevertheless in moral consideration, and in the usage especially current among theologians, it cannot. Hence it follows that human, moral, and free acts signify the same thing in moral matters, and can be used promiscuously.

But other acts, which are not referred to morals and are done in man or by man without any deliberation, such as first-first movements, or acts of a man wholly distracted, dreaming, raving, insane, drunk, or deprived of the use of reason in any manner whatever, are called acts of man, but not human acts. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 1, art. 1. - Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 1, disp. 2, sect. 2, n. 7. Baller., note (a), p. 1.

A human act is distinguished in many ways; for it is:

1st. Elicited or commanded. It is called elicited when it is consummated in the will itself, as an act of love, hatred, desire; but commanded when, at the command of the will, it is completed by another power, either internal, as an act of thinking, or external, as an act of walking, writing.

2nd. Internal or external. An internal act is that which is completed only by the internal powers of the soul, such as an act of thinking, loving; but an external or mixed act is that which the will completes through the organs of the body. An internal act is more specially called an act, and an external act is rather named an action.

3rd. Good, bad, indifferent. A good act is called that which is conformable to right reason; bad, that which is repugnant to the same; indifferent, that which is neither conformable to, nor repugnant to, the norm of reason.

A good or indifferent act, because it is prohibited by no law, is also called licit; but a bad act, because it is opposed to natural or positive law, is called illicit.

4th. Natural or supernatural. The former is that which is produced by the powers of nature alone; but the latter, that which is completed by the aid of divine grace. A supernatural act is further called meritorious either de condigno or de congruo, according as some retribution is repaid to it either from justice, or from mere fittingness and from the benignity of God.

5th. Valid or invalid. A valid act is that which enjoys all the essential requisites for producing its proper effect; but an invalid act is that which lacks even any one of the essentials.

DISSERTATION III

ON HUMAN ACTS SPECIALLY TAKEN

St. Thomas, Iª 2ae, from q. 8 to q. 17.

The general condition of human acts having been explained, namely by reason of voluntary and free, we must now treat of the acts themselves specially : first of elicited acts, then of imperated ones. Now six acts are elicited by will : three concerning end, namely simple volition, intention, and fruition; and three concerning means, namely consent, election, and active use. To these six acts of will there correspond on the part of intellect five directing acts, and one on part of executive powers. On part of intellect, two concerning end, namely simple apprehension and judgment; three concerning means, namely counsel or consultation, practical or discriminative judgment of means, and command. On part of other powers, passive use.

Of these Author treats quite fully through ten questions. Several things also concerning volitional power itself he intermingles in first questions, unto more accurate knowledge of acts. We shall select what are more useful.

This QUESTION is exceedingly weighty, and presupposes much, and hands down things necessary also for other Tracts, even that on marriage.

I ASSUME first, from the first part 2. Tract. 1. disp. 3. quaest. 5., that the Will, as regards elicited acts, cannot be coerced.

I ASSUME secondly, from the same disput. quaest. 8., that things done through fear are not involuntary. So holds also the Jurisconsult l. si mulier 21. §. si metu coactus, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. and l. cum proponas C. de hered. instit. and C. si privatus, ff. qui et a quibus. The reason is clear, because he can elicit, and not elicit, the act.

Fear IS a trepidation of mind from danger present or to come. So defines Ulpian the Jurisconsult, l. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. It is defined likewise by D. Bonav. 3. p. Centil. sect. 55. and in 4. at the place cited.

Fear is DIVIDED into Concussive, such as that which is inflicted by threats, and Impressive, which is called fear of Fact, as when deeds intervene, say blows, etc. So D. Bonav. loc. cit., on which Zasius Instit. de actione, §. quadrupli, num. 10. Bursatt. consil. 72. num. 11. vol. 1., where he reports others; Sanchez l. 3. de matrim. disput. 12 num. 8. Another fear they add, Compulsive from a powerful man, which is also called Violent; because the force that strikes fear is a man of great power: another fear, they say, is tacit, or of reverence, such as a daughter's toward her Father. The last they call fear of treachery, such as that of a sick man fearing to be treated treacherously by his physician.

Fear, then, is said of someone coerced conditionally, because setting fear aside the will would not will it; yet not absolutely, because he can still be unwilling, and therefore it is called conditional force.

BUT violent force, or absolute force, is that which is from without, not conferring force upon the sufferer ex 3. Eth. cap. 2., as if a Christian were dragged to a Mosque, and compelled by blows to offer incense to an Idol; which force D. Bonav. defines thus, loc. cit. Centil. and in 4. at the place cited, following the Jurisconsult, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa: Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest, which assuredly lacks the voluntary altogether:

A CELEBRATED division of fear is that of D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. in corpore, and loc. cit. Centil., and found in c. Considerationi, c. veniens, el. 2. de sponsal. cap. cum dilectus de his quae vi, et from the Jurisconsult, l. metu, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Decio cap. final. de appell. c. causam matrimonii, num. 4. de off. deleg. Menochio de arbitrariis l. 2. Centur. 2. casu 135. n. 1. Flaminio de resignatione benef. l. 13. q. 1. n. 54. Abb. c. cum dilectus n. 3. D. Thoma in 4. dist. 29. quaest. un. art. 2. and elsewhere everywhere with the other Theologians and Summists.

Another is called fear falling upon a constant man, which is also called just fear, c. Finali de appell.; it is called probable by D. Bonav. loc. cit. and Goffredo de his, quae vi, num. 2. Angelo, at the word metus. Sylvest. quaest. 1. Sanchez loco cit. num. 19. It is called also grave fear by D. Bonav. and others, with the Jurisconsult, lege metum, l. 2 ff. de eo quod metus causa, where he says, it is not of a man of no account, since even the strong are shaken by it.

Another is called the fear of an inconstant man, and it is called light fear, in contrast to the preceding, because it marks out as inconstant, light, and vain the one who is shaken by it and led to act against his appetite.

Five conditions, however, S. Bonav., in the places adduced, whom the rest follow, assigns to fear, that it be of the first kind. The first is that the evil feared be grave, l. Metum, l. 1. de eo quod metus causa, there, Labeo says fear is to be taken, not any fear whatever, but of a greater evil.

From the last words they take occasion to say that this fear need not be great absolutely, but comparatively, so that it be greater than another, though light in itself. So Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Veracruz p. 1. speculi, art. 8. concl. 3. Carbon. de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 3.

But D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit. in corpore, and loc. cit. Censil. wills it to be grave in itself, say of death, infamy, or mutilation; whom follow Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Sanchez num. 12. The reason is, D. Bonav. loc. cit., because contracts are rescinded by such fear, seeing it impedes consent, cap. Cum locum de sponsal.; but when the evil is light, though preferred before a graver evil, the liberty of consent in a strong man is not held to be impeded.

To those words I say that the comparative is there abusive, and signifies only what is positively great, as the Gloss explains there.

The second condition of fear falling upon a constant man is that the estimation of the grave evil be of one probably imminent, and not a light suspicion. So D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit., and found l. Metum la 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. For a constant man is not so lightly terrified; so also D. Thom. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore. Scotus there quaest. unica, §. de primo contradictio. Durandus there quaest. 2. Richard. art. 1. quaest. 1. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios there, disp 1. Ledesm. dub. 23. de matrimonio. And from the Jurisperiti, Torcremata 31. quaest. 2. in summa, num. 6. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Tabiena v. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 1. Burlat. consil. 72. num. 30. vol. 1. Alphaeus in his collectaries, collect. 877. Sanchez num. 15. Hence Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 9., says, the brave man is fearless, because he does not fear lightly, but where right reason dictates that he must fear.

Hence I infer with D. Bonav. loc. cit. in resol. that there is not required a true and real infliction of the punishments, for then it would be called not fear but harm; but it is enough that there be a probable fear of a future or imminent infliction, Leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa and l. 15. tit. 2. p. 4., and the Gloss teaches, c. el. primo vero metuebant de electione. Bartolomaeus l. metum autem, at the beginning, num. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Lopez on that l. 15. Cucus l. 5. instit. Maiorum, tit. 12. num. 157.

Some add that the fear ought to be present, not awaited, though the evil be only future. They gather this from l. metum autem 9. ff. de eo, quod metus causa. So expound many, as Sanchez num. 16. reports.

Others, however, think that a probable suspicion of fear suffices, and that this is enough for rescinding the act, Leg. novissime, ff. de falso tutore, there, that he was thus compelled by fear, or fearing, lest he be compelled. So Bartol. l. 2. lectura 2. C. quod metus causa. Baldus leg. interpositas at the end C. de Transact. Alex. cons. 99. n. 6. vol. 3. Parisius consil. 60. num. 15. vol. 3. Romanus l. 5. ob turpem, num. 10. C. de condonatione ob turpem causam. Hostiens. c. Cum dilectus de his, quae vi, on the words nec metum mortis, and there Anchar. num. 7. Rebuff. Tom. 2. consil. Gallicarum, tit. de rescissione contractuum, art. unico Glossa 2. 2. num. 6. Alex. Tartagnus among the matrimonial consilia of Tileti cons. 21. num. 5. Sylvest. v. metus Villalobos in communi opinione, litt. N. at the word metus, num. 70. Anton. Gabr. tom. 2. commun. l. 11. v. metus, fol. 107. Burgos de Paz cons. 25. num. 73. Padella l. cum proponas, la 1. num. 3. C. de transact. Decisio Pedemontana 170. num. 3. Ioan. Garzia de nobilitate, gloss. 17. num. 14. Mascard. de probat. concl. 1055. num. 26.

Yet that Law sounds differently to me: that the contract be rescinded of one who, compelled by fear, or fearing, would not be compelled, that is, by force against the thing, say if he were compelled to subscribe, l. nam timor violentiae inferendae vitiat electionem. So the Gloss C. bone, CL. 1., at the word metuebant de electione, which all follow there, Alex. cons. 98. vol. 3. Rebuff. Mascad. loc. cit.

Therefore I note that the Law does not say, or thinking probably, lest fear be struck into him, but fearing (it says) lest he be compelled, that is, by force.

The third condition required for grave fear is assigned by D. Bonav. loc. cit. in corpore; and it is that the one striking fear be able to command his threats to execution; for it is not for a brave general to be terrified by the threats of little rustics, as D. Bonav. notes, l. Famosi, ff. ad legem Iul. maiest., there, for the person also is to be considered: whether he could do it, Gloss. l. metum, v. iactationibus, C. de his, quae vi. Anchar. c. ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his, quae vi. Baldus l. metum q. C. de his quae vi, and there Alex. Salicetus num. 2. Sebastianus de medicis, de casibus fortuitis, quaest. 1. num. 67. Flaminius de resign. benef. l. 13. quaest. 1. n. 116. Cucus l. 1. Instit. Mai. tit. 12. num. 165. Rolandus consil. 83. num. 28. vol. 2. Angelus v. metus, Sotus l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 2. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. §. Pro explicatione, fol. 988. Carbo de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 4., and all whom Sanchez num. 19. follows.

Note, however, that it is not to be taken as though he could in very fact fulfill the threats, but that the one fearing reasonably judge that he can fulfill them, even though in fact he truly cannot, for some reason unknown to the one fearing. Which D. Bonav. signified excellently, loc. cit., whom Richardus follows, there art. 1. quaest. 1., as Sanchez num. 19. reports. Wherefore the quality and power of the one striking fear and of the sufferer must be weighed, as if the former were a powerful man and the latter weaker, as Beroius cap. 1. n. 30. de off. deleg. Sotus, Arag. Carbo, and Sanchez loc. cit., and Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., after D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., teach well.

The fourth condition is D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., which he indicates in 4., that it be likely that the threatener will execute his threats; because he is wont to do so, and is not of those Worthies who fling out threats but do not execute them. It is established ex l. unica, C. Si quis Imperatori, there, let us weigh the sayings from the characters of men. And leg. Famosi, ff. ad Leg. Iul. maiest. and Leg. metum, C. de his, quae vi, there: Fear ought to be proved not by boasts or contentions alone, but by the atrocity of the deed. And so teaches Bartolus, Paulus, Alex. Baldus, Salicet. and Aretinus: Abbas indeed cap. 1. num. 3. de offic. deleg., and cap. causam matrimon. numer. 5. on the same title, and cap. Cum dilectus, numer. 8. Anchard. in the chapter ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his quae vi. Navo cap. consultatione, num. 12. de sponsal., and cap. finali, num. 17. de appel. Felinus cap. 1. de offic. deleg., there Decius, and cap. causam matrim. on the same title num. 21. Crottus leg. stipulatio hoc modo concepta, num. 67. ff. de verb. oblig. Vitalis de Cambaris tract. de clausulis; clausula non vi, tit. de metu uxoris, found in Tom. 18. tract. noviorum, Iacobinus leg. interpositas, num. 10. Cod. de transact. Couar. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 6. Tiberius Decianus consil. 18. num. 128. vol. 1. Bursatus consil. 72. num. 35. and 42. vol. 3. Flaminius lib. de resignatione, benef. lib. 15. quaest. 1. num. 174. Mascardus de probat. consil. 1055. num. 18. Antonius Gabriel. Tom. 2. com. lib. 11. v. metus, fol. 106.

From the Theologians, Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 40. fo. 1071., and Sanchez num. 20., who num. 21. adds that it is required that such a one be wont to execute the threatened evil in the same kind of evil as that threatened, on the doctrine of Baldus leg. finali at the end, ff. de haered. instit., where he says that conjecture is not drawn from unlike things; so Cynus, whom Alexander cites and follows, leg. metum, num. 2. Cod. de his, quae vi.

The last condition is that the one fearing be unable to meet the threatened evils otherwise than by vowing; for if he could meet them otherwise, it would not be the fear of a brave man, but of a little fellow, whose it is to dread evils he could easily escape. This condition, however, seems to me implicit in the second, whereby the evil is imminent, for then it is well-nigh irreparable.

Straightway Sanchez disputes whether one choosing a greater evil, say to deny Christ, in order to avoid a lesser, say death, can be called a constant man, and whether that fear of a lesser evil, though grave in itself, suffices to render external acts invalid, as involuntary, because it is fear falling upon a constant man, since it is grave according to the first condition of fear.

Very many assert that an evil, even if grave, does not suffice to strike fear into a constant man if it be chosen to avoid another greater evil, to say, he is not held to be a constant man if he chooses the greater evil, say fault, to avoid a lesser penalty, say death; the reason is, because such a one is moved not by rational but by irrational fear; but the constant man acts rationally.

And indeed D. Bonavent. holds this, at the place cited, toward the end, D. Thom. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore, Scotus quaest. unic. §. de prima contradictio, and §. hic dicitur, Durandus quaest. 1. Richardus art. 1. quaest. 1. ad Paludanum quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 2. num. 13. Gabriel. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. and art. 3. concl. 8. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 168. Sotus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios in 4. dist. 29. dub. 1. fol. 655. Veracruz p. p. speculi, art. 8. and others, whom Sanchez reports, lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 2. num. 2., where he asserts that these Doctors, speaking of fear in reference to marriage and other contracts to be rescinded — namely that it be fear falling upon a constant man, sufficient to annul marriage — require that the lesser evil be chosen by the man, otherwise he was not constant but inconstant.

Others, however, explain that these Doctors will this condition of choosing the lesser evil to be required in order that fear excuse from fault, but not that it suffice for rescinding contracts; and in this sense D. Bonavent. spoke, in 3. dist. 29. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3., where he grants fear falling upon a constant man with regard to human contracts; yet with regard to things of universal justice he denies it, according to that of Matth. 10.: Fear not them that kill the body. Therefore such fear, on grounds urged before God, is not reckoned a sufficient cause to excuse man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath, though it exempt him from human contracts, according to the Axiom of the Jurisperiti reported above.

In the place indeed adduced by Sanchez, in the fourth sent., at the end of the question cited, he says that fear falling upon a constant man is of those things only that are not contrary to our salvation, and thus no fear of penalty, with respect to committing sin, can fall upon a constant man; therefore he ought rationally to suffer death rather than sin; but marriage is not of things contrary to salvation, whence he infers that, with respect to it, the fear of a constant man can fall, which fear renders the act involuntary; whence it comes about that this condition, of one choosing the lesser evil in order to be a constant man, in our case does not come into play in a vow or oath, but only in things that carry fault in themselves, which, even though they carry only venial fault, are yet a greater evil than any penalty whatsoever, even of death, as D. Bonavent. teaches, in 3. dist. 38, whom others imitate after D. Augustine, reported in cap. ne quis 22. quaest. 2.

Which things being so, Sanchez does not rightly institute the second disputation lib. 4. de matrimonio: Whether the fear of a constant man necessarily requires that the lesser evil be chosen, that is, the penalty rather than the fault. He says that B. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others assert that such an evil ought to be preferred in reference to marriage; for since marriage is not compared, as an evil, with the fear, and consequently cannot be called a lesser evil than the evil certainly threatened by the threatener unless one enter marriage, I do not see on what ground Sanchez says that D. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others spoke in this sense, that by choosing marriage rather than death, or death rather than marriage, one is said to choose the greater or the lesser evil, and thence one is argued to be a constant or inconstant man. As D. Bonavent. subtly argues, at the place cited, and Sanchez himself, disp. 5. num. 16., where he says that the fear of just excommunication does not strike grave fear with regard to some contract, because one thing is not chosen as an evil before another, since both are goods.

This fear, then, is not only required for the rescission of marriage and other just contracts, as Soto asserts, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 4., Nauar. summa lat. cap. 22. num. 51., and others whom Sanchez follows, num. 3.; neither can it even intervene.

Sanchez defines this well indeed, disp. 3.: this grave fear, which is called falling upon a constant man, is not equally to be assessed, but proportionally, so that what is light to a man may be grave to a woman or a child, cap. indignanti, 13. quaest. 6., as Tiraquel notes, lib. 1. connub. num. 71., the Gloss cap. cum locum de sponsal. v. metu, where Anton. num. 12. Abbas num. 6. Alexand. de Nevo, num. 23. and others.

Moreover, note that it is not required for grave fear, which deters a constant man, that the evil be feared for one's own person, but it is enough that it be feared in the persons of one's children, leg. isti quidem §. fine, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

The same of other kindred, in cap. sciam cuncti de electione, in 6., which text Jason says is notable, leg. de pupillo, ff. si quis ipsi, num. 12. ff. de operis novi nuntiat. Felinus cap. Ecclesiae sanctae Mariae, n. 99., where fear inflicted upon the kindred of an elector in order to strike fear into the elector is held to have been struck into the elector himself.

The same of a bond of friendship closely joined, Sanchez teaches, num. 9.; because a friend is another self. Attend also to other things concerning grave evil, sufficient to strike fear into a constant man.

AND indeed, as to those evils that are not declared grave by law, that is to be defined by the judgment of a Judge, leg. 3. ff. ex quibus causis. The greater reason is, because all cases cannot be expressed; but this judgment is not required for those evils that are clearly grave by law. So Baldus, cap. 2. de his, quae ad finem; his reason is, because arbitria are given with respect to those things that cannot be comprehended under a rule, on account of human variety, as is noted on leg. non possunt, ff. de legibus. Sylvester notes the same, V. metus, quaest. 4.; it will be so judged, whether the estimation of the impending evil be in accordance with right reason.

AS TO evils certainly grave, D. Bonavent., at the place cited, in corpore, enumerates death, found in cap. cum dilectus, de his quae vi, and leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa. The reason is, because of all terrible things the greatest is death, by the testimony of Aristotle, 4. Eth. So also Sanchez, disp. 5. num. 4.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of mutilation; for it is a kind of partial death, cap. si quis absciderit disp. 55., and it is found expressly in dicta leg 7. The same, of grave bodily torment, is found expressly in the said cap. cum dilectus, and the said leg. 7., to which grave blows are reduced. The same must be said of the fear of arms, leg. 3. at the beginning, in the verse qui armati, ff. de vi, et vi armata.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of the fear of servitude. It is found in leg. ego puto, and leg. isti quidem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. Say the same of the fear of captivity and of grave exile. Of the fear of prison, it is found in leg. nec timorem, and leg. qui in carcerem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

I. We shall have much to say concerning oaths that are deceitful, and extorted by fear, which can be consulted, lest we act twice over. We shall therefore only touch briefly on a few points here, all the more since, when treating of contracts and marriage, we shall bring similar controversies under examination.

II. Question I. Does an error concerning the substance of a vow render the vow invalid? Response: Authors commonly affirm this — since error removes the voluntary: for nothing is willed unless first known. Therefore, if you are ignorant of the nature, or substance, of the vow, then the thing promised by the vow is not voluntary, but involuntary. There is, then, no vow — since it is not voluntary. Hence, if you were to profess religious life, ignorant that profession is perpetual, your profession would be null — since perpetuity pertains to the substance of profession. Say the same of ignorance of those things which are reduced to the substance of the thing promised: say, you vowed to journey to Jerusalem, thinking your vow could be fulfilled by an overland journey, being ignorant of the sea voyage; you vowed to enter the Carthusian, or Dominican, order, thinking that eating meat there was permitted — these vows are null, as is taught by Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 21), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 12), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 1, n. 21), Prado (ch. 31, q. 4, §1, n. 2), Palao (disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 2), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, punct. 6, §4, n. 116), who add that the one vowing is not bound to other religious orders, since he determinately vowed these two.

Two things present a difficulty to me. The first is that abstinence from meat should enter into the very substance of profession, or pertain to it — for it seems that this abstinence is a certain grave circumstance, but it is not the one thing that distinguishes one Order from another; indeed, all monastic orders that have this law observe the same abstinence from meat. Of the four mendicant orders, two observe this same abstinence. Moreover, this abstinence, compared with the three solemn perpetual vows, does not seem so grave a circumstance as to enter into the very substance of the profession, and to be able to invalidate it. The other difficulty is likewise this: namely, that such a one vowing ought not to be bound to enter any other religious order. Since one who vows entrance into religious life seems to vow, first, the religious state, and then, secondarily, this particular religious order — when there is no express, determinate, contrary intention. All these considerations together render the aforesaid resolution quite doubtful to me. Wherefore it seems to me safer, and more probable, that the one vowing is bound either to enter the promised religious order, or to choose another in which meat is eaten — since, as I said, the circumstance of abstaining from meat does not seem to enter into the substance of a perpetual profession.

III. All theologians, moreover, admit that ignorance of circumstances which do not pertain to the substance of the matter does not invalidate vows, or oaths, but leaves their obligation intact as to substance — even if the person, had he foreseen these circumstances when he made the vow, would not have made it — since such ignorance, as they say, is concomitant with respect to the vow, not principal, or as giving cause to the vow. For you embrace absolutely the principal object of your vow, even though, had you foreseen that object clothed in such a circumstance, you would have abstained from it. For very many vows, promises, and contracts would not be made, if all the circumstances that supervene in the course of time were foreseen; yet, when they actually occur, they invalidate neither vows nor contracts. In this all agree: Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, near the end), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 3, ad 3), Molina (Vol. II, disp. 272), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 20, dub. 2, n. 10), Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 6), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 6), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 4), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 6, §1, n. 156). The difficulty is which of the circumstances redound into the substance of the promise, or vow. The cited authors maintain that, in the aforesaid vow of religious life, abstinence from meat is a circumstance invalidating the profession, since it pertains to the substance of the profession. It seems to me, however, that such a circumstance does not pertain to the substance of monastic profession, for the reasons assigned; and this opinion seems to me more probable.

IV. Likewise, if error concerns the end of the vow, if the ignorance is of the essential end of the vow, such ignorance will also impede the value of the vow — since the end of the vow is its object. Wherefore, if ignorance of the essential end of the vow occurs, it will produce the same effect regarding the end as it does regarding the substance of the vow. Several ends are distinguished in a vow. The first is the divine worship, which is common to all vows, and can be called universal, and extrinsic; without which no matter is fit for a vow. The second end is the special, and, in a certain way, intrinsic end, upon whose cessation, too, the vow ceases — as, for example, the proximate end of alms is the relief of another's need. For example: you vowed to give Peter alms, thinking him poor; you afterward discover him to be rich, and in no way needy, and in no way in need of alms; the vow ceases, since it altogether recoils into the nature of the object, which is a peculiar and total relief of poverty — and, that failing, the vow ceases entirely. The third is the extrinsic end which the one vowing freely set before himself: as if you vowed to give health to your sick son... , whom you believe infirm; and, that son being restored to health, or having died, the vow ceases, and so too is that end reduced to the nature of the object; and thus, once that ceases, the vow ceases. If, however, the error is about the occasion, or occasional cause, of the vow, then the vow is not impeded — although, if, before the vow was made, the cause had been known, it would have impeded the making of the vow.

V. You will object, from St. Thomas (Bk. IV, Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 3), where he says that "that which, if present, would impede the vow being made, also removes the obligation once the vow has been made." But the circumstances and difficulties that supervene were unknown to the one vowing. Therefore, once the vow is made, they remove the obligation. Response: St. Thomas, in the place cited, speaks in express words of a difficulty, or circumstance, that renders the execution of the vow impossible. Now what renders the execution of the vow impossible, whether it follows, or precedes, the making of the vow, renders the vow null. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor which immediately follow the passage cited: "Whence, since there cannot be a vow concerning the impossible, as has been said, if something which was formerly possible becomes impossible after the vow is made, the obligation of the vow is removed as to that." And to the proposed difficulty the Angelic Doctor answers, in the first argument, that no one is obligated to a vow whose execution is impossible.

VI. Question II. From what is it to be gathered that circumstances are only an impelling, not a principal, cause of the vow — that is, that they do, or do not, redound to the substance of the object promised by the vow? Response: It is clear from what has been said that all authors agree in this: that error concerning the substance invalidates the vow; not so, error concerning adventitious matters, or concerning impelling causes. The whole difficulty turns on this: from what is it to be gathered whether the circumstances redound into the substance of the object, or not? Authors commonly answer that all those things are the end of the vow which the one vowing intends to obtain through the vow; but that those things are merely the occasion of vowing which only excite the one vowing to make the vow — as if you vow alms to be conferred on a respectable poor person: the relief of poverty is the end of the vow; but the respectability of the poor person is the occasion which excites, and impels, you to make the vow. For relief of poverty is not obtained through the vow in the same way that relief of poverty is really obtained; and therefore this is the end of the vow. Respectability, however, is the occasion of the poor person, which excites you, but is not the end of the vow. All this is clear, and quite easy to grasp. But sometimes circumstances occur so grave that they seem to some to redound into the substance of the vow, on which several others judge otherwise; and concerning these no certain rule can be established, but this business must be left to the judgment of prudent men.

VII. In doubt, however, whether some circumstance has the character of a final, or an occasional, cause, one must consider whether, these being absent, all the other circumstances retain merely the character of occasion. For if, in their absence, the end of the vow still stands, the rest have merely the character of occasion. If, however, in their absence, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end, as Sylvester teaches (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 8), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, near the end, n. 52), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 7). If, all things considered, probable and grave reasons press on both sides, Sánchez teaches (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 5) that it is lawful to adhere to either side, even the less probable, as Bonacina says more explicitly (loc. cit.). If, however, all things considered, the matter remains doubtful and undecided, both these authors determine that it must then be judged in favor of the vow — since when the words of the vow are established, whether spoken aloud or held in the mind, possession stands for the vow, not for the external forum's liberty; and also because the presumption favors the validity of the act. From this you see, then, that these authors do form a peculiar notion of doubt. For if, they say, probable reasons induce the opinion, it is lawful to adhere to either side; but if the reasons are such as to leave the intellect undecided, then judgment must be made in favor of the vow. We too decide that judgment must be made in favor of the vow, in doubt — but on this principle: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen; and, furthermore, when equal reasons press on both sides, we say the intellect remains in doubt, however probable both sides may be. When, however, the reasons are more probable in favor of the vow, and less probable in favor of liberty, we hold that judgment must be made, by the stronger right, in favor of the vow — as we shall prove at length in its proper place.

VIII. Question III. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Response. The distinction of fear has already often been explained. For one fear is grave, falling upon a steadfast man; another is light. Grave fear can arise from within: say, from illness, from a storm, from death feared from a wild beast, from an imminent shipwreck. This fear is called intrinsic, because, although the danger that excites the fear is external, it in no way compels the making of the vow; the one vowing is moved by himself to make the vow. Another fear is called extrinsic, which arises from an external cause that compels; and this again is twofold, one justly, the other unjustly instilled in order to extort the vow. Wherefore the one vowing, struck by such fear, chooses the vow as the only means of turning aside the danger that threatens him. These things being laid down, authors by common consent assert that the vow is valid, both by the law of nature and by positive law, when it arises from a grave fear that is intrinsic: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself, and of his own accord and freely chooses the vow as a fit means of escaping the danger. All vows, therefore, made to avoid shipwreck, illness, or death threatening either from a wild beast or from an enemy, are valid. Indeed, even vows elicited on account of a fear instilled from without, but not in order to extort the vow, are valid. For example: you have offended your neighbour; he threatens you with death in revenge; you make a vow to escape death. The vow is valid, because you made the vow with no one compelling you to it. Likewise valid is the vow you elicit in order to avoid the death, or the danger of harm, with which the brother of the girl whom you deflowered threatens you. For although such fear is unjustly instilled from without, it does not tend to extort a vow, but to take revenge; and you, to withdraw yourself from the danger, make the vow of your own accord and freely. The same must be said when the fear comes from without, but is justly brought to bear in order to extort the vow. Because, when the fear is just, the one vowing is unwilling unreasonably; and consequently the consent is justly extorted, and the one vowing is justly compelled to the vow: the whole of the coercion and necessity comes from the one vowing himself, who unjustly refuses to make the vow. Finally, neither does light fear make a vow void, as all commonly admit, because it impairs free consent but little and lightly. And this is certain among all authors.

IX. The whole difficulty, therefore, turns on this: whether a vow is valid that proceeds from grave fear brought to bear from without in order to extort the vow itself. It is agreed almost among all that by the law of nature even such a vow is valid, supposing that the man, though unjustly coerced, truly and sincerely wills the vow and actually makes it: for without the will and deliberation of the one vowing a vow is null, as we said in its place. But if he truly and deliberately wills it, although coerced by unjust fear, the vow is valid by the law of nature: because such external coercion, although it diminishes the voluntary, nevertheless does not take it away, but leaves it absolutely, so far as it suffices for merit and demerit; as is plain in the martyr, who, if under examination he denied the faith out of fear unjustly instilled by a tyrant, would sin mortally. External coercion, therefore, does not take away liberty, though it diminishes it. Much less does an injury inflicted by an unjust aggressor impair that same liberty. For this injury leaves to the one who promised only the right not to be bound to render what he pledged to the invader; but not the right to be freed from the obligation of keeping and fulfilling the faith given to God. The Angelic Doctor explains all this clearly, II-II, q. 89, art. 7, ad 3, speaking thus: In an oath which someone makes under coercion, there is a twofold obligation. One by which he is bound to the man to whom he promises something; and such an obligation is taken away by the coercion. . . . The other is the obligation by which he is bound to God, to fulfil what he has promised in His name; and such an obligation is not taken away in the forum of conscience: because he ought rather to suffer temporal loss than violate his oath. The theologians, both of the household and from without, commonly subscribe to the doctrine of St. Thomas: Sánchez, Lessius, Azor, Palaus, Trullench, and others.

X. The dissent of the theologians comes down to ecclesiastical law. Although, even with this in view, if the discourse is of the solemn vow made in the profession of religion, all affirm that such a vow is null: because the laws speak openly of this vow, and declare that it is made void: chapter Perlatum, Bk. I, tit. 40, on what is done by force or for fear; chapter Sicut qui monasterium, causa 20, q. 1; and chapter Praesens, causa 20, q. 3; and expressly the Synod of Trent, sess. 25, ch. 17, on reform: Let a girl who wishes to take the regular habit . . . not take it beforehand, nor afterwards . . . make profession before the Bishop has diligently examined . . . the will of the virgin, whether she has been coerced, whether seduced, whether she knows what she is doing.

XI. Concerning other vows there are two opinions. The first maintains that other vows are valid: because the laws do not speak of the other vows; and on the other side the making void of a vow is odious, since it derogates from the natural law, in respect of which the vow is valid. When, therefore, no plain text occurs in the law declaring the aforesaid vows null, we ought to defend them as valid. But no such text is in fact found. Therefore these vows are valid, even with ecclesiastical law in view. And this opinion is defended by Sylvester, s.v. Metus, 8, at the end, and s.v. Votum, 2, q. 12; Pontius, On Marriage, Bk. III, ch. 19, n. 9; Suárez, Bk. II, ch. 8, n. 5. The contrary opinion, namely that such vows are null and void, is defended by many authors, who contend that this was declared in the chapter Cum locum, on betrothals, where it is said: Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes; and in the chapter Ad audientiam, and the chapter Perlatum. These texts, they say, though they do not speak expressly of these vows, are nevertheless extended to the vows recounted, by the common interpretation of the jurists and the custom of the Church. Soto, Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, in the solution to the 1st and 2nd; Trullench, Bk. II, ch. 2; Bartholomew of St. Faustus, Bk. I of the Thesaurus, q. 111; Prado, ch. 31, q. 5, n. 4; Sánchez, Bk. IV, ch. 3, n. 11; Lessius, Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 3, n. 18.

XII. It is difficult to pass judgment for either of these opinions. The authors themselves who disagree judge both to be probable. The former, if reason alone is regarded, seems to rest on the firmer foundation. For all the laws alleged speak expressly either of the solemn vows of monastic profession, or of betrothals and matrimony. Why is it that they do not speak universally? Why is it that they restrict their declarations to the two aforesaid kinds of promises? Certainly it seems to be very clearly drawn from the written law that only solemn vows and matrimony are excepted, while the rest are left under the common law. Since, then, the universal law of nature declares these vows valid, on this side this opinion appears the more probable. Moreover, the very reason which the authors of the contrary opinion put forward tells against them. They rely on the examples of matrimony and of monastic profession: because, they say, the reason of all vows is the same. Granted: and in fact by the law of nature all are valid. But if the Church expressly excepts two only from the burden of the obligation, it is legitimately inferred that the rest are not excepted from the law of nature. This reason, which asserts that the condition of all vows is the same, was known to the makers of ecclesiastical law; and nonetheless they excepted only monastic vows and matrimony. Why, then, did they make no mention of the other vows as well? To what they add afterwards, that by the custom of the Church these vows have been declared null, we reply that if such a custom exists, we readily admit that the aforesaid vows are null. But no document of this custom is brought forward. Therefore in such cases, when they occur, it is safer, and to us more probable, that a dispensation should be obtained.

X. Question VIII. From what indications can it be gathered that an erring conscience is vincible, or invincible? Answer. You can prudently presume the ignorance to be invincible: 1. If the thing ignored be of human, or of positive, law. 2. If the matter be most difficult even among the Learned themselves. 3. If no scruple, doubt, or any confused notion whatever has preceded. 4. If the man, on perceiving that he was deceived and violated the Law from ignorance, grieves and is saddened. 5. If the man be upright, and of an entire and well-ordered conscience. 6. If he has not been prejudiced by a false system and a depraved manner of opining. From these and similar circumstances and signs the Confessor can gather that the ignorance or inadvertence was invincible. The contrary holds if the matter be of the natural law; if some doubt has preceded; if the man be accustomed to offend, and be of a conscience entangled in crimes; if he be facile in adopting opinions which favor liberty and the appetites. For the rest, this ascertainment is difficult: therefore God must be prayed to with the Prophet David: Remember not my ignorances.

III. Ignorance is the privation of knowledge. Error is the approbation of falsity. One ignorance is of law, which is ignorant of a law or precept; another of fact, which admits knowledge of the law, but is ignorant of the fact. One is vincible, or voluntary, consequent, and culpable — this can be conquered by diligence and study, and through negligence is not conquered. Another is invincible, which can be overcome by no study — this is without all fault. Of vincible ignorance, one kind is affected, which repels knowledge: He would not understand, that he might do well. Another is crass and supine, which applies no diligence at all to know those things which one can and ought to know.

XIII. The Probabilists rather commonly teach that sin is never committed without actual consideration, clear or obscure, of the malice of the action. This opinion, as it seems to my weakness, is the same as the error of the Pelagians denying the sins of ignorance, as Jerome and Augustine and the other Fathers testify. No crime, said the Pelagians, without liberty; no liberty without knowledge; therefore no sin without knowledge. The Probabilists deny that sin can be committed without some actual knowledge of the malice of the action: therefore the doctrine of the Pelagians and of the Probabilists is the same, so far as appears from the force of the reasoning. Which I prove thus.

XIV. It is a Catholic truth that men commit sins of ignorance. Actual advertence being admitted, the darkness of ignorance vanishes. The Probabilists teach that actual knowledge, or advertence, is necessary that the ignorance be vincible and criminal. Therefore the doctrine of both parties is the same. Tell me: what is opposed to ignorance? Knowledge. Therefore it cannot be that he sins ignorantly who knows, and considers — and that actually — that he is sinning.

XXI. Invincible ignorance is that — as the very word bears on its face — which cannot be conquered and overcome. The mere doubting of the thing which is unknown makes the ignorance vincible and criminal. When you doubt whether such an action be depraved, by the confession of all you sin, because you expose yourself to the danger of sinning. And when you judge it more probable that the action is befouled with malice, and you repudiate this more probable opinion, and select the opposite, less probable one — if this be false, will your ignorance be invincible? You flee from the more splendid light, you close your eyes to it, that you may select the less probable opinion, which favors your liberty and is opposed to the Law: and in this case your error will be insuperable? Who, I pray you, endowed with common sense, can defend so great a paradox? Yet this is the paradox which all the Probabilists champion. But it is repugnant to common sense. For that is called invincible which cannot be conquered and overcome. With what face, then, do the Probabilists assert that this error cannot be overcome and conquered, at that very time at which they turn their eyes away from the greater light shining forth — at which they will not understand, that they may do well, and may at least approach nearer to the truth?

VIII. Question II. Are sins committed from ignorance to be corrected by force of the precept? Answer. All affirm it, if the ignorance be vincible. Of invincible ignorance there is disagreement among the Theologians. But the more common opinion, and the true one to me, is that the precept presses above all when the neighbor labors under a double misery — both that he has committed a sin, material though it be, and that, wrapped in the gloom of darkness, he is ignorant of the sin. The precept of enlightening the neighbor, then, presses greatly at that time. If the invincible ignorance be only of ecclesiastical law, the precept presses even then — especially if that law regard the universal Church, as does the law which commands Lent, the Ember days, abstinence from flesh on Friday, and things of that kind. For ignorance of these is a grave evil, from which the neighbor must be rescued by the benefit of fraternal correction.

VI. Likewise in the same place, article 5, reply 1, he subjoins: It must be said that in him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will to that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. And therefore that which is done through fear is in a certain manner involuntary. … The timid man acts against that which even now in itself he wills.

VIII. Ignorance, as has been said elsewhere, is of one kind of right, of another of fact, of another of penalty. One is invincible, another vincible; another gross, affected, or supine. He labours under ignorance of right who is ignorant of a law forbidding or commanding. He labours under ignorance of fact who is ignorant that he whom he beats is a cleric. Ignorance of penalty is when someone is ignorant that a penalty has been appended to such a crime. You know that the beating of a cleric is forbidden; you know that he whom you beat is a cleric; but you know not that a penalty has been appended to this unlawful beating of a cleric. That is invincible which cannot be overcome by human industry; and vincible which can be overcome.

X. Ignorance truly invincible, whether of right or of fact, just as it excuses from fault, so it exempts from censure. Ignorance venially vincible excuses from a censure for the incurring of which a mortal fault is required. Ignorance nevertheless is not presumed in the exterior forum unless it be proved, as is said in chapter Ignorantia on the rules of law in the Sixth. Ignorance of fact excuses, but not of law. He who knows that homicide is forbidden by divine right, but is invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law forbidding it under a censure, does not according to very many incur the censure, although he sin against natural and divine right: because, they say, for the contracting of a censure contumacy is necessary, which an admonition ought to precede. For the penalty of censure differs from those penalties passed either by the civil forum or by the ecclesiastical forum, which are contracted even if they be ignored, when the law is known. Wherefore a homicide, from whom the law forbidding it is not hidden, is obnoxious to capital punishment even if he be ignorant of this penalty. Similarly he who knows the ecclesiastical law forbidding such an act would incur irregularity from a delict, although he were ignorant of such a penalty. On the contrary, if he were invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law, just as he would be immune from fault, so he would be free from irregularity from a delict.

Among the parishioners and penitents of Titius the priest is Paul, who for several years has been addicted to drunkenness. Paul, however, is not continuously intoxicated, but, after intervals of about two months given to sobriety, thereafter for a month or six weeks he is never perfectly sober. When Titius, however, warns him about the injuries inflicted by drunkenness upon himself and his family, as well as about the scandal given to others, and proposes remedies, Paul says to him that he is no longer able to restrain himself from being borne at fixed times, like a brute animal, toward excessive drinking, all motives to the contrary being well known but in no way standing in the way. Titius indeed has heard of the disease of the will which is called aboulia by some, and he knows that men sometimes become insane through drunkenness; but his penitent, in other matters when he is sober, is as far as possible removed from insanity. Therefore, he does not know how Paul is to be treated, either inside or outside the confessional. Hence it is asked:

1. What is required for a human act and for sin?

2. Are there persons insane in one matter who nevertheless are sane in others?

3. Are habitual sinners who have lost free choice thereby guiltless if they indulge the vice?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What is required for a human act and for sin to be imputable?

We are not responsible for those actions over which we have no control. We are responsible for those which we freely produce. Such are called by divines “human acts,” and they proceed freely from the will with an intellectual knowledge of the end. Hence three conditions are required in order that an action may be imputed to us: (a) It must proceed from the will; all moral responsibility lies there; it is not sufficient if we are forced against our will to do it, nor if it proceeds merely from the reflex action of the nerves and muscles. (b) It must proceed freely from the will. If our will is inevitably determined to action by the antecedent circumstances, we can not be blamed for what follows; we could not help it. (c) In order that free will may act, a suitable object must be proposed to it by the intellect — Nil volitum quin precognitum. An action which is against right reason and known to be such will be imputable to us as sin if those three conditions are verified.

2. Do monomaniacs exist?

Suarez and some other theologians denied that they did on the ground that capacity for free moral action depends on the power of apprehending general principles and drawing conclusions from them. But one who can not do this in one class of matters can not do it in others. In reply it may be said that this would be true if special matters did not exert a special disturbing influence on kleptomaniacs, for example. When certain objects are put within the reach of those unfortunates, the desire to steal them becomes so overpowering that the deliberative faculty is in abeyance, and the resulting theft is not free. In other matters there may be no such disturbing influence at work, and kleptomaniacs are therein free and sane.¹

1 Frins., De Actibus Humanis, part i, nn. 236, 237.

3. Are those who have lost self-control through habitual indulgence in vice on that account guiltless?

This question supposes that self-control may be lost by habitual self-indulgence in vice. The fact is notorious. It does not follow that such people are not responsible for what they do in their insanity. In so far as they are the free cause of their loss of self-control, the evil that they do in this state will be voluntary in causa, like sins committed by a drunken man, and therefore imputable to them.²

2 St. Thomas, Summa, I–II, q. 77, a. 7.

4. Paul, the parishioner of Titius, has been addicted to drink for many years. However, he did not get drunk regularly; he would be sober for a couple of months, and then he would have a drinking bout for a month or six weeks, during which time he was never perfectly sober. Titius points out to him the ruin he is bringing on himself and on his family, and the scandal he causes to others. Paul asserts that he can not help it, and that he is driven to drink like a brute when the fit seizes him. This may be true. As Cardinal Mercier says: “Sans doute, sous diverses influences — hérédité, alcoolisme, débauche, habitudes vicieuses, certain régime des prisons, etc. — la responsabilité est, chez plusieurs sujets, atténuée; il est vraisemblable que chez quelques-uns elle n’est pas ou n’est plus suffisante pour justifier le qualificatif criminel. Il y a des monstres sociaux qui ne devraient pas tomber sous les coups de la justice pénale, mais contre lesquels la société a néanmoins le droit et le devoir de se prémunir ou de se défendre, au nom de la mission générale de gouvernement qui lui incombe.”¹

1 Psychologie [Psychology], vol. ii, p. 146.

Literal English translation of the preceding French quotation: “Without doubt, under various influences—heredity, alcoholism, debauchery, vicious habits, a certain prison regime, etc.—responsibility is diminished in several subjects; it is likely that in some it is not, or is no longer, sufficient to justify the designation criminal. There are social monsters who ought not to fall under the blows of penal justice, but against whom society nevertheless has the right and the duty to protect or defend itself, in the name of the general mission of government incumbent upon it.”

If what Paul asserts is true in his case, the best remedy would be to get him to go to a home for inebriates, or to undergo treatment for alcoholism. We must suppose the habit to have been voluntarily formed with at any rate some confused advertence to the danger incurred, and so Paul can not be held guiltless even if now he can not help getting drunk. But absolute loss of control should not readily be presumed. Between this stage and that of the temperate man there are innumerable grades of greater or less power of self-control. The confessor will be wise if he presumes guilt, but sometimes, as in Paul’s case, leaves its degree to the judgment of God. If Paul can not go to a home, the confessor will prescribe the avoidance of occasions of sin, constant occupation, and work, preferably in the open air, fervent prayer for help to God, and the frequent reception of the sacraments; and eating an apple or drinking some harmless beverage may be suggested when the craving for drink comes on. He may also usefully advise Paul to join some Catholic association for the cultivation of temperance, such as the League of the Cross.

Albert, a young Catholic who applies himself to the study of medicine with this intention, that after his studies have been completed he may practise the medical art, does not hesitate also to give a great span of time to pleasures. His parents and teachers warn him to prepare himself more diligently for undertaking that rather burdensome state; nevertheless, matters proceed almost as before. At fixed times he undergoes examinations with by no means unhappy success, since he always gives evidence of sufficient learning, although because of laziness he is ignorant of some things in each examination. Finally, at some point, he is admitted to practise the art, and he goes to a certain city in order to seek a livelihood there by his art. He undertakes the care of the sick, and immediately finds himself to be ignorant of many things altogether necessary for him to know, since very often the remedies prescribed by him seem to be of no benefit, and indeed not rarely to increase the disease. After some months he is so distressed by scruples of conscience that he lays open his whole condition to his confessor and asks what is to be done. Hence it is asked:

1. When is ignorance culpable?

2. When a bad act has been performed from invincible ignorance, at what time and in what way is sin committed?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. When is ignorance culpable?

Ignorance is culpable if it concerns what we are bound to know and if it is voluntary. There is no guilt attaching to ignorance about what we are under no obligation to know. Neither can we be blamed for ignorance which we can not help. The degree of culpability for voluntary ignorance about what we are bound to know will depend upon the seriousness of the matter and the degree of voluntariness in the ignorance. If the matter is serious and if there was great negligence in not procuring the requisite knowledge, grave sin will be committed. On the other hand, if either the matter be trivial or the negligence slight, no more than a venial sin will be committed.

2. When a bad action is done out of voluntary ignorance, is the sin committed when the agent culpably neglected to procure knowledge or when the act is done; and of what species is the sin?

Per se, inasmuch as formal sin consists in doing wrong or neglecting duty with advertence, formal sin is committed when the doer of a bad action, which is the result of voluntary ignorance, culpably neglects to procure the requisite knowledge. At the time when the bad action is done through ignorance the doer of it does not advert to the wrong that he is doing, and so the act can not be a formal sin at the time when it is done. Of course if the bad act is not merely the result of ignorance, but at the time when it is done there is some suspicion of its not being right, or some advertence to its malice, then the harm done will not only be voluntary in its cause, but also voluntary in itself. But then it will not be done out of voluntary ignorance, but out of malice here and now.

A sin of ignorance is of the same species as the act done out of ignorance would be if it were committed with knowledge. For the law which is violated by the sin is violated also by voluntary ignorance concerning it, inasmuch as every law imposes on those who are subject to it the obligation of obtaining knowledge of it, and voluntary ignorance is a violation of this obligation.

3. Albert neglected his work when he was a medical student. In spite of warnings from professors and parents he gave a great deal of time to enjoyment. In each examination he managed to show sufficient knowledge to pass, though there were some subjects of which he was ignorant. When he began to practise, he soon found out his deficiencies. His prescriptions often seemed to do harm to his patients instead of good. After some months he became so uneasy that he spoke on the subject to his confessor and asked him what he was to do. After satisfying himself that there are good grounds for Albert’s scruples the confessor should tell him that he must give some time to study now, so as to make up for his idleness in his student days. He knows what subjects he neglected, and he should apply himself to those in the first place. Until he can make up for lost time he should not undertake cases where his ignorance is likely to be an obstacle to his treating them properly. On one pretext or another he may call in some other medical man, and forego his own fees in such cases. If he does what he can in this way, he need not give up his practice, as all serious danger of doing harm will be removed, and he will soon gain the knowledge without which he should not have begun to practise at all. He committed sin in neglecting his studies, and as the matter was serious, nothing less than the lives and health of his patients, and the negligence was apparently grave, the sin was a grave one. He must be sorry for this and resolve to make up for it as far as he can in the future and then he may be absolved.

Philip, a seventeen-year-old student in a certain Catholic college, confesses before his confessor that he has suffered depraved motions. The confessor asks whether he consented to them, which Philip denies. Then, when the confessor asks whether perhaps he has posited a cause of them and what cause, he replies that sometimes they arise as if spontaneously, sometimes from the reading of books, sometimes from association with other boys toward whom perhaps he cherishes a carnal affection, and sometimes from the fact that he has kissed them. Hence it is asked:

1. What is concupiscence?

2. Can any order of the acts by which sin is usually committed be distinguished?

3. Is there sin in the motions which are called first-first and second-first?

4. What is to be said concerning the case, and what counsel is to be given to Philip concerning each point?

1. What is concupiscence?

Concupiscence is commonly used in different senses by dogmatic and by moral theologians. Dogmatic theologians use it to signify the inclination to evil and the inordinate motions which we all experience within us, and which, as the Council of Trent teaches, are the effects of original sin.¹ In moral theology concupiscence is used in a wider sense to signify any movement of passion, or any movement of the sensible appetite toward its own proper good. Thus it is a general term used to signify emotions of love, hatred, joy or gladness, desire, sorrow, and anger. Such emotions are not in themselves either good or evil; their moral quality depends on their object, on whether they are voluntary or not, and on whether they are duly moderated. Thus, regulated love of what is good is praiseworthy, love of what is evil is wrong and blameworthy.

1 Sess. 5, Decree on Original Sin.

2. Can any order be traced in the acts by which sin is usually committed?

Yes, the first promptings of sin usually come through the senses. I see a beautiful piece of jewelry; by its beauty and luster it naturally attracts me. I can not help feeling this impulse; it is the necessary movement of the appetite toward an object which promises satisfaction. It is the motus primo-primus of the moralists. When such an emotion is excited, it attracts the notice of the intellect. The intellect begins to consider whether the incipient desire for the jewelry is right or wrong. If I have money to buy it and am willing to pay the price, the intellect sees nothing in the series of acts which conscience can condemn. But if I have not the money or I have no intention of parting with it, then it behooves me to put a curb on my desire. No harm is done if it stops at a mere velleity — “I should like to have that pretty thing if I could afford it.” But such an imperfect desire if not kept under control is apt to issue in a definite purpose — “I like that and I will have it, by theft if need be.” In this deliberate act of the will sin is first committed; the seeking for means and opportunity and the actual execution of the purpose only belonging to the accidental perfection of the sinful act.

3. Is there any sin in the movements of the sensible appetite called by theologians primo-primi and secundo-primi?

Those movements which are called primo-primi are antecedent to the exercise of the deliberative reason and therefore are not free, and so can not be sinful. Those called secundo-primi follow upon imperfect advertence to the morality of the movement in question, and so if the object or circumstances are bad, the movement will be bad also, and inasmuch as to some extent it is voluntary and free, to that extent it will be imputable to the agent. However, as the act is imperfect, and for mortal sin a perfect and consummated act is required, a secundo-primus movement can not be mortally sinful.

4. Philip, a boy of seventeen, confesses that he has had movements of impurity. His confessor asks him whether he consented to them, and he answers “No.” Then the confessor asks him whether he caused them, and the boy answers that sometimes they arose spontaneously, sometimes from reading novels, sometimes from talking with other boys for whom he entertains a feeling of softness, and occasionally he has kissed these. The confessor should tell Philip to pay no attention to the impure movements which arise spontaneously, and to turn his mind away from them by thinking of something else. If the novels are lascivious and obscene, Philip commits a grave sin by reading them, inasmuch as he voluntarily and without justification puts the cause of strong temptations to impurity which will frequently be the cause of sin. If Philip has any such books, he should destroy them. If they are not lascivious, there will not be grave sin in reading them, and they may be permitted even to young people like Philip in moderation, for the sake of cultivating the imagination and style, and gaining a knowledge of literature. The confessor, however, should warn his penitent against wasting too much time in such reading and against the dangers which frequently arise from it.

Philip should be told not to touch, fondle, much less to kiss the boys for whom he feels a sensual attraction. If such acts on his part have not hitherto led to grave disorder and sin, they will certainly do so before long. By such conduct he is developing passions which are very difficult to keep in order. He should be told to act in a manly and Christian manner towards his companions, and to treat them with respect — Great reverence is owed to a boy.

Certain more recent authors reject the principle of a double effect on the ground that it contains a begging of the question; for the first condition which the said principle establishes for the lawfulness of an action requires that the cause be good or at least indifferent; secondly, because it requires that the bad effect not be intended, although intention cannot change the nature of the external action and it is permissible to intend the killing of an unjust aggressor, to which example St. Thomas applies this principle; in this example the third condition also is lacking, namely, that the good effect not follow from the bad effect; finally, the fourth condition, namely, that there be a proportionate cause, is indeed true, but according to them it is useless in practice and incapable of application.¹ Hence it is asked:

1 Ita fere Dr. W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, p. 149.

1. What is the principle of a double effect, and for what does it serve?

2. Is the said principle true?

1. See c. i., nn. 2, 3, 4.

2. An act is more or less voluntary, as it is done with more or less knowledge, and proceeds more or less fully and purely from the will properly so called. Whatever diminishes knowledge, or partially supplants the will, takes off from the voluntariness of the act. An act is rendered less voluntary by ignorance, by passionate desire, and by fear.

3. If a man has done something in ignorance either of the law or of the facts of the case, and would be sorry for it, were he to find out what he has done, that act is involuntary, so far as it is traceable to ignorance alone. Even if he would not be sorry, still the act must be pronounced not voluntary, under the same reservation. Ignorance, sheer ignorance, takes whatever is done under it out of the region of volition. Nothing is willed but what is known. An ignorant man is as excusable as a drunken one, as such,—no more and no less. The difference is, that drunkenness generally is voluntary; ignorance often is not. But ignorance may be voluntary, quite as voluntary as drunkenness. It is a capital folly of our age to deny the possibility of voluntary intellectual error. Error is often voluntary, and (where the matter is one that the person officially or otherwise is required to know) immoral too. A strange thing it is to say that "it is as unmeaning to speak of the immorality of an intellectual mistake as it would be to talk of the colour of a sound." (Lecky, European Morals, ii., 202.)

4. There is an ignorance that is sought on purpose, called affected ignorance (in the Shakspearian sense of the word affect), as when a man will not read begging-letters, that he may not give anything away. Such ignorance does not hinder voluntariness. It indicates a strong will of doing or omitting, come what may. There is yet another ignorance called crass, which is when a man, without absolutely declining knowledge, yet takes no pains to acquire it in a matter where he is aware that truth is important to him. Whatever election is made in consequence of such ignorance, is less voluntary, indeed, than if it were made in the full light, still it is to some extent voluntary. It is voluntary in its cause, that is, in the voluntary ignorance that led to it. Suppose a man sets up as a surgeon, having made a very imperfect study of his art. He is aware, that for want of knowledge and skill, he shall endanger many lives: still he neglects opportunities of making himself competent, and goes audaciously to work. If any harm comes of his bungling, he can plead intellectual error, an error of judgment for the time being; he did his best as well as he knew it. Doubtless he did, and in that he is unlike the malicious maker of mischief: still he has chosen lightly and recklessly to hazard a great evil. To that extent his will is bound to the evil: he has chosen it, as it were, at one remove.

5. Another instance. A man is a long way on to seeing, though he does not quite see, the claims of the Church of Rome on his allegiance and submission. He suspects that a little more prayer and search, and he shall be a Roman Catholic. To escape this, he resolves to go travelling and give up prayer. This is affected ignorance. Another has no such perception of the claims of Catholicism. He has no religion that satisfies him. He is aware speculatively of the importance of the religious question; but his heart is not in religion at all. With Demas, he loves the things of this world. Very attractive and interesting does he find this life; and for the life to come he is content to chance it. This is crass ignorance of religious truth. Such a man is not a formal heretic, for he is not altogether wilful and contumacious in his error. Still neither is it wholly involuntary, nor he wholly guiltless.

6. Passionate desire is not an affection of the will, but of the sensitive appetite. The will may cooperate, but the passion is not in the will. The will may neglect to check the passion, when it might: it may abet and inflame it: in these ways an act done in passion is a voluntary act. Still it becomes voluntary only by the influx of the will, positively permitting or stimulating: it is not voluntary precisely as it proceeds from passion: for voluntary is that which is of the will. It belongs to passion to bring on a momentary darkness in the understanding: where such darkness is, there is so much the less of a human act. But passion in an adult of sane mind is hardly strong enough, of itself and wholly without the will, to execute any considerable outward action, involving the voluntary muscles. Things are often said and done, and put down to passion: but that is not the whole account of the matter. The will has been for a long time either feeding the passions, or letting them range unchecked: that is the reason of their present outburst, which is voluntary at least in its cause. Once this evil preponderance has been brought about, it is to be examined whether the will, in calm moods, is making any efforts to redress the evil. Such efforts, if made, go towards making the effects of passion, when they come, involuntary, and gradually preventing them altogether.

7. What a man does from fear, he is said to do under compulsion, especially if the fear be applied to him by some other person in order to gain a purpose. Such compulsory action is distinguished in ordinary parlance from voluntary action. And it is certainly less voluntary, inasmuch as the will is hedged in to make its choice between two evils, and chooses one or other only as being the less evil of the two, not for any liking to the thing in itself. Still, all things considered, the thing is chosen, and the action is so far voluntary. We may call it voluntary in the concrete, and involuntary in the abstract. The thing is willed as matters stand, but in itself and apart from existing need it is not liked at all. But as acts must be judged as they stand, by what the man wills now, not by what he would will, an act done under fear is on the whole voluntary. At the same time, fear sometimes excuses from the observance of a law, or of a contract, which from the way in which it was made was never meant to bind in so hard a case. Not all contracts, however, are of this accommodating nature; and still less, all laws. But even where the law binds, the penalty of the law is sometimes not incurred, when the law was broken through fear.

Readings.—Ar., Eth., III, i.; St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 6, art. 3; ib., q. 6, art. 6, 8; ib., q. 77, art. 6.

1. The morality of any given action is determined by three elements, the end in view, the means taken, and the circumstances that accompany the taking of the said means. Whoever knows this principle, does not thereby know the right and wrong of every action, but he knows how to go about the enquiry. It is a rule of diagnosis.

2. In order to know whether what a man does befits him as a man to do, the first thing to examine is that which he mainly desires and wills in his action. Now the end is more willed and desired than the means. He who steals to commit adultery, says Aristotle, is more of an adulterer than a thief. The end in view is what lies nearest to a man's heart as he acts. On that his mind is chiefly bent; on that his main purpose is fixed. Though the end is last in the order of execution, it is first and foremost in the order of intention. Therefore the end in view enters into morality more deeply than any other element of the action. It is not, however, the most obvious determinant, because it is the last point to be gained; and because, while the means are taken openly, the end is often a secret locked up in the heart of the doer, the same means leading to many ends, as the road to a city leads to many homes and resting-places. Conversely, one end may be prosecuted by many means, as there are many roads converging upon one goal.

3. If morality were determined by the end in view, and by that alone, the doctrine would hold that the end justifies the means. That doctrine is false, because the moral character of a human act depends on the thing willed, or object of volition, according as it is or is not a fit object. Now the object of volition is not only the end in view, but likewise the means chosen. Besides the end, the means are likewise willed. Indeed, the means are willed more immediately even than the end, as they have to be taken first.

4. A good action, like any other good thing, must possess a certain requisite fulness of being, proper to itself. As it is not enough for the physical excellence of a man to have the bare essentials, a body with a soul animating it, but there is needed a certain grace of form, colour, agility, and many accidental qualities besides; so for a good act it is not enough that proper means be taken to a proper end, but they must be taken by a proper person, at a proper place and time, in a proper manner, and with manifold other circumstances of propriety.

5. The end in view may be either single, as when you forgive an injury solely for the love of Christ: or multiple co-ordinate, as when you forgive both for the love of Christ and for the mediation of a friend, and are disposed to forgive on either ground separately; or multiple subordinate, as when you would not have forgiven on the latter ground alone, but forgive the more easily for its addition, having been ready, however, to forgive on the former alone; or cumulative, as when you forgive on a number of grounds collectively, on no one of which would you have forgiven apart from the rest.

6. Where there is no outward action, but only an internal act, and the object of that act is some good that is willed for its own sake, there can be no question of means taken, as the end in view is immediately attained.

7. The means taken and the circumstances of those means enter into the morality of the act, formally as they are seen by the intellect, materially as they are in themselves. (See what is said of ignorance, c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27.) This explains the difference between formal and material sin. A material sin would be formal also, did the agent know what he was doing. No sin is culpable that is not formal. But, as has been said, there may be a culpable perversion of the intellect, so that the man is the author of his own obliquity or defect of vision. When Saul persecuted the Christians, he probably sinned materially, not formally. When Caiphas spoke the truth without knowing it, he said well materially, but ill formally.

8. In looking at the means taken and the circumstances that accompany those means, it is important to have a ready rule for pronouncing what particular belongs to the means and what to the circumstances. Thus Clytemnestra deals her husband Agamemnon a deadly stroke with an axe, partly for revenge, partly that she may take to herself another consort; is the deadliness of the blow part of the means taken or only an accompanying circumstance? It is part of the means taken. The means taken include every particular that is willed and chosen as making for the end in view. The fatal character of the blow does make to that end; if Agamemnon does not die, the revenge will not be complete, and life with Aegisthus will be impossible. On the other hand, the fact that Clytemnestra is the wife of the man whom she murders, is not a point that her will rests upon as furthering her purpose at all; it is an accompanying circumstance. This method of distinguishing means from circumstance is of great value in casuistry.

9. It is clear that not every attendant circumstance affects the morality of the means taken. Thus the blow under which Agamemnon sank was neither more nor less guiltily struck because it was dealt with an axe, because it was under pretence of giving him a bath, or because his feet were entangled in a long robe. These circumstances are all irrelevant. Those only are relevant which attach some special reasonableness or unreasonableness to the thing done Thus the provocation that Clytemnestra had from her husband's introduction of Cassandra into her house made her act of vengeance less unreasonable: on the other hand it was rendered more unreasonable by the circumstance of the dear and holy tie that binds wife to husband. The provocation and the relationship were two relevant circumstances in that case.

10. But it happens sometimes that a circumstance only affects the reasonableness of an action on the supposition of some previous circumstance so affecting it. Thus to carry off a thing in large or small quantities does not affect the reasonableness of the carrying, unless there be already some other circumstance attached that renders the act good or evil; as for instance, if the goods that are being removed are stolen property. Circumstances of this sort are called aggravating—or, as the case may be, extenuating—circumstances. Circumstances that of themselves, and apart from any previous supposition, make the thing done peculiarly reasonable or unreasonable, are called specifying circumstances. They are so called, because they place the action in some species of virtue or vice; whereas aggravating or extenuating circumstances add to, or take off from, the good or evil of the action in that species of virtue or vice to which it already belongs.

11. A variety of specifying circumstances may place one and the same action in many various species of virtue or vice. Thus a religious robbing his parents would sin at once against justice, piety, and religion. A nun preferring death to dishonour practises three virtues, chastity, fortitude, and religion.

12. The means chosen may be of four several characters:—

(a) A thing evil of itself and inexcusable under all conceivable circumstances; for instance, blasphemy, idolatry, lying.

(b) Needing excuse, as the killing of a man, the looking at an indecent object. Such things are not to be done except under certain circumstances and with a grave reason. Thus indecent sights may be met in the discharge of professional duty. In that case indeed they cease to be indecent. They are then only indecent when they are viewed without cause. The absence of a good motive in a case like this commonly implies the presence of a bad one.

(c) Indifferent, as walking or sitting down.

(d) Good of itself, but liable to be vitiated by circumstances, as prayer and almsgiving; the good of such actions may be destroyed wholly or in part by their being done out of a vain motive, or unseasonably, or indiscreetly.

13. It is said, "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome." (St. Matt., vi., 22.) The eye is the intention contemplating the end in view. Whoever has placed a good end before him, and regards it steadily with a well-ordered love, never swerving in his affection from the way that reason would have him love, must needs take towards his end those means, and those only, which are in themselves reasonable and just: as it is written: "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." (Deut. xvi., 20.) Thus I am building a church to the glory of God; money runs short: I perceive that by signing a certain contract that must mean grievous oppression of the poor, I shall save considerable expense, whereas, if I refuse, the works will have to be abandoned for want of funds. If I have purely the glory of God before my eyes, I certainly shall not sign that contract: for injustice I know can bear no fruit of Divine glory. But if I am bent upon having the building up in any case, of course I shall sign: but then my love for the end in view is no longer pure and regulated by reason: it is not God but myself that I am seeking in the work. Thus an end entirely just, holy, and pure, purifies and sanctifies the means, not formally, by investing with a character of justice means in themselves unjust, for that is impossible,—the leopard cannot change his spots,—but by way of elimination, removing unjust means as ineligible to my purpose, and leaving me only those means to choose from which are in themselves just.

14. With means in themselves indifferent, the case is otherwise. A holy and pious end does formally sanctify those means, while a wicked end vitiates them. I beg the reader to observe what sort of means are here in question. There is no question of means in themselves or in their circumstances unjust, as theft, lying, murder, but of such indifferent things as reading, writing, painting, singing, travelling. Whoever travels to commit sin at the end of his journey, his very travelling, so far as it is referred to that end, is part of his sin: it is a wicked journey that he takes. And he who travels to worship at some shrine or place of pilgrimage, includes his journey in his devotion. The end in view there sanctifies means in themselves indifferent.

15. As a great part of the things that we do are indifferent as well in themselves as in the circumstances of the doing of them, the moral character of our lives depends largely on the ends that we habitually propose to ourselves. One man's great thought is how to make money; what he reads, writes, says, where he goes, where he elects to reside, his very eating, drinking and personal expenditure, all turns on what he calls making his fortune. It is all to gain money—quocunque modo rem. Another is active for bettering the condition of the labouring classes: a third for the suppression of vice. These three men go some way together in a common orbit of small actions, alike to the eye, but morally unlike, because of the various guiding purposes for which they are done. Hence, when we consider such pregnant final ends as the service of God and the glory of a world to come, it appears how vast is the alteration in the moral line and colouring of a man's life, according to his practical taking up or setting aside of these great ends.

16. We must beware however of an exaggeration here. The final end of action is often latent, not explicitly considered. A fervent worshipper of God wishes to refer his whole self with all that he does to the Divine glory and service. Yet such a one will eat, drink, and be merry with his friends, not thinking of God at the time. Still, supposing him to keep within the bounds of temperance, he is serving God and doing good actions. But what of a man who has entirely broken away from God, what of his eating, drinking, and other actions that are of their kind indifferent? We cannot call them sins: there is nothing wrong about them, neither in the thing done, nor in the circumstances of the doing, nor in the intention. Pius V. condemned the proposition: "All the works of infidels are sins." Neither must we call such actions indifferent in the individual who does them, supposing them to be true human acts, according to the definition, and not done merely mechanically. They are not indifferent, because they receive a certain measure of natural goodness from the good natural purpose which they serve, namely, the conservation and well-being of the agent. Every human act is either good or evil in him who does it. I speak of natural goodness only.

17. The effect consequent upon an action is distinguishable from the action itself, from which it is not unfrequently separated by a considerable interval of time, as the death of a man from poison administered a month before. The effect consequent enters into morality only in so far as it is either chosen as a means or intended as an end (nn. 2, 3, p. 31), or is annexed as a relevant circumstance to the means chosen (n. 9, p. 34.). Once the act is done, it matters nothing to morality whether the effect consequent actually ensues or not, provided no new act be elicited thereupon, whether of commission or of culpable omission to prevent. It matters not to morality, but it does matter to the agent's claim to reward or liability to punishment at the hands of human legislators civil and ecclesiastical.

18. As soul and body make one man, so the inward and outward act—as the will to strike and the actual blow struck—are one human act. The outward act gives a certain physical completeness to the inward. Moreover the inward act is no thorough-going thing, if it stops short of outward action where the opportunity offers. Otherwise, the inward act may be as good or as bad morally as inward and outward act together. The mere wish to kill, where the deed is impossible, may be as wicked as wish and deed conjoined. It may be, but commonly it will not, for this reason, that the outward execution of the deed reacts upon the will and calls it forth with greater intensity; the will as it were expands where it finds outward vent. There is no one who has not felt the relative mildness of inward feelings of impatience or indignation, compared with those engendered by speaking out one's mind. Often also the outward act entails a long course of preparation, all during which the inward will is sustained and frequently renewed, as in a carefully planned burglary.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2ae, q. 18, art. 1; ib., q. 18, art. 2, in corp., ad 1; ib., q. 18, art. 3, in corp., ad 2; ib., q. 18, art. 4-6; ib., q. 18, art. 8, in corp., ad 2, 3; ib., q. 18, art. 9, in corp., ad 3; ib., q. 18, art. 10, 3; ib., q. 18, art. 11, in corp.; ib., q. 20, art. 4, in corp.

1. A passion is defined to be: A movement of the irrational part of the soul, attended by a notable alteration of the body, on the apprehension of good or evil. The soul is made up of intellect, will, and sensible appetite. The first two are rational, the third irrational: the third is the seat of the passions. In a disembodied spirit, or an angel, there are no senses, no sensible appetite, no passions. The angel, or the departed soul, can love and hate, fear and desire, rejoice and grieve, but these are not passions in the pure spirit, they are acts of intellect and will alone. So man also often loves and hates, and does other acts that are synonymous with corresponding passions, and yet no passion is there. The man is working with his calm reason: his irrational soul is not stirred. To an author, when he is in the humour for it, it is a delight to be writing, but not a passionate delight. The will finds satisfaction in the act: the irrational soul is not affected by it. Or a penitent is sorry for his sin: he sincerely regrets it before God: his will is heartily turned away, and wishes that that sin had never been: at the same time his eye is dry, his features unmoved, not a sigh does he utter, and yet he is truly sorry. It is important to bear these facts in mind: else we shall be continually mistaking for passions what are pure acts of will, or vice versa, misled by the identity of name.

2. The great mark of a passion is its sensible working of itself out upon the body,—what Dr. Bain calls "the diffusive wave of emotion." Without this mark there is no passion, but with it are other mental states besides passions, as we define them. All strong emotion affects the body sensibly, but not all emotions are passions. There are emotions that arise from and appertain to the rational portion of the soul. Such are Surprise, Laughter, Shame.

There is no sense of humour in any but rational beings; and though dogs look ashamed and horses betray curiosity, that is only inasmuch as in these higher animals there is something analogous to what is reason in man. Moreover passions are conversant with good and evil affecting sense, but the objects of such emotions as those just mentioned are not good and evil as such, common parlance notwithstanding, whereby we are said to laugh at a bon mot, or "a good thing."

3. Love is a generic passion, having for its species desire and delight, the contraries of which are abhorrence and pain. Desire is of absent good; abhorrence is of absent evil; delight is in present good; pain is at present evil. The good and the evil which is the object of any passion must be apprehended by sense, or by imagination in a sensible way, whether itself be a thing of sense or not.

4. Desire and abhorrence, delight and pain, are conversant with good and evil simply. But good is often attainable only by an effort, and evil avoidable by an effort. The effort that good costs to attain casts a shade of evil or undesirableness over it: we may shrink from the effort while coveting the good. Again, the fact of evil being at all avoidable is a good thing about such evil. If we call evil black, and good white, avoidable evil will be black just silvering into grey: and arduous good will be white with a cloud on it. And if the white attracts, and the black repels the appetite, it appears that arduous good is somewhat distasteful, to wit, to the faint-hearted; and avoidable, or vincible, evil has its attraction for the man of spirit. About these two objects, good hard of getting and evil hard of avoidance, arise four other passions, hope and despair about the former, fear and daring about the latter. Hope goes out towards a difficult good: despair flies from it, the difficulty here being more repellent than the good is attractive. Fear flies from a threatening evil: while daring goes up to the same, drawn by the likelihood of vanquishing it. Desire and abhorrence, delight and pain, hope and despair, fear and daring, with anger and hatred (of which presently), complete our list of passions.

5. Aristotle and his school of old, called Peripatetics, recommended the moderation of the passions, not their extirpation. The Stoics on the other hand contended that the model man, the sage, should be totally devoid of passions. This celebrated dispute turned largely on the two schools not understanding the same thing by the word passion. Yet not entirely so. There was a residue of real difference, and it came to this. If the sensitive appetite stirs at all, it must stir in one or other of nine ways corresponding to the nine passions which we have enumerated. Such an emotion as Laughter affects the imagination and the sensitive part of man, and of course the body visibly, but it does not stir the sensitive appetite, since it does not prompt to action. To say then that a man has no passions, means that the sensitive appetite never stirs within him, but is wholly dead. But this is impossible, as the Stoic philosopher was fain to confess when he got frightened in a storm at sea. Having no passions cannot in any practical sense mean having no movements of the sensitive appetite, for that will be afoot of its own proper motion independent of reason: but it may mean cherishing no passions, allowing none to arise unresisted, but suppressing their every movement to the utmost that the will can. In that sense it is a very intelligible and practical piece of advice, that the wise man should labour to have no passions. It is the advice embodied in Horace's Nil admirari, Talleyrand's "No zeal," Beaconsfield's "Beware of enthusiasm." It would have man to work like a scientific instrument, calm as a chronometer, regulated by reason alone. This was the Stoic teaching, this the perfection that they inculcated, quite a possible goal to make for, if not to attain. And it is worth a wise man's while to consider, whether he should bend his efforts in this direction or not. The determination here taken and acted upon will elaborate quite a different character of man one way or the other. The effort made as the Stoics direct, would mean no yielding to excitement, no poetry, no high-strung devotion, no rapture, no ecstasy, no ardour of love, no earnest rhetoric spoken or listened to, no mourning, no rejoicing other than the most conventional, to the persistent smothering of whatever is natural and really felt, no tear of pity freely let flow, no touch of noble anger responded to, no scudding before the breeze of indignation,—all this, that reason may keep on the even tenour of her way undisturbed.

6. The fault in this picture is that it is not the picture of a man, but of a spirit. He who being man should try to realize it in himself, would fall short of human perfection. For though the sensitive appetite is distinguished from the will, and the two may clash and come in conflict, yet they are not two wholly independent powers, but the one man is both will and sensitive appetite, and he rarely operates according to one power without the other being brought into corresponding play. There is a similar concomitance of the operations of intellect and imagination. What attracts the sensitive appetite, commonly allures also the affective will, though on advertence the elective will may reject it. On the other hand, a strong affection and election of the will cannot be without the sensitive appetite being stirred, and that so strongly that the motion is notable in the body,—in other words, is a passion. Passion is the natural and in a certain degree the inseparable adjunct of strong volition. To check one is to check the other. Not only is the passion repressed by repressing the volition, but the repression of the passion is also the repression of the volition. A man then who did his best to repress all movements of passion indiscriminately, would lay fetters on his will, lamentable and cruel and impolitic fetters, where his will was bent on any object good and honourable and well-judged.

7. Again, man's will is reached by two channels, from above downwards and from below upwards: it is reached through the reason and through the imagination and senses. By the latter channel it often receives evil impressions, undoubtedly, but not unfrequently by the former also. Reason may be inconsiderate, vain, haughty, mutinous, unduly sceptical. The abuse is no justification for closing either channel. Now the channel of the senses and of the imagination is the wider, and in many cases affords the better passage of the two. The will that is hardly reached by reason, is approached and won by a pathetic sight, a cry of enthusiasm, a threat that sends a tremor through the limbs. Rather I should say the affective will is approached in this way: for it remains with the elective will, on advertence and consultation with reason, to decide whether or not it shall be won to consent. But were it not for the channel of passion, this will could never have been approached at all even by reasons the most cogent. Rhetoric often succeeds, where mere dry logic would have been thrown away. God help vast numbers of the human race, if their wills were approachable only through their reasons! They would indeed be fixtures.

8. Another fact to notice is the liability of reason's gaze to become morbid and as it were inflamed by unremitting exercise. I do not here allude to hard study, but to overcurious scanning of the realities of this life, and the still greater realities and more momentous possibilities of the world to come. There is a sense of the surroundings being too much for us, an alarm and a giddiness, that comes of sober matter-of-fact thought over-much prolonged. Then it happens that one or more undeniable truths are laid hold of, and considered in strong relief and in isolation from the rest: the result is a distorted and partial view of truth as a whole, and therewith the mind is troubled. Here the kindlier passions, judiciously allowed to play, come in to soothe the wound and soreness of pure intellect, too keen in its workings for one who is not yet a pure spirit.

9. Moral good and evil are predicable only of human acts, in the technical sense of the term. (c. i., nn. 2—4, p. 41.) As the passions by definition (c. iv., s. i., n. 1, p. 41) are not human acts, they can never be morally evil of themselves. But they are an occasion of moral evil in this way. They often serve to wake up the slumbering Reason. To that end it is necessary that they should start up of themselves without the call of Reason. This would be no inconvenience, if the instant Reason awoke, and adverted to the tumult and stir of Passion, she could take command of it, and where she saw fit, quell it. But Reason has no such command, except in cases where she has acquired it by years of hard fighting. Passion once afoot holds on her course against the dictate of Reason. True, so long as it remains mere Passion, and Reason is not dragged away by it, no consent of the will given, no voluntary act elicited, still less carried into outward effect,—so long as things remain thus, however Passion may rage, there is no moral evil done. But there is a great temptation, and in great temptation many men fall. The evil is the act of free will, but the pressure on the will is the pressure of Passion. But Passion happily is a young colt amenable to discipline. Where the assaults of Passion are resolutely and piously withstood, and the incentives thereto avoided—unnatural and unnecessary incentives I mean—Passion itself acquires a certain habit of obedience to Reason, which habit is moral virtue. Of that presently.

10. In a man of confirmed habits of moral virtue, Passion starts up indeed independently of Reason, but then Reason ordinarily finds little difficulty in regulating the Passion so aroused. In a certain high and extraordinary condition of human nature, not only has Reason entire mastery over Passion wherever she finds it astir, but Passion cannot stir in the first instance, without Reason calling upon it to do so. In this case the torpor of the will deprecated above (n. 7) is not to be feared, because Reason is so vigorous and so masterful as to be adequate to range everywhere and meet all emergencies without the goad of Passion. This state is called by divines the state of integrity. In it Adam was before he sinned. It was lost at the Fall, and has not been restored by the Redemption. It is not a thing in any way due to human nature: nothing truly natural to man was forfeited by Adam's sin. It is no point of holiness, no guerdon of victory, this state of integrity, but rather a being borne on angel's wings above the battle. But one who has no battle in his own breast against Passion, may yet suffer and bleed and die under exterior persecution: nay, he may, if he wills, let in Passion upon himself, to fear and grieve, when he need not. So did the Second Adam in the Garden of Gethsemane.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a, q. 81, art. 2, in corp.; id., 1a 2æ, q. 23, art. 1, in corp.; ib., q. 23, art. 2, in corp.; Cicero, Tusc. Disp., iv., cc. 17-26; St. Aug., De Civitate Dei, ix., cc. 4, 5; Ar, Eth., III., v., 3, 4; ib., I., xiii., 15-17; St. Thos., 3a, q. 15, art. 4; id., 1a 2æ, q. 59, art. 5; Plato, Timaeus, 69, B, E: 70, A.

1. Desires are either physical cravings, by moderns called appetites; or physical desires or tastes, called desires proper. The appetites have their beginning in bodily uneasiness. They are felt needs of something required for the animal maintenance of the individual or of the race. The objects of the several appetites are Meat and Drink, Warmth or Coolness, Exercise and Repose, Sleep, Sex. The object of mere appetite is marked by quantity only, not by quality. That is to say, the thing is sought for in the vague, in a certain amount sufficient to supply the want, but not this or that variety of the thing. The cry of a hungry man is, "Give me to eat," if very hungry, "Give me much:" but so far as he is under the mere dominion of appetite he does not crave any particular article of food, vegetable or animal: he wants quantity merely. So of thirst, so of all the appetites, where there is nothing else but appetite present.

2. But if a thirsty man cries for champagne, or a hungry man fancies a venison pasty, there is another element beyond appetite in that demand. On the matter of the physical craving there is stamped the form of a psychical desire. The psychical element prescribes a quality of the objects sought. The thirsty man thus prompted no longer wants drink but wine: the man mewed up within doors no longer calls for exercise, but for a horse or a bicycle. It is obvious that in man the appetites generally pass into the further shape of psychical desire. It is when the appetite is vehement, or the man is one who makes slight study of his animal wants, that pure appetite, sheer physical craving, is best shown. Darius flying before his conqueror is ready to drink at any source, muddy or clear, a drink is all that he wants: it is all that is wanted by St. Paul the first Hermit. But your modern lounger at the clubs, what variety of liquors are excogitated to please his palate!

3. Not all psychical desires are on the matter of appetite; they may be fixed on any good whatsoever of body or of mind. Many psychical desires are not passions at all, but reside exclusively in the superior part of the soul, in the will prompted by the understanding, and do not affect the body in any sensible way. Such for instance is the great desire of happiness. Those desires that are passions are prompted, not by the understanding, but by the imagination or fancy, imaging to itself some particular good, not good in general, for that the understanding contemplates. Fancy paints the picture; or if sense presents it, fancy appropriates and embellishes it: the sensitive appetite fastens upon the representation: the bodily organs sensibly respond; and there is the passion of psychical desire.

4. Physical cravings, or appetites, have limited objects: the objects of psychical desires may be unlimited. A thirsty man thirsts not for an ocean, but for drink quantum sufficit: give him that and the appetite is gone. But the miser covets all the money that he can get: the voluptuary ranges land and sea in search of a new pleasure: the philosopher ever longs for a higher knowledge: the saint is indefatigable in doing good. Whatever a man takes to be an end in itself, not simply a means, that he desires without end or measure. What he desires as a means, he desires under a limitation, so far forth as it makes for the end, so much and no more. As Aristotle says of the processes of art, "the end in view is the limit," [Greek: peras to telos] (cf. c. ii., s. iii., n. 3, p. 15) Whatever is desired as an end in itself, is taken to be a part of happiness, or to represent happiness. Happiness and the object that gives happiness is the one thing that man desires for itself, and desires without end or measure. Unfortunately he is often mistaken in the choice of this object. He often takes for an end what is properly only a means. They "whose god is their belly," have made this mistake in regard of the gratification of appetite. It is not appetite proper that has led to this perversion, but psychical desire, or appetite inflamed by the artificial stimulus of imagination. For one who would be temperate, it is more important to control his imagination than to trouble about his appetite. Appetite exhausts itself, sometimes within the bounds of what is good for the subject, sometimes beyond them, but still within some bounds; but there is no limit to the cravings bred of imagination.

5. By this canon a man may try himself to discover whether or not a favourite amusement is gaining too much upon him. An amusement is properly a means to the end, that a man may come away from it better fitted to do the serious work of his life. Pushed beyond a certain point, the amusement ceases to minister to this end. The wise man drops it at that point. But if one knows not where to stop: or if when stopped in spite of himself, he is restless till he begin again, and never willingly can forego any measure of the diversion that comes within his reach, the means in that case has passed into an end: he is enslaved to that amusement, inasmuch as he will do anything and everything for the sake of it. Thus some men serve pleasure, and other men money.

Case.—Confessor A has a penitent who rather frequently has to accuse himself of certain solitary and grave sins. This penitent has tried for many years to overcome the temptation but without success. The habit in question was formed in early boyhood days and has grown upon him to such a degree that it is now, he claims, beyond his control. The temptation comes upon him with such suddenness and fury that, at least to his mind, he seems compelled to yield, and he is of the opinion that he would do so even though he knew with certainty that at the moment of gratification his soul would be lost.

Question.—Now, what is the confessor to do with such a case?

Solution.—To decide whether this penitent is guilty of grave sin each time he falls, one must consider whether his habit of sin is voluntary or involuntary.

(1). If the penitent desires to retain the evil habit it is clear that the resulting acts are of his own choice and that he sins gravely each time he yields to the temptation.

(2). If he does not positively will to continue the habit, but yet has not efficaciously rejected it, his guiltiness will depend on whether the habit was begun voluntarily or involuntarily.

(a). In the former hypothesis, the acts consequent on the habit are voluntary in their cause, since the penitent foresaw and willed them, at least in a confused way, at the time he consciously contracted the vicious habit. He cannot decline responsibility on the ground that his will-power has been weakened, any more than a person who deliberately throws himself into a deep pit can excuse himself for not continuing a journey. (b). In the latter hypothesis, the voluntariness of the acts are much diminished. The sinful habit was contracted in boyhood days before its sinfulness or gravity was understood and it grew so powerful that the will seemed utterly enslaved. One must beware, however, of taking a lax view. Only when the force of habit is so strong as to unbalance the reason and to extort consent before a clear judgment is possible, may it be said that the act is not free and not imputable. Such cases are comparatively rare. The confessor will have to judge from the circumstances the extent to which the sinful habit has weakened the free-will and diminished the guilt of the penitent. He should remember, too, that even though the habit was involuntary in its origin, it may have become voluntary subsequently, if the duty of using proper means to combat the vice was knowingly neglected.

(3). If the penitent has formally retracted the habit and has employed means to conquer it, this circumstance greatly extenuates his guilt. But here again it is only when the habit produces a gravis perturbatio mentis that it takes away grave culpability.

The confessor should be slow to conclude that such a condition of mind exists, even though the penitent should protest ever so much his powerlessness to resist. This is the very explanation that self-deceived consuetudinarii often allege in their own favor. However, the confessor should use great gentleness along with prudence and firmness. The penitent should be so directed that on the one hand he will not feel that he is free from imputability, nor on the other hand that God is a tyrant and that there is no hope for himself. He should be absolved as often as he presents himself with dispositions which the priest judges to be genuine and sufficient. Moreover he should be persistently exhorted not to become the slave of discouragement but to keep up his efforts despite his frequent relapses, and to use all means, natural and supernatural, which tend to lessen the severity of his temptations, and to strengthen the force of will-power. Especially should he be urged to commend himself to the Mercy of God.

36. Having discussed in the preceding chapter the end of human acts, we shall next proceed to study their nature. With this purpose we shall examine: 1. The essential difference between morally good and morally bad acts, or the essence of morality; 2. The determinants of morality in any given action; 3. Accountability for moral acts; 4. Circumstances that lessen accountability; 5. The passions as influencing accountability; 6. Habits as facilitating moral acts.

37. Human acts are those of which a man is master, which he has the power of doing or not doing as he pleases. (No. 2. See also Ment. Phil., Nos. 194-199.) True, we are physically free to perform certain acts or to omit them — to do one thing or its contrary, to choose this act rather than some other; but are we also morally free in regard to all such acts? Is it right for me on all occasions to do whatever my inclination prompts me to do? My reason plainly answers, No: it is evident even to a child that some actions are good in themselves, morally good, and others bad in themselves, morally bad. The good acts our reason commends and approves; these we call right. Evil acts, on the contrary, our reason disapproves and blames; these we call wrong. The ideas of right and wrong, like those of truth and falsity, substance and accident, cause and effect are "primary ideas" which are common to all men; hence, they are trustworthy ideas — that is, the distinction existing in the mind between right and wrong corresponds to a distinction existing objectively in human acts. (See Logic, Nos. 119, 120.)

38. But though all men distinguish between right and wrong, it does not follow that all theorizers acknowledge the distinction. It often stands in the way of their false speculations. Such writers, for instance as Huxley, Spencer and the Agnostics and Positivists generally, admit no true liberty in man, and therefore they cannot consistently treat of human acts as such: there are no human acts with them, for there are no acts which a man has the power to do or not to do. The same holds true for all Materialists, who teach that nothing exists but matter — acting, of course, by necessary laws. Pantheists likewise, admitting no real distinction between man and God, cannot speak of human acts as such, and cannot therefore correctly explain the difference between moral right and moral wrong. Nevertheless, all these false theorizers employ the terms "right" and "wrong" — the distinction being too widely accepted to be ignored. They are forced, however, by the exigencies of their theories to misinterpret the meaning of these words. Without stopping to refute their false and demoralizing interpretations singly, we shall briefly explain the obvious, certain and common-sense distinctions between moral right and moral wrong.

39. The reason why our intellect approves certain acts, calls them morally good and pronounces them worthy of praise, precisely as free acts, is because it perceives that they are rightly directed to their true end, suitable to and worthy of a rational agent, conformable to the exigencies of things, and therefore that they ought to be done by man: man ought to do what is conformable to his rational nature and conducive to his perfection.

Our intellect disapproves of other acts, calls them morally bad or evil and pronounces them to be, inasmuch as they are free acts, deserving of blame, because it perceives they are directed away from their true end, are unbecoming and unsuitable to a rational agent, at variance with the exigencies of things, and therefore not to be done by man: man ought not to do that which is unworthy of a rational being, and which, instead of perfecting, debases him.

40. The radical notion conveyed by the term "good" is "suitableness to an appetite or desire." Using the word, then, in its radical meaning, we say something is good for a being which that being desires — i. e., which is the object of its appetites. And the good is the object of the being's appetites because it tends in some manner to the perfection of the being; for the wise Creator has made all things such that they tend to what promotes their perfection. Hence we call that a physical good which contributes to perfect a being physically — as, for example, food for the animal nature. We call whatever benefits the intellect, e. g., truth and science, an intellectual good. So, too, that which perfects a free being, as such, we call a moral good.

41. A free being perfects itself by drawing near to its ultimate end, its supreme good, which is God. Consequently, those acts are morally good for man which bring him nearer to God, the ultimate end of his existence; and those are morally bad which lead him away from God.

42. Since there are some human acts, like blasphemy, that are of themselves bad at all times, and others, like reverence for God, that are of themselves always good, the quality of goodness or badness must be something intrinsic to the acts and must depend upon their accord with or disagreement from the permanent natural order of things. It is clear that this order, with respect to human acts, corresponds to the relations which man, as a creature, possesses necessarily towards God; as a social entity, towards his fellow-men; and towards himself as a being endowed with various faculties, sensitive and spiritual. These relations in turn are founded on the essences of things; hence, the difference between the two classes of acts is an essential difference. Now the essences of things are modelled by the Creator upon perfections known to the Divine Intellect as existing in the Divine Essence; therefore the morality or immorality of a human act is determined ultimately by the intellect and not by the free will of God. As God can not contradict Himself, He can not make an intrinsically moral act immoral, nor remove the immorality of an act intrinsically immoral.

43. Some human acts are so disorderly as to turn a man entirely away from the pursuit of his true last end; for, in place of God as the ultimate object of desire, these acts substitute explicitly or implicitly something altogether incompatible with the love of God. There are other human acts, which, though impeding the soul's tendency towards its true ultimate end, do not become an obstacle to the attainment of that end. In this difference lies the distinction between mortal and venial sin.

44. Once the true meaning of morality is grasped, it is easy to detect the errors of certain false theories which have been fabricated to explain the power residing in all men of distinguishing between good and evil.

1. Some philosophers attribute this power to instinct. But instinct, in the accurate meaning of the word, is a blind impulse of nature, which prompts the animal to conduct itself in a determined manner, and thus to perform complex acts, without understanding their further purpose, for the good of the individual and of the species. Moral good and moral evil, on the contrary, are apprehended intellectually — that is, by a cognitive faculty which can reflect and draw inferences; hence, in distinguishing between good and evil, we do not act blindly, but intelligently.

2. Some speak of a moral sense. If by a moral sense an organic faculty or the action of an organic faculty is meant, the use of the term is erroneous and misleading; because material organism, which is required for every organic action, cannot possibly grasp the abstract immaterial relations contained in the idea of moral good or evil. If, however, the term is employed to denote a certain perfection of the intellectual powers, a quickness and keenness of mind in detecting and judging the morality or immorality of human acts, it is used correctly.

3. Others maintain with Herbert Spencer¹ that this power of distinguishing between good and evil rests upon the power of distinguishing between what is useful and what is hurtful to men generally in the present life. Whatever tends to the temporal good of mankind generally is morally good, they say, and whatever generally does injury is morally evil. Now, it is true that moral good is ultimately useful to mankind even on earth, and moral evil is ultimately injurious. But moral good is not good because it is useful; on the contrary, it is useful because it is good, i. e., because it tends to make man more perfect, and hence better fitted to attain his last end. Moreover, it is a part of the universal harmony which God has established in His creation, that the moral good of the individual be either immediately or ultimately beneficial to the many. In this sense, honesty is truly the best policy.

¹ I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions corresponding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. (Spencer's Letter to Mill.)

4. In the theories of Hobbes, Paley, Mandeville, and the older English Utilitarians, regard to personal advantage on earth is the only motive of human action: that is morally good which brings me pleasure; the "moral good" is the "useful to me personally."

5. Finally, some in theory and very many in practice hold that the norma or rule of right and wrong lies in the opinion of men. That is right, they declare, which the majority of men approve. "Vox populi, vox Dei " — "The voice of the people is the voice of God." But on many topics the opinions of men are changeful and often false. When, moreover, all men agree in calling a certain act good or evil, they do so because they see that in itself it is good or evil; but it is not good or evil because they call it so.

45. It may be asked whether every human act is either good or evil. We must make a distinction.

1. An act considered in the abstract, i. e., apart from all circumstances, may be specifically neither good nor evil. For instance, walking, riding, reading, etc., are acts that in themselves do not imply a tendency to our last end or a departure from it. All such are called indifferent acts: specifically, they are neither good nor bad.

2. But every moral act considered individually, i. e., as done in such and such circumstances of time, place and persons, is necessarily either good or bad. For, since we distinguish a good from a bad act by its conformity with fixed principles known to reason, it follows that when reason approves, the act is right; when it disapproves, the act is wrong. Now, in every individual human act, reason approves the act as a fit object for a deliberate choice, or disapproves it as an unfit object for such choice; therefore, every individual or concrete human act is either right or wrong.

The truth of this principle is made clearer in the next article.

46. To know whether an individual human act is morally good, we must consider it with reference to these three things which, because they determine the moral character of acts, are called the determinants of morality: 1st. The object of the act; 2d. The end, or purpose; 3d. Its circumstances. That the act may be morally good, all three determinants must be without a flaw, according to the received axiom: "Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu," — " A thing to be good must be wholly so; it is vitiated by any defect."

47. I. The object of an act is the thing done. In reality, it is not distinct from the act itself; for we cannot act without doing something, and the something done is the object of the act; say, of going, eating, praising, etc. The act or object may be viewed as containing a further specification —e. g., going to church, praising God, eating meat. Now, an act thus specified may, when considered in itself, be good, bad, or indifferent; thus, to praise God is good in itself, to blaspheme is bad in itself, and to eat meat is in itself an indifferent act. But that an individual act may be good, its object, whether considered in itself or as further specified, must be free from all defect; it must be good, or at least indifferent.

48. II. The end, or purpose, intended by the agent is the second determinant of an act's morality. The end here spoken of is not the end of the work, for that pertains to the object, but the end of the workman or agent (No. 11). No matter how good the object of an act may be, if the end intended is bad, the act is thereby vitiated. Thus, to praise God is good in itself, but, if in so acting the intention be to play the hypocrite, the act is morally bad. And this holds true whether the vicious end be the nearest, remote or last end (No. 9); whether it be actually or only virtually intended (No. 12). On the other hand, a good end, though ever so elevated, cannot justify a bad act; in other words, we are never allowed to do evil that good may result therefrom.²

² The doctrine that the end justifies the means has been falsely attributed to the Catholic Church, and particularly to the Jesuits. No institutions in the world have more strenuously opposed the pernicious tenet either in their theory or their practice.