§ 2. On Mitigated Tutiorism.

230. Mitigated tutiorism teaches: it is not lawful to follow the opinion for liberty unless it is most probable.

1. This system, which likewise involves exaggerated rigorism, was maintained in the 17th and 18th century by the doctors of Louvain, more devoted than was right to Jansenius: Opstraet (d. 1720), Steyaert (d. 1701), Henry of St. Ignatius (d. 1719), etc. They indeed tried to soften the harshness of the Jansenian doctrine in this way, by admitting a most probable opinion for liberty. Moreover, they defend their doctrine by the same arguments as the Jansenists. In recent time Cardinal Gerdil (1802) acceded to this opinion, which now no one any longer holds.¹

There are several probabiliorists (Antoine, Gazzaniga, Patuzzi, L. Habert, etc.) who exaggerate the greater probability which they require for acting licitly against the law to such an extent that the more probable opinion becomes most probable and their probabiliorism degenerates into tutiorism.²

2. It is refuted by the same arguments as absolute tutiorism; besides, it must be noted that mitigated tutiorism has not indeed been proscribed by the Church, but necessarily falls back into proscribed doctrine unless it wishes to affirm that it is lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience: for the most probable opinion which it is lawful to follow against the law either produces a certain conscience or it does not; if the first, we fall into condemned tutiorism; if the second, it is lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience, which is false.

¹ Gerdil, Opere edite ed inedite (Firenze. Gelli. 1850). Vol. VII. c. 3. et 4.

² Cf. Bouquillon l. c. p. 544. note 3.