Article Second. On Specific Distinction.

301. Declarations. 1. That there are sins specifically distinct is certain from the precept of Christ by which we are commanded to confess sins in their lowest species. From this precept at the same time the practical importance of this question is understood: for the whole question is directed to this, that the confessor may be able to help the penitent in making a confession of mortal sins according to species and number.

Sin can be considered in two ways: first, insofar as it is a human act; and then insofar as it is a morally evil human act, which consists in privation or lacks due form. But in whatever way it is considered, it is clear that there are sins specifically diverse. And indeed not only the objects of sins, but also the forms which evil acts lack, are essentially diverse: for the forms which sinful acts lack are the opposed virtues or relations of fittingness with the precepts which are injured. But since acts are specified by objects, and privations receive species from the forms to which they are opposed, it is clear that morally evil human acts, or sins, are specifically diverse.

2. Now it is asked what the norm is according to which sins are specifically distinguished. Not all assign the same norm.

a. St. Thomas takes specific distinction from the formally diverse objects of sins: those sins differ specifically which turn about formally diverse objects; for human acts receive their species from the object.¹

b. Scotus takes it from the diverse virtues to which sins are opposed: those sins differ specifically which are opposed to diverse virtues; for privation receives its species from the opposed form, which in this case is virtue.²

c. Vasquez takes it from the diverse laws to which sins are opposed: those sins differ specifically which are opposed to morally diverse precepts; for sin consists in privation of fittingness with the precept which is violated through sin.³

These three norms for specifically distinguishing sins do not in fact differ from one another, but one explains and perfects another: for virtues are diverse according as their objects are diverse, and laws are diverse according as they regard diverse virtues. Therefore it can rightly be said: sins proximately receive specific distinction from the virtues or precepts to which they are opposed; remotely, from the objects to which they are referred. And indeed hatred of neighbor and theft are sins specifically distinct either because they turn about morally diverse objects, namely the person of the neighbor and the goods of the neighbor, or because they are opposed to essentially diverse virtues, namely charity and justice, or because they are contrary to formally diverse precepts, namely the precept of charity and the seventh precept of the decalogue.

¹ Summa I-II, q. 72, a. 1.

² In II, dist. 37, q. 1, n. 9.

³ Disputationes in I-II S. Thomae, disp. 98, c. 2.

302. The norm taken from virtues. But because of these norms the easier one is that which Scotus proposes, I shall explain it more fully.

For the rest, the following rules furnish only general norms for specifically distinguishing sins; but which sins in particular are opposed to virtues specifically diverse will have to be explained below, where the discussion is about precepts.

1. Those sins are specifically diverse which are opposed to diverse virtues.

a. Therefore heresy, despair, and hatred of God are sins diverse in objective species because they are against the three theological virtues diverse among themselves; perjury, theft, and lying are specifically diverse because they are opposed to diverse virtues, namely religion, justice, and truthfulness.

b. If one act is against several virtues diverse in species, it likewise contains in itself several sins diverse in species. Thus the killing of a priest contains two sins, one against justice, the other against religion; and the carnal sin of a priest with a married blood-relative contains four sins: against chastity, religion, justice, and piety.

2. Those sins are specifically diverse which are opposed to the same virtue in a morally diverse mode. For sometimes the object of a virtue is so universal that it contains in itself several objects diverse in moral estimation; therefore diverse precepts of the same virtue also exist. Thus the object of justice is morally diverse according as the goods of the neighbor are diverse, namely life, reputation, honor, or riches; therefore also diverse precepts, the fifth, eighth, and seventh, are referred to these goods. Likewise the object of temperance in the use of food is diverse according as it regards the quantity or quality of foods; wherefore a twofold precept also is had concerning this matter.

a. Therefore perjury, violation of a vow, and blasphemy are sins specifically diverse, because they are opposed to the virtue of religion in a morally diverse mode. Local, real, and personal sacrilege are sins specifically diverse, because a sacred thing, a sacred person, and a sacred place are objects diverse in moral estimation of the same virtue of religion. He who on feast days omits Mass and is occupied in servile works commits two sins, because he injures the virtue of religion in a morally diverse mode.

b. Sins of commission, which are contrary to a negative precept, and of omission, which are contrary to an affirmative precept, against the same virtue are sometimes not specifically diverse, namely if they are referred to the same moral object and precept, as theft and omission of restitution, i.e. taking away and retaining another's thing. But for the most part they are sins specifically diverse, because they regard objects and therefore precepts morally diverse. Therefore heresy and omission of an act of faith, despair and omission of an act of hope, hatred of God and omission of an act of charity, are sins diverse in objective species, because they regard diverse objects and precepts and therefore injure the same virtue in a morally diverse mode.

3. Those sins are specifically diverse which are opposed to the same virtue in a contrary mode, i.e. through excess and through defect: for any virtue has its own mean, and what is opposed to it on either side has a distinct malice and constitutes a sin specifically distinct.

Therefore prodigality and avarice are sins diverse in species, because the former is opposed to the virtue of liberality through excess, the latter through defect. Despair and presumption are diverse in species, because the former is opposed to the theological virtue of hope through defect, the latter through excess.

303. Whether a sin which is opposed to several precepts passed concerning the same matter contains several sins specifically diverse. A distinction must be made: a. If the precepts are formally diverse, i.e. if they were passed from a diverse motive, the sins opposed to them are specifically distinguished. Thus he who breaks a fast to which he is bound from a precept of the Church and from a vow commits two sins, because the precept of the Church obliges from the virtue of temperance and the vow from the virtue of religion.

b. But if the precepts are only materially diverse, i.e. if they were passed from the same motive, the sins opposed to them do not differ specifically, whether they were passed by the same or by diverse legislators.

Thus through theft one sin is committed, even if it is prohibited by natural, divine, and human law, because these laws were passed from the same motive of justice. The beneficed presbyter who does not recite the office commits one sin in species and number; likewise the religious priest who sins against chastity commits one sin against religion, because the obligation is imposed by the same legislator from the same motive of religion.