Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article Three. On the Effects of Betrothals.
539. Four Are the Effects of Betrothals: 1. An obligation of justice, and a grave one, to contract matrimony afterward.
a. An obligation arises because betrothals are a contract, and every contract produces a true obligation. An obligation of justice arises because betrothals are an onerous contract; but every onerous contract produces an obligation of justice. A grave obligation arises because the object of the contract is a grave thing, namely matrimony. It is an obligation to matrimony or, if one withdraws from the betrothals unjustly, at least to repairing the harm which has arisen from the unjust dissolution. It binds afterward, that is, at the determined time, if any was established in the betrothal contract, or if none was defined, when one party reasonably seeks matrimony. Therefore to defer matrimony notably beyond that time without a just cause is a grave sin.
b. To the obligation of each betrothed of contracting matrimony with the other there corresponds in each the right of demanding matrimony from the other at the proper time. Therefore it is not licit for a young man who had contracted betrothals with a girl to abandon her without injury in order to marry another, even if he wishes to endow her abundantly; for the bride can demand the very matrimony by her right.
c. Betrothals, because they oblige to contracting matrimony afterward, also oblige to omitting all things which can impede the future matrimony or render it more difficult and burdensome, and therefore to omitting those things which furnish the innocent party a cause of rescinding the betrothals, especially carnal intercourse with a third person.1
- The invalidity of betrothals which are contracted with another person against the faith of the prior betrothals; for what by force of a promise is already owed to one cannot be promised to another.
Hence if a young man has contracted betrothals with two women and sinned with the second:
a. He is held to marry the first, unless she freely yields her right; for the first betrothals do not lose their force, even if afterward he contracted others. Therefore the first bride can be advised to renounce her right freely, but she is not held to this, even if she herself would suffer no detriment or only a light one, while the second would suffer a great detriment.2
b. If the first freely yields her right, the young man is held to marry the second, not indeed by force of the promise, which was null, but to repair the harms inflicted on the second, where she consented to copula because of hope of future matrimony and from it became pregnant.
c. But if the second, when she had copula with him, knew that betrothals had already been entered with the first, the young man has no other obligation toward the second except to pay for the education of offspring perhaps received, because no injury is done to one who knows and wills.
The illicitness of matrimony with a third person, unless the betrothals already contracted have been duly dissolved. For although betrothals no longer constitute a prohibiting impediment of matrimony, nevertheless the moral obligation of not contracting against faith given remains.
From betrothals, although they are valid and no just cause excuses from not fulfilling them, no action is given for seeking the celebration of matrimony; there is given, however, for reparation of harms which from the faith given happen to the other party.3
a. The action for reparation of harms is of the mixed forum, so that the Church and civil power are equally competent; but they do not suspend the celebration of matrimony. Commission for Interpretation of the Code, June 2-3, 1918.
b. By this disposition of law, ecclesiastical law concerning the effects of betrothals is conformed to the civil law of Austria, section 45 ff., and of Germany, section 1298 f., which admit judicial action only for repairing harms.
c. Hitherto betrothals brought two other effects: a prohibiting impediment of matrimony and the diriment impediment of public honesty. Now, therefore, if someone tries to impede a proclaimed matrimony by this, that matrimony had been promised to him or her by one or the other of the betrothed, he effects nothing.
d. The bishop, although competent as judge in this matter, cannot, as formerly, compel one who refuses to fulfill valid betrothals and has no cause of withdrawing from them to observe the faith given.
1 What kind of sin carnal copula of the betrothed with a third person is, is said in the fascicle De sexto praecepto7, n. 20, 2.
2 St. Alphonsus, n. 540.
3 Cn. 1017, 3.
540. To What Betrothals Entered Under a Condition Oblige. a. Betrothals entered under a possible and honorable condition, e.g., if I shall have received this office, oblige under grave obligation from justice to waiting for the event of the condition; but when the condition has been fulfilled, without another consent they pass into absolute betrothals and produce the obligations of other betrothals, provided neither party meanwhile has revoked consent.
Betrothals which are contracted with a third person before the event of the condition are invalid, because they are against the right of the other party.
Whether, when the condition has been fulfilled, betrothals become valid if one party before the condition was fulfilled illicitly revoked consent, some, Lugo, Wernz, Lehmkuhl, affirm, because an illicit revocation of consent is also invalid; others, Sanchez, Gasparri, D'Annibale, deny it, judging the revocation valid.
b. Betrothals entered under an impossible condition are invalid, unless it is proved that the condition was placed in jest and the betrothals were entered seriously.
c. Betrothals entered under a base condition are invalid before the condition has been fulfilled; therefore they do not oblige to waiting for the event of the condition. But when the condition has been fulfilled, they pass into absolute betrothals and produce the obligation of entering matrimony, unless the condition is opposed to the substance of matrimony.
Since betrothals entered under the condition, if the pope shall have dispensed, are, from what has been said above, not certainly valid betrothals, one who after dispensation has been obtained refuses to enter matrimony is not held to entering matrimony.