Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article Third. On the One Counseling
483. Prenotanda. The one counseling is said to be he who by his persuasion moves another to inflict damage on the neighbor.
a. The one counseling differs from the one mandating in that the mandatary acts in the name of the one mandating, but the executor of the counsel acts not in the name of the one counseling, but in his own name and ordinarily for his own utility; wherefore the one counseling, with relation to the executor, is a secondary cause of the damage, while the executor of the counsel is the primary cause of the same. Yet if the one counseling gives counsel solely for his own advantage, he is equated to one mandating and is the primary cause of the damage.
b. It belongs to the nature of counsel that it move the will of the executor as a moral cause to the damage. Counsel can be given in diverse ways: by suggesting reasons and motives, by prayers, exhortations, promises, flatteries, by showing the way and mode, etc.
c. Counsel is either impulsive, if it moves and determines another to inflict damage, or doctrinal, if it says an opinion concerning the goodness or malice, validity or invalidity of an action, for example, of a contract. Impulsive counsel is bare if it does not rest on motives but consists in exhortation alone; or clothed, if motives determining to harm are added, or if means of harming are suggested.
d. The distinction between bare and clothed counsel must be noted: bare counsel loses the character of a cause and the force of influencing the will of another by retraction, and becomes merely the occasion of the damage; but clothed counsel continues to influence even if it has been retracted, unless it is destroyed by contrary motives equally efficacious.
484. Obligations of the one counseling as to the counsel itself. He who gave an iniquitous counsel, whether he acted in good faith or bad faith, is bound from justice to retract it: for everyone is bound from justice to bring it about that from his action, whether formally or materially evil, damage not follow for another.
But if he cannot turn the executor away from inflicting damage, he is bound to warn the one to be damaged so that he may guard himself, if he can warn him without too great inconvenience; and indeed from justice, if he gave impulsive and clothed counsel, because he must impede, as much as he can, lest damage follow from his unjust action; and from charity, if he gave bare counsel, because he must avert the evil of the neighbor of which he himself is the occasion.
a. He who gave counsel in good faith and cannot retract it, or, once the retraction has been made, nevertheless cannot impede the damage, is bound to nothing further: for he is not a theologically culpable cause of the damage. But if he culpably neglects retraction, he is held for the damages.
b. If he gave counsel in bad faith and retracted it, one must distinguish: alpha. if the counsel is doctrinal, or impulsive and bare, the one counseling is not bound to repair damages nevertheless inflicted by the executor; for the force of the counsel, and therefore the cause of the damage, is taken away by the revocation itself. beta. If the counsel is impulsive and clothed, again one must distinguish. If the one counseling, in retracting the counsel, does not apply contrary motives at least equally efficacious, he must repair the damages, because his counsel truly remains the efficacious and theologically culpable cause of the damage. But if in the retraction he applies contrary motives at least equally efficacious, he can be excused from the obligation of restoring: for he who does not yield to motives of this kind is proved to act from his own malice, not from another's counsel.1 Which motives for drawing another back from damaging are more efficacious depends on the quality of the person; but ordinarily in a Christian man the most efficacious motives are those which are sought from faith.
c. He who shows the damager the mode of inflicting damage which could not have been inflicted without that counsel, for example, the mode of committing theft which otherwise could not have been committed, is not excused from restitution by retraction: for in this case retraction is not efficacious unless the damager is impeded from inflicting damage or the one to be damaged is warned concerning the damage which threatens him.
1 Ballerini-Palmieri III, n. 362.
485. Obligations toward the damaged person. The one counseling is bound to repair all damages which have been inflicted by the executor by force of the counsel: for of these he himself is the efficacious moral cause.
a. The one counseling is bound to nothing if the executor, already determined to inflict damage, would have inflicted the damage equally without the counsel, except in the case in which the damager is moved to inflict damage not by his own motives but by the motives of the one counseling.
b. If it is doubtful whether the counsel had influence on the executor, he is likewise bound to nothing, because the damage inflicted by the counsel is not established.1
c. If the counsel certainly influenced the executor, he is bound to repair the whole damage: for he is an efficacious concause of the damage.
d. If the one counseling persuades a greater evil than otherwise would have been inflicted, he is bound only for the excess, because of this alone he is the efficacious cause.
e. If the one counseling suggests to an executor already determined to inflict damage another mode of inflicting damage, he is bound to restitution insofar as that mode increases the damage.
f. To what the one counseling a lesser evil is bound will be said below (n. 487).
1 St. Alphonsus (n. 562) calls this opinion sufficiently probable.
486. Obligations toward the executor. The one counseling is not bound to compensate damages which the executor suffered in executing the counsel: for no injury is done to one knowing and willing. Yet in a twofold case he is bound to restitution toward the executor:
a. If by deceit, fraud, or lies he was the author to another that he inflict damage: in this case he must repair the damage to each, both to him to whom he fraudulently gave counsel and to him to whom by force of the counsel damage was inflicted.
b. If he who must give counsel from justice gave harmful counsel. He must give counsel from justice who by force of state or office is bound to it, as advocate, physician, counselor, confessor, as will appear more clearly from the things to be said below (n. 488).
487. It is asked to what he is bound who induces another, already determined to inflict damage, to inflict a lesser damage.
a. If there is question of damage to be inflicted on the same person, he is bound to nothing: for he who persuades one who is determined to take away one hundred from the same person to take away only twenty, not only does not act against justice, but exercises a good work, since he persuades the diminution of evil, which is good.
b. If there is question of damage to be inflicted on a different person, as if someone persuades one determined to take away one hundred from Cantius that he should rather take twenty from Cantianus, authors disagree. It seems that one must say he is bound to repair the damage, except in the case in which the injured person must consent to the damage to be inflicted on himself, or in which a lesser damage is not counseled to be inflicted on a determined person, as if one wishing to steal from a church is told that he should rather take elsewhere.1
Namely, this counsel is licit and does not induce the obligation of restitution insofar as the other must consent to damage to be inflicted on himself; now if he to whom the damage was going to be inflicted (Cantius) would have fallen into extreme necessity because of this, another (Cantianus) is bound, if not to aid him, at least not to impede him providing for himself, and therefore to consent to the damage.
1 Cf. Lugo, disp. 19, n. 44 ss.; Ballerini-Palmieri III, n. 365.
488. On doctrinal counsel. 1. He who is deputed by force of office to give counsels and with evil intention or from gravely culpable ignorance gave harmful counsel, must repair damages which arise from the evil counsel both to the one seeking counsel and to a third person, because the one seeking counsel has a strict right of demanding that he who must give counsels from office have due knowledge and apply moral diligence.
- He who by reason of office is not bound to give counsels is not bound to repair damages which arise from evil counsel to him who seeks and accepts the counsel, unless he deceitfully affects knowledge: for the one seeking counsel cannot be reasonably unwilling concerning the counsel nor concerning the damage arising from it. But he must repair damages which arise from evil counsel to a third person, provided the one counseling knew his own ignorance and foresaw, at least confusedly, the damage going to follow: for the one counseling concurs positively in inflicting the damage, and the injured person does not consent to the damage.