§ 3. On Induction

110. Notion. Induction, or seduction or solicitation to sin, is an external action by which another is explicitly and directly provoked to sinning. Induction can be made by various actions: by words or writing, by nods or gesture.

Induction agrees with scandal in this, that induction and scandal stir up to sinning a neighbor not yet determined to sin. But it differs from indirect scandal in that induction is always joined with the intention of drawing another to sin. It differs from direct scandal, by which the sin of the neighbor is intended, in this, that scandal is an occasion, but induction is the cause of another's sin. Therefore through induction an obligation of restitution is contracted, but through direct scandal an obligation of restitution is not contracted.

111. Malice of induction. 1. Induction is grave or light according as the sin to the committing of which another is provoked is grave or light, unless he is already habitually prepared to commit the sin when the occasion is given.

One who invites another to commit a grave theft with him commits a grave sin of seduction if the other is not accustomed to steal; but he does not sin gravely by seduction if he already knows the other is accustomed to thefts.

2. Any sin of induction contains a twofold malice: one against charity, because it brings evil upon the neighbor; the other against the virtue to the injuring of which another is provoked, because any precept demands that another not be directly provoked to its injury.

a. Therefore he does not satisfy in confession who accuses himself of this sin: I seduced another to sin; but in addition he must add the species of sin to which he provoked another: I seduced another to steal.

b. Yet in sins which by their nature have an accomplice, such as fornication, adultery, filthy speech, etc., it is not necessary that the circumstance of induction be declared in confession, but it is sufficient that it be said, for example, I committed adultery, I spoke filthy things; for because one sinning with another, for example by fornicating, already sins against charity by cooperation, the circumstance of induction, which likewise is against charity and is added to this sin of cooperation, is only an aggravating circumstance, unless the other is seduced to sin by deceit or threats, which would be against justice.

112. Whether it is licit to ask from another what he himself will not furnish without sin. 1. It is never licit to ask what another cannot furnish without sin, for example a sacrament from an excommunicated vitandus: for such a petition is true induction to sin. Therefore it is not licit to ask from a notary or a guard what is against his office.

2. If the thing which is asked can be furnished without sin, when a grave cause exists it can licitly be asked, although the other will not furnish it without sin; for example, a loan from a usurer, an oath from one about to perjure himself, a sacrament from a priest existing in the state of sin: for from a just cause it is licit to permit another's sin. But without a grave cause this is not licit, as if the thing could equally be had from another without notable inconvenience, who will furnish it without sin.

113. Whether it is licit to advise a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil to the committing of which another is determined, for example, to one who wishes to kill an enemy, to advise that he rather strike him.¹

1. When a neighbor cannot in any way be turned away from the sin to the committing of which he is determined, it is licit, in order to prevent a greater evil, to advise him to the lesser, to the committing of which, however, he is already prepared: for evil is not advised absolutely, but to him who is already altogether going to do evil, he is advised not to do so great an evil, but rather to choose a lesser one, which advice indeed is good.²

a. Therefore a twofold condition is required for this induction to be licit: a. that the neighbor cannot be turned away from the greater sin; for if the sin can be wholly prevented, the advice of a lesser evil is no longer good; b. that the neighbor is already determined to commit the sin which is advised; but only he can be said to be already determined to commit a sin to whom an evil of the same species is advised. Therefore it is licit to advise one who is prepared to steal one hundred from Peter to steal fifty from the same man, and to one who is prepared to kill Peter for the end of stealing from him, to advise that he only steal.

b. The action of the sinner which is less evil is not said to be good: for this always remains evil; but the counsel of the one advising in these circumstances is good, since, when the evil cannot be wholly prevented, it tends at least to its diminution.

2. It is not licit to advise the neighbor to a lesser evil to the committing of which he is not yet determined: for he who advises another to an evil to the committing of which he is not prepared is himself the cause of that evil, which is sin, although he acts from a good end.

Therefore it is not licit to advise one who is prepared to commit homicide that he rather commit adultery; but it is licit to propose to him the object of a lesser evil, without nevertheless inducing him to commit it. St. Alphonsus (n. 57) says the affirmative opinion is more probable; and objectively indeed even this advice is good, since it tends to the lessening of evil, but it is difficult to understand subjectively that a lesser evil is advised to him to whom a sin of a different species is advised. And indeed, if adultery is advised to one who is determined to commit homicide, he is induced to committing a new sin, and the one following the advice, besides the internal sin of homicide, also commits the sin of adultery.

3. Not only is it licit to advise a lesser evil, but it is also licit to cooperate with an indifferent action toward a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil which otherwise cannot be prevented.

Therefore it is licit to lead home with oneself a friend who is thinking of turning aside to an inn for the purpose of violating the fast, and to serve him supper. It is licit to help a robber in carrying off another's property if in this way he can be prevented from bringing greater damage or death upon the owner.

To the question whether it is licit to induce a robber to drunkenness and to cooperate with it by proposing wine, so that he may be drawn back from committing homicide, it must be said: a. It is not licit to provoke him to drunkenness, to the committing of which he is not determined, not even to prevent a greater evil, because evil is not to be done that good may come. b. But it is licit to place wine before the robber, although it is foreseen that he will become drunk, because this is indifferent, and drunkenness can be permitted from a just cause, namely in order to prevent homicide.

¹ Cf. Castropalao, Opus morale, tr. 6, de carit., disp. 6, punct. 6.

² Cf. Gen. 37:27.

114. Whether it is licit not to remove, or even to place, an occasion of sinning, although another's sin is feared, indeed foreseen. a. It is licit from a just cause not to remove an occasion of sin which could be removed, because from a sufficient cause it is licit to permit another's sin; but it is a sufficient cause to allow one sin for the sake of many which would afterwards occur and in this way are prevented.

Therefore parents and masters can permit to children and servants an occasion of stealing in order to correct them if they have offended, so that in this way they may be amended. Guards of vineyards and forests, etc., can hide themselves so that those causing damage may be caught and punished and thus be deterred from thefts to be committed later.

b. If the action furnishing the occasion of sinning is good or indifferent and a just cause exists, it is licit even to place the occasion: for he who places the occasion does not induce to sinning nor concur in the sin of another, but from a grave cause permits it, namely that he may have his fidelity tested or that several other sins may afterwards be prevented.

Therefore parents and masters can expose money or open a chest in order to test the fidelity of children or servants.

115. On the reparation of scandal and induction. a. There exists an obligation of repairing, insofar as can be done, scandal or induction: for if anyone from charity is bound to procure the amendment of one sinning, a fortiori he is bound to this who himself, through scandal or induction, was the author that another should sin.

b. This reparation must be made from charity, whether another has been induced to sin through scandal (for example, by bad example) or through induction (command, counsel, prayers): for no injury has been done to him, as one knowing and willing; it must be made from justice only if someone has drawn another to sin by an unjust means (force, deceit, fear), because injury has been inflicted on him as unwilling.

c. Public scandal must also be repaired publicly, both so that the further influence of the scandal may be removed, and so that all to whom scandal was given may be admonished concerning the evil which they have suffered.

d. As regards the mode of reparation, it must be distinguished thus:

a. Ordinary scandals, namely those which consist only in sins committed before others, whether they are private or public scandals, it is sufficient to repair implicitly, namely by cessation from scandal, by good example, by public reception of the sacrament of penance, etc.

b. But scandals given by this, that false and pernicious doctrines have been spread among the common people, or by this, that someone has committed crimes worthy of a graver censure (for example, plotting against the Church), must be repaired explicitly by revoking false doctrines or by publicly detesting the crimes.

The mode of explicit retraction can be diverse: for either a retraction composed in writing is made public through public papers, or retraction is made before (two) witnesses who will afterwards make the matter public, or finally retraction is made before the parish priest (confessor), who will afterwards make public that the penitent has satisfied his obligations.

Note. Since cessation from scandal and its reparation is an obligation of conscience, it is clear that one who has not yet satisfied this obligation, if it is grave, cannot be admitted to the sacraments of the Church, as unworthy. Indeed, one administering the sacraments to him who has not ceased from furnishing scandal and has not repaired it himself commits the sin of scandal, because he furnishes the faithful an occasion of judging that the sacraments are administered to the unworthy and that scandalous actions are tacitly approved.