Article Fifth. On the Denial of Faith

18. Preliminary notions. a. The negative precept of faith prohibits faith from being denied, whether internally or externally; therefore this precept, as negative, obliges always and for always.

b. It is one thing to deny faith, another to dissimulate faith; he dissimulates faith who uses words or signs which neither manifest nor deny faith, but leave it in doubt, and therefore are apt for hiding faith.

c. It is one thing to deny faith, another to be ashamed of faith; he is ashamed of faith who, because of shame or fear, does not profess faith when the precept requires this.

d. He directly denies faith who knowingly and voluntarily denies the true faith or professes a false one; he indirectly denies faith who, without the intention of denying faith, places an action which others have or can have as a denial of faith, as if someone assists at the rites of heretics.

19. It is never permitted directly to deny faith, whether this is done seriously or fictitiously and only externally.

The reason of the first is that denial of faith is a most grave injury inflicted on God: for he who denies faith either indicates that divine revelation is not true, or at least is ashamed of the divine majesty. He who shall deny Me before men, I also will deny him before My Father who is in heaven.¹ He who shall be ashamed of Me and of My words, of him the Son of Man will be ashamed when He shall come in His majesty.² Therefore the Church has always held denial of faith, even in times of persecutions, as a most grave sin.

The reason of the second is that a fictitious denial of faith is a lie injurious to God and harmful to the neighbor because of scandal; wherefore the Church has held even only external denial of faith as a grave sin. Therefore even if he who only externally denies faith is not a heretic and does not lose the habit of faith, because he retains faith internally, nevertheless he sins against the negative precept of faith.

¹ Matt. 10:33.

² Luke 9:26.

20. In how many ways faith is denied. Faith can be denied either by words, or by deeds, or by signs, or by silence.

1. He denies faith by words who seriously or fictitiously uses words which either of themselves or as they are rightly perceived by the hearers deny faith universally or deny some article of faith.

a. He who, when asked, denies that he is a Catholic, an infallibilist, etc.; likewise he who affirms that he is a Turk, a Freemason, etc.; in like manner he who professes that he is a Lutheran, an Old Catholic, explicitly denies the true faith.

b. If a priest or religious passing through the lands of an unbelieving or heretical prince were asked by this prince about his state, namely whether he is a priest, he could of itself for a grave cause evade the question by ambiguous words, because it is not an interrogation concerning faith, but concerning his state; and if he denied his state, he would sin not against faith, but against truth by a lie, venially.

2. He denies faith by deeds who seriously or fictitiously performs an action which either from its own nature or from the circumstances necessarily signifies profession of a false religion.

a. He who sacrifices to an idol, bends the knees before an idol, communicates in the supper of heretics, ordinarily frequents the sacred rites of heretics, prays or sings with them, denies faith, because by deeds he professes a false religion; and he who does this fictitiously commits by deed a lie injurious to God and harmful to men. Therefore the Holy See declared that it is not permitted to Chinese Christians to exhibit external signs of adoration to an idol, although the intention is directed to a cross hidden under the garment.¹

b. To the proposed question whether it is permitted for the faithful to bend the knees before hosts consecrated by intruders or schismatics, the response was that although one must genuflect, nevertheless care must be taken, lest Catholics by offering worship of this kind seem to mingle with schismatics, that they avoid occasions of encountering schismatics while they carry the sacrament.²

c. It is permitted to visit the Most Holy Sacrament which is reserved in churches of schismatics, and to pray before images of the saints which are found in them, provided Catholics do not associate in prayers with schismatics.³

3. He denies faith by signs who uses garments or signs which either from their own nature or from use and custom indicate only heresy or infidelity.

To wear the insignia of Freemasons or to use the nods and compression of hands or fingers by which Freemasons recognize one another is illicit, because it contains profession of a false sect and denial of the true faith. Yet this must be restricted to the case in which a Catholic uses these signs: for the use of these signs by which Freemasons themselves, who habitually deny the faith, use them among themselves to recognize one another, does not seem on each occasion to be a new denial of faith.

4. He denies faith by silence who is silent in those circumstances in which silence is deservedly held as a denial of faith.

He who is silent when another answers for him that he is not a Catholic, likewise he who is silent when, after several have been asked concerning faith, some deny that any of them is a Catholic, has denied faith, because silence in this case is consent to the denial.

He who hears others speaking against faith or mocking and calumniating the Catholic religion is of himself bound to contradict them and admonish them, lest he seem to consent to them; yet if he fears either worse calumnies or grave inconveniences to himself, he does not sin by being silent. But a priest in such a case, especially among Catholics, will hardly ever be able to be silent: for his silence would be scandal and confirmation of error;⁴ besides this, the fruit of admonition can be more easily hoped for.

¹ S. C. de Prop. Fide, 12 Sept. 1645.

² Responses of Pius VI, 18 May 1793, to 11. Cf. continuation of the Roman Bullarium, ed. Barberi, Rome, IX, p. 314.

³ S. C. de Prop. Fide, 15 Dec. 1764.

⁴ E. Muller, Theologia moralis^7, Vienna: Meyer, 1894, II, Section 10, n. 6.

21. It is permitted to hide or dissimulate faith when the precept of confessing faith does not oblige; indeed, if from the profession of faith no good but rather detriment to the honor of God or to the salvation of neighbors follows, hiding faith can be a precept. But someone can dissimulate or hide faith either by silence, or by ambiguous words, or by deeds, signs, garments, etc.

a. It is permitted for a Catholic or priest existing in the lands of heretics to eat meat on prohibited days, lest, recognized as a Catholic, he undergo grave danger either of life or of goods: for this action of itself does not signify denial of faith; besides this, in these circumstances there is no necessity of confessing faith, and the precept of the Church does not oblige with grave inconvenience. But to avoid mockeries the same thing would not be permitted, because a light inconvenience does not excuse from the precepts of the Church.

b. He who, whether in contempt of faith or of an ecclesiastical precept, or in protestation of disobedience toward the Church or the supreme pontiff, or in profession of a false sect, when challenged to eat meat, does this, denies faith, because in these circumstances, in which the obligation of professing faith urges, the eating of meat is not an indifferent action, but a virtual denial of faith.

Whether it is permitted to use ambiguous words for hiding faith. When the precept of professing faith obliges, it is certainly not permitted; but when this precept does not urge, it is permitted not only to be silent or to decline a response, "this does not concern you," but also to use ambiguous words, unless the words ought to be understood by the hearers as a denial of the true faith.¹

¹ Cf. Lacroix, bk. 2, n. 61.

22. Whether for hiding faith it is licit to use the garments or other signs of unbelievers. In general it must be said: if the garment or sign is of such a kind that he who assumes it ought to be judged to profess a false religion, it is not permitted; but if it can be judged that he assumed it for another end, it is permitted from a just cause: for without cause it is not permitted to allow the deception of others. But the cause ought to be the graver, the more the sign is apt to introduce a false judgment.

a. Some garments or signs are distinctive of a nation rather than of a religion, as the hat of the Turks; now it is permitted for a grave cause to use these garments or signs for hiding religion.

b. Other garments and signs are distinctive of religion: wherefore by common usage they are employed only by unbelievers or by members of a determinate sect to distinguish men of one sect from men of another, as the cloak of preachers, or the gown of bonzes, or the yellow hat which the Jews used at Rome; further, from a most grave cause it is permitted to use even these garments or signs for hiding faith.

Because by the usage and institution of men these are not signs which immediately manifest the faith which the sect professes, therefore he who uses them does not necessarily have to be judged an unbeliever or heretic: for their primary use is for covering or adorning the body, and their secondary use for distinguishing the sect.

c. Finally, other garments and signs are not only distinctive of a sect, but from institution or custom immediately manifest and protest heresy or infidelity, such as priestly garments which idolaters or heretics use in the exercise of their functions, for example in sacrifices, or the sign by which Turks profess themselves followers of Mohammed. It is not permitted to use these garments or signs, because their use is a profession of false faith, unless from the circumstances it manifestly appears that they are employed not for professing a false sect, but from an entirely different cause, as if someone uses them in public spectacles.

In a similar way one must judge concerning the signs of Freemasons and of other non-Catholic sects, which from their institution and use signify nothing other than profession of a false sect.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, De virtute fidei divinae, disp. 14, n. 87.

23. Whether, when persecution of faith urges, it is permitted to flee. Of itself, or by reason of flight, it is always permitted to flee: for he who flees neither denies nor dissimulates faith, nor feigns a false faith, but, fearing persecution, uses his right to preserve faith. Accidentally, however, it is not permitted for all to flee; concerning this matter this rule is established:

a. Those whose presence is necessary for the salvation of the faithful, as are pastors of souls, bishops, and parish priests, cannot licitly flee.

b. Those whose presence is indeed useful but not necessary can remain or also licitly flee.

c. Those whose preservation is necessary to the public good, or for whom proximate danger of denying faith threatens, are bound to flee.

24. From a just cause it is permitted indirectly to deny faith, provided the action which is placed is indifferent and the intention of placing that action is honorable.

Although of itself it is not permitted to deny faith even indirectly, nevertheless under certain conditions this must be called licit; thus it is permitted for a Catholic from a just cause to assist at the religious functions of heretics. For if the action which is placed is of such a kind that in these circumstances it ought not to be judged, either of itself or from human institution, a profession of false faith and a denial of true faith, but is customarily judged by men as such, the action indifferent in itself is illicit so far as from it there follows deception and scandal of others; but, when a just cause exists, it is permitted to allow this evil effect, unless it can be entirely impeded by opportune admonition.