Article First. On Unjust Cooperation in General

477. Prenotanda. Cooperation in general is concurrence with another acting. As it is taken here, it is concurrence with another unjustly inflicting damage; therefore a cooperator is said to be one who with another is the cause of unjust damage.

a. This cooperation is either positive or negative: negative consists in the omission of an action due from justice for impeding damage; positive consists in an action by which damage is unjustly inflicted with another; each can be physical and moral.

b. Positive moral cooperation influences the will of the damager; physical cooperation concurs with the damaging action, or assists the damager in inflicting damage. Negative moral cooperation consists in the omission of an action due from justice by which damage must be impeded through influence on the will of the damager, as if someone omits counsel or command by which he can and must turn another away from inflicting damage. Negative physical cooperation consists in the omission of an action by which damage can be impeded through influence on the damaging action, as if a guard does not drive away a thief.

c. This cooperation differs from that of which there was speech above (n. 116 ss.) in that here there is question alpha. of cooperation in a sin against justice; above, of cooperation in a sin against any virtue; beta. of formal cooperation, from which the obligation of restitution arises; above, of formal and material cooperation; gamma. of any cooperation whatever, whether the cooperator is an equally principal or secondary cause; above, of cooperation with another acting principally.

478. Obligation of restitution. 1. Unjust cooperation induces the obligation of restitution: for it is the cause of damage unjustly inflicted, at least partial cause, whether the cooperation was positive or negative.¹

Therefore even negative cooperation, by which another's damage is not impeded when it ought to have been impeded from justice, induces the obligation of restitution. To impede the damage of others pertains of itself to charity, just as to preserve and promote the good of others does, because commutative justice only requires this: that we not violate the rights of others nor inflict damages on them. Yet per accidens, namely from contract or from office or quasi-contract, there can be an obligation of justice to procure the good of others and to impede the damages of others.

2. In order that unjust cooperation induce the obligation of restitution, these conditions are required: that it be truly unjust, efficacious of damage, and theologically culpable: for an action by which damage is inflicted on the neighbor induces the obligation of restitution only under this threefold condition (n. 454).

Therefore no obligation of restoring exists if the action of the cooperator influenced nothing in the damage; and this generally has place in moral cooperation when the damager is already determined of himself and independently of the cooperator to inflict the damage.

¹ Therefore proposition 39 was condemned by Innocent XI: "He who moves or induces another to inflict grave damage on a third person is not bound to restitution of that damage inflicted."

479. The diverse modes of cooperation are contained in these verses:

Command, counsel, consent, flattery, recourse,

The participant, the silent, the one not opposing, the one not manifesting.¹

Of these nine modes, some set forth negative cooperations (the silent, the one not opposing, the one not manifesting), others positive cooperations; and indeed four (command, counsel, flattery, recourse) set forth moral cooperations, while two (consent and participant) set forth physical cooperation.

It is clear that moral cooperations are so many inductions to sin, while physical cooperations pertain to that cooperation of which there was speech above (n. 116 ss.).

¹ Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 7.