Article IV. On Commuting Satisfaction.

Two things must be noted beforehand: a. commutation which happens in another confession is not made by revocation of the prior sentence, but by a new sacramental judgment of either the same or another confessor. By this judgment another work is substituted for the work previously enjoined, and when this has been done the prior obligation is extinguished.¹ b. For commutation to be made licitly a just cause must be present, of which kind is any spiritual utility of the penitent. But when commutation is made from a just cause, the penance can be changed not only into another equal one, but even into a lesser one.

¹ Cf. Suarez, disp. 38, sect. 10, n. 7.

309. Who can commute it. The penitent himself cannot commute the penance imposed by the confessor, not even into one evidently better: for he cannot elevate the penance to the merit of sacramental satisfaction. But both the confessor who imposed it and any other confessor can commute it: for the penitent can freely and licitly subject again to the judgment of either the same or another confessor sins from which he has already been absolved, so that, with another penance imposed in place of the former, he may again be absolved by him.

They dispute whether a penance which had been imposed on account of reserved sins can be commuted by a confessor not having power over reserved matters. Those who deny this power to the confessor say: just as the sins are reserved, so also the punishment imposed for them is reserved, or, an inferior can do nothing against a law made by a superior. But those who concede the power to the confessor teach: once reservation has been removed by the prior absolution, any confessor can judge concerning the sin and enjoin penance for it; and since there is present a just cause of commuting the penance, the consent of the superior to the commutation to be made is rightly presumed, even if the penance had been imposed for reserved sins.

310. How it can be commuted. 1. The confessor who imposed the penance can commute it even outside the sacrament, and indeed not only immediately after absolution, before the penitent departs, but also as long as the change is morally united with the sacramental judgment and constitutes one judgment with it. And the confessor can do this even if he no longer remembers the sins: for he acquires knowledge of them, as far as is necessary, from the gravity and quality of the penance imposed.

a. But the question is asked: how long does the commutation cohere morally with the prior absolution? St. Alphonsus (n. 529) judges that only the commutation which is made immediately after absolution, before the penitent departs, constitutes morally one judgment with it. But Lugo thinks that commutation even after a long time still coheres with the prior absolution. "For the satisfaction itself fulfilled after a long time integrates one judgment with the preceding parts; therefore, as long as the satisfaction has not been placed, that judgment is still understood as incomplete and as it were suspended, and the judge still has the right of urging the execution of the sentence; therefore he will still be able, with the consent of the penitent, to change or diminish the prior sentence, so that it can better be put into execution."¹

b. But if the commutation no longer coheres morally with the prior confession, the commutation must be made in another confession. Yet a repetition of the prior confession is not required; rather, it suffices that the confessor still remembers the state of the penitent confusedly, or, if he does not remember, that he receive a confused knowledge of it, whether from a generic confession or from the penance imposed in another confession.

2. But another confessor cannot commute the penance outside the sacrament, because he has no sacramental power over the penitent except in the tribunal of penance, while he exercises the power of the keys. But he can change it in the sacrament, even if the penitent does not repeat the confession of the sins for which it was imposed, provided he acquires a confused knowledge of the matter of the sins, such as he can draw either from a generic accusation or from the quality of the penance imposed by another confessor. For he does not have to pronounce judgment concerning the individual sins, since they have already been declared and remitted before, but only concerning the difficulty of fulfilling the satisfaction and concerning a penance in some way proportioned to the sins; and for this a distinct knowledge of the sins is not required. It is clear that this change, which is instituted in another confession, can be made at any time whatever, since a new sacramental judgment independent from the former is instituted.

¹ Lugo, disp. 25, n. 112. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 318.