Article Second. On Impotence

516. What impotence is and when it excuses. Both physical impotence excuses from restitution, when the debtor does not have and cannot afterward have the means from which to restore, and moral impotence, when restitution cannot be made without grave damage which would arise from this to the debtor or to a third person. Hence impotence of restoring, or rather a just cause of delaying restitution, is considered to be present:

1. If by restoring the debtor would fall into very grave or grave necessity.

2. If by restoring the debtor would fall from his justly acquired state, for example, from the state of merchant to the condition of a worker.

Justly acquired: for he who acquired his state unjustly (by frauds, deceits, things of another) cannot licitly delay restitution because otherwise he would lose his state; for by restoring he does not lose his state, but rather returns to his own state.

3. If by restoring the debtor would suffer grave damage in goods of fortune which by delaying restitution he would avoid, as if a farmer by restoring would have to deprive himself of grain necessary for cultivating fields, or if a merchant would have to sell "obligations" with great detriment.

4. If restitution cannot be made without grave damage in goods of a higher order, for example, without danger of sin, or of life, or of reputation.

517. Whether entrance into religion excuses from restitution. 1. If the debtor has not yet entered religion, one must answer with a distinction. Where he has hope of paying debts within a short time, he is bound to delay entrance, because creditors are reasonably unwilling that, because of a slight spiritual damage, he not satisfy his temporal obligations. But if the debtor would have to remain in the world for a long time in order to pay, considering natural law he can licitly enter religion, because the creditors cannot be reasonably unwilling that with such great loss in spiritual goods he not satisfy his temporal obligations.

2. If the religious is a debtor, whether because he entered religion burdened with debts or because he contracted debts in religion, these things must be held.

a. Religion does not free from the obligation of paying debts except insofar as it renders payment impossible; but neither is the prelate bound to pay the debts from the goods of the monastery, unless he had received the debtor in bad faith or the religious contracted the debts in his name.

b. Therefore the religious debtor is bound to labors suitable to his state and condition, so that he may earn those things by which he can pay, if the prelate has given permission; but he is not bound to extraordinary labors not suitable to his state, even if the superior had given permission.

The prelate who denies permission for ordinary labors does not injure justice, because he himself owes nothing and has a right in the labors of his subject; yet he seems to injure charity if he denies this permission without a just cause.

c. If the religious debtor acquires goods for the monastery, whether by inheritance, donation, or stipend of his labor, for example, by teaching, after expenses have been deducted, debts must be paid from these: for these goods are acquired for the monastery with that burden which they would have had annexed if they had remained in the ownership of the religious debtor.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 3, n. 220; Lacroix, l. 3, pr. 2, n. 441 ss.; Reuter III, n. 362; Lehmkuhl I, n. 1039.