Article Second. On Reflex Principles.

247. On universal principles. 1. Direct principles are called those truths from which the matter itself is proved and known certainly; but reflex principles are called certain general truths which indeed do not prove the matter whose truth is sought, yet serve for bringing about practical certitude.

They are called reflex principles because from their proper object they are, as it were, bent by reasoning toward another, so that through them a certain dictate concerning the honesty of an action can be obtained.

2. Reflex principles are of two kinds: some are universal, which can be employed in any doubt whatever for forming a practically certain conscience; others are particular, which can be employed only in negative doubt, whether of law or of fact, for the same end. The principle of possession indeed is employed for informing conscience in a negative doubt of law and of fact; but the other particular principles are employed only for solving negative doubts of fact.

3. Universal principles are counted as only two: a doubtful law does not oblige and an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; these two principles are clear from the arguments by which the formula of probabilism is demonstrated. Since between these two principles there is scarcely any real distinction, in reality there is only one reflex principle, namely, a doubtful law does not oblige, which alone suffices for forming a practically certain conscience in all doubts. Particular principles are numbered as several, among which the chief is the principle of possession.

248. On the principle of possession.¹ 1. The principle of possession, which in law is set forth thus: in equal fault or case the condition of the possessor is stronger,² among moralists occurs in this formula: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. This principle, which properly and immediately pertains to the matter of commutative justice, which concerns ownership of things, and indeed to the external forum, has this sense: if between two persons there exists a dispute concerning the property of some thing and each proves his right by an equal reason, the laws assign the thing to him who up to now possessed it, until the other sufficiently proves that the thing is his: for possession founds the presumption of ownership, and therefore grants the right of retaining the thing until the contrary is sufficiently established. No one denies that this principle, as regards the matter of justice, is valid not only in the judicial forum, but also in the internal forum.

Therefore the principle of possession protects a certain stability of things, so that things, by force of possession, remain unchanged in the same state in which they up to now legitimately existed, until there supervenes a reason sufficient for changing the prior state.

2. There are some who, because of analogy, transfer this same principle also to other matters of other virtues and apply it for solving doubts concerning the obligation of a law: for they imagine liberty and law as two persons, of whom one has the right of acting as it pleases, but the other the right of limiting liberty; now in the conflict between liberty and law victory must be assigned to that one which is in possession. But if liberty and law are said to be possessed, possession is nothing other than the existence of liberty and of law. And rightly indeed, provided its use is restricted to negative doubts whether of law or of fact; nevertheless in negative doubts of fact other principles also are rightly applied, as is clear from what follows.

¹ Bouquillon, Theologia moralis fundamentalis^3 (Brugis. Beyaert. 1903) n. 302 ss.

² C. In pari 65 reg. iur. in 6°.

249. On particular principles. Since negative doubt is founded only in no reason or in a slight reason, it does not impede sufficient certitude of conscience, and therefore is not to be attended to. And indeed he would act imprudently who from no motive or a slight motive would determine himself to placing or omitting an act. Wherefore in practice one must act in such a way as if no doubt were present; and this is expressed by the principle of possession or by another particular reflex principle, as the examples which follow show.

a. If in a negative doubt of law no reason or a slight reason proves that a law has been enacted, that the law extends itself to this case, that the law commands under grave obligation, etc., liberty remains, or the condition of liberty possessing is better. Likewise if no reason or a slight reason proves that a law has been abrogated, that someone is excused from it, that dispensation has been given in it, etc., the law remains, or the condition of the law possessing is better.

b. If in a negative doubt of fact no reason or a slight reason proves some fact on which the obligation of the law depends, it is often difficult to understand which side possesses, wherefore other principles are rather employed.

Thus in negative doubt whether a boy of seven years has the use of reason, whether a man of timorous conscience has consented to temptation, etc., this principle is applied: in doubt one must judge from things commonly occurring.

In negative doubt whether someone has emitted a vow, committed a sin, inflicted damage; whether the time of beginning an obligation is present (Friday has begun), the time of ending an obligation is present (Friday has ceased); whether someone has recited the hours, committed this sin or confessed it, whether he has satisfied a vow, paid a debt, etc., this principle is applied: a fact is not presumed, but must be proved.

In a negative doubt of fact on which the value of an act depends, where no reason or a slight reason proves that I did not have the due intention or attention in Mass, in the sacraments, in the hours, that I do not justly possess this thing, that baptism conferred was not valid, that confession was not integral, etc., this principle is applied: in doubt one must stand for the value of the act, or: what has been done is judged to have been done rightly.