Article Second. On the Obligation of Following Conscience.

210. Principles. 1. We are bound to follow a certain conscience where it prescribes or prohibits.

For certain conscience is the law itself certainly known by us and applied to a particular action, if conscience is supposed true; but we are bound to follow law certainly known; therefore we are bound to follow certain conscience, at least if it is also true.

2. We are bound to follow a certain conscience where it prescribes or prohibits, even if it is invincibly erroneous, and we can follow the same without sin where it permits something.

The reason for the first is that the will, since it is a blind faculty, in order to act rightly is bound to follow the guidance of the intellect certainly prescribing or prohibiting; therefore it is bound to follow true conscience equally as conscience invincibly erring, provided it is certain. The reason for the second is that one following a permitting conscience wills an action which he judges licit, which cannot be sin.

It is asked whence erroneous conscience receives the force of obliging; for since it obliges insofar as it announces the divine law, erroneous conscience, inasmuch as it does not in reality announce divine law, seems unable to oblige. It must be said that erroneous conscience draws the force of obliging from the universal principle of law: good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, as far as can be done, i.e. as it is manifested to us through conscience; whence we are bound always and in every case to obey certain conscience. Therefore erroneous conscience does not oblige by force of the particular precept which it announces, but by force of the universal precept by which we are bound to do good and avoid evil insofar as we can.

a. The affirmation supposes that he who acts with invincibly erroneous conscience preserves freedom. For in those things which cannot be avoided, sin cannot be committed from erroneous conscience, because the action or omission is altogether involuntary. He who thinks that dishonest or blasphemous thoughts already are sins does not sin, even if he has thoughts of this kind, because he cannot bring it about that they do not enter the mind. Likewise an imprisoned person who erroneously thinks that he sins because he omits Mass does not in reality sin.

b. "Hence if conscience dictates to someone that he is bound to lie in order to aid a neighbor in danger, he sins against charity if he does not lie." - "He who thinks there is a fast when there is not, because of erroneous conscience sins if he does not fast."¹

c. He who places a work evil in itself, which from erroneous conscience he thinks to be good, not only does not sin, but according to the opinion of many exercises a good work and, with the suppositions to be supposed, also merits through it.

d. Sin committed from erroneous conscience is of the same gravity and species as if it had been committed from true conscience. He who, erroneously thinking that Mass must be heard, omits it, sins gravely against the precept of the Church, and in confession it suffices to say: I omitted Mass. He who strikes a man, erroneously thinking that he is a priest, commits sacrilege just as if in reality he had struck a priest. Yet if the confessor notices that the penitent has sinned from erroneous conscience, let him ask him whether he really judged that he was sinning gravely, and let him instruct him concerning the truth of the matter.²

e. If, therefore, conscience dictates that it is licit to steal in order to aid a poor man, theft from invincibly erroneous conscience would not be a sin.

3. A vincibly erroneous conscience, whether it prescribes or permits, may neither be followed nor acted against; rather, we are bound to lay aside the error before the action: for one acting thus would expose himself to the danger of sinning. Yet if there were question of a good act which someone thinks to be prescribed, he could follow a vincibly erroneous conscience and would not be bound to lay aside the error.

"He who thinks, but with doubt, that he must steal from a rich man in order to aid one in need, sins whether he steals with a conscience of this kind or does not steal. Therefore before the action, if it can be done, he must lay aside the error by inquiring into the truth."³ - But he who with doubt thinks that today he must hear Mass and goes to hear Mass is not bound, by inquiring into the truth, to lay aside the error.

Note. In order that a confessor may discern whether conscience was invincibly or vincibly erroneous, let him ask the penitent: a. whether he noticed some indecency in the act or at least doubted concerning its liceity; b. whether conscience dictated to him that someone should be asked about that matter. But if he denies each, the error was invincible; if he affirms either one, the error was vincible and culpable, and indeed gravely culpable if he apprehended the matter under discussion as a matter of great moment.

¹ Gury, Compendium theologiae mor. I. n. 38.

² Cf. Lugo, De poenit. disp. 16. n. 499 ss.

³ Gury, l. c. n. 38.

211. On lax conscience. Lax conscience sometimes denotes a habit, namely that disposition of soul which tends to extending moral liberty more than is right; if it signifies an act, it is a judgment which from a slighter motive judges that to be licit which is illicit, or that to be a light sin which is grave. And consequent lax conscience is a judgment which from a slight motive judges that there was not grave sin where in reality grave sin was committed.

Principles. a. Ordinarily those who, knowing that they have a lax conscience, transgress a precept in a grave matter, sin gravely: for either they have a confused knowledge of grave sin, or if they do not have this, those who in a grave matter knowingly follow a lax conscience knowingly expose themselves to the danger of violating a grave precept. Nor does the error by which they judge that there is no sin excuse them, because the error is voluntary in its cause.

Those who do not know that they are of lax conscience and do not notice the malice of the action even confusedly are excused from sin because of ignorance. Indeed even he who knows that he is of lax conscience can be immune from mortal sin, namely where he notices neither the malice of the action nor the obligation of investigating its malice more accurately, not even confusedly.

b. In doubt concerning full consent to sin, it must be presumed that they fully consented, just as those who are of timorous conscience, in doubt, are presumed not to have consented: for from things ordinarily occurring a conclusion is rightly made with moral certitude to a particular fact.

c. He who labors under lax conscience is bound under grave obligation to lay it aside, because he is bound to lay aside the habitual danger in which he is situated of sinning gravely.

212. On perplexed conscience. The rules to be observed by him who has a perplexed conscience, from St. Alphonsus (n. 10), are these:

a. If without grave damage he can defer the action, he is bound to defer it until he has consulted wise men, e.g. a confessor: for anyone is bound to avoid what he thinks is sin.

b. If he cannot defer the action, he is bound to choose that which seems to him the lesser evil: for he ought rather to avoid a greater evil than a lesser, e.g. transgression of the natural law than of positive law, if he cannot avoid each.

c. If he cannot discern the lesser evil, whatever he chooses, he does not sin; and this indeed even if through error he thinks that he sins, because the act which he places is not voluntary.

Let the example be a man who on a feast day, assisting a sick person, thinks that he sins if he remains, and likewise that he sins if he goes to church; or a priest who, making the sacrifice, thinks that he will sin if he repeats the form of consecration, and likewise that he will sin if he does not repeat it; or a confessor who fears that he will sin by denying absolution, because he wholly frightens the penitent away from the sacraments, and that he will sin by granting absolution, because he administers the sacrament to an unworthy person. Let him do what he wills: for no necessity of sinning exists.