Article Third. On the Possessor in Doubtful Faith

450. A possessor in doubtful faith is not said to be one who doubts from only a slight reason whether the thing which he possesses belongs to another: for he is bound to nothing and can retain the thing for himself; but a possessor in doubtful faith is said to be one who doubts from a grave and probable reason whether the thing which he possesses is his or another's. Now this can happen in two ways: either the doubtful faith is supervening, namely when he accepted the thing in good faith and afterward a doubt arose; or the doubtful faith is antecedent, when he accepted the thing when the faith was already doubtful.

451. In the case of supervening doubtful faith. 1. When doubt has arisen, he is bound diligently to investigate the truth, and with so much greater solicitude as the thing about whose ownership he doubts is more precious. During the investigation he must preserve the thing; but if afterward, once investigation has been made, the doubt perseveres, he can retain the thing and dispose of it: for by possession in good faith he acquires the right of disposing of the thing until it is established that it belongs to another.

If afterward the owner appears, he is bound to restore as a possessor in good faith, namely the thing itself if it still exists, or, if it no longer exists, that in which he has become richer, unless meanwhile he has acquired ownership of the thing by prescription: for a supervening doubt does not impede prescription (n. 403).

2. If, once doubt has arisen, he culpably neglects inquiry, by this culpable negligence itself he begins to become a possessor in bad faith. Therefore:

a. If a certain owner afterward appears, he must restore to him as a possessor in bad faith: the thing, fruits not yet prescribed, loss of profit, and emergent damage from the time at which he became a possessor in bad faith.

b. If a certain owner afterward does not appear, and from the omitted inquiry it has become impossible for the doubt to be solved, restitution must be made to the owner who possesses a doubtful right to that thing, according to the ratio of the hope which he had of recovering his own thing. But if no determined person has a doubtful right, he can retain the whole thing, because he began possession in good faith.¹

The hope which the owner would have had of recovering his own thing is worth much less than half the price of that thing about whose ownership there is doubt. If, however, it is established that the owner at the time when the doubt arose had no hope of recovering his own thing, he is bound to nothing: for the thing, as abandoned, had then already passed into the ownership of the possessor.²

3. He who inculpably omits inquiry is held as a possessor in good faith; therefore if he consumed the thing, he must restore only that in which he has become richer.

He alone is considered culpably to neglect inquiry who omits it from grave negligence; therefore he who from inadvertence or invincible ignorance, or in good faith thinking that the owner cannot be found, or from light negligence omits inquiry, is considered to have neglected it inculpably. But grave negligence is present if inquiry is voluntarily omitted as long as probable hope shines forth that the owner can be found.

¹ Bucceroni, Institutiones theol. moral.^3 I, n. 1353; Genicot, I, n. 534.

² St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 37; Ballerini-Palmieri III, n. 439.

452. In the case of antecedent doubtful faith. 1. He who in doubt despoiled a possessor in good faith is bound, if the doubt cannot be solved, to restore the whole thing to the possessor in good faith; for him himself who probably thinks the thing is his own only recourse to a judge lies open: for in doubt the condition of the possessor is better.

2. He who despoiled no one, but knowingly accepted a thing (for example, by buying) from a possessor in doubtful or suspicious faith, is bound, if the doubt cannot be solved, to restore according to the ratio of the doubt, and indeed to the probable owner, if he can be found, and if he cannot be found, to the poor or to a pious cause. For he cannot retain the whole, because the doubt prevents him from ever becoming simply the owner of the thing; but neither must he return the whole, because it is not certain that the thing belongs to another.

"Artisans and merchants who buy from those about whom they greatly doubt whether they sell their own things or another's, buy in bad or at least doubtful faith, and therefore will always be bound to restore either the whole or a part."¹

3. He who accepted a thing with doubtful faith (for example, by buying) from a possessor in good faith, if the doubt cannot be solved with moral diligence applied, is probably bound to nothing: for he can use the right of him whom he succeeds.²

¹ Lugo, disp. 17, n. 81.

² Lugo, l. c., n. 83.