Fifth Article. On The Imputability Of Moral Acts

79. The nature of imputability. a. The imputability of moral acts necessarily follows from their nature. For imputability is that property of a moral act by force of which it can and must be attributed to man as to its proper author and master; but moral acts, since they proceed from a deliberate will, belong to man as to author and master.

Ordinarily, however, imputability is predicated of the man himself as author of moral actions, and signifies that condition of man by which he himself can and must be considered as author of his actions.

b. Imputation is the judgment by which acts and their effects are attributed to man as to their proper author and master.

c. The foundation and root of imputability is the free will, through which man is constituted author and master of his acts. And therefore the grade of imputability depends upon the greater or lesser influence of the free will in producing moral acts.

Since moral acts are either good or evil, and their goodness or malice is attributed to man as author, they are imputed to him, insofar as they are good, unto praise and merit; but insofar as they are evil, unto blame or fault and punishment. Therefore moral acts, by reason of imputability, are either praiseworthy and meritorious or culpable and worthy of punishment.

80. Conditions of imputability in general. 1. In order that a moral act can be imputed fully to man (especially as grave sin), there is required: a. perfect knowledge on the part of the act; b. knowledge, at least confused, of the morality of the act; for if he does not apprehend the morality of the act, the physical action, but not the moral action, is to be imputed to the agent.

a. Knowledge of the intellect is perfect if no impediment stands in the way of its natural activity, such as is present in one who has full use of reason or is fully self-possessed. The more the intellect is impeded in its activity, the more the imputability of the action is lessened.

b. With regard to the morality of the act, knowledge can be concerned: a. with the morality of the act in general (good or evil); b. with the morality of the act in species (theft or sacrilegious theft); c. with the gravity of the evil act (grave or light sin).

c. For the full imputation of an act, confused knowledge of its morality suffices.

2. In order that a moral act can be imputed fully to man, perfect consent of the will is required, so that the act is perfectly human.

The perfection of consent depends not so much upon adhesion of the will as upon knowledge of the intellect, so that consent is perfect if knowledge is perfect, and imperfect if knowledge is imperfect. Therefore acts placed from fear are indeed less voluntary, insofar as they contain repugnance and therefore a lesser adhesion of the will; nevertheless they are perfectly human acts, placed with perfect consent of the will, provided that knowledge of the intellect has not been impeded because of fear.

81. On the imputability of an act morally good and evil. In order that a good act can be imputed to the agent, the moral goodness itself must be sought and intended; in order that an evil act can be imputed to the agent, it is not necessary that the moral malice be intended.

a. Both good and evil can be voluntary in itself or voluntary in the cause; concerning both, that is, concerning good and evil voluntary in itself, and concerning good and evil voluntary in the cause, the principle holds: To one giving alms, the moral goodness of the action is not imputed unless he intends it; to one striking an enemy, the moral malice of the action is imputed even if he does not intend it. To one writing a good book for the sake of making profit, the good effects from it, even if foreseen, are not imputed unless he intends them; but to one writing a depraved book for the sake of making profit, the foreseen evil effects are imputed even if he does not intend them.

b. The reason for the first is that the will must intend the good; for the will cannot be and be called good except from the goodness of the object which it intends. The reason for the second is that the will must not intend but avoid evil: for since the object of the will cannot be evil, the will is and is called evil from the malice which is joined with the object that is intended and which we must avoid.

82. On the imputability of an evil effect voluntary in the cause. Here there is question only of an evil effect, not likewise of the imputability of a good effect, because good, in order to be imputed to us, must be intended in itself, and therefore good voluntary only in the cause is never imputed. But evil voluntary only in the cause can be imputed to us (n. 80). Therefore it is asked whether every evil effect is imputed to us already for this reason, that it follows from a cause freely placed by us, or whether other conditions are further required for this.

1. In order that an evil effect which alone follows from an action (indifferent in itself) be imputed, it suffices that it was foreseen confusedly. For since the effect is contained in the cause, the will which wills the cause necessarily wills also the effect which alone is contained in it.

Although this principle is implicitly contained in the following one, nevertheless it is better to state it explicitly. Example: drunkenness, which alone follows from drinking, must be imputed to the drinker, provided that he knew the drink as intoxicating.

2. In order that an evil effect which follows together with a good one from a good or indifferent action be imputed to the agent, the three following conditions must be present simultaneously:

a. That the agent foresaw the effect at least confusedly: for what has in no way been foreknown is not voluntary; what is in no way voluntary cannot be imputed to the agent.

Therefore drunkenness following from moderate drinking of wine, whose intoxicating force was unknown, is not imputable as sin, because it was not foreseen. Nevertheless brawls, blasphemies, obscene words, and things of this kind which are committed in drunkenness must be imputed as sin to him who is accustomed to commit these things in drunkenness, because on account of the custom of doing things of this kind in this state they have been sufficiently foreseen. But to him who was not accustomed to commit these things in drunkenness, they are not imputed if they happen by chance, because they have not been foreseen.

b. That he could have impeded the effect, that is, that the agent could have either not placed the cause or removed it once placed; for what does not depend upon his will cannot be imputed to the agent, since the foundation of imputation, liberty, is lacking.

a. The agent is rightly judged able to impede an evil effect which follows together with a good one from the same cause if there exists another means for obtaining the good effect with which the evil effect is not joined.

b. Hence a priest is not guilty of sacrilege who gives Holy Communion to a sinner, which he cannot deny because of the sacramental seal; nor is the omission of Mass imputable to him who must care for the sick.

c. That he ought to have impeded the effect, that is, that the agent is held either not to place the cause or to remove it once placed, lest the evil effect follow. For if he is not held to abstain from the cause, the agent uses his own right and, with regard to the evil effect, has himself only permissively.

To him who, in attacking a city, fires an instrument of war in such a way that besides the fighting enemies several innocent persons are killed at the same time, the death of the innocent is not imputed. To a physician are not imputed the depraved movements which he suffers in carrying out care of the sick.

83. When the cause of an evil effect is licit. Now it is asked when we are no longer held to abstain from an action, although it is foreseen that an evil effect will follow from it. The conditions under which it is licit to place a cause from which an evil effect follows are contained in this principle:

It is licit to place a cause from which a twofold effect follows, one good and the other evil, if the cause itself is in itself good or at least indifferent, if the good effect follows at least as immediately as the evil, if a proportionately grave reason is present, and if the end of the agent is honorable. Therefore four conditions are required in order that it be licit to place a cause from which an evil effect is known to be going to follow:

a. That the cause which is placed be good or at least indifferent: for if it were evil, the placing of the cause itself would already in itself, independently of every effect, have to be imputed as sin, for example in one who makes himself drunk while foreseeing that homicide will arise from it.

If, however, the cause were evil not precisely because of that effect about to follow, the malice of the cause would be imputed, but not the malice of the effect. Thus to one who harms his health while foreseeing that it will happen that he cannot fast, the omission of the fast is not imputed, because he is not held to preserve his health for the reason that he may be able to fast.

b. That the good effect follow from the cause at least as immediately as the evil, and not by means of the evil effect: for if from the cause there immediately follows an evil effect and from this only then a good one, evil would be done so that good may follow, which is never licit: for evils are not to be done that goods may come.¹

a. If two effects follow from a cause, it can happen that they proceed from the cause equally immediately, because the cause by its nature is determined to produce both, as if a surgeon, by amputating an arm, causes health and pain for the sick man; or it can happen that the effects do not proceed from the cause equally immediately, because the cause is not determined by nature to produce both, as if someone paints an image for the sake of making profit, by the sight of which another is incited to sin. In each case the agent can intend one without intending the other.

b. Hence a girl pregnant from a crime sins gravely if she procures an abortion in order to avoid infamy; for she employs an evil means to obtain a good end. A physician licitly gives medicine to heal a pregnant woman, even if he foresees that an abortion will follow; but he acts illicitly if the remedy directly and immediately tends to expelling the fetus and only then, from this expulsion, to healing the disease.

c. That the evil effect which is foreseen to follow be not intended nor approved, but merely permitted: for even an action honest in itself becomes evil if the agent, in performing it, intends a depraved end.

Therefore two things from this side must be guarded against when a cause is placed from which an evil effect is foreseen to follow: first, lest the effect be intended when the cause is placed; and then, lest it be approved or pleasing when it actually follows. For example, if someone, using his own right, digs a pit into which he foresees his neighbor will fall, he sins both if he intends the neighbor's evil and if he rejoices in it once it has followed.

d. That there be present a proportionately grave reason for placing the cause and permitting the evil effect: for when a sufficient cause is added, the law ceases by force of which the evil effect was to be avoided; but when this law ceases, the evil effect can licitly be permitted, as if someone kills an attacker in order to preserve himself.

¹ Cf. Rom. 3:8.

84. A proportionately grave reason. Therefore, in order to obtain a good effect, it is sometimes licit to permit evil, if there is present a proportionately grave excusing reason. The proportion must be present between the good effect, or between the cause on account of which the action is placed, and the evil effect.

In order that it can be judged whether there is present a proportionately grave excusing reason, attention must be given to these circumstances:

a. The greater the evil which is foreseen to follow from the cause placed, the greater the excusing reason must be.

Thus it is not licit to kill an aggressor in order to preserve goods of lesser value, but it is licit in order to preserve goods of greater moment or life itself.

b. A greater excusing reason is required if, by omitting the action, the agent can impede the evil effect, than if the evil is nevertheless going to follow from elsewhere.

Thus a greater reason is required so that an innkeeper can provide meats to guests on a fast day if no one else will be found who will give them, than if another is present who will give them when he refuses.

c. The closer the cause concurs toward effecting the evil, the greater reason is required.

A proximate cause is distinguished, which produces the effect in such a way that between it and the effect no other middle cause intervenes; and a remote cause, which does not produce the effect unless several other middle causes intervene. A cause is called nearer or more remote according as fewer or more other causes intervene. Therefore a greater excusing reason is required in one who concurs proximately, a lesser in one who concurs remotely, toward another's sin, for example drunkenness. From this reason it can happen that a good lesser in itself compensates a greater evil, namely when the good follows proximately, but the evil only remotely, from the same action.

d. The more certainly the evil effect is foreseen to follow, the greater excusing reason is required; therefore a lesser reason suffices if the evil will follow only more or less probably.

e. A greater reason is required in those who are held from office to impede evil than in those who are held by no office to impede it.

Thus a greater reason is required so that an innkeeper can provide meats to his son on a fast day than so that he may licitly do this toward strangers, because from the office of piety he is held to impede the sins of his son. Those are said chiefly to be held from office to impeding sin who by force of contract, and therefore from justice, must impede it, such as guards and pastors.

85. When an evil effect voluntary in the cause is imputed. 1. One who knowingly places or does not remove the cause of an evil effect (the same must be said of omission of a commanded action) does not commit sin when the evil effect follows, but when he voluntarily places or does not remove the cause: for sin consists not in the existence of the evil effect, but only in the internal act of the will. Therefore, although the evil effect does not in fact follow, nevertheless the sin has already been committed.

a. Hence one who, while drinking, adverts that he will become drunk by further drink, and besides this knows by experience that in drunkenness he is accustomed to quarrel and to blaspheme, at the very instant at which, foreseeing the evil effects, he decides to drink, commits the sin of drunkenness, quarrel, and blasphemy willed in the cause. One who on a feast day in the morning gives himself to sleep, foreseeing altogether that Mass will be omitted from this, then sins against the precept of the Church when, foreseeing the omission, he gives himself to sleep. One who has decided not to hear Mass sins by this purpose, even if afterward, his will changed, he hears it. The same must be said of one who gives poison to another; namely, he does not sin when the death of the other follows, but when he places the cause of death.

b. Therefore the gravity of a sin voluntary in the cause is not to be taken from the gravity of the effect or from the gravity of the precept violated, but from the malice of the internal act of the will. But if the act of the will which seeks the cause with foresight of the evil effect is a venial sin, even the violation of a grave precept will be only venial.

2. An evil effect voluntary in the cause, which completes an internal sin externally, has the character of sin from the malice of the internal sin. Hence if he who placed the cause has retracted his will before the evil effect followed, this effect does not have the character of sin, but only has the character of an effect of sin.

To him who, foreseeing that he will commit homicide in drunkenness, makes himself drunk and kills a man, death is imputed as sin. But if before the death of the other he retracted his depraved will, the death is not imputed to him as sin, but only as an effect of sin. The same must be said of one who gives poison to another but before that one dies has confessed the sin; namely, after death has later followed, he is not held to confess again the sin of homicide; nevertheless he must repair the damage inflicted by the homicide.

86. On the imputability of sin committed from a depraved habit. If someone has contracted a custom, for example of swearing, the individual acts committed from this custom are imputable as sin if the one swearing adverts to the act and its malice. But if he swears inadvertently, one must distinguish: as long as the custom is voluntary, the acts are imputed as sin; if the custom is involuntary, the acts are not imputed as sin. For the contracted custom is the cause of the individual acts; therefore if it is voluntary, the individual acts are voluntary in the cause. But custom is voluntary both if the one swearing, adverting to the custom to be contracted by repeated acts, nevertheless does not amend himself, and if, adverting to a custom already contracted, he tries by no remedy to put it away. It is involuntary if, whether contracted advertently or inadvertently, he retracts it by penance and proposes to put it away.

a. Therefore one who from a depraved custom which he is studying to amend swears or blasphemes inadvertently does not sin, because the individual acts are voluntary neither in themselves nor in the cause. But one who from a depraved custom which he neglects to root out swears or blasphemes inadvertently commits sin, because the individual acts are voluntary, not indeed in themselves, but in the cause. Nevertheless he does not commit as many sins as the oaths or blasphemies he says, but one, and that he commits when, adverting to the contracted custom and to the obligation of rooting it out, he neglects amendment. Therefore if someone does not advert to the individual sins which are committed from a depraved custom, there is no reason for the confessor to be solicitous about their number, since the sin consists only in the neglected amendment of the depraved custom.

b. From these things is gathered what sort of sin is negligence in taking away a depraved custom of this kind, which is the cause of sins. Namely, if the sins committed from custom are grave, the negligence is grave, because the obligation of rooting it out is grave; but if the sins are light, the negligence is light, because the obligation of taking it away is light; but finally, if some care is applied for amending the custom, yet not serious and sufficient care, light negligence likewise is committed.