Fourth Article. On The Impediments Of Human Acts

47. Since it depends upon the exercise of liberty that an act be human, it is necessary to know what things impede the exercise of liberty and therefore a perfectly human act. The impediments of human acts are of two kinds: some are actual, which actually and transiently lessen or remove the human, voluntary, and free act; others are habitual, which habitually and permanently lessen or remove the human, voluntary, and free act.

I. Actual Impediments

There are four things which actually and transiently impede the human act: ignorance, concupiscence, fear, and force. Because a human act must proceed from previous knowledge, ignorance impedes it; because it must proceed from the will as from an internal principle, violence impedes it; because it must proceed from a principle indifferent to acting and not acting, concupiscence and fear impede it.

1. On Ignorance

48. Notion. Ignorance is the lack of knowledge of some thing. Therefore ignorance denotes a habitual state of the mind.

a. Ignorance differs: a. from error, for error signifies an erroneous judgment or an assent not conformable to truth; therefore besides the lack of knowledge of some truth it involves a judgment contrary to truth, as if someone not only did not know that Christ is God and man, but judged Him to be a mere man; b. from inadvertence, which consists in this, that the mind does not attend to a matter, even though habitual knowledge of that matter is present.

b. Ignorance, which denotes a habitual state of the mind, is taken here insofar as it actually influences our action, namely for actual ignorance, to which inadvertence also pertains.

49. Division of ignorance. 1. By reason of the object, ignorance is divided into ignorance of law and ignorance of fact. The first is ignorance of the law, as if someone does not know that fasting must be observed on the vigil of Pentecost, or does not know that the reading of a heretical book is prohibited. The other is ignorance of a thing, either as to substance or as to some circumstance, as if someone does not know that today is the vigil of Pentecost, or that the book which he reads is heretical.

Some reduce ignorance of the penalty to ignorance of law, namely of the law decreeing the penalty for the offense; others to ignorance of fact, namely of the connection of the penalty with such an offense; finally others list it as a third species of ignorance.

2. By reason of the subject, or of the man ignorant, ignorance is divided into invincible and vincible. The first is that which cannot be put away, and is called physically invincible if it cannot be put away in any way, as if someone does not think at all about the matter or law, or about the obligation of investigating; and morally invincible if, with moral diligence applied, it cannot be put away. The other is that which can be put away by applying moral diligence, but is not put away.

a. That diligence is considered moral which prudent persons are accustomed to apply in matters of this sort. Moral diligence must be diverse according to the quality of the matter, person, and circumstances: for greater diligence is usually applied in a matter of grave moment, lesser in a matter of slight moment; likewise, other things being equal, a person to whom many means of finding the truth are available applies greater diligence, and a person to whom only few means are available applies lesser. How much diligence must be applied so that it can be called moral must be measured from the way prudent persons act in these diverse circumstances. Therefore moral diligence is not the greatest diligence which can be applied, but is that diligence which anyone, from prudent judgment here and now, in this matter and in these circumstances, can and must apply for dispelling ignorance. But no one is bound to greater than moral diligence, even if he could apply greater.

b. Invincible ignorance is involuntary and therefore inculpable. Vincible ignorance is voluntary at least in the cause, and is culpable if it concerns those things which must be known, but inculpable if it concerns those things which can lawfully be unknown.

c. In order that ignorance be vincible and culpable, it is required both that a thought, or at least suspicion, of ignorance and of the obligation of putting it away enter the mind, and that the occasion of inquiring be voluntarily passed over or not sufficiently used.

3. Vincible ignorance, according to the diverse way in which it is willed, is divided into affected and not affected. The former is had when someone deliberately wills ignorance, for example so that he may sin more freely, as if someone doubting whether today is a fast does not ask, although he could easily ask, lest perhaps he be bound to fast. The latter is had when someone omits due inquiry, not because he wills to be ignorant of the matter, but for another reason, for example because of negligence, shame, and so forth.

The former is willed in itself; the latter is willed not in itself but in the cause, that is, in the omission of due inquiry.

4. Ignorance not affected is subdivided into crass or supine, when no diligence or almost no diligence is applied to putting it away; and into simply vincible, when some diligence indeed is applied, but not sufficient.

5. Invincible ignorance is divided into antecedent and concomitant. It is called antecedent if the one operating is actually so disposed that he would not place the action if he knew what he is ignorant of. Thus the ignorance of a hunter who kills a friend whom he thinks to be a beast is antecedent, because he would not have done it if he had known it was his friend. It is called concomitant if the one operating is actually so disposed that he would place the action even if he knew what he here and now is ignorant of. Thus the ignorance of a hunter who kills an enemy sought for death, whom he thinks to be a beast, is concomitant, because he would have killed him even if he had known him to be his enemy.

The former precedes the consent of the will and is usually called the cause of the action, because the action would not be done if the ignorance were absent. The latter accompanies the consent of the will and is usually named a non-cause, because the action would be done even if the ignorance were absent. In the former case the action is done from ignorance; in the latter, with ignorance.

6. Ignorance in general is divided into antecedent and consequent. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes voluntary negligence in investigating an obligation, as is ignorance of the fast in one who has not even thought about the fast. Consequent ignorance is that which follows voluntary negligence in investigating an obligation, as is ignorance of the fast in one who, thinking about the fast, does not put away the ignorance.

All antecedent ignorance is invincible and therefore involuntary and inculpable. But all consequent ignorance is vincible and therefore voluntary and culpable, either in itself or in the cause.

Note. Ignorance of those things which must always be known is called habitual ignorance. A physician, judge, advocate, confessor, or pastor labors under habitual ignorance when he does not know those things which he must know from his office. Those who labor under ignorance of this sort are said to be in a habitual state of sin. This is not to be understood as though they sin at every moment for as long as they labor under this ignorance, but as meaning that they sin as often as an occasion offers itself of learning those things whose knowledge is necessary to them, if they advertently neglect the opportune occasion.

50. The influence of ignorance on human acts. 1. Invincible ignorance, whether antecedent or concomitant, removes the voluntary: for what is done ignorantly is not voluntary in itself, because it is unknown, nor is it voluntary in the cause, because the ignorance is supposed invincible. And since both antecedent and concomitant ignorance are invincible, the latter removes the voluntary by equal reason.

a. Invincible ignorance, just as it removes the voluntary, also removes fault. Hence one who on Friday eats meat while invincibly ignorant that it is Friday, or that what he eats is meat, does not commit sin. One who strikes a man while invincibly ignorant that he is a priest is guilty of injustice, but not of sacrilege. Children and the uneducated who do shameful things whose malice they do not know do not sin.¹

b. That disposition of soul by which one operating with concomitant ignorance would place the action even if he knew the matter cannot bring it about that the action is voluntary, but only brings it about that after the truth is known the action is pleasing. Therefore, in the example given above, the actual will of killing the enemy indeed brings it about that the hunter sins by internal affection, but not that he is guilty of actual homicide.

2. Vincible ignorance does not remove but lessens the voluntary, at least if it is not affected.

a. The reason for the first is that vincible ignorance is voluntary; therefore voluntary also is the action or omission which proceeds from this ignorance, and the effect which follows from the action or omission.

Because vincible ignorance does not remove the voluntary, neither does it remove fault: one who shoots at a beast while suspecting that it could be a man is guilty of homicide if in fact he kills a man.

b. The reason for the second is that something is less voluntary the less knowledge there is of it; but manifestly there is less knowledge in one who is ignorant of a thing, even vincibly, than in one who knows it.

a. Therefore vincible ignorance also lessens fault: for something is imputed as fault insofar as it is voluntary. And since this ignorance has diverse grades of voluntariness, namely according as it is simply vincible, crass, or affected, so also the action which follows from this ignorance has diverse grades of fault.

b. The quantity of fault which is present in a sin committed from vincible ignorance is not taken from the action or omission which followed because of the ignorance, but from the negligence which was committed in dispelling the ignorance: for the action or omission is voluntary insofar as the cause of that ignorance is voluntary. Hence it can happen that great defects committed from ignorance by confessors in absolving penitents, by pastors in arranging marriages, or by physicians in treating the sick, are only light sins, when the negligence in fulfilling the obligation or in removing the ignorance was slight.

c. Ignorance is usually called crass when the negligence of investigating the truth is very great; and it is usually called simple or simply vincible when that negligence is not so great. Therefore crass ignorance is usually assessed as grave sin, while simple ignorance is assessed as light sin. There are authors, however, who say that not every simply vincible ignorance is a light sin, but that even simply vincible ignorance is either light or grave sin according to the greater or lesser negligence. Ignorance that is lightly culpable in a moral matter is usually equated with invincible ignorance.

Note. Because affected ignorance ordinarily arises from a great inclination to sin, it seems rather to increase than to lessen the voluntary. But an action which proceeds from affected ignorance is voluntary only in the cause; and what is voluntary in the cause is never as perfectly voluntary as that which is voluntary in itself and directly, because knowledge of the former is not as perfect as knowledge of the voluntary in itself.

2. On Concupiscence

¹ Therefore this proposition (2) was condemned by Alexander VII on December 7, 1690: "Although invincible ignorance of the law of nature may be granted, this in the state of fallen nature does not excuse the one operating from formal sin from it."

51. Notion. Concupiscence in the broader sense, as it is taken here, is otherwise also called passion, and designates any act or movement of the sensitive appetite toward sensible good or evil apprehended through the imagination.

a. Concupiscence taken in the stricter sense is one of the passions, of which six are numbered in the concupiscible appetite: love, desire or concupiscence, joy, hatred, horror, and sadness; and five in the irascible appetite: hope, daring, despair, fear, and anger. Therefore concupiscence taken in the broader sense signifies the acts of all the passions, but taken in the stricter sense signifies the act of one passion only, namely desire.

b. Sometimes concupiscence in an altogether different sense signifies a depraved inclination of the appetite, lower and higher, arising from original sin, by which man is borne toward those things which are opposed to right reason.¹ Therefore this concupiscence differs in two ways from that concerning which we treat here: a. this one signifies a movement or act, but that one only an inclination or disposition; b. this one is concerned with sensible good or evil, but that one only with evil, yet both sensible and rational evil.

¹ Cf. Gal. 5:17; Rom. 7:23.

52. It is divided into antecedent and consequent. Antecedent concupiscence is that which precedes every consent of the will, yet draws and allures the will to consent. Consequent concupiscence is that which follows the consent of the will.

a. It can happen in three ways that concupiscence follows the consent of the will: either it is admitted after having arisen spontaneously, as if in one who meets an enemy, hatred spontaneously aroused is fostered by deliberate consent of the will; or it is deliberately stirred up, as if someone recalls in his mind injuries inflicted upon him by an enemy in order that he may be stirred to revenge; or it overflows from a vehement free act of the will, as if affections of hatred or love freely admitted overflow into the sensitive appetite.

b. Therefore antecedent acts of the sensitive appetite are not voluntary and hence in themselves neither good nor evil. But consequent acts of the sensitive appetite are voluntary and therefore either good or evil; and those indeed which are deliberately stirred up or, once stirred up, are admitted, are voluntary in themselves, while those which overflow from the will into the sensitive appetite are voluntary in the cause.

53. The influence of concupiscence on human acts. 1. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntary and sometimes entirely removes it.

a. The reason for the first: for the voluntary is less, the more reason is impeded in its deliberation and the more the will is inclined by an external influence toward one side. But movements of the sensitive appetite impede the deliberation of reason: for they turn it away from considering the proper motives of reason and weaken their force and efficacy; moreover, they allure the will to consent.

b. The reason for the second: sometimes passion is so vehement that it entirely disturbs the mind and wholly removes the use of reason, to such a degree that the moral malice of the object is no longer perceived. Now, if no deliberation of reason is present, there is likewise no voluntary, as is clear in those who because of love or anger are plainly insane. But if passion does not wholly remove the use of reason, it does not entirely remove liberty.

a. Passion which lessens the voluntary also lessens sin, and passion which removes the voluntary excuses altogether from sin. Yet passion which does not wholly remove the use of reason does not remove the voluntary, and therefore neither excuses from sin. Hence it happens that actions which proceed from sudden anger or from vehement sadness, according to the degree of advertence, are either altogether involuntary or at least cannot be imputed as perfectly human acts; and if evil, they are frequently either no sin or only a light sin. A determinate judgment in the concrete concerning the imputability of such an action must be committed to God.

b. Whether the consent of the will which adheres to movements of concupiscence is a perfectly or imperfectly human act does not depend upon the movement of concupiscence, that is, upon its greater or lesser vehemence, but upon the influence which it exercises upon the use of reason. For a movement of concupiscence cannot act directly upon the will and absolutely draw it to consent; on the contrary, the will can resist even more vehement movements of concupiscence and deny consent. But passions usually impede the use of reason more or less.

2. Consequent concupiscence which overflows from an act of the will neither increases nor lessens the voluntary, but is a sign of its intensity.

a. The reason for the first is that the act of the will is already perfect when the movement of the sensitive appetite arises.

b. The reason for the second is that only from an intense act of the will does a movement overflow into the sensitive appetite.

Consequent concupiscence which is deliberately stirred up by the will serves this purpose, that human operations may be performed with greater alacrity and with greater vigor and fervor; and since it itself is voluntary, it can add merit to good actions and demerit to sins.

3. On Fear

54. Notion. Fear is defined as a trembling of the mind on account of a future evil. Therefore it is an act of the appetite by which we flee from an imminent evil which we think we can conquer either in no way or only with difficulty.

a. Fear arises in the appetite from the representation of evil; and although the one fearing remains altogether self-possessed, nevertheless fear often moves him to willing something which otherwise he would not have willed. And thus fear must be considered in this place, namely insofar as it moves the will to choose something for avoiding a greater evil, which otherwise it would not have chosen, as if someone chooses amputation of a leg in order to avoid death.

b. The evil which causes fear can threaten either the one himself who fears, or those joined to him; for the evil which happens to those joined either by blood or by friendship is considered one's own.

c. He is said to operate from fear for whom fear is the cause of the operation; he is said to operate with fear for whom not fear but another thing is the cause of the operation. A sailor throws goods into the sea from fear; a martyr undergoes death with fear, which he naturally fears. In the former case fear is antecedently related to the operation; in the latter, only concomitantly. Here the discussion concerns operations which are done from fear.

55. Fear is divided: a. By reason of quantity into grave and light, according as the evil from which fear arises is grave or light.

In order that fear be called grave, two things are required: a. that a grave evil threaten, such as death, mutilation, long imprisonment, grave infamy, great loss of goods, and the like; b. that the evil can be averted only with difficulty. If a light evil threatens, or indeed a grave evil but one which can easily be averted, fear is called light.

Grave fear is either absolutely grave, if an evil truly grave in itself is feared; or relatively grave, if the evil is indeed light in itself but grave with respect to a determinate person who is fearful, such as children, the elderly, and women.

a. Relatively grave fear in moral matters is equated with absolutely grave fear, because it induces the same trembling of the mind and therefore exercises the same influence on the action.

b. Fear which falls upon a constant man signifies absolutely grave fear: for it arises from an evil which even a constant, strong, and courageous person deservedly dreads.

b. By reason of origin it is divided into fear inflicted from without and from within, according as it comes from an external or internal cause; thus fear of death from shipwreck is from without, fear of death from disease is from within.¹

Fear from without is again divided into fear inflicted by a necessary cause, as by shipwreck, fire, or attack of wild beasts, or by a free cause, namely by man.

Fear inflicted by a free cause is again inflicted either justly or unjustly, according as the person causing the fear has the right of causing fear, as a prince or father who threatens punishment, or unjustly causes fear, as a robber threatening death unless money is given.

c. Reverential fear must be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have those offended and indignant whom he ought to revere, such as parents and any superiors whatever, princes, prelates, bishops, and the like. It is referred to fear justly or unjustly inflicted, according as its cause is just or unjust.

Can reverential fear be grave? Fear arises from evil which someone thinks is threatening him. Therefore if grave evil can threaten from the offense of parents or superiors, reverential fear can be grave. But reverential fear is taken in two ways: a. in itself, insofar as it signifies the confusion and distress which an inferior suffers because of the offense and indignation of the superior alone; b. insofar as it also signifies other evils besides, such as long reproof, harsher treatment, deprivation of goods, and the like. Now if reverential fear is taken in this latter sense, without doubt it can be grave; but if it is taken in the former sense, it is considered light. Once this distinction has been made, authors can be reconciled, some of whom hold reverential fear to be grave, while others hold it light.

¹ Others, for example D'Annibale (I, n. 138), call fear from without if it is inflicted by another for extorting consent, and fear from within if the imminent evil itself brings fear, whether it comes from an internal cause, such as infirmity, or from an external cause, such as contagious disease, storm, shipwreck, the punishments of hell, and so forth. According to this distinction, fear indeed inflicted by another, but not for extorting consent, must be referred to fear from within.

56. The influence of fear on human acts. 1. Fear which is so vehement that it disturbs the use of reason entirely removes the voluntary: for where deliberation of reason is lacking, there is perfect involuntary. Yet this happens in fear rarely and only accidentally: for ordinarily and of itself even grave fear does not remove deliberation of reason, which is required for a perfectly human act. Therefore with regard to fear, the following principle must especially be attended to.

2. An act placed from fear, however grave, of itself is voluntary simply and involuntary in a qualified sense. For fear of itself brings it about that the will deliberately chooses the action as a means for avoiding evil, but with some repugnance, as if someone from fear of shipwreck throws goods overboard. But an act of this sort is voluntary simply with an admixture of the involuntary.

a. Since fear ordinarily does not remove the voluntary, it does not excuse from sin, nor remove the merit of a good action, as if someone assists at Mass from fear of punishment. Yet because involuntary is mixed with the voluntary which proceeds from fear, fear lessens fault and merit, and indeed the more, the greater is the repugnance in placing the action. But in particular: a. if the matter is intrinsically evil, no fear excuses from sin, nor does it lessen fault so much that mortal sin becomes venial because of fear; b. if the matter is prohibited by positive law alone, grave fear can completely excuse from sin, unless fear is inflicted in hatred of the Church or of religion.

b. Because an act which is done from fear is voluntary simply and therefore simply human, of itself fear does not excuse from obligations contracted because of it unless a law or special reason stands in the way. For the voluntary which suffices for committing grave sin also suffices for contracting obligations. Therefore, of itself, a vow emitted from fear of death in the midst of shipwreck or in grave illness is valid.

3. Light fear is not attended to in the external forum: for it is supposed not to have had influence on the action. But in the internal forum it lessens the voluntary and therefore the gravity of sin according to the quantity of influence upon the will.

4. On Violence

57. Notion and division. 1. Violence, coercion, or force, considered passively, is defined as motion caused by an external principle while the will resists; considered actively, it is the force itself which is applied for causing motion in another.

Therefore two things are required for an act to be called violent or coerced: a. that it proceed from an external principle; b. that it be against the will resisting with all its powers. Therefore one who truly and perfectly suffers force, so that outwardly he cannot do otherwise, not only inwardly does not consent, nor merely dissents, but also outwardly resists as much as he can by persuasion, prayers, threats, shouting, force, and so forth, and tries to repel the force brought against him.

2. It is clear that violence cannot fall upon elicited acts of the will, since it is a contradiction in terms for the will to be coerced to an act, that is, that in the will there be an inclination toward an object while the same will declines from the same object by resisting. Therefore not even God can coerce the will. But violence can fall upon acts which can be commanded by the will: for not only members of the body, but also internal powers, especially imagination and intellect, can be moved to acts by external force, for example through the influence of a good or evil angel, while the will resists.

3. Violence is divided into absolute violence and violence in a qualified sense. The former is had when he to whom it is brought resists as much as he can and therefore suffers altogether unwillingly. The latter is taken in a twofold sense: a. according to some, it is had when the one suffering can repel the force brought against him or at least diminish it, but does not; b. according to others, it is had when the one suffering cannot repel the force brought against him, but does not suffer it altogether unwillingly.

58. The influence of violence on human acts. 1. Absolute violence removes every voluntary: for an act caused by absolute violence is done with the will altogether resisting, and if it consented even minimally or omitted due resistance, the absolutely violent would already fail. Therefore violence removes sin, since there cannot be sin which is not voluntary.

One does not sin who, violently shut in, is forced to omit Mass on a feast day; who is forced to bend the knees or burn incense before idols; the virgin who is oppressed by force and resists according to her powers; one who suffers depraved suggestions.

2. Violence in a qualified sense does not remove but lessens the voluntary. For either resistance which could and ought to be applied is omitted, and then the violent action is indirectly voluntary in the omission of resistance, as if a woman who is oppressed does not repel an attacker whom she could repel; or the will does not entirely oppose, and then there is some consent of the will, as if a woman who is oppressed and cannot repel the attacker consents to depraved pleasure.

The resistance which must be opposed to violence, lest a violent or coerced action can be imputed as sin, is sometimes required of itself, namely when the violence is of such a kind that it can be overcome. Thus if someone suffers immodest touches, in order that they be violent and involuntary in the full sense, it is required not only that the will oppose, but also that the touches be repelled as far as possible; otherwise the one who suffers force is considered at least in some way to consent. Sometimes resistance is required accidentally, even if it is useless, namely when it is required for preventing scandal; thus martyrs who were compelled to offer incense to idols were bound to resist insofar as it was necessary to show that they suffered unwillingly. Or resistance is required when it is necessary for forestalling consent, which happens where force is brought against chastity; thus a woman oppressed is bound of itself to resist, even by shouting and by the powers of the body, as much as she can. But if this positive resistance is useless or too difficult, indeed dangerous, she is excused from applying it, provided she can avoid consent.

II. Habitual Impediments

Habitual impediments are of two kinds: habits, both good and evil, inhering in the will; and illnesses of the soul, which impede man from being able fully to use his spiritual faculties.

1. On Habits

59. Notions. A habit is defined as a constant inclination, added to a faculty, for producing similar acts. To the power in which it exists, a habit confers that the power can operate easily and promptly.

a. Here the discussion concerns moral habits, and these acquired, which exist in the will and incline it to moral acts, whether good, virtues, or evil, vices.

b. Man by nature is not endowed with habits, neither good nor evil, but only with certain dispositions to habits, which are called inchoate habits and come from natural temperament or by heredity from parents. Habits themselves are acquired by repetition of similar acts: for any act leaves in the power from which it proceeds a certain determination or inclination toward producing similar acts; then, through the repetition of the same acts, a habit is generated in the power. Ordinarily several acts are required for generating a habit, unless they are very intense.

c. After he has acquired the use of reason, man begins to acquire habits for himself. For if he resists the passions which draw toward sensible things, by this very fact the forces of the will against the passions are gradually increased; there is formed in the will a certain disposition of eliciting similar acts against the passions, which inclines the will to the good, lessens the appetite of passion, and subjects it to the will; indeed, as experience testifies, the very organs of the body take on a disposition consonant with virtue. If on the contrary he indulges the passions, the forces of the will for overcoming the passions are lessened, inclination into the object of the passion is increased, and the very organs of the body take on a disposition consonant with vice, to such a degree that man is finally subjected to the vice. Nevertheless there remains in the will the power of freely determining itself against the impulses of passion, however much increased by the habits of vices, provided that sufficient use of reason has remained.

d. The more frequently similar acts are repeated, the greater in the power becomes the inclination and facility toward similar acts. An intense habit and one already long rooted in the power is called custom, which sometimes impels to similar acts with such force that it can scarcely be commanded: custom is a second nature. This especially holds concerning depraved custom.

e. Depraved customs are of two kinds: some which do not affect the organic powers, imagination and the sensitive appetite, nor impede the spiritual powers in their functions, such as the custom of blaspheming, lying, stealing; others which alter the organic powers, and sometimes indeed so vehemently that the activities of the spiritual powers are impeded thereby, such as the custom of lust and drunkenness.

f. By reason of origin there is distinguished natural or involuntary custom, which is contracted without advertence to its moral effects; and moral or voluntary custom, which is contracted and retained with knowledge of the moral effect.

60. The influence of habits on human acts. 1. A habit, whether good or evil, in the acts upon which it influences, increases the character of the voluntary and of merit or demerit; but it lessens the character of the free.

The reason for the first is that the act proceeds from a will which is more fixed in the object and more inclined to the object than a will lacking the habit. The reason for the second is that the free, or the indifference of the will, is less the more the intellect considers one side and the will is inclined into the same; but habit brings it about that the part which is consonant with the habit is exhibited more vividly to the intellect and that the will inclines more toward the same.

2. On custom. a. Depraved custom which does not infect the activity of the mind and will indeed lessens liberty, but does not exclude a perfectly human act and grave fault. Sometimes it exercises such force upon the will that it can be overcome only with difficulty; nevertheless it is not such that the will, at least aided by the help of grace, cannot command it.

It must altogether be held that any depraved custom whatever can, by applying apt remedies, be corrected over time, unless the spiritual faculties are thereby disturbed in their activities.

b. Depraved custom which impedes the functions of the mind and will lessens liberty in such a way that man is incapable of a perfect act and grave fault, and indeed the more so, the more the activity of intellect and will is disturbed.

In order that the imputability of offenses which are committed from depraved custom, especially against chastity, can be judged, it must be noted that sinful acts, the more frequently they are committed, increase the appetite the more, to such a degree that a most vehement impulse drives one to sin; that the same acts weaken the energy of the will; and that the intellect, recalling sensible goods, is impeded from sufficiently weighing the motives which would draw it back from sin. These impediments of liberty are greater in those who have contracted the depraved habit almost from infancy, and greater still in those to whom an evil disposition has been transmitted by heredity from parents. Therefore, although they sin more or less deliberately, nevertheless they can be excused not indeed from all sin, but from so great a sin.

2. On Illnesses Of The Soul

61. Notions. 1. The recent medical discipline which is called psychiatry or psychopathology has illnesses of the soul as its object. From this discipline moral theology chiefly gathers that there are diverse affections of soul which exercise a more or less determining influence upon the moral life and lessen liberty, and which therefore deserve to be attended to in assessing the imputability of offenses.

a. In times past, an examination concerning the state of mind of those who had perpetrated a crime was rarely instituted, since full use of reason, and therefore perfect imputability of the crime, was not called into doubt unless the accused were found to be plainly insane. But in our time a diligent examination is instituted concerning the state of mind of those who are guilty of crime. And rightly indeed, since a crime cannot be imputed to an agent who is not fully self-possessed. Although it cannot be denied that in our time, since men suffer much more frequently from nerves, there are more evildoers than before who lack the perfect use of the spiritual faculties, nevertheless several physicians, in making a judgment from theories of psychiatry concerning the full deliberation of evildoers, exceed the measure. For they teach that from disease there is present in the will an internal necessity by which it is impelled with inescapable vehemence to perpetrating evils, or that the will at least labors under perfect abulia (Willenslosigkeit), to such a degree that, the movements of concupiscence having been rejected, it plainly cannot choose the good. They attribute this sick will to those who labor under neurasthenia, melancholia, hysteria, or moral dementia.

b. From inclination to evil and from abulia there must be distinguished weakness of the will in relation to good (Willensschwache, sittliche Schwache), which is naturally present in it in the state of fallen nature. There is indeed present in the will, even after the fall, a natural inclination to good, to which nevertheless the sensitive appetite, concupiscence, the tinder of sin, is opposed; this by its nature is borne also toward sensible goods which are opposed to uprightness. Now concupiscence, insofar as it is borne toward shameful sensible goods, renders the choice of the moral good difficult and constitutes the natural weakness of the will in the moral order; this weakness can be greatly increased by depraved habits.

2. Illness of the soul, psychopathy or Seelenkrankheit, is said to be present when the activities of mind and will are habitually badly affected. From psychological principles it cannot happen that the intellect and will in themselves labor under some disease, since they are merely spiritual powers, incapable of disease. In particular, the will cannot have any other sickness in itself than depraved habits, which indeed lessen free determination but do not remove it. Nevertheless, since the spiritual powers in their acts externally depend upon the senses, especially upon imagination, upon the sensitive appetite, and upon that part of the brain which serves the functions of these powers, if the sensitive powers are badly affected, then by overflow the intellect and will also are disturbed in their functions.

Since the will in its acts depends directly only upon knowledge, with the required knowledge shining beforehand, the will itself is always unimpeded and free. Hence it cannot happen that one lacks moral liberty who sufficiently apprehends the moral goodness and malice of his action.

62. The influence of illness of the soul on human acts. One must distinguish between men who labor under illness of soul and those who are indeed not truly sick, but nevertheless are affected by dispositions which, when certain circumstances are added, can degenerate into a perfect illness of soul.

1. For those sick in mind, as lacking the use of liberty, it is manifest that moral actions cannot be imputed. They are driven by an inescapable force and inclination to committing depraved actions, thefts, arsons, homicides, lust, in which, on account of illness of mind and defect of liberty, they are immune from sin.

If such persons come before a confessor: a. he should not openly signify to them that in those acts they are plainly immune from sin, both because this cannot be established with certainty in a particular case and lest they yield to the depraved inclination without any resistance at all and thus increase it; b. he should gently exhort them to resist depraved inclinations, for serious resistance can at least diminish the natural inclination.¹

2. Those who are not truly sick do not fully lack the use of liberty, and therefore cannot be immune from the obligation of rendering an account of their moral acts. For although imputability is lessened according to the measure of impeded liberty, nevertheless offenses committed must be imputed to them as fault, and sometimes even as grave fault.

a. For making an equitable judgment concerning some offense committed, attention must be given to the actual and habitual disposition of the delinquent. The more perfect the advertence to the malice of the action is, and the more unimpeded the deliberation concerning the obligation of omitting the action and concerning the consequences which arise from the offense, the greater is the imputability of the offense. The more knowledge and deliberation are impeded and disturbed by an actual affection and impulse or by a habitual disposition, the less is the imputability of the offense. But to those whose advertence and deliberation are not impeded, evil actions are fully imputed, even if they committed the offense under the influence of some passion or impulse.

b. Therefore the opinion must be rejected both of those who teach that offenses are to be imputed to all in the same degree, and of those who, with recent psychiatry, affirm that offenses cannot be imputed to any of those who have an affected disposition of soul. The true opinion neither removes their imputability nor equates it with that of the healthy; since it is impossible to determine its grade in a particular case, it must be committed to the judgment of God.²

Note 1. Pastors of souls and confessors must know what illnesses of the soul are, by what signs they are recognized, whether moral actions are to be imputed to sick persons of this kind, and how the sick themselves are to be treated in the care of souls. Pastoral theology treats of these things. Cf. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der speziellen Seelenfuhrung (Freiburg: Herder, 1904), p. 166 ff. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit (Munster: Schoningh, 1904), p. 210 ff. Bessmer, Storungen im Seelenleben (Freiburg: Herder, 1907). The same, Grundlagen der Seelenstorungen (Freiburg: Herder, 1906). Familler, Pastoralpsychiatrie (Freiburg: Herder, 1898). Romer, Psychiatrie und Seelsorge (Berlin: Reuther, 1849). Schloss, Propadeutik der Psychiatrie (Vienna: Kirsch, 1908).

Note 2. Although sins of the flesh are often the cause of illnesses of the soul, nevertheless it must also be noted that from illnesses of the soul, or of the brain and nerves, sins of the flesh, especially sexual perversities, not rarely arise. In this way it is explained why sometimes men who until now had lived piously and chastely suddenly give themselves to sins of the flesh and foul perversities. Their moral defects are to be attributed not to fault, but rather to a disease contracted through misfortune.

¹ Cf. Genicot, Casus conscientiae I, p. 6 f.

² Cf. Bessmer, Grundlagen, p. 181 ff.