Question — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Fourth Question. On Supernatural Acts
96. Declarations. 1. Moral acts by which we arrive at the supernatural end of eternal life must be supernatural, and this by the internal supernaturality of the act itself, by which it is elevated above nature in its very being and as to substance. For the way must be proportioned to the terminus, and the work to the reward; but the end of eternal life is strictly supernatural and essentially diverse from a natural ultimate end. Therefore also the acts by which we tend toward that end must be supernatural as to essence.
- The conditions which are required in order that a human act truly be supernatural are assigned variously by authors. All indeed require: a. that the act be morally good, for a human act indifferent in itself morally cannot be supernatural. Certainly a supernatural act has God as principal author through grace exciting and assisting; but God does not excite by His grace to indifferent acts. Then they require: b. that the act proceed from a supernatural principle, namely from a power elevated by actual grace; for in order that an act be supernatural, this certainly is required: that it be elicited not by the powers of nature, but by the supernatural powers of grace. But others further require: c. that its formal object or motive also be supernatural.
What this condition means they explain in diverse ways; nevertheless most wish the formal object to be apprehended through faith, that is, that the agent be moved to acting by some revealed truth which he knows not by the mere light of reason but by faith (the intellect furnished with the light of faith). For example, one who gives alms to a poor man because to aid the poor is honorable acts from a natural motive; but one who bestows alms because the poor man has been redeemed by Christ, because he is the brother of Christ, because Christ commands this, because it contributes to eternal life, acts from a supernatural motive apprehended through faith, provided that he is furnished with the habit of faith. For faith must influence the supernatural act; but it influences through a motive known from faith.
1 Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14. Schmid, "Die Ubernaturlichkeit der menschlichen Heilswerke," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie (1888), pp. 263, 419. Mullendorff, "Die Verdienstlichkeit u. das ubernaturliche Motiv," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie (1893), pp. 42, 496. Schiffini, De gratia divina (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), n. 371 ff.
97. Twofold opinion. 1. Theologians of great name require for a supernatural act, besides a supernatural principle, also a supernatural object or motive: Suarez,1 Lacroix,2 St. Alphonsus,3 Mazzella,4 Lehmkuhl.5
These authors bring forward two kinds of arguments:
a. From the nature of the thing: acts are specified by the (formal) object; but a natural act differs in species from a supernatural act; therefore the (formal) object of each act must be diverse in species or essentially. But the essential diversity of each (formal) object consists in this, that one is apprehended through reason, but the other through faith.
b. From the sources of revelation. Some patrons of this opinion concede that from the nature of the thing there is not an efficacious argument by which it is demonstrated that a natural and a supernatural act cannot be concerned with the same object. But they affirm that from the positive will of God all supernatural acts must proceed from faith, or must have a supernatural motive; since both Sacred Scripture and tradition teach that faith is the root from which supernatural life sprouts. Therefore without the influence of faith through a motive known from faith, supernatural acts cannot be exercised. And indeed:
a. These testimonies: "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe";6 "the just lives from faith,"7 must be understood not only of first justification, for which man must dispose himself through an act of faith, but of absolutely all supernatural acts, which cannot be supernatural unless faith influences them through their supernatural motive.
b. The Council of Trent, wishing to declare the doctrine of St. Paul expressed by these testimonies, adds: "For this reason we are said to be justified through faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification";8 from which we have that not only first justification, but also the increase of sanctifying grace through supernatural and meritorious acts, must proceed from the root of faith. But, they say, acts proceed from the root of faith only in this way, that faith influences them through a supernatural object and concurs in their production.
- Nevertheless it can be affirmed: in order that a human act be supernatural, no other condition is required except that it be ethically good and proceed from grace or from a supernatural principle; but it is not necessary that the object of the supernatural act be supernatural. Therefore the supernaturality of the act does not depend upon the object, but upon the eliciting principle, so that it is supernatural even if it is concerned with a natural object, provided that it is elicited by the powers of grace.
a. By these things it is not denied that an act which proceeds from faith, and therefore is elicited from the supernatural motive of faith, is of greater dignity and worth. Therefore, although the supernatural good intention, as it is called, is not proved necessary from this head, nevertheless the faithful are to be admonished and exhorted that they accustom themselves to exercise their actions from the supernatural motives of faith; for their works will in this way be of greater merit. But for the very supernaturality of the act this is not necessarily required.
b. For the rest, that which Cardenas teaches specifically concerning alms can be extended to most morally good actions of a Christian man: "He who in the school of faith has learned that alms are a holy operation and pleasing to God, because God has thus revealed, although when the occasion of alms is offered he is actually unmindful of divine revelation, nevertheless operates led by the doctrine which he learned in the school of divine faith; and thus that operation proceeds virtually from an act of faith, because he operates from the dictate which he acquired in the school of faith."9
1 De gratia, l. 2, c. 4, 5; l. 12, c. 7, 33, n. 10.
2 Theologia moralis, l. 2, n. 21 ff.
3 Theologia moralis, l. 6, n. 439.
4 De gratia Christi, n. 54 ff.
5 Theologia moralis I, n. 258. Passauer Monatsschrift (1895), p. 14 ff.
6 Heb. 11:6.
7 Heb. 10:38; Rom. 1:17; Gal. 3:11.
9 Cardenas, Crisis theologica, pr. 4, disert. 16, c. 6, n. 54.
98. Arguments for this opinion. 1. Acts which proceed from a principle supernatural through grace are without doubt supernatural: for if the root and principle is supernatural, the fruit or effect must also be supernatural. And indeed actual grace brings it about that human acts are supernatural. For grace is granted for this reason, that acts may become supernatural through grace; and for this reason grace is necessary for every salutary work both of the just and of the sinner, both of the faithful and of the unbeliever, because grace itself must bring it about that the work is supernatural.
a. Therefore if for supernatural acts a supernatural object or motive were required, this would be for this reason: because in this order of providence God would grant the help of grace (especially for indifferent acts) only under this condition, that man act from a supernatural motive. But it can be demonstrated by no argument that God in this order made the supernatural concurrence of grace dependent upon the supernatural motive of the agent. On the contrary, it seems able to be demonstrated that faith is the condition on which the supernatural help of grace depends in this order, so that God grants supernatural grace to those who have already received faith, by which their works are elevated to the dignity of a truly supernatural act. Namely, for man constituted on the way to the terminus, as often as he acts well, God is present with the supernatural help of grace. For God has destined man to a supernatural end; by this very fact He has also imposed upon him the obligation of tending by his acts toward the end established for him. But since without the help of grace he cannot tend toward his end, God must succor him through grace, so that man can satisfy his obligation. Therefore as often as man by his acts tends toward the end established for him, God grants him supernatural grace. But man tends toward his end as soon as he embraces faith or disposes himself to having it: for through faith he apprehends his end and orders himself to it. To bring forward at least one testimony of Scripture from many, Christ the Lord says: "He who hears My word and believes Him who sent Me has eternal life,"1 that is, he has that by which he can perform the works of eternal life, because he has the condition by which, once posited, supernatural graces are supplied by God. From tradition, moreover, it is established that in the Church there flourishes the persuasion which St. Augustine expresses in these words: "that anyone cannot operate well unless through faith he has received grace. But man begins to receive grace from the time when he begins to believe God, moved to faith by internal or external admonition."2
b. From the preceding argument it follows that actual grace is always available to all the faithful, whether just or sinners, by which their morally good actions become supernatural. But with greater certitude it can be affirmed that all morally good works of the just are always exercised with the help of divine grace and therefore are supernatural. For the Council of Trent has this: "For since that same Christ Jesus, as head into the members and as vine into the branches, continually pours virtue into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works."3
- If for supernatural acts the influence of faith through a supernatural motive were required, there would be no supernatural act without the influence of faith; but there are supernatural acts without the influence of faith. It is certain that in unbelievers before faith and independently of the influence of faith there are found acts which proceed from grace: for the proposition affirming that faith is the first grace has been proscribed;4 since before faith truly supernatural graces are granted, by which the unbeliever may dispose himself to embracing the true faith. But acts which are elicited by the powers of grace are supernatural. Therefore there are supernatural acts which are not founded on faith in this sense, that faith influences them.
1 John 5:24.
2 Ad Simplicianum, l. 1, q. 2, n. 2. Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie XVIII (1894), p. 593; XX (1896), p. 22 ff.
3 Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16.
4 Cf. proposition 27 of Quesnel and 5 condemned by Alexander VIII.
99. To the arguments of the opposing opinion. a. Acts without doubt are specified by the object: for an object diverse in species brings it about that the acts also are essentially diverse. Nevertheless the object is not the only reason from which the essential distinction existing between acts must be sought, since this can also be derived from an essentially diverse power, even if the object of the acts is the same. Now the distinction between a natural and a supernatural act must chiefly be taken from the side of the essentially diverse principle.
b. It cannot be affirmed that all supernatural acts are so founded in faith that they spring forth from faith as from a root. For it is established that there are truly supernatural acts in unbelievers, namely those acts which precede faith itself and its influence.
c. The words of the Apostle in Heb. 11:6 must proximately be understood of first justification, so that the sense is: the good pleasure with which God follows the just cannot be obtained without faith; and in like manner, one who comes to God through justification itself must have faith. Therefore proximately those words signify the absolute necessity of faith for justification. Then, if the words of the Apostle are taken more broadly, so that faith is said to be necessary for any good pleasure with which God follows even supernatural works, and for any approach by which even through supernatural works we come to God, this is true in this sense: not indeed that the motive of faith, but that the existence of faith in the one operating, is the condition without which grace necessary for supernatural acts is not granted.
d. The words "the just lives from faith" signify: a. the just man has through faith and on account of faith that by which he can live the supernatural life, because faith is the foundation and condition by which, once posited, he receives supernatural graces from God. b. The just man, at least for the most part, takes from faith the motives of willing and acting; from the same faith he takes motives of living well and piously and of exactly observing the precepts of the Christian religion, and in this way he lives, that is, preserves and perfects the supernatural life.
e. Faith is called the foundation and root of all justification not because of the motive of faith from which works supernaturally good must be done, but: a. because supernatural life begins with faith and depends upon faith as upon a condition of actual graces; b. because faith moves one to exercising good works and in this way concurs toward preserving and increasing justification.