Question Fifth. On Violation of Secret

666. Preliminary notions. 1. A secret subjectively is the obligation of not manifesting some hidden matter; objectively it is the hidden matter itself and the matter to be kept hidden. A threefold secret is distinguished (besides the sacramental secret):

a. Natural, whose obligation arises without contract from the nature of the thing alone, namely because the matter which someone has known by chance cannot be manifested without another being reasonably unwilling.

b. Merely promised, whose obligation arises from a promise, if someone promises silence to another about a matter already known before.

This promise can be given in two diverse circumstances: for either one promises another secrecy concerning a matter which he already knew before, or he afterwards promises secrecy concerning a matter which he had received from another without secrecy.

c. Committed or strict, whose obligation likewise arises from a promise, if someone receives from another a matter previously unknown to himself under the condition and express or tacit promise of keeping secrecy.

a. Therefore one committed secret arises from a promise or explicit pact, and can be called a private committed secret; another arises from a promise or tacit pact, and can be called an official (committed) secret (Amtsgeheimnis). The observance of the former is demanded only by private good; the observance of the latter is demanded in some measure also by the common good.

b. By the obligation of official secrecy are held counselors, physicians, midwives, advocates, theologians, etc., to whom, by force of office or for the sake of seeking counsel or help, secrets are revealed. Some refer here also friends and relatives to whom, by right of friendship and kinship, secrets are manifested for the sake of help or consolation.

Note. A secret can be an invention of art or science; it can be some fact (for example, that an office is vacant); it can be a hidden crime. The same principles do not apply to every secret.

2. Anyone has a right to his own secret; hence of itself it is not lawful: a. to investigate a secret; b. to manifest a secret; c. to use secret knowledge.

a. It is not lawful to investigate a secret unjustly, because a secret is like another's property; therefore he who unjustly investigates a secret takes another's property away from its owner.

a. A secret which is an invention of art or science may not be investigated by unjust or dishonorable means (by listening secretly, opening letters, employing force or deceit), but it may be investigated by natural and honorable means (art, study): for the owner cannot reasonably be unwilling that each one strive to know these secrets by licit means. The same must be said of a secret which is some fact. b. A secret which is a hidden crime, either already committed or to be committed later, may be investigated when there is question of averting truly grave damage to oneself or to an innocent third person, which threatens from that very person whose secret it is.

b. It is not lawful to manifest a secret, because manifestation is against justice or at least against charity, unless there is question of a case in which use of the secret is lawful.

c. It is not lawful to use a secret, or secret knowledge unjustly acquired: for he who has inflicted an injury on another is bound to remove it, or at least not to continue it; but he who uses knowledge unjustly acquired to the damage of another continues the injury inflicted on another. It is lawful to use secret knowledge justly acquired for one's own or another's advantage, even if some damage to another follows from it: for when someone has justly acquired knowledge of a secret, whether there is question of a fact or of an invention of art or science, the right of secrecy ceases, because the secret itself ceases.¹ Nevertheless it is not lawful to use a committed secret for one's own or another's advantage against the will of the one committing it: for a secret is judged to be committed in such a way that he to whom it is committed must abstain not only from its manifestation but also from its use.²

¹ Cf. Lugo, l.c., disp. 14, n. 103; St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 969; Sporer-Bierbaum II, tract. 5, n. 674; Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 1083.

² Cf. Elbel-Bierbaum I, pr. 4, n. 412 s.; Bucceroni, Casus consc., 2nd ed., n. 88, 5. Let the examples be: a. From another's opened letters someone knows that some office is vacant; using this knowledge he himself seeks and receives it earlier. b. By chance, hearing persons speaking in a loud voice, he knows an invention of art whose secret they were diligently guarding; he himself uses this knowledge for his own advantage. c. An advocate, knowing by reason of office the unstable state of someone's business, warns his brother, a creditor of that business, about this matter, so that he may provide for himself in time.

667. On natural secret. 1. A natural secret obliges either from justice or from charity, and therefore under grave obligation in a grave matter, namely where the neighbor, from its revelation, is affected either by grave sadness or by grave injury.

2. It is lawful to manifest a natural secret where it cannot be kept without grave inconvenience; this inconvenience indeed must be greater if the secret obliges from justice.

To reveal one or another secret of lesser moment does not exceed venial sin. In a (positive) doubt whether the secret is of slight or great moment, it cannot be revealed without grave sin, because the one revealing exposes himself to the danger not only of sinning gravely but also at the same time of causing grave damage; therefore the principle of probabilism cannot be applied in this case.

668. On a promised secret. 1. A promised secret as such obliges either from mere fidelity under light obligation, or from justice, and indeed in a grave matter even under grave obligation, according as the one promising intends to bind himself either from fidelity or from justice; ordinarily, however, it obliges only from fidelity.

a. The matter of a promised and committed secret is sometimes that which by its own nature must be kept hidden, and therefore imposes a double obligation, of natural secret and of promise.

b. It must be noted that a promise of keeping secrecy is sometimes made from mere propriety and civility; this promise indeed of itself induces no obligation.

2. A promised secret does not oblige: a. where it cannot be kept without grave inconvenience to oneself or another, unless someone expressly obligated himself otherwise; b. when the matter would have had to be manifested without the promise: for no one can obligate himself by a promise to that which is illicit.

Therefore he who is legitimately questioned by a judge or superior concerning some matter must manifest it, even if he had promised secrecy.

669. On a committed secret. A committed secret obliges from justice and therefore under grave obligation in grave matter, because this obligation arises from a promise burdensome on both sides. Moreover, the common good demands that the opportunity of seeking necessary counsel or help be available to all; but men would be deprived of this advantage unless, because of the grave obligation of this secret, they were certain concerning its observance.

a. The obligation of a committed secret is stricter and graver than that of a promised secret, and the obligation of an official secret is graver than the obligation of a privately committed secret. For a committed secret obliges from justice, but a promised secret ordinarily only from fidelity; an official committed secret, however, obliges even when otherwise the matter would have had to be manifested, because the common good demands that this secret be kept unharmed except in a few cases. Therefore a committed secret may not be opened even to a judge or superior legitimately questioning, and the one questioned must answer with restriction that he knows nothing, namely nothing which he can reveal.¹

b. Not all committed secrets are of the same strictness and obligation, but some urge more strictly than others; this must be attended to when there is question of the licit revelation of a committed secret. Thus the obligation of a secret which is committed entirely freely, without another cause, to a private man is less; the obligation of a secret which is committed to a private man for the sake of receiving counsel is greater; the obligation of a secret which is committed to men constituted in public office (physicians, advocates, etc.) is still greater; finally the obligation of a secret which is committed to counselors in public causes is the greatest (if we abstract from the sacrament).²

c. To reveal even a committed secret of greater moment to one or another prudent man under secrecy is a venial sin, provided no other grave damage follows from it, and the secret is not manifested to him from whom the one committing it especially wished it to be hidden: for a matter communicated to one person only can still be called secret; hence by this lesion of secrecy only a light injury is inflicted on another.

¹ By civil law it is for the most part prohibited that those who perform a public office, as pastors, physicians, etc., be questioned by magistrates or judges concerning those things which have been entrusted to them by reason of office. Yet in some places this is enjoined by civil law on all, even physicians who were present at childbirth, that they report the name of the father and mother to the magistrate. Where a law of this kind is in force, since it must be said to be just (so that children may know their parents), it must also be observed by physicians: for in this case the obligation of committed or official secrecy ceases for them.

² Cf. Lehmkuhl I, n. 1198.

670. A committed secret can licitly be revealed in the following four cases.

It is evident of itself that the obligation of secrecy ceases: a. if the consent of him who committed the secret can rightly and deservedly be presumed. If a subject (the example is Cardinal de Lugo's) manifests under secrecy to a superior the crime of some subject, it must be supposed that the informer indeed wishes to remain hidden, but it can also be supposed that he permits the superior to do concerning the delinquent what he judges opportune.¹ b. If the matter is already known or divulged from elsewhere; hence anyone can licitly speak of a committed secret with a man who has knowledge of it, even if this knowledge is not yet public. The same holds if he to whom the secret was committed received knowledge of the matter from elsewhere. Therefore the secret can be revealed:

1. If it is necessary for averting grave common damage to the Church or the republic: for the obligation of secrecy, which was introduced for the sake of the public good, ceases where the same public good demands the manifestation of the secret. But it is not lawful to reveal a secret because of light public damage, such as arises, for example, from the guilty man remaining unpunished.

If someone knows under secrecy another's purpose of harming the city, and the latter cannot otherwise be turned back from executing it, he can and must reveal the secret committed to him.

2. If it is necessary for averting grave damage unjustly to be inflicted on an innocent third person by him who committed the secret: for charity demands that we free the innocent from the injury of the harmful man even with some damage to the harmful man.

a. If Titius knows under secrecy another's purpose of killing Gaius, and the wicked man cannot be turned back from his purpose, Titius can and must manifest it as much as is necessary to avert the evil, for example by warning Gaius to take care for himself. Likewise a physician knowing that a bridegroom, who pretends himself healthy, is laboring under a contagious disease, could manifest the matter to the deceived bride, if the bridegroom, after warning, was unwilling to desist.

b. Note that the obligation of a committed secret does not cease in favor of the innocent unless the secret concerns an evil still to be inflicted by injury; for if the secret concerns an evil already committed, its obligation does not cease, even if by manifestation the damage of the innocent person could be averted. If, for example, someone knew from a committed secret that Titius is a homicide, he could not reveal the matter in order to free Sempronius, who is unjustly condemned to death in place of Titius. For just as Titius himself is not bound, with equal damage to himself, to manifest his own crime in order to free Sempronius from an evil of which he is not the cause except accidentally, so he to whom Titius committed the secret is not bound, indeed he cannot manifest the crime of Titius in order to free Sempronius. For Titius is reasonably unwilling concerning the revelation of a secret committed by himself, so long as he himself can licitly keep it.²

3. If it is necessary for averting grave damage to the one committing the secret himself: for the one committing cannot be reasonably unwilling concerning the manifestation of the secret.

If someone knows under secrecy that Gaius has resolved to enter marriage with a hidden impediment, and he cannot otherwise be impeded from entering marriage, he can and must denounce the impediment.

4. If it is necessary for averting grave damage to oneself, even if from this there would follow for the one committing the secret danger of death: for one accepting a secret is not judged to wish to bind himself with so great an inconvenience, unless he expressly promises that he will keep the secret even with the gravest inconvenience.

If someone knew under secrecy that homicide had been perpetrated by another, and he himself, to whom the secret was committed, being suspected of the homicide, was in danger of undergoing a grave penalty, he would licitly reveal the secret even with danger of death to the one committing it, supposing that there is not another means of averting the most grave penalty threatening.

¹ Lugo, disp. 14, n. 117.

² Cf. Laymann, l. 3, tr. 3, pr. 2, c. 5, n. 2.