Question — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Question First. On Injury in General
408. Definition. Injury is the violation of another's right strictly so called, whether this happens by action or by omission of an action which is owed by strict right. A violation of strict right of this kind is theft, detraction, homicide.
a. Concerning the relation between injustice and injury it must be said that injustice is the wicked habit which is contrariwise opposed to the virtue of justice; for just as justice signifies a good habit, so injustice signifies the opposed evil habit. Injury is an act which pertains to that vicious habit.
b. Since there is a threefold true and properly so-called right, namely the right which is the object of legal, distributive, and commutative justice, there is also a threefold injury of right, namely injury of the right of legal justice, which lacks a proper name; injury of the right of distributive justice, which is called acceptance of persons; and injury of the right of commutative justice or of right strictly so called, which is properly called injury.
c. It is clear that injury is opposed to charity and justice, because through it a right is injured and at the same time an evil is inflicted. Nevertheless sins of injustice (for example, thefts) do not contain a twofold malice, one against charity and another against justice, but only one against justice, in which the injury of charity is contained as a genus.
409. Division. Injury is divided:
a. Into positive, which is inflicted by doing something against another's right, and negative, which is inflicted by omitting what is owed to another by strict right.
b. Into personal and real, according as the right of another is injured in the person, that is, in goods of soul or body, or in external goods.
c. Into verbal and real, according as the neighbor's rights are injured by words or by deeds.
To verbal injury is referred injury inflicted by writing, namely when through a letter, poem, defamatory pamphlet, etc., something which falls to another's ridicule, contempt, or infamy is spread among the people.
d. Into mere and damaging, according as the right of another is injured without damage or with damage of him to whom the right pertains. Thus adultery of a wife, with offspring not conceived, is mere injury; with offspring conceived, it is damaging injury.
410. Moral and specific malice. 1. Injury is a sin grave from its genus, because it is opposed to commutative justice, which indeed of itself obliges under grave obligation. This is also established from sacred Scripture: for the precept of not injuring justice is reckoned among the commandments which must be observed that we may enter into life.1 It admits smallness of matter, because order is not gravely disturbed if a right in a slight thing is injured.
- The gravity of matter in an injury of justice, especially if the matter concerns goods of fortune, must be determined from a twofold source: a. from the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor; b. from the damage which would arise for the community if such matter were not prohibited under grave obligation. For a twofold reason demands that the right of each be preserved uninjured: both the good of individual men, and the peace and security of the community. Since each person is gravely unwilling about grave damage inflicted on himself, it is usually said that a grave injustice is committed when the injured person, either on account of the damage which he himself suffers, or on account of the damage which threatens the community, is by right deservedly gravely unwilling.2
In sins which are committed against justice, gravity is to be taken not so much from the affection with which the owner is borne toward the thing taken away, nor from the indignation or sadness with which he is affected on account of it, but from the damage which he himself suffers, and consequently from the reluctance and opposition of will by which he is reasonably unwilling. Hence it can happen that he who takes away a thing of slight value, but very dear to the owner, sins gravely against charity, if namely he foresees that he will be affected with grave sadness and indignation, but not against justice.
Note. This universal norm, which extends itself to all genera of goods, will have to be applied and determined more accurately in its own places to individual goods.
Not all injuries are of the same moral species, but there are as many specifically diverse injuries as there are rights or goods diverse in species in which the neighbor can be injured. But first four genera of goods must be distinguished: a. spiritual goods, both natural and supernatural; b. internal goods (of life and members); c. mixed goods (of reputation and honor); d. external goods (of fortune). Some of these genera contain within themselves goods diverse in species, as will be said in their own places.
A right in goods of fortune can be injured in a twofold way: by unjust taking away of a thing and by unjust damaging. Through taking away a thing, the one taking receives profit; through damaging, the one damaging takes no advantage. Unjust taking away and damaging do not differ in specific malice: for each injures the neighbor's right only in goods of fortune; but that someone takes an advantage from this does not change the morality of the action.
1 Matt. 19:18.
2 Cf. Reuter, Theol. moralis, III, n. 294; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 761 s.
411. To one knowing and consenting no injury is done:1 for no injury is inflicted where no right is injured; but no right is injured of him who freely yields his own right. But he freely yields his own right who consents to an action unjust of itself. Nevertheless a twofold condition is required, that then no injury be done: a. that the one consenting can yield his right; for if he cannot yield it, the yielding is invalid; b. that he in reality wishes to yield his right, that is, that the yielding be altogether free. For this it is required that consent be given fully and with full knowledge. Hence where consent is given from error or is extorted by fraud or fear, in reality it is none.
Hence a. he who kills one consenting or asking for his own killing commits injury: for since God alone has ownership over the life of man, man cannot fully yield this right. He who strikes a cleric renouncing the privilege of the canon does injury, because a singular person cannot renounce this privilege, since it was granted in favor of the clerical state. He who takes goods from a ward, even one consenting, commits injury, because the ward cannot validly yield his right. He who sins with another's wife commits injury, even if the husband approves the adultery of the wife, because he cannot alienate all the rights which in this case are injured.2
b. Therefore the action of him who kills one consenting is unjust against God, but cannot be unjust against him who consents to the action injurious in itself. Likewise the action of a wife who commits adultery with the husband consenting is opposed to the holiness of the sacrament and to the right of legitimate offspring, but is not unjust against the husband himself.
c. He who gives money to a robber to avoid death suffers injury; likewise a buyer who pays for merchandise beyond the highest price, or buys a defective thing as sound, because these persons do not consent freely. A worker who, compelled by necessity, consents to a wage less than what is owed to him by natural right suffers injury.
d. If someone, as holy men are read to have done, desires that injury be inflicted on himself and rejoices over it once inflicted,3 likewise if someone, having followed the counsel of Christ the Lord, leaves his cloak also to one taking away his tunic,4 he is not judged to wish to yield his right, but to exercise excellent virtue.
1 C. Scienti 27, reg. iur. in 6.
2 Cf. Lugo, disp. 8, n. 10; Vermeersch, n. 144.
3 Cf. Heb. 10:34.
4 Matt. 5:40.
412. Whether the intention of harming can render the external act unjust.
a. If the action indeed harms another, but does not injure his strict right, whether because the other does not have strict right, or because the agent has the right of placing the action, intention cannot render the act unjust, although it is harmful: for no injury is inflicted where no right is injured.
A private man who does not extinguish a fire from a wicked mind of harming does not act unjustly, because he is not bound to this by strict right. A judge who condemns a guilty person from hatred, so that he may harm him and his family, likewise he who in legitimate defense of himself wounds an enemy from hatred, is not unjust, because these persons have the right, one to condemn the guilty person, the other to defend himself.
b. If the action of itself is indifferent toward a just or unjust effect, it can become unjust through the wicked intention of the agent: for an unjust intention causes that then the right of another is injured.
He who takes another's thing from a thief so that he may restore it to the owner does not act unjustly; he who takes it so that he may retain it for himself commits injustice. According as someone takes away the book of a friend either with the mind of stealing or with the mind of joking, he acts or does not act unjustly; wherefore if afterward by chance he lost the book, by reason of the intention he would or would not be bound to restitution.