Question — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Question First. On the Nature and Division of Sin.
286. Notion. 1. Sin is a morally evil human act;2 but every human act is a free act, and every evil act is against the rule of morals, which is the divine law; therefore sin is customarily defined as a free transgression of the law of God.
a. Free: that which occurs from previous knowledge of the intellect and with consent of the will; for what is not free can in no way be imputed as sin. Transgression signifies any injury of the law of God, whether it is done by commission or by omission, whether by heart, mouth, or work. Of the law of God: for sin supposes a law, and one obliging in conscience, whether it was passed immediately by God or by man; but since there is no power except from God, every obligation of law is derived ultimately from God. Therefore Sacred Scripture says: sin is iniquity, that is, lawlessness;3 and it also calls sin prevarication4 and disobedience.5
b. Sin differs from imperfection. Three genera of imperfections are customarily distinguished, the first of which contains negative imperfections, the two latter positive and moral imperfections. a. Imperfection is called the defect of a further perfection in human acts, e.g. love of God lacking that perfection which it could have: this imperfection inheres by its nature in all human acts and therefore is not sin. b. Imperfection is called an indeliberate transgression of a divine law of lesser moment, e.g. involuntary distraction in prayer, an indeliberate excess in laughter or jokes: this imperfection is a light material sin, since it is an action entirely involuntary. c. Imperfection is called an action or omission which is opposed to a counsel, e.g. not complying with a divine inspiration, violating the statutes of a community, not obeying the dictate of reason moving one to morally better things, omitting morning or evening prayers, etc. Imperfections of this kind, since they are not against the law of God, of themselves are not sins; nevertheless they displease God and merit reproof, and, if they are committed deliberately, by reason of the motive on account of which the counsel is omitted, they will rarely be without some sin of sensuality, negligence, curiosity, acedia, etc. For the law of nature forbids man to determine himself in his actions from an irrational motive; therefore if the motive on account of which the counsel is omitted is irrational, the omission is a sin.
- Since offense consists in this, that something is done against the will of another, and injury in this, that something is done against the right of another, every sin, inasmuch as it is against the will of the supreme legislator, by its nature is an offense and injury inflicted upon God. Therefore every sin gives God a motive of displeasure and a right of punishing the agent.
1 St. Thomas I-II, q. 71-89. St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 1-84. Suarez, De peccatis. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. 16. Greg. de Valentia, Commentar. scholast., II, disp. 6. A. Tanner, Theologia schol., II, disp. 4. Billot, Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati personalis (Rome: Typogr. de Prop. Fide, 1897). Schiesl, Der objective Unterschied zwischen Tod- und lasslicher Sunde (Augsburg: Wolff, 1891). Lehmkuhl I, n. 219-256. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit^2 (Munster: Theissing, 1872), II, Von der Sunde, p. 404 ff. Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones dogm. (Freiburg: Herder, 1900), IX, n. 429-556. The same, Theologische Zeitfragen (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), Das Wesen der Todsunde, p. 47 ff. K. Frick, Der objective Unterschied zwischen schwerer und lasslicher Sunde (Zeitschrift fur k. Theolog., 1889), p. 417 ff.
2 St. Thomas I-II, q. 71, a. 6.
3 1 John 3, 4.
4 Rom. 5, 14.
5 Ibid. 5, 19.
287. Conditions required for sin. Therefore three things are necessarily required for every sin: a. an action which is against the law of God, and therefore an evil action; b. advertence of the mind to the malice of the action; and c. consent of the will. For true sin is a human action, which is not had without advertence of the mind and consent of the will.
- Advertence to the malice of the action must be actual; interpretative advertence does not suffice, but imperfect and confused advertence does suffice. For sin is a free transgression of the divine law; but an actual free transgression cannot be had unless advertence is actually made to it in some way.
a. Nevertheless it is not required: a. That advertence last as long as the sinful action lasts, but it suffices that it be present when the evil action is begun. b. Nor is it required that it be clear and distinct, but confused advertence suffices, by which, either indistinctly or by doubting and suspecting, one knows the matter to be evil (n. 46). c. Nor is it required that it be reflex, by which the sinner is conscious to himself of advertence to the malice of the action, but direct advertence suffices, which arises from habitual and ready knowledge of sin. Thus a priest who sins against chastity, or a religious who commits theft at home, is not excused from the sin of sacrilege because he does not reflexly attend to his vow. d. Nor is explicit advertence to the offense of God required, but it is enough that the sinner know the matter to be evil or to be against conscience: for by the very fact that he knows this, he also adverts in some way that the matter is contrary to the will of the supreme legislator, which is manifested to us through the dictate of conscience; but this knowledge suffices for incurring an offense of God.
a. Interpretative advertence is called that which someone could and ought to have had, but in fact did not have from involuntary inconsideration. Therefore the doctrine of certain authors is altogether to be rejected, who judge that even those actions of which in fact there is no advertence can be imputed as fault, provided this advertence could and ought to have been present. Thus they affirm that a hunter is guilty of homicide who, as soon as he perceives something hidden among the bushes, with no investigation first made, invincibly thinking it to be a wild beast, fires and kills a man: for although, they say, he does not advert to the danger of killing a man, nevertheless he could and ought to have adverted to it. They teach that this happens especially when the man, even if adverting, would not have acted otherwise. Therefore they affirm that he sins in himself, not only in the cause, who, having a depraved custom of swearing falsely, from a sudden motion of soul, altogether inadvertently swears falsely.1
- By equal reason an action cannot be sinful unless it is voluntary either in itself or at least in the cause; therefore there cannot be sin without consent of the will.
Therefore he who experiences motions of the flesh or the stimuli of his passions, of anger or concupiscence, without consenting, does not sin, since sense does not harm unless consent is present. From consent of the will, namely, there must be distinguished both temptation, by which someone is allured to sin, and the sense of pleasure, and the natural propensity of the sensitive appetite or of the will toward an evil thing, and finally the deliberation of the mind weighing on either side motives for sinning or not sinning, all of which precede the sinful consent itself. This is taught by the words of Sacred Scripture exhibiting the origin of sin: Each one is tempted, being drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. Then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been consummated, generates death.2
1 The patrons of this sentence are Cajetan and especially the rigorists Concina, Collet, Antoine, etc., whom St. Alphonsus cites and refutes, n. 4.
288. Therefore there is no philosophical sin which is not at the same time theological, i.e. in this order of things there is no morally evil action which is not an offense of God: because it is impossible that a man perfectly using reason be ignorant of God without fault, and in his actions not advert, not even confusedly, to God the supreme legislator.
a. There were those who affirmed that morally evil actions could be given which are against right reason, because they are against the dictate of conscience, but which nevertheless are not offenses of God, because they are not known to be against the law of God, namely in those who either are ignorant of God or, while they sin, do not think of God and his law. Their doctrine was condemned by the Church as erroneous.1
b. Indeed, philosophical sin is called an action which is and is known to be against right reason; theological sin, however, is an action which is and is known to be against the will of God. But he who through the dictate of conscience knows that something is against right reason, by this very fact confusedly and implicitly, yet actually, knows also that it is against the will of God. Therefore there is no action which through the dictate of conscience is known to be against right reason without its at the same time being confusedly known to be against the will of God and thus an offense of God. For in this order of providence it cannot happen that someone invincibly be ignorant of God, or know some action to be morally evil, without at the same time at least confusedly knowing that it is against the law of God, because through conscience the supreme legislator manifests himself to man. Therefore in this order there is no morally evil action which is not an offense of God, which is manifestly gathered from the epistle of St. Paul to the Romans.2
1 This proposition (2) was condemned as erroneous by Alexander VII (August 24, 1690): "Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offense of God nor worthy of eternal punishment ..." By these words there is not proscribed the sentence of those who hypothetically teach that, if someone in fact labored under invincible ignorance of God and, while performing an action which he nevertheless adverts to be unfitting to rational nature, invincibly did not even implicitly think of God, he would not commit an offense of God, because it is impossible for God to be offended unless he is known in some way. Cf. Viva on this proposition.
2 Cf. Rom. 1, 18 ff.; 2, 5 ff.
289. Division of sin. Sin is divided in many ways.
Into original sin, which, committed by Adam's will, is poured into descendants through generation; and personal sin, which is committed by each man's own will.
Into actual sin, which is an action or omission against the law of God; and habitual sin, which is the effect left in the soul from actual sin and is customarily called the state of sin. The divisions which follow pertain to actual sin.
Into sin of commission, which is the placing of a prohibited action against a negative precept, as theft; and of omission, which is the omission of a prescribed action against an affirmative precept, as omission of Mass.
Into external sin, which is committed by word or by some exterior deed, and internal sin, which is committed by the mind and heart alone; whence sins are also distinguished into sins of the heart, which are completed interiorly, of the mouth, which are completed by word, and of work, which are completed by external action.
Therefore by St. Augustine sin is defined as something said, done, or desired against the eternal law of God.1
There are sins which are completed interiorly by the heart alone, as heresy, hatred. These sins are complete in their species, even if they are not manifested exteriorly. There are other sins which are not perfect in their species unless they are consummated exteriorly by work, as sacrilege, theft, homicide, fornication. In these the internal sin, e.g. the purpose of stealing, has itself toward the external as incomplete toward sin complete in its species. In each case the internal and external sin pertain to the same objective species; but they are said to differ from one another in species, entitatively, because the mode of sinning only internally or also externally is essentially diverse and must be distinctly declared in confession.
Into sin against God, which is against virtues whose object is God himself, as blasphemy; against neighbor, which is against virtues which regard neighbor, as theft; against oneself, which is against virtues which moderate one's own passions, as drunkenness and lust.
Into sin of ignorance, which proceeds from culpable ignorance; of infirmity, which proceeds from passion soliciting the will; and of malice, which proceeds from full knowledge, with no passion drawing, and therefore from the perversity of the will alone.
Not only sins of malice, but also of infirmity and ignorance, can be grave sins. As regards the degree of subjective malice, indeed, these three genera of sins differ among themselves; but as regards essence, any one of them can be grave and mortal. And sins of ignorance in a grave matter are grave if the ignorance is gravely culpable; but sins of infirmity in a grave matter are grave, in a light matter light. Experience establishes that a great part of mortal sins are sins of infirmity.
Mortal or grave sin is called that which turns man away from God, the ultimate end, which brings death to the soul because it deprives it of sanctifying grace, which of itself is worthy of eternal punishment. Venial or light sin is called that which does not turn man away from God, which does not bring death to the soul, which merits not eternal punishment but only temporal.
Into material sin, which is an involuntary transgression of law and therefore not imputable as fault; and formal sin, which is a voluntary transgression of law and therefore imputable as fault.
Material sin, or sin taken objectively, is opposed only to law; formal sin, or sin taken subjectively, is opposed to law and conscience. In a twofold way it can happen that sin remains only material: either because the act is not human, as if one fully drunk does an evil thing, or because the act is indeed in itself human, but the agent is ignorant that it is against law, as if someone violates abstinence not knowing it is a day of abstinence.
Into carnal sin, which consists in disordered pleasure of the flesh, as gluttony, drunkenness, lust; and spiritual sin, which consists in disordered pleasure of the mind, as hatred, pride, envy, avarice.2
Into one's own sin, which is the act or omission of the sinner himself, and another's sin, which is the act or omission of another, but nevertheless is imputed to us by reason of scandal, inducement, cooperation.
This distinction is to be explained in such a way that one sin is called one's own only, another another's and one's own at the same time, because the sin which is committed by another becomes one's own for us by reason of scandal, etc.
1 Contra Faustum, l. 22, c. 27.
2 St. Paul does not understand works of the flesh in the same sense, since he also counts idolatry, anger, enmities, etc. among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5, 19 ff.). By the name flesh he rather understands human nature corrupted by original sin and prone to sins. Cf. Gal. 5, 13. 16; 1 Cor. 3, 3.
290. On sin of omission. Sin of omission can be committed by omission of a commanded internal act, as if the precept of eliciting an act of faith or charity is not fulfilled; or by omission of a commanded external act, as if the precept of hearing Mass, giving alms, is not fulfilled. Here the discussion is about external omission.
- The internal sin of an external omission is committed when the cause of the future omission is deliberately desired; the external omission then occurs when the time for fulfilling the precept is at hand.
If someone gives himself over to sleep, so that he foresees that on account of this he will not be able to hear a commanded Mass soon to be celebrated, he commits the internal sin of omission when he gives himself over to sleep; he is guilty of the external omission when the time of hearing Mass occurs, even if then he is not in possession of reason. Hence if, when the time of Mass occurs, he wakes and hears Mass, he is guilty of the internal sin of omission, but by no means of the external omission.
- External omission in the cause of the will has the nature of sin, although it is not actually free, if he who placed the cause has not meanwhile retracted his will; but if he has retracted the will, the external omission is not a sin, but only the effect of a sin.
If someone commits himself to a journey, foreseeing that in this way he cannot hear Mass, and on the journey, before the time at which the precept can no longer be fulfilled, he revokes the evil will, because he would wish to hear Mass if he could, the omission is no longer a sin, because it is no longer voluntary either in itself or in the cause, which he would remove if he could.
- The actions which are done at the time of the commanded act become evil if they are causes of the omission of the commanded act; but they do not become evil if they are not causes of the omission, but have themselves toward it merely concomitantly.
If someone determines to omit the commanded Mass in order to be free for study at home, the study becomes morally evil because it is the voluntary cause of the sinful omission; if someone determines to omit Mass from another undue cause and afterward, lest he be idle at home, is free for study at the time of Mass, the study is not morally evil.
- The malice which an action contracts that is the cause of an omission is not distinct from the omission, but is the malice itself of the omission: for it contracts the malice of that sin of which it itself is the cause.
Therefore if the action which is the cause of the omission is evil in itself, two sins are committed; if it is indifferent or good, one sin is committed. Thus if someone omits Mass in order to read prohibited books, two sins are committed; if he omits Mass in order to occupy himself with licit studies, one sin is committed.