Second Article. On The Norm Of Morality

64. What it is. 1. Actions are called moral, and their objects are called moral. That by which something is and is called moral, in an abstract term, is called morality. Therefore a twofold morality is distinguished: one objective, which belongs to the object of the moral act, or to the act considered objectively; the other subjective, which belongs to the moral acts themselves.

2. Whether an action is moral, and specifically whether it is morally good or evil, depends on its object, so that the action is moral, and morally good or evil, because its object is moral and morally good or evil. Therefore the question is what that is by which the objects of moral actions are constituted moral and specifically morally good or evil. The objects of the will are constituted moral and morally good or evil by some norm, which is called the norm of morality; so that an action which is conformable to this norm is and is called morally good, but one which is difform from it, morally evil. Therefore the morality of moral objects consists in a certain relation to the norm of morality and can be defined: the relation of a moral object to the norm of morality. The norm of morality is twofold: one proximate, the other supreme and ultimate. Therefore the question is what the norm of morality is.

Morality is a generic notion and consists in that property of moral objects by which they have a relation to their norm. But this relation can be twofold, either of conformity or of difformity; therefore two supreme genera of moral objects are distinguished: the morally good and the morally evil.

¹ The question of morality and of the principle or norm of morality easily occupies the chief place in moral philosophy, from which it will be useful to take the principal notions for the plan of moral theology. Cf. Suarez, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum. Schiffini, Philosophia moralis (Augustae Taurinorum: Marietti, 1891), I, n. 57 ff., n. 133. Frins, "Zur Philosophie der Sittlichkeit," Zeitschrift fur kath. Theologie (1886), p. 577 ff. The same, De actibus humanis (Freiburg: Herder, 1904), II, p. 54 ff. Theod. Meyer, Institutiones iuris naturalis, 2nd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1906), I, n. 140 ff. W. Schneider, Gottliche Weltordnung und religionslose Sittlichkeit (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1900), chapters 6 and 7. V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, 4th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1904), I, p. 156 ff.

65. The proximate norm. The proximate norm of morality is rational nature as such, elevated to the supernatural order, so that the good is that which is fitting to rational nature, and evil that which is unfitting to it.

The norm and measure according to which man must direct his actions is: a. human nature, indeed whole, not according to the superior part alone, but insofar as it is rational, that is, insofar as it is the nature of this species, diverse from brutes, human and rational. Hence in order that an action be morally good it is not enough that it be fitting to a nature which is rational, but it is required that it be fitting to nature insofar as it is rational. For it can happen that something is fitting to the nature of man insofar as it is sensitive, which nevertheless is not fitting to it insofar as it is rational. b. Human nature considered not only in itself and according to itself, but in its relations, namely as it is part of the universe created by God (n. 24). c. Human nature as it really exists in the present order of providence, namely elevated to the dignity of divine sonship.

a. The norm according to which the actions of all beings are directed and measured is their nature, and their actions are judged according to this norm: those which are fitting to their nature are called good, those which are unfitting to their nature are called evil; there is no reason, with regard to man, to seek another norm and to judge his actions according to another norm.

b. In the moral order, that is called fitting to rational nature which befits rational nature, or which, when the dignity of rational nature has been considered, is fitting to be sought and loved or rejected (n. 62). Now if it is asked what in particular that is which befits rational nature and is fitting to its dignity, one must say: that which is consonant with its relations (n. 34).

a. The same norm is exhibited in other ways:

a. Some call the norm of morality the moral order, so that the good is that which is, and because it is, consonant with right order; evil is that which is, and because it is, difform from right order. For since human nature considered according to its relations is the norm of morality, and the relations by which human nature is referred to God, to itself, and to other created things constitute the moral order, it comes to the same thing whether human nature or the moral order is called the norm of morality.

b. Others call right reason the norm of morality, so that the good is that which is, and because it is, according to reason; evil is that which is, and because it is, against reason. For since the will in its actions follows the guidance of reason, the dictate of reason is the immediate and proximate norm of the will; but reason takes its judgments from objects, or from the objective order. Therefore the goodness of the will depends upon reason in the way in which it depends upon the object, or upon the moral order.

b. The norm of morality is also called the principle of morality, and this for a twofold reason: because it determines the morality of acts, or constitutes moral acts morally good or evil; and then because it is the criterion from which we know moral acts and acts morally good and evil. Therefore, from what has been explained above, morally good acts are those which are consonant with the nature of man created by God and elevated to the supernatural state according to relation to God, to himself, and to other creatures; but acts which are unfitting to man considered in this way are morally evil.

66. Divisions of morality. 1. By reason of the subject, morality is objective and subjective.

a. Objective morality is that condition of the object (of the moral act) on account of which it deserves that a rational being either embrace it by the will or turn away from it. A twofold objective morality is distinguished: internal, which belongs to the object from itself; and external, which belongs to the object from the precept of a superior.

b. Subjective morality is that condition of the act by which the agent deliberately embraces or turns away from an object which deserves that a rational being embrace it or turn away from it.

a. Subjective morality depends essentially upon objective morality and designates the mode in which a moral act is produced, namely that condition by which it is exercised freely and with knowledge of the moral quality of the object. By this morality a man is constituted morally good or evil.

b. Objective morality is also called material, insofar as it belongs to actions considered objectively in themselves, independently of the agent's apprehension; and subjective morality is also called formal, insofar as it belongs to an action dependently upon the apprehension of the agent. Because the agent is fallible in his knowledge, it can happen that the same action is formally good and materially evil, and conversely it can happen that the same action is formally evil and materially good.

2. By reason of perfection, morality must be distinguished into incomplete and complete: actions obtain the former from mere fittingness with rational nature, the latter also from conformity with the divine will. For in the complete sense, that is called good and evil which is worthy of reward and punishment; but that is worthy of reward or punishment which is conformable to law or difform from it.

a. Once creation has been supposed, God wills, and indeed necessarily wills, that man observe the moral order. This act of the divine will is the eternal law, by which man is held to observe the moral order. Therefore one must say that good is that which is conformable to the divine will or to the eternal law, and that evil is that which is difform from the divine will or from the eternal law.

b. The principle of obligation must be distinguished from the norm of morality. Indeed, it is one thing to ask why a human act is morally good or evil, and another to ask why a human act is morally (positively or negatively) necessary, or to be placed or omitted from obligation. The norm of morality is the moral order constituted by God insofar as He is author of human nature; the principle of obligation is the eternal law, or God insofar as He is supreme legislator. Morality extends much more broadly than obligation: for although a morally evil action is also prohibited, nevertheless there are very many morally good actions which are not commanded. These things are aptly confirmed by the well-known definition of St. Augustine, according to which eternal law is the reason and will of God commanding that the natural (moral) order be preserved and forbidding that it be disturbed.

67. The supreme norm. The supreme norm of morality is the divine essence. The supreme norm of morality is the ultimate reason and foundation of the proximate norm; but the ultimate reason on account of which human nature is such, has this essence and these relations, and on account of which some actions are fitting to it and good, others unfitting to it and evil, is this: because the divine essence is imitable ad extra according to this mode. For the human essence, as created by God, is a finite image of the divine essence, which manifests itself ad extra through created things. Therefore what is good in the moral order is good for this reason, that it is fitting to the divine essence; and what is evil in the moral order is evil for this reason, that it is unfitting to the divine essence. Therefore Christ the Lord admonishes: "Be you therefore perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."¹

¹ Matt. 5:48.

68. There is no morality without God. Morality can be taken in a twofold sense, in a broader and imperfect sense, in which it signifies the moral order, that is, actions which are fitting to the moral order; and in a strict and perfect sense, in which it signifies the moral order, or actions fitting to the order and commanded by immutable law. In both senses it is true that, if abstraction is made from God, morality is not had.

a. Actions fitting to the moral order are moral principles, which are understood to be necessary and immutable; but the foundation of principles of this kind can be nothing except a necessary and immutable being, God, who, just as He is the source of all truth, so also is the source of all moral goodness. Therefore without God moral principles lack a foundation, and therefore they lose their absolute necessity and their immutability.

b. All understand that law or moral obligation contains in itself the absolute necessity of the end and the equal necessity of the means; but only the supreme legislator, God, can constitute for rational beings an end to be obtained by absolute necessity and determine the means to be employed with equal necessity.¹

¹ Cf. Cathrein, Religion und Moral (Freiburg: Herder, 1900). Th. Meyer, Die Grundsatze der Sittlichkeit und des Rechtes (Freiburg: Herder, 1868).