Section — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Section 1. On the Obligations of Children
287. On obligations in general. 1. Children are bound from piety to show parents love, reverence, and obedience. This obligation is founded in the threefold peculiar relation by which children are referred to parents: by reason of origin, which children draw from parents; by reason of dignity, by which parents excel them; and by reason of power, by which the same parents can and ought to educate and direct children.
a. Some children are legitimate, who are born in legitimate marriage from a husband and his wife; others are illegitimate, who are generated outside legitimate marriage. Of illegitimate children, some are natural, who are born from a man and woman between whom marriage could then have been entered, wherefore, marriage having been entered, the children are by that very fact legitimated. Others are spurious, who are born from a man and woman between whom marriage could not have been entered, as those born from adultery, from incest, from sacrilegious fornication; wherefore the spurious cannot be legitimated. Among legitimate children are also numbered legitimated natural children and adoptive children.
b. Between father and son there intervenes both a debt of piety and a debt of justice; hence it happens that violations of justice sometimes constitute two sins. If a son unjustly injures his father in the goods of life, reputation, and honor, he commits a twofold sin, against justice and against piety, because the father, as he is a man, has a right to his own life, reputation, and honor even in relation to son and wife; and the father, as he is a father, has a peculiar right of requiring reverence and obedience from his children (n. 279). The same must be said if, conversely, the father injures the son in the same goods, because the son retains his own right even with respect to the father. But if the son unjustly injures the father in goods of fortune, he does not sin against piety but only against justice (n. 278), and that less than by theft committed against strangers; for the natural conjunction between father and son effects that the goods of the father are in some way also the goods of the son.1
- This obligation is of its kind grave, so that he sins gravely who in a notable matter, and lightly who in a small matter, injures the love, reverence, and obedience due to parents. But more easily it is a grave sin if these offices are injured toward parents than if toward other superiors.
1 Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 4.
288. On the obligation of love. 1. The love of children toward parents ought to be internal, by which they are bound to will good to them, and external, by which they are bound to signify benevolence to them, to do good to them, and to furnish help to them when they are constituted in necessity, whether bodily or spiritual.
a. Therefore children sin gravely against piety who deliberately and in notable matter are carried with indignation or hatred against parents, wish evil to them, treat them harshly, habitually look upon them with grim eyes, converse with them in bitter words, speak ill of them, or gravely sadden them, for example, because they frequent games, neglect study or a trade, return home late, etc.
b. Likewise they sin gravely who do not assist parents in grave bodily or spiritual necessity, as those who do not furnish food to parents in need, do not take care that in danger of death they can receive the sacraments, that when dead they have funeral rites suitable to their condition and to the custom of the place, who do not execute their testaments, and do not pay their debts, whether sacred or not sacred, according to the resources of the inheritance.
- Since the obligation imposed by nature precedes every obligation assumed by one's own will, or an action which is of mere counsel, such as the religious state, it is not licit for a son, when his parents are constituted in extreme or grave necessity, to enter religion, even if by vow he has promised entrance, provided that by remaining in the world he can assist his parents. And if he had entered against the will of his parents, he is bound under grave obligation to depart if the necessity of the parents is extreme, provided that outside religion he can assist them more efficaciously. But if the necessity of the parents is only grave and already existed at the time of entrance, he is likewise bound to seek permission to depart; but if the grave necessity did not yet exist at the time of entrance, he is not indeed bound to depart, but he can justly seek and obtain permission.
a. The reason for the distinction is that in the first case at the time of profession the son was bound by the law of nature to assist his parents. Now this obligation, as prior and natural, is to be preferred to the obligation of the vow, which is posterior and voluntarily assumed. But in the second case the obligation supervened after the change of state; and one is not bound to satisfy a supervening obligation except insofar as it can be done while preserving the state.1
b. A brother is bound from piety to assist a brother or sister in extreme and grave necessity; nevertheless this obligation is not as great as that which exists between parents and children. Therefore one who is professed in religion is indeed bound to depart so that he may assist parents, but he is not bound to depart so that he may assist a brother or sister existing in extreme or grave necessity.
Whether a son is bound from his own goods to pay the debts of a father who left nothing to the son. - A son to whom the father left goods is bound to pay the father's debts as soon as he conveniently can, both from the obligation of love, lest the reputation of the deceased suffer, and from the right of succession, because one succeeding to the goods also succeeds to the burdens. But if the father left nothing to the son, he is not bound, because the obligation of paying debts in this case is personal.
Therefore a son is not bound to return the money which the father had received as a loan, not even if he had received it for paying expenses for the education of the son, because the son by nature has the right of receiving education, and therefore its expenses are to be demanded from the father, not from the son.
1 Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 41, n. 34.
289. On the obligation of obedience. 1. Children are bound of themselves under grave obligation to obey parents in all things which are honest and licit and pertain to their care, as long as they are under their power, provided they command expressly and seriously: "Children, obey your parents in all things," namely those things which pertain to their care; "for this is pleasing in the Lord."1 And indeed, parents are bound to instruct and educate children; therefore in turn children are bound to listen to parents.
a. The obligation of obedience lasts as long as children are under paternal power; but it ceases when they are emancipated from paternal power or become of age. On the contrary, the obligation of love and reverence never ceases.
alpha. A son of the family becomes major or of age at the time determined by civil law. Nearly all modern laws declare children of either sex majors after the twenty-first year of age has been completed.2 If an adult son remains in the paternal house, the obligation of obedience toward the head of the family does not cease in those things which are necessary for domestic order.
beta. An emancipated son is one who has been released from paternal power. Civil law governs emancipation, so that according to some laws a son is emancipated by the very fact that he has attained the legitimate age, but according to other laws he is emancipated only when he himself wills it.
b. Sacred Scripture indicates in many places that this obligation is of itself grave;3 yet in order that a grave sin of disobedience be committed, it is required that parents command seriously, not merely by warning, exhorting, or directing show their will, and that they command in a grave matter pertaining to their care.
alpha. What matter is to be judged grave must be defined by prudent judgment, after account has been taken of the end which parental power has, which is the good of the son himself and the good of the family. Hence generally that matter will be grave by whose omission parents, domestic order, or the temporal or spiritual good of the son himself will suffer grave detriment, as to avoid evil companionships, gambling games, suspect houses, etc.4
beta. In practice the disobedience of children, even in a grave matter, will not rarely be excused from mortal sin both on account of defect of a strict precept on the part of parents, and on account of defect of advertence to the gravity of the malice on the part of children.
gamma. Where the matter concerns a precept which refers to several successive acts, for example, that they not approach a tavern, that they not return home too late, etc., grave sin, contempt being excluded, is not committed unless the precept is violated rather often.5
c. The object concerning which parents can justly command comprehends all those things which pertain to their care; but this care extends to three things: alpha. to the salvation of the soul; beta. to good morals; gamma. to the governance of the family, both in temporal and in spiritual matters.
Hence children can sin gravely against obedience due to parents: alpha. if against the express precept of parents they do not assist at Mass on feast days, and for a notable time do not receive the sacraments; beta. if they frequent the tavern or theaters, give themselves to harmful games, go out at night, do not avoid dangerous conversations; gamma. if they neglect to devote themselves to studies or to learn a trade, if they do not execute a work of great importance enjoined upon them.
1 Col. 3:20.
2 The German civil code, Section 2, and the Austrian civil code, Section 21, declare children of the family majors only after the twenty-fourth year has been completed. From canon law a son is major who has completed the twenty-fifth year of age.
3 Ecclus. 3:9 ss.; Deut. 27:16; Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2.
4 Genicot, I, n. 318.
5 Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 821; Elbel-Bierbaum, I, tr. 3, n. 555.
290. 2. But in other matters, especially in choosing a state of life, whether matrimonial, clerical, or religious, children are free by the law of nature. They are indeed ordinarily bound under grave obligation to consult parents both about entering marriage and about choosing a certain person; but of themselves they are not bound to follow their counsel. Hence to reject just and prudent counsel does not exceed a venial sin, unless the matter concerns obtaining an end of great importance, for example, extinguishing hatreds or relieving the necessity of parents.
But concerning a clerical or religious vocation, it will be better not to seek the counsel of parents when the necessary knowledge of these matters seems to be lacking to them; but, once the choice has been made, it suffices to seek their consent. If they deny it, God calling is to be obeyed more than resisting parents. Indeed, if it is foreseen that parents will unjustly impede the matter, children can embrace the state without the parents' knowledge.
Therefore parents sin gravely if they compel children to enter religion or to enter marriage without a just reason; and in equal manner they sin gravely if they impede children without just cause from entrance into religion or from contracting marriage: for it is a grave injury to deprive someone of the liberty which the author of nature has given to each concerning the state of life. The gravity of the sin increases if parents impede a son from contracting marriage either entirely or for a time, because marriage was instituted also as a remedy for concupiscence; for by this manner of acting parents can be the occasion of many sins which are committed by children. Yet if parents are in grave necessity, they rightly require that they be helped by their children as long as the necessity lasts.
291. On the obligation of reverence. The reverence which children owe to parents requires that interiorly they acknowledge their dignity and exteriorly profess it by words, signs, and deeds.
a. Hence children can sin gravely against the reverence due to parents by words, if they call them by contumelious names or seriously curse them; by signs, if they despise them, mock them, are so ashamed of them that they pretend they do not know them; by deeds, if they strike them, even only lightly, or if they only raise the hand as a sign of striking them, if they accuse them in court, even concerning a true crime, except for the cause of the public good. Children by striking parents sin not only against piety, but also against justice; and although the deeds are only lightly opposed to justice, nevertheless they gravely injure reverence.
b. St. Alphonsus notes (n. 334) that a son is excused from mortal sin who, for a just cause and without internal contempt, pretends that he does not know his parents or refuses to have them with him, for example, because they are marked by an infamous crime or because he himself would suffer grave damage from it, provided that he furnishes them necessities; because in such a case the parents themselves are not judged gravely or reasonably unwilling. And in like manner, at least from grave sin, children are excused who restrain by words or deeds parents lacking the use of reason on account of old age, drunkenness, etc., without contempt or malice.
c. Children who have sinned against the reverence due to parents properly and strictly ought to restore wounded honor by petition for pardon; yet if this has not been done before confession, it can and ought indeed to be advised that it be done afterward, but it must never be strictly enjoined or imposed as penance, lest children who do this with difficulty be exposed to the danger of sinning again. For deservedly it can be presumed that parents remit this obligation to children precisely lest they sin again.
292. On illegitimate children. 1. Parents do not enjoy paternal power over illegitimate children, nor do illegitimate children enjoy the same rights as legitimate children, unless they have been legitimated, since they have been brought into human society through wrong, that is, injury.
Illegitimate children do not pertain to the family of the father, but rather to the family of the mother, whose name also they receive; nevertheless they do not enjoy the rights of children of the family. Therefore by civil law a guardian (Vormund) must be constituted for them.
The obligations of parents extend also to illegitimate children; and in equal manner illegitimate children are bound to show parents love and obedience which the end of education requires, because in each case the foundation of obligation is the same, namely natural generation.
a. By natural right both parents are bound in an equal manner to support illegitimate offspring; yet recent codes primarily enjoin the obligation of support upon the father, and only if he fails, upon the mother, with the exception of the French code, which imposes this burden upon the mother alone. This disposition of law, after the sentence of a judge, is to be obeyed in conscience.
b. According to the civil codes, parents, or the father, are bound to provide for illegitimate children concerning an education consonant with the condition of the parents, or of the mother, although by the law of nature they seem to satisfy their obligation if they procure for them the education necessary and suitable to a man.1
1 Austrian civil code, Sections 165-171; German civil code, Sections 1705-1718.