Third Question. On Acts Morally Good

87. Which they are. In order that a human act be morally good, a twofold condition is required:

1. That it be explicitly sought as good: for an act of the will cannot be morally good except from the moral goodness of the object, which is explicitly sought by the will as such.

2. That it be referred to God at least objectively: for since God is the first principle and ultimate end of all things, reason demands that all our works be referred to God.

a. Besides the threefold subjective intention, actual, virtual, and habitual (n. 42, 6), there is another relation of actions to God, which is called objective or natural. An action is referred to God objectively, naturally, or implicitly, by the fact that the action is referred to God, not by some intention elicited by the one operating, but by its very nature. For every good work by its own nature is fitting to the moral order; but since God is the author and end of the moral order and has willed that it be observed, one who deliberately acts according to this order implicitly regards God and places an action ordered to God and conformable to the divine will. Now it is asked how an act must be referred to God in order that it be good. Concerning this matter there are diverse opinions of theologians.²

b. There are some who teach that all acts which are not concerned with God Himself, the ultimate end, must be referred to God through the virtual intention of the one operating in order that they be good.

Their argument is this: by a positive precept we are obliged to refer all our actions to God, for the Apostle says: Whether you eat, or drink, or do anything else, do all things for the glory of God.³

a. St. Alphonsus seems to be of this opinion, who (l. 5, n. 44) teaches that indeed an actual relation of all works to God is not required, but nevertheless a virtual one is. "Hence," he says, "it is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer all one's acts to God, so that the precept of the Apostle may thus be fulfilled, at least by a virtual intention of doing all things for the glory of God."

b. Besides the Jansenists, the theologians who are called Augustinians (Noris, Berti, and others) thought that every act good from its object, in order that it be truly good, must be referred explicitly to God from the motive of charity. They came to this opinion from several testimonies of St. Augustine wrongly understood, and they thought it was confirmed from Sacred Scripture (by the texts just cited). They said that the omission of this relation was a venial sin.

It cannot be understood why, from the nature of the thing, another relation of the same action to the ultimate end would be required for honesty than the implicit and natural relation. And indeed, since God is the absolutely ultimate end, every moral action must tend toward God the ultimate end; but a moral action, by the very fact that it is morally good, tends toward God, and the one operating exercises an action tending by its nature toward God. Therefore, if another and more perfect relation were required, this would be necessary from the positive will of God. Therefore, in fact, the patrons of this opinion appeal to the precept of God promulgated through the Apostle. But no divine precept exists by which we are obliged to refer our actions to God by a positive intention. For the words of the Apostle related above are explained by some, with St. Bonaventure and his school, not of a precept but of a counsel; but if nevertheless, as St. Thomas with his followers thinks, they contain a precept, they do not oblige to anything else except that all works be referred to God implicitly and objectively. And indeed those words cannot contain a universal precept which affects absolutely all men; for if all actions, in order to be morally good, had to be referred to the ultimate end by the intention of the one operating, it would follow that all works of unbelievers are sins from defect of due relation, which is false.⁴

Nor do those words contain a particular precept which obliges only the faithful; for besides the fact that an intolerable yoke would be imposed upon the faithful by a precept of this kind, this doctrine is contrary to the sense and practice of the faithful. For all the faithful, even the pious and timorous, judge that they do a good work if from mercy they give alms to a poor man, even if they do not think about a further end.⁵

Finally, if these words contained a precept of explicitly referring all things to God, we would not be held only to refer all works to God in whatever way, but we would be held to this from the motive of charity. For to seek the glory of God by one's acts pertains to charity; indeed it is even the most perfect intention which man can elicit, since it is the intention which God Himself pursues in His works ad extra, and the intention according to which Christ the Lord offered His life here on earth to God the Father. But it is false that all works are to be referred to God from the motive of charity; for it would follow that every action which is not done from the motive of charity is a sin, which no sane person affirms.

In fact, by these words the Apostle concludes a discourse expounding the precept that in no way by our operation should we scandalize our neighbors, but rather edify them; and therefore from the context the words objected contain the precept that our external operations, especially indifferent ones (to eat, to drink, and things of this kind), should edify the neighbor and in this way redound to the glory of God. Concerning the motive from which those operations are done, since it is internal and hidden from others, there is no discussion in these words.⁶

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 103 ff. Walsch, l.c., n. 675 ff. Frins II, n. 290 ff. Ernst, Uber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung (Freiburg: Herder, 1905).

² Since the relation of works to God is made through a good intention, here is solved the question whether a good intention is required, and what kind, in order that our works be good.

³ 1 Cor. 10:31. Cf. also 1 Cor. 16:14; Col. 3:17; 1 Pet. 4:10-11.

⁴ Cf. Baian proposition 25: "All works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices"; likewise propositions 36 and 37.

⁵ Cf. proposition 9 of Alexander VIII: "He truly sins who has hatred for sin merely because of its turpitude and unfittingness with nature, without any respect to God offended." Therefore he neither sins nor performs an evil act who, from the motive of natural honesty without a further relation to God, elicits an act of sorrow for his sins.

⁶ Cornely, Commentarius in s. Pauli ep. 1. ad Cor. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1890).

88. If there is question of acts indifferent in themselves, it is required that they be moderated at least according to the prescriptions of reason and that they be apprehended and sought as such, even if the will explicitly intends not the honorable good but delight or advantage.

a. One who plays in order to recreate himself and understands this action, all its adjuncts considered (of person, place, time, duration, etc.), to agree with the prescriptions of reason, and intends it as such, acts well. Theologians of every school hold this opinion, especially St. Thomas and his genuine disciples, who think that the acts which most Scotists call indifferent are morally good. Today this opinion has become almost common among theologians.¹

b. Ordinarily men judge some action to be exact according to reason by the fact that they apprehend it as not illicit.

a. Others teach that all actions, especially indifferent ones, in order that they be morally good, must be referred positively to an honorable end, that is, the reason which moves and determines the will to acting must be a positively honorable good or the motive of some virtue; nor does it suffice that it be either delight or advantage of nature.

In order that actions by which a man consults his own health or preserves life through food be morally good, the will must seek them because, for example, God thus commands, or because they sustain life. The bestowal of alms by which someone intends to relieve the need of the poor is a morally good work because it is done from a positively honorable motive, namely from the motive of the virtue of mercy.

Of this opinion, besides the Augustinians, are many theologians of every school, not only Thomists, but especially Scotists, who, admitting acts indifferent in the individual, require this for acts to be morally good: that they be explicitly ordered to an honorable end.

b. Their argument is this: man always and in all things is held to operate as man, or as a rational being. For God cannot permit that man, acting deliberately or as a rational being, should operate in a mode which does not befit the dignity of rational nature. But an operation which is not positively referred to an honorable end is not worthy of man; for the end proper to rational nature is a positively honorable end. Therefore one who by his actions seeks advantage or delight, and does not positively intend a further end, acts after the manner of brutes and does not place a morally good action.

c. Refutation. But neither does this opinion seem to be admitted. For although the end proper to rational nature is called the honorable good, nevertheless it can be shown by no argument that man is held always and in all things to intend that end positively in order that he act well. For it suffices that he intend it negatively, that is, that he apprehend himself to do nothing which is contrary to the honorable end; by this very fact he also implicitly intends the positively honorable end. Besides this, this opinion also seems to be contrary to the sense and practice of the faithful, as will soon be explained.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 112-129; VI, n. 239. Genicot I, n. 39. Pesch III, 673. Lest anyone think this doctrine foreign to the mind of the ancient theologians, let him compare these testimonies. "The act of political virtue (to speak to someone from a certain civil friendship - an indifferent act from an indifferent end) is not an indifferent act, but is good in itself, and if it is informed by grace, it will be meritorious." St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5. "In two ways man can operate for relieving a necessity of nature or even for an advantage of the body: first, by considering human nature only as animal; in another way, by considering it also as rational, which happens when, for operating on account of an advantage of nature, man applies the rule of reason and judges that advantage to be fitting to himself also as regulated by reason. Therefore the former mode does not suffice for the honesty of the action. But if he operates in the second mode, this is enough for the honesty of the action." Suarez, in I-II, tr. 33, disp. 9, sect. 3, n. 9. "We are accustomed to call recreation honest, games honest, etc., insofar as in their delightfulness, which is the reason of willing and the formal object of such acts, the measure prescribed by reason is preserved, and on account of this measure preserved they are named honest." Mastrius, l. 1, disp. 5, q. 4, a. 4, n. 196.

89. Arguments for the proposed opinion. a. An action is morally good which is good from object, end, and circumstances; but an action which is ordered according to reason is of this sort. Certainly an object which, considered abstractly, is indifferent, but in the concrete, all circumstances considered, is ordered according to reason, must be called morally good. Likewise an end which, considered abstractly, is indifferent (delight), but in the concrete, with account taken of the circumstances, is ordered according to reason, must be called morally good, because it is conformable to reason. It is always indeed required that man in his deliberate actions operate as man and as befits rational nature; but one who in some action intends delight or advantage of nature, yet one tempered according to the norm of reason, does not act after the manner of brutes, but as a rational being, namely deliberately and according to the prescription of reason.

b. An act by which moral virtue is exercised is a morally good act: "the honorable," says St. Thomas, "is properly referred to the same thing as virtue."¹ But there are acts whose object and end are indifferent in themselves, and which are constituted acts of virtues by this alone, that the use of things, which is undertaken for advantage and delight, is in every respect tempered according to the norm of reason; of this kind is the virtue of temperance.²

c. This opinion agrees with the mind and practice of the faithful, even the timorous. For no one, however pious he may be, judges that he has committed sin if he moderately uses the advantages and delights of nature according to the prescription of reason, and is not solicitous about a further honorable end. Therefore the faithful nowhere accuse themselves of actions of this kind as though they had performed an evil action; and this practice of the faithful agrees very well with the mind of the holy Fathers.³

Note. Nevertheless all concede that this moral goodness of actions is the lowest, and that it can be increased and perfected through an intention by which actions are explicitly ordered to a higher honorable end and therefore to the ultimate end. For the goodness of actions grows so much the more, the higher and nobler is the end which is positively intended by the agent, and the more this intention is explicit and actual.

¹ Summa II-II, q. 145, a. 1.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 6. Cf. also I-II, q. 64, a. 1.

³ Cf. St. Augustine, In Ps. 34, serm. 2, n. 16; In Ps. 164, n. 2.

90. Difficulties. Against this doctrine a twofold difficulty arises. One is from Sacred Scripture, by which idle words, and by equal reason idle actions, are reproved;¹ but idle words are said to be those which do not have an honorable end. The other difficulty arises from propositions 8 and 9 condemned by Innocent XI, from which it is clear that to use delights for pleasure alone is sin;² but one who in delightful actions does not intend a further end acts for pleasure alone.

a. An idle word is called not indeed a shameful or lying word, but neither is it a word which is not directed by the intention of the speaker to a higher honorable end. Rather an idle word is a word which, without reason of necessity or utility, is uttered from mere buffoonery or talkativeness; but a word of this kind, as uttered against the prescription of reason, is evil.³

b. He is said to act for pleasure alone, not who in the use of delights does not intend a further honorable end, but who seeks delightful actions as long as they bring pleasure, without respect to the prescriptions of reason dictating and requiring mode and measure, lest the use of delights impede goods of a higher order. Therefore one who acts for pleasure alone not only does not intend a higher end, but also implicitly excludes and impedes it (n. 74).

Therefore to act for pleasure alone in such a way that a further honorable end, and therefore the ultimate end, is impeded, is sin. But to act for pleasure alone in such a way that delight moves one to acting and is intended, without being directed to a further honorable end, is not sin, provided that the delightful action is known truly to serve nature and that in its use the mode prescribed by reason is observed.

¹ Matt. 12:36.

² Proposition 8: "To eat and drink unto satiety for pleasure alone is not sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts." Proposition 9: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without fault and venial defect." These propositions are false under multiple heads.

³ Cf. Knabenbauer, Commentarius in evangelium s. Matthaei (Paris: Lethielleux, 1892), I, p. 496 f.

91. On the use of delights.¹ a. Delightful goods (Genussmittel, Genussguter) are called those whose use brings delight. Delight is the rest or complacency of the appetite in a present or possessed good. Since there is a twofold appetite, there are also two genera of delightful goods: spiritual and sensible. Although delight is perceived also from the use of spiritual things, nevertheless the discussion here is chiefly of the delights of the lower appetite from the use of sensible things.

b. Sensible delightful goods are of two kinds: necessary, which are required for conserving life or the species and to which delight is annexed, as food and drink; and non-necessary, which serve only for bringing delight, as liquors, odors, spices, tobacco, etc. These are either taken alone or sprinkled upon things necessary for life in order to increase their delight. Concerning delightful things a twofold question is instituted: a. whether their use is licit; b. whether delight itself can licitly be sought.

1. Each person can licitly procure for himself delights which are not harmful, provided that their use is directed by the law of reason so as to be honorable and morally good; nevertheless abstinence from them is to be commended as an exercise of virtue.

a. All created things are good and were created by the author of nature for this reason, that we might use them to obtain our honorable ends. This especially holds concerning things which serve for conserving life and the species: "For all things are yours";² therefore their use is not only not prohibited but entirely licit.

b. After the fall the appetite is borne toward delights independently of the norm of honesty, namely even toward those which are illicit and inordinately toward those which are licit. Therefore in their use it must be ruled by reason, so that its acts may be morally good.

c. For a twofold reason abstinence from delightful things, even licit ones, is to be commended: to strengthen the will, so that it may abstain from them so much the more certainly and easily when their use is illicit; and to exercise virtue according to the example of Christ the Lord, who, though He was rich, for our sake became poor,³ and completely renounced non-necessary delights.

2. The act of the will by which delight itself or a delightful thing is sought on account of delight is licit and morally good, provided that the object is licit and the appetite for delight is moderated according to the rules of right reason. Therefore one who uses the delights of nature, such as conversing, eating, drinking, playing, recreating himself, etc., because they please, is far from acting badly; rather, he acts well, if in these things he observes the mode and measure prescribed by reason.

a. There are theologians (for example Billuart with other Thomists) who contend that acts which are done from delight, of whatever sort this may be, are all morally evil: for since to act on account of delight is not fitting to a rational being, they think every deliberately sought delight is morally evil. Others (as Viva)⁴, distinguishing between animal delights, such as delights of touch and taste, and superior delights, though sensible, such as delights of sight and hearing, teach that the former can never under any condition be licitly sought for their own sake, because they are not of themselves worthy of rational man; but that the latter can licitly be sought for their own sake, provided they are sought with moderation, because they serve intellectual knowledge and do not so depress man to the condition of brutes.

b. To actions which contribute to conserving and perfecting nature, the author of nature has for this reason given advantage and delightfulness, that men might be drawn from this to exercising them. Therefore man can will advantage and delights. Now if in those actions he perceived and sought nothing other than advantage of nature and pleasure, the action would indeed be fitting to animal nature, but would not be worthy of rational nature. But by the fact that he prescribes in every respect, to the advantages and delights which he seeks, the mode and measure which right reason demands (with regard to adjuncts of time, place, duration, etc.), he acts as a rational being. Nor can it be understood what would be lacking to actions of this kind so that they cannot be called right and worthy of man. For the nature of man, since he is a rational animal, is not rational only, but animal and rational; therefore he can positively seek and pursue those things which are fitting to his animal nature. But by the fact that these are exercised under the guidance and dominion of reason, they also sufficiently befit rational nature.

¹ Cf. I. B. Becker, "Die moralische Beurteilung des Handelns aus Lust," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie (1902), pp. 448, 673. Frins II, n. 198 ff.

² 1 Cor. 3:22.

³ 2 Cor. 8:9.

⁴ Damnatae theses, on propositions 8 and 9 condemned by Innocent XI, nn. 6, 9, 13.

92. On omissions. It is asked whether omissions of a good work not commanded are sins. An omission of a good work cannot take place without the pursuit of some good; now, according as this good is honorable or dishonorable, the omission will be sinful or not sinful.

In order that this may be explained better, it must be noted that omissions of a good work can occur in a twofold way: either in place of a more perfect work a less perfect work is chosen, or the good work is simply omitted.

a. If in place of a more perfect action another less perfect action is chosen which itself is honorable, the omission is far from a sin; rather, it is a good act, although of lesser perfection than the omitted action. If, for example, to a young man there offers itself an occasion of hearing Mass (not commanded) and at the same time of taking a walk, and, the more perfect work omitted, he chooses the less perfect walk, by the omission of Mass he in no way sins.

b. If the good work is simply omitted, or excluded by an act of nilling, without another work being chosen in its place, it depends upon the motive on account of which the more perfect work is omitted whether the omission is sin or not. For since no one can will against the good insofar as it is good, one who omits a good work omits it for this reason, that he perceives in it some evil which he intends to flee; but we flee evil from love of the opposite good. Now if the love of the opposite good is honorable, the omission will be a morally good act; if it is dishonorable, the omission will be sin. If, for example, when an occasion of hearing Mass is offered, a young man apprehends that indeed no impediment is present for going to church, but also that no obligation urges, and omits it, he decides to omit Mass for this reason, that he apprehends in it an evil, for example inconvenience, which he intends to flee. Now if the motive on account of which he tries to avoid the inconvenience is reasonable, the omission is not sin; but if the motive is, for example, spiritual sloth or disdain of the good, the omission is sin.¹

¹ Cf. Pesch III, n. 675. Lehmkuhl I, n. 40.