Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Article IV. On the Object (Matter) of Law
Proposition. Human law can command external acts and, in the manner soon to be explained, internal acts, which are not opposed to a higher law, which pertain to the competence of the legislator, which are morally possible, and which are necessary or very useful for the common good. I said:
I. External acts. That these can be imposed follows from the fact that human legislative power is ordered at least to the external or public prosperity, peace, and uprightness of the community. Nor are hidden external acts excluded from legislative power, since these also can conduce to the end described; that the superior cannot judge concerning them is accidental (St. Alphonsus, I, 100).
II. Internal acts, of which sort are, for example, acts of faith, meditation, etc. Human power can command these as follows:
Human power can command internal acts indirectly, that is, in order to an external act, either because they are required for the moral substance of the external act, or because acts of this sort are or become the complement of it. Furthermore, among acts required for the moral substance of an external act, some are necessarily required for the moral substance of every external act, such as the will of placing it; others are necessary for the moral substance of a particular external act. Considering this, for example, in contracts consent and the will to bind oneself are commanded indirectly; in oaths, the will of swearing; in the administration of the Sacraments, the intention of administering them; in the reception of the Sacraments, the intention of receiving them and a worthy reception; in prayer, the intention of worshiping God, etc. (St. Alphonsus, I, 100, q. 2). The application of a Mass can be considered, for example, as the complement of an external act.
As regards the power of directly imposing internal acts, it is certain that this does not belong to the civil state; for the civil state can obtain its end, which is prosperity and public uprightness, without power of this sort.
It is disputed whether the Church can directly command internal acts.1 Many, especially more recent authors, affirm this; but with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 91, a. 4; II-II, q. 104, a. 5) and St. Alphonsus (I, 100), it seems it must be denied.
For, first, ecclesiastical authority enjoys legislative power because the Church is a society. But power resting on this title does not extend itself to acts which by their nature escape social or external life, of which sort internal acts are. Hence the words of Christ, "Whatever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven,"2 so far as concerns the legislative power proper to the Church, ought not be extended to acts of this sort. Next, "man can make a law about those things about which he can judge; but the judgment of man cannot be about interior acts which lie hidden" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). Hence Innocent III says: "It has been given to us to judge only concerning manifest things."3 Finally, the Church, as it seems, has never used power of this sort. Some more recent authors indeed think that the Church sometimes directly prescribes internal acts, for example, the application of a Mass, the meditation on the Most Holy One to be made by the celebrant after receiving the Body,4 etc. But it can be answered that the aforesaid acts are not imposed directly but indirectly, namely, in order to an external act, in this case to the Sacrifice, the regulation of which has been entrusted to the Church. Besides St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus, Suarez,5 De Lugo,6 Billuart,7 Benedict XIV,8 and many more recent authors adhere to this opinion.
Objection 1. The Church can by law impose whatever conduces to her end, that is, to the salvation of souls. But internal acts also conduce to the salvation of souls.
Response. I deny the major: for, as has been said, the Church can make laws only because she is a society. But power resting on this title does not extend itself to those things which by their nature escape social life, even though of themselves they conduce to the salvation of souls.
Others briefly state the proposed doctrine thus: human power can prescribe external acts; likewise mixed acts, but not merely internal acts.
Note. The controversy concerning internal acts regards the Church's proper jurisdiction, but not her vicarious jurisdiction, that is, the jurisdiction which she exercises in the name of Christ. By force of this jurisdiction she can impose even internal acts, for example, assent to definitions. For the same reason, a confessor can enjoin an internal act upon a penitent as satisfaction. Moreover, it is clear that the Church can constitute an internal act as a condition without which, for example, an indulgence or some other favor will not be obtained. Finally, regular prelates, by force of dominative power arising from the vow of obedience, can command even merely internal acts to a subject, provided, however, that the vow emitted in the Order is so understood.
III. Not opposed to a higher law, namely, neither to divine law nor, for example if there is question of civil law, to ecclesiastical law. To this pertains proposition 56 of the Syllabus: "The laws of morals by no means need divine sanction, and it is by no means necessary that human laws be conformed to the right of nature or receive binding force from God";9 and the 57th: "Civil laws can and ought to depart from divine and ecclesiastical authority."10 Hence laws are invalid, for example, which dissolve marriage, or impede the preaching of the Gospel, or enroll clerics in military service.
IV. Pertain to the competence of the legislator; concerning this, observe:
- To the competence of the Church belong:
a) Things spiritual by their nature, of which sort are, for example, evangelical preaching and the administration of the Sacraments. Likewise things which are indeed partly temporal, but in such a way that the temporal cannot be separated from the spiritual, such as ecclesiastical benefices. That the aforesaid things pertain to the Church is clear from the doctrine of the Church herself.11
b) Ecclesiastical goods. Nevertheless, if the safety of the commonwealth manifestly demanded it, which could have place in time of war, and there were danger in delay, nor did a relatively grave spiritual harm stand in the way, the State could dispose of them by presumed permission. But if circumstances are not urgent, the matter should be settled amicably with ecclesiastical authority. Apply the same to the revenues of benefices.
c) Mixed things12 as regards the spiritual element. Thus, for example, marriage as regards validity, impediments, and inseparable effects pertains to the Church;13 likewise education as regards religious and moral instruction.14
d) Mixed things as regards the temporal element, and temporal things,15 when they, that is, the temporal element and temporal things, are required for the spiritual end. The reason is that the end of temporal things, which is also temporal, must in a conflict yield to the higher spiritual end, to which the Church has the right of directing human beings. Moreover, note proposition 24 condemned in the Syllabus: "The Church does not have the power of inflicting force, nor any temporal power, direct or indirect."16 Therefore the contradictory proposition is true, that is: the Church has the power of inflicting force, and some temporal power.17 The practice of the Church, which proves the same thing, is added.18
The aforesaid power is called indirect, insofar as it does not arise from the Church's power over the natural end of temporal things, but from her power of leading human beings to the supernatural end. Nevertheless, it can scarcely be accurately defined how far that power is to be pressed, or how far it extends itself.
The Church lacks direct power over temporal things, as Pius IX,19 Leo XIII,20 and Pius X21 teach, among others.
Concerning the doctrine of St. Thomas on the power of the Church over temporal things, cf. II Sent., dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3; IV Sent., dist. 37, q. 2, a. 2; II-II, q. 10, a. 10; II-II, q. 12, a. 2; II-II, q. 40, a. 2, ad 3; II-II, q. 60, a. 6, ad 3.
Corollary. Ecclesiastical superiors, if they use indirect power, are to be obeyed, even in doubt whether they exceed the scope of indirect power.
- To the competence of the civil power belong:
a) Mixed things as regards the temporal element, except the case in which the temporal element is required for the spiritual end.
b) Temporal things, with the case assigned under a) again excepted. Public uprightness also is reduced to temporal things, insofar as it is a good of the natural order; and the civil power ought to protect and promote public uprightness, because this imports a certain common good which individual families cannot attain.
V. Morally possible. Otherwise the law would be observed only by a few, and therefore would tend toward evil rather than toward the common good.22 Nevertheless, even human power can impose very difficult or even heroic acts by law or precept: 1. when necessity of the common good urges. Hence soldiers are rightly ordered to fight with danger to life; hence a bishop can command priests, even non-pastors, and a magistrate can command physicians, not to depart during a time of contagious disease. Nevertheless, when the case occurs, generally the natural law itself will impose the heroic act; for that law prescribes that private good be set after the common good. 2. Very difficult or even heroic acts can be imposed when the hypothesis is supposed of a state freely assumed. Thus the Church binds those initiated into Sacred Orders to celibacy, and religious Superiors can command subjects those things which pertain to the observance of their state or rule.
VI. Necessary or at least very useful for the common good. It is required that a law yield to the common good, because legislative power has been granted for the good of the community. It is required that it be necessary or very useful for the common good, because otherwise a proportionate cause for restricting the liberty and rights of subjects is lacking, and all the more because Authority of itself is bound to protect rather than restrict the rights of subjects.
Note. A law does not affect past acts, neither as regards fault, as is clear, nor as regards invalidation and penalty,23 unless this is expressly signified (can. 10). Hence the saying: the law does not look backward. Moreover, as regards penalty, it is required that it be ordinary; for an extraordinary penalty has no proportion with an act which was placed at a time when the penalty could not have been foreseen. A comprehensive declaration declares that past acts were affected by an earlier law, but it does not itself affect them.
1 Thus, for example, Sylvius, Comm. in S. Theol., I-II, q. 91, a. 4; Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. Theol., I, De legibus, n. 332; Noldin, Theol. mor. de legibus, n. 314; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund., n. 114; Forstmann, Theol. Mor. Gen., n. 81, and others.
2 Matt. 16:19.
3 Cap. 34 X, De simonia, V, 3.
4 Ritus celebrandi Missam, X, 4.
5 De legibus, bk. IV, cc. 12-13.
6 De virtute fidei divinae, disp. 23, sect. 1, nn. 6, 10.
7 De legibus, diss. 4, a. 1.
8 De Synodo Dioecesana, bk. 9, c. 4, n. 4.
9 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1756.
10 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1757.
11 Alexander VIII, Inter multiplices, August 4, 1690; Clement XI, Nova semper, November 29, 1714; Accepimus nuper, January 11, 1715; Alias ad apostolatus, October 23, 1711; Pius VI, Auctorem fidei, August 20, 1794; Leo XIII, Sapientiae christianae, January 10, 1890; Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885; Libertas, June 20, 1888; Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.
12 Those things are called mixed which tend directly both to a spiritual end and to a temporal end, so that in them there are two elements which are so joined that they have a different juridical status.
13 Council of Trent, sess. 24, De reformatione matrimonii, canon 12; Pius VI, Auctorem fidei, August 28, 1794; Leo XIII, Arcanum, February 10, 1880.
14 Council of Trent, sess. 12, c. 8†; sess. 23, c. 4, canon 7; Pius IX, Tuas libenter to the Archbishop of Munich, December 21, 1863.
15 Those things are called temporal which tend directly to the temporal end alone, such as agriculture, commerce, etc.
16 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1724.
17 May 15, 1931.
18 Cf. Bouix, De Papa, t. III, p. 4, sect. 3.
19 Encyclical Quartus supra, January 6, 1873.
20 Encyclicals Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885; Diuturnum illud, June 29, 1881; Sapientiae christianae, January 10, 1889; Libertas, June 20, 1880.
21 Acta Pii X, t. III, p. 213.
22 "In this there is a great difference between God and man, that God can command some things impossible to nature, because He can make them possible through grace, which He does not deny, as far as concerns Himself, insofar as it is necessary for the observation of precepts; and therefore the precept of God is always about a possible thing" (Suarez, bk. 1, c. 9, n. 16).
23 Civil laws agree.