Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
III. On Legal Succession or Succession Ab Intestato
I. When the owner of goods has died without a legitimate testament, de facto those can be heirs whom civil law assigns.
II. Who come in the first place, who in the second, etc., likewise learn from the law of one's country; likewise in what manner and in what order blood-relatives are called to the inheritance; likewise what the law is in a case in which, with or without legitimate heirs, illegitimate persons are present; likewise how succession is made to illegitimate persons; likewise what part falls to each. Moreover, observe:
- As regards the manner in which blood-relatives are called to an inheritance, note that they can be called per capita, per stirpes, or per lines.
a) Succession is made per capita when several heirs, distant from the deceased by an equal degree, divide the inheritance equally among themselves.
b) Succession is made per stirpes when one or another of the heirs is dead, and his descendants are called to the inheritance by representation; it is called by representation because they represent the deceased heir.
c) Succession is made per lines when the inheritance is divided into two parts, of which one falls to paternal blood-relatives, the other to maternal blood-relatives.
- As regards legitimacy and illegitimacy, observe:
a) A child who, considered according to ecclesiastical law, is legitimate, but considered according to civil law is illegitimate, cannot vindicate for himself the rights of legitimate persons, except insofar as natural law itself attributes them to him. The reason is that the legislator, though to be reprehended, nevertheless de facto does not admit canonical legitimation for his own forum, and therefore de facto does not grant to a child who is only canonically legitimate the rights of the civilly legitimate.
Objection. A canonically legitimate child has the right that he be held as legitimate also in the civil forum, and so that he participate in the rights of legitimate persons.
Response. That the child has a strict right, I deny; a broad right, so that the State violates distributive justice, let it pass.
b) A child who, considered according to ecclesiastical law, is illegitimate, but considered according to civil law is legitimate, cannot use the rights granted to him by civil law, except insofar as natural law itself grants them to him. The reason is that the disposition of civil law, since it ought to follow Canon Law, is dishonest and therefore destitute of force.
It is disputed whether parents act unjustly or not when they falsely recognize and legitimate illegitimate offspring, namely offspring of only one of the two, and thus bring it about that the legitimate portion of legitimate heirs is diminished. Now it seems one must distinguish thus:
If the parents, with civil law considered, by injuring the legitimate portion do not act unjustly with respect to the legitimate heirs, neither do they act unjustly with respect to the same by falsely recognizing the offspring. For in the posited hypothesis they have the right of bringing it about that goods come to the illegitimate child; with this posited, recognition - granted that it is a lie - does not become unjust with respect to the legitimate heirs, so that they do not impede them by an unjust means from obtaining a good.
If the parents, with civil law considered, by injuring the legitimate portion act unjustly with respect to the legitimate heirs, they also act unjustly with respect to the same by falsely recognizing the offspring. For, once this hypothesis is admitted, recognition becomes an unjust means by which they impede the legitimate heirs from obtaining a good.