Morals of the Church
Library › Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology › Volume I › Book II. On the Exercise of the Christian Life, or on the Cultivation of the Virtues › Treatise II. On the Cultivation of the Moral Virtues › Dissertation I. On the Precepts of the Decalogue › Part VII. On the Seventh and Tenth Precepts of the Decalogue › Section II. On Injustice and on Restitution › Chapter II. On Restitution in Common › Article II. The Subject and Object of Restitution › § IV. On Those who Cooperate in Injustice › Point I. On Positive Cooperators

Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

I. On the One Commanding

999.

I. Notion. Here one commanding is understood as one who efficaciously moves another to inflict damage in his own name, that is, in the name of the one commanding. For in this the one commanding differs from the one counseling: he who acts by command acts in the name of the one commanding; he who acts by counsel acts in his own name. For the rest, it makes no difference whether another is induced to inflict damage by precept or by threats or prayers or by contract, whether explicitly or tacitly. Nor is it required that the one commanding possess authority over the mandatary.

II. Damages to be repaired. The one commanding is bound to restore:

  1. The damage which he ordered to be inflicted.

  2. The damage which, besides the damage commanded, naturally follows from carrying out the order, and which he foresaw at least confusedly would follow; as if soldiers ordered to devastate a city kill citizens. It must be said otherwise concerning damage which is not morally connected with the damage commanded, or which was in no way foreseen; as if, being ordered to strike someone lightly, you kill him. It must also be said otherwise, sufficiently probably, concerning damage which the mandatary by error inflicted on someone other than the one commanded, for example on Peter instead of Paul. The reason is that in the case the command seems rather an occasion than a cause, while the error of the mandatary seems the cause of the damage. There is added that in this hypothesis the one commanding did not will the damage which in fact was inflicted (n. 993).

  3. The damage which befell the mandatary in the execution of the command, the one commanding is bound to restore, if the danger of damage was attached to the execution and the mandatary was unjustly forced or deceived; otherwise if the mandatary freely accepted the command and the danger of damage, for instance because of a promised reward.

III. Cessation of the obligation. In order that the one commanding as such be freed from the obligation of restoring, there is required a serious revocation of the command, and that made known to the mandatary in time. If the revocation for any reason whatever was not made known in time, the command continued to exercise force, and therefore the one commanding remains a cause of the damage (St. Alphonsus, III, 558).

The One Commanding