Chapter I. Principles

I. Notion. Under the name of immodesty come external acts which by their nature influence venereal motion and are placed inordinately. Such acts can be looks, touches, embraces, and kisses (St. Thomas, loc. cit. and II-II, q. 154, a. 4, ad 2).

II. Morality. 1. The acts enumerated above are in themselves indifferent; if they were evil in themselves, they would never be lawful (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 154, a. 4).

2. The acts enumerated, indifferent in themselves, can become unlawful by reason either of scandal and cooperation, or of intention, or of the danger of provoking a venereal effect, or of the danger of consenting to a venereal effect (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 154, a. 4; St. Alphonsus III, 426). It is said:

a. By reason of scandal and cooperation; in which case the morality must be judged according to the doctrine of theologians concerning scandal and cooperation in general.

b. By reason of intention; namely, they are always gravely evil if they are done with the intention of exciting pollution or some venereal commotion.

c. By reason of the danger of provoking a venereal effect; in this case the morality must be defined according to what has been said concerning indirectly voluntary lust (nn. 65-68).

d. By reason of the danger of consenting to a venereal effect; that is, if that danger is grave and remains, an immodest act must be avoided under grave obligation.

3. The acts enumerated, and unlawful on account of one of the assigned causes, differ in species as follows:

a. Considered in themselves they do not differ in species, so that, for example, a sinful look at a girl and a sinful touch of a girl contain the same species of lust.

b. The acts enumerated and unlawful of themselves take on the species of the completed act in the same species, that is, of fornication, sodomy, or bestiality, insofar as they regard a person of diverse sex, a person of the same sex, or a beast; but you should not apply this to looks, because they are not judged to be the natural beginning of a completed act. I said of themselves, because otherwise one must speak differently if they are referred by the agent to an act completed in another species (n. 50).

c. The acts enumerated and unlawful also contract a species: 1. from the circumstances of the subject, or of the one sinning, insofar as he, if he is married, contracts the species of adultery; if he is a sacred person, the species of carnal sacrilege, etc.; 2. from the circumstances of the object, insofar as, if they regard a married person, they again put on the character of adultery; if a sacred person, the character of carnal sacrilege; if a blood-relative or relative by marriage, the character of incest. These things, however, again do not hold concerning the act of looking, unless the affection of libido is determined toward the person, for example a married person, as such. The reason for the distinction is that touches, kisses, and embraces, since they reach such a person concretely and materially, cannot abstract from the circumstance inhering in the person. Looks, which are less material, commonly abstract from the person as such. There is added the fact that, as we said, they are not judged to be the natural beginning of a completed act.

Note. For how honorable kisses, embraces, touches, and looks are to be judged if they are done from sensible carnal pleasure, see n. 64.