Scholion I. On the Doubtful Damager

I. He who doubts either whether damage followed, or whether he posited the cause of the damage, or whether he posited the said cause with the required theological fault - he who doubts about these things, I say, is not held to restitution. For in the enumerated cases there is question of a doubt of fact founding the law or obligation. But in such a doubt the obligation is lacking (n. 228; St. Alphonsus, III, 562).

II. He who posited the cause, but doubts about the influence of his action, for example of evil counsel given, on the damage that followed, likewise is not held to restitution; for the reason alleged under I holds. Note, however, that if there is question of a physical cause, for example of a wound inflicted and apt for killing, commonly there is no reason to doubt the influence; but it is more easily present if there is question of a moral cause, for example of counsel or command (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

You should also apply these things: 1° if several unjustly posited a cause, and it is doubted whether some one of the agents influenced the damage; as if several committed adultery with the same wife, and it is doubted whether the offspring was born from conjugal intercourse or from adultery (St. Alphonsus, III, 658); 2° if several unjustly posited a cause, and it is doubted which one of them influenced the damage. The case would be if several, while the husband was absent, had intercourse with the wife at the same time morally speaking. Make exception, however, if one or the other was a culpable cause of the doubt, as if someone, while the husband was absent, conscious of adultery committed by another, had intercourse with the same wife (St. Alphonsus, III, 658).

III. What has been said about the doubtful damager should also be applied both to him who doubtfully or doubtfully unjustly impeded another from obtaining a good, and to him who doubtfully or doubtfully unjustly cooperated in injustice.