Scholion I. On the Acts which Concur to Constitute a Deliberate Act of the Will

To constitute an entire deliberate act of the will, twelve acts concur, six of which pertain to the intellect and just as many to the will.

The first act of the intellect is simple apprehension, by which it apprehends some good, for example an act of lust, and proposes it to the will.

To simple apprehension there corresponds in the will simple volition, by which it is inclined by affective love toward the good proposed to it. This inclination is not free, but natural.

If the simple volition is efficacious,¹ the will applies the intellect to inquiring whether that good is expedient and possible to attain. Hence there follows an act of the intellect which is called judgment, by which the intellect proposes that good to the will as possible and fitting.

Judgment is followed by the intention of the will, by which the will determines to attain the good by the means which conduce to it.

Intention is followed by the first counsel of the intellect; that is, the will applies the intellect to inquiring into the means more suitable for attaining the end and proposing them to the will.

The first counsel is followed by the consent of the will, by which the will approves or accepts in general the proposed means.

By force of this consent, the intellect is moved to the second counsel, that is, to discerning and proposing to the will the more fitting means.

The second counsel is followed by the choice of the will, by which the will embraces and chooses the means proposed as more fitting.

The choice of the will is followed by the command of the intellect; that is, by force of the said choice, the intellect intimates and declares what must be done through the other powers, so that the will may attain what it chooses (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 17, a. 3, ad 3).

The command of the intellect is followed by the use of the will, by which the will employs the powers subject to it for assuming and executing the means.

Through the operations of the powers which the will uses, the end is obtained; from possession of it there follows fruition of the will, or its rest in the possessed good. By this fruition the whole deliberate act is completed.

It is disputed, however, whether command is formally an act of reason or of the will; concerning this dispute, see n. 73.

¹ Often simple apprehension and simple volition are inefficacious and pass away without effecting anything.