IV. On the Observance of Other Social Laws

It is enough to have noted these things: other social laws, just as the laws already explained, seem mixed; yet in general they do not oblige from commutative justice, but from legal justice or another virtue, unless they are more determinative of a strict right. We have said:

I. Other social laws seem mixed. For on the one hand the presumption seems to be that the act contained in the law is truly prescribed, if the matter is moral (n. 1054); on the other hand, the aforesaid presumption is not overthrown by common estimation, which holds the laws about which we are speaking to be merely penal.

II. Yet in general they do not oblige from commutative justice, but from legal justice or another virtue distinct from commutative justice. For the obligation of commutative justice is commonly clear from no source, and therefore at least practically can be held not to exist; hence, when the law has not been fulfilled, the obligation of restitution is lacking (cf. what was said p. 696).

III. Unless they are more determinative of a strict right, for example a law which, for the circumstances, determines the price of some things or the wage to be paid; this is sufficiently clear. Yet sometimes even outside the assigned case they establish a strict right, as can be elicited from the nature of the matter or from the tenor of the law (cf. n. 764 and 796).