§ II. Causes Suspending the Obligation

The causes which suspend the obligation of restoring are enumerated:

I. The impotence of the debtor, whether physical or moral. As regards physical impotence, the matter is clear; as regards moral impotence, it is deduced from the fact that the creditor in the case would demand restitution irrationally. To impotence belong:

1. The necessity of the debtor or of his own, that is, of wife, children, parents, or, as others add, of the other ascendants and descendants, indeed of brothers and sisters. Necessity excuses: 1° when the debtor lacks the means with which he can satisfy; 2° when by restoring the debtor would be cast into extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. Make exception if the creditor is already in the same necessity, and "precisely by reason of that subtraction or taking away has been cast into extreme necessity, because to take from someone a thing necessary for life itself is the same as killing him; whence in the case the condition of the owner who possessed first ought to be better" (St. Alphonsus, III, 701); 3° when by restoring the debtor would be cast into grave necessity. Make exception if the creditor is already in necessity of this sort, or in graver necessity, because then the condition of the creditor ought to prevail; 4° when both creditor and debtor are already in grave necessity; for then the debtor, by restoring, would be cast into a much worse condition than the creditor. Make exception if the thing taken away exists in species, or if the creditor precisely through that taking away has come into grave necessity (St. Alphonsus, III, 701, 702, 703).

2. Damage in his own affairs much greater than that which will follow for the creditor from the delay. Hence, for example, you are not held to sell your things for much less than they are worth. But ceasing profit is not a cause for delaying restitution; for it is not equitable that the creditor be deprived of his thing or his debt so that the debtor may gain profit from them. Make exception if the creditor would suffer no damage from the delay, or if there is founded hope that by delaying restitution the debtor could so gain that he would satisfy all the creditors; for then it seems that the creditor ought to suffer some delay (St. Alphonsus, III, 697).

3. Damage to himself or to his own in goods of a higher order, such as infamy, imprisonment, etc., unless the loss of the higher good is minimal with respect to the damage which the creditor undergoes (St. Alphonsus, III, 698). Hence, for example, a notary is not held, with danger of infamy, to disclose a false instrument made by himself in order to repair the damage which followed from it for another. An adulterous woman ought not, with danger to reputation, confess adultery in order to prevent the damage which threatens legitimate children from illegitimate offspring born. A spouse, in order to restore, is not held to reveal to the other spouse what things he or she has unjustly usurped from common goods. A debtor who has made cession of goods, but has unjustly concealed certain things, is not held afterward to reveal this to the creditors, because on account of the fraudulent cession of goods he would expose himself to danger of a very grave punishment. Nevertheless, he is held in another way, if he can, to repair the damage given.

4. Ejection from a justly acquired status. According to many, this reason excuses even then when someone by his own vice, for example by feasting, gaming, etc., has come to such necessity. I have said, however, justly acquired; for no one is excused from restitution on account of the loss of a status unjustly acquired, unless the injustice is hidden, in which case he is excused by reason of infamy. For the rest, ejection from a justly acquired status is nowadays to be urged somewhat less than before; both because ejections of this sort occur much more frequently, and because more people can more easily turn aside to another place, there to bear a lower status without confusion. Gluttons and gamblers also are not worthy of such great commiseration. Moreover note that even those who have justly acquired a status have the obligation of abstaining from superfluous expenses, indeed also of procuring for themselves, with some diminution of status, the faculty of restoring gradually and in parts (St. Alphonsus, III, 702).

II. Damage that will follow either to the creditor himself or to a third party, namely from the fact that the creditor is going to abuse the thing restored, whether for sinning or for harming another. "When the thing to be restored," says St. Thomas, "appears to be harmful to him to whom restitution is to be made, or to another, it ought not then to be restored to him; because restitution is ordered to the utility of him to whom it is restored: for all things that are possessed fall under the aspect of the useful; nor nevertheless ought he who detains another's thing to appropriate it to himself, but either to reserve it so that he may restore it at a fitting time, or even hand it over to another to be kept more safely" (II-II, q. 62, a. 5, ad 1). Indeed, in the case there is per se an obligation of delaying restitution, an obligation, I say, either of charity, if there is question of the creditor himself, or of justice, if there is question of a third party, because in the case restitution would take on the character of cooperation toward the damage of the third party (St. Alphonsus, III, 697).