Morals of the Church
Library › Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology › Volume I › Book I. On the General Principles of the Christian Life › Treatise II. On Motion in Order to the Final End, or on the Human Act, Considered according to Moral Being › Dissertation I (Preliminary). On the Human Act, Considered according to Physical Being › Part II. The Elements of the Human Act Considered Separately › Section II. On the Free › Chapter II. On Those Things which Influence Liberty › Article III. On the Passions

Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Section II. On Concupiscence in Particular

37.

I. Notion. Concupiscence is sometimes taken for the tinder of desires following from original sin in fallen man; sometimes for one of the passions of the concupiscible appetite, namely desire. Here, however, it is taken somewhat more broadly and is understood as any motion whatever of the concupiscible appetite toward some sensible good (St. Alphonsus, V, XXIII).

Concupiscence

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II. Division. Concupiscence is usually distinguished as antecedent and consequent.

Antecedent concupiscence is that which "precedes the consent of the will and draws and inclines it to acting" (St. Alphonsus, V, XXIII).

Consequent concupiscence is that which "follows the consent of the will; indeed, it arises from a previous consent of the will already given to some matter, as when, for example, a man vehemently desires something, a vehement passion of concupiscence is excited in him" (St. Alphonsus, V, XXIII); "for the will cannot be intensely moved toward something without some passion being excited in the sensitive appetite" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 6).

Concupiscence

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III. Influence on the free.

  1. Antecedent concupiscence, which is chiefly considered here, generally does not remove the free, but lessens it. The reason is that generally it does not remove but only lessens the indifference of judgment, on which the free is founded. I said:

a) Generally it does not remove the free, "because sometimes passion is indeed so great that it totally takes away the use of reason, as is plain in those who become insane because of love or anger" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 7; St. Alphonsus, V, XXV).

b) It lessens it; nevertheless concupiscence for the most part leaves enough deliberation to suffice for perfect freedom and therefore, if the required conditions are present, for mortal sin (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 8). Sometimes, however, because of the defect of full deliberation, only imperfect freedom is had, which does not suffice for mortal sin.

  1. Consequent concupiscence "does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or rather is a sign of its magnitude, insofar namely as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the sinful act" (St. Thomas, same place, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, XXIII).

Concupiscence