Chapter I. On Absolute Betrothals

The effects of betrothals are distinguished into natural and canonical. The natural effects are: 1° the obligation of entering matrimony; 2° incapacity validly to contract betrothals with a third person; 3° incapacity licitly to contract matrimony with a third person; 4° the obligation of carrying on betrothal conversation with the bride or bridegroom; 5° the obligation of avoiding betrothal conversation, and still more lustful acts, with another. There is added 6° a canonical effect situated in this, that an action is given, not indeed for seeking the celebration of matrimony, but for the reparation of damages, if any are owed (canon 1017, § 3).

I. The obligation of entering matrimony; and indeed an obligation of commutative justice, and a grave one. The obligation must be fulfilled: if the time for fulfilling has been prefixed, at this time; if it has not been prefixed, at the time when the other party reasonably asks for matrimony. If the other party through shame or fear does not ask, it is not licit to wait beyond a reasonable time (St. Alphonsus VI, 845). Thus the matter stands of itself; for by reason of a just cause it is licit to defer nuptials. Moreover, commonly it is to be advised that the betrothed enter matrimony as soon as it can conveniently be done, lest namely they remain longer in danger of sin.

What if one party refuses to enter matrimony, but the other urges the betrothals?

Response 1. The confessor, if the refusing party truly brings forward a just cause, can pronounce that he or she can withdraw from the betrothals. If the party brings forward a more or less doubtful cause, or, to take the matter practically, if he or she brings forward changed affection as the cause, there will be added a founded fear lest the matrimony have a bad outcome; this fear constitutes a cause for withdrawing from betrothals (n. 680). If a cause for withdrawing is in reality lacking, the confessor should proceed by advising rather than by commanding; at times also a dispensation can be obtained from the Holy See (n. 681).

Response 2. The pastor should furthermore keep before his eyes these words of canon 1017, § 3: "From a promise, although it is valid and no just cause excuses from fulfilling it, no action is given for seeking the celebration of matrimony; nevertheless one is given for the reparation of damages, if any are owed." This action, however, is of mixed forum and does not suspend the celebration of matrimony with another.¹

II. Incapacity validly to contract betrothals with another person. Therefore betrothals of this kind are not only illicit, but also destitute of every value, unless they are contracted under the condition: "If the prior betrothals are dissolved." The reason is that no one can confer on someone a right in a thing after he has already granted a right in it to another. But if intercourse has followed upon betrothals entered with another, the prior bride does not lose her right. Nevertheless she should be advised to yield her right spontaneously, unless she herself would suffer notable damage from it, or regard the very matrimony not contracted as a grave damage (St. Alphonsus VI, 848).

III. Incapacity licitly to contract matrimony with another; which is clear.

IV. The obligation of carrying on betrothal conversation with the bride or bridegroom, namely according to the circumstances and honest morals of the region; which likewise is clear.

V. The obligation of avoiding betrothal conversation, and still more acts of lust, for example fornication, with another. Here, however, it is disputed whether fornication with a third person of itself takes on the nature of injustice, and of grave injustice. Now with St. Alphonsus (VI, 847) the nature of grave injustice is denied with sufficient probability, because the arguments of the adversaries prove the matter in no way, as will be clear from the objections to be discussed.

Objection 1. Fornication renders the promised thing, that is, the body in order to matrimony, notably worse.

Response. First, what the adversaries suppose is deservedly called into doubt, namely that by betrothals there is induced an obligation of justice of handing over the body such as it was at the time of the promise. If it is a question of another promise, this will sometimes be clear from the circumstances; but in the case at hand the matter seems doubtful. Next, it is by no means clear that the body is rendered notably worse in order to matrimony by fornication.

Objection 2. Fornication is at least implicitly excluded by the betrothal contract, so that fornication is opposed to the contract and therefore to justice.

Response. It is not clear that fornication is excluded by the betrothal contract itself. In addition, if the assertion is admitted, the same seems to have to be said about immodest touches committed with another person, so that these too would be opposed to justice.

Note 1. As was said above, from betrothals, even if they are valid and here and now bind, no action is given for seeking the celebration of matrimony, but one is indeed given for the reparation of damages, if any are owed (canon 1017, § 3; p. 508).

Note 2. Effect of a unilateral promise. A unilateral promise of matrimony is presumed to have induced a grave obligation of justice. For an obligation of this kind is judged to have been undertaken if, as we suppose to have taken place, witnesses or a public writing are added to the promise. As to an action arising from a unilateral promise, however, the things said under the note concerning an action arising from betrothals hold, as is clear from the documents cited there.

¹ Pontifical Commission, June 2-3, 1918 (A.A.S. 1918, p. 345).