Chapter — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Chapter I. On Lust Generally
I. Notion. Lust is: the disordered appetite and use of venereal things as such (St. Alphonsus III, 412). It is called:
Appetite; by this word internal acts concerning venereal things are comprehended.
Use; this word regards external acts.
Of venereal things; under this name come semen and a certain spermatic fluid distinct from semen. They are called venereal things because they serve generation, over which, according to the gentiles, the goddess Venus presided.
As such. Venereal things as such are understood as venereal things considered according to themselves, or insofar as they are of such a nature, and not insofar as they are a part of the body. Moreover, the use of venereal things as such is constituted by venereal acts, both complete and incomplete (n. 10). But the use - if it is permitted to use this word in the present case - of venereal things as they are a part of the body is constituted, for example, by the artificial removal of infected semen. Moreover, if in the course of the treatise there is speech of the use of venereal things, venereal things as such are always understood; let this be said once for all.
Disordered, that is, which either is in no way ordered to the good of the species, as for example pollution, or is indeed ordered to the propagation of the species, that is, to generation, but not to the preservation and education of the one generated, as for example fornication.
II. Division. Lust is distinguished:
Into consummated and non-consummated, according as the act of lust is complete or not complete (n. 10).
Into natural and unnatural, according as the act of itself is apt for generation, as fornication, or is not apt for it, as pollution.
Into directly voluntary and indirectly voluntary, according as it is intended or is not intended, but is foreseen as going to follow from an action and ought to be guarded against.
III. Morality. 1. All lust is sin. This is proved first from Sacred Scripture. "No fornicator, or unclean person, or covetous person, which is the service of idols, has an inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God."1 "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor those serving idols, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor men who lie with males, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God."2 "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, impurity, lust... of which I forewarn you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God."3
Secondly, by reason. The use of a thing which lacks ordination to the natural end of that thing is sin, unless that very thing is ordered to an intermediate end higher than its natural end. But all lust involves the use of a thing, namely of venereal things, which lacks ordination to the natural end of venereal things; and those venereal things themselves are not ordered to an intermediate end higher than their natural end. Therefore all lust is sin.
The major is clear from this, that one who uses some thing contrary to its natural end acts against the ordering of the Author of nature, unless He Himself has furthermore ordered that thing to a higher intermediate end. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, "that sin in human acts is that which is contrary to the order of reason; but this belongs to the order of reason, that it order each thing suitably to its end; and therefore it is not sin if, through reason, man uses certain things for the end for which they are" (II-II, q. 153, a. 2); and these words certainly must also be applied to venereal things. Hence the holy Doctor soon declares that the emission of semen "ought to be done in such a way that it agrees with the end for which it is needed" (II-II, q. 153, a. 3, ad 1; cf. De malo, q. 15, a. 1, ad 4).
The minor contains two things which need exposition or proof. The first is this: Lust involves the use of venereal things which lacks ordination to the natural end of venereal things. For the natural end of venereal things is the perfect good of the human species, that is, generation and the perfection of the one generated through education (n. 33; St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 41, a. 1). But all lust involves the use of venereal things which lacks ordination to the perfect good of the human species. Namely, unnatural lust is ordered neither to generation nor to education; natural lust is not ordered to education; finally, non-consummated lust lacks ordination to a legitimate complete act, and thus is deprived of remote ordination to the good of the species. Each of these points will become clearer from what is to be said.
The other is this: Venereal things themselves cannot be ordered to an intermediate end higher than their natural end; for the good of the human species is ordered immediately to God, that is, to the ultimate end.4
Objection 1. Anyone can lawfully use, as he pleases, that which is his own; but in a venereal act man uses nothing except that which is his own, unless perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there cannot be sin in venereal use.
1 Eph. 5:5.
4 Cf. the clear argumentation of Duynstee (cited work, p. 16 sq.), who takes the argument from the fact that an act of lust is opposed to the natural end of the venereal act; this seems to be the proximate reason for its malice.
Response. Man enjoys only useful dominion over his body and its semen; their owner is God Almighty. Hence he is bound to use them according to the norm established by the Author of nature. But the Author of nature, as has been proved, forbids the use which lust involves (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 3, ad 2).
Objection 2. "Through the venereal act semen is emitted, which is a superfluity of food; but in the emission of other superfluities no sin is considered; therefore neither can there be any sin concerning venereal acts."
Response. "Semen is a superfluity which is needed; for it is called superfluous from the fact that it is a residue of the operation of the nutritive power; yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are those which are not needed, and therefore it does not matter howsoever they are emitted, provided the decency of human society is preserved. But it is not the same in the emission of semen, which ought to be done in such a way that it agrees with the end for which it is needed" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 3, ad 1).
Instance. At least in those whose semen is not generative, its emission will lack sin.
Response. "Moral precepts attend to that which is according to nature, and not to that which is found accidentally in this constitution or age. But of itself semen is ordered by nature to the generation of offspring; otherwise it would not be semen. And therefore, concerning any emission of semen, the common precepts, which are taken chiefly from the end, which is generation, must be observed, however much by accident generation cannot then follow."1 (Cf. St. Thomas, De malo, q. 15, a. 2, ad 14.)
- All lust is grave sin. This is clear first from the texts of Sacred Scripture adduced in n. 27. Then, all lust, as we have just said, is sin because it involves the use of venereal things deprived of ordination to the good of the species. But the said privation in the individual species of lust is grave, or contains a grave disordering. Therefore all lust is grave sin.
The minor is proved in parts. a) The privation of consummated unnatural lust consists, if the discussion is of a man, in this: that the act is neither of itself apt for generating a man nor ordered to the education of the one generated; these privations are grave. It consists, if the discussion is of a wife, likewise in this: that the act is not ordered to education; this privation is likewise grave. It also consists, as regards the wife, in this: that the act is not ordered to generation. But since the seminal emission of the wife is neither necessary nor proved to be very useful for each individual generation, the gravity of this privation is not established.
b) The privation of natural consummated lust consists in this: that the act is not ordered to the education of the one to be generated (n. 33); this privation is grave.
c) The privation of non-consummated lust consists in this: that the act is not a proximate and natural preparation for a legitimate consummated act; this privation is likewise grave.
Others argue from the fact that all lust involves an act deprived of an essential relation to the species.2 I confess that I do not see the force of this argument without the addition of the proposed point, perhaps because the very sense of the argument has remained inaccessible to me. For it remains, as it seems, to prove that the privation of that relation is grave. But if this is supplied, the argument seems to fall into our proof.
St. Thomas reasons thus: "It must be said that the more necessary something is, the more necessary it is that the order of reason be preserved concerning it; hence consequently it is more vicious if the order of reason is set aside. But the use of venereal things, as was said in the preceding article, is very necessary for the common good, which is the preservation of the human race; and therefore in this matter the order of reason must especially be attended to; and consequently, if anything is done concerning this besides what the order of reason has, it will be vicious. But this belongs to the nature of lust, that it exceed the order and mode of reason concerning venereal things; and therefore without doubt lust is sin" (II-II, q. 153, a. 3). By these words, as is clear from what is set down at the beginning of the question, the holy Doctor intends to establish the grave malice of lust. Moreover, compare what is to be said concerning the individual species of lust (nn. 32-61), and likewise concerning non-consummated lust (nn. 62-64).
- Lust cannot be rendered honorable by any end. For in order that it could be rendered honorable, there would be required an intermediate end to which the good of the human species is subordinated, so that it would be lawful to pursue that intermediate end while neglecting the good of the species. But the good of the human species is subordinated to no intermediate end, but is immediately ordered to the ultimate end, which is God (St. Alphonsus III, 478).
Objection 1. Just as it is lawful, for preserving life, to amputate genital members and even directly to remove semen, so likewise pollution seems lawful if it is supposed necessary for protecting life.
Response. The difference is in this: that the said operations do not involve, as pollution does, the use of venereal things as such, but a disposition concerning them insofar as they are part of the body and, as such, ordered to the whole.
Objection 2. Theologians formerly conceded the expulsion of corrupt semen, even if, beyond the intention, some emission of non-corrupt semen were to follow.
Response. Theologians conceded the expulsion of corrupt semen when produced by means of medicine and without libido (St. Alphonsus III, 478); such an expulsion does not involve, as pollution does, the use of venereal things as such. Moreover, corrupt semen is no longer true semen.3
Question: whether he sins gravely who consents to the venereal pleasure of pollution or of venereal commotion, to which libidinous distillation is equivalent, when it follows beyond the intention.
Response. Affirmatively, and this holds even if it is a question of a merely natural venereal motion, for example pollution. The reason is that all venereal things, even venereal pleasures, in order to be rightly admitted by the will, must be ordered to the good of the species; for this is the supreme intermediate end of all venereal things. But the venereal pleasure of which we are speaking is not ordered, indeed cannot be ordered, to the good of the species; and this privation is grave. Therefore the will must not admit that pleasure, or consent to it. It is added that consent to the pleasure of a venereal motion fosters and increases the venereal motion itself.
- Consummated and non-consummated lust differ in species. This is commonly admitted by authors and seems to be deduced from the fact that the non-consummated act of itself prepares for, or leads to, the consummated act. But that which prepares for an act is morally diverse from the act itself. These things hold only if one stops at the non-consummated act; but if the non-consummated act is ordered to the consummated act, and the consummated act follows, with this it constitutes one sin in number and species.4 If the consummated act, although intended, does not follow, there is a consummated act in affection, but a non-consummated act in effect.
1 Cajetan on II-II, q. 153, a. 3.
2 Cf. Vermeersch, De castitate et de vitiis contrariis, nn. 352-354; Merkelbach, Quaestiones de castitate et luxuria, pp. 22-23.
3 This question concerning the expulsion of corrupt semen today seems no longer practical. For according to modern physicians, semen is not corrupted, because the part of the semen that has gone outside its internal place either flows out spontaneously or is expelled with urine. Moreover, physicians have found no medicine by which, apart from libidinous pollution, even the smallest part of the semen may be expelled (Gaude, edition of St. Alphonsus's Theologia Moralis III, 448, note).
4 To this case can be applied what St. Thomas declares concerning a similar case: "A sin of the heart and of the mouth are not distinguished from a sin of deed when they are joined with it, but as any of these is found in itself; just as also a part of a motion is not distinguished from the whole motion when the motion is continuous, but only when the motion stops in the middle" (Ethics, l. 10, c. 4).
IV. Effects. 1. Lust is a capital vice. For a vice which has an end that is very appetible, so that from its appetite a man proceeds to commit many sins, is capital. But lust has an end that is very appetible, from the appetite of which a man proceeds to commit many sins. Therefore lust is a capital vice.
The minor is proved from the fact that the end of lust is the pleasure of venereal things, which is the greatest; and for that reason pleasure of this kind is especially appetible according to the sensitive appetite, both because of the vehemence of the pleasure and also because of the connaturality of this kind of concupiscence.1
- Lust causes not only many sins but also other moral evils which lead to sins, namely blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, rashness, inconstancy, love of self, hatred of God, affection for the present age, and horror of the future; these are called the daughters of lust. That they are produced by lust St. Thomas proves in this way: when the lower powers are vehemently affected toward their objects, it follows that the higher powers are impeded and disordered in their acts. But through the vice of lust the lower appetite tends vehemently toward its object because of the vehemence of passion and pleasure. Therefore through lust the higher powers, namely reason and will, are especially disordered in their acts. Now four acts of reason are distinguished, and two acts of the will concerning things to be done; each of these is corrupted by lust.
The first act of reason is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good; and this act is impeded by lust, and in this respect there is posited blindness of mind, by which it happens that the lustful man does not apprehend as his due ultimate or intermediate end the one which truly is such, but goes astray and sets up for himself another, undue end.
The second act is deliberation concerning means; and this too is impeded by lust, and in this respect there is posited rashness, by which it happens that a man does not use sufficient deliberation concerning the means and the end.
The third act is judgment concerning things to be done, which is also impeded by lust, and in this respect there is posited thoughtlessness, by which it happens that someone fails in selecting, among several means, those more apt for the end.
The fourth act is the command of reason concerning things to be done, which is also impeded by lust, and in this respect there is posited inconstancy, by which it happens that the lustful man does not carry out what he determines must be done; hence Terence in the Eunuch says of someone who was saying that he would withdraw from friendship: "One little false tear will restrain these words."
The first act of the will is the appetite of the end, which is impeded by lust, and in this respect there is posited love of self, by which the lustful man not only loves himself inordinately - for that is common to every sin - but by which he loves his flesh and its pleasures, so that he constitutes his ultimate end in them. And by opposition there is posited hatred of God, who forbids and punishes the pleasure desired.
The other act of the will concerns the means to the end, and in this respect there is posited affection for the present age, to which the lustful man adheres because of his pleasures in such a way that he would always wish to remain in it; and by opposition, horror and despair of the future age: horror, because the lustful man knows that through death he must be deprived of his pleasures and undergo most grave torments for them; likewise despair, because the lustful man, while he is too much detained by carnal pleasures, does not care to arrive at spiritual ones, but is disgusted by them (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153, a. 5).
1 Hieronymus de Medicis, on II-II, q. 153, a. 4.