§ I. Causes Extinguishing the Obligation

The causes which, besides the very fulfillment of the obligation, extinguish it are:

I. Remission or condonation made by the creditor, provided, of course, those things required for valid condonation are present (St. Alphonsus, III, 700, 1°).

Presumed remission for the future suffices, that is, that the creditor would remit it if he were asked, provided he would not do this on account of the petition alone, but on account of, or also on account of, a good affection toward the debtor. The reason is that, in the hypothesis posited, the owner, morally speaking, is now not unwilling with respect to the omission of restitution. If, however, he is unwilling with respect to the mode, that is, with respect to the omission of restitution without express pardon, you are not excused from venial sin (St. Alphonsus, III, 700, question 1).

II. Compensation properly so called, or legal compensation, has place when two persons who are debtors between themselves oppose and extinguish a mutual debt. But what is required by law in the case, see in the Code of the country.

There will be discussion later about compensation improperly so called, or hidden compensation, which can likewise extinguish the obligation of restitution.

III. Composition made by public authority; namely:

1. A sentence of a judge obtained without fraud frees, if the cause was truly doubtful, whether by doubt of law or of fact. Likewise a punitive sentence which, as a punishment for a delict committed by the creditor, absolves the debtor from restitution, is valid also for the internal forum.

2. The Supreme Pontiff can condone restitution owed to pious causes.

In fact, the Roman Pontiffs have not rarely granted condonation of this sort concerning those goods which had been unjustly confiscated by the Government, or had been occupied by private persons and then passed into the hands of the Government. But if there is question of those goods which were usurped by private persons, or even by public authority but in those places where the aforesaid condonation has not been made, Catholic acquirers will not be safe in conscience unless, for the individual case, they have recourse to the Holy See to obtain sanation.¹ The Supreme Pontiff can also remit uncertain spiritual debts, or even certain ones, to be paid by someone, for example Masses to be said. He can remit them, I say, by compensating from the treasury of the Church the detriment which the creditor is going to suffer. Indeed, sometimes he has granted a general faculty of satisfying, by one Mass, for several Masses owed from a stipend accepted. Recourse is made to the Sacred Congregation of the Council; but if the case is hidden, to the Sacred Penitentiary.

3. Prescription can also be referred here, since it sometimes extinguishes the debt itself; it can be referred here, I say, insofar as it receives force from public authority.

¹ Sweens, n. 415.

IV. As to how far the destruction of the thing excuses from restitution, see nn. 983, 990.

Question 1. Whether he is still held to restore or pay who doubts whether he has restored or paid.

Response 1. He who thinks that he has restored or paid is held to nothing. Now he who is generally diligent in paying can, in doubt, rightly think that he has satisfied the obligation. On the contrary, he who thinks that he has not restored or not paid is held to the whole debt (cf. n. 229).

Response 2. It is disputed to what he is held who, all things considered, strictly doubts whether he has restored or paid. Some deobligate him entirely; a few bind him to a part, others to the whole debt; and this opinion seems to have to be admitted. For 1° in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, that is, of that which is prior and continues to persist with equal probability (n. 229). But the creditor's right to restitution or payment is prior to the restitution or payment itself, and in the hypothesis posited persists with equal probability. 2° Natural equity demands that he who is in doubt whether he contracted an obligation of restoring or paying be obligated to nothing; and, I say, that he who is in doubt whether he has satisfied a contracted obligation be bound to the whole debt (St. Alphonsus, III, 700, question 2; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 1, n. 20).

Objection 1. It is not equitable that the whole debt be paid to him who indeed had a certain right, but here and now has only a doubtful right.

Response 1. I turn the argument back; since with the same right it can be said: it is not equitable that nothing be paid by him who doubtfully did not contract the debt.

Response 2. That is equitable, provided it is admitted that nothing is to be paid by the same person if he only doubtfully contracted the debt. Once this is admitted, and it is now commonly admitted, equity precisely demands that he pay the whole if he certainly contracted the debt and only doubtfully satisfied it.

Objection 2. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. But the debtor possesses the thing, for example his own money. Therefore in doubt his condition is better.

Response. I distinguish the major: in doubt as to whose some thing is, the condition of him who possesses it is better, I concede (n. 777). In doubt whether the one possessing the thing has satisfied the obligation of yielding it to another, posited that the said obligation certainly existed and with equal probability continues to persist, the condition of the possessor is better, I deny, on account of the reasons given.