§ I. On Interpretation Properly So Called

I. Notion. Interpretation properly so called is the explanation of the words of a law with respect to the sense which they have according to the intention of the legislator. But the word "interpretation" is commonly taken in a broader sense, so that it also includes those declarations which extend or restrict the law, rather than interpret it; this will be clearer from what is to be said.

II. Division. Interpretation properly so called is divided:

1. By reason of the author, into authentic, usual, and doctrinal. Authentic is that which proceeds from the legislator himself (or his superior or successor), or from him to whom the faculty of interpreting the law has been delegated (can. 17, § 1). Usual is that which is made through the usage or custom of the people. Doctrinal is that which is handed down by learned men or experts in law (St. Alphonsus, I, 200).

Authentic interpretation can be made by way of law and by way of judicial sentence or rescript in a particular matter (can. 17, §§ 2 and 3), according as it formally explains the law and therefore regards the whole community, or applies it to a particular case or person. The latter, however, as is clear, are not interpretations properly so called, but applications of the law, although applications of this sort are apt to induce an interpretation of the law, as we shall say immediately.

2. By reason of scope, into comprehensive, extensive, and restrictive. Comprehensive is that which does not depart from the proper or usual signification of the words. Extensive is that which extends the law to more cases or persons than the proper signification of the words permits. Restrictive is that which restricts the law to fewer cases or persons than is permitted by the proper signification of the words. Comprehensive interpretation is distinguished into declarative and explicative, according as it merely declares words of the law which are certain in themselves, or explains a doubtful law (cf. can. 17, § 2).

III. Author of authentic interpretation. Laws are authentically interpreted by the legislator or his successor, and by him to whom the power of interpreting has been committed by the same (can. 17, § 1). Therefore:

1. The Supreme Pontiff can authentically interpret by way of law: first, his own laws; second, all other laws, whether passed by an Ecumenical Council, by a particular Council, by a Bishop, or by chapters of regulars. Moreover, he can interpret also divine law itself, both natural and positive.

2. A Bishop can authentically interpret by way of law the laws made by himself or by his predecessor, whether within or outside a Synod; but not, of himself, the laws of a national or provincial Council, since a Council is superior to a Bishop. I said "of himself," because Councils sometimes grant the faculty of interpreting to the Metropolitan, either alone or with the consent of the suffragans, with the authority of the Apostolic See always preserved.

3. Sacred Congregations, just as they lack the power of making laws (n. 109), so also are without the power of interpreting them authentically by way of law, without pontifical approval (can. 244, § 2).

4. The Commission for Authentically Interpreting the Canons of the Code. This commission was established by Benedict XV by the Motu proprio of September 15, 1917,¹ and to it "alone will belong the right of authentically interpreting the canons of the Code, after hearing, however, in matters of greater importance, that Sacred Congregation whose proper matter is the subject proposed for discussion by the Council."

Furthermore note that doubts which are of lesser importance or do not have much difficulty can be resolved by the Most Eminent President of the Commission.²

5. In religious orders, generally only general chapters possess the faculty of authentically interpreting rules by way of law, provided those rules have the force of law independently of pontifical approval.

6. The faculty of authentically interpreting laws by way of judicial sentence or rescript in a particular matter belongs both to Sacred Congregations and to Tribunals, and to other ecclesiastical judges (cf. can. 244, § 2). Sometimes, however, even in these cases, by reason of the importance of the matter in question, pontifical approval is sought. In addition, akin to the faculty of authentically interpreting law by way of judicial sentence is the faculty belonging to every Superior who must apply the law and bind the parties.

¹ A.A.S. 1917, p. 483.

² Commission for the Interpretation of the Code, December 9, 1917 (A.A.S. 1918, p. 77).

IV. Force of interpretations. 1. Authentic interpretation set forth by way of law (n. 139) has the same force as the law itself; and if it merely declares words of the law which are certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation and has retroactive force; if it narrows or extends the law, or explains a doubtful law, it is not retroactive and must be promulgated (can. 17, § 2). It is said:

a) If it merely declares words of the law which are certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation. For in this case the law is objectively clear enough, so that the interpretation at most removes a subjective doubt.

b) And it has retroactive force; that is, the law was in force from the beginning in that sense which the interpretation sets forth.

c) If it narrows or extends the law, or explains a doubtful law, it is not retroactive and must be promulgated. It is not retroactive, that is, the law is in force, not from the beginning, but only from the time at which the interpretation was made, in the sense set forth by the interpretation. And it must be promulgated. That promulgation is necessary, if there is question of a narrowing or extending interpretation, follows from the fact that the former abrogates something of an existing right, while the latter adds some new right. It used to be disputed whether the same could be said of a comprehensive interpretation which explains a truly doubtful law, understand: objectively or publicly doubtful, or such that it is deservedly called into doubt as regards that sense. That controversy now is no longer practical, since for the future promulgation is necessary at least by the disposition of the legislator.

2. Authentic interpretation given by way of judicial sentence or rescript in a particular matter does not have the force of law and binds only the persons and affects only the matters for which it was given (can. 17, § 3). This, however, does not prevent forensic usage and the style of the Curia from being able to arise from repeated judicial decisions of tribunals, which, with the consent of the legislator acceding, receive the force of law.

3. Usual interpretation is equivalent to authentic interpretation set forth by way of law, if the usage or custom has been legitimately prescribed. A custom not yet prescribed should rather be referred to doctrinal interpretation, and is to be greatly valued, according to that saying: "Custom is the best interpreter of laws" (can. 29; St. Alphonsus, I, 108).

4. Doctrinal interpretation has only as much value as the reasons brought forward by learned men and their authority. But if the doctors agree, moral certainty concerning the sense of the law will generally be had.

V. Rules of interpretation. For authentic interpretation, which proceeds from legislative power, no rules are assigned. In usual interpretation, the doctrine on custom should be kept before one's eyes (n. 19). For doctrinal interpretation the following rules are handed down.

1. Ecclesiastical laws are to be understood according to the proper signification of the words considered in the text and context; if this has remained doubtful and obscure, recourse must be had to parallel places of the Code, if there are any, to the end and circumstances of the law, and to the mind of the legislator (can. 18). It is said: the proper signification of the words; understand either the natural signification, or the legal signification, that is, that established by law, which legal signification is sometimes different from the natural one.

2. Laws which establish a penalty, or restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law, are subject to strict interpretation (can. 19).

3. If there is lacking an express prescription of law, whether general or particular, concerning a certain matter, the norm is to be taken, unless there is question of applying penalties, from laws passed in similar matters; from general principles of law observed with canonical equity; from the style and practice of the Roman Curia; and from the common and constant opinion of doctors (can. 20).