Morals of the Church
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Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

§ I. On Promise

862.

I. Notion. A promise is a giving of faith to another concerning something to be given or done. It differs both from a simple proposal and from a donation. It is said:

  1. From a simple proposal; this is the mere will of doing or omitting something. Moreover, those things which verbally seem to be promises are often in reality simple proposals, insofar as they are not made with the mind of obliging oneself, but only of testifying to the present will; but a simple proposal does not oblige, not even from truthfulness, but at most from constancy, if there is no reason for changing; which is rare in common and free proposals.

  2. From a donation, which is a giving of a right, whether in a thing or to a thing, made gratuitously to another.

Simple promises

863.

II. Division. A promise can be distinguished into a promise properly so called and one improperly so called. A promise properly so called is the one which we have defined. One improperly so called is a promise made with the intention of conferring on someone a right to a thing; but a promise of this kind, strictly speaking, is a kind of donation. Now then:

  1. A promise improperly so called is had or is presumed to be had: 1° when someone expressly wills to oblige himself from justice; likewise, if expressly under grave obligation, because a promise properly so called obliges only under light obligation; 2° when an oath, or a public writing, or a promissory note, or witnesses are added to the promise; 3° when neglect of the promise would manifestly tend to the damage of the promisee, as if someone promises to a poor man, wishing to buy a horse, that the price will be given as a loan (St. Alphonsus, III, 720); 4° when a mutual promise has place, as in betrothals.

  2. Outside the aforesaid cases, a promise properly so called is had or is presumed to be had; namely: 1° if someone wills to oblige himself expressly from fidelity; 2° if someone wills simply to oblige himself, and does not add an oath, a public writing, a promissory note, or witnesses. Moreover, people commonly will simply to oblige themselves.

  3. In doubt as to what kind of promise was present, practically one must stand in favor of a promise properly so called.

Simple promises

864.

III. Obligation. 1. A promise properly so called induces an obligation of fidelity, as is sufficiently drawn out from the notion handed down. But the obligation of fidelity is only light, because neglect of it does not involve the injury of a right properly so called, and therefore brings with it only a light injury of the social order. St. Thomas says thus: "It must be said that according to honesty, from any promise a man is obliged to a man" (II-II, q. 88, a. 3, ad 1).

  1. A promise improperly so called induces an obligation of justice, and one grave from its own kind; this is clear from the notion explained. But note that by St. Alphonsus and others, "to constitute grave matter in a promise there is required matter four times greater than in mortal theft; because the promisor deals with his own, the thief with another's" (III, 720).

Simple promises

865.

IV. Cessation of the obligation. The obligation of a promise ceases: 1° by remission of the promisee; 2° if the thing promised becomes impossible, illicit, or useless to the promisee; 3° if in a reciprocal promise the other party does not stand by what was promised; 4° if there supervenes a notable change of circumstances which, if it had been foreseen, would have prevented the promise; for the one promising is not judged to have obliged himself for such an event (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 5; St. Alphonsus, III, 720). Therefore it ceases if, for example, the promisee becomes rich from being poor; if he shows himself ungrateful, and so forth; likewise it can cease, for example, because of the misfortune of the one promising, and so forth.

Corollary I. The obligation of a promise passes to the heirs of the one promising, and indeed by the same title, if there is question of a real promise; but it does not pass if there is discussion of a personal promise (n. 649).

Corollary II. The right or quasi-right arising from a promise passes to the family, the heir of the promisee, if the promise is judged to have been made with a view not only to the promisee, but also to his family.

Corollary III. A promisee to whom satisfaction is not made cannot use occult compensation, if the promise was properly so called, because such a promise confers no strict right.

Simple promises